

WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE 100

A Road Less Traveled

Felicitation Volume in Honor of John Taber



ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN
UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

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FELICITATION VOLUME IN HONOR OF
JOHN TABER

EDITED BY
VINCENT ELTSCHINGER, BIRGIT KELLNER,
ETHAN MILLS AND ISABELLE RATIÉ

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John Taber, Albuquerque, 2016, photograph by Isabelle Rati   © I. Rati  

Contents

<i>Introduction</i>	ix
<i>Publications of John A. Taber</i>	xvii
Dan Arnold, Location, Location, Location! Thoughts on the Significance of a Grammatical Point for Some Mādhyaṃika Arguments.....	1
Hugo David, Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedānta (3): Maṇḍana Miśra on Ontology, Time and Commandment.....	37
Vincent Eltschinger, Dharmakīrti on the Origin of Suffering. An Annotated Translation of PV 2.179–189.....	95
Christopher Framarin and Stephen Harris, Pleasure, Desire, and Welfare in Buddhist and Hindu Texts.....	127
Eli Franco, The <i>Bhāvikāraṇavāda</i> of Jitāri. A Tenth-Century Buddhist Treatise on Backward Causation.....	147
Elisa Freschi, Mīmāṃsā between Epistemology and Hermeneutics: The History of <i>Arthāpatti</i>	175
Alessandro Graheli, Epistemology Meets Poetry: Jayanta on <i>Dhvani</i>	219
Kunio Harikai, Kumārila on <i>Sādhūśabda</i>	247
Matthew T. Kapstein, The * <i>Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra</i> of a Late Candrakīrti.....	269
Kei Kataoka, Bhāviveka and Kumārila on Omniscience and Scripture: Reconsidering the New Chronology.....	279
Ethan Mills, “ <i>Prapañca</i> ” in Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna.....	301
Roy W. Perrett, Moral Motivation and Hindu Ethics.....	325
Isabelle Ratié, A History of Time in the Sāṃkhya Tradition.....	341
Ernst Steinkellner, Analyse einer Sammelhandschrift von Werken Dharmakīrtis.....	421
Tom J. F. Tillemans, Reversing Śāntarakṣita’s Argument. Or Do Mādhyaṃikas Derive Part-Whole Contradictions in All Things?.....	443

Alex Watson, Jayanta on the Question of God's Existence.....	471
Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, Jaimini, Bādari, and Bādarāyaṇa in the <i>Mīmāṃsāsūtra</i> and the <i>Brahmasūtra</i>	505
<i>Contributors</i>	541

Introduction

I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I –
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.

Robert Frost, *The Road Not Taken*

The reference to Robert Frost’s famous poem in the title of this volume in honor of John Taber is not (or not entirely) due to the editors’ personal inclination: not only did Taber himself publish an essay whose title directly alludes to the same,¹ he seems to have chosen the “less traveled” of two diverging roads at every turn of his career. His insatiable curiosity must have made those choices as painful as the ones of Frost’s poem. Taber’s published works amply demonstrate that, equipped as he was with a vast knowledge of both Western and Indian philosophical traditions, he could have traveled all the paths he did not choose. Yet, in Frost’s words, he could not have traveled them all and been “one traveler”; the choices he made resulted in a unique intellectual trajectory, one that has made him one of the most distinguished historians and interpreters of Indian philosophy in the world today.

Having studied Western philosophy in the United States, with a BA and MA from the University of Kansas, Taber could have specialized in any area of analytic philosophy; instead, he chose to focus on what he was to call in his first book “transformative philosophy” – philosophical endeavors whose goal is to effect “a total transformation of consciousness, the basic relationship between the knower and the things he knows.”² He recognized such attempts in German

¹ J. Taber: “A Road Not Taken in Indian Epistemology: Kumārila’s Defense of the Perceptibility of Universals.” In: *Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics*, ed. J. Tuske. London 2017, 243–269. A full list of Taber’s publications is included in this volume on pp. xvii–xxii.

² J. Taber: *Transformative Philosophy: A Study of Śaṅkara, Fichte, and Heidegger*. Honolulu, Hawaii 1983, 2.

idealism and Johann Gottlieb Fichte's transformative philosophy, and therefore left the United States for Hamburg to explore them under the supervision of Reiner Wiehl. But once in Germany, he did not confine his investigations to Fichte. At the University of Hamburg, where he studied from 1973 to 1976, Taber forged contact with several towering figures of Classical Indology: Srinivasa Ayya Srinivasan, Albrecht Wezler, whom he later credited with having introduced him to Indian philosophy and shown him "its analytic-philosophical worth,"³ and Lambert Schmithausen, who would end up co-supervising Taber's doctoral dissertation. These decisive encounters made Taber fully aware of the existence and conceptual wealth of another philosophical continent – an alternative intellectual world, perfectly independent in its development from the one he had studied thus far, and rich in parallel (yet different) controversies, problems and ideas. The dissertation Taber submitted to the University of Hamburg in 1979 was profoundly influenced by these new interests; it was published in 1983 in a revised form under the title *Transformative Philosophy – A Study of Fichte, Śaṅkara and Heidegger*. It was as much about Śaṅkara, the great proponent of Advaita Vedānta, as it was about German philosophers – and one might argue that it was already far more concerned with the former than the latter. Throughout his career, Taber kept up his interest in Advaita Vedānta, whose authors he never ceased reading.⁴ After his return to the United States, Taber continued to maintain close contacts with German and Austrian Indologists. He translated two papers by Paul Hacker on Advaita Vedānta into English⁵ and wrote reviews and review articles of Indological publications appearing in Germany and Austria. In many ways Taber made substantial contributions to mediating this area of research to scholarship in the United States and its academic environment where knowledge of the German language has come close to disappearing and where awareness of an academic world beyond the Atlantic seems not always as pronounced as would be scholarly beneficial.

Taber began his career as an Indologist by adopting a comparative approach. Yet his method was quite distinctive from the very start of his undertakings. As

³ Taber: *Transformative Philosophy*, xi.

⁴ Among others, see J. Taber: "Kumārila the Vedāntin?" In: *Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, Papers of the 12th World Sanskrit Conference*, ed. J. Bronkhorst. Delhi 2007, 159–184, as well as his entry on Vedānta in: *The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy*, ed. J. L. Garfield and W. Edelglass. Oxford – New York 2011, 147–158.

⁵ J. Taber (trans.): "Distinctive Features of the Doctrine and Terminology of Śaṅkara" and "The Theory of Degrees of Reality in Advaita Vedānta". In: *Theology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Tradition and Modern Vedānta*, ed. W. Halbfass. Albany, New York, 1995, 57–100 and 137–162.

he himself noted in *Transformative Philosophy*, Indian philosophy had until the time of his writing been considered in a comparative fashion mostly “to draw attention to sophisticated discussions in Indian linguistics and epistemology of issues relevant to contemporary analytical philosophical concerns,” but metaphysics and soteriology had been to a great extent “left out of this program.”⁶ Rather than trying at any cost to spot and isolate in medieval Indian works what contemporary philosophers might deem relevant to their own concerns, he favored the comparative method as “the ground for contrast, which in turn aids comprehension.”⁷ From the outset, he used comparison to highlight the originality of Indian thought. And while he recognized that it was perfectly legitimate to “extract ideas integral to a complex thought-system ... and introduce them into a discourse completely different from that in which they evolved and for which they were intended,” he also clearly saw the limitations of this procedure: “it causes us to miss valuable aspects of the systems we are borrowing from besides those that are immediately relevant to problems already familiar to us from our own tradition.”⁸

The comparative aspect of Taber’s explorations of Indian thought never entirely disappeared, but it tended to recede into the background of his research as he started publishing essays where concepts, theories and arguments from Indian philosophy were considered in their own right. His works also became more concerned with historical questions and problems of a philological nature – a change that was only to be expected given the state of the field into which he was diving. Still today, some of the most influential Sanskrit philosophical works are in need of being critically edited and await being translated. In some cases it is still not even possible to assign them to a specific century, since many questions of relative chronology remain to be resolved; philosophical works tend to present themselves divorced and abstracted from the specific spatio-temporal environment in which they took shape. Indeed, there is still much textual archaeology required if we are to acquire as much as a dim view of the historical contours of this vast field before us.

Taber realized early on that it was of utmost importance to pay closer attention to what texts of Classical Indian philosophy were saying in their original language,

⁶ Taber: *Transformative Philosophy*, 28.

⁷ Taber: *Transformative Philosophy*, 2–3.

⁸ J. Taber: “On Borrowing from the Indian Philosopher’s Toolbox: Comments on Mark Siderits, *Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy*.” *APA Newsletters : Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophy*, Volume 06, Number 1 (Fall 2006), 8.

Sanskrit, and that a true – that is, *philosophical* – understanding of them required first *reading* them in their Sanskrit original, and considering them within the context of the philosophical conversations of their time. This led him to publish a series of brilliant studies on Mīmāṃsā, a powerful Hindu exegetical and philosophical tradition that claimed to embody Brahmanical orthodoxy.⁹ His 2005 monograph *Kumārila on Perception. The “Determination of Perception” Chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Ślokavārttika* focused on the epistemology of perception according to Kumārila, one of Mīmāṃsā’s most influential representatives. It became a reference work almost instantly, and serves as a prime example of the delicate balance Taber has managed to achieve between philosophical, historical and philological concerns. The combination of sharp philosophical acumen with philological rigor and historical consciousness that this monograph epitomizes is a hallmark of Taber’s research and has made the volume a model for all students of Indian philosophy.

After having completed his 2005 Kumārila book, Taber once more could have comfortably continued along the same road he had set out on: to deepen and broaden our understanding of (para-)Brahmanical philosophy, in which he had always taken a keen interest. Besides his work on Kumārila and Advaita-Vedānta, he had written on Nyāya as well as on the Śaiva system of Utpaladeva.¹⁰ Pursuing these interests alone could have easily filled another lifetime. But once again Taber opted for the road less traveled and ventured forth to better understand an aspect that many have highlighted as a crucial dimension of Indian philosophizing in the first millennium CE, but few have confronted seriously: the manifold interactions between Brahmanical and Buddhist philosophy, ranging from unacknowledged mutual influence and tacit appropriation of each other’s ideas and methods to overtly hostile polemics and rivalry. With these two currents representing internally diverse traditions with long and complicated histories, concrete studies of specific debates or the philosophical transformations that resulted from them are difficult to tackle by any single expert. In the winter term of 2006, Taber was invited to the University of Vienna as a visiting professor. This

⁹ J. Taber: “Further Observations on Kumārila’s Bṛhaṭṭikā,” *Journal of Oriental Research* 62 (1991) 179–189; J. Taber: “What Did Kumārila Bhaṭṭa Mean by ‘Svataḥ Prāmāṇya’?” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 112 (1992) 204–221; J. Taber: “Kumārila’s Refutation of the Dreaming Argument: The *Nirālambanavāda-adhikaraṇa*.” In: *Studies in Mīmāṃsā*, ed. R. C. Dwivedi. Delhi 1994, 27–52; J. Taber: “The Significance of Kumārila’s Philosophy.” In: *Beyond Orientalism*, ed. E. Franco and K. Preisendanz. Amsterdam 1997, 373–393.

¹⁰ J. Taber: “Uddyotakara’s Defense of a Self.” In: *Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue*, ed. I. Kuznetsova, J. Ganeri, and Ch. Ram-Prasad. Farnham 2012, 97–114; J. Taber: “Utpaladeva’s *Īśvarasiddhi*.” *Adyar Library Bulletin* 50 (1986) 106–137.

would become the first of three longer stays – he returned to hold the Vienna Numata Chair in Buddhist Studies in 2011 and 2019. During these visits, as well as several shorter stays, Taber made ample use of opportunities to establish, broaden and intensify contacts within the Viennese research community in Indology and Buddhist Studies, both at the University and at the Austrian Academy of Sciences.

These long-term professional as well as personal relations resulted in a unique track record of scholarly collaboration, yielding several substantial monographic studies centering on the *magnum opus* of the great Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, the *Pramāṇavārttika* – a dauntingly difficult work whose influence extended well beyond the confines of Indian Buddhism. Together with Helmut Krasser and Vincent Eltschinger, Taber first studied the extensive digression on Vedic authority in the *Pramāṇavārttika*’s first chapter on inference, whose elliptic verses are accompanied by the author’s equally terse prose; the three scholar’s joint monograph *Can the Veda Speak?*, comprising careful translations and historical as well as philosophical studies on Dharmakīrti’s criticism of Mīmāṃsā and the Veda, was published in 2012.¹¹ The second main digression in the *Pramāṇavārttika*’s first chapter, Dharmakīrti’s extensive defense of nominalism – the so-called “*apoha* digression” – became the subject of a further collaborative project, this time involving Michael Torsten Much in Vienna, and Vincent Eltschinger and Isabelle Ratié in Paris, where the latter two had in the meantime been appointed professorships. This still ongoing project yielded its first harvest with the 2018 publication of the monograph *Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Exclusion (apoha)*;¹² the second out of altogether three planned volumes is currently under preparation.

A further major line of enquiry has involved Buddhist–Brahminical controversies about the nature of the object of perception, this linked to the question of the extent Buddhist positions rejecting external objects amounted to some form of idealism as known from Western philosophy. Taber had already approached these controversies in one of his earlier papers.¹³ Joint readings and discussions with Birgit Kellner that began during Taber’s first stay in Vienna

¹¹ V. Eltschinger, H. Krasser, and J. Taber: *Can the Veda Speak? Dharmakīrti Against Mīmāṃsā Exegetics and Vedic Authority. An Annotated Translation of PVSV 164,24–176,16*. Vienna 2012.

¹² V. Eltschinger, J. Taber, M.T. Much, and I. Ratié: *Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Exclusion (apoha): An Annotated Translation of Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti 24,16–93,5, on verses 1.40–185. Part I: On Concealing*. Tokyo 2018.

¹³ J. Taber: “Kumāṛila’s Refutation of the Dreaming Argument: The *Nirālambanavāda-adhikaraṇa*.” In: *Studies in Mīmāṃsā*, ed. R. C. Dwivedi. Delhi 1994, 27–52.

in 2006 then motivated him to more closely investigate Kumārila's reception and criticism of Buddhist positions.¹⁴ A few years later, Kellner and Taber together developed a new interpretation of Vasubandhu's *Viṃśikā*, rehabilitating Vasubandhu as an idealist against various alternative philosophical construals of his position.¹⁵ After Kellner's appointment as professor at the University of Heidelberg – in whose vicinity Taber, coincidentally, in the 1970s had put the finishing touches to his dissertation after his supervisor Reiner Wiehl had moved there from Hamburg – in 2014 Taber was able to return to Germany, this time as a visiting professor in Heidelberg. He expanded his philosophical engagement with Buddhist arguments against external objects further; the latest product of this line of enquiry is a philosophical appraisal of Dharmakīrti's famous *sahopalambhaniyama* inference.¹⁶ As if all this were not enough, Taber also extended his work on *apoha* by studying Kumārila's criticism of Dignāga in the *apoha* chapter of Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika*, in collaboration with Kei Kataoka from Kyūshū University. Together with Kataoka he first authored a paper on Kumārila's criticism and Dharmakīrti's reception of Dignāga,¹⁷ which was then followed by a joint monograph containing a critical edition and translation of the *Ślokavārttika*'s *apoha* chapter, accompanied by individual studies by both authors.¹⁸

John Taber has won the admiration of the most uncompromising philologists among Indologists; yet, as he pointed out himself in an important essay he wrote about methodological concerns,¹⁹ his research has always been first and foremost an attempt to engage *philosophically* with medieval Indian philosophers. His works deal with some of the most original and complex epistemological, ontological and metaphysical issues in Ancient and Medieval India: the relationship

¹⁴ J. Taber: "Kumārila's Buddhist." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 38 (2010) 279–296.

¹⁵ B. Kellner and J. Taber: "Studies in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Idealism I: The Interpretation of Vasubandhu's *Viṃśikā*." *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 68/3 (2014) 709–756.

¹⁶ J. Taber: "Philosophical Reflections on the *sahopalambhaniyama* Argument." In: *Reverberations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy, Proceedings of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference, Heidelberg, August 26–30, 2014*, ed. B. Kellner, P. McAllister, H. Lasic, and S. McClintock. Vienna 2020, 441–462.

¹⁷ K. Kataoka, J. Taber: "Coreference and Qualification: Dignāga Debated by Kumārila and Dharmakīrti." In: *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy*, ed. J. Ganeri. Oxford 2017, 255–271.

¹⁸ K. Kataoka, J. Taber: *Meaning and Non-existence: Kumārila's Refutation of Dignāga's Theory of Exclusion. The apohavāda Chapter of Kumārila's Ślokavārttika, Critical Edition and Annotated Translation*. Vienna 2021.

¹⁹ J. Taber: "Engaging Philosophically with Indian Philosophical Texts." *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 67/1 (2013) 125–164.

between perception and conceptualization, the nature of universals, the epistemological and ontological status of perceived objects, the definition of nonbeing, the attempts to demonstrate God's existence, the nature of personal identity, and the scope of scriptural authority and its relationship with reason. His determination to understand Indian systems as truly *philosophical* edifices, not just as historical museum pieces or philological puzzles, has significantly improved our knowledge in all these areas. His work – especially his collaborations with self-avowed philologists – has always been animated by the fear that we might lose sight of the philosophical stakes in a text once we separate historico-philological problems from philosophical issues. By stressing the need of integrating both dimensions, his work has been a major source of inspiration. It demonstrates, as a whole and throughout its many diverse parts, *both* the necessity of apprehending Indian philosophers as providing singular answers to unique problems (something we can only achieve by placing their ideas in their proper intellectual, historical and cultural context), *and* the need to take them seriously by philosophically assessing their universalist claims to account for the totality of human experience.

Having thus seemingly avoided all labels and their corresponding *vikalpas* – continental versus analytic, historico-philological versus philosophical, comparative versus Indological, Hindu versus Buddhist – Taber is certainly, in the best sense of the term, an intellectual maverick, a kind of Eleatic (or rather, New Mexican) Stranger: friendly to all, yet attached to no school, and committed to nothing but philosophy. Despite this fierce independence, or maybe in a shrewd sense because of it, he has initiated several major collaborative projects and proved time and again to be a wonderful coconspirator on joint scholarly journeys: he has worked on several continents with very different scholars, gracefully adjusting to their habits and cultural environments (while occasionally remarking with gentle irony on their sometimes quite peculiar traits). All those who have participated in a research endeavor with him, as well as the graduate students he has guided through the labyrinths of Sanskrit and Indian philosophy at the University of New Mexico, have a deep gratitude for his seemingly endless energy, modesty, patience, sense of humor, and supportive attitude towards younger scholars.

The essays gathered in this volume were written by Taber's friends, colleagues and students as a token of admiration. They are often strikingly different in their topics. Many deal with Buddhist authors: Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti and a later Mādhyamika namesake, Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Jitāri. Several focus on Mīmāṃsā, with a particular emphasis on Kumārila; a few venture into other Hindu currents, notably Vedānta and Sāṃkhya. Approaches differ as well: some essays are more concerned with contemporary analytic questions, while others have a more philological and historical orientation. We hope that

their variety and breadth will be appreciated as a sincere, if modest, tribute to the remarkable scope of John's scholarship, and that they can give their readers a glimpse of our immense debt towards a great master of Indian Studies.

The editors of this volume would like to thank the Georgia O'Keeffe Museum in Santa Fe for granting permission to reproduce O'Keeffe's painting "Black Mesa Landscape / Out Back of Marie's II, 1930" on the cover. We thank Liudmila Olalde Rico (Mexico City/Heidelberg), who in her capacity as editorial assistant helped move the papers closer to a state of formal consistency (an ideal never to be fully accomplished), checked bibliographies and took care of many other minutiae. We are also deeply grateful to Dania Huber (Vienna), who was responsible for layout and typesetting and put finishing touches to this volume at breakneck speed, and, last but not least, to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for gently polishing the English of the introduction.

Vincent Eltschinger (Paris)

Birgit Kellner (Vienna)

Ethan Mills (Chattanooga)

Isabelle Ratié (Paris)

Publications of John A. Taber

1. Books

- 1983 *Transformative Philosophy: A Study of Śaṅkara, Fichte, and Heidegger*. Honolulu, Hawaii 1983.
- 2005 *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumārila on Perception. The “Determination of Perception” Chapter of Kumārilabhaṭṭa’s Śloka-vārttika, Translation and Commentary*. London 2005.
- 2012 (Together with Vincent Eltschinger and Helmut Krasser) *Can the Veda Speak? Dharmakīrti Against Mīmāṃsā Exegetics and Vedic Authority. An Annotated Translation of PVSV 164,24–176,16*. Vienna 2012.
- 2018 (Together with Vincent Eltschinger, Michael Torsten Much, and Isabelle Ratié) *Dharmakīrti’s Theory of Exclusion (apoha): An Annotated Translation of Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti 24,16–93,5, on verses 1.40–185. Part I: On Concealing*. Tokyo 2018.
- 2021 (Together with Kei Kataoka) *Meaning and Non-existence: Kumārila’s Refutation of Dignāga’s Theory of Exclusion. The apohavāda Chapter of Kumārila’s Śloka-vārttika, Critical Edition and Annotated Translation*. Vienna 2021.

2. Articles in refereed journals

- 1981 Reason, Revelation, and Idealism in Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981) 283–307.
- 1984 Fichte’s Emendation of Kant. *Kantstudien* 75 (1984) 442–459.
- 1986 The Philosophical Evaluation of Religious Experience. *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion* 19 (1986) 43–59.
- 1986 Utpaladeva’s Īśvarasiddhi. *Adyar Library Bulletin* 50 (1986) 106–137.
- 1989 The Theory of the Sentence in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Western Philosophy. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 17 (1989) 107–130.
- 1990 The Mīmāṃsā Theory of Self-Recognition. *Philosophy East and West* 40 (1990) 35–57.

- 1991 Feature Review of Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe*. *Philosophy East and West* 41 (1991) 229–240.
- 1991 Further Observations on Kumāṛila's *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*. *Journal of Oriental Research* 62 (1991) 179–189.
- 1992 What Did Kumāṛilabhaṭṭa Mean by 'Svataḥ Prāmāṇya'? *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 112 (1992) 204–221.
- 1998 On Nāgārjuna's So-called Fallacies: A Comparative Approach. *Indo-Iranian Journal* 41 (1998) 213–244.
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- 2002 Mohanty on Śabdapramāṇa. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 30 (2002) 161–190.
- 2003 Dharmakīrti Against Physicalism. (Discussion of E. Franco, *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*.) *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 31 (2003) 479–502.
- 2004 Is Indian Logic Nonmonotonic? *Philosophy East and West* 54 (2004) 143–170.
- 2006 On Borrowing from the Indian Philosopher's Toolbox: Comments on Mark Siderits, *Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy*. *APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 6/1 Fall (2006) 7–12.
- 2006 Kumāṛila's Interpretation of Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.4. *Journal of Indological Studies* 16 (2006) 63–78.
- 2010 Kumāṛila's Buddhist. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 38 (2010) 279–296.
- 2013 Engaging Philosophically with Indian Philosophical Texts. *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 67/1 (2013) 125–164.
- 2014 Feature review of R. Gombrich, *What the Buddha Thought*. *Buddhist Studies Review* 30/1 (2013) 129–136.
- 2014 (Together with Birgit Kellner) Studies in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda Idealism I: The Interpretation of Vasubandhu's *Viṃśikā*. *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* December (2014) 709–756.
- 2018 The Self and What Lies Beyond the Self: Remarks on Ganeri's 'Mental Time Travel and Attention.' *Australasian Philosophical Review* 1/4 (2018) 395–405.

- 2018 Dharmakīrti, *svataḥ prāmāṇyam*, and Awakening. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 56–57 (2015–2018) 77–98.

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3. Chapters in edited volumes and conference proceedings

- 1989 Are Mantras Speech Acts? The Mīmāṃsā Point of View. In: *Mantra*, ed. H. P. Alper. Albany, New York, 1989, 144–164.
- 1994 Kumārila's Refutation of the Dreaming Argument: The *Nirālambana-vāda-adhikaraṇa*. In: *Studies in Mīmāṃsā*, ed. R. C. Dwivedi. Delhi 1994, 27–52.
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Location, Location, Location!

Thoughts on the Significance of a Grammatical Point for Some Mādhyamika Arguments

Dan Arnold

I. Introduction: on some supposed fallacies in Nāgārjuna's arguments

In an article considering whether (as Richard Hayes had argued) certain of Nāgārjuna's arguments are fallacious, John Taber's Sanskritic sensitivity to matters philosophical is evident in his attention to the difference a locative case-ending makes in a verse centrally at issue. Taber suggests that Hayes's unfavorable assessment of the argument of MMK 1.3,¹ in particular, depends on Hayes's debatable construal of the verse as involving a locative absolute construction. In exploring various ways of absolving Nāgārjuna of the fallacies alleged by Hayes, Taber asks what difference it makes for the argument if the verse instead involves a straightforward use of the locative. Taber is likely right that this represents the more natural reading of Nāgārjuna's Sanskrit, but Candrakīrti's thoughts on the matter – little noted by either Hayes or Taber – cast everything in a different light.

Hayes adduces only a brief and admittedly unhelpful passage from Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, apparently lending credence to the view that Nāgārjuna's argument is problematic. Hayes does not indicate, however, that Candrakīrti's comment continues beyond this passage, offering an alternative interpretation on which the argument of MMK 1.3 differs significantly from Hayes's reading – although the verse does, on Candrakīrti's second reading, use a locative absolute (even if Taber's straightforward locative is the more natural reading of the Sanskrit). Candrakīrti clarifies this when he elaborates just the same line of argument in his *Madhyamakāvatāra*, at 6.17–19. If we read MMK 1.3 according to Candrakīrti's extensive consideration of its argument, then, it turns out Hayes

¹ As discussed below (note 3), Hayes and Taber both cite the same verse as MMK 1.5.

is right that the verse's first locative is absolutive – but wrong to think that entails a reading on which Nāgārjuna's argument is clearly fallacious.

Even as understood according to Candrakīrti's reading, however, the argument of MMK 1.3 might reasonably be thought problematic. Indeed, Hayes comments on the fallaciousness of this argument-form, too, although it's not clear whether he sees it as pertaining to MMK 1.3. Taber agrees that the alternative line of argument – which he likewise considers with regard to texts other than MMK 1.3 – is suspect, but entertains reasons for nonetheless thinking that Nāgārjuna might not be vulnerable to Hayes's critique. By way of homage to the philosophically and philologically sensitive work of John Taber, I here want to suggest some alternative considerations in light of which the argument Candrakīrti takes Nāgārjuna to have made is perhaps more interesting than either Hayes or Taber allows.

On the reading here developed, MMK 1.3's argument against dependent production veritably epitomizes Nāgārjuna's project. That such an argument raises philosophical suspicions is unsurprising, as it finally targets a view many take to be obviously correct: that relations of *causal* dependence are essentially different from what might be distinguished as *semantic* dependence. Owing, perhaps, to its being natural to suppose these represent essentially distinct kinds of relations, many readers of Nāgārjuna have thought him careless in often seeming to treat them as though they are the same. As against the view that Nāgārjuna carelessly oscillates between these senses, however, I suggest that on Candrakīrti's reading, MMK 1.3 advances an *argument* to the effect that it cannot, in fact, coherently be held that causal and semantic relations really are essentially distinct; the intuitively plausible presupposition that they are is, indeed, precisely what is targeted by the argument. The argument is eminently relevant, moreover, to an elusive question that poses a challenge for any understanding of Madhyamaka: the question of how Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti can both take their bearings from the doctrine of “dependent origination” (*pratītyasamutpāda*) while yet pressing the critique of causal dependence – of *parata utpāda*, “origination from another” – that is paradigmatically exemplified by MMK 1.3 and MA 6.17–19. All this, we will see, can be brought into view by attending to a use of the locative case.

II. Hayes on MMK 1.3, Taber's counter-proposal

Richard Hayes is arguably right that despite their great interest for scholars (as for Buddhists elsewhere in Asia), Nāgārjuna's writings “had relatively little effect on the course of subsequent Indian Buddhist philosophy.” In his provocative article “Nāgārjuna's Appeal,” Hayes speculates that this may be owing to the fact that

Nāgārjuna’s arguments just weren’t very good: “Nāgārjuna’s arguments, when examined closely, turn out to be fallacious and therefore not very convincing to a logically astute reader” (1994: 299). Thus setting out to identify some ways in which Nāgārjuna’s arguments misfire, Hayes considers a verse of particular significance for Madhyamaka – one, indeed, that Candrakīrti takes to epitomize the tradition’s arguments in support of the baffling claim with which Nāgārjuna famously begins his *magnum opus*: “There are no existents at all, anywhere or of any kind, that are intrinsically occurrent; none that are dependently so; none that are so in both ways; nor any that are so without cause”² (MMK 1.1). Nāgārjuna concisely makes good on this verse’s first two denials at MMK 1.3 – and that is just the verse that Hayes, although identifying it (after P. L. Vaidya’s edition) as 1.5, takes to epitomize Nāgārjuna’s fallacious reasoning.³

Now, it is uncontroversial among Buddhist philosophers to deny that existents occur “intrinsically,” which commentators generally agree in taking to represent the Brahmanical Sāṃkhya school’s characteristic conception of causation – in particular, Sāṃkhya’s *satkāryavāda*, the “doctrine that effects are already existent.” While this doctrine perhaps makes sense given Sāṃkhya’s notion that all occurrences are “transformations” of more basic existents that remain substantially the same throughout, Sāṃkhya’s conception is clearly problematic if it is supposed, with Buddhist philosophers, that the point of an account of causation just is to conceptualize the “origination” or “occurrence” (*utpāda*) of new entities.

² MMK 1.1: *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana* // Except when I cite another’s, all translations are my own. For the text of the MMK, I follow La Vallée Poussin’s edition of the *Prasannapadā* (1970b), in consultation with Ye’s edition of the *kārikās* alone (2011); for chapter one of the *Prasannapadā* including Nāgārjuna’s verses, MacDonald’s edition (2015) is definitive.

³ Vaidya’s (1960) edition effectively reproduces La Vallée Poussin’s, whose pagination Vaidya gives in the margins. Against convention, however, Vaidya numbers Nāgārjuna’s *maṅgalaśloka* – two verses in praise of the Buddha, generally taken as prefatory to the main work – as the first two verses of chapter one. That means Vaidya’s numbering of the verses in MMK chapter one is, relative to most other editions (including all those cited in the immediately preceding note), off by two verses; what Vaidya’s edition numbers as MMK 1.3 is 1.1 in other editions, and so on. Hayes (1994) follows Vaidya’s edition, so the verse centrally at issue for us (MMK 1.3) is identified by Hayes – as by Taber (1998), who follows Hayes – as MMK 1.5. Further complicating matters, the same verse is given in the edition of Ye (2011) – and (following Ye) in the translation of Siderits and Katsura (2013) – as the *second* verse in chapter one, as Ye’s edition switches the order of verses two and three accepted in other editions. The line of argument we will here develop following Candrakīrti is relevant to the question of rightly ordering these verses; not only does the *Prasannapadā* recommend the conventional ordering of these verses, but Candrakīrti’s development of the same arguments at MA 6.8, ff., confirms this order.

With that sort of question in mind, the notion that existents could occur “intrinsically” becomes utterly vacuous: anything that could somehow generate itself must, as doing the generating, already exist – but in that case, nothing is explained by saying it “generates” itself. What is really at stake for any Buddhist reader, then, will be refutation of MMK 1.1’s second alternative, which represents not only the most intuitively plausible of the options, but also, it seems, precisely the alternative affirmed in the Buddhist tradition itself. Indeed, “dependent origination” (*pratītyasamutpāda*) would seem to be nothing if not the idea that all existents originate from causes “other” than themselves – how, then, can Nāgārjuna refute the origination of existents “from another” (*parataḥ*), and yet claim to uphold the doctrine of *dependent* origination?⁴

When it comes to understanding Madhyamaka, then, it is clear that a lot depends on just how we understand the sense it makes for Nāgārjuna to refute the second of the four alternatives dismissed in MMK 1.1 – and it is with respect to Nāgārjuna’s initial refutation of that alternative, at MMK 1.3, that Hayes sees a fallacy. On Hayes’s reading, the argument MMK 1.3 makes against dependent production exploits two unrelated senses of the word *svabhāva*, thus committing the fallacy of equivocation. *Svabhāva*, of course, denotes the principal target of basically all Mādhyamika critiques – the “essence” or (as I will translate) “intrinsic identity” of which all existents are ultimately empty. It is, however, perhaps a problem for Mādhyamika critiques of the idea that on its conventional Sanskrit usage, *svabhāva* denotes something not obviously problematic: the idea of a “defining characteristic,” as exemplified by the idea that fire’s *svabhāva* is *being hot*, that earth’s is *being resistant*, etc.⁵ According to Hayes’s translations, *svabhāva* in this sense is best captured by “identity.” In showing, however, the absurd entailments of the *svabhāva* idea, Mādhyamika commentators like

⁴ Introducing the lengthy rehearsal of arguments against dependent production that he will launch at MA 6.14, Candrakīrti’s MABh acknowledges that rejecting this alternative seems not just counter-intuitive but veritably *un-Buddhist*. Indeed, Candrakīrti anticipates what seems for Buddhists an obvious objection: “scripture teaches that there are four causal conditions which are ‘other,’” and that just “these causal conditions produce existents.” (MABh on 6.13; La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 87,19–88,1: *gzhan du ’gyur ba’i rkyen bzhi po rgyu dang dmigs pa dang de ma thag pa dang de bzhin du bdag po ste, rkyen rnams dngos po rnams kyi skyed par byed pa’o.*) Candrakīrti takes the same objection to be expressed by MMK 1.2. Apropos of the right order of verses MMK 1.2–3 (see note 3), it is thus clear from his own elaboration of the same arguments in MA 6 that Candrakīrti takes MMK 1.2 first to express an objection subsequently met by 1.3 – just as the objection anticipated here in the MABh introduces MA 6.14, which begins Candrakīrti’s development of MMK 1.3’s argument against dependent production.

⁵ On these examples, see Arnold 2005: 200–204.

Candrakīrti had in mind another idea, one that exploits a basic lexical fact about the Sanskrit word *svabhāva*: that it can be analyzed as referring to anything's "own (*sva*) existence (*bhāva*)."⁶ So understood, *svabhāva* becomes the idea of *causal independence*; that fire is defined by its *being hot*, for example, becomes a claim about *heat's existing by itself* – and any such claim will stand contradicted by the Buddhist conviction that heat, like all occurrents, is dependently originated.⁷

Are we entitled, though, to suppose in the first place that anyone who acknowledges the conventional sense of *svabhāva* is committed to any particular views about how things *exist*? The fallacious equivocation identified by Hayes touches on just this worry, which does indeed seem a problem given Hayes's understanding of the equivocation as epitomized by MMK 1.3. On Hayes's reading, Nāgārjuna's point in this verse is to argue that causation cannot be conceived as *dependent* occurrence (the second of the alternatives rejected in MMK 1.1) just because it cannot be conceived as *intrinsic* occurrence (the first alternative rejected) – an argument that Hayes takes to depend, however, on MMK 1.3's equivocating on the word *svabhāva*: the argument's conclusion concerns *svabhāva* in the sense of "identity," whereas the reason given as warranting that conclusion instead pertains to *svabhāva* in the sense of "causal independence." This is, Hayes notes, easy to miss when reading Nāgārjuna's Sanskrit, in which the word *svabhāva* makes sense on both occurrences; in translating Nāgārjuna's text into English, though, one finds it (Hayes says) "almost impossible to translate his argument in a way that makes sense in translation." An intelligible translation requires disambiguating the different senses – "and in disambiguating, we end up spoiling the apparent integrity of the argument" (1994: 312).

⁶ Candrakīrti's oft-cited comment to this effect – cited and discussed in Arnold 2005: 201 – can be found at La Vallée Poussin 1970b: 260,4–5: *iha hi svo bhāvaḥ svabhāva iti vyutpatter ...*

⁷ Thus, to complete the passage from Candrakīrti given in the preceding note: *iha hi svo bhāvaḥ svabhāva iti vyutpatter yaḥ kṛtakāḥ padārthaḥ sa loka nāiva svabhāva iti vya-padiṣyate tadyathā apām auṣṇyam dhātupiśācaprayatnaniṣpāditaḥ...* ("based on the analysis of *svabhāva* as meaning *its own existence*, a referent that is produced is not indicated, in ordinary usage, as *having its own existence* – the heating of water, for example, which is brought about through various efforts"). As concisely stated by Richard Robinson, this argument might indeed seem sophistical: "*Svabhāva* is by definition the subject of contradictory ascriptions. If it exists, it must belong to an existent entity, which means that it must be conditioned, dependent on other entities, and possessed of causes. But a *svabhāva* is by definition unconditioned, not dependent on other entities, and not caused. Thus the existence of a *svabhāva* is impossible" (1957: 299).

Here, then, is Nāgārjuna's MMK 1.3:

*na hi svabhāvo bhāvānām pratyayādiṣu vidyate /
avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate //*⁸

First leaving the equivocation undisclosed, Hayes (1994: 312) translates:

Surely beings have no *svabhāva* when they have causal conditions. And if there is no *svabhāva*, there is no *parabhāva*.

The need for disambiguation becomes clear, Hayes argues, when we see that the second sentence makes sense only given a different sense of the word *svabhāva*, such that he finally translates: "Surely beings have no **causal independence** when they have causal conditions. And if there is no **identity**, then there is no **difference**" (1994: 312–313). Now, however, it becomes clear that the claim made in the second sentence does not follow from the one made in the first; that nothing is *causally independent* does not obviously entail anything at all with regard to the nature of *identity*.

In that case, though, we are here left without any argument for the second denial expressed in MMK 1.1. Emphasizing as much, Hayes suggests that Candrakīrti completely whiffs in his attempt at making good on MMK 1.3's argument against dependent production. Hayes adduces, then, only this much from Candrakīrti's comment on the verse (here in Hayes's translation):

And if there is no *svabhāva* there is no *parabhāva*. The word "*bhāva*" means the act of coming into being, or the act of arising. The act of arising from others is what is meant by "*parabhāva*." But that [act of arising from others] does not exist. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that there is coming into or arising from others.⁹

Wryly commenting that it is "very difficult to see why" Candrakīrti's last sentence follows, Hayes says Candrakīrti is in fact "left without a strong argument for why this is incorrect, and so all he can do is to assert it strongly and hope that no one will question him too forcefully" (1994: 314). It seems, then, that one of Nāgārjuna's most important claims goes unsupported.

Here, though, let us note that Hayes's translation of the verse reflects a reading of the locative construction at 1.3b other than what a more natural reading of the Sanskrit arguably recommends. Hayes reads the locative form *pratyayādiṣu*,

⁸ La Vallée Poussin 1970b: 78, Ye 2011: 12; as noted above (note 3), Ye's edition gives the verse as 1.2.

⁹ As translated by Hayes (1994: 314); text at La Vallée Poussin 1970b: 78,6–8. Cf. MacDonald's edition (2015: Vol. I, 278–279), as well as MacDonald's translation (2015: Vol. II, 304–306).

in the second quarter-verse, as a locative absolute: existents have no *svabhāva*, he translates, “*when they have causal conditions*.” Nāgārjuna’s first claim, on this reading, would seem to be that existents are without *svabhāva* just *insofar as* they have causal conditions. This reading does indeed recommend taking the first half-verse’s use of *svabhāva* as denoting *causal independence*, which yields an intelligible (if truistic) argument: *of course* things cannot have “causal independence” – they have causal conditions!

This is arguably not, however, the most natural reading of Nāgārjuna’s *pratīyādiṣu*; a straightforwardly locative sense of the word makes good sense here. On that reading, the first half-verse says there is no *svabhāva* to be found *among* anything’s causal conditions. John Taber’s critical assessment of Hayes’s critique of Nāgārjuna exploits just this alternative. As Taber rightly says, Hayes’s unfavorable assessment of the argument of MMK 1.3 is “dictated by his construal” of the locative *pratīyādiṣu* as absolutive; it is particularly insofar as that is thus taken to mean *when they have causal conditions* that the point is clearly in contradiction with *svabhāva* (understood as denoting causal independence). Accordingly, Taber suggests that we “follow other translators in taking *pratīyādiṣu* as a simple locative.”¹⁰

This enables, he says, a “completely different possibility” than Hayes’s reading allows: the first half-verse expresses “not a hypothetical statement but a categorical one: ‘There is no identity/own-being/essence of entities *in* the causal conditions’” (Taber 1998: 216). On this reading, the first half of MMK 1.3 merely denies (what is affirmed by the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *satkāryavāda*) that the real existence of an effect is be found already existing among its causes. Thus, Taber ventures, “Nāgārjuna goes on to say in the second half that nothing different from them exists in them either. If the essence of the effect does not exist in the cause, then neither can that which is different from the effect (*parabhāva*)... The refutation of the *asatkāryavāda* follows immediately from that of the *satkāryavāda*!” (Ibid.).

Taber allows, however, that MMK 1.3 might nevertheless be thought to involve a fallacy: “If any fallacy is committed in *kārikā* [3], then, it is not a fallacy of equivocation but rather the other kind of fallacy Hayes identifies in *kārikā* [5], namely, the fallacy – if it is a fallacy – that a thing cannot be a certain type unless its counterpart exists simultaneously with it” (1998: 216). The verse may, Taber thus allows, involve an argument from what he christens the “principle of

¹⁰ Taber 1998: 215–216. Taber cites (at p. 240, n. 12) the translations of Kalupahana (1986), Streng (1967), and Garfield (1995); the latter was done from the Tibetan translation of Nāgārjuna.

coexisting counterparts.”¹¹ Taber thinks this indeed a fallacious principle, but concludes his exploration of “Nāgārjuna’s so-called fallacies” by suggesting that Nāgārjuna’s *use* of it might be unproblematic; perhaps, Taber will suggest, this is a principle presupposed *by Nāgārjuna’s interlocutors*. Before entertaining that idea, though, let us first consider what else Candrakīrti has to say on all this.

III. Candrakīrti’s readings of the argument: his comment on MMK 1.3, *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.17–19

Notwithstanding the cogency of Taber’s reading, which is based on what seems to me the more natural reading of Nāgārjuna’s Sanskrit, there is an altogether different reading suggested by Candrakīrti, whose considered view of Nāgārjuna’s argument in MMK 1.3 is not addressed by Hayes or Taber. Candrakīrti has, in fact, a great deal to say about the argument of this verse, not only in comments extending beyond those Hayes (we saw) adduced from the *Prasannapadā*, but also in his own elaboration of the same argument in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, at MA 6.17–19. Here, we will see, Candrakīrti explicitly recommends reading Nāgārjuna’s *pratya-yādiṣu* as, in fact, a locative absolute. Lest it be supposed, however, that Candrakīrti thus recommends Hayes’s understanding of the verse’s argument, it is clear, as well, that Candrakīrti understands the locative-absolute reading as recommending an altogether different argument from the fallacious one Hayes attributes to Nāgārjuna. We will see, in particular, that Candrakīrti reads *this verse*, MMK 1.3, as arguing from Taber’s “principle of coexisting counterparts” – the principle, if it’s right thing to call it that, that *relations can obtain only between real relata*. Notwithstanding, however, its air of sophistry, this argument represents, I take it, a philosophically interesting expression of Candrakīrti’s understanding of the Madhyamaka critique of causal realism.

Let us begin, then, by picking up where Hayes’s attention to Candrakīrti’s comment on MMK 1.3 leaves off.¹² Hayes is right that Candrakīrti’s first pass at Nāgārjuna’s verse sheds little if any light on the question centrally at issue: why or whether the verse’s second claim follows from its first. Hayes does not note, however, that immediately following the commentarial passage he has adduced, Candrakīrti goes on to suggest an alternative interpretation:

Alternatively: There is no intrinsic identity of existents such as *sprouts* when their causal conditions (e.g., seeds) exist in unchanged form, since

¹¹ On the argument form he thus christens, Taber notes that Ruegg calls this “the principle of the complementarity of binary concepts and terms,” while Jacques May refers to it as “le principe de solidarité des contraires” (Taber 1998: 241, n. 17).

¹² See note 9, above.

there would be the consequence that the former are without causes; with respect to what, then, would the causal conditions be “other”? For Maitra and Upagupta have the property of *being other* than one another only insofar as both are present – and there is not, in the same way, simultaneity of seeds and sprouts. Given, therefore, that their effects have no intrinsic identify, seeds (etc.) do not have the property of *being other* (which is what the verse’s *parabhāva* means) – hence, just because there can be no reference to an “other,” origination is not from an other.¹³

On this construal, MMK 1.3ab says neither (as Taber suggests) that existents cannot already be present *in* their causes, nor (with Hayes) anything about what follows *given that* they have causes. Nāgārjuna says, rather, that effects cannot be present *at the same time* as their causes. The argument, Candrakīrti clarifies in glossing Nāgārjuna’s *parabhāva* with *paratva*, is then that only *existents* can stand in a relation of “being other” (*paratva*) – can stand, indeed, in *any relation at all* – with respect to one another. The argument thus involves an *a priori* analysis of what is presupposed by the very concept of *being other*. To be “other,” on this analysis, is, *ipso facto*, to *be* something – and nothing non-existent can *be* anything at all. Given, however, the constitutive temporality of causal relations – sprouts are present only when their seeds no longer exist – the supposedly distinct (“other”) cause of any effect cannot, in fact, *be* in any relation at all to it, not even that of *being other*.

Of course, this argument might be thought no more promising than the one Hayes takes to be expressed by MMK 1.3; indeed, Hayes’s critical assessment of Nāgārjuna characterizes this argument-form, too, as fallacious, though he (Hayes) evidently takes it to be epitomized not by MMK 1.3 but by 1.5.¹⁴ Taber, notwithstanding his own thoughts on how Nāgārjuna might elude Hayes’s critique, allows that an argument of this sort is suspect. Let us see whether we might

¹³ PrP 279,7–280,4: *atha vā bhāvānāṃ kāryāṇāṃ anikurādīnāṃ bījādiṣu pratyayeṣu satsv avikṛtarūpeṣu nāsti svabhāvo nirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt / tat kiṃ apekṣya paratvaṃ pratyayādīnāṃ / vidyamāṇaḥ eva hi maitropaguptayoḥ parasparāpekṣaṃ paratvaṃ / na cāivaṃ bījāṅkurayoḥ yaugapadyam / tasmād avidyamāṇe svabhāve kāryāṇāṃ **parabhāvaḥ paratvaṃ** bījādīnāṃ nāstīti paravyapadeśābhāvād eva na parata utpāda iti* / My translation emphasizes that Candrakīrti’s last sentence glosses Nāgārjuna’s *parabhāva* with *paratva*; thus, “the property of *being other* (which is what the verse’s *parabhāva* means)” renders only what I have indicated in bold type (*parabhāvaḥ paratvaṃ*).

¹⁴ That is, at any rate, how Taber understands Hayes in this regard. Hayes refers only to “Nāgārjuna’s second critique of the notion of causal relations,” which he takes to be “independent of his first argument” (1994: 314–315). However, Hayes’s schematic presentation of the second argument makes no reference to any text from Nāgārjuna; it is Taber’s surmise that Hayes has MMK 1.5 in mind (although, *pace* note 3, above, Taber refers instead to 1.7; see Taber 1998: 241, n. 16).

get any help by consulting Candrakīrti's fuller elaboration of the same line of argument in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*.

Candrakīrti begins his systematic rehearsal of arguments for Madhyamaka at MA 6.8, the first half of which concisely restates the claims of Nāgārjuna's MMK 1.1. Quoting the latter verse in introducing his own restatement thereof, Candrakīrti effectively suggests that MMK 1.1 epitomizes the Madhyamaka project, which can be entirely unfolded in terms of the entailments of Nāgārjuna's opening verse.¹⁵ More precisely, Candrakīrti's lengthy presentation of arguments for Madhyamaka following MA 6.8ab is framed as following just from the first two claims of MMK 1.1 – that an existent cannot originate “from itself,” or “from something other.” (Mādhyamikas invariably dispatch the “both” and “neither” positions rather cursorily, so it's the first two that really matter.)¹⁶ Candrakīrti's arguments against the idea that anything could be *self*-caused are fully presented at 6.8cd–13. Verses 6.14–21 first advance what Candrakīrti takes to be the basic arguments against the idea that existents arise from “other” existents. Following, moreover, a lengthy excursus on the “two truths” idea as integral to understanding the arguments to that point (6.22–44), Candrakīrti's celebrated critiques of Yogācāra doctrines – extensively elaborated in the course of verses 6.45–97 – are in turn framed as furthering the case against dependent production. Indeed, Candrakīrti notes at MA 6.47, Yogācāra's most general term of art for the mental items that alone are ultimately real is *paratantra*, the “dependent.”¹⁷

It is abundantly clear, then, that the arguments against dependent production are absolutely central for Candrakīrti – which makes it all the more striking that in his first pass through these arguments (at MA 6.14–21), Candrakīrti most lengthily elaborates precisely the argument he takes Nāgārjuna's MMK 1.3 to make. Candrakīrti begins (at 6.14) by arguing that *being other* is a problematic

¹⁵ Before quoting MMK 1.1 as giving him his own thesis, Candrakīrti's commentary introducing MA 6.8 adduces a lengthy *sūtra* passage on the ten respects in which all phenomena are ultimately “alike.” According to the third of these, all existents are alike “without origination.” Candrakīrti then quotes MMK 1.1 as reflecting the thought that “it is easy to teach all the other respects in which phenomena are alike by propounding only the reasoning which shows that all alike are *unoriginated*” (*de'i phyir 'dir chos skye ba med par mnyam pa nyid kho na rigs pas bstan pa nyid kyis chos mnyam pa nyid gzhan bstan pa sla bar dgongs te, slob dpon gyis dbu ma'i bstan bcos kyi dang por*; La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 81,4–6). As further reflected in the entire structure of MA 6 (as noted presently), Candrakīrti thus takes MMK 1.1 as epitomizing Mādhyamika arguments.

¹⁶ These are dealt with in MA 6.98 and 6.99–103, respectively.

¹⁷ Representing Yogācāra reasoning, then, MA 6.47 says that “it is what has the nature of the dependent that is the really existent basis of what is nominally existent” (*saṃvidyate 'taḥ paratantrarūpaṃ prajñaptisadvastunibandhanam*; Li 2015: 10).

criterion for causal relations; for *being other* is a property of many things besides the cause we're interested in identifying – a property, indeed, of everything in the world besides the effect in question. Thus, Candrakīrti says at MA 6.14, “If one thing were to occur depending on another, then pitch darkness could be produced from a lamp; indeed, there could be the production of anything from everything, since *being other* (*paratva*) likewise pertains to everything that is not a cause, too.”¹⁸ And, Candrakīrti argues in the next couple of verses, there is no non-question-begging way to specify *which* of the innumerable “other” things could make sense as being “the cause.” For example, it's no use (as Candrakīrti will later argue at MA 6.59–61) to invoke discrete continua (*santāna*) as facilitating the individuation of causes, since these discrete continua are likewise “other” with respect to one another – given which, one still has the problem of specifying, without begging the question, *which* continuum is the one comprising the relations at issue.

Enriching this *a priori* analysis of the very idea of *being other*, Candrakīrti further elaborates his own version of the argument he takes to have been made in MMK 1.3.¹⁹ To his first argument against the “being other” criterion, then, he now adds (at MA 6.17ab): “Moreover, a sprout does not exist at the same time as its seed; how could a seed exist as being other without ‘being’ other?”²⁰ Here, Candrakīrti skillfully exploits the root sense of the abstractive suffixes *-tva* and *-tā*, which Sanskrit commentators conventionally gloss as denoting anything's “being” (*bhāva*) as the word or compound preceding the suffix suggests.²¹ Thus understood, these suffixes are readily seen to work just as well in English as in Sanskrit, with the usage in both languages similarly requiring an (often implicit) subjective genitive; it makes just as much sense, for example, to refer in English to “Indra's being the king” as to speak in Sanskrit of *indrasya rājatā*. The laconic but elegant Sanskrit of Candrakīrti's MA 6.17ab nicely exemplifies this syntactic usage even as it suggests the abstraction that makes this an *a priori* argument: “how could a seed exist *as being other* [*bījaṃ kutaḥ paratayāstu*] without *being*

¹⁸ MA 6.14 (Li 2015: 6): *anyat pratītya yadi nāma paro 'bhaviṣyaj jāyeta tarhi bahulaḥ śikhino 'ndhakāraḥ / sarvasya janma ca bhavet khalu sarvataḥ ca tulyaṃ paratvam akhile 'janake 'pi yasmāt //*

¹⁹ Apropos of Candrakīrti's commentary on MMK 1.3, Anne MacDonald amply notes the parallel line of argument that begins at MA 6.17; see MacDonald 2015: Vol. II, 305–306, n. 564.

²⁰ MA 6.17ab (Li 2015: 6): *aṅkuraś ca na hi bījasamānakālo bījaṃ kutaḥ paratayāstu vinā paratvam /*

²¹ See the clear and concise treatment by Tubb and Boose (2007: 177–185).

other [*vinā paratvam*]?”²² (Note that the word *paratvam* figures not only in 6.17ab, but also in Candrakīrti’s gloss of MMK 1.3d.)²³

Commenting on this, Candrakīrti clarifies that the argument so concisely expressed in his verse does indeed presuppose Taber’s “principle of coexisting counterparts” – the principle, I’ve said, that relations can obtain only between real *relata*. Much as in his comment on MMK 1.3,²⁴ Candrakīrti now says of his own argument at MA 6.17: “We recognize Maitra and Upagupta as *being other* than each other only insofar as both are present; a seed and a sprout, however, are never observed together, since a sprout does not exist while the seed remains unchained.”²⁵ A couple sentences later, Candrakīrti quotes Nāgārjuna’s MMK 1.3 as making the same point, and given Candrakīrti’s ensuing comment, it is clear the verse is to be understood thus: “Existents do not have an intrinsic identity *when their causal conditions are present*; in the absence of intrinsic identity, there is no *being other*.” Notwithstanding, then, the case for reading this verse as involving a straightforward locative, Candrakīrti’s quotation of the verse – here in commenting on his own MA 6.17 – occasions an explicit recommendation that Nāgārjuna’s locative be read as part of an absolute construction. Thus, of the “causal conditions, etc.” (*pratyayādiṣu*) referred to in MMK 1.3, Candrakīrti, commenting on his own verse (MA 6.17) making the same argument, now says:

As long as their intrinsic identity is unchanged, the intrinsic identity of their effects is not existent, since the latter have not yet been produced; given their non-existence, their *being other* with respect to their causal conditions is not existent, either. The locative [in Nāgārjuna’s verse is thus to be understood] in the sense [specified by Pāṇini’s rule regarding locative absolutes:] “denoting an action which serves to characterize another action.”²⁶

²² Done from the Tibetan, Huntington’s translation (1989: 159) differently captures the same sense: “how then can the seed be different [from the sprout] when there is [no existing sprout] for it to be contrasted with?”

²³ See note 13, above.

²⁴ See, again, note 13.

²⁵ MABh (La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 92,16–19): *’di na byams pa dang nyer sbas yod bzhin pa dag kho na phan tshun bltos nas gzhan nyid du mthong gi / sa bon dang myu gu dag ni de ltar cig car dmigs pa yang ma yin te / sa bon rnam par ma gyur par myu gu med pa’i phyir ro //*

²⁶ MABh (La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 93,11–14): *rang bzhin rnam par ma gyur pa na ’bras bu rnam kyī rang bzhin yod pa na yin pa kho na ste ma skyes pa’i phyir ro //* *de med na rkyen la sogs pa rnam la gzhan nyid yod pa ma yin no //* *gang yod pas na yod pa’i mtshan nyid do zhes bya ba ’di ni bdun pa yin no //* Supplying Pāṇini’s Sanskrit (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.3.37), La Vallée Poussin (1910: 291) thus translates the last sentence: “le locatif

Here it becomes clear that of the two alternative readings canvassed in his commentary on MMK 1.3, Candrakīrti thinks the second argument – the one based on the principle that relations can obtain only between real *relata* – is the one Nāgārjuna should be taken to have made. The argument, on Candrakīrti’s considered view, thus concerns not whether effects can be found *in* their causes, but rather whether they can exist *at the same time* as those. As here made at MA 6.17, this point interestingly builds on the point Candrakīrti first makes at 6.14; not only, then, does *being other* make no sense as criterial for the terms of causal relations (since there is no non-question-begging way to pick out which of the innumerable “other” things could ever be meant) – moreover, *being other* is not, in any case, a possible relation between cause and effect, which, as temporally sequential, can never *be* in any relation at all.

This argument’s importance for Candrakīrti is further clarified in the next two verses. At MA 6.18ac, Candrakīrti first anticipates an attempt to circumvent the problem just raised: “The two arms of a balanced scale are observed to go up and down at the same time; the cessation and production of (respectively) cause and effect could be just the same as this.”²⁷ Mightn’t one thus argue that cause and effect are (to mix metaphors) two sides of the same coin, such that for one to occur just is for the other to occur at the same time? Not bothering to interrogate the scale example, Candrakīrti responds (at 6.18d–19ac) by emphasizing only that simultaneity makes no sense in the case at hand:

But even if going up and down are simultaneous in the instance of a scale, there is no simultaneity in the case at hand, so the example is inappropriate. If it is acknowledged that what is *being* produced is on the verge of production (but not yet existent), and that what is perishing is on the verge of destruction (and yet still existent), how then is this comparable to a balanced scale?²⁸

[*pratyayādiṣu*, dans la *kārikā* de Nāgārjuna], s’explique par la règle: *yasya ca bhāvena bhāvalakṣaṇam*.” Katre translates the rule here cited: “[The seventh sUP triplet 36 is introduced after a nominal stem] denoting an action (*bhāvena*) which serves to characterize another action (*bhāva-lakṣaṇam*).” Katre explains: “This is the locative absolute construction. *goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ, dugdhāsu āgataḥ*, ‘went away while the cows were being milked (but) returned after they were milked’” (1987: 146). See, too, MacDonald 2015: Vol. II, 306, n. 564.

²⁷ MA 6.18ac (Li 2015: 6): *antadvayasya namanonnamane tulāyā drṣṭe yathā na khalu naiva samānakāle / syātāṃ tathā janakajanyanirodhajātī [...]* //

²⁸ MA 6.18d–19ac (Li 2015: 6): *yady ekadā tad asad atra vinaikakālam // janmonmukhaṃ na sad idam yadi jāyamānaṃ nāśonmukhaṃ sad api nāma nirudhyamānaṃ / iṣṭam tadā katham idam tulayā samānaṃ [...]* //

The scale example, Candrakīrti thus urges, is utterly inadequate to the distinct temporality of causation. The idea of causation just is the idea that constitutively *present* events are constrained by constitutively *predecessor* ones – given which, it is hard to see how causal relations can coherently be theorized as real relations.

And that is just as Candrakīrti takes Nāgārjuna’s MMK 1.3 to have argued. Like Hayes’s interpretation of that verse, Candrakīrti’s also involves reading Nāgārjuna’s *pratīyādiṣu* (at MMK 1.3b) as a locative absolute. With Candrakīrti’s sense of the argument now clearly in view, though, we can see that the locative absolute reading does not, after all, entail the fallacious argument that is, Taber says, dictated by Hayes’s likewise reading the locative. On Hayes’s reading, recall, Nāgārjuna’s verse first makes the truistic argument that nothing could be “self-existent” (*svabhāva*) “when it has causal conditions” (*pratīyādiṣu*). Hayes’s “when” has the sense of *insofar as* (or “given that”); *given that* existents have causal conditions, they cannot, of course, be “self-existent.” If that’s right, however, then what the verse represents as a consequent claim – that “dependence” (*parabhāva*) therefore makes no sense, either – is a *non sequitur*. While it may make sense to say that dependence is unintelligible because (and here’s the equivocation on *svabhāva*) *identity* does not make sense, that it is not, on Hayes’s reading, what the word *svabhāva* means in the first half of the verse.

Clearly, the argument as thus read fallaciously trades on equivocation. On Candrakīrti’s reading, however, Nāgārjuna’s argument is instead based on the principle that relations can obtain only between real *relata*, and the verse’s locative absolute instead has the straightforwardly temporal sense such constructions paradigmatically have. Here, then, the construction expresses the thought that an existent can never be present *at the same time as its causes*. The verse thus begins, on this reading, by expressing not a truistic thought such as that nothing can be “self-existent” if it has causal conditions, but rather the fact – well-nigh incontrovertible, it seems to me – that *causes* temporally precede *effects*. The temporal sense of the locative absolute thus suggests what is a possibly significant premise for an argument: insofar as causation veritably consists in this temporal asymmetry, there is reason to think it may not be so easy to say just what kind of *relation* causation could be.

The principle that relations can obtain only between real *relata* then gives the reason for its following from the foregoing premise that there can be no *parabhāva*. Given this reason, moreover, the claim expressed in the second half of MMK 1.3 does, in fact, follow from the first claim. Here I would emphasize a significant advantage in understanding the verse as making the argument Candrakīrti takes it to make: this reading clearly recommends an eminently meaningful way to

translate the *parabhāva* in the fourth quarter-verse of MMK 1.3 (*avidyamāne svabhāve, parabhāvo na vidyate*). Hayes, recall, notes that Nāgārjuna's supposed equivocation on *svabhāva* is revealed by attention to difficulties particularly in translating the word *parabhāva*; it is, indeed, just because the English expression "other-existence" is scarcely intelligible as counterpart to "self-existence" that it becomes clearly necessary to translate the second iteration of the word *svabhāva* in something other than the latter sense.²⁹

But Candrakīrti's succinct gloss of the argument of MMK 1.3 tells us, we have seen, exactly how to understand the word: "Given, therefore, that their effects have no intrinsic identity, seeds (etc.) do not have the property of *being other* (which is what the verse's *parabhāva* means) – hence, just because there can be no reference to an 'other,' origination is not from an other."³⁰ In thus making explicit what he takes Nāgārjuna to argue, Candrakīrti – skillfully exploiting the sense of Sanskrit's abstractive suffixes just as he does in his own statement of the same argument at MA 6.17ab³¹ – tells us that the second half of Nāgārjuna's MMK 1.3 argues that *being other* cannot be made coherent as criterial for the terms of causal relations. If we translate accordingly, it is not at all clear that we must read the verse as equivocally using the word *svabhāva*; for it makes perfectly good sense to say, in the first half-verse, that the *identity* of an effect does not exist (that it does not exist, we might say, *by definition*) so long as its causes are present – from which it does indeed follow (given the relevant principle) that the two cannot stand together in any relation of *being other*.

IV. Excursus: Hartshorne's "fallacy of misplaced symmetry," Prajñākaramati's critique of causal realism

Despite, then, its supporting Hayes's translation of MMK 1.3 as involving a locative absolute, Candrakīrti's reading does not, after all, yield an obviously fallacious argument. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask whether we really ought to endorse the principle on which the argument, on this reading, clearly depends. Surely there's something fishy about the idea that real relations can obtain only among contemporaries; this suggests, *inter alia*, a radical sort of presentism on which nothing is constrained by relation to a past. According to Hayes, the problem with Candrakīrti's principle – and he apparently takes not MMK 1.3 but MMK 1.5 as exemplifying an argument based thereon³² – is that it reflects

²⁹ See Hayes 1994: 313–314.

³⁰ See note 13, above.

³¹ See note 22, above.

³² See note 14, above.

a failure to distinguish “between saying that a thing exists at all and saying that it exists under a given description.”³³ The question, for example, of whether a man exists *as a father* is very different from the question *whether he exists* – and Hayes is not the first to suppose that Nāgārjuna tends problematically to conflate just such issues.

In fact, Nāgārjuna does tend to conflate what would seem clearly to be different kinds of dependence relations. An effect’s dependence upon its cause, for example, would seem to be an instance of *existential* dependence (an effect could not *exist* but for its cause’s having occurred). Nāgārjuna, though, often seems to treat such dependence the same way he treats what we might instead call *notional* dependence, as typically epitomized for Nāgārjuna by the thought that a “father” cannot be so denominated without reference to a “son” – which Nāgārjuna often appears to express, perhaps problematically, as the thought that a father cannot *exist* without a son. The problem, of course, is that while it may indeed make sense that a man can only be *called* a “father” insofar as he has a child, it seems clearly wrong to say he would not *exist* but for the child – which, in fact, is just as Nāgārjuna sometimes seems to suggest.³⁴ As Jan Westerhoff says in this regard, it is clear that “the ‘mutual dependence’ of father and son that Nāgārjuna postulates is based on two different dependence relations, the son depending existentially on the father, the father notionally on the son. For Nāgārjuna’s argument, however, it is necessary that the two entities be related by a symmetric dependence relation.”³⁵

To the extent that Nāgārjuna treats such cases as involving the same kinds of relation on the part of both *relata*, one might well suppose there is something fallacious about arguments such as we are considering. Taber’s engagement with Hayes concludes by scouting some ways to salvage the argument, and thus to exculpate Nāgārjuna from fallacious use of the principle in question. On the

³³ Hayes 1994: 315; quoted by Taber (1998: 217).

³⁴ See, for example, *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 49–50, and also the helpful discussion by Westerhoff (2009: 26–29).

³⁵ Westerhoff 2009: 28. Noting Taber and Hayes on this, Westerhoff comments that “[t]he failure to distinguish between existential and notional dependence has resulted in considerable confusion in the contemporary commentarial literature, primarily in connection with the so-called *principle of co-existing counterparts*” (2009: 29, n. 40). Later in the book, though, Westerhoff expresses a view of the matter just such as I will finally recommend – a view to the effect that the two kinds of dependence may not, after all, be so sharply distinct, insofar as causes turn out to “depend for their existence on us, because it is our cognitive act of cutting up the world of phenomena in the first place which creates the particular assembly of objects that constitutes a causal field...” (2009: 98).

alternative reading I will suggest in concluding, however, Nāgārjuna should be understood not as *failing* to distinguish essentially distinct things, but as *arguing* that it makes no sense to think any of the terms in such relations really are “essentially distinct.” Taber affords an interesting way for me to approach that assessment insofar as he cites Charles Hartshorne by way of getting a handle on the fishiness of the principle at issue; for notwithstanding Hartshorne’s view that Nāgārjuna’s principle is problematic, Hartshorne’s own philosophical project turns out to show matters in an interesting light.

Noting, then, that Hartshorne attributes to Nāgārjuna a “fallacy of misplaced symmetry,” Taber explains:

Charles Hartshorne suggests that [the principle] rests on a failure to see that although one thing exists only in relation to another, the other thing can exist independently of the first. “...I think about Caesar and Caesar is thought about by me. But whereas the relation attributed to me cannot be omitted from the description of me without obvious loss there is no scintilla of evidence that the supposed relation of being thought about by me was in Caesar.”³⁶

As thus suggested by the obvious fact that *being thought about* is typically not a real relation on the part of any object of someone’s thought, it is fallacious to suppose that relations between existents must be of the same *kind* for all terms of the relation – and this is just as Nāgārjuna’s principle evidently presupposes.

Given, however, the extent to which Nāgārjuna’s argument (as we have come to understand it in light of Candrakīrti) has everything to do with the temporality of causal relations, it is worth further exploring just what is most centrally at issue for Hartshorne. It is, in particular, time’s arrow that Hartshorne theorizes in terms of an *asymmetry* in the relations had, he argues, by all temporal existents. The salient point of the foregoing example is that Caesar is a figure *from the past*; while it’s possible to imagine cases in which *being thought about* is, in fact, a property of some object of thought (as, perhaps, when I am thought of by a loved-one who is with me), the reason this cannot be the case with respect to Caesar is clear: it makes no sense to think that Caesar could, in (say) the year 50 BCE, have been related to (as *being thought of by*) the particular person that is *me*, writing now over two thousand years later.

It does make sense, on the other hand, to think that certain facts about me or my world would not be as they are but for Caesar’s having lived. This is the asymmetry that Hartshorne thinks is problematically obscured by the “fallacy of misplaced symmetry:” despite there having been no relation at all from the

³⁶ Taber 1998: 217, here quoting Hartshorne 1988.

perspective of Caesar's temporal present, there is a sense in which I am existentially dependent on my *relatedness-to-Caesar*. Hartshorne expresses this as the point that existents are *internally* related to events in their pasts (i.e., they would not be as they are but for the relation), but *externally* related to events in their futures (i.e., they are not changed by their relation to what is, for them, still an indeterminate future). And, that existents are thus related only "externally" to future existents is of particular significance for Hartshorne; for the constitutive asymmetry between retrospective and prospective relations is, among other things, a condition of the intelligibility of novelty and creativity – that events are not wholly deterministic is chief among the facts theorized in terms of Hartshorne's asymmetry.³⁷

Now, given the importance for Nāgārjuna's argument of the specifically temporal sense of the locative absolute – given, i.e., that the possibility of *being other* is made problematic precisely by the fact that existents do not exist *at the same time as their causes* – it is worth considering whether Hartshorne's "misplaced symmetry" really captures something problematic in the argument-form we have been considering. I suggest that if we think a bit further along the path suggested by Taber's invocation of him, Hartshorne's theorization of time may actually recommend the conclusion that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are, in fact, onto something interesting. On Hartshorne's reading, Nāgārjuna's principle reflects the problematic presupposition that all relations are *internal* relations. Not only, though, does this diagnosis underestimate the significance of Nāgārjuna's critique of all privileged descriptions (for Nāgārjuna, of course, *no* relations could count as ultimately real); what's more, Hartshorne's own attempt to theorize the reality of *external* relations introduces the same kinds of problems exploited by Nāgārjuna's argument.

The reality of external relatedness is central to the philosophical project of Hartshorne, whose way of taking time seriously is in terms of internal and external relatedness. Other projects in the history of philosophy can be characterized, for Hartshorne, in terms of their emphasis on one or the other of these sorts of relation as real – a way framing things that had been prevalent since F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell debated the status of "relations" around the turn of the twentieth century. Hartshorne's wager was that discussions of this issue historically had erred in supposing only one kind of relatedness could finally make sense, and his proposal was that the real significance of time consisted precisely in the fact that both kinds of relatedness are real, but with a crucial

³⁷ My account of Hartshorne's approach to these matters is based particularly on Hartshorne 1948.

asymmetry that is constitutive of time's arrow: existents are *internally* related to events in their pasts, but *externally* related to successor events. There is much to be said about this, but among the problems is that it turns out to be hard, on Hartshorne's account, to make any sense of relations between contemporaries. Thus, if present existents are defined by their *internal* relatedness to existents in their pasts (present existents would not be as they are but for the fact that past occurrences were as they were), and by their *external* relatedness to future existents (insofar as future existents will, when they become present, have internal relations to present events), what kind of relation could obtain between contemporaries? Hartshorne himself acknowledges "the very difficult problem, for me *the* problem, of relations between contemporaries,"³⁸ thus acknowledging in effect that he is hard-pressed to make sense of the "coexisting counterparts" of Candrakīrti's principle. That "principle" is that real relations make sense *only* among contemporaries; that Hartshorne is hard-pressed to make sense of there being *any* relations among contemporaries would seem at least as problematic.

More to the point for present purposes, though, Hartshorne's account is significant for its focusing the question of whether *external* relatedness in the first place involves any real relationship. This is the problem, Hartshorne says, of whether an external relation is "only nominally a relation 'of' the term to which it is external." Hartshorne acknowledges, then, that on his view that external relations are real, "It is not that certain terms externally have no relations, but that certain relations have terms, in such fashion that the terms, some of them, do not really 'have' the relations" (1948: 65). It is clear this is a problem in the same vicinity as those identified by Candrakīrti's contention that real relations could obtain only between real relata. As it shows up for Hartshorne, the problem is that his "external" relations can never be to actual *particulars*; any existent's external relatedness to the future can, rather, involve relation only to *possible* states of affairs. Indeed, this is just what makes for the asymmetry: relation to past existents is, *ipso facto*, relation to something objective, to something *already actualized*; future existents, however, are not yet actual. Insofar, however, as it thus concerns something yet indeterminate, relation-to-the-future cannot consist in relation to anything in particular; to what, then, could any such relation really be a relation?

It has been found to be a philosophical problem, then, that sometimes it seems there is no available *relatum* to make sense of a relation that is uncontroversially taken as real. Let's stick with this thought for a moment. If it seems problematic

³⁸ Hartshorne 1948: 98. Although thus acknowledging that this "seems the most vulnerable point" in his doctrine, Hartshorne here adds only that "the difficulty would not, I think, be disposed of by dropping theism..." (1948: 99).

for Candrakīrti's principle to say that nothing *present* can really be related to anything *past*, consider the problem in the other temporal direction: can anything enjoy real relation to *future* particulars? When asked this way, the question suggests an argument that makes reference, as well, to Candrakīrti's critique of the idea of discrete continua³⁹ – an argument, in particular, made by the later Mādhyamika Prajñākaramati (c. 950–1000 CE), who was greatly influenced by Candrakīrti. What Prajñākaramati particularly adds to Candrakīrti's critique of the “continuum” idea is that the temporality of the involved terms entails the inexorable involvement of *conceptualization*. Prajñākaramati argues:

The restriction of produced and producer to a single causal continuum does not make sense as real, on account of this restriction's being notional (*kālpanika*) as long as the effect has not originated; depending as it does on the state of future phenomena, ordinary reference to things like “effects” is not really true.⁴⁰

Prajñākaramati's concisely stated argument – which has a locative absolute with just the same sense Candrakīrti sees in Nāgārjuna's MMK 1.3 (*anutpanne kārye*, “as long as the effect has not originated”) – clarifies what I take to be the real point at issue when it comes to the question of whether relations make sense as obtaining only between contemporaneous terms. Prajñākaramati makes explicit that in virtue of the constitutive temporality of the terms, causal relations remain necessarily conceptual or, as in my translation, “notional” (*kālpanika*). This is, Prajñākaramati says, because no causal *relata* can be individuated except relative to the expectations of an observer who in the first instance *takes* there to be some event of causation, his or her taking of which determines (*inter alia*) the scale at which anything will count as “cause” or “effect.”⁴¹ To say that reference to an “effect” necessarily “depends on the state of future phenomena” (*anāgatāvasthita-dharmāpekṣayā*) is thus to say that it depends on some perspective from which a complete, temporally extended event of causation could be in view – that it depends on there being something that is in the first instance taken, or *conceived*, as such an event, any reference to which remains, to that extent, “notional.”

³⁹ At MA 6.59–61, as noted above.

⁴⁰ BCAP 356,12–14: *janyajanakaikatvaikasantatipratiniyamo 'py anutpanne kārye kālpanikatayā vastuto na saṅgacchate / na cānāgatāvasthitadharmāpekṣayā kāryādivyavahāro vāstavaḥ /*

⁴¹ What sort of *cause* will be sought depends, e.g., on whether the event in question is subatomic in scale; what will be relevant in that case differs greatly from what would be so given an event at an *astronomical* scale, with innumerable alternative scales in between.

Prajñākaramati, I suggest, thus clarifies that the point really at issue in the arguments we have been scouting relates precisely to the supposedly problematic conflation of *notional* and *existential* dependence that's characteristic of Nāgārjuna. What Prajñākaramati suggests is that causal relations obtain, by definition, between *events* – and “events” do not just individuate themselves. To that extent, the very idea of causation turns out to make sense only relative to a determination of just what “event,” in any case, is in view. This means, however, that when it comes to the *relata* involved in any case of causal relations, no “ultimately real” existents can be involved; for nothing just discloses itself, independently of some particular description of the event at issue, as *essentially* a “cause” or “effect” in any case. Nothing, in other words, makes sense as being cause or effect *just by itself* (*svabhāvena*); only relative to some “taking” of things can any candidates for the roles of “cause” and “effect” so much as come into view. To that extent, causal realism – the idea that causal explanations represent an essentially privileged level of description uniquely pertaining to ultimately real existents – makes no sense just insofar as any causal explanation inexorably implicates some description of the matter. There is, to that extent, no basis for thinking that causal explanation uniquely captures the mind-independent essence of anything at all.

V. By way of a conclusion: a Mādhyamika alternative to causal-realist readings of dependent origination

All this can be precisely expressed in Buddhist terms: *ultimate truth* cannot coherently be thought to consist in reference to ultimately real existents, and this because all candidates for that status finally depend for their intelligibility on the conventionally real phenomena they were posited to explain.⁴² The foregoing critiques of causal realism thus figure, I would suggest in concluding, in a kind of pragmatic-transcendental argument against reductionist understandings of the no-self doctrine – an argument, in particular, from the conditions of the intelligibility of causation itself.

Now, *causation* clearly figures centrally in the Buddhist no-self idea, the flip side of which is the doctrine of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*); it is just because every moment of experience can be seen to originate in dependence upon a host of impersonal factors (none of which makes sense as being one's “self”) that there are no selves. And Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti veritably take their bearings from the idea of dependent origination; it is, indeed, among

⁴² For more on the understanding of the two truths I here have in mind, see Arnold 2012: 231–234.

Nāgārjuna's signature moves to say that that is just what "emptiness" means.⁴³ To that extent, the argument we have considered against "dependent production" – that of MMK 1.3, as interpreted by Candrakīrti and as further elaborated by him at MA 6.17–19 – is best understood as particularly targeting *causal-realist* workings-out of the dependent origination doctrine. The philosophical significance of Mādhyamika critiques of causal realism – critiques generally to the effect that we can make no sense of *existential* and *notional* dependence as representing essentially distinct relations – can thus be brought into focus by considering how Mādhyamikas would instead have us understand dependent origination. On my reading, then, the logic of the argument we have considered is particularly clear in light of Candrakīrti's theorization of *pratītyasamutpāda* as effectively glossed by the idea of *upādāya prajñapti*; this amounts, I take it, to Candrakīrti's proposal for what a non-causal-realist understanding of dependent origination might look like.

Taber, in concluding his own attempt to rescue Nāgārjuna's argument from Hayes's critique, gets close enough to what I have in mind here that it is worth appreciating how his conclusion differs from the suggestion I am making. Taber here grants that the principle of coexisting counterparts is fallacious, but emphasizes that there is a question whether Nāgārjuna himself is guilty of fallacious reasoning, or whether instead the offending principle represents a presupposition of *his interlocutors*. Might any of Nāgārjuna's opponents be thought to have held to such a principle? Following Kamaleswar Bhattacharya's influential work on grammatical presuppositions that figure centrally in Nāgārjuna's works (e.g., Bhattacharya 1980), Taber suggests that "the principle of coexisting counterparts seems in many cases reducible to a certain grammatical notion current in the thought of Nāgārjuna's day, but interpreted very literally by him" (1998: 233). Finding this, however, insufficient for fully understanding all the arguments in which the principle figures, Taber suggests a further way in which Nāgārjuna might be understood as invoking the principle only provisionally – in particular, "as an expression of the doctrine of dependent origination." In that case, "Nāgārjuna could claim simply to be going along with an assumption that any Buddhist would make, i.e., that things arise dependently" (1998: 236).

Particularly at issue, Taber says of this, is whether dependent origination can coherently be understood as really consisting in "mutual dependence." Accordingly, Taber concludes by considering how Nāgārjuna might in the first place

⁴³ Among the many passages that might be cited in this regard (MMK 24.18, *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 22, *Śūnyatāsaptati* 1, etc.), I would here emphasize the MMK's opening verse of homage, wherein Nāgārjuna extols the Buddha particularly as having taught *pratītyasamutpāda*, characterizations of which take up half the verse.

have come to the idea that dependent origination could be so understood. “Perhaps,” Taber finally ventures, “it was a more profound experience of his own of the truth of dependent origination” that guided Nāgārjuna; to that extent, the MMK can be seen “as an attempt to articulate this vision, which for Nāgārjuna is ultimately based not on discursive reasoning but on some kind of non-discursive thought” (1998: 236–237).

I think Taber is quite right to emphasize that the logic of the arguments we have considered centrally implicates, for Nāgārjuna, the doctrine of dependent origination. I take it, however, that the relation of our arguments to the conception of dependent origination is integral to the logic of the whole Madhyamaka project, and that it is therefore unnecessary to appeal to any supposed “vision” of this on the part of the person who was Nāgārjuna, or to suggest that his position will not admit of rational expression. On my reading, the suspicious principle commonly invoked by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti – the principle that relations can obtain only between real *relata* – makes straightforward sense as effectively identifying just the kind of problem these Mādhyamikas are most concerned to disclose. I do not, then, take it that either Nāgārjuna or Candrakīrti *affirms* this principle as part of a preferred theory of causation. Theirs is not an argument to the effect that on an ultimately true account, causal relations can obtain only between empirically contemporaneous existents. Rather, by interrogating the terms most basically presupposed by theories of causation (e.g., *relation*), they are arguing that the events theorized by accounts of causation are not just *given*; causal relations are intelligible only relative to some *taking* of events – only relative, for example, to the scale at which the terms have in the first place been identified, which represents a conceptual taking that cannot itself be eliminated by the explanation. That relations between cause and effect make sense only relative to already conceptualized existents follows, the argument here considered shows, from causation’s constitutive temporality; the fact, in particular, that causation constitutively involves *duration* means that the terms to be related show up only for a conceptual thought, which alone makes sense as at once comprising the whole unfolding of a temporally extended event.

That no sense can be made of relations between non-contemporaneous existents does not mean, then, that there *are* no such relations – only that such relations cannot obtain independently of what are in any instance *taken* as the actions or events at issue. And, that the idea of causal dependence thus ineliminably presupposes reference to some conceptual *taking* is arguably the principal point that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti aim to press against causal-realist understandings of dependent origination. That, indeed, is just the point of

Candrakīrti's characteristic analysis of dependent origination in terms of *upā-dāya prajñapti* – in terms, that is, of some act of *upādā* (“appropriating” or “taking up”), reference to which inexorably implicates all the terms presupposed by such an act.

We can approach Candrakīrti's characteristic view to that effect by recurring, first, to MA 6.18–19, where (we saw) Candrakīrti entertained the idea that perhaps cause and effect are like the “two arms of a balanced scale,” which of course “go up and down at the same time.”⁴⁴ In that context, Candrakīrti responded (we saw) by simply denying that an example thus involving simultaneity is appropriate to the case of causation; whatever is to be said about a balanced scale, *causes* are, by definition, temporally prior to their effects, so there can be no question of their occurring simultaneously. Candrakīrti revisits the same example in commenting on Nāgārjuna's MMK 26.2, where it is the application of *pratītyasamutpāda* to the process of rebirth that is at issue. In that context, it becomes clear that Candrakīrti's handling of the scale example has everything to do with *pratītyasamutpāda*. The example is relevant, in particular, to a basic tension at the heart of this doctrine, one that is disclosed by analysis of the syntax of the compound form *pratītya-samutpāda*. As Buddhist philosophers well-versed in Sanskrit grammar had long been aware, this compound counterintuitively involves a gerund as its first member: *pratītya*, “having depended.”⁴⁵ The problem, in Sanskrit as in English, is that a gerund is an infinite verbal form that can figure only in a dependent clause, one subordinate, in a complete sentence, to a finite verbal predicate that generally must have the same subject as the gerund. Moreover, the dependent clauses in which gerunds figure concern temporally prior states of affairs; as Mattia Salvini explains, Sanskrit grammarians thus theorized this grammatical form as “employed in reference to the same *agent* as the agent of the main action, but in reference to a prior time” (2011: 231).

As with the issue of theorizing causal relations, then, it is the temporality implied by the syntax of gerunds that is problematic. As Salvini explains, “if we accept the sense of strict succession between the act of depending upon (*pratītya*) and the act of arising (*samutpāda*), it would follow that the same agent should be able to perform the first action (depending upon) before having come into

⁴⁴ Cf. notes 27 and 28, above.

⁴⁵ That is, at any rate, the most widely prevalent construal of the form *pratītya*, although early in the *Prasannapadā* Candrakīrti lengthily engages several alternative readings of the compound, entertaining proposals also considered by (among others) Vasubandhu in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam*. For the Sanskrit text of this section of the *Prasannapadā*, see MacDonald 2015: Vol. I, 120–133 [§§6–15]; for MacDonald's helpfully annotated translation of the passage, see 2015: Vol. II, 18–41.

existence” (2011: 232). In that case, though, the very idea of *pratītyasamutpāda* would seem to entail precisely the contradiction Nāgārjuna had shown with regard to the “self-production” idea: how could there be the *arising* of something that must, if it is to make sense as first “having depended” on something, *already exist*? Indeed, it seems to me that Salvini rather understates the matter when he notes that “the structure of this paradox about the temporal displacement of an effect and the cause on which it is supposed to depend is not dissimilar from the structure of the Madhyamaka refutation of causality” (2011: 243). It seems to me the problem bequeathed to Buddhist commentators by the grammatical form of the compound *pratītyasamutpāda* is, in fact, exactly the problem disclosed (on Candrakīrti’s reading) by Nāgārjuna’s critique of causation at MMK 1.3. What Candrakīrti takes Nāgārjuna here to have shown is directly pertinent, as well, to the question of how we are to understand *pratītyasamutpāda* – the question, in particular, of just how that idea, which Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti strongly affirm, differs from “origination from another” (*parata utpāda*) refuted at MMK 1.3 and MA 6.17–19. The upshot of Candrakīrti’s understanding of all this is perhaps nowhere more clear than when he invokes the same discussion in commenting on MMK 26.2, which concerns the third link in the twelvefold chain of dependent origination – the moment, in particular, of “rebirth,” at which awareness (*viññāna*) becomes associated with a new aggregated embodiment.⁴⁶

Regarding that, Candrakīrti raises the question whether the process can be made coherent with Ābhidharmika views on the essentially *momentary* character of causation. An Ābhidharmika, Candrakīrti says, is apt to affirm in this case that “when the aggregates are ceasing at the time of death, the aggregates have parts that are, just like a balanced scale’s rising and falling, arising at the very same moment; these are born according to what is projected by karma.”⁴⁷ Responding that “it does not make sense for those well-versed in the nature of dependent origination to say as much,”⁴⁸ Candrakīrti rejects the scale example as no more applicable to the moment of rebirth than to the problem that first occasioned

⁴⁶ Epitomizing the distinctive *modus operandi* of MMK’s chapter 26 – the only chapter of Nāgārjuna’s magnum opus that concerns something *affirmed* by Nāgārjuna – 26.2 says, “Having as its condition volitional factors [*saṃskāras*, the second link in the twelvefold chain], awareness enters a new state of existence; when awareness has entered, mental and material aggregates are precipitated” (*viññānaṃ saṃniviśate saṃskārapratyayaṃ gatau / saṃniviṣṭe ’tha viññāne nāmarūpaṃ niṣicyate* // Ye 2011: 468).

⁴⁷ *marañāntikeṣu skandheṣu nirudhyanāneṣv ekasminn eva kṣaṇe tulādaṇḍanāmonnāmanyāyenaiva aupapattyāṃśikāḥ skandhā yathākarmākṣepata upajāyante* (La Vallée Poussin 1970b: 544,5–7).

⁴⁸ *na tu punaḥ pratītyasamutpādassvarūpavicakṣaṇānām evaṃ vaktuṃ yujyate* (La Vallée Poussin 1970b: 545,7).

attention to this example – the problem (stated at MA 6.17) that the constitutive temporality of causal relations makes it hard to say exactly what the *relata* could be. Commenting on the moment of rebirth as invoked at MMK 26.2, then, Candrakīrti quotes MA 6.19 by way of an answer: “If it is acknowledged that what is *being* produced is on the verge of production (but not yet existent), and that what is perishing is on the verge of destruction (and yet still existent), how then is this comparable to a balanced scale?”⁴⁹

Helpfully clarifying what he takes to be at stake in thus rejecting the Ābhidharmika’s attempt to salvage a certain understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda*, Candrakīrti finally emphasizes that what is problematic is *the idea of momentariness*, which now stands revealed as a problematic entailment of the Ābhidharmika’s causal realism: “Why, then, worry about whether things like foam and heaps are momentary or non-momentary? Occurrent in dependence upon whole collections of causes and conditions, they lack anything real at their core.”⁵⁰ What is problematic, then, is not *pratītyasamutpāda*, but only those philosophical elaborations thereof that entail misbegotten doctrines like momentariness. And, Candrakīrti’s repurposing of MA 6.19 shows, the critiques of causation we have considered are directly relevant to showing what is problematic about theoretical attempts at delimiting the idea of *pratītyasamutpāda*. If, as for Ābhidharmikas, *pratītyasamutpāda* is theorized as specifying the ultimately existent causes to which all that is merely “conventionally” real can be reduced – if dependent origination represents a true description just insofar as it uniquely makes reference only to ultimately real terms – it had better give us some explanatory grip on the conventionally real. To the extent, then, that the terms of Ābhidharmika accounts turn out themselves to be intelligible only relative to the very phenomena they were invoked to explain – only, that is, relative to conventional truth – it can only be concluded that the proposed explanatory terms are not, after all, essentially more real than the phenomena they were supposed to explain. Insofar, in particular, as the terms of causal explanation make sense only as applied to *already conceptualized existents* – to events that have in the first place been *taken* as requiring explanation – it cannot coherently be thought that causal explanation uniquely picks out mind-independently real existents.

Accordingly, “dependent origination,” on the Mādhyamika view as I take it, must be understood not only as constitutively involving both existential and notional dependence, but indeed as entailing that these kinds of dependence cannot,

⁴⁹ For the text of MA 6.19, see note 28, above; as quoted apropos of MMK 26.2, the verse is at La Vallée Poussin 1970b: 545,9–11.

⁵⁰ *ataḥ phenapiṇḍādīnāṃ hetupratyayasāmagrīm prāpya pratītya samutpannānāṃ sāravastuvigatānāṃ kutaḥ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikacittēti* (La Vallée Poussin 1970b: 549,8–9).

after all, coherently be conceived *as essentially distinct*. I thus concur with Mattia Salvini's conclusion regarding the upshot of Candrakīrti's grammatical handling of the compound *pratītyasamutpāda*; Madhyamaka is distinguished by its affirming not only that notional dependence entails causal dependence, but indeed that "notional dependence is the most *fundamental* type of *pratītyasamutpāda*" (2011: 243). Given that Salvini argues for that conclusion by way of considering problems raised by the grammatical form of the latter compound, it is revealing that just the same conceptual issues arise in connection with the expression *upādāya prajñapti* – an expression famously associated with MMK 24.18, and recurrently elaborated by Candrakīrti. Just like the gerund in the compound *pratītyasamutpāda*, it seems *upādāya* "should refer to the action of *upādā* occurring prior to the action of *prajñapti* and having the same agent."⁵¹ For Candrakīrti, the parallels are deeper still; on his view, Madhyamaka is distinguished precisely by its embrace of *upādāya prajñapti* as equivalent to dependent origination – a view, I suggest, that is best understood as a transcendental alternative to causal-realist elaborations of dependent origination.

Here foregoing consideration of MMK 24.18,⁵² I want to sketch this idea with reference to Candrakīrti's handling of *upādāya prajñapti* and related expressions in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*'s celebrated elaboration (at MA 6.150–163) of an idea that had long figured centrally in the Buddhist tradition: that the reductionist analysis of *persons* is helpfully analogized to the similar analysis of a chariot. The main interpretive challenge posed by Candrakīrti's elaboration of this example is to explain the sense it makes for him to affirm *upādāya prajñapti* as a viable characterization of the relation between a "chariot" and its parts; how, in particular, does that differ from all the relationships that Candrakīrti first shows to be incoherent?

Candrakīrti first shows, in this regard, that the "basis of egocentrism" (*ahaṃkāraśraya*) cannot be thought a "real thing" (*vastu*), insofar as no such thing can be in any way related to the aggregates; as he says at 6.150, the basis of egocentrism is "not something other than the aggregates, nor does it have the aggregates as its nature; it is not a container of the aggregates, nor does it possess them." He concludes, however, that this nevertheless leaves a viable account of the egocentrism at the root of the Buddhist tradition's diagnosis of the human

⁵¹ Salvini 2011: 234. Among the problems Salvini considers regarding the comparable expression is whether Candrakīrti is entitled to change its word-order; it shows up in MMK 24.18 as *prajñaptir upādāya*, but Candrakīrti typically gives *upādāya prajñapti* (see Salvini 2011: 242).

⁵² On MMK 24.18 (and on *upādāya prajñapti* more generally), see Arnold 2005: 162–174, Salvini 2011: 235–237.

predicament: “Relative to the aggregates, however, it becomes intelligible.”⁵³ As distinct from all the putatively explanatory relations Candrakīrti rejects, what, exactly, is affirmed by this?

In my translation, “relative” renders the gerund *upādāya*, for which Candrakīrti’s verse here supplies the direct object (*skandhāṃs tūpādāya*), which remains implicit in such uses as Nāgārjuna’s at MMK 24.18. The expression “becomes intelligible” renders *yāti siddhim*, which might also be rendered with something like “reaches fulfillment” or “succeeds;” commenting on the verse, Candrakīrti glosses the expression with *prajñāpyate*. Following the Tibetan translation of this (*gdags pa*), many if not most modern interpreters have rendered *prajñāpyate* as meaning something like “is designated” or “imputed” – a translation that suggests it is *only* a “notional” sort of dependence that is here intended. I suggest, however, that as derived from the causative stem of *prajñā*, the term *prajñāpyate* is better rendered as denoting any case of something’s being “made known” – of anything’s “coming into view,” or “becoming manifest.” Here is how Candrakīrti’s comment on MA 6.150 deploys this language:

So as not to destroy what is settled as conventional truth, it can be acknowledged merely that *this occurs dependent upon that*, but not that its occurrence is (e.g.) without any cause. Here, too, so as to accommodate ordinary usage one can set aside all the problematic approaches we have explained and, insofar as anything is dependent if it shows up relatively, acknowledge merely that it shows up relative to the aggregates; after all, we do observe ordinary transactions regarding a self.⁵⁴

Candrakīrti here makes several important points. First, despite the impossibility of any ultimately warranted account of the phenomenon, it is nonetheless to be acknowledged that something is occurrent (“after all, we do observe ordinary transactions regarding a self”). It is important, moreover, that the conventionally real status of this occurrence not be altogether denied; the view on offer is proposed “so as not to destroy what is settled as conventional truth.” What is rejected, then,

⁵³ MA 6.150 (Li 2015: 22): *nāhaṃkāṛāśrayo vastu tasmān, nānyaḥ skandhebhyo ’pi na skandharūpaḥ / skandhādhāro nāiva nāiāiṣa tadvān, skandhāṃs tūpādāya yāty eṣa siddhim //*

⁵⁴ From the commentary on MA 6.150 (La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 271,8–15): *ji ltar ’di la brten nas ’di ’byung zhes bya ba ’di tsam zhig kun rdzob kyi brten pa’i rnam par bzhas pa ma chad par bya ba’i phyir khas len gyi rgyu med la sogs pa dag las skye ba ma yin pa de bzhin du, ’dir yang rten nas gdags pa la yang dag par brten pa na ji skad bshad pa’i skyon dang ldan pa’i rnam pa bsal nas phung po rnams la brten nas gdags pa zhes pa ’di tsam zhig ’jig rten gyi tha snyad rnam par gnas par bya ba’i phyir khas blang bar bya ste, bdag tu tha snyad btags pa mthong ba’i phyir ro.*

is just philosophically systematic explanations of *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is to be affirmed only having “set aside all the problematic approaches we have explained” – only, that is, having acknowledged that an ultimately true description of *pratītyasamutpāda* (those rejected, e.g., at MMK 1.3) cannot be made coherent. This leaves in play, however, the observed regularities captured in the traditional gloss of *pratītyasamutpāda* Candrakīrti quotes (“*this occurs dependent upon that*”).⁵⁵

When he concludes in this context, then, that the basis of egocentrism “shows up relative to the aggregates,” Candrakīrti is clearly not affirming a philosophical alternative comparable to any of those rejected starting at MA 6.8. He is affirming, rather, that conventionally real existents do occur, even though no philosophically typical account of these can withstand ultimate scrutiny. He affirms, in other words, that *something is occurrent* – only nothing whose reality could conceivably consist in its having a mind-independent intrinsic identity.

Having said all this in connection with MA 6.150, Candrakīrti proceeds to rehearse the same line of reasoning with respect to the example of a chariot, whose relation to its parts can no more be made coherent than that of a “self” to the aggregates. Concluding this famous discussion, Candrakīrti adds some important points to the alternative understanding of *pratītyasamutpāda* here being elaborated. Reiterating, first, the worry that there can be no making sense of ordinary usage regarding “chariots” without presupposing *really existent chariots*,⁵⁶ he responds (in introducing 6.158) by thus clarifying what the real problem is:

This problem occurs only for you. That is, a chariot does not make sense when sought according to the previously explained seven-fold method, and yet *you* remain intent on demonstrating its existence through rigorous analysis. But you acknowledge no way of demonstrating that other than these seven; how, then, can *you* make sense of ordinary exchanges such as “bring the chariot”? This problem does not occur for us.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ On this formulation, see Arnold 2012: 44–45.

⁵⁶ “If all this is as you say – if a chariot, when sought according to the seven-fold method you’ve expressed, turns out not to exist – then, there being no *chariots*, ordinary usage and reference involving ‘chariots’ would be annihilated” (*gal te ’o na shing rta ’di ji skad bshad pa’i tshul du rnam pa bdun gyis btsal ba na yod pa ma yin pa de’i tshe shing rta med pas gang zhig shing rtas ’jig rten na tha snyad ’dogs pa de rgyun chad par ’gyur na*; La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 276,12–15).

⁵⁷ *nyes pa ’di ni khyod kho na la ’gyur te; ’di ltar sngar bshad pa’i tshul du rnam pa bdun gyis btsal ba na shing rta mi ’thad cing khyod kyis kyang rnam par dpyad pa nas dngos po grub par rnam par ’jog par byed la. grub pa’i thabs gzhan yang khas ma blang pa de’i phyr na shing rta ’on cig ces bya ba la sogs pa’i ’jig rten pa’i tha snyad khyod la ci ltar grub par ’gyur; kho bo cag la ni nye pa ’di med do* (La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 276,18–277,4).

That is, the fact that no analysis of the dependence relations in question can make sense as ultimately true is a problem only insofar as it is in the first place presupposed that such an account is required. As Candrakīrti here makes clear, though, it is just that presupposition that is the target of his critique; it cannot be doubted, he argues, that ordinary exchanges involving things like “chariots” are intelligible – the only conclusion reasonably drawn from the failure of all theoretical attempts at *explaining* that, he would thus have us recognize, is that no such theoretical explanation can in the first place be thought necessary. The upshot of this is that Candrakīrti rejects not the *existence* of ordinary existents such as chariots, but a particular *criterion* of existence; insofar as it is the idea that existents are individuated by their “intrinsic identity” (*svabhāva*) that finally entails the contradictions shown by Mādhyamika argument, it can only be concluded that it was wrong in the first place to suppose that ordinary usage could be intelligible only if ultimately underwritten by such a criterion.

Only, then, by rejecting philosophical demands for ultimately existent “truth-makers” can one so much as keep conventional truth in view. This is much as Candrakīrti says at MA 6.158, where he draws just the same lesson from the example of a chariot’s failure to withstand analysis that he had earlier drawn (at 6.150) regarding the basis of egocentrism: “Even though it does not become intelligible (either ultimately or ordinarily) in any of the seven possible ways, without rigorous analysis – in ordinary terms alone – it does become manifest relative to its proper components.”⁵⁸ Commenting on this verse, Candrakīrti explicitly says both that the Mādhyamika view is distinguished by its taking *upādāya prajñāpti* as equivalent to *pratītyasamutpāda*, and that this is just what forecloses nihilistic conclusions with respect to ultimate truth: “Since we affirm relative manifestation just as we affirm dependent origination (the mere the fact that everything is contingent), our position does not entail the annihilation of ordinary usage.”⁵⁹

Candrakīrti’s embrace of the ordinary usage he takes Madhyamaka to leave in play is striking; the upshot of this recuperation of conventional truth, he says at MA 6.159, is to acknowledge just such things as Buddhists had generally been

⁵⁸ MA 6.158 (Li 2015: 23): *na tattvato naiṣa lokataś ca sa saptadhā yady api yāti siddhim / svāṅgāny upādāya vinā vicāraṃ prajñāpyate lokata eva caiṣaḥ ||*

⁵⁹ *de'i phyir rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba rkyen nyid 'di pa tsam khas blang pa ltar brten nas brtags pa khas blangs pa'i phyir kho bo cag gi phyogs la 'jig rten gyi tha snyad chad par thar bar mi 'gyur la*. The phrase “merely the fact that everything is contingent” renders *idampratītyatāmātra*, a standard gloss for *pratītyasamutpāda*; literally, this means “merely having something [*idam*] as its causal conditions” (La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 277, 14–18).

in the business of refuting: “The usage common to everyone has it that a chariot is at once a *whole*; a *possessor of its parts*; an *agent*, also well-known to everyone as being the *appropriator* [of its constituents].”⁶⁰ Candrakīrti provocative point, clearly, is thus to emphasize that Madhyamaka can countenance reference to just such things as Ābhidharmika analyses would explain away with reference to ultimately real existents. Among the kinds of things Candrakīrti thus thinks it necessary to acknowledge is, significantly, another derivative of the same verb (*upādā*) behind the gerund *upādāya*: the “appropriator” (*upādātṛ*) that is presupposed by any identification of something’s *parts* – presupposed, that is, by any reference to something as *upādāna* (“appropriated” or “taken up”), which for Candrakīrti is typically shorthand for all the impersonal existents posited by Ābhidharmikas as ultimately real. On this way of putting things, the claim typical of Ābhidharmika analyses (at least on Candrakīrti’s understanding thereof) just is that only the impersonal constituents of persons (collectively denoted by the word *upādāna*) are finally real. Typifying his predilections as a Sanskritic ordinary language philosopher, Candrakīrti sees in this term implicit reference to an *act* – that some existents have been identified as the impersonal constituents of persons (*upādāna*) means there has been some *taking* (*upādā*) of them. Reference to an act of taking presupposes, however, all the constituents of an action (all the *kāraṇas*), as theorized by the Sanskrit grammatical tradition. That means, however, that insofar as it is acknowledged that something “shows up relative to its parts” (*upādānām upādāya prajñāpyate*), it must also be acknowledged that this occurrence presupposes some *agent* of that act – an “appropriator” (*upādātṛ*).

That amounts, I suggest, to the claim that it can only be relative to some “taking” of events – only relative, that is, to some kind of *whole* – that anything is intelligibly individuated as *upādāna*. Insofar as it is, for Buddhists, particularly the analysis of *being a person* that is finally at issue, this is precisely to say that nothing can be intelligibly adduced as *the impersonal constituents typically taken to constitute “persons”* (to give a tendentious gloss of *upādāna* that is, I would wager, consistent with Candrakīrti’s aims), without some reference to the very thing supposedly explained by that. That is not, of course, to say that things like persons do, after all, ultimately exist – only that it is incoherent to affirm any of the basic constituents of these contingent phenomena as somehow more real.

⁶⁰ *aṅgī sa evāyavāṇī sa kartā, rathah sa evēti jane niruktiḥ / siddho ’py upādātṛtayā janānām...* (Li 2015: 23). The phrase “appropriator of its constituents” renders *upādātṛ*, “appropriator;” I have added “of its constituents” to reflect the thought (integral to Candrakīrti’s point here) that the “appropriator” in question is intelligible only relative to the *upādāna* (“constituents”) that it takes up.

As Candrakīrti says in commenting on 6.159a–c, it makes no sense to say – as, he takes it, those who “mistakenly understand the meaning of scripture” have held – that “only collections of parts exist, but *wholes* in no way at all exist, since they are not apprehended over and above the parts.” The problem with that claim, he explains, is that “this reasoning entails that the mere *parts* (etc.) do not exist, either.”⁶¹ If it is affirmed that there are no wholes but that “parts” are ultimately real, then we are asked to accept the reality of something that is itself intelligible only relative to something else whose reality is denied; ordinary usage, to that extent, becomes incoherent. The same goes, he says, for parts and part-possession, actions and actors, and, of course, *upādāna* and *upādātṛ*; all these, for Candrakīrti, are just as real as the parts that alone count, for Abhidharma, as real. This represents, of course, a way to express the thought that Abhidharma’s ontologically basic categories turn out to be, like the common-sense entities they were posited to explain, just conventionally real – which, by Candrakīrti’s lights, is all the more real anything can be.

On my reading, that conclusion follows not only from the dependence of all existents on causes and conditions, but also from the basically transcendental point I take Candrakīrti to be making with regard to all dependence relations: like anything at all that shows up for us, these, too, are themselves intelligible only relative to some description, some *taking*. That, I take it, is finally why it is important for Candrakīrti to conclude this discussion with the exhortation that ends MA 6.159: “Do not annihilate the conventional well-known to everyone!”⁶²

Among the upshots of this, I take it, is that there can be no making sense of the claim that *notional* and *existential* dependence are essentially distinct relations; an account of anything’s existential dependence will itself be notionally dependent on whatever description renders the terms of the account intelligible. That is a philosophically significant contention particularly insofar as it is, for Buddhists, finally *persons* that are centrally at issue. In arguing for the truth of the cardinal Buddhist claim that persons are not individuated by really existent “selves,” Ābhidharmika philosophers generally worked to show, of all moments or aspects of experience, that these invariably depend for their existence on a host of impersonal factors, none of which makes sense as the kind of enduring and unitary object supposedly denoted by the word *self*. To the extent, however, that Abhidharma’s reductionist re-description is privileged as ultimately true, there

⁶¹ *gang 'ga' zhig gsung rab kyi don phyin ci log tu rtogs pas yan lag tshogs pa tsam zhig yod kyi yan lag can ni nram pa thams cad du yod pa ma yin te, de las tha dad par ma dmigs pa'i phyir ro... gtan tshigs de nyid kyis yan lag la sogs pa tsam yang med par thal bar 'gyur bas...* (La Vallée Poussin 1970a: 278,9–18).

⁶² *mā saṃvṛtiṃ nāśaya lokasiddhām* (Li 2015: 23).

is reason to worry that one object of attachment (an illusory self) has just been replaced by another (ultimately existent *dharma*s that are taken as exhaustively explaining away the initial illusion). Motivated by that worry, the Mādhyamikas Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti argued that, although persons will indeed admit of analysis into all manner of impersonal categories, it cannot coherently be held that the latter enjoy an altogether different kind of existence than the former. These Mādhyamikas set out to show, accordingly, that any explanatory categories proposed as giving us a privileged grip on reality invariably turn out themselves to be dependently originated – not only, moreover, in the sense that any explanatory terms will, in turn, have their own causes and conditions, but also (and more importantly) in the sense that all these depend for their intelligibility on the very phenomena they were supposed to explain.

Lest this seem like an idealist claim,⁶³ it should be emphasized that these Mādhyamikas hold that *no* part of this picture is to be privileged; as is abundantly clear from Candrakīrti's extensive critical engagement with Yogācāra, the ineliminable character of perspectival "takings" cannot be taken to recommend the conclusion that *mind* must therefore be ultimately real. Moments of experience do indeed depend, then, on all manner of psycho-physical events – it's just that no such events are intelligible as the kinds of things they are independently of its being *taken* that "persons" are at issue. To that extent, the already "taken" character of anything we could seek to understand is presupposed by any explanation that could be offered, which therefore cannot explain the taking itself. And that is just to say that *pratītyasamutpāda* must be understood as pertaining not only to the dependence of all existents on their causes and conditions, but also to the dependence of *any conception thereof* on our own explanatory interests, conceptual capacities, etc.

To that extent, Mādhyamika critiques of "dependent production," as epitomized by MMK 1.3 and MA 6.17–19, can be understood not as fallaciously conflating what are really different kinds of dependence; Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are *arguing*, rather, that there is no making sense of the idea that existential dependence essentially differs from notional dependence. Among the conditions of the possibility of my arguing as much, I would say in concluding, is the availability of outstanding examples of philosophically engaged study of premodern Indian philosophy. It is, then, only in conversation with work like

⁶³ Indeed, British idealist T. L. S. Sprigge thus expresses a view just such as I have here attributed to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti: "If I ask how many physical objects there are in a room the answer depends on an entirely optional way of thinking of that part of the physical world as composed of what I choose to call units" (2011: 64).

that of John Taber that I have myself “taken” Mādhyamika arguments as worthy of (and as *admitting* of) a certain kind of engagement – and the dependence of my work on that of scholars like John Taber is surely both existential and notional.

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Action Theory and Scriptural Exegesis in Early Advaita-Vedānta (3): Maṇḍana Miśra on Ontology, Time and Commandment*

Hugo David

The linguistic phenomenon of injunction (*vidhi*) gave rise to an intense theoretical interest in medieval India, where it often stood as a prototype for non-assertive discourse, first of all among specialists in Pāṇinian grammar (*Vyākaraṇa*) and Vedic exegesis (*Mīmāṃsā*), later on in other schools of thought which, for various reasons that still need to be cleared, developed an interest in the *vidhivāda*, the “discussion of injunctions/of the cause of human action.” The philosophical and historical significance of this discussion is now widely recognised,¹ and a preceding study was devoted to exploring some of its consequences for the early evolution of *Mīmāṃsā* as an exegetical theory (David 2013b). Little attention has been paid, however, to its implications for the development of Brahmanical

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¹ After a long break following E. Frauwallner’s pioneering study of the concept of *bhāvanā* in the work of Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa and Maṇḍana Miśra (Frauwallner 1938), Brahmanical theories of injunctive discourse have enjoyed some new attention in recent years. See in particular studies by Marui (1989), Freschi (2012) (who also proposes an overview of secondary literature [pp. 19–21]) and David (2013a and 2013b). The historical and ideological background of these discussions is sketched in David 2015.

V. Eltschinger, B. Kellner, E. Mills, I. Ratié (eds.), *A Road Less Traveled : Felicitation Volume in Honor of John Taber*. (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 100) Wien 2021, pp. 37–94.

ontology.² Still, it is remarkable that the most ancient Brahmanical treatise entirely devoted to an investigation of the cause of human activity (*pravṛtтиhetu*), the *Vidhiviveka* (“An enquiry into the cause of human action,” henceforth ViV) by Maṇḍana Miśra (660–720?), also offers the most elaborate argument in favour of existence (*sattā*) as the highest universal in early Mīmāṃsā.³ Equally significant is that the only parallel for this discussion in Maṇḍana’s work should precisely be a large section of the second book (*kāṇḍa*) of his presumably later *Brahmasiddhi* (“Proof of *brahman*,” henceforth BS), for the most part a defence of Vedāntic exegesis against the Prābhākara hypothesis of the “commandment” (*niyoga*) as the object of all linguistic utterances.⁴ The purpose of the present study is to attempt an explanation of what may otherwise appear as a mere coincidence or a case of theoretical “digression” (*prasaṅga*), a view further comforted by the conspicuous absence of ontological reflection in later Brahmanical writings on injunction.⁵ This investigation might also allow us, it is hoped, better to

² An important exception to this statement is the work of Wilhelm Halbfass, who first proposed to correlate the Mīmāṃsakas’ conceptions of being (*bhāva/sattā*) with their linguistic analysis of Vedic injunctions. Halbfass’s sketch of the early history of the concept of *sattā* in Mīmāṃsā deserves to be quoted at length: “(...) in the field of ontology, the different explanations of ‘being’ are associated with exegetic positions. While Kumāṛila adopts and modifies the Vaiśeṣika notion of the highest universal *sattā*, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha explain it as *pramāṇasaṃbandhayogyatā*, ‘suitability for being connected with valid cognition,’ in order to accommodate *kārya*, ‘the ought,’ as a reality *sui generis*. Maṇḍana, who rejects Prabhākara’s *kārya* and wants to support his own interpretation of the nature of *vidhi*, ‘injunctions,’ proposes *vartamānatā*, ‘being present,’ or *vartamānakālasaṃbandhitva*, ‘connectedness with the present time.’ Yet, at the same time, these definitions are contributions to the general ontological debate. As such they have been recognized not only within the Mīmāṃsā, but also in the wider arena of Indian philosophical debates” (Halbfass 1991: 33).

³ ViV(SV) 12 (S 330.2–371.1 [= G 45.2–57.1]). The ViV is quoted, for the *pūrvapakṣa*-part, as in Elliot M. Stern’s critical edition (Stern 1988), marked S. Since this edition is still unpublished, references to the most widespread edition by Mahāprabhu Lāl Goswāmī, marked G, are given in square brackets. As the two published editions of the ViV I could access (i.e. the *editio princeps*, marked M, and G) generally do not provide any additional evidence with respect to E. Stern’s critical apparatus, variant readings from these editions are not systematically mentioned for this part of the text.

⁴ BS(SV) 2.29–58 (pp. 84.24–96.22). I accept the division of the BS in three books (and not in four, as in K. Kuppuswami Sastri’s *editio princeps*) proposed by Diwakar Acharya (2006). For a summary and discussion of Acharya’s arguments, see David 2013b: 281–82, n. 32.

⁵ The section of the ViV including a lengthy discussion of *sattā* (ViV 5–14, especially ViV 8–14), was neglected, not only by modern scholarship on Maṇḍana (the brief monograph by K. Natarajan [1995] devotes only a few pages [pp. 41–52] to his refutation of the doctrine of the *niyoga*), but also by his medieval readers. In his metrical rendering

understand how a reflection on forms of discourse defining what *should be* can have decisive implications for our conception of what there *is* and, eventually, of *being* as an architectonic idea allowing the understanding of reality as a unified totality.

Between the beginning of the 6th century and the end of the 8th Mīmāṃsā saw the rise of two fundamentally distinct and mutually incompatible doctrines in the field of ontology.⁶ The former, of which Maṇḍana Miśra was the first advocate, is characterised by a univocal concept of existence (*sattā*), equally applicable to all kinds of positive entities (substances, qualities, universals, etc.).⁷ At the heart of this conception of being lies the equation of existence and being present (*vartamānatā*): for Maṇḍana, *to be* essentially means to be *in the present*.⁸ Past and future entities owe their existence (or rather, their non-vacuity)⁹ to their

of the ViV's *pūrvapakṣa* in the *Nyāyasudhā* 1.2.7 (pp. 26–29), Someśvara Bhaṭṭa (12th c.?), for instance, supplements his fairly trustworthy paraphrase of ViV 1–4 (*k.* 1–15) by a refutation of the Prābhākara hypothesis of the “obligation” (*kārya*) entirely based on Śālikanātha's works (*k.* 16–41), with no consideration whatever of Maṇḍana's own exposition. That Maṇḍana's objections to Prabhākara are omitted by a scholar quite explicitly following his course of argument reveals, I believe, a shift in Brahmanical theory of action from a wider reflection including ontological preoccupations to a purely psychological analysis of human action, a shift that must have taken place between the time of Maṇḍana and that of Śālikanātha.

⁶ I follow here the terminological usage introduced by W. Halbfass in his fundamental work on classical Vaiśeṣika (Halbfass 1993), whose chapter 7 (“The conceptualization of Being in Classical Vaiśeṣika”) constitutes the most immediate background of this study. See also Halbfass 1975, 1986 and 1989. Thus the word “ontology” will be used here in the restricted sense of an “explicit conceptualisation of being” or of an explication of what it means to say that something *is*, distinguished from “categoriology” understood as the mere enumeration of “what there is.” However, I do not adopt Halbfass's distinction between “existence” and “reality” (respectively translating *astitva* and *sattā*), since the concept of *astitva* plays no role in the texts under consideration here. I consequently keep the more literal translations “being” for *sat* and “existence” for *sattā*.

⁷ On the exclusion of absence (*abhāva*) from the domain of *sattā*, see Vācaspati's *Nyāyakaṇikā* (NyK) ad ViV 12 (SV): *na khalu prameyatā sattā, tadanuvṛttāv api sattāyā abhāvād vyāvṛtteḥ*; “Existing differs from being known, for even though the latter [= being known] pertains to absence, existence does not” (S 331.6–7 [= G 45.23–24]). On the difference between the Mīmāṃsaka concept of *sattā* and that of the Vaiśeṣika, see below n. 11.

⁸ See ViV 13 (SV – Introduction): *vartamānataiva hi sattvam ucyate*; “For [we] maintain that existence is nothing but being present” (S 375.1–2 [G 58.1]); BS 2.35 (SV): *sac ca vartamānam ity ucyate*; “And [we] maintain that being is whatever is present” (p. 87.18).

⁹ In one place in the ViV, Maṇḍana qualifies past and future objects as “indescribable [in terms of being and non-being]” (*anupākhyeya*). See ViV 15 (SV): (...) *jñānotpattāv ajātanivṛttayor anupākhyeyatvād asāmarthyāt*; “(...) for [an entity] that has not come

having been *formerly* present, or to their being *about to be* present. There is little doubt that this kind of ontology was implicitly admitted even by some of Maṇḍana's predecessors in Mīmāṃsā. The reason why it needed to be voiced and argued in both his main exegetical works is that it had to confront a fundamentally distinct comprehension of being, based on radically different assumptions. For its advocates being was not a distinct property of things. Nor can it be associated with any temporal characteristics belonging to the thing in itself, but only with its (actual or potential) relationship to cognition (*pramāṇa*).¹⁰ Thus, according to this second conception, there is no contradiction entailed in saying that an entity *is* and that it is *not*, never has been and will never be *present*, as long as one can provide a convincing epistemological basis for its distinction from non-existent entities such as sky-flowers, hares' horns and the like. The price to pay for this significant extension of the realm of being to entities that do not exist *in time* (strictly speaking they are *timeless* entities) was the dissolution of the univocal conception of being elaborated by earlier Mīmāṃsakas in close confrontation with early Vaiśeṣika,¹¹ and the correlative dissemination of being into an irreducible

[into existence] or has ceased [to exist] does not have the capacity to produce knowledge, since it is indescribable [in terms of being and non-being] (*anupākhyeyatvāt*)” (S 466.1–2 [G 83.4]). For a similar usage of the adjective *anupākhyeya*, see for instance Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (VP) 1.26 (SV): *sa caikapadanibandhanaḥ satyāsatyabhāvenānupākhyeyaḥ*; “And this [i.e. the artificially extracted word-object – *apoddhārapadārtha*], which depends on a single word, is indescribable in terms of ‘real’ or ‘unreal’” (p. 65.7). For another (less explicit) occurrence of the same term, see VP 1.83a and SV (p. 149.6). Śrīvr̥ṣabha's gloss in the *Sphuṭākṣarā* is similar in both cases: *satyo 'satya ity ākhyātum aśakyah* (p. 66.10); *idaṃ tad iti tasya (...) ākhyātum aśakyatvāt* (p. 149.27–8). More striking yet, in VPSV 2.24 (p. 203.19), Bhartṛhari uses the similar adjective *nirupākhyā* to qualify the two “edges” (*koṭi*) of the “middle” (*madhya*) that is the present time, i.e. past and future (read *nirupākhyayoḥ* as in Cārudeva Śāstrī's edition [Ed^{1939/40} p. 20.11] instead of *nirūpākhyayoḥ* as found in Iyer's edition [Ed¹⁹⁸³ p. 203.19]). This characterisation of past and present, as far as I can see, is taken up without change in Maṇḍana's own theorisation of time.

¹⁰ See ViV 12 (SV): *pramāṇagrāhyatā sattvalakṣaṇam*; “The defining characteristic of existence is the fact of being grasped by a [valid] cognition” (S 330.2 [G 45.2]); BS 2.30–31 (SV – Introduction): *na pramāṇagamyatāyā anyā kā cana sattā*; “And there is no ‘existence’ that would differ from the mere fact of being apprehended by a [valid] cognition” (p. 85.10).

¹¹ In spite of Halbfass's somewhat ambiguous claim that “Kumārila adopts and modifies the Vaiśeṣika notion of the highest universal *sattā*” (quoted above, n. 2), the older Mīmāṃsaka notion of *sattā* (“existence”) should not be confused with the Vaiśeṣika understanding of this concept as the highest generality (*param sāmānyam*) inherent only in substances, qualities and movements. See *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.7–8: *sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu* (7) *dravyaguṇakarmabhyo 'rthāntaram sattā* (8); “*sattā* is the cause for [our cognition] that substances, qualities and movements ‘exist,’ [and] it is a different thing with respect to

diversity of beings (in the plural), devoid of any common aspect (*ākāra*) and not governed by any common principle (if we except, of course, their purely verbal designation as “beings,” *sad iti*).

The origin of this second position is not easy to trace, and we cannot even be sure that its fully-fledged formulation predates Maṇḍana. Vācaspati Miśra ascribes it to Prabhākara in person,¹² and the number of quotations from Prabhākara’s

substances, qualities and movements” (text: Isaacson 1995: 169). See also *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* p. 81.8–14, Halbfass 1993: 143–147 and Isaacson 1995: 25–26. To this technical use of the word *sattā*, Kumārila and his followers oppose the common usage of *sattā* as the “quality of what exists” (*sadbhāva*), possessed indifferently by all kinds of positive entities. This point is made particularly clear by Kumārila in the *Tantravārttika* (TV) 1.3.30 [9/10]: *sadbhāvaḥ satteti, na tu vaiśeṣikaparibhāṣayā yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sad iti pratītiḥ, sā sattety evaṃlakṣaṇā jātīḥ pratipattavyā* “Existence is the quality of what exists (*sadbhāvaḥ sattā*), and one should not admit a universal ‘existence’ defined, according to the technical usage of the Vaiśeṣika, as ‘the cause for’ our cognition ‘that substances, qualities and movements ‘exist’” (vol. 2, p. 240.4–5 – Harikai [2012] has a slightly different reading *sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu sad iti pratītiḥ*, which I am not following here). This extension of the domain of *sattā* beyond the first three Vaiśeṣika categories is reaffirmed by Maṇḍana in BS 2.39 (SV): *api ca sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyā api santa eva, na teṣv aupacārikaḥ sacchabdaḥ, pratyayasāvāilakṣaṇyāt*; “Moreover, even generality (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and inherence (*samavāya*) exist, [and] the use of the verb *√as* (‘to be, to exist’) to [denote] them is not figurative, for there is no difference in the cognition [of their existence].” (p. 89.12–14). In his commentary on this passage, Śaṅkhaṇḍī quotes a half-verse I was unable to identify so far, which expresses the same idea: *jātyādiṣv api sadbuddheḥ sattā taj jātiṣu sthitā* |; “Since the idea that ‘it exists’ also applies to universals, etc., existence (*sattā*) is also established for universals” (*Vyākhyā* p. 205.23–24). Thus, if it is true that the opposed Mīmāṃsaka notion of being as the “ability to be grasped by a valid knowledge” (*pramāṇagrāhyatā*) constitutes “one of the most conspicuous challenges to the Vaiśeṣika conception of being” (Halbfass 1993: 153), this might not have been its most immediate purpose.

¹² See NyK ad ViV 12 (SV – Introduction): *saṃprati ṭīkākārīyaṃ matam upanyasyati*; “Now he exposes the view of the Commentator [= Prabhākara]” (S 299.3 [= G 35.23]). The use of the word *ṭīkākāra* (“the Commentator”) to refer to Prabhākara, although it occurs only once in the NyK, is not exceptional in Mīmāṃsā literature. Śālikanātha, for instance, frequently contrasts the view of the *ṭīkākāra* (Prabhākara) with that of the *vārttikakāra*, the “Author of the *Vārttikas*” (Kumārila). See for instance *Rjuvimalā* 1.1.1 (M₁ 1.16) and 1.1.5 (M₁ 116.10–20); see also Raja 1934: 13. Similarly, in the *Vākyārthanirṇaya* (p. 89.12–13), Pārthasārathi Miśra identifies two of the main positions regarding the object of the sentence (*vākyārtha*) as that of the *ācārya* (“the Teacher,” i.e. Kumārila) and that of *ṭīkākārapādāḥ* (“the Reverend Commentator”), in which we clearly recognise Prabhākara’s *anvītābhīdhānavāda* (see also Rāmānujācārya’s commentary: *saṃprati* [...] *gurumataṃ svamataṃ cāha*; “Now he states the view of the Guru [= Prabhākara] [...], as well as his own” – *Nāyakaratna* p. 92.1).

work in the *vṛtti* on ViV 12–14 leaves, in fact, little doubt as to the identity of Maṇḍana’s main target. Still, I was unable to find in the *Bṛhatī* any clear statement confirming this attribution.¹³ Some characteristic features of this theory, beginning with the negation of *sattā* as a universal (*jāti*), are found in the works of Prabhākara’s earliest commentator, Śālikanātha (around 900),¹⁴ who always betrays close dependence on Maṇḍana’s works on that topic (the BS, in particular),¹⁵ so that it is impossible to know whether he or Prabhākara himself is the source of Śālikanātha’s elaborations.¹⁶ Our earliest testimonies for the opposition of the two ontologies outlined above are therefore Maṇḍana Miśra’s

¹³ See below, Section 2, for a discussion of the relevant passage of the *Bṛhatī* (2.1.1). Further evidence – admittedly negative – for Prabhākara’s relative indifference to “general” ontology is found in the *Bṛhatī* 1.1.5 (M₁ 158.5–159.3) and its commentary by Śālikanātha (*Rjuvimalā* 1.1.5 – M₁ 159.14–160.15). In this passage, which is part of Prabhākara’s refutation of the grammarians’ *sphoṭa*-theory, the author of the *Bṛhatī* rejects the existence of a universal *śabdatva* (“being-*śabda*”) because of the absence of any common feature between the various speech-sounds (*ka*, *ga*, etc.). However, he does not extend the application of this criterion to other universals. Śālikanātha, on the other hand, takes this discussion as an opportunity to reject *sattva* (“being”) on a similar basis: *etena sattvādisāmānyāni pratyuktāni. na hi jātiḥ guṇakriyādravyeṣu sādharmaṇākārāvamārśo ’sti, sadādiśabdānāṃ prameyādiśabdavat pravṛttisaṃbhavāt*; “By this [principle], generalities such as ‘being’ are [also] rejected, for one does not recognise (*ava-√mrś*) any aspect (*ākāra*) that would be common to universals, qualities, movements and substances; in fact, nothing prevents a word like *sat* (‘being’) from being used as the word *prameya* (‘knowable’)” (M₁ 159.17–19). Had there been a discussion of *sattā* elsewhere in the *Bṛhatī*, I find it likely that Śālikanātha would have developed his arguments in the corresponding section of his commentary, and not as an appendix to the discussion of *śabdatva*. Thus, although one cannot exclude that a discussion of ontological topics was carried out in Prabhākara’s presumably lost “Short Gloss” (*Laghvī* or *Vivaraṇa*) on Śabara’s *Bhāṣya*, this passage of the *Rjuvimalā*, which exactly parallels the discussion of *sattā* at the end of the *Jātinirṇaya* (see following note), rather suggests that the topic was introduced into the Prabhākara-tradition by Śālikanātha himself, possibly under Maṇḍana’s impulse.

¹⁴ See *Jātinirṇaya* (pp. 97.1–100.4) and *Rjuvimalā* 1.1.5 (M₁ 159.17–160.15).

¹⁵ As rightly pointed out by the editor of the *Jātinirṇaya*, A. Subrahmanya Sastri (p. 98, nn. 1–2), Śālikanātha’s refutation of *sattā* at the end of that treatise is mostly addressed to Maṇḍana, disdainfully called “another, who prides himself as a scholar” (*anyaḥ paṇḍitaṃjanya* – p. 98.1).

¹⁶ The refutation of the universal *sattā* became a familiar topic of later Prabhākara treatises, which rely in large measure on Śālikanātha’s treatment of the subject. See, for instance, Bhavanātha Miśra’s *Nayaviveka* 1.1.5 (pp. 100.5–101.5 and p. 180.3–4), generally dated in the 11th/12th century (Verpoorten 1987: 44) and the presumably later *Prabhākaravijaya* (pp. 62–65) by Nandīśvara (13th–14th c.).

treatises, especially the earlier one, the ViV, which will thus be the main focus of the present study.

My purpose in what follows is to highlight two related factors that must have contributed to the crystallisation of this opposition in the ViV and, later on, in the BS, both of which have to do with the interpretation of Vedic injunctions. The first factor was a theoretical attempt, unknown in earlier Mīmāṃsā, to account for the functioning of Vedic injunctions in terms of a particular relation between the action referred to by an injunctive verbal form and *time* as perceived by the listener. The second was a particular difficulty underlying Kumārila's theorisation of *dharma* (the main object of a Vedic injunction, according to MīSū 1.1.2) as an entity “not within the reach of the senses” (*nendriyagocaraḥ*) due to its relation to a future result,¹⁷ a difficulty that finds no clear solution in Kumārila's works. My contention is that Prabhākara's theory of the “commandment” (*niyoga*) represented, for Maṇḍana, the accomplishment of such an attempt to correlate injunction and time *and* thereby to provide a successful explanation for *dharma*'s imperceptibility, but that the introduction of the concept of “commandment” into Mīmāṃsā had consequences for ontology he was unwilling to accept. In order to avoid such consequences he had to produce his own theory of existence as presence (*vartamānatā*), a theory that would remain influential and associated with his name for many centuries to come, even when its exegetical origin would somehow fail to be clearly recognised.

My investigation will proceed in three steps. I shall consider, firstly, three theoretical models (all eventually rejected) found in the intermediate portion of Maṇḍana's *pūrvapakṣa* (ViV 8–14), converging in the elaboration of a *temporal interpretation of imperativity*. After examining the first two models separately (Section 1), I shall show how the last, Prabhākara's theory of the commandment, had decisive implications for the understanding of the relation between *dharma* and time, hence between *existence* and time (Section 2). Finally, we shall see how Maṇḍana, just before engaging in his *siddhānta* (ViV 25), proposed an alternative to Prabhākara's theory, improving on Kumārila's theory of *dharma* while remaining compatible with his own ontological premises (Section 3).

1. A temporal interpretation of imperativity. Two hypotheses (ViV 8–11)

Within the set of verbal suffixes (*lakāra*) introduced by Pāṇini in sections 3.2 and 3.3 of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (A) a fair number are justified by the speaker's intention

¹⁷ *Ślokaṇvārttika* (*codanā*°) k. 14d (quoted below – Section 3).

to express the *time* in which the action takes place. *laṭ* (the affix of the present tense), for instance, is introduced when the action referred to by the verbal base takes place at the moment of the enunciation (*vartamāne laṭ* [A 3.2.123]), *luṇ* (aorist) when it occurred in the past (*bhūte* [A 3.2.84] *luṇ* [A 3.2.110]), *lṛt* (future) when it will occur later on (*bhaviṣyati* [A 3.3.3] *lṛt śeṣe ca* [A 3.3.13]), and so on. This, however, is not the case of “modal” suffixes such as *loṭ* (imperative) and *lin* (optative) which, along with the suffixes used to form gerundives (*kṛtya*), are most typical of injunctive discourse.¹⁸ These suffixes are never defined by Sanskrit grammarians in relation to temporal characteristics of the prescribed action,¹⁹ but in reference to a set of “intentions” listed by Pāṇini – command (*vidhi*), invite (*āmantraṇa*), prayer (*adhīṣṭa*), etc.²⁰ – systematised already in Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya* as the triad of “command” (*ājñā/praiṣa/preṣaṇa*), “request” (*abhyarthanā/adhyeṣaṇa/adhyeṣaṇā*) and “permission” (*anuññā/abhyanuññā*), and collectively referred to by Bhartṛhari (5th c.) as “properties of the speaker” (*prayokṭṛdharma*).²¹ The group of stanzas here taken into consideration (ViV 8–14)

¹⁸ These three groups of suffixes are generally gathered together under the stereotyped phrase *linādi*, “*lin*, etc.,” freely translated here as “injunctive suffixes.”

¹⁹ As rightly pointed out by V. Vergiani, the grammatical definition of action (*kriyā*) as something “to be realised” (*sādhya*) found, for instance, at the beginning of Bhartṛhari’s *Kriyāsamuddeśa* (VP 3.8.1: [...] *sādhyaṭvenābhidhīyate* | [...] *tat kriyety abhidhīyate*; “[...] [that which] is expressed as something to be realised [...] is called ‘action’ [in grammar]”) does not have any temporal implications, so that “linguistically, tense is not an indispensable component of verb meaning” (Vergiani 2010: 391). On this distinction and on its difference from the similar distinction current in Mīmāṃsā, see below n. 88.

²⁰ See especially A 3.3.161 and 163.

²¹ On the concept of *prayokṭṛdharma* (“property of the speaker”), see David 2013b: 287–288 and Vergiani 2014. In the *pūrvapakṣa* of the ViV Maṇḍana makes repeated use of the twin expressions *prayokṭṛdharma/puruṣadharmā* (“property of the speaker”/“property of a person”) to designate the most immediately “perceived” (*pratīta/prajñā[ta]*) value of injunctive suffixes in the subjective experience of Sanskrit speakers. See ViV 3 (SV – S 155.3–156.1 [G 12.9–13.1]) and ViV 5 (*kārikā* and SV – S 195.1–196.1 [G 17.6–18.3]), both translated in David 2013b: 287–288, nn. 52–53. Maṇḍana’s debt to Bhartṛhari is, again, suggested by ViV 7, where the concept of *prayokṭṛdharma* is used to differentiate injunctive suffixes (*linādi*) from the affix of the causative (*ṇic*): *prajñāyate linādīnām vyañjanīyā pravartanā* | *prayokṭṛdharṃ na ṇico yathānīyatakartṛkā* || *lokād dhi śabdārthādhigamaḥ. tatra ca pravartanā niyatādhārā prayokṭṛsaṃśrayaiva linādyartho ’vagamyate. ṇijarthas tu sānīyatādhārā. na ca ṇijarthaval linādyartho ’pi bhavitum arhati, yathālokaprajñānam śabdārthavyavasthānār;* “[Ordinary speakers of Sanskrit] perceive that the instigation which is to be manifested (*vyañjanīyā*) by injunctive suffixes is a property of the speaker (*prayokṭṛdharma*), unlike [the instigation that is characteristic] of *ṇic* [= the affix of the causative], whose agent is variable (*anīyatakartṛ*).’ Sure enough, [our] knowledge of the meaning of speech[-units] is based on worldly usage. And there

is therefore the earliest (and perhaps the only) testimony to an attempt by Indian theoreticians to understand the linguistic phenomenon of imperativity on the basis of temporal characteristics belonging to the action (*kriyā/bhāvanā*) prescribed, or to its most immediate product. Our main concern here is of course not that Maṇḍana disagreed with such an approach, but rather that it was prominent enough in 7th-century Mīmāṃsā to deserve a relatively detailed treatment by one of its most eminent proponents, if only to be deemed an essential failure.

The unity of ViV 8–14 might not appear at first sight, embedded as it is in an exhaustive and apparently homogeneous series of refutations of all kinds of “objects” (*artha*) possibly aspiring to the rank of ultimate “cause of [human] activities” (*pravṛttihetu*), Maṇḍana’s most obvious purpose in that section of his *pūrvapakṣa* (ViV 5–14).²² Seven distinct “objects” are successively examined, whose knowledge ought to be sufficient, according to some, to explain the undertaking of *any* activity by a rational agent after hearing an injunction. These are: 1. the three “properties of a speaker” (*prayokṭṛdharma*) from the grammarians’

we understand that the meaning of injunctive suffixes (*linādi*) is an instigation whose subject is invariable (*niyatādhāra*), because it is always (*eva*) located in the speaker (*prayokṭṛsaṃśraya*). But [the instigation which is] the meaning of *ṇic* has a variable subject (*anīyatādhārā*). And the meaning of injunctive suffixes cannot be identical with the meaning of *ṇic*, for the establishment of the meaning of speech[-units] should conform to [our] perception (*prajñāna*) in worldly usage” (S 268.1–269.1 [= G 26.7–27.2]). Although such an explanation of the difference between injunctive and causative suffixes is not proposed by Bhartṛhari in the section of the *Sādhanaśamuddeśa* dealing with the difference between *loṭ* and *ṇic* (VP 3.7.125–126), a very close distinction is made by Helārāja in his commentary on VP 3.7.125 (*Prakīrṇaparakāśa* pp. 328.24–329.2, on which see Vergiani 2014). There is, of course, more than one possible explanation of such a similarity, particularly visible in the parallel idea that injunctive suffixes “manifest” (*√vyañj^{caus}*) (Maṇḍana)/“illuminate” (*√dyot^{caus}*) (Helārāja) intentions of the speaker without expressing (*abhi-√dhā*) them, but it is at least possible that the learned Kashmiri commentator directly adopted from Maṇḍana what he might have considered a trustworthy elaboration on Bhartṛhari’s views. In any case a direct filiation from Bhartṛhari to Maṇḍana on that particular point is very likely, and is further suggested by the quotation of another stanza from the *Sādhanaśamuddeśa* (VP 3.7.7) at the end of the immediately preceding portion of the *svavṛtti* on ViV 6 (S 266.2–3 [G 26.2–3]).

²² See ViV 5 (SV – Introduction): *astu tarhy arthabhedah. naitad api (...)*; “Well then, let [*vidhi*] be a certain kind of object! – This, also, is not the case (...).” (S 194.1 [G 17.5]). This proposal is made in direct reference to the three hypotheses enumerated at the very beginning of the treatise (ViV 2 [SV – Introduction]; S 66.1–70.1 [G 4.1–2]): *vidhi* (the cause of human activities when they are the result of an injunction) could either be a certain speech-unit (*śabda*), its operation (*vyāpāra*), or a certain object (*artha*) referred to by injunctive suffixes. The first two hypotheses are examined in ViV 2 and ViV 3–4 respectively. For an overview of these passages, see David 2015: 581–585.

psychological model of injunction (see above): command, request and permission (k. 5); 2. “incitement” (*pravartanā*), understood as their common objective denominator (k. 5); 3. the “[expected] result” (*phala*) of the prescribed action (k. 6); 4. the “act” (*karman*) in itself (k. 7); 5. “effectuation, provided that [its] particular [relationship to] time is not acknowledged” (*bhāvanā* [...] *aparāmrṣṭakālabhedā*) (k. 8); 6. “one’s own relation to the action, whose relation [with an agent] has not yet been obtained” (*aprāptasaṃbandhayā kriyayātmanaḥ saṃbandha[h]*) (k. 9–11); 7. “commandment” (*niyoga*), in the specific sense given to this term by Prabhākara (k. 12–14).²³ Apart from the first and last hypotheses, clearly

²³ A similar, though not entirely identical, list is found in BS 2.101–104 (SV): *nanv adhyavasāyaḥ, ākūtaḥ, ādyā pravṛttiḥ, kālatrayaviyuktaḥ pravṛttimātram, ajñātakriyākārṣaṃbandha itī vidhivido vidhiṃ vyācakṣate*; “[Objection:] but, those who know about *vidhi* (the cause of human activities) characterise it as (a) the decision (*adhyavasāya*), (b) the intention (*ākūta*), (c) the nascent activity (*ādyā pravṛttiḥ*), (d) the mere activity, detached from the three times (*kālatrayaviyuktaḥ pravṛttimātram*) [or as] (e) the [hitherto] unknown relation between an action and an agent (*ajñātakriyākārṣaṃbandha*)” (p. 117.3–4). It is easy to recognise under (d) and (e) positions (5) and (6) of the ViV respectively. According to Śaṅkhaṇḍī (Vyākhyā p. 241.24), position (a) of the BS should be identified with Prabhākara’s theory of the *niyoga* (7 in the ViV), but this identification is made somewhat implausible by the joint mention of positions (a)–(c) in ViV 8 (SV – S 267.5–268.1 [G 29.5]), with no connection whatsoever to Prabhākara’s theory. Older commentators on the ViV and BS agree in understanding *adhyavasāya* as *prayatna* (“effort”) and *ākūta* as *icchā/cikīrṣā* (“desire”/“desire to do”). See NyK (S 278.4–5 [G 29.21–22]), *Abhiprāyaprakāśikā* (p. 421.26) and *Bhāvaśuddhi* (p. 421.8). Only Śaṅkhaṇḍī differs in this respect by interpreting *adhyavasāya* as *niścaya* (“certitude”); his gloss of *ākūta* as *saṃkalpaviśeṣa* (“a particular wish”), on the other hand, corresponds to that of his predecessors (Vyākhyā p. 241.24–25). In any case all commentators agree that elements (a)–(c) in the BS appear to form a system, and constitute a rough description of the stages immediately preceding the performance of the main action that is undertaken. This “system” can, however, be seen in various ways. Thus Vācaspati, in the NyK, regards *adhyavasāya* and *ākūta* as two subdivisions of *ādyā pravṛttiḥ* (S 278.4–5 [G 29.21–22]), the latter preceding the former (on that point, see also Parameśvara’s *Juṣadhvaṇikaraṇī* – S 278.10–12). His conception can be summarised as follows (the arrow marks a succession in time):

ākūta/cikīrṣā (= *ādyā pravṛttiḥ* 1) → *adhyavasāya/prayatna* (= *ādyā pravṛttiḥ* 2) [→ *uttarā pravṛttiḥ*]

This, however, seems hardly compatible with the enumeration found in the BS, and it is regrettable that the corresponding part of Vācaspati’s *Tattvasamīkṣā* is not available to us. In any case some among the later commentators on the BS tend to interpret the three items (a)–(c) as three successive *stages* in the process leading to the main action. Śaṅkhaṇḍī (Vyākhyā p. 241.24–25), for instance, understands their succession as follows, in accordance with his “cognitive” interpretation of *adhyavasāya*:

adhyavasāya/niścaya → *ākūta/saṃkalpaviśeṣa* → *ādyā pravṛttiḥ* [→ *uttarā pravṛttiḥ*]

imputable to the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition and to Prabhākara respectively, none of these positions can be attributed with any certitude to a particular thinker or current of thought in or out of Mīmāṃsā, and it is not impossible that several of them were actually devised by Maṇḍana.²⁴ Leaving aside views (1)–(4), I shall now concentrate on the views where temporality plays a key role.

a. Activity without time: first hypothesis (ViV 8)

Among the last three hypotheses (5–7) only the first makes an explicit mention of the perception of time (*kāla*) as a reason for undertaking – or rather, for *not* undertaking – a certain action. It is voiced in the prose introduction to ViV 8:²⁵

Now, some [theoreticians] observed [in Śābara's *Bhāṣya* ways of speaking such as] “The effort of a person (*puruṣaprayatna*) is reiterated”²⁶ [or] “But the operation consisting of (*gata*) the oblation [or] the sprinkling of clarified butter [on the kindling sticks] (*homāghāragataḥ* [...] *vyāpārah*) is explicitly stated,”²⁷ [and] consider [on this basis] that the effectuation

This second interpretation of the process leading to the performance of the main action seems to be partly confirmed by Ānandapūrṇa, who considers that “the nascent activity immediately follows desire” (*ādyā pravṛttir icchānantarabhāvinī* – *Bhāvaśuddhi* p. 421.8–9), while Citsukha apparently has no definite opinion on that particular point. However it may be, the identification of *vidhi* with one or the other of those three elements does not seem to be taken very seriously by Maṇḍana, who briefly refutes it both in the ViV (S 277.5–279.1 [G 29.6–9]) and in the BS (p. 117.3–6).

²⁴ For a discussion of a possible attribution of the third hypothesis to Uddyotakara (*Nyāya-vārttika* 3.2.3 – p. 378.2), see Stern 1988: 20, who concludes, however, that it should not be ascribed to any Naiyāyika, but rather to “some now unidentifiable Mīmāṃsaka.”

²⁵ ViV 8 (SV – Introduction): *yasya tv 'evaṃ sati puruṣaprayatno 'nuvādaḥ*, ‘*homāghāragatas tu vyāpārah śrutycyata*’ *iti darśanāt cetanakartṛvyāpārātmikā, itarathā vā bhāvanā vidhiśabdaparyāyā līnartho 'parāmṛṣṭakālabhedā, laḍādiṣu tu sattve 'pi kāla-viśeṣeṇa vidhirūpapratibandhād apravṛttihetutvāt, yadyādibhir iva līnabhidheyāyāḥ iti darśanam*, (...) (S 269.1–271.3 [G 27.3–7]). A much shorter allusion to this thesis is found in BS 2.101–104 (SV), where Maṇḍana mentions a definition of *vidhi* as “mere activity, detached from the three times” (*kālatrayaviyuktaṃ pravṛttimātram*) (p. 117.3).

²⁶ ŚBh ad MīSū 4.1.5 [3]: *puruṣaprayatnaś caivaṃ sati anuvādaḥ*; “And this being so, the effort of a person is reiterated” (vol. 4, p. 1200.11–12).

²⁷ ŚBh ad MīSū 2.2.16 [5] (*pūrvapakṣa*): *nanv āghārayati, juhotīti homāghāragato <°gato em.: °mato Ed> vyāpārah śrūyate, na dadhyūrdhvatādisaṃbandhaḥ*; “[Objection:] but [in Vedic sentences such as] ‘He sprinkles with clarified butter’ [or] ‘He performs the oblation,’ it is the operation consisting of the oblation or the sprinkling of clarified butter that is explicitly stated, not the [simple] relation with curds [in the case of the oblation] or with the upper direction [in the case of sprinkling]” (vol. 2, p. 501.1–2). The two ritual acts referred to by Śābara are the sprinkling of clarified butter on the kindling sticks during the Darśapūrṇamāsa-ceremony and the Agnihotra-oblation. On the wider context

(*bhāvanā*) [itself], for which the word *vidhi* is a synonym and which consists in the operation of a conscious agent (*cetanakartrvṛyāpāra*) or in something similar,²⁸ is the object of *lin* [= the optative suffix], so long as its particular time is not considered (*aparāmṛṣṭakālabheda*). On the contrary, [so they argue,] in the case of *laṭ* [= the suffix of the present tense], even though [the effectuation] is present, it is not the cause of an activity (*pravṛttihetu*) because its quality of being *vidhi* is hindered by the particular time [expressed by the *laṭ*-suffix, i.e. the present time] (*kālavīṣeṣa*), just as it happens for the [effectuation] expressed by *lin* along with [particles] such as *yadi* (“if”), etc.

The two quotes from Śabara’s *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* (ŚBh), claimed here as a traditional basis for the *pūrvapakṣin*’s argument, are borrowed from two distinct and largely independent exegetical contexts. The first is taken from a chapter of the fourth *adhyāya* establishing that the “vows [related to] Prajāpati” (*prajāpativrata*)²⁹ such as “He should not look at the rising or setting sun” (*nodyantam ādityam ikṣeta, nāstaṃ yantaṃ*)³⁰ are observed by the sacrificer “for the sake of the person”

of this *adhikaraṇa*, see Benson 2010: 382–383 (especially n. 102).

²⁸ As Vācaspati rightly points out in the *Nyāyakanikā*, Maṇḍana probably alludes here to his own definition of “effectuation” (*bhāvanā*), in the *Bhāvanāviveka* (BhāV), as the “cessation of apathy” (*audāsīnyapracutyū/udāsīnatvaviccheda*), of which the “effort” (*prayatna*) of a conscious being is but a particular case. See NyK ad ViV 8 (SV – Introduction): **itarathā vā** *spandāspandasādhāraṇenaudāsīnyapracutyūpalakṣyamāṇātmavyāpāramātram*; “**or in something similar**, [for instance in] an operation in general (*vyāpāramātra*), whose nature is marked (*upa-√lakṣ*) by the cessation of [the agent’s] apathy (*audāsīnyapracutyū*), due to the fact that movement and absence of movement meant the same [to him]” (S 269.8–270.3 [G 27.16–17]). Cf. BhāV 5 (SV): *sakalapuruṣapratyātmavedanīyaś cetanasyātmāna audāsīnyapracutyūpalakṣyamāṇātmā prayatnaśabdasaṃvedanīyo*^b *vyāpāro bhāvanā*; “Effectuation (*bhāvanā*) is an operation, experienced individually by every human being, whose nature is marked by the cessation of apathy in a conscious self, and commonly referred to by the word *prayatna* (‘effort’)” (R 18.1–3 [J 8.2–3]). ^a *°pracyutyūpalakṣyamāṇātmā* R: *°pratyūpalakṣyamāś cātmā* J; ^b *prayatnaśabdasaṃvedanīyo* R: *prayatnādiśabdapravedanīyo* J; BhāV 48ac: *udāsīnatvavicchedasāmānyātmā tato mataḥ | karotyārthaḥ* (...); “Thus we consider that the object of the verbal root *√kr* (*karotyārtha* [= *bhāvanā*]) generally consists in the suppression of apathy (*udāsīnatvaviccheda*) (...)” (R 168.1–2, J 91.5–6). Maṇḍana’s definition of *bhāvanā* ultimately goes back to Kumārila’s elucidation of this concept in TV 2.1.1 [1] (SV on *k*. 33): *yad audāsīnyapracutyūtmātreṇa pariṣpandarūpaṃ nirūpyate, sā bhāvanā*; “That which is understood [in verbal forms such as *pacati* or *yajati*] as consisting of movement [in general] (*pariṣpandarūpa*), due to the mere cessation of apathy (*audāsīnyapracutyūtmātreṇa*), is [what we call] *bhāvanā* (‘effectuation’)” (text: Kataoka 2004: 85).

²⁹ On the *prajāpativrata*s, see Kane 1974: 24 (especially n. 42).

³⁰ Quoted in ŚBh ad MīSū 4.1.3 (vol. 4, p. 1198.8–9). For possible Vedic sources see Benson 2010: 134.

(*puruṣārtha*) – that is, for his own sake – and not for the sake of the sacrifice (*kratvartha*) (ŚBh ad MīSū 4.1.3–6). The second belongs to a section of the *Bhāṣya* stating that Vedic injunctions like “He sprinkles clarified butter upwards” (*ūrdhvam āghārayati*) or “He performs the oblation with curds” (*dadhnā juhōti*) merely teach the subsidiary nature of the mentioned elements (the upper direction for sprinkling ghee, curds as a substance for oblation in the Agnihotra rite), and do not prescribe a distinct ritual operation (ŚBh ad MīSū 2.2.16).³¹ This whole exegetical context appears, however, of little relevance to the *pūrvapakṣin*’s argument. It is more likely that both quotes were chosen simply because they state in a relatively unambiguous way that injunctive suffixes primarily denote the “effort” (*prayatna*) or the “operation” (*vyāpāra*) of a sentient being, two terms understood as rigorous synonyms of “effectuation” (*bhāvanā*).

Maṇḍana builds here on the theory of *bhāvanā* he propounded in the *Bhāvanāvivēka* (BhāV), according to which “effectuation” – consistently understood in his work as a synonym for Kumārila’s “objective effectuation” (*ārthī/arthātmikā bhāvanā*) – is the object of all verbal suffixes.³² He also presupposes his own definition of effectuation, in the same treatise, as the “suppression of apathy” (*udāsīnatvapracyuti/audāsīnyaviccheda*),³³ itself twofold: “effort” (*prayatna*) in the case of a conscious agent (*cetana*) or self (*ātman*), “movement” (*parispanda*) in the case of inanimate substances like chariots, etc. (*rathādi*).³⁴ On this basis Maṇḍana circumscribes the function of injunctive suffixes in an entirely negative way. Two verbal forms such as the imperative *gaccha* (“Go!”) and the present *gacchati* (“He goes”), for instance, have in common that the verbal suffix (respectively *loṭ* and *laṭ*, in Pāṇinian terms) denotes an effort on the part of a conscious agent. The difference between them lies in the fact that the latter does so by relating it to the present time (*vartamāna*), while the former simply refers to the effort without any perceivable reference to time. In other words, following this hypothesis, the use of the imperative (or one of its equivalents: the optative, etc.)

³¹ The gist of Śābara’s argument is summarised in the following lines of the *Bhāṣya*: *ūrdhvam āghārayati, dadhnā juhōtīti ca naitad uktaṃ bhavati: ‘āghāraḥ kartavyo,’ ‘homaḥ kartavyaḥ’ iti, kiṃ tarhy ūrdhvatāghārasaṃbandhaḥ kartavyo, dadhihomasāṃbandhaḥ kartavya iti*; “In [Vedic sentences such as] ‘He sprinkles upwards’ or ‘He makes the oblation with curds’ it is not said that the sprinkling or the oblation [in themselves] should be done, but rather that one should carry out the relationship between the clarified butter and the upper direction, or the relationship between curds and the oblation” (vol. 2, p. 500.9–12).

³² On Maṇḍana’s extension of Kumārila’s concept of (*ārthī/arthātmikā*) *bhāvanā* to all verbal suffixes, see Frauwallner 1938: 233–36.

³³ On this definition see above n. 28.

³⁴ See BhāV 48 (SV – R 170.1, J 91.7–9) and Frauwallner 1938: 238–39.

does not add any semantic value with respect to non-imperative verbal forms. The imperative rather represents the “primary” form of the verb³⁵ – the simple mention of an activity being in itself, as it were, an incitement to perform it –, to which assertive values such as the description of a present state of affairs or the narration of past events are simply added. In this last case the “natural” imperative value of the verb undergoes a process of dissimulation or, as Maṇḍana puts it, of “hindrance” (*pratibandha*) through the establishment of a relation between the action and a certain point of time in which it takes place, took place or will take place.³⁶

b. Validation by a future action: second hypothesis (ViV 9–11)

The obvious weakness of such a position, which is not taken up in later literature on injunction,³⁷ is that it assumes a necessary causal link between activity and the absence of consciousness of time without being able rationally to account for it. Why, after all, should an agent start walking when the idea of walking is suggested to him without relation to time? As Maṇḍana points out:³⁸

For sure, cognition of the mere form of a thing (*vasturūpamātra*) is not [in itself] the cause of an activity: when one grasps an object from [a single word like] “pot,” one does not [necessarily] act towards such an [object]!

³⁵ This “primacy” of the imperative and associated verbal forms is, of course, not to be understood in an historical, but in a semantic or derivative sense.

³⁶ It is hard not to be reminded, at that point, of the structural description of the imperative made by É. Benveniste in his famous article on the distinction between imperative and performative: “L’impératif n’est pas un temps verbal; il ne comporte ni marque temporelle ni référence personnelle. C’est le sémantème nu employé comme forme jussive avec une intonation spécifique” (Benveniste 1966: 274). The main point of divergence between Benveniste’s linguistic description of the imperative and the ViV’s analysis is, I believe, the stress laid by the former on the “specific intonation” thanks to which the “bare” verbal stem acquires its pragmatic value. Understandably such an extra-linguistic device plays no role in the present theory, which is meant to account also for “impersonal” injunctions such as those found in the Veda. Still, there is every reason to think that the external aspect of verbs in the imperative (which, in Sanskrit as in most Indo-European languages, have no visible termination in the third person singular) played a significant role in the elaboration of such a view.

³⁷ Although I was unable to find a later formulation of this hypothesis in a Mīmāṃsā text, an echo of this (or a similar) theory may be found in the sixth chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī* (10th/11th c.), Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. See David [2014] 2016.

³⁸ ViV 8 (SV): *na hi vasturūpamātrapratītiḥ pravṛttinimittam. na hi ghaṭa iti pratipadya tato ’rthaṃ tāvaty eva tasmin pravartate* (S 275.1–2 [G 28.9–10]).

It is therefore hardly surprising that the next hypothesis (6), discussed in ViV 9–11, should be centred precisely on the establishment of a relation (*saṃbandha*) between the agent and his proposed activity:³⁹

Now some people judge that the activity results from the cognition of one's relation with the action [expressed by the verbal root] (*kriyayātmanah saṃbandha[ḥ]*), whose relation [with an agent] has not [yet] been obtained (*aprāpta*). For instance, in worldly usage, [we often hear] “This is your task (*karman*) for today.”⁴⁰ [Objection:] even so (*atrāpi*), a [verb] in the future

³⁹ ViV 9 (SV – Introduction): *yad api samarthanam: aprāptasaṃbandhayā kriyayātmanah saṃbandhasya pratītyā pravṛttiḥ, yathādyā tavedaṃ karmeti loke. atrāpi lṛdante śrotuḥ pramāṇāntareṇānadhigatam artham avagamayati vidhitvaprasaṅgaḥ! – na nimittāntarāprāpte tasya tadabhidhānam, tatra nimittāntarāprāptasyaiva bhaviṣyattvenābhidhānād arthasya, liṅādibhis tu tathābhidhānam. ataś cājñātajñāpanam apravṛttappravartanam ubhayavidhāprāptipratishedhenāprāptakriyākartṛsaṃbandho vidhir iti vidhividām udgārāḥ* (S 279.3–282.2 [G 30.1–7]). Cf. BS 2.101–104 (SV): (...) *ajñātakriyākartṛsaṃbandhaḥ iti vidhivido vidhiṃ vyācaṣṭe*; “People who know about *vidhi* define it as (...), [or] as a [hitherto] unknown relation between an action and an agent” (p. 117.3–4).

⁴⁰ The relation (*saṃbandha*) which, on the present hypothesis, constitutes the specific import of the injunction is expressed in the example by the genitive *tava* (“your”). Vācaspati's explanations might not be out of place here: *svāminā hi yadā bhṛtyaṃ praty ucyate ‘caitra! adya tava nagaragamanam karma’ iti, tadā khalv ayaṃ caitra ātmano nagaragamanasaṃbandhaṃ svāmivacanād anyato ’nadhigatam avagamyā gamane pravartate. tathēhāpi svargakāmāder yāgādikriyāsaṃbandhaṃ liṅāder anyato ’nadhigatam avagamyā svargakāmasya yāgādau pravṛttir ity aprāptakriyākartṛsaṃbandha eva vidhir iti arthaḥ*; “When a master says to his servant ‘Caitra! Your task for today is to go to the city,’ Caitra understands the relation [established] between him and the action of going to the city, which he could not have understood without the master's statement, and acts accordingly. In the same way, here [= in the Veda], one first understands from *liṅ*, etc. the relation between someone who desires Heaven, for instance, and actions such as sacrificing, which cannot be understood without the injunction; then, one who desires Heaven undertakes the activity, e.g. a sacrifice. Thus *vidhi* [= the cause of an activity] is nothing but the relation between an action and an agent, which has not been obtained [before hearing the injunction]” (NyK ad ViV 9 [SV – Introduction] – S 279.13–280.6 [= G 30.12–16]). It is not impossible that the idea that the function of an injunction is newly to establish a relation between an action and an agent echoes Patañjali's reflections on the distinction between the imperative (*loṭ*) and the causative (*ṇic*) in the *Mahābhāṣya* ad A 3.1.26 (vt. 2 – vol. 2, p. 33.9–17). See also Helārāja's insightful remarks on the same topic in the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* ad VP 3.7.125 (pp. 327.19–328.25). The specific contribution of the grammarians is to show that, unlike other verbal suffixes, which rely on an independent relation of action and agent, the imperative establishes an entirely new agency (*navam eva [...] kartṛtvam* – *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* ad VP 3.7.125, p. 328.22) in a person who is not yet “possessed with action” (*sakriyā* – VP 3.7.126c), “for,” as Helārāja says, “an order is given [with the thought] ‘become the agent of that action!’, not when the agent is already there!” (*kriyāyām kartā bhaveti hi preṣyate, na tu kartaiva san* –

tense (*lṛḍanta*) [also] communicates an object which is not apprehended by any other means of [valid] cognition, so the undesired consequence [of your hypothesis] is that [the future affix *lṛt*] should also be [referred to as] *vidhi*! – It [= *lṛt*] (*tasya*) does not express this [relation] (*tadabhidhānam*) as something which has not been obtained by any other cause (*nimittāntarāprāpte*),⁴¹ for in the case of [a verb in the future tense] (*tatra*)⁴² the object (*artha*) expressed as future is already (*eva*) obtained by another cause (*nimittāntarāprāpta*).⁴³ On the contrary, [suffixes] such as *lin* express a [relationship] of this kind [i.e. that is not obtained by any other cause].⁴⁴ And that is the reason why people who know about *vidhi* repeatedly urge (*udgāra*) that *vidhi* is a relation [established] between an action and an agent that has not been obtained (*aprāptakriyākartṛsaṃbandho vidhiḥ*), a twofold “obtaining” (*prāpti*) being [thus] excluded: [an injunction] teaches what is not known (*ajñātajñāpana*) and puts into motion someone who is not in motion (*apravṛttappravartana*).⁴⁵

That this second analysis should involve a particular relationship between action and time is not immediately evident from the preceding explanation, where *vidhi* is simply defined as a kind of relation (*saṃbandha*) instituted by the injunctive sentence (“John, wash your hands!”) between its addressee (John) and a certain type of action (washing his hands), whose knowledge is considered sufficient to

Prakīrṇaparakāśa ad VP 3.7.125, p. 328.22–23).

⁴¹ See NyK: *pariharati codakaḥ* – **na nimittāntarāprāpte** kriyākartṛsaṃbandhe **tasya lṛḍādes**^a **tadabhidhānam** saṃbandhābhidhānam; “The opponent replies: **it** (*tasya*), i.e. *lṛt*, etc. **does not express this**, i.e. the relation **when it**, i.e. the relation between the action and the agent **is not obtained by any other cause**.” (S 280.13–281.3 [G 30.19–20/ M 41.12–13]). ^a *lṛḍādes* S: *linādes* var. (S) G M.

⁴² See NyK: **tatra** *lṛḍādu* (S 281.4 [= G 30.20]).

⁴³ By this we should understand that the hearer’s activity is not provoked by the sentence itself, but may be due to any other motive or cause (*nimitta*). For instance, a statement like “John will come tomorrow” expresses the relation between John and his future coming, but is not the cause of John’s coming, unlike a corresponding imperative statement like “John, come tomorrow!”

⁴⁴ See NyK: **tathābhidhānam** nimittāntarāprāptatayābhidhānam (S 281.5–6 [= G 30.21–22]).

⁴⁵ The classical definition of *vidhi/vidhāna* as the “conveying of what is not known” (*ajñātasya jñāpanam*) goes back to Śabara (ŚBh ad MīSū 2.3.4 [3] – vol. 2, p. 593.4–5 – see Stern 1988: 667), and one finds the definition of *vidhi* as the “putting into motion of someone who is not in motion” (*apravṛttappravartana*) in Prabhākara’s *Bṛhatī* 6.1.1 (M₅ 25.2 – see Stern 1988: 667). The joint mention of both conditions, however, might be Maṇḍana’s own contribution. Cf. BS 2.97cd–98a: *ajñātajñāpanam ato ’thāpravṛttappravartanam* || *vidhiṃ ācakṣate dhīrāḥ*; “The sages call *vidhi* the conveying of what is not known and the putting into motion of someone who is not in motion” (p. 114.1–3).

provoke the agent's activity. A closer look at the theoretical consequences of this hypothesis reveals, however, that the association of the action with a certain point of time (in that particular case, with the future) in the hearer's consciousness is not less vital to this position than the absence of such an association was to the preceding one.

As Maṇḍana makes clear at the end of the passage, the institution of the action/agent relationship at stake here implies that the action satisfies simultaneously two kinds of "non-obtaining" (*aprāpti*) or indeterminacy. The first is what we may call an *epistemological* indeterminacy: so that we can speak of the sentence as a "means of [valid] cognition" (*pramāṇa*), the hearer must have no clear idea of what is conveyed by the injunction before hearing it; in our example, John must still be unaware of his relation with the prescribed action. This should be distinguished from another kind of indeterminacy we could call *ontological*: the sentence should be the *only* cause (*nimitta*) of John's subsequent effort. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the prediction of a soothsayer for instance ("Now, John will go and wash his hands!"),⁴⁶ which, after all, also fulfils the first of these two conditions, an injunction must constitute in itself, one could say, the whole of the agent's motivational complex. But how can the knowledge of a relation *in itself* constitute a motive? Where, in other words, should the addressee's compliance (*anurodha*) with an impersonal prescriptive speech-unit (*śabda*) come from?⁴⁷

It is not my purpose here to analyse in detail the various attempts to answer these questions examined by Maṇḍana in ViV 9–11 and the corresponding *svavṛtti*. What is of interest to the present investigation is the opponent's recourse to an argument based on the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of injunctive sentences: were the action *not* to take place at any time, the injunction would simply lose its validity – strictly speaking, it would be "false" (*mṛṣā*) –, because the relationship between the action and a potential agent, which is supposedly its specific import, would never exist! Thus the mere consideration that the sentence is *true* should

⁴⁶ The example of the soothsayer – more precisely, the expert in palmistry (*sāmodra-vid*) – is traditional in Indian discussions on action. See for instance Śālikanātha's *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā* 2.4cd (SV) p. 427.6–7 and Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (*vidhi*^o) vol. 4.2, p. 170.4. The example may actually have been used for the first time by Maṇḍana (see ViV 11 [SV] S 298.2 [G 35.5]), who does not mention it, however, in that particular point of the discussion.

⁴⁷ See ViV 9 (SV): *nanv ihāpi śabdānurodhī pravartsyati. – na śabdānurodhe kiṃ cana nimittam*; "[Objection:] but even here [= in the case of an impersonal sentence, such as a Vedic injunction], he who complies with speech (*śabdānurodhin*) usually acts! – There is no reason [for the hearer] to comply with speech [in itself]." (S 284.2–3 [= G 31.4–5]).

be enough to explain the agent's activity. In fact no act of obedience is possible without at least a certain amount of confidence in the prescription, either based on personal charisma or on its belonging to an authoritative textual corpus.⁴⁸ In the *pūrvapakṣin*'s own words:⁴⁹

Still, [an injunction] has validity (*prāmāṇya*), and this [validity] is sanctioned (*samarthita*) by [the hearer's] activity (*pravṛtti*), for otherwise [i.e. if the hearer did not act] it would simply be false (*mṛṣā*)! [Objection:] how? – Since there is no past or present relationship [between the hearer and the action], if [that] person was not going to act at least in the future (*bhaviṣyaty api*), [the sentence] would have no [validity at all], so it would, alas, be false.

It would be all too easy to be ironical about the obvious circularity of such an argument (for why should anybody care to ensure the validity of the command that is given to him?⁵⁰). I find it more interesting to see how it presupposes a particular conception of the validity of injunctions, based not so much on the prescribed actions' being known or felt as mandatory as on their being actually performed, and relies on the existence of the action at a certain time.⁵¹ In other words, in the view reflected by this *pūrvapakṣa*, the action/agent relationship glossed by the phrase “This is your task for today” (*adya tavedaṃ karma*) should

⁴⁸ That the authority of an injunction should depend, at least in part, on its epistemic validation (*pramāṇīkaraṇa*) is by no means characteristic of the present hypothesis, and one can only subscribe to E. Freschi's observation that, for most Mīmāṃsakas, “the Veda is a deontic authority only insofar as it is an epistemic one. It pertains to the sphere of what must be done, but it derives its authority from the fact that it is the only instrument that enables us to know about this sphere” (Freschi 2012: 62).

⁴⁹ ViV 9 (SV): *prāmāṇyaṃ nanv asti, tac ca pravṛttau samarthitaṃ bhavati, anyathā mṛṣātvāpātāt. katham? – bhūtavartamānayoḥ saṃbandhayoḥ abhāvāt bhaviṣyaty api na cet puruṣaḥ pravarteta, na tat syād iti mṛṣātvāpātāḥ* (S 284.4–285.4 [G 31.5–7]).

⁵⁰ This is, in substance, Maṇḍana's counterargument in the following lines of the *svavṛtti*: *kāmaṃ bhavatu mṛṣā! kimartha 'yam asya śabdapramāṇīkaraṇaprayāsaḥ? bahutaraṃ ca tasyaivam āyasitavyam āpatati sakalamithyājñānapramāṇīkaraṇāt*; “Well then, let it be false! Why should this [person] make an effort to make this speech into a means of [valid] cognition? And he will have to make a good effort indeed, should he make every false cognition into a valid one!” (S 286.1–3 [= G 31.8–32.1]).

⁵¹ This is indeed, as far as I can see, one of the only passages in Mīmāṃsā literature which clearly asks whether injunctions should be validated by the actual performance of the prescribed action or rather constitute statements “modally distinct from the statements of facts, and (...) hence valid in a different way” (Freschi 2012: 62). Although the overwhelming majority of Mīmāṃsakas, no doubt, subscribe to the second view, and consider that the authority of the Veda has nothing to do with the people's actually performing Vedic rituals, the present discussion suggests, nonetheless, that the alternative possibility was taken seriously by at least some early theoreticians.

not be understood on the mode of an *ought*, but rather as something that necessarily *will be* (in the future), with the notable restriction that it will be only in virtue of its being verbalised (“John, you *will* wash your hands!”). By apparently circumscribing the validity of injunctions in terms of “true” or “false” (rather than “trustworthy” or “delusive”), Maṇḍana’s *pūrvapakṣin* reduces prescriptions to a particular case of description of future actions, in a way that recalls the definition of the imperative in the initial section of Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous essay on *Intention*:⁵²

An imperative will be a description of some future action, addressed to the prospective agent, and cast in a form whose point in the language is to make the person do what is described. I say that this is its point in the language, rather than that it is the purpose of the speaker, partly because the speaker might of course give an order with some purpose quite other than that it should be executed (e.g. so that it should *not* be executed), without detriment to its being an order.

2. An ontology of commandment? Third hypothesis (ViV 12–14)

Now, in spite of their intrinsic interest, the two hypotheses discussed above appear as nothing but a preliminary to Maṇḍana’s real *pièce de résistance* in that section of his *pūrvapakṣa*, namely his confrontation with Prabhākara’s theory of the commandment. Again the centrality of time is striking, especially in comparison with its almost total disappearance in subsequent writings on injunction.⁵³ Let us first consider Maṇḍana’s general rendering of Prabhākara’s theory:⁵⁴

⁵² Anscombe 1963: 3. Equally relevant to the present discussion is Anscombe’s remark that “execution-conditions for commands correspond to truth-conditions for propositions” (p. 3), an order being called “sound” or “unsound” rather than “true” or “false” (as an assertion) due to what she calls a “dispensable usage” (p. 3), in other words to a mere linguistic habit. By ascribing the distinction between commands and (other types of) prediction to a fact of “superficial grammar” (p. 4), she nonetheless seems to go one step beyond what would be acceptable to an Indian theoretician, in so far as the second condition of “non-obtaining” (*aprāpti*) which characterises injunctive suffixes (the injunction being the unique cause of the agent’s activity) should be enough, in the present case, to justify the intuitive distinction between the use of the future tense and of the various injunctive suffixes, simply reflected by grammatical formalisation.

⁵³ Among the few later works regarding temporality as a key dimension of Prabhākara’s theory of *niyoga*, the *Śābdanirṇaya* (ŚN) by the Vedāntin Prakāśātman (950–1000) stands out for its extensive treatment of the topic. See in particular ŚN 56–57 (SV – pp. 233–234 [= G 53.10–54.3]). As I have shown elsewhere (David 2020a: 495–98), Prakāśātman borrows most of his arguments from the ViV, with which he shows a deep familiarity.

⁵⁴ ViV 12 (SV – Introduction): *yad api darśanam – pramāṇāntarāgocaraḥ śabdāmātrā-lambano niyukto ’smṛti pratyātmavedanīyaḥ sukhādivad aparāmṛṣṭakālatrayo linādīnām*

According to another view (*yad api darśanam*), *vidhi*, the object of injunctive suffixes, lies beyond the domain of other [= non-Vedic] means of [valid] cognition, [and it is therefore] exclusively dependent on [Vedic] speech (*pramāṇāntarāgocaraḥ śabdāmātrālabanaḥ*);⁵⁵ it is experienced individually, just like pleasure and similar [feelings], [in the cognition] “I am bound [to this task]” (*niyukto 'smṛti*), [and] its [relationship to the] three times is not acknowledged (*aparāmṛṣṭakālatraya*).

In this crucial passage Maṇḍana defines the entity soon to be named “commandment” (*niyoga*),⁵⁶ and thus addresses one of the key concepts of Prabhākara’s Vedic hermeneutics, to which he will devote a full chapter of the BS, the so-called “Chapter on Commandment” (*Niyogakāṇḍa*).⁵⁷ The introduction of this concept

artho vidhir iti (S 298.5–299.2 [= G 35.7–9]).

⁵⁵ I follow Vācaspati’s interpretation of the compound *śabdāmātrālabana*. See NyK: *śabdāmātrālabanaḥ*. *śabdāmātram ālabanam āśrayaḥ pratipādatayā yasya sa tathoktaḥ*; “**Exclusively dependent on [Vedic] speech.** This is said of an [entity] whose *ālabana* (‘base’) – that is, its ‘support’ (*āśraya*) – is [Vedic] speech, and nothing else (*śabdāmātra*), inasmuch as [speech] is what conveys it” (S 299.5–6 [= G 35.24–25]). For a different interpretation of the same compound as a *tapuruṣa* (with a masculine *ālabanaḥ?*), see Yoshimizu 1997: 244, who considers that *ālabana* refers to the “object of words” (“Gegenstand der Worte”), not to the cause of our knowledge of the *niyoga*.

⁵⁶ The first occurrence of the term *niyoga*, which becomes recurrent in the subsequent part of the text, is found in ViV 12 (SV) S 301.1–2 (different text in G 36.6–37.1).

⁵⁷ The only extensive study of Prabhākara’s concept of *niyoga* available to date is Yoshimizu 1997. On Maṇḍana’s critique of this theory, see also Yoshimizu 1989 (in Japanese). It is impossible to render with a single English word all the nuances of this Sanskrit term, which covers a wide semantic field ranging from “command” or similar intentions to “duty,” understood as that which is to be fulfilled *by* the action (see, for instance, the examples given in Apte, *Dictionary* [s.v.]). For a discussion of the translation of *niyoga* into German, see Yoshimizu 1997: 10 (n. 1), who chooses the German “Weisung,” more or less equivalent to the English “directive.” A literal translation of *ni-√yuj* as “to appoint” (as when we say, for instance, that somebody is “appointed” to a certain office or task, with “appointment” and “appointee” respectively translating *niyoga* and *niyojya*) would be possible and generally quite faithful, but sounds awkward in English in many contexts. It seems, besides, necessary to distinguish between (at least) two usages of the term *niyoga*, which are closely related and are both present in Prabhākara’s work. 1. In a first sense, *niyoga* is the “command(ment)” of an authoritative person or text, understood as a particular speech-act or sentence whose *content* is an obligation (*kārya*). This more common sense of *niyoga* is still found, for instance, in the *Bṛhatī* 1.1.25 [7]: *tataś ca kāryābhidhāyitā loke niyogasyāvagatā, ‘ācāryacoditaḥ karomi’ iti hi darśanam*; “And therefore we understand from worldly usage that a commandment (*niyoga*) expresses an obligation (*kārya*), for we hear [statements such as] ‘I am doing (*karomi*) what the master ordered me to do’” (M₁ 386.2–387.1). See also *Bṛhatī* 2.1.1 [1] (M₂ 303.2), translated below,

in the ViV constitutes an important move in Maṇḍana's argument, since all hypotheses considered so far were meant to account for both "worldly" and ritual action, while the domain of application of the concept of *niyoga* is strictly restricted to the analysis of Vedic injunctions. As it is generally interpreted by Prabhākara and his followers, the *niyoga* is a specific object (*artha*) conveyed by an injunctive verbal suffix (and by no other means), which is "to be realised" (*kārya*) by the action referred to by the verbal root.⁵⁸ It is therefore distinct both

and ViV 14 (SV) S 325.1 (G 62.2), where "the master's command(ment)" (*ācāryaniyoga*) is put into equation with "the king's decree" (*rājaśāsana*). 2. In a second, more frequent sense, the *niyoga* is what "binds" (*ni-√yuj*) a certain person to a certain task; it is therefore on the side of the object (*artha*), not on the side of speech (*śabda*). See for instance *Bṛhatī* 1.1.25 [7]: *pravartakatvaṃ tu śabdārthaḥ, sarvatrāparityāgāt. – ato niyogābhidhānam idam*; "[Objection:] but the incitement (*pravartakatva*) must be the object of [injunctive] speech[units], for it is never absent [when they are uttered]. – Then, it is [a case of] expression of a commandment (*niyoga*)!" (M₁ 388.2–3). These two senses of the word *niyoga* might have been confused, to a certain degree, in common Sanskrit parlance due to the relative polyvalence of the primary suffix *-a* (*ghañ*, according to Pāṇini's grammar) with which it is formed. A specialisation of the term is seen, however, in the practice of later Prabhākara authors. Only the second, "objective" signification of *niyoga* is commonly found, for instance, in the work of Śālikanātha, who technically defines *niyoga* in the *Vākyārthamātrikā* (2.26) as "that which, being an obligation (*kārya*), incites the [person] to whom the commandment is given (*niyojya*) to its own [undertaking]" (*kāryatvena niyojyaṃ [...] svātmani prerayan* – p. 441.7). He therefore considers *niyoga* as a synonym of *kārya* ("obligation") and *apūrva* ("the Unprecedented"), and this exclusively in a Vedic context (as far as I know, the "worldly" obligation, identical with the action to be done, is never called *niyoga* by Śālikanātha). On the equivalence between *niyoga* and *apūrva* for Śālikanātha see for instance *Ṛjuvimalā* 1.1.25 [7]: *niyogaśabdena kriyāvyatiriktam apūrvam (...) ucyate*; "The word *niyoga* refers to the Unprecedented (*apūrva*), distinct from the action [referred to by the verbal root] (...)" (M₁ 387.18). This last, technical usage being an adaptation, for technical purposes, of the more common sense of the word, I prefer to keep trace of this origin by giving a uniform translation of *ni-√yuj* as "to command" and of *niyoga* as "commandment," without trying to render the etymology. It seems, besides, that Maṇḍana was still thinking of the *niyoga* as a form of commandment emanating from an authoritative person, as appears from some of his arguments in the ViV, which simply would not make sense in the context of the Prabhākara theory as canonised by Śālikanātha. See for instance ViV 12 (SV): *api ca niyoktrvyāpāro niyogo na niyoktur vināvakalpate. na cāsya sambhavaḥ, apauruṣeyatvāc chabdasya pratiṣedhāt*; "Moreover, a commandment, which is the operation of [a person] who commands, cannot be conceived in the absence of [a person] who commands. And such a [person] does not exist [in the case of the Veda], for it has been denied for [Vedic] speech, since it lacks a personal [author]" (S 326.2–27.1 [G 43.2–44.1]).

⁵⁸ See *Bṛhatī* 1.1.2 [2]: (...) *kārya eva cārthe vedasya prāmāṇyam (...). na ca pramāṇāntarāvagamyo 'yam arthaḥ*; "The Veda is a means of [valid] cognition only with respect to an object that is to be realised (...). And this object cannot be known by any other

from the action (*kriyā*) and from its various factors (*kāraṇa*).⁵⁹ Accordingly, Prabhākara can say that the action is at the same time its content (*viṣaya*) – I am commanded *to perform* a certain action – and its instrument (*karaṇa*) – I am “accomplishing” the commandment *through* the action.⁶⁰ Following this analysis, in a Vedic (or pseudo-Vedic) injunction like *svargakāmo yajeta* (“Let him who desires Heaven sacrifice!”), the optative verbal form *yajeta* states that a certain “commandment” is to be accomplished (*kārya*) by the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) through the sacrifice (*yāga*) referred to by the verbal root \sqrt{yaj} (“to perform a sacrifice”). The sacrificial act is therefore at the same time *what* the sacrificer is commanded to do (the content of the commandment) and that *through which* this commandment reaches its fulfilment (its instrument).

Later expositions of Prabhākara’s theory tend to lay exclusive stress on the privilege of the Veda as an epistemic source for knowing the commandment, the *niyoga* being at the same time something known only through the Vedic speech and the only object specifically conveyed by the Veda. Compare, for instance, Maṇḍana’s presentation of Prabhākara’s theory with that of a later (Bhāṭṭa-)Mīmāṃsaka, Pārthasārathi Miśra (1050–1120?),⁶¹ at the beginning of his *Vidhinirṇaya* (I underline the elements directly borrowed from the ViV):⁶²

Vidhi is the commandment (*niyoga*), which lies beyond the domain of other means of [valid] cognition [and is therefore] exclusively dependent on speech[-units] such as *liṅ*, etc. Its nature is that it has to be accomplished (*kāryātman*) [and] its content is a process [= an action] such as the sacrifice; it incites the [person] to whom the commandment is given (*niyojya*), [for instance] he who desires Heaven, to its own [undertaking].

means” (M₁ 23.5–7).

⁵⁹ The distinction between the *niyoga* and the action expressed by the verbal root in a Vedic injunction is made by Śālikanātha in the *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā* 2.23bd: (...) *vidhivācibhiḥ* (|) *kāryaṃ kālāntarasthāyī kriyāto bhinnam ucyate*; “(...) [Speech-units] that are expressive of *vidhi* convey an obligation persisting in a later time [and] distinct from the action [expressed by the verbal root] (*kriyāto bhinnam*)” (p. 436.2); *Vākyārthamāṭṛkā* 2.25ab: *kriyādibhinnam yat kāryaṃ vedyam mānāntarair na tat*; “This obligation, which is distinct from the action and [its factors] cannot be known by any other means [than the Vedic injunction]” (p. 441.3–4). See also *Rjjuvimalā* 1.1.25 (quoted above n. 57). I see no good reason to think that Śālikanātha is unfaithful to Prabhākara on this particular point.

⁶⁰ On these two aspects of Prabhākara’s concept of *niyoga* see Yoshimizu 1997: 79–82.

⁶¹ On Pārthasārathi’s date, see Verpoorten 1987: 41.

⁶² *Vidhinirṇaya* 1 (SV): *pramāṇāntarāgocarō liṅādiśabdāmātrāḷambanah kāryātmā yāgā-dibhāvārthagocaraḥ svargakāmādinīyojyam ātmani prerayan niyogo vidhir iti* (p. 63.3–5).

We can see how Pārthasārathi draws heavily on the ViV but, at the same time, considerably reduces its scope. In fact such a presentation, without being properly unfaithful, significantly underplays at least two central elements in Maṇḍana's understanding of Prabhākara's theory: the nature of the experience of the commandment, first of all, namely the certitude of being "bound" (*niyukta*) to a certain task, a certitude whose vividness and immediacy make it comparable with the experience of pleasure and other feelings;⁶³ secondly, the absence of its relation to time (*kāla*): the commandment being essentially known as something "to be accomplished" (*kārya*), this excludes all relationships to past and present time, but also, according to Maṇḍana's *pūrvapakṣin* at least, relation to a future course of events.⁶⁴

⁶³ The "intimate" or "inward" (*āntara*) nature of both pleasure and the commandment is well underlined by Vācaspati, who also insists that pleasure is experienced only through the mind (*manomātrapravedanīya*) – hence through a single epistemic source – a point that plays no obvious role in Maṇḍana's use of the comparison. See NyK ad ViV 12 (SV): *yathā hi saṃtāpadhūnaś candanānulepanānantaram āntaram api manomātrapravedanīyam āmilitalocanaḥ sukhabhedam ananyapramāṇakam anubhavati, evaṃ niyogam api liṅādivākyaśravaṇānantaram ity arthaḥ*; "Just as someone who is afflicted by a burning heat, after smearing [his body with] sandal paste, feels with his eyes closed a great pleasure, most intimate, experienced only through the mind and inaccessible to other means of knowledge, so does one [feel] the commandment after hearing a sentence [with] an injunctive suffix" (S 299.9–12 [G 35.27–30]). The subordination of the last two properties of the *niyoga* to the first – its radical inaccessibility to non-Vedic *pramāṇas* – is characteristic of Vācaspati's reading of this passage of the ViV and does not directly result from Maṇḍana's explanation.

⁶⁴ As in the case of the *niyoga*'s inwardness (*āntara*[*tva*], see preceding note), Vācaspati interprets this last characteristic as a reason (*hetu*) justifying the idea of the commandment's inaccessibility to all non-Vedic *pramāṇas*. See NyK ad ViV 12 (SV): *pramāṇāntarāgocaratve hetum āha*; "He states the reason for [the commandment's] inaccessibility to other means of [valid] cognition" (S 299.9–300.8 [= G 35.30]). Unlike in the preceding case, this interpretation seems to be confirmed by Maṇḍana later on in the same discussion. See ViV 12 (SV): *yad api pramāṇāntarāṇām kālaviparivṛtyartha-viṣayatvāt kurv iti tadaparāmarśād ananyagocaratvam...*; "Now if someone says that the other means of [valid] cognition are about things [subject to] the passing of time (*kālaviparivṛtti*) so that, inasmuch as one does not acknowledge it [= time] when one hears 'Do it!,' [the commandment] is inaccessible to other [means of valid cognition], [we answer...]" (S 327.1–2 – The text in G [44.2] is fragmentary).

This last point, which allows Maṇḍana to pick up the thread of the discussion started in ViV 8, might be made in direct reference to a short, but crucial, passage of Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* (2.1.1 [1]),⁶⁵ which reads as follows:⁶⁶

And therefore,⁶⁷ only the number (*saṃkhyā*) pertaining to the agent or to the object is expressed, in a finite verb (*ākhyāte*), by the [grammatical] number (*vacana*).⁶⁸ The agent and other [factors of action] are not, for they can be known through other means of [valid] cognition: either through the [Vedic] commandment⁶⁹ or through perception and the like. And therefore,

⁶⁵ Yoshimizu (1997: 244, n. 55) regards as “probable” the identification of this passage as Maṇḍana's direct source. This conclusion is corroborated by Vācaspati's commentary, where Prabhākara's most significant statement (*kāraṇavyāpāro hi kālātrayāvacchedyo nādhikāraḥ*) is quoted and discussed. See NyK ad ViV 12 (SV) (S 330.3–4 [G 45.9]).

⁶⁶ *Bṛhatī* 2.1.1 [1]: *ata eva cākhyāte^a kartṛkarmagatā saṃkhyocyate vacanaiḥ, na punaḥ kartrādayaḥ. pramāṇāntarāvagamāyā hi te, niyogataḥ pratyakṣādibhir vā. ata eva ca^b niyogaḥ kārye 'py arthe na bhaviṣyantam artham avagamayati. kāraṇavyāpāro hi kālātrayāvacchedyaḥ, nādhikāraḥ* (M₂ 303.1–4). ^a *ākhyāte* Ms: *ākhyātārthe* Ed; ^b *ca* Ms corr. (Yoshimizu): *tu* Ed. Readings from the only known manuscript of the *Bṛhatī*, kept at the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta) and marked “Ms,” are borrowed from Yoshimizu 1997: 243–44 and 409, who also provides the only existing translation of the passage (into German).

⁶⁷ The justification for the next statement is Prabhākara's view that a verbal ending (*tiṇvibhakti* – *Ṛjuvimalā* M₂ 303.6) does not express the relation (*saṃbandha*) between the action expressed by the finite verb (*ākhyāta*) and its various factors (the agent, etc.), a point on which Prabhākara claims the authority of Pāṇini: *ākhyātaṃ na saṃbandhe smarati pāṇiniḥ*; “Pāṇini does not teach that a finite verb [refers] to a relation” (*Bṛhatī* 2.1.1 – M₂ 302.2). See also Śālikanātha's comments in the *Ṛjuvimalā* (M₂ 302.22–303.7 – translation: Yoshimizu 1997: 243, n. 146).

⁶⁸ I adopt the reading *ākhyāte* (instead of *ākhyātārthe*, as in the Madras edition) from the Calcutta manuscript of the *Bṛhatī* (see Yoshimizu 1997: 243, n. 149 and above n. 66), although K. Yoshimizu prefers to keep the reading *ākhyātārthe* found in Śālikanātha's commentary (M₂ 303.6). He accordingly translates the sentence as follows: “Durch die Personalendungen (*vacana*) wird eben deshalb nur die Zahl, die zum Agens bzw. dem Ziel des Gegenstands des Verbums (d. h. der Handlung) gehört, ausgedrückt” (p. 243). This choice, however, makes the syntactical construction of the sentence unnecessarily complicated, in my opinion. The identification Yoshimizu proposes of *vacana* with *tiṇvibhakti* (“personal ending”) on the basis of Śālikanātha's use of the term *tiṇvibhakti* in the *Ṛjuvimalā* (M₂ 303.7–9 – see also Yoshimizu 1997: 143, n. 146) is possible, but not absolutely compelling. I find it equally plausible that Śālikanātha simply uses a more generic term, even while understanding *vacana* in Prabhākara's text in its usual sense of “[grammatical] number.”

⁶⁹ On this point see *Ṛjuvimalā*: *vede niyogataḥ kartur avagamaḥ. yasya niyojyatvaṃ, tasyaiva kartṛtvam. tena niyogataḥ kartur avagamaḥ*; “In the Veda, the agent is known through the [Vedic] commandment: the [person] to whom the commandment is addressed (*niyojya*) becomes, precisely, the agent. Therefore, the agent is known through the [Vedic]

the [Vedic] commandment,⁷⁰ although it [refers to] an object [that is] to be done (*kārya*), does not convey a future object (*na bhaviṣyantam artham avagamayati*), for [only] the operation of a factor of action is to be delimited be the three times (*kālatrayāvacchedya*), not the duty [to perform the rite] (*adhikāra*).⁷¹

Prabhākara's most important statement for our purpose is, of course, his final claim that the object "to be done" (*kārya*) – here called *adhikāra* ("duty") or *niyogārtha* ("the object of the commandment" – *Rjuvimalā*), but referred to as *niyoga* ("commandment") elsewhere in the *Bṛhatī* and in Maṇḍana's rephrasing of the theory⁷² – escapes the delimitation by the three times (*kālatrayāvacched[a]*): past, present and future. This statement, however, leaves space for at least two interpretations, both of which can claim support in the later tradition, as we shall see. According to a "weaker" interpretation of Prabhākara's statement, there is no absolute ontological difference between the *niyoga*⁷³ and other entities existing in time. A relation of the *niyoga* to future time does exist, but it is not perceived

commandment" (M₂ 303.11–12 – equivalent German translation in Yoshimizu 1997: 244, n. 151; see also Yoshimizu's very useful explanations in the same note). Unlike for the second occurrence of the term (see following note), Śālikanātha does not make clear whether he understands *niyoga* here as an individual speech unit (*lin*, etc.) or as the injunctive statement taken as a whole.

⁷⁰ Although Śālikanātha (*Rjuvimalā* – M₂ 303.14) identifies the commandment with "a speech[-unit] such as *lin*" (*linādiśabda*), I see no real benefit in this "technicisation" of the term *niyoga*, which could simply refer, in its two occurrences in this passage of the *Bṛhatī*, to the injunctive sentence taken as a whole. Yoshimizu (1997: 244) follows Śālikanātha and translates the word *niyoga* as "der (Wortteil für die Bezeichnung) der Weisung (d. h. die Optativendung u. ä.)."

⁷¹ On the interpretation of the word *adhikāra*, see *Rjuvimalā*: *nādhikāro na niyogārthā ity arthaḥ*; "**not the entitlement**; the meaning is: not the object of the commandment" (M₂ 303.18).

⁷² The equation of the three concepts of *adhikāra* ("duty"), *niyoga* ("commandment") and *kārya* ("obligation") in this context is made by Vācaspati while commenting Prabhākara's statement in the NyK. See NyK ad ViV 12 (SV): *avyāpārātmatayādhikāro niyogaḥ kāryam na kālatrayasambhinnaḥ*; "Since it is not an operation (*vyāpāra*), duty, [i.e.] commandment or obligation, is not mixed up with [any of] the three times" (S 330.5 [= G 45.10]).

⁷³ In order to avoid confusion between post-Prabhākara nomenclature and Prabhākara's own terminological habits, I shall use from now on the word *niyoga* to refer exclusively to the commandment in its *objective* dimension (= duty, appointment, etc.), i.e. as a synonym for Prabhākara's "entitlement" (*adhikāra*), thus *not* in the sense it had in the above passage of the *Bṛhatī*, where it stood for the commandment in its *linguistic* dimension (= order, injunction, etc.). On the distinction between these two meanings of *niyoga* in Prabhākara's work see above n. 57.

by the listener due to the particular mode of expression of the commandment (the imperative, etc.), which leaves it unnoticed. By contrast, a “stronger” interpretation of the theory would claim that the *niyoga*’s separation from the three times is not a mere fact of language, but characterises its very mode of existence: the commandment exists, objectively, without any relation to past, present or future. Following this second interpretation, which alone has bearing on ontology, we must say that the commandment as understood by Prabhākara literally *is* “without time” (*kālavivikta*).⁷⁴

The most uncompromising supporter of the first, “weaker” interpretation of Prabhākara’s view is no doubt his faithful commentator Śālikanātha, who makes it absolutely clear in the *Rjuvimalā* that, for him, *to be known* (verbally) without relation to time does not by any means imply that the thing *is* without time:⁷⁵

Although the quality of being an obligation (*kāryatā*) concerns something [that will happen] in the future (*bhaviṣyat*), its being future is not understood by the word (*pada*) [= the injunctive suffix].

Such an interpretation is certainly allowed by Prabhākara’s formulation and even, one may say, by Maṇḍana’s general rendering of the theory in the ViV: provided one interprets the verb *parā-√mṛś* in Maṇḍana’s expression *aparāmṛṣṭakālatraya* in a cognitive sense (“to acknowledge,” as in our translation of the passage above), even his description of Prabhākara’s theory does not, strictly speaking, imply that a relation of the prescribed action to time does not *exist*, but only that it is not *recognised* when we hear an injunction.⁷⁶

As to the second, “stronger” interpretation of Prabhākara’s statement, we find one of its earliest formulations after Maṇḍana in a short passage of the second *āhnika* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM) dealing with the perception of Yogis, a text to which attention was drawn for the first time by John Taber.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ See ViV 12cd: *kālaviviktaṃ ca khaṇuṣpavat* (S 300.3 [= G 36.3] – translated below).

⁷⁵ See *Rjuvimalā* 2.1.1: *bhaviṣyadviṣayāyām api kāryatāyām na padena bhaviṣyattvā-vagamasiddhiḥ*^a (M₂ 303.15–16). ^a *bhaviṣyattva° em.: bhaviṣyatva°* Ed. German translation in Yoshimizu 1997: 244.

⁷⁶ Recall that the same verb *para-ā-√mṛś* is already used in Maṇḍana’s formulation of the first hypothesis (see above, Section 1a) in the introduction to ViV 8.

⁷⁷ NM₁ 270.11–271.8; partial translation in Taber 2005: 178, n. 18. I find it very plausible that Jayanta borrowed this interpretation from Umbeka’s commentary on the *Śloka-vārttika* (*pratyaḥsa°*) k. 34, which will be dealt with later on (Section 3). Umbeka might, then, be considered the earliest advocate of the “stronger” interpretation of Prabhākara’s statement after Maṇḍana. The connection of his argument to the ViV is, however, less evident than in the case of Jayanta.

These lines, sometimes mistaken for a restatement of Kumārila's views,⁷⁸ deserve special attention in the present context as Jayanta here unambiguously considers the hypothesis of an objectively "timeless" object of the Veda. In a skilful adaptation of Maṇḍana's *pūrvapakṣa* to the debate on the perception of Yogis,⁷⁹ the 9th-century Kashmiri philosopher refers polemically to the difficulty Yogis have in perceiving *dharma* if it is "devoid of contact with the three times" (*trikālasparśavarjita* – NM₁ 270.11), in other words if it is "not delimited by the three times" (*trikālānavacchinna* – NM₁ 271.3). In so doing, Jayanta implicitly proposes a different interpretation of the verb *parā-√mrś* in the compound *aparāmṛṣṭakālatraya* of the ViV, not as "to acknowledge" but as "to touch," "to be in contact with" the three times. It is clear that Jayanta is not speaking here of a property of our verbal knowledge of *dharma* from Vedic injunctions which, obviously, is not what is at stake in the case of Yogis, but of an intrinsic characteristic of *dharma* making it radically imperceptible even to Yogis.

That Maṇḍana himself took this second possibility very seriously appears from his refutation of Prabhākara's hypothesis in ViV 12 and the corresponding *svavṛtti*. In fact the flaw in Prabhākara's conception of action as resulting from cognition of the commandment is not that it would be incapable of accounting for human action, as was the case in the two preceding hypotheses, but rather the "absolute non-existence" (*atyantāsattā*) of its object. For how could anything that lacks a position in time be said to "exist"? Is it not rather an appropriate definition of absolute non-existence of a thing – hares' horns and the like – that it does not appear at any time?⁸⁰ As Maṇḍana states in his usual pithy style: "what has no [position in] time (...) is like a sky-flower" (*kālavivikṭaṃ [...] khaṇuṣpavat*).⁸¹

⁷⁸ See for instance K. S. Varadācārya's note in the Mysore edition of the *Nyāyamañjarī* (NM₁ 270.25–26), where *k.* 13 of the *codanā*-section of the *Ślokaṇvṛttika* is quoted.

⁷⁹ See in particular the beginning of the prose portion (NM₁ 271.3–4), which unmistakably recalls the wording of ViV 12 (SV) S 298.5–299.2.

⁸⁰ See ViV 12cd (SV): *athārthataḥ, atyantāsattvaṃ khaṇuṣpādivat, tallakṣaṇatvād atyantāsattāyāḥ*; "If this [= the fact that time is not acknowledged when hearing an injunction] is due to the object[']s having no actual position in time], [then this object] is entirely inexistent (*atyantāsattā*), like a sky-flower, for this is [precisely] the mark of absolute non-existence" (S 328.1–3 [G 44.3–4]). See also Vācaspati's explanation in NyK ad ViV 12cd (SV): *yathā khaṇuṣpādayo nābhuvan na bhavanti na bhaviṣyanti, tathā cen niyogo 'pi, nāśya tebhyo viśeṣaḥ. na hy atyantāsattāyā anyal lakṣaṇam ataḥ kālatrayavivekāḍ*; "A sky-flower and [similar objects] never were, are not and will never be. If this is also the case with the commandment, there will be no difference between them. For there is no other mark of absolute non-existence than being separate from the three times (*kālatrayaviveka*)" (S 328.8–11 [= G 44.15–17]).

⁸¹ ViV 12cd (S 300.3 [= G 36.3]).

Later theoreticians diverge on the plausibility of this second interpretation of Prabhākara's views, although all agree in attributing it to Maṇḍana. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's careful consideration of Prabhākara's hypothesis of *dharma*'s being "without time" may be in sharp contrast to the scepticism displayed, for instance, by Śālikanātha, who scornfully discounts Maṇḍana's arguments as "the refutation of [an hypothesis] that never came forth" (*asaṃbhavidūṣaṇa*).⁸² One fact remains, though: whenever the hypothesis of an objectively "timeless" *niyoga* is discussed by later authors it is always in reference to the ViV's claims against the author of the *Br̥hatī*.

Still, even from Maṇḍana's point of view, an exception to this apparently obvious equation between "existing" and "existing in time" is not as unlikely as it seems. As was pointed out more or less at the same time by Sucarita Miśra, the 10th-century commentator on Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika*,⁸³ and by the Kashmirian Śaivasiddhāntin Rāmakaṇṭha II (950–1000),⁸⁴ quoting ViV 12cd in the chapter on time of his *Mataṅgaparameśvaravṛtti*, the Mīmāṃsaka theory of time as an eternal (*nitya*), (all-)pervading (*vyāpaka*) substance presupposes at least one such exception, namely time itself. For otherwise how could one determine "when" time exists – that is, at which point of time – without entering a vicious circle?⁸⁵

⁸² *R̥juvimalā* ad *Br̥hatī* 2.1.1 [1]: *tena paropādhikaiva bhaviṣyattā. kārakavyāpāravyatirekeṇa cānyeṣām api na kālasaṃbandhaḥ. tena yad ucyate "kālatrayaviyuktaṃ ca khapuṣpavat" iti, tat khapuṣpavad evāsaṃbhavidūṣaṇam*; "Therefore, [the commandment's] being future is conditioned by something else (*paropādhika*). Besides, even other [entities denoted by the words of a sentence] have no relation to time without the operation of a factor of action. Therefore, [the statement that] '[an entity] having no [position in] time is like a sky-flower' (≈ ViV 12cd) is indeed very much like a sky-flower, [for it is] the refutation of [something] that never came forth!" (M₂ 303.18–20). Śālikanātha might not be so categorical everywhere in his work. In fact the distinction between an action to be realised (*kārya*) and an event expected in the future (*bhaviṣyat*) is well marked in his critique of Maṇḍana's theory of the "means for realising a desired [end]" (*iṣṭasādhana*) in the *Vākyārthamātrkā-vṛtti*: *kriyāphalayoḥ sādhyasāadhanatāvagame 'pi na pravṛttir upapadyate, tṛptihetau bhojane 'tīte vartamāne vāpravṛtteḥ, bhaviṣyaty api tatsādhane sāmudravidākyāta ivānuṣṭhānābhāvāt*; "In order to justify the activity [of a rational agent], it is not enough to say that he understood the action and its expected result to be [respectively] the means and what is realised [by this means]. For no activity [is devoted] to [the action of] eating, the cause of satiety, if it already [took place] (*atīta*) or if it is currently [taking place] (*vartamāna*). Even if this means [of realisation] was still to come (*bhaviṣyat*), nobody would act [to make it happen], just as in the case of [the event] predicted by an expert in palmistry" (2.4cd [SV] p. 257.5–7).

⁸³ On Sucarita's date, see Kataoka 2011₂: 20.

⁸⁴ On Rāmakaṇṭha II's date, see Goodall 1998: xiii–xviii.

⁸⁵ See *Kāśikā*₂ ad *Śloka-vārttika* (*autpattika*^o) 15 (discourse of a Prabhākara *pūrvapakṣin*):

Maṇḍana's rendering of Prabhākara's ideas follows a similar line of argument: why, after all, should we take for granted that "being" and "being in time" are coextensive? Could there not be an alternative explanation to our consistent usage of the word "being" (*sat*)? The conception of being as "being graspable by a means of [valid] cognition" (*pramāṇagrāhyatva*), discussed in the remaining part of the *vṛtti* on ViV 12, constitutes precisely such an alternative. In order to support his critique of Prabhākara's theory of *niyoga* as a "timeless" entity Maṇḍana therefore needed to resort to a clear and uncontroversial concept of existence, which earlier Mīmāṃsaka tradition was unable to provide.

It is now manifest that, in spite of its apparent dispersion, Maṇḍana's reflection on time in ViV 8–14 is a fairly systematic investigation of a limited set of philosophical and exegetical options, which forms the immediate background of his investigation of existence. All are related to the central hypothesis of an intimate relationship between the activity (*pravṛtti*) of a rational agent and his perception of time (*kāla*), conceived in three ways following two alternatives: 1. whether the matter at issue is the temporality of the action/effectuation or that of the commandment, distinct from the action; 2. whether the agent's incentive is the consideration of the future or the absence of a perception of time. The three hypotheses (H1–3) might be rearranged along these two lines, as follows:

yady evam asat kāryaṃ kālatrayāparamarśāt śaśaviṣṇāṇavad āpadyate. – na, kālenānekāntāt. kālo hi na tāvat kālāntaraparicchinnaḥ. na ca nāsti kālah! kālāntarāvacchede tv anavasthāpātah; "[Objection:] but if it is so, the obligation (*kārya*) becomes inexistent, for its [position in any one of the] three times is not acknowledged, as it happens for a hare's horn. – No, for this [reasoning] knows [at least] one exception, [namely] time itself. For time, first of all, cannot be delimited (*paricchinna*) by another time. Nor is it true that time does not exist! But if it is delimited by another time, an infinite regress ensues" (p. 9.8–10); *Mataṅgaparamaśvaravṛtti (Vidyāpāda) 12.19: yad vastu, tat kālāviviktaṃ. "kālaviviktaṃ ca khapuṣpavat."* *vastu cātmādi. atas tato 'vivekasiddhyā kālasya nityatvavyāpakatvasiddhir iti maṇḍanamiśraḥ. tasya kālenānaikāntiko 'yaṃ hetur iti nānena kālasya nityatvaṃ sidhyati;* "An [existing] thing cannot be devoid of [position in] time, [as it is said] 'and an [entity] having no [position in] time is like a sky-flower' (ViV 12cd). And the Self and similar entities are [existing] things. So, since it is proved that [time] is not separate from such [things], it is [also] proved that it is eternal (*nitya*) and [all-]pervasive (*vyāpaka*). This is [the view of] Maṇḍana Miśra. But this [inferential] reason of his has [at least] one exception, [namely] time [itself]. Therefore, it cannot prove the eternity of time." (345.28–346.2). I have not been able to trace this argument back to any Mīmāṃsaka source prior to Rāmakaṇṭha, but Vācaspati, who does not try to solve this problem, appears to be aware of it, since he repeatedly states that the equivalence between "being" and "being in time" is valid for all entities "except time" (*kālavyatirikta*). See NyK ad ViV 12cd (SV) S 328.12/15 (G 44.18/21).

	Action/effectuation	Commandment
Without time	H1	H3
Future	H2	

Table 1. Three hypotheses regarding action and time.

But by introducing **H3** Maṇḍana not only pursues the logic of this investigation; he also operates a shift from the field of linguistics and psychology of action, where it had developed so far, to that of ontology. The appropriate response to the challenge posed by the theory of *niyoga* would therefore not be an alternative theory of action – that Maṇḍana would propose only much later – but a new theory of being.

One point remains to be clarified: in introducing the concept of *niyoga* as an entity “without” time, Prabhākara not only aimed to provide a successful explanation of action as resulting from an immediate “you must;” he also accounted for the radical cognitive “otherness” of the object of the Veda. By bringing back religious duty, in the form of the “means to a desired end” (*iṣṭasādhana*),⁸⁶ in the realm of “presence” (*vartamāna*), did Maṇḍana not run the risk of making *dharma* an object among others, and thereby undermine the specificity of Mīmāṃsā as an enquiry into a field inaccessible to human faculties?

3. *Dharma* and time. Another concept of duty?

The question of time in Mīmāṃsā is not confined to the field of action theory and the linguistics of verbal modes. Indeed, it lies at the very heart of one of the school’s most essential hermeneutic presuppositions, namely the radical “otherness” of the object of the Veda.⁸⁷ According to one of Mīmāṃsā’s most fundamental dogmas, *dharma* (the “ritual function”) is known through Vedic injunctions (*codanālakṣaṇa* – MīSū 1.1.2), and through them alone, in virtue of its being an entity “to be accomplished/to be produced” (*sādhya/utpādyā*), as distinct from “accomplished/produced” (*siddha/utpanna*) entities like the pot in front of our eyes or the cooking taking place in the nearby kitchen. The aim of Scripture as Mīmāṃsakas conceive it is therefore not to teach us what there *is* – be it something as unfathomable as the origin of the universe, the existence of

⁸⁶ On Maṇḍana’s theory of *iṣṭasādhana*, and for some preliminary hypotheses regarding its hermeneutic background, see David 2013b.

⁸⁷ The last section of this essay can be read as a free – though hopefully faithful! – elaboration on John Taber’s enlightening remarks on verses 17–18 of the *pratyakṣa*-section of Kumārila’s *Ślokavārttika*. See Taber 2005: 51–52 and 178, n. 18.

heavens or hells, etc. – but to provide instructions on practical matters, ways of acting ritually that cannot be learned from mere experience.

This distinction of *siddha* and *sādhya* as traced by early Mīmāṃsakas is truly ontological as much as it is epistemological.⁸⁸ For a “non-accomplished” entity – the Agnihotra which is to be performed tomorrow morning, for instance – is as different from a *future* event (for example, the result of the next election) as it is from a *past* event (like the result of last year’s election). Past and future events differ according to the point in time where they take place and to the knower’s own position in time, and the way they are known (by perception, inference, etc.) also differs accordingly. What makes ritual duties “non-accomplished,” however, is precisely that they are not *events*; it is not, strictly speaking, that they have not taken place *yet*, rather they exist in a different mode, that of an “ought” (to borrow John Taber’s felicitous expression), radically distinct from the mode of existence of all, even future events.

It is significant that, in spite of that, whenever early Mīmāṃsakas were driven to explain what they meant exactly by this “ought,” they did so, once again, by having recourse to temporal categories. From the earliest stages in the development of the school, the fundamental distinction between what is “accomplished” and what is “non-accomplished” or “to be accomplished” (both can be expressed indifferently by the same gerundive *sādhya*), and between the faculties capable of grasping them, was interpreted in terms of a relation to distinct points of time or, alternatively, of certain limitations (or absence of limitations) with respect to time. Consider, for instance, Śabara’s seminal characterisation of the object of Scripture in contrast to that of perception and other “worldly” sources of knowledge in the *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya*:⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Note that this distinction, cardinal in classical Mīmāṃsā (though rarely explicated by Mīmāṃsakas themselves), differs from the well-known *siddha/sādhya* distinction at work in Pāṇinian grammar, which rather has the sense of an opposition between the processual (*sādhya*, which is the object of finite verbs), and the non-processual (*siddha*, as the object of nominal and participial forms). Thus past action as denoted by a finite verb like the aorist *apakṣīt* (“He cooked”), for instance, though *sādhya* in the grammatical sense of the term (because it is described *as* a process, though the latter took place in the past), will be considered *siddha* according to the Mīmāṃsaka distinction. For an attempt at theorising this distinction from the point of view of Vyākaraṇa see for instance Helārāja’s comments on the first verse of Bhartṛhari’s *Kriyāsamuddeśa* (*Vākya-padīya* vol. 2, k. 3.8.1).

⁸⁹ ŚBh ad MīSū 1.1.2: *codanā hi bhūtaṃ bhavantaṃ bhaviṣyantaṃ sūkṣmaṃ vyavahitaṃ viprakṣṭaṃ ityevaṃjātīyakam arthaṃ śaknoty avagamayitum, nānyat kiṃ canendriyam* (text: Frauwallner 1968: 16.12–14).

A [Vedic] injunction (*codanā*) is able to convey an object of all sorts: *past*, *present*, *future*, subtle, hidden, distant and so forth. No other faculty can do that!

As rightly pointed out by Kumārila, Śābara's remark does not seem to be specifically about "injunctions" – though the word *codanā* is, no doubt, used in that sense and in direct reference to MīSū 1.1.2 –, but about language in general.⁹⁰ Unlike perception, language is not riveted to the present and reaches as far in the past or future as one can conceive. The epistemic capacity of Vedic injunctions, then, is nothing but an instance of that extraordinary capacity of language to go beyond the immediate preoccupations of the knowing subject through narration, fantasy, prophecy, etc. and it is precisely that capacity, according to Śābara, which allows the Veda to become a means (*nimitta*) to knowledge of *dharma*. By contrast, the connection of perception to the present time (*vidyamāna*, an exact synonym of *vartamāna* in the present context) is established by Jaimini in MīSū 1.1.4, and taken up by Śābara as an argument against the capacity of the senses to convey religious duty.⁹¹

[MīSū:] perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the birth of an idea for a person whose senses are in contact [with an object, and] it is not a means [to know *dharma*], for it grasps something present (*vidyamāna*). [Śābara's comment:] (...) but that object (i.e. *dharma*), being future (*bhaviṣyat*), does not exist at the time of cognition, while this (i.e. perception) is the grasping of something that exists (*sant*), not of something that does not exist (*asant*). Therefore, perception is not a means [to know *dharma*].

Śābara's commentary leaves no space for doubt: according to him, religious duties are *sādhya*, and thereby inaccessible to perception and the like, because they relate to something future (*bhaviṣyat*), indeed because they *are* something future.⁹² What, then, allows us to distinguish *dharma* from other kinds of future

⁹⁰ See *Śloka-vārttika* (*codanā*°) k. 7ab: *codanety abravīc cātra śabdāmātravivakṣayā* |; "And here, [Śābara] speaks of a '[Vedic] injunction' having in mind language in general." Text: Kataoka 2011₁: 2. Translation: Kataoka 2011₂: 201 (modified).

⁹¹ MīSū 1.1.4, and Śābara's *Bhāṣya* thereon: [MīSū:] *satsaṃprayoge puruṣasyendriyānāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittam, vidyamānopalambhanatvāt*. [ŚBh:] (...) *bhaviṣyaṃś caiṣo 'rtho na jñānakāle 'sti. sataś caitad upalambhanam, nāsataḥ. ataḥ pratyakṣam animittam* (text: Frauwallner 1968: 22.9–15).

⁹² There is, no doubt, some degree of ambiguity in Śābara's way of putting things, and it is indeed tempting to read Kumārila's theory (see below) as a welcome clarification of the old Mīmāṃsaka's views. Are we to understand that *dharma* – identified in the same section with the sacrifice (*yāga* – see below and n. 112) – is "future" because we are speaking of sacrifices that still need to be accomplished, not of past ones? Or is it because *dharma* is to be interpreted here as "the result of *dharma*," i.e. "the expected fruit of the

events, some of which may well be known by inference? For how could any action take place without one's at least being able to predict, with a degree of certainty, the results that may be expected from that action? No answer to these questions is to be found in the work of Śābara, who rather seems content with the broad division of the two realms of perception and Scripture as respectively dealing with what "exists [at present]" (*sat*), and what "does not [yet] exist" (*asat*).

Still, the idea that *dharma* is inaccessible to perception, etc. because it relates to something future (if not because it *is* something future) safely made its way into classical Mīmāṃsā, and indeed, became the typical position of the followers of Kumārila, who elaborates on Śābara's remark in a considerably subtler way in the *codanā*-section of his *Ślokavārttika* (ad MīSū 1.1.2):⁹³

It will be established later on that the substance [for oblation], the action [= the sacrifice], qualities [of the substance], etc. are *dharma*s.⁹⁴ Although they are [possible] objects of the senses, they are not *dharma*s under that aspect. For the fact that they are means to realising the Supreme Good (*śreyaḥsāadhanatā*) can only be known through the Veda, and it is under that aspect that they are *dharma*s, therefore [*dharma*] is not an object for the senses.

What do we learn from a Vedic injunction like *svargakāmo yajeta* ("He who desires Heaven should sacrifice!"), if not the holding of a relation (*saṁbandha*) between an action – the sacrifice (*yāga*) – and its expected result, namely the obtaining of Heaven (*svarga*)? Should one object that sacrifices are actually not beyond perception, for one does observe sacrifices, at least, when they are performed by others? Kumārila answers that it is not the sacrifice *as such* that can be qualified as (a) *dharma*, but only the sacrifice inasmuch as it produces a result in the future. Precisely such a capacity of the rite (and its auxiliaries) with respect to a future result – technically called its "being a means to accomplishing the

sacrifice"? I think both options can be defended, although the second is certainly more in line with later interpretations of Śābara's text.

⁹³ *Ślokavārttika* (*codanā*°) k. 13–14: *dravyakriyāguṇādīnāṃ dharmatvaṃ sthāpayiṣyate | teṣāṃ aindriyakatve 'pi na tādrūpyeṇa dharmatā || 13 || śreyaḥsāadhanatā hy eṣāṃ nityaṃ vedāt pratiyate | tādrūpyeṇa ca dharmatvaṃ tasmān nendriyagocaraḥ || 14 ||* (text: Kataoka 2011, 3; translation: Kataoka 2011, 206–209 [slightly modified]).

⁹⁴ Kumārila refers here to a later passage in the same *codanā*-section (k. 190–200), where the signification of the word *dharma* will be topically considered. Several views are refuted in that passage, on which see Kataoka 2011, 440–454. On the word *dharma*'s referring not only to the main sacrifice but also to its subsidiaries, see Kataoka 2011, 206–207, n. 118. On Kumārila's use of the plural *dharma*s (instead of the more common singular *dharma*) see David 2012: 405, n. 20 and 2015: 569, n. 6.

Supreme Good” (*śreyaḥsāadhanatā*) – is taught by the Veda, nor is it accessible to any other, non-Vedic means of knowledge. As Kumārila states again later on in the *pratyakṣa*-section of the same work:⁹⁵

Dharma is perceptible neither prior to its execution nor after it has been carried out, since it does not exist at that time as a means of bringing about its result.

Results such as Heaven are expected beyond the life of the sacrificer, so the impossibility of observing their relation to any action performed in the present life is not incidental; it is a form of radical imperceptibility due to the impossibility of perceptually establishing a relation whose two correlates are never present at the same time, and that can never be brought back to any form of “natural” causality.⁹⁶

If Kumārila’s “relational” interpretation of the imperceptibility of *dharma* enjoyed wide success in later Mīmāṃsā, this did not prevent it from undergoing a sustained critique, sometimes stemming from the Master’s own ranks. The earliest and perhaps the most important of such critiques is certainly Maṇḍana’s: in Kumārila’s view, as we have seen, what we know by a Vedic injunction is a certain relation, in other words a capacity of the sacrifice (*śakti*, in Maṇḍana’s re-formulation; see below) to produce an expected result in the future, for instance,

⁹⁵ *Ślokavārttika* (*pratyakṣa*°) k. 34: *pratyakṣaḥ prāg anuṣṭhānān na dharmo ’nuṣṭhito ’pi vā | phalāsāadhanarūpeṇa tadānūṃ yena nasy asau* || (text: Taber 2005: 152; translation: Taber 2005: 56).

⁹⁶ On the relation of *dharma*(s) to time in Kumārila’s view see in particular *Ślokavārttika* (*codanā*°) k. 7cd: *na hi bhūtādiviṣayaḥ kaś cid asti vidhāyakaḥ*; “For there is no enjoining [speech] about [an action] that is past or [present]” (text: Kataoka 2011₁: 2; translation: Kataoka 2011₂: 201 [modified]); *Ślokavārttika* (*pratyakṣa*°) k. 18: *pratyakṣam yaj jane siddham tasyaivaṃ dharmakatvataḥ | vidyamānopalambhatvaṃ tena dharme ’nimittatā* ||; “Since perception, which is well known to ordinary people, has such a property, it is the apprehension of that which is present. Therefore, it is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma” (text: Taber 2005: 152; translation: Taber 2005: 51). Although neither of these two passages explicitly states that *dharma* should be understood as something future (*bhaviṣyat*), or relating to the future, this is nonetheless the most natural consequence of Kumārila’s statements, which were generally interpreted in this way both by modern interpreters (Taber 2005: 51, Kataoka 2011₂: 201, n. 107) and by his medieval commentators. See, for instance, Sucarita Miśra’s commentary on *Ślokavārttika* (*pratyakṣa*°) k. 18: *tataś ca bhaviṣyaty avidyamāne dharme ’nimittatā*; “Therefore, it is **not a means of [valid] cognition concerning dharma** [Taber: ‘it is not a basis of knowledge of Dharma’], because it is future (*bhaviṣyat*), [hence] not present (*avidyamāna*)” (*Kāśikā*₁ p. 209.20). Sucarita’s idea that *dharma* not only relates to the future but *is* future is, I think, to be traced back to Śabara.

the capacity of the New and Full Moon sacrifice to produce Heaven (*svarga*).⁹⁷ It is that capacity, connecting a present, ephemeral event like the sacrifice with its result in a remote future that makes a *dharma*, strictly speaking, imperceptible. Now, such a capacity, Maṇḍana argues, though *relating* to something future, is not *in itself* something future (unlike Heaven, for instance), but something present at the time of the sacrifice, which *could* in principle be observed in a sacrifice taking place in front of us, and consequently become the basis of a teaching about religious duty. Our “*de facto*” incapacity to perceive such a subtle quality is, then, not essential, but only relative to our current perceptual faculties which, as far as logic is concerned, could be indefinitely improved. How, then, can one maintain the idea of a radical imperceptibility of the object of the Veda? This objection is voiced at the very end of Maṇḍana’s *pūrvapakṣa*, in the prose introduction to ViV 25, and most certainly addresses directly Kumārila’s conception of *dharma*:⁹⁸

Even [a sacrifice] which is [already] produced (*utpanna*) is not a *dharma* as such (*svarūpeṇa*), but only inasmuch as it is the means for realising the Supreme Good (*śreyaḥsādhana*); and this [property of being a means] is beyond the reach of the senses.⁹⁹ [Objection:] but, what is this [property]? If, first of all, you argue that it is a capacity (*śakti*) [of the sacrifice], and that it is beyond the reach of the senses, then [your idea that] the senses are not limited in their object (*viśayaniyama*) either by measure or [the object’s] nature is well-established indeed!¹⁰⁰ [One proposes:] but [this

⁹⁷ It is noteworthy that Kumārila, in all passages quoted so far, never speaks of a “capacity” of the sacrifice to produce its fruit. The (apparently harmless) introduction of the concept of “power/capacity” (*śakti*, *sāmarthyā*) in the present context is thus Maṇḍana’s own contribution, and it is cardinal to his discussion of the problem of *dharma*’s imperceptibility. This might however have been made on the basis of Kumārila’s own account of the “Unprecedented” (*apūrvā*) as a “capacity” of the sacrifice, as we shall see.

⁹⁸ ViV 25 (SV – Introduction): *utpannam api na svarūpeṇa dharmāḥ, śreyaḥsāadhanatvena tu, tac cātindriyam. kiṃ punar idam? yadi tāvac chakṛtiḥ, sā cātindriyety uktam atra nendriyāṇām parimāṇato vā svarūpato vā viśayaniyamāḥ sunirūpita iti. atha tadāsattvāt, kālāntarabhāvitvāc chreyasaḥ. – tatsāadhanatvaṃ tv atīśayo yāgādisamavetas tatkālaḥ, anyathā dharmatvahāneḥ. tasmād yadā tadā bhavatu śreyaḥ, tatsāadhanatvaṃ tu vartamānam iti nākṣāṇām aviśayaḥ* (S 736.1–738.2 [G 162.2–163.1]).

⁹⁹ This, of course, is nothing but a very close paraphrase of Kumārila’s verses quoted above (*codanā*° k. 13–14), where *tādrūpyeṇa* (“as such,” i.e. as object of the senses) is benignly replaced by *svarūpeṇa* (“as such,” i.e. in its very nature as a sacrifice, regardless of its result).

¹⁰⁰ Maṇḍana alludes here, through the words of his opponent, to his own idea that perception cannot be limited by any factor other than time (*kāla*), advanced earlier in ViV 15 while refuting the idea of the Buddha’s omniscience. See ViV 15 (SV) S 461.2–468.1 (G 82.6–84.3); translation: David 2020b: § 3.2. In Maṇḍana’s view perceptive abilities

is not the case], because [this capacity] does not exist by then [= at the time of the sacrifice], since the Supreme Good will only take place at a later time. [Answer from the opponent:] well, the property of being a means [to realise it] is inherent in the sacrifice, etc. (*yāgādīsamaveta*) as a supplement (*atiśaya*), [thus] it is contemporaneous with that [sacrifice] (*tatkāla*), otherwise the latter's being a *dharma* would have to be abandoned. Therefore, let the Supreme Good occur when it pleases you; the property of being a means to realise it, in turn, is there at present (*vartamāna*), so nothing prevents it from being an object of the senses.

Maṇḍana's reduction of the relation (*sambandha*) with the Supreme Good to a capacity (*śakti*) inherent in the sacrifice sheds light on an essential weakness of Kumārila's argument for the imperceptibility of *dharma*. A relation of the sacrifice to an object placed in an "absolute" future may well exempt it from being perceived by ordinary observers of a rite. Still, when we speak of a "relation" – no matter how remote this relation may be – we are still talking about a certain state of *facts* (namely a present action, its future result and their connection). How could such a fact account for the modally distinct cognition resulting from a Vedic injunction, in the form of an "ought"? Surely what is taught by the injunction is not a fact, but something that *should be*. Such considerations – or similar ones – therefore called for another, more radical interpretation of the imperceptibility of *dharma*, one that would entirely withdraw it from the realm of "things" by denying it their most immediate feature: their relation to time (*kāla*). Prabhākara's theory of the commandment as an entity known exclusively through the Veda and without connection to time provided precisely such a robust theoretical alternative, definitively placing *dharma* out of reach of perception, be it the super-sensory perception of Yogins.¹⁰¹ Being entirely "without time" (*kālavivikta*), the commandment is not a fact, not a "thing;" it exists, for sure, but on a different modality, that of the imperative.

Additional evidence for the connection we postulate between Prabhākara's theory of the commandment and the problem of the imperceptibility of *dharma* is

can be extended indefinitely in terms of the object's dimension (*parimāṇa*), distance in space (*deśa*), etc., but can never extend beyond the present time. In other words an individual may become capable of perceiving atoms, or far away galaxies, but never what happened the day before or will happen the next, let alone his past or future lives, as Buddhists claim. The same idea is alluded to earlier on in the same portion of the SV on Vi V 25 (S 734.1–2: *na hi rūpataś cakṣurādīnāṃ viṣayaniyamo nirūpyata ity uktam*; translated below).

¹⁰¹ In this respect, I find it significant that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, as we have seen (above, Section 2), introduces Prabhākara's theory of the *niyoga*, not as a hypothesis regarding injunctions, but as an objection to the possibility of a super-sensory perception of *dharma* by Yogins.

provided by Umbeka (8th century), the earliest commentator on the *Śloka-vārttika*, but also on Maṇḍana's *Bhāvanāviveka*, and a great name of early Mīmāṃsā. Quite astonishingly, when commenting on k. 34 of the *pratyakṣa*-section of Kumārila's work (quoted above) – as we have seen, one of Kumārila's key statements on the problem of the imperceptibility of *dharma* – Umbeka chooses not to comment on the stanza itself, but to refute Kumārila's position in terms clearly recalling Prabhākara's *niyoga*-theory; of course, the question of time plays, once again, the crucial role:¹⁰²

This [i.e. Kumārila's statement in k. 34] cannot be justified (*tad anupapannam*). For, as is well known, the fact that substances, actions and qualities are *dharma*s is equivalent to their being means for accomplishing the Supreme Good (*śreyaḥsāadhanatvaṃ dharmatvaṃ*). And that [property] surely does exist both before and after the performance [of the sacrifice], for who would undertake [to perform an act] which is not the means of accomplishing the Supreme Good either before or after the performance, hence [an act] that would be totally fruitless (*niṣphala*)?¹⁰³ And [the sacrifice] also does not acquire this quality at the time when the expected result comes into existence (*bhavana*), for at that time the means (*sādhana*, i.e. the sacrifice) has ceased to exist! (...) Therefore, the following explanation should be given: here [= in the Veda], an injunction conveys that the effectuation (*bhāvanā*)¹⁰⁴ is an obligation (*kārya*). And that [obligation] is not touched by the three times (*kālatrayāsaṃśṛṣṭa*), and it is as such (*tādrūpyeṇa*)¹⁰⁵ that the effectuation is said to be a *dharma*. Therefore, *dharma* is not the object of perception, which is the apprehension of something present; this is the meaning. Thus, one shows in this manner that perception and injunction have distinct objects, and there is no fault.

¹⁰² *Tātparyatīkā* (*pratyakṣa*°) k. 34: *tad anupapannam. dravyakriyāguṇādīnāṃ śreyaḥsāadhanatvaṃ nāma dharmatvaṃ. tac cānuṣṭhānāt prāg uttarakālāṃ ca vidyata eva. yo hy anuṣṭhānāt prāg uttarakālāṃ ca śreyaḥsāadhanatvaṃ na, kas tatra niṣphale pravartate? na ca phalabhavanakāle śreyaḥsāadhanateti, tadānīṃ sādhanasya vinaṣṭatvāt (...). tasmād evaṃ vyākhyeyam: vidhir iha bhāvanāyāḥ kāryatvaṃ avagamayati. tac ca kālatrayāsaṃśṛṣṭam, tādrūpyeṇa ca saiva bhāvanā dharma ity ucyate. tasmād vidyamānopalambhanasya pratyakṣasyāgocarō dharma ity arthaḥ. tad anena prakāreṇa vidhyasamānārthatām pratyakṣasya darśayatīty anavadyam* (p. 128.9–16).

¹⁰³ Despite a slightly different wording, one can easily recognise here Maṇḍana's objection to Kumārila's theory of the imperceptibility of *dharma*(s) in ViV 25 (see above). This in itself is not surprising considering Umbeka commented on the ViV's "twin" treatise. It is, then, all the more noteworthy that Maṇḍana's response to that objection finds no place whatsoever in Umbeka's discussion.

¹⁰⁴ Understand: the action (*kriyā*) that is the sacrifice.

¹⁰⁵ Umbeka's use of the expression *tādrūpyeṇa* is of course an iconoclast – but perfectly recognisable – imitation of Kumārila's own use of that expression in k. 13–14 of the *codanā*-section.

I find it remarkable that Umbeka, even while commenting on Kumārila's work, clearly states the superiority of Prabhākara's solution of the problem at issue. This passage is also quite extraordinary in that it is the *only* text in the whole tradition, to the best of my knowledge, mentioning the idea of an object "without time" as a solution to the problem of *dharma*'s imperceptibility without any intention of refuting it.¹⁰⁶

Another, perhaps less compelling clue to the inference that the main aim of Prabhākara's theory – at least as it is interpreted by Maṇḍana – was precisely to account for the impossibility of a "Knower of *dharma*" (*dharmajñā*) is its reappearance in the introduction to ViV 25, some ten stanzas after its final refutation in ViV 12–14 (I underline the obvious reference to Prabhākara's theory).¹⁰⁷

[Objection:] very well then, let no Omniscient (*sarvajñā*) be the author of the commandment (*niyoktā*);¹⁰⁸ but let us accept [at least] a Knower of *dharma* (*dharmajñā*) [as its author]! For, as you said, no limitation of the object (*viśayaniyama*) of the eye and other [senses] in terms of form (*rūpatas*) is observed.¹⁰⁹ Now, if[, as you claim,] they are limited with

¹⁰⁶ Interestingly, neither of the later commentators on Kumārila's verse, even while acknowledging the problem raised by Maṇḍana of a possible perception of the "capacity" (*śakti*) of the sacrifice to produce its result, follows in Umbeka's steps, and both evacuate it in a similar (and equally laconic) manner on the basis of the general imperceptibility of *śaktis*. Sucarita: *śaktis tu sarvabhāvānām nityaparokṣaiva, tena na tadviśiṣṭo dharmah pratyakṣo bhavātīti*; "The capacity (*śakti*) of all things is perpetually beyond perception; therefore, *dharma* qualified by that [capacity] can never be perceived" (*Kāśikā*, p. 220.18–19); Pārthasārathi: *yo 'pi yāgasyāpūrvam phalaṃ vā prati śaktiḥ, sā yady api yāgakāle vidyate, tathāpi na pratyakṣā, sarvaśaktīnām atīndriyatvāt*; "As for the capacity (*śakti*) of the sacrifice to [produce] the Unprecedented or the expected result, even if it exists at the time of the sacrifice, it is not perceived [at that time], for all capacities are beyond the reach of the senses" (*Nyāyaratnākara* p. 144.8–10).

¹⁰⁷ ViV 25 (SV – Introduction): *nanu mā bhūt sarvajño niyoktā, dharmajñas tv iṣyatām! na hi rūpatas cakṣurādīnām viśayaniyamo nirūpita ity uktam. kālatas tu niyame yadā vartamānatvam, tadātiśayavaccakṣurādīviśayabhāvo 'viruddhaḥ. ātyantike cāvartamānatve 'atyantāsattvam khaṇuṣpādivat' ity uktam. na ca kurv ity artho dharmah, yāgāder viśayasya dharmatvenopagamāt* (S 733.4 – 735.3 [G 161.162.1]).

¹⁰⁸ For the general context of Maṇḍana's discussion of omniscience (*sarvajñatva*), a debate that reaches back as far as ViV 15 and extends practically up to the end of the *pūrvapakṣa*, see David 2020b: § 2.1. Despite the mention of an "author of the commandment" (*niyoktṛ*), the discussion of omniscience is very loosely connected to the consideration of Prabhākara's *niyoga*-theory in ViV 12–14.

¹⁰⁹ On Maṇḍana's position on perception, referred to here by the opponent, see above, n. 100. The mention of "form" is a short designation of a list of four potentially limiting factors enumerated earlier on in the treatise: form (*rūpa*), acuity/feebleness (*paṭumandatā*), distance in space (*deśa*) and dimension (*parimāṇa*). See David 2020b: § 3.2.

respect to time (*kālatas*), then if [*dharma*] is present (*vartamāna*), there is no difficulty in its being an object for the eye, etc. when the latter possesses a special excellence (*atiśayavant*). As for something that would absolutely not be present (*ātyantike* [...] *avartamānatve*),¹¹⁰ we have said before that “it is entirely non-existent, like a sky-flower, etc.”¹¹¹ And it is not the case that *dharma* is an object [having the form] “do!” (*kuru*), for [Mīmāṃsakas] maintain that objects such as the sacrifice (*yāgādi*) are *dharma*s.¹¹²

Precisely because such a solution was unacceptable to him on ontological grounds, Maṇḍana had to find another alternative to Kumārila’s view, one that, unlike Umbeka’s, would not fall into the trap of sky-flower-like “timeless” entities. Before considering his own original answer to this problem in ViV 25, let us sum up all positions available in his time to account for the imperceptibility of *dharma*:

	Nature of <i>dharma</i> (s)	Cause of imperceptibility
Śābara	Sacrifice (<i>yāga</i>)	Existence in the future (<i>bhaviṣyat</i>): Of the sacrifice Of the results of the sacrifice
Kumārila	Sacrifice (<i>yāga/karman</i>) Substance (<i>dravya</i>) Qualities (<i>guṇa</i>)	Relation (<i>saṃbandha</i>) to something future (<i>bhaviṣyat</i>) = being a means for the Supreme Good (<i>śreyaḥsādhantā</i>)
Prabhākara	Commandment (<i>niyoga</i>)	Absence of connection to time (<i>kālatrayāparāmarśa</i> , <i>kālatrayāsparśa</i> , <i>kālaviveka</i>)

Table 2. Three views on *dharma* and its imperceptibility.

The tenor of Maṇḍana’s response in ViV 25 is not always easy to grasp, and led to surprising hypotheses as to the identification of the various opponents in that section of the *pūrvapakṣa*. E. Stern (1988: 43) identifies Maṇḍana’s main opponent as “a Bauddhaḥ who accepts, at least for the sake of this argument, certain Mīmāṃsā constructs and theories,” and the target of his attacks as “evidently

¹¹⁰ Understand: something that is not and can never become present.

¹¹¹ ViV 12 (SV): *atyantāsattvaṃ khaṇuṣpādivat* (S 328.2 [= G 44.3–4]).

¹¹² ŚBh ad MīSū 1.1.2: *yajatiśabdavācyaṃ eva dharmam samāmananti* <em.: *samānanti* Ed>; “They teach that *dharma* is none but what is expressed by the root *yaj-* (‘to sacrifice’)” (text: Frauwallner 1968: 20.11; full context quoted in Stern 1988: 1575); according to Kumārila’s commentary on this passage (*Ślokavārttika* [*codanā*°] k. 191), this includes, besides the ritual act (*karman*) itself, also the sacrificial substance (*dravya*) and its qualities (*guṇa*), presumably referred to here by °*ādi* in *yāgādi*.

a Naiyāyika” (*ibid.*). But, as we have just seen, the argument Stern attributes to Nyāya (*dharma* is imperceptible due to its being a means to producing the Supreme Good) is almost certainly Kumārila’s, and I find it also very unlikely that the critique addressed to him should be ascribed to a Buddhist (although the hypothesis of a *sarvajña* who is also a *dharmajña* admittedly has some Buddhist flavour).¹¹³ Rather, it seems we are dealing here with a solution devised by Maṇḍana himself to a difficulty he sees in the views of his illustrious predecessor in the field of Mīmāṃsā.¹¹⁴ It is, in fact, a clear token of Maṇḍana’s dialectical skill that he was able to introduce an alternative view on such a crucial topic without leaving the aporetic framework characteristic of his so-called “*pūrvapakṣa*.”

Maṇḍana’s solution to our main problem consists in simply dissociating the “capacity” (*śakti*, *sāmarthya*) of the sacrifice to produce a result from the ritual act (*karman*) itself, by having recourse to Kumārila’s theory of the “Unprecedented” (*apūrvā*). His main statement in ViV 25 and the corresponding *svavṛtti* reads as follows:¹¹⁵

[Kā:] “[In order to account] for a result [taking place] after a long period of time (*cirakāla*), they postulate a capacity (*sāmarthya*)¹¹⁶ of the rite, [in

¹¹³ As I have remarked elsewhere (David 2020b), Maṇḍana generally does not proceed by directly refuting “schools” of thought but dialectically, by inserting the various theoreticians’ arguments within a homogeneous (and most of the time anonymous) course of argumentation. It is also clear that Buddhism does not have for him the prominence it had, for instance, in Kumārila’s critique of omniscience. On this last point, see David 2020b: § 1.3.

¹¹⁴ This strategy of discreetly improving on Kumārila’s views on a given topic is by no means exceptional in Maṇḍana’s work, though it is not always easy to detect. For similar cases, see Frauwallner 1938 and David 2020b: § 2.1–2.5.

¹¹⁵ ViV 25 (SV): [kā:] *atulyakālaṃ sāmarthyam karmaṇaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ | cirakālaphalāyāhur na tad adhyakṣam iṅṣyate* || [SV:] *āsutaravināśitvāt karmaṇaḥ pralīyamānakarmalabdhopajanaḥ pūrvāparāṅgopapāditāvasthāntaro deśakālādyapekṣāsāditaparīnatibheda ānantaryam api karmaṇo ’tivartamānaḥ ko ’py atīśayaḥ kartari nityātmāni karmaṇaś cirabhāvināḥ phalasya sādhanam kathyate vṛddhaiḥ. tad asau na karmakāle vartamānaḥ, svakāle vartamāno ’pi karmaṇo nivṛttatvān na karmasaṃbandhitayādhyakṣam iṅṣyate. tad uktam: ‘phalasādhanarūpeṇa tadānūṇi yena nasy asau’ iti. karmakāle tasya bhāvitvam, tatkāle ca karmaṇo ’bhāvaḥ. katham tarhi karmaṇaḥ sādhanatvam tadanyasamavāyī? – tadāhitatvāt. na hi svasamavāyī eva sādhanatvam iti kaś cin niyamaḥ. kāryānumeyaṃ tad yatra kāryāyālaṃ tatraiva yuktam, tadāhitatvāc ca tasya śaktiḥ. na cettham aupacārikaḥ karmaṇaḥ sādhanabhāvaḥ, kāṣṭhādiṣu tathaiva siddheḥ* (S 740.2–745.2 [G 163.6–165.1]).

¹¹⁶ The two words *śakti*, used in the opponent’s discourse (introduction to ViV 25, quoted above), and *sāmarthya* are, of course, rigorous synonyms in the present context.

itself] momentary (*kṣaṇabhaṅgin*), [to produce the expected result], [a capacity] which is not contemporaneous [with the sacrifice] (*atulyakāla*); that [capacity] is not seen to be perceived.” [SV:] Since the rite disappears immediately [after being performed], the Elders (*vr̥ddha*) postulate a certain supplement (*atiśaya*)¹¹⁷ born from the rite as it vanishes, of which a different stage is produced by the former and latter members [of the sacrifice],¹¹⁸ and whose particular transformation (*pariṇatibheda*) is established in dependence on space, time and other [conditions].¹¹⁹ [That supplement,] which goes even beyond the immediate subsequence (*ānantarya*) to [the sacrifice],¹²⁰ is [inherent] in the agent, whose Self is permanent (*nityātmani kartari*), and it is the means (*sādhana*) of accomplishing the expected result of the rite, which takes place only after a long period of time. Therefore, that [supplement] is not present at the time of the rite (*na karmakāle*

¹¹⁷ As confirmed by Vācaspati (NyK S 742.7 [G 164.15]), this “supplement” identified with the “capacity” (*sāmarthyā*) of the rite is none but the “Unprecedented” (*apūrvā*) linking, according to Kumārila, the ritual act to a result taking place only much later. Note that Maṇḍana’s opponent in the introduction to ViV 25 already spoke of the capacity (*śakti*) of the sacrifice to produce a result as a “supplement” (*atiśaya*) inherent in that sacrifice.

¹¹⁸ The interpretation of the compound *pūrvāparāṅgopapāditāvasthāntara* is difficult, and Vācaspati’s commentary is not of much help here, nor is E. Stern’s rather loose paraphrase (“The succession of subsidiary actions assume a new condition in it[, which is a particular evolute, etc.]”). The main question is whether this “different stage” (*avasthāntara*) is assumed by the sacrifice or by the supplement itself, i.e. the Unprecedented (*apūrvā*), both options being, I think, possible. I choose here the second solution, which seems grammatically more natural, though the fact of speaking of the various “intermediary” *apūrvās* and of the “final” *apūrvā* as different “stages” (*avasthā*) is unfamiliar to me. On the “former and latter members [of the sacrifice],” see NyK: *pūrvāparāṅgāgnyanvādhā-nāḍibrāhmaṇatarpaṇānta...*; “**the former and latter members [of the sacrifice]**, beginning with the reinstallation of the fire, up to the feeding of the Brahmins” (S 741.6–7 [G 134.9]).

¹¹⁹ I take it that the word *pariṇati* is not another name of the “supplement” (*atiśaya*), as suggested by E. Stern’s paraphrase (“a particular evolute arising with regard to space, time, and so on” – Stern 1988: 44), but rather refers to the “maturation” (*≈ paripāka*) of the *apūrvā* enabling it to bear its fruit in a certain time and place, and under various circumstances. I thank S. L. P. Anjaneya Sarma for suggesting this interpretation of that difficult compound.

¹²⁰ This remark, in itself not very explicit, could be a form of *a fortiori* reasoning, as suggested by Vācaspati: *karmānantaryam api tasya nāsti, kim āṅga punas tatkalatā?*; “That [supplement] does not even [take place] immediately after the rite, how could it [take place] at the same time?” (NyK S 741.5–6 [= G 163.28]); *kim punaḥ samānakalatā?*; “How could it [take place] at the same time?” (NyK S 741.10 [G 164.10–11]). Nor is it impossible that Maṇḍana tries to avoid the kind of temporal proximity that would allow the establishment of a “natural” causal relation between the rite (*karman*) and the *apūrvā*.

vartamānaḥ); even though it is present in its own time (*svakāle vartamāno 'pi*),¹²¹ since [at that time] the rite has disappeared, it is never seen to be perceived as something which is connected to the rite. As [Kumārila] says: “(...) since it (*asau*)¹²² does not exist by then (*tadānīm*), for it is the means to accomplishing the result [of the sacrifice]” (*Ślokavārttika* 1.1.4, k. 34). At the time of the rite, it is future; in its own time, the rite does not exist [anymore]. [Objection:] but then, how can the property of being a means (*sādhana*), [belonging to] the rite, be inherent in something else? [Answer:] because it is placed [in the Self of the sacrificer] by the [rite]. In fact, there is no rule stating that the property of being a means (*sādhana*) should be inherent precisely in that [means]. It is [rather] correct [to think] that the [property of being a means], inferred from the effect, is there wherever it is sufficient to [produce] that effect, and it is the capacity of whatever placed it [there]. And we do not say that the rite is the means for accomplishing [the expected result] in a figurative way, for this is established in the case of the pieces of firewood (*kāṣṭha*).¹²³

Reading this crucial passage of the ViV one cannot help wondering how much of it actually differs from Kumārila's views. Two points need to be considered: the appeal to Kumārila's theory of the *apūrva*, and the quote from the perception chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* (k. 34). Regarding the second point, first of all, the new inflection given by Maṇḍana to this half-verse is noticeable. In the context of the *Ślokavārttika* the pronoun *asau* can only refer to *dharma*, that is, in Kumārila's interpretation, to the ritual action (*kriyā*), the substance (*dravya*) or its qualities (*guṇa*).¹²⁴ Even though the verse could, in principle, be read in the same way when quoted in the ViV, the flow of Maṇḍana's discourse, especially the use of the same pronoun *asau* (“this”) in the preceding sentence to denote the “supplement” (*atiśaya*) that is the *apūrva* and the constant designation of the act by the neuter *karman*, clearly invites the reader to interpret *asau* in Kumārila's

¹²¹ As rightly pointed out by Vācaspati, this remark is probably meant to prevent an understanding of the *apūrva* as a “timeless” entity, as in Prabhākara's theory: that supplement is present (hence existent) in its own time, only this time does not coincide with that of the sacrifice. See NyK: *atha sarvadaiva kim avartamānaḥ? tathā ca gagana-kamalakalpāḥ prasajyeta!*; “Or is [that supplement] never present? Then it is, alas, similar to a sky-lotus!” (S 742.11–13 [G 164.18–19]).

¹²² On the interpretation of the demonstrative *asau*, see our remarks below.

¹²³ On the example of the pieces of firewood (*kāṣṭha*), which Maṇḍana almost surely borrows from the *Tantravārttika*, see below and n. 129.

¹²⁴ See above and n. 94. All commentators agree on this point: *asau* refers, according to Umbeka, to “substance, action, qualities, etc.” (*dravyakriyāguṇādi – Tātparyatikā* p. 128.9), according to Sucarita to “substance and the like” (*dravyādi – Kāśikā* p. 220.13), according to Pārthasārathi to “sacrifice and the like” (*yāgādi – Nyāyaratnākara* – p. 143.23).

verse as referring, again, to the *apūrva*. Following this interpretation, the half-verse should not be translated as

since it [= the sacrifice] does not exist at that time [= the time of performance]
as a means of bringing about its result (Taber's translation, quoted above)

but as

since it [= the *apūrva*] does not exist at that time [= at the time of the performance], for it is the means of bringing about the result [of the sacrifice]. (My translation, in the context of the ViV.)

The reason for this inflection is clear: being perishable and momentary (*āśuvīnāśīn*, *kṣaṇabhāṅgin*, etc.), the sacrifice is not, strictly speaking, the means to realising any result as long as it does not have a “supplement” (*atiśaya*) – the *apūrva* – that helps build a continuity between the ephemeral performance of the rite and the production of its fruit. If we now examine the theory of *apūrva* mobilised in this section by Maṇḍana, we see that there is in fact very little in it that does not have an equivalent in the *Apūrvādhikaraṇa*, the “Chapter on the Unprecedented” of the *Tantravārttika* (2.1.5). The idea of the *apūrva* as an “ability” (*yogyatā*) pertaining to the sacrifice or the sacrificers, first of all, is part of Kumārila's very definition of the Unprecedented.¹²⁵ The *apūrva* is also often called by Kumārila a “capacity” (*śakti*),¹²⁶ in most ways similar to the capacity of worldly actions “like agriculture, drinking butter (?) or study” (*kṛṣighṛtapānādhyayanaprabhṛti* – p. 395.5) which, like the sacrifice, cannot bear their fruit immediately.¹²⁷ Similarly,

¹²⁵ See in particular TV₁ 2.1.5: *karmabhyah prāg ayogyasya karmaṇa puruṣasya vā | yogyatā sāstragamyā yā parā sāvūrvam iṣyate ||*; “That ability (*yogyatā*) of a rite or a person that did not have any ability before [the undertaking of] the rite, which is different [from the rite] and which is grasped by Scripture is called the ‘Unprecedented’” (p. 394.6–7); *saiva ca puruṣagatā kratugatā vā yogyatā śāstre 'smīnn apūrvam ity apadiśyate*; “And that ability pertaining to (*gata*) the person or the rite is called ‘Unprecedented’ in the present discipline” (p. 394.10–11).

¹²⁶ See TV₁ 2.1.5: *yadā darśapūrṇamāsas tadavayavo vā kāṃ cid puruṣe śaktim anādhāyaiva vinaśyet...*; “If the New and Full Moon sacrifices or their parts vanished without laying down a certain capacity (*śakti*) in the person [who performs them]...” (p. 394.23–24); *apūrvākhyāḥ śaktayaḥ*; “the capacities called ‘Unprecedented’” (p. 394.29); *yāgād eva phalaṃ tad dhi śaktidvāreṇa sidhyati |*; “For the expected result arises from the sacrifice through its capacity (*śakti*)” (p. 395.11); *yāgāhitayā tu śaktyā sādhyamānam yāgenaiva sādhitam bhavati*; “That which is produced by the capacity laid down [in the person] by the sacrifice is produced by the sacrifice, and by nothing else” (p. 395.13–14). The idea of the Unprecedented as a “capacity” (*śakti*) of the sacrifice is already expressed in k. 199 of the *codanā*-section of the *Ślokavārttika*. See Kataoka 2011₂: 158, 452 and n. 588 and Yoshimizu 2000: 154–155.

¹²⁷ TV₁ 2.1.5: *laukikaṃ cāpi yat karma phale kālāntarodgatau | tatrāpi śaktir evāste na tv*

the idea of the Self of the agent as the locus of inherence of the *apūrva* is fully Kumārila,¹²⁸ as is the example of the pieces of firewood (*kāṣṭha*) used to explain how the production of a thing from another may suppose the operation of an unexpressed causal link.¹²⁹ Even the *apūrva*'s keeping away from perception is occasionally underlined by the author of the *Tantravārttika*, though on slightly different grounds.¹³⁰ Only one major difference is noticeable, as far as I can see: if Kumārila accepts, as does Maṇḍana, that the *apūrva*, although a capacity of the sacrifice, may inhere in something else, he is less categorical than the author of the ViV on the possibility, for the *apūrva*, first to inhere in the act itself, before it vanishes, as can be seen from the following verse:¹³¹

Although we accept that the capacity of [ritual] acts is inherent in [the acts] themselves (*svasamaveta*), it will not be [inherent in that way] after they have perished; but since it is present [i.e. inherent] in the agent (*kartṛstha*), it does not perish.

Such a distinction is, of course, entirely unacceptable to Maṇḍana, for whom the idea of the act's capacity to produce a fruit being inherent in the act itself (*svasamaveta*) immediately involves its being perceptible. For him, the capacity of the rite *must* be inherent in something else; for Kumārila it *can* be inherent in something else, although it is, at first, inherent in that entity to which it pertains as a *śakti*.¹³²

apūrvam iheṣyate ||; “A capacity is there even in worldly actions, aiming at a result that will arise only much later, only it is not called the ‘Unprecedented’” (p. 395.3–4).

¹²⁸ See TV₁ 2.1.5: *ātmaiva cāśrayas tasya kriyāpy atraiva ca sthitā* ||; “And its support is none but the Self, and the action also stands there” (p. 397.29).

¹²⁹ TV₁ 2.1.5: *kāṣṭhaiḥ paktavyam ity ukte nirdiṣṭā jvalanakriyā* ||; “When we say ‘This should be cooked by means of firewood,’ we also designate [implicitly] the action of burning [pertaining to the pieces of firewood]” (p. 395.20).

¹³⁰ See TV₁ 2.1.5: *pratyakṣeṇa tāvan nāvagamyaṭe, rūpādyanātmakatvena cakṣurādibhir asaṃbandhāt*; “[The Unprecedented], first of all, is not grasped by perception, for not being a colour, etc., it cannot be connected with the eye and other [sense-organs]” (p. 390.14–15).

¹³¹ TV₁ 2.1.5: *yadi svasamavetaiva śaktir iṣyeta karmaṇām | tadvināśe tato na syāt kartṛsthā tu na naśyati* || (p. 398.4–5).

¹³² That Maṇḍana had this particular passage in mind while elaborating his theory appears clearly from a comparison of the last lines of the passage of the ViV quoted above with the immediately following verse in the *Tantravārttika*: *śaktiḥ kāryānumeyatvād yadgataivopayujyate | tadgataivābhyupetavyā svāśrayānāśrayāpi vā* ||; “Since a capacity is to be inferred from its effect, it will be assumed to pertain (°gata) to that [entity] pertaining to which it is useful, regardless of whether [that entity] is its own substratum (*svāśraya*) or not” (TV₁ 2.1.5 – p. 398.8–9).

What is new, then, in Maṇḍana's treatment of the topic is the slight adaptation of Kumārila's theory of the *apūrvā* to the question of the imperceptibility of *dharma*. So understood, the theory of the "Unprecedented" could solve two difficulties: the "inherence" (*samavāya*) of the capacity to produce a result in the sacrifice, and its being (therefore) "contemporaneous" (*tatkāla*) with the rite.

To represent this difference graphically we may explain Kumārila's account of *dharma*'s inaccessibility to perception in two steps:¹³³




Figure 1. Kumārila's two-step model of *dharma*'s imperceptibility.

Maṇḍana's version of the theory simply denies, on the basis of Kumārila's own theory of the *apūrvā*, that the property of "being a means" can be inherent in the sacrifice, and also that it can take place at the same time. By temporally dissociating the sacrifice from its capacity to produce a result, Maṇḍana therefore substitutes for Kumārila's two-step model a three-step structure, where the act and its causal power simply cannot be grasped together:




Figure 2. Maṇḍana's three-step model of *dharma*'s imperceptibility.

What makes the teaching of the Veda inaccessible to perception is therefore not that its object would entirely escape the constraints of time, but that its two components, the sacrifice and its property of being a means, though "present" (*vartamāna*) each in its own time (*svakāle*), are never found together at the *same* time. From the standpoint of the act efficiency towards the goal is always something "to be

¹³³ This graphic representation of Kumārila's theory is loosely inspired by Kataoka 2011₂: 116 and 158.

done” (*sādhya*), that cannot come into existence unless the corresponding act disappears altogether. That an object is *sādhya* thus does not mean, for Maṇḍana, that it is *not present*, but that it is essentially a *composite* whose members do not share a single point in time. This discrepancy, that clings to all ritual acts (but not to others), allows Maṇḍana to account for the specificity of a *Vedic* teaching on *sādhya* objects without having to dissolve the intimate connection of being (*sat*) to the present time. The defence of a strict definition of being as presence and the interpretation of the injunctive “ought” as (temporal) non-coincidence of the act and its capacity are thus correlative theses, and indeed the two sides of the same coin.

Conclusion

It appears from what precedes that Maṇḍana’s reflection on injunction – culminating in his identification of “being a means to accomplishing what is desired” (*iṣṭasāadhanatā*) as the object of all injunctive suffixes in ViV 26–28 – and his investigation of *dharma*’s imperceptibility as (temporal) non-coincidence of that property with the ritual act, are essentially part of the same theoretical complex, whose epicentre is his conception of existence as presence (*vartamānatā*). It is because being is equivalent to being present that a temporal interpretation of imperativity was bound to fail, and it is for the same reason that the Vedic “you must” had to be distilled to a mere non-coincidence of a property and its possessor. The opposite view, which I still hesitate to attribute to Prabhākara in person, is not less coherent, and explains, under the premise of an equivocal conception of being as “being cognised,” both, linguistically, the functioning of injunctive discourse and, hermeneutically, the specificity of the object of the Veda. This second position, piecing together views on being, language and action, can therefore properly be called an “ontology of commandment,” if I may borrow this expression coined by G. Agamben. Not quite illegitimately, it seems to me, for it is precisely as a result of a brilliant reflection on liturgy and the imperative in the Western tradition that the author of *Homo Sacer* proposes to distinguish an ontology “of operativity” (as he also calls it), “at work in the the juridical and religious sphere” from the ontology developed by the philosophical and scientific tradition, “which speaks in the indicative.”¹³⁴ Maṇḍana’s thesis of being as presence, which marks the irruption of Mīmāṃsā in the philosophical arena of debate on “existence” (*sattā*), can only be understood in reaction to such an attempt to inscribe in ontology “the contraction of what is and what ought to be” (Agamben 2012: 136). That attempt, however, did not have all the con-

¹³⁴ Agamben 2012: 135–138 (I translate from the Italian).

sequences one might have expected for the history of Brahmanical reflection on being. Already Śālikanātha, followed in that by the later Prābhākara tradition, loses sight of the ritual background of the two ontologies. For him *sattā* is just a particular case of pseudo-universal, a fictitious entity comparable with universals of caste (“being a Brahmin,” *brāhmaṇatva*) or sound (*śabdatva*). Maṇḍana’s definition of being as presence, on the other hand, is alluded to in texts as diverse as the Buddhist Prajñākaragupta’s *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (around 800)¹³⁵ and Vyomaśiva’s *Vyomavatī* (9th–10th century), a work on Vaiśeṣika,¹³⁶ though entirely severed from its original exegetical background. And indeed this might be the natural destiny of an ontology of commandment that it should always remain in the margins of a metaphysical reflection essentially devoted to what there *is*, not to what *ought to be*. By cutting off their reflection on being from its exegetical roots, and the thought of commandment from its ramifications in ontology, Mīmāṃsakas thus certainly facilitated the inscription of their discipline as a “philosophical view” among others; but they also renounced what was perhaps one of their most adventurous attempts: rationally to account for being when it is modally distinct, hence without common measure, with objects as we normally experience them.

Appendix: *niyoga* as an independent category (*padārtha*)?

One of the most intriguing aspects of Prabhākara’s theory of the *niyoga* – but one for which our sources are scarce – is the hypothesis of the commandment as a separate ontological category (*padārtha*). Could consequences of Prabhākara’s understanding of injunctions on ontology have led some among his followers to recognise *niyoga* as a separate kind of entity? Without drawing any final conclusion, this appendix gathers the evidence available so far for an independent investigation in the field of categoriology among early advocates of the school.

The enumeration and definition of “entities” or “categories” (*padārtha*) is not a common topic in early Mīmāṃsā, and Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā is no exception to

¹³⁵ See *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*: *nanu vartamānakālasaṃbandho ’stitvam, na sāksātka-
raṇam*; “But, existence is the connection with the present time, not direct perception” (p. 112.7).

¹³⁶ *Vyomavatī* 36.12: *ato ’rthakriyākāritvena sattvam iti śākyā manyante. vartamānakāla-
saṃbandhitvenety apare*; “The Buddhists believe that ‘existence’ [can be explained] by ‘practical efficiency’ (*arthakriyā*). Others (*apare*) [take it] in the sense of ‘having a connection with the present time’” (translation: Halbfass 1986: 77 [modified]); *Vyomavatī* 37.15: *etena vartamānakālasaṃbandhitvena sattvaṃ pratyuktam*; “With this [argumen-
tation] the theory that ‘existence’ is due to a ‘connection with the present time’ is also refuted” (translation: Halbfass 1986: 77 [modified]).

this rule. This, of course, is not to say that the reality and independence of some of the entities isolated as “categories” by early Vaiśeṣika (for instance, absences or universals) is not discussed at length in Prābhākara treatises. However, it does not seem possible, from the extant Prābhākara literature from its beginnings to the time of Bhavanātha (11th c.?), to draw any univocal list of categories that would have been accepted by all theoreticians belonging to that tradition.¹³⁷

Such a list is found at a much later probable date in two anonymous Prābhākara tracts retrieved from Kerala at the beginning of the last century and published in Trivandrum under the (fabricated) titles *Gurusaṃmatapadārthāḥ* (GSP) and *Gurusaṃmatapadārthasaṃkṣepa(ḥ)* (GSPS).¹³⁸ Although neither text can be dated with any precision, their proximity to the second section (*Prameyapariccheda*) of Rāmānujācārya’s *Tantrarahasya* (TR) (15th–17th c.?)¹³⁹ suggests they might belong to the last stages in the history of the Prābhākara school. The GSP, GSPS and TR all agree in advocating the same list of eight kinds of entities (list A): substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), movement (*karman*), universal/generalality (*jāti/sāmānya*), potentiality (*śakti*), inherence (*samavāya*), number (*saṃkhyā*) and similarity (*sādrśya*).¹⁴⁰ The same list is also found in two treatises ascribed to Śālikanātha: the *Pramāṇapārāyaṇa* (included in all printed editions of Śālikanātha’s “*Prakaraṇapañcikā*”) and the lost *Prameyapārāyaṇa*, known only through

¹³⁷ Lists of entities are occasionally found in older literature. See for instance *R̥juvimalā* 1.1.5 (M₁ 159.16–18), where Śālikanātha denies the existence of any common aspect in “universals, qualities, movements and substances” (*jātiḥ guṇakriyādravyeṣu*). There is, however, no way to decide whether Śālikanātha regarded such a list as exhaustive.

¹³⁸ As the editors in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series themselves point out (GSP – Introduction, p. 1; GSPS – Introduction, p. 1), the edition is based in each case on a single manuscript with neither title nor final rubric. The two titles have been artificially extracted by the editors on the basis of the first stanza of each treatise. See GSP: (...) *itīme ’ṣṭau padārthā gurusaṃmatāḥ* (p. 1); GSPS: (...) *aṣṭau padārthā atha tāt vibhajya saṃkṣīpya vakṣyāmi guror matena* (p. 1).

¹³⁹ For a discussion of Rāmānujācārya’s date, see Freschi 2012: 9–10.

¹⁴⁰ See TR 2: *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyasamavāyaśaktisaṃkhyāsādrśyāny aṣṭau padārthāḥ*; “There are eight [kinds of] entities: substance, quality, movement, generality, inherence, potentiality, number and similarity” (p. 20.4); GSP 1: *dravyajātiguṇāḥ karma saṃkhyāsādrśyaśaktayaḥ | samavāya itīme ’ṣṭau padārthā gurusaṃmatāḥ || 1 ||*; “The eight [kinds of] entities accepted by the Guru [= Prābhākara] are: substance, universal, quality, movement, number, similarity, potentiality and inherence” (p. 1); GSPS: *dravyaṃ guṇaḥ karma ca jātiśaktiḥ sādrśyasamkhye samavāya ete | aṣṭau padārthā atha tāt vibhajya saṃkṣīpya vakṣyāmi guror matena || 1 ||*; “The eight [kinds of] entities are: substance, quality, action, universal, potentiality, similarity, number and inherence. I will [first] distinguish them [from one another], and [then] explain them briefly according to the view of the Guru [= Prābhākara]” (p. 1).

brief mentions in the *Pramāṇapārāyaṇa* and in late Nyāya works.¹⁴¹ The authenticity of both treatises is doubtful, and it is impossible, on the basis of current research, to get a clear idea of their date.

However, as M. Hiriyanna already pointed out a century ago in an important article (Hiriyanna 1972, first published in Madras in 1930), other sources suggest the existence, at an earlier date, of another list of eight kinds of entities (list **B**), excluding the last three of the above list and including particularity (*viśeṣa*), dependence (*pāratantrya*)¹⁴² and the commandment (*niyoga*) as independent categories. If the inclusion of *viśeṣa* can be interpreted as a concession to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of categories, the distinction of the *niyoga* as a kind of entity *per se* is significant for the present enquiry as it testifies to an attempt, on the part of at least some Prābhākaras, at theorising the commandment not only in linguistic or psychological terms, but also in relation to other entities existing in the world.

Unfortunately, the earliest occurrences of this second list are quite late and, what is even more disturbing, do not include any Prābhākara work. Reference to this second list is mostly found in Vedāntic texts. We come across list **B** for the first time in a doxographic passage of the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* by the Vedāntin Prakāśātman (950–1000),¹⁴³ in which various lists of entities developed

¹⁴¹ *Pramāṇapārāyaṇa* (*upamāna*^o): *kiṃ punar idaṃ sādṛśyam? nedaṃ dravyaguṇa-karmasāmānyasamavāyaviśeṣāṇāṃ anyatamam (...). ataḥ padārthāntaram evedam, śaktivat saṃkhyāvac ceti prameyapārāyaṇa evoktam*; “But what is it [that you call] ‘similarity’ (*sādṛśya*)? It is not counted among the following [kinds of entities]: substance, quality, movement, generality, inherence, particularity (...). Therefore it must be a different [kind of] entity, just like potentiality or number, as is explained in the *Prameyapārāyaṇa*” (pp. 167.4–168.13). In the same passage, the author of the *Pramāṇapārāyaṇa* makes it clear that particularity (*viśeṣa*), which is not included in list **A**, is mentioned here for the sake of argument, not because it would be recognised as an independent kind of entity, for “those who are conversant with the means of [valid] cognition do not accept [the existence] of an entity called ‘particularity’” (*viśeṣākhyaṃ [...] padārthaṃ pramāṇavādino nānumanyante* – p. 268.7–8). The passage of the *Prameyapārāyaṇa* referred to here may correspond to a fragment of this work quoted in Mallinātha’s commentary on Varadarāja’s *Tārkikarākṣā* (around the 15th c.): *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaśaktisaṃkhyāsādṛśyasamavāyā aṣṭau padārthāḥ*; “The eight [kinds of] entities are: substance, quality, movement, generality, potentiality, number, similarity and inherence” (quoted in Hiriyanna 1972: 50, n. 6).

¹⁴² Some authors argue that dependence (*pāratantrya*) is equivalent to inherence (*samavāya*) in this context. See *Tātparyadīpikā* (Citsukha): *pāratantryaṃ samavāyaḥ*; “Dependence is [nothing but] inherence” (p. 644.22); *Tattvadīpana* (Akhaṇḍānanda): *pāratantryaṃ samavāyaḥ* (p. 628.18). Note, however, that Mādhava, who often closely relies on Citsukha, does not give such an explanation in the corresponding passage of the *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* (quoted below).

¹⁴³ On this date see David 2020a.

in the philosophical schools of his time are discussed.¹⁴⁴ Later Vedāntic tradition from Citsukha (13th c.) and Mādhava (14th c.) onwards then distinguishes (possibly on the sole authority of Prakāśātman's text) between “ancient Prābhākaras” (*cirantanaprābhākara*) upholding list **B**, and “contemporary [Prābhākaras]” (*ādhunika[-prābhākara]*) advocating list **A**.¹⁴⁵ The “older” list is the only one found in a later Vedāntic work, Rāmānanda Sarasvatī's *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* (16th c.), but Rāmānanda's neglect of the “new” list is more likely to be a sign of his exclusive reliance on Prakāśātman's *Vivaraṇa* (of which his work is a paraphrase) than of a persistence of list **B** in later Prābhākara tradition.

The two lists can better be compared in the following chart (the list of six categories commonly accepted in early Vaiśeṣika sources is added for reference):

List A (“new” Prābhākaras)	List B (“older” Prābhākaras)	Vaiśeṣika
A1. <i>dravya</i>	B1. <i>dravya</i>	V1. <i>dravya</i>
A2. <i>guṇa</i>	B2. <i>guṇa</i>	V2. <i>guṇa</i>
A3. <i>karman</i>	B3. <i>karman</i>	V3. <i>karman</i>
A4. <i>sāmānya/jāti</i>	B4. <i>sāmānya</i>	V4. <i>sāmānya</i>

¹⁴⁴ *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* (5th *varṇaka*): *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣaśaktipāratantryaniyogā aṣṭāv iti prābhākaraḥ*; “According to Prābhākaras, there are eight [kinds of entities]: substance, quality, movement, generality, **particularity**, potentiality, **dependence** and **commandment**” (pp. 643–44). Prakāśātman examines the lists of entities established by eight schools of thought (the number of categories is indicated in brackets): Vedāntins (3), Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka (*vārttikakārīyāḥ*) (4), Śaivas (5), Vaiśeṣikas (6), Jains (*kṣapaṇakāḥ*) (7), Prābhākaras (8), Naiyāyikas (16) and Sāṃkhya (25). This account is certainly eclectic and over-systematic, but it is nevertheless generally faithful to the various doctrines taken individually, so there is no reason to think that Prakāśātman's description of the Prābhākara doctrine of categories would have been made up.

¹⁴⁵ *Tātparyadīpikā* (Citsukha): *idaṃ tu cirantanaprābhākaramatam. dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyasamavāyāśaktisamkhyāsādrśyānīty aṣṭapadārthā ādhunikamatena*; “This [= the view exposed by Prakāśātman] is the view of the ancient Prābhākaras. According to the opinion of contemporary [Prābhākaras], the eight [kinds of] entities are: substance, quality, movement, generality, inherence, potentiality, number and similarity” (p. 644.22–24); *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* (Mādhava): *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣapāratantryaśaktiniyogā aṣṭāv iti cirantanāḥ prābhākaraḥ. dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyasamavāyāśaktisamkhyāsādrśyāny aṣṭāv ity ādhunikāḥ*; “According to the ancient Prābhākaras, the eight [kinds of entities] are substance, quality, movement, generality, particularity, dependence, potentiality and commandment; according to contemporary [Prābhākaras], the eight [kinds of entities] are substance, quality, movement, generality, inherence, potentiality, number and similarity” (p. 201.5–7).

A5. <i>śakti</i>	B5. <i>śakti</i>	V5. <i>viśeṣa</i> (= B7)
A6. <i>samavāya</i>	B6. <i>pāratantrya</i>	V6. <i>samavāya</i> (= A6)
A7. <i>saṃkhyā</i>	B7. <i>viśeṣa</i>	
A8. <i>sādrśya</i>	B8. <i>niyoga</i>	

Table 3. Categories (*padārtha*) according to “old” and “new” Prābhākaras, compared with Vaiśeṣika.

Since all dated sources concerning both lists are later than 950, it is impossible to draw definite conclusions on the evolution of the Prābhākara doctrine of categories before that date.¹⁴⁶ Prakāśātman may of course be wrong when he ascribes the doctrine of the commandment as a separate category to some Prābhākara thinkers (if not to “Prābhākaras” taken as a single homogenous group), but there is no decisive reason to think so. All we can say for the moment is that an interpretation of Prābhākara’s *niyoga* as an independent entity might have been available at some point before the 10th century, and that the abandonment of commandment as a category somewhat coincides with the evolution of philosophical ideas on ontology, time and the imperative as it is outlined in the present article.

¹⁴⁶ M. Hiriyanna’s 1930 (1972) article is ground-breaking, and also presents a much more nuanced opinion than that put forward by A. B. Keith (1921), who did not hesitate to ascribe list A to... Prābhākara himself (p. 52)! Still, one might not be ready to follow his reasoning in all its consequences. Taking at face value Mādhava’s (in reality, Citsukha’s) distinction between “ancient” and “contemporary” Prābhākaras, Hiriyanna first argues that this really refers to “an ‘old’ and a ‘new’ school among the Prābhākaras themselves” (p. 49). The fragment of the lost *Prameyapārāyaṇa* mentioned earlier is then considered sufficient ground to identify the latter with “the school of thought as represented (*sic*) by Śālikanātha” (p. 50). The older list is in turn ascribed to Prābhākara himself or to one of his immediate followers. Leaving aside the serious doubts one might entertain regarding Śālikanātha’s authorship of the *Pramāṇa*° and *Prameyapārāyaṇa*, it seems rather unlikely that Prakāśātman, certainly one of Śālikanātha’s most acute readers in his time, would have had no knowledge whatsoever of his doctrine of categories. It would be equally surprising that Citsukha and Mādhava, writing in the 13th and 14th century respectively, should still refer to Śālikanātha’s opinion as that of a “contemporary” (*ādhunika*). Thus, even admitting there really was an evolution between an “old” and a “new” doctrine of categories in the Prābhākara tradition (which, again, is anything but certain), the available evidence rather suggests that this modification took place in the period between the 10th and the 13th century, a period in which the twin (pseudo-?)śālikanāthan treatises *Pramāṇa*° and *Prameyapārāyaṇa* could also have come to light.

References and abbreviations

Sanskrit texts

A = *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini. Quoted according to Sharma 1995.

Abhiprāyaparakāśikā of Citsukha. In: *Bhāvaśuddhi of Ānandapūrṇamuni and Abhiprāyaparakāśikā of Citsukhamuni. Two Commentaries on Brahmasiddhi*, ed. N. S. Ananta-krishna Sastri. Madras 1963.

BhāV = *Bhāvanāviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra:

J = *The Bhāvanāviveka of Maṇḍana Miśra, with the Commentary of Bhaṭṭa Umbeka*, ed. G. Jhā and G. Kāvīrāj. Benares 1922.

R = *Bhāvanāviveka with Viśamagranthibhedikā*, ed. V. A. Rāmasvāmī Śāstrī and K. A. Śivarāmakṛṣṇa Śāstrī. Annamalainagar 1952.

Bhāvaśuddhi. See *Abhiprāyaparakāśikā*.

Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra:

C = *Bṛhatī (a commentary on Śābarabhāṣya) by Prabhākara Miśra with the commentary Rjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra*, ed. A. Chinnaswami Sastri. Benares 1929.

M₁₋₅ = *Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra (on the Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya of Śābarasvāmin) with the Rjuvimalāpañcikā of Śālikanātha*, ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri (vols. 1–2) and S. Subrahmanya Sastri (vols. 3–5). Madras 1934–1967.

BS(SV) = *Brahmasiddhi by Ācārya Maṇḍanamiśra with [the] commentary by Śaṅkha-pāṇi*, ed. S. Kuppaswami Sastri. Madras 1937.

GSP = *Gurusaṃmatapadārthāḥ*, ed. S. Kunjan Pillai. Trivandrum 1954.

GSPS = *Gurusaṃmatapadārthasamkṣepa*, ed. V. G. Namboodiri. Trivandrum (Anantaśayana).

Jātinirṇaya of Śālikanātha. See *Prakaraṇapañcikā*.

k. = *kārikā*.

*Kāśikā*₁₋₃ of Sucarita Miśra = *The Mīmāṃsāśloka-vārttika with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamīśra*, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī (vols. 1–2) and V. A. Rāmasvāmī Śāstrī (vol. 3). Trivandrum 1926–1943.

Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali = *The Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, ed. F. Kielhorn. 3 vols. Bombay 1880–1885.

Mataṅgaparameśvaravṛtti = *Mataṅgaparameśvarāgama (Vidyāpāda) avec le commentaire de Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha*, ed. N. R. Bhatt. Pondicherry 1977.

MiSū = *Mīmāṃsāsūtra: Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte Mīmāṃsādarśane...*, ed. Subbāśāstrī. 6 vols. Pune 1929–1934.

Nāyakarātna of Rāmānujācārya. See *Vākyārthanirṇaya*.

Nayaviveka of Bhavanātha Miśra = *Nayaviveka of Bhavanātha Miśra with the Vivekatattva of Ravideva [Tarkapāda]*, ed. S. K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī. Madras 1937.

NM₁₋₂ = *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, with Tippanī – Nyāyasaurabha by the editor*, ed. K. S. Varadācārya. 2 vols. Mysore 1969–1983.

Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra. See *Ślokavārttika*.

Nyāyasudhā of Someśvara Bhaṭṭa = *Nyāyasudhā, a commentary on Tantravārttika by Paṇḍit Someśvara Bhaṭṭa*, ed. Mukunda Śāstrī. Benares 1909.

Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara = *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvaja Uddyotakara*, ed. A. Thakur. New Delhi 1997.

NyK = *Nyāyakanikā* of Vācaspati miśra. See ViV.

Padārthadharmasaṃgraha of Praśastapāda (*Praśastapādabhāṣya*). See Bronkhorst and Ramseier 1994.

Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa of Prakāśātman. In: *Pāñcapādikā of Śrī Padmapādācārya, with the Commentaries Prabodhapariśodhinī of Ātmasvarūpa and Tātparyārthadyotinī of Vijñānātman and Pañcapādikāvivarāṇam of Śrī Prakāśātman with Tātparyadīpikā of Citsukhācārya and Bhāvaprakāśikā of Nṛsiṃhāśrama*, ed. S. Śrīrāma Śāstrī and S. R. Kṛṣṇamūrti Śāstrī. Madras 1958.

Prabhākara-vijaya of Nandīśvara = *Prabhākara-Vijaya of Nandīśvara*, ed. Ananta Krishna Sastri. Calcutta 1926.

Prakaraṇapañcikā, collection of treatises ascribed to Śālikanātha = *Prakaraṇapañcikā of Śālikanātha Miśra, with Nyāyasiddhi of “Jaipuri” Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa*, ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Benares 1961.

Prakīrṇaparakāśa of Helārāja. See VP 3.

Pramāṇapārāyaṇa of Śālikanātha. See *Prakaraṇapañcikā*.

Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra of Prajñākaragupta = *Pramāṇavārtikabhā[ṣ]yam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikam)*, ed. R. Sāṅkrityāyana. Patna 1953.

R̥juvimalā of Śālikanātha. See *Bṛhatī*.

ŚBh = *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* of Śabara (*Śābarabhāṣya*). See MiSū and Frauwallner 1968.

Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa = *Mīmāṃsāślokavārttikam, śrīmatkumārīlabhaṭṭapāda-viracitam, (...)pārthasārathimiśrapraṇītayā nyāyaratnākarākhyayā vyākhyayānugatam*. Benares (Kāśī) 1898.

See also Kataoka 2011₁ and Taber 2005.

ŚN = *Śābdanirṇaya* of Prakāśātman. See David 2020a.

G: *The Śābdanirṇaya by Prakāśātmapāṇḍita*, ed. T. Gaṇapati Śāstrī. Trivandrum 1917.

Sphuṭākṣarā of Śrīvṛṣabha (= *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva). See VP(SV) 1.

SV = *svavṛtti*.

Tātparyadīpikā of Citsukha. See *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa*.

Tātparyāṭikā of Umbeka/Umveka Bhaṭṭa = *Ślokavārttikavyākhyā Tātparyāṭikā of Umveka Bhaṭṭa*, ed. S. K. Rāmanātha Śāstrī. Madras ²1971. Revised ed. – 1st ed. 1940.

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TR = *Tantrarahasya* of Rāmānujācārya, ed. R. Shamashastry. Baroda 1923.

TV₁₋₆ = *Tantravārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. See MīSū and Kataoka 2004.

Vākyārthamātrikā and °*vṛtti* of Śālikanātha. See *Prakaraṇapañcikā*.

Vākyārthanirṇaya of Pārthasārathi Miśra. In: *Nyāyaratnamālā of Pārthasārathimiśra, with the Commentary of Rāmānujācārya entitled the Nyākaratna*, ed. K. S. Rāmaswami Śāstrī Śiromaṇi. Baroda 1937.

ViV(SV) = *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra:

M = *Vidhivivekaḥ, śrīmadācāryamaṇḍanamiśraviracitaḥ, pūjyapādaśrīmadvācaspati-miśranirmitayā nyāyakaṇikākhyayā vyākhyayā samalaṅkṛtaḥ*, ed. Mānavallyupāhva-tailaṅgarāmaśāstrī. Benares 1907.

G = *Vidhivivekaḥ of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra, with the Commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspati Miśra*, ed. Mahāprabhu Lāl Goswamī. Benares 1978.

S = Stern 1988.

Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha of Vidyāraṇya = *The Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha of (Mādha-vācārya) Vidyāraṇya*, ed. Rāmaśāstrī Tailaṅga. Benares 1893.

VP 3 = *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari (*kāṇḍa* 3):

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja. Kāṇḍa 3, part 1 (3.1–3.7), ed. K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer. Pune 1994. Reprint. 1st ed. Pune 1963.

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VP(SV) 1 = *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari (*kāṇḍa* 1):

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, with the Vṛtti and the Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva. Kāṇḍa 1, ed. K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer. Poona 1966.

VP(SV) 2 = *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari (*kāṇḍa* 2):

Ed^{1939/40}: *Vākyapadīyam, bhartṛharyupajñāvṛttisanātham puṇyarājaṭīkāsaṃyutaṃ dvitīyaṃ kāṇḍam (dvitīyabhāge prathamakhaṇḍaḥ)*, ed. Cārudevaḥ Śāstrī pāṇinīyaḥ. Lahore [Lavapura] 1939/40 (= Vikrama era 1996).

Ed¹⁹⁸³: *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari (an ancient treatise on the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar), containing the Ṭīkā of Puṇyarāja and the ancient Vṛtti. Kāṇḍa* 2, ed. K. A. Subrahmanya Iyer. Delhi/Varanasi/Patna 1983.

vt. = *vārttika*.

Vyākhyā = *Brahmasiddhivyākhyā* of Śāṅkhaṇḍī. See BS(SV).

Vyomavatī of Vyomaśiva = *Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya*, ed. Gaurinath Sastri. Benares (Varanasi) 1983–1984.

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Dharmakīrti on the Origin of Suffering An Annotated Translation of PV 2.179–189*

Vincent Eltschinger

Introduction

In SNa 16.17, Aśvaghoṣa (1st century CE?) claims that “[...] the cause of this suffering from active being in the world is to be found in the category of the vices such as desire and the rest, not in a Creator or Primordial Matter or Time or the Nature of Things or Fate or Chance.”¹ The same *topos* underlies BC 18.18–56, a fascinating passage in which Aśvaghoṣa alias Anāthapiṇḍada criticizes all available metaphysical hypotheses concerning the origin and/or the nature of the universe: God (*īśvara*), Nature (*rañ bṛ̥jīn* = *svabhāva/prakṛti*), Spirit (*puruṣa*), Time (*kāla*), Chance/Fortuitousness/Causelessness (*yadṛcchā/ahetu/ākasmika*). In these two passages, the poet resorts to a fairly widespread motif whose *locus classicus* (and origin?) is often claimed to be ŚvUp 1.1–2ab:²

What is the cause of *brahman*? Why were we born? By what do we live? On what are we established? Governed by whom, O you who know *brahman*, do we live in pleasure and pain, each in our respective situation? Should we regard it as time, as inherent nature, as necessity, as chance, as the elements, as the source of birth, or as the Person? Or is it a combination of these?³

* Most sincere thanks are due to Isabelle Ratié for her close reading of the present paper and her insightful remarks.

¹ SNa 16.17: *pravṛttiduḥkhasya ca tasya loke tṛṣṇādayo doṣagaṇā nimittam / naiveśvaro na prakṛtir na kālo nāpi svabhāvo na vidhir yadṛcchā* // Translation Johnston 1932: 89–90.

² If Thomas Oberlies is to be followed concerning the chronology of the ŚvUp (early centuries CE; more or less concomitant with the *Bhagavadgītā*), there is no discernible reason why Aśvaghoṣa's BC and SNa should postdate the Upaniṣad. See Oberlies 1988 and 1995.

³ ŚvUp 1.1–2ab: *kiṅkāraṇaṃ brahma kutaḥ sma jātā jīvāma kena kva ca sampratiṣṭhāḥ / adhiṣṭhitāḥ kena sukhetaṛeṣu vartāmahe brahmavido vyavasthām // kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣeti cintyam / saṃyoga eṣām [...]* // Translation Olivelle 1998: 415. On this *topos*, see Schrader 1902 and Eltschinger forthcoming a; on *svabhāvavāda* especially, see Bhattacharya 2002 and 2006.

Whatever its origin, this ubiquitous motif likely was intended to map all possible metaphysical principles, thus allowing early Indian thinkers to locate themselves in a conceptual universe of basic religio-philosophical positions. In Buddhist texts, these metaphysical hypotheses are generally regarded as contrasting with the only satisfactory account of causality, dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) understood either as the twelvefold chain of factors in its standard formulation or as causation per se, often with suffering (*duḥkha*) as the *explicandum*.⁴

While tracing the history and later occurrences of this *topos*, my attention was attracted to its role in the epistemological tradition of Buddhism. Perhaps its most striking manifestation there is as an organizing principle of the TS,⁵ the first seven chapters of which successively deal with *prakṛti*, *īśvara*, both, *ahetu* = *svabhāva*, *śabdabrahman*, *puruṣa*, and *ātman*. While commenting on TS 1ab₁ (*prakṛtīśobhayātmādivyāpārarahitaṃ...*), Kamalaśīla (740–795) first explains that

among them, *prakṛti* is the primordial matter consisting of [the three *guṇas*] *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, [as it is] imagined by the Sāṅkhyas; *īśa* is the [creator] God; “both” [refers to] those two; *ātman* refers to the *puruṣa* that is the agent of creation and resorption and to the other, [individual] one, [the one] that transmigrates; “etc.” includes [principles] such as time. Their operation [means] their being causes. “Free from it” [means] devoid of their operation. Such is the meaning.⁶

Immediately after this word-for-word explanation, Kamalaśīla claims that

this is [what has been] stated by the Blessed One [himself]: “And the sprout is not made by itself, not made by another, not made by both, not made by God, not arisen from Nature, nor dependent on a single cause, nor born without a cause.” With this, [Śāntarākṣita] introduces [the chapters dealing with] the critical examination of primordial matter, God, both, the absence of cause, *śabdabrahman*, and the self.⁷

⁴ This is the case, e.g., in ŚSū 403,9–404,1 (see below, n. 8) and MAVSū §9c28ab.

⁵ See TSP_K 11,1–3/TSP_§ 11,21–23, referring to ŚSū 403,9–404,1.

⁶ TSP_K 10,25–11,1/TSP_§ 11,18–20: *tatra prakṛtiḥ sāṅkhyaparikalpitaṃ sattvarajastamorūpaṃ pradhānam / īśa īśvaraḥ / ubhayaṃ etad eva dvayaṃ / ātmā sṛṣṭisaṃhārakāraka ekaḥ puruṣas tadanyaś ca saṃsārī / ādigrahaṇena kālādīparigrahaḥ / teṣāṃ vyāpārah kāraṇabhāvaḥ / tena rahitaṃ tadvyāpāraśūnyaṃ ity arthaḥ /*

⁷ TSP_K 11,1–3/TSP_§ 11,21–23: *tad uktaṃ bhagavatā – sa cāyam aṅkuro na svayaṅkṛto na parakṛto¹ nobhayaṅkṛto neśvaranirmīto na prakṛtisambhūto naikakāraṇādhīno nāpy ahetusamutpanna² iti / etena pradhāneśvarobhayāhetukaśabdabrahmāmaparīkṣāṇāṃ upakṣepaḥ / ¹na parakṛto TSP_§: TSP_K om. na parakṛto. ²ahetusamutpanna TSP_§: TSP_K ahetuḥ samutpanna.*

The Buddha's statement quoted by Kamalaśīla is none other than the ŚSū *locus* already referred to above.⁸

Albeit in a much more humble way, the trope also features in the works of Dharmakīrti (around 600?), where it underlies the philosopher's treatment of the noble truth of the origin of suffering in PV 2.179–189, the translation and explanation of which are the subject matter of the present essay. In terms of targets and rhetorical strategies, this short section of the PV epitomizes Dharmakīrti's apologetic method in buddhological and religious matters. For while defending his interpretation of the truth of origin, Dharmakīrti does not only criticize the advocates of two items from the above-mentioned *topos*, viz. the so-called *svabhāvavādins* and the *īśvaravādins*, but also rebukes a Cārvāka opponent and defends, in an exegetical/hermeneutic vein, his own account against (rhetorical?) objections on the part of Buddhist coreligionists. Quite interestingly in my opinion, Dharmakīrti's treatment of the origin of suffering echoes an earlier section of PV 2, viz. PV 2.131cd–135. In these stanzas, the philosopher comments on the second epithet describing the (future) Buddha in the homage verse of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the Buddha as a teacher (*śāstr*), and briefly sketches the Bodhisattva's examination of the cause of suffering and its antidote.⁹ Dharmakīrti's arguments in PV 2.179–183a are strikingly (but unsurprisingly) similar to those he and especially his commentators Devendrabuddhi (630–690?) and Prajñākara Gupta (around 800?) ascribe to the Bodhisattva himself in and under PV 2.131cd–135. In my opinion, this reflects a lasting tendency among Indian Buddhist intellectuals, that of replicating the exemplary philosophical reflections of the (future) Buddha in his quest for salvation, most of which were seen to entail staunch criticism of alternative paths to salvation. These intellectuals could thus see themselves as the true heirs of the Buddha interpreted as a paradigmatic philosopher whose last embodiment was aimed, according to the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*, at defeating a host of reasoners (*tārkika*), brahmin traditionalists (*ānuśravika*) and “meditators” (*samāpatt*).¹⁰

⁸ ŚSū 403,9–404,1: *myu gu de yañ bdag gis ma byas / gžan gyis ma byas / gñis kas ma byas / dbaṅ phyug gis ma byas / dus kyis ma bsgyur / rañ bžin las ma byuñ / rgyu med pa las kyañ ma skyes te* / Translation Schoening 1995: I.283 (slightly modified). For Sanskrit fragments, see Schoening 1995: II.705 (§10): *sa cāyam aṅkuro na svaya-ṅkṛto na parakṛto nobhayakṛto neśvaranirmīto na kālapariṇāmito na prakṛtisambhūto naikakāraṇādhiṇo nāpy ahetusamutpannaḥ*. See above, n. 4.

⁹ On this passage, see Eltschinger 2005.

¹⁰ See Eltschinger 2019 and forthcoming b.

The present paper provides an additional *avatāra* of a kind of hermeneutics that my friend John Taber may not always or entirely agree with, but that he faithfully depicted.¹¹ It is meant as a token of loving friendship to John, one of the very few present-day philosophers able to read Indic texts in the original and thus to make truly authoritative statements about them. John and I know how rare and fragile friendship can be in academic circles and how much more we therefore have to cherish the many months we spent and will spend together translating Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, weighing each word and humbly listening to each other.¹²

Against *svabhāva* and *īśvara* as the causes of suffering

In PV 2.145–279, Dharmakīrti gives his own explanation of the fifth and last epithet of the Buddha in Dignāga's homage verse, the Buddha as a protector (*tāyin*) of living beings.¹³ According to Dharmakīrti, protecting can be interpreted in two different but perfectly compatible ways:

Protecting (*tāya*) [living beings consists in] teaching [them] the path he himself experienced (*dr̥ṣṭa*) [in order to rid himself from suffering]; he does not speak untruth for this would be useless, [both] because he is compassionate and because [it is but] for the others' sake [that] he yoked himself to [that] whole [soteric] enterprise; therefore, [the Blessed Buddha] is a *pramāṇa* [with regard to the salvational means for those who seek salvation]. Or, protecting [them and thus being a *pramāṇa* consists in] revealing the four truths.¹⁴

From PV 2.146cd, Dharmakīrti attempts to demonstrate the reliability of the four noble truths, thus choosing to elaborate on the second meaning of *tāyitva*.

Having dealt with the truth of suffering and its four aspects (PV 2.146cd–178),¹⁵ Dharmakīrti turns to the origin of suffering (PV 2.179–189), trying first

¹¹ See Taber 2013: 146.

¹² See Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012 and Eltschinger/Taber/Much/Ratié 2018. Thanks to a new grant from the US National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), we shall resume our work on the *apoha* section of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, hoping that the second of the planned three volumes will be published in 2022.

¹³ On this topic, see Inami/Tillemans 1986 and Franco 1997: 15–43.

¹⁴ PV 2.145–146ab : *tāyaḥ svadr̥ṣṭamārgoktir vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam / dayālutvāt parārthanī ca sarvārambhābhiyogataḥ // tataḥ pramāṇam tāyo vā catuḥsatyaparakāśanam* / My interpretation is based on PVP D61a1–62b3/P69b4–71b2.

¹⁵ PVP D78a6/P89b5 and PVV 72,24. These four aspects (*ākāra*) are summarized in PV 2.176; see Vetter 1990: 78–79; on the sixteen aspects of the four truths, see Eltschinger 2014.

to demonstrate that suffering cannot be without a cause (PV 2.179–182ab).¹⁶ His argument is as follows: “Since it is occasional, suffering is known (*siddha*) to have a cause, [for if it were] without a cause, it would either eternally exist[, like space,] or it would never exist[, like a rabbit’s horn],¹⁷ because it would not depend on anything else.”¹⁸ According to Devendrabuddhi,

something (*artha*) that has no cause (*nirhetuka*?), arising autonomously (*svātantryeṇa*?), has nothing to depend upon (*apekṣya*, *apekṣanīya*) thanks to the presence of which it would exist at a certain time (*kadācit*?) and thanks to the absence of which it would not exist at another time; therefore, it will not come into being even when it is about to arise (*utpitsa*), because it is immutable, [and] it will never cease to exist (*rtaḡ tu yod par ’gyur ro*) [even] when it is about not to arise², because it is immutable.¹⁹

The verse’s *pādas* c and d, *nityaṃ sattvaṃ asattvaṃ vāhetor anyānapekṣaṇāt*, are borrowed from PV 1.35ab, where Dharmakīrti explains in some detail why a causeless thing either would constantly exist or would never exist. Note, however, that PV 1.35ab deals with smoke, a spatio-temporally defined material (*rūpin*) entity contrasting with suffering which, as a conditioning factor (*saṃskāra*), is a non-physical entity (*arūpin*) with no spatial determinations: “[If it were without a cause, smoke] would either always exist or never exist, because [something] causeless does not depend on [anything] else [to arise]. For the fact that real entities occur occasionally is due to [their] dependence [upon something else].”²⁰ In his autocommentary on PV 1.35, Dharmakīrti explains that

¹⁶ According to PVP D78a6/P89b6: *re žig sdug bsñal de rgyu med pa can du mi ’gyur ro //*

¹⁷ PVV 73.4.

¹⁸ PV 2.179: *kādācitkatayā siddhā duḥkhasyāsya sahetutā / nityaṃ sattvaṃ asattvaṃ vāhetor anyānapekṣaṇāt //* PV 2.179cd = PV 1.35ab = PVin 2.58ab; see below, n. 20. PVV 73.4 reads *bāhyānapekṣaṇāt*, against PVP D78a7/P89b8 (*gžan la mi ltos phyir*), PV_{PVA} and PV 1.35ab = PVin 2.58ab (*anyānapekṣaṇāt*). My translation is based on Devendrabuddhi’s explanation; for an alternative reading of *pādas* cd, see PVSVT 102,9, Steinkellner 1979: 104, Steinkellner 2013: I.56 and Dunne 2004: 336.

¹⁹ PVP D78b1–2/P89b8–90a2: *don rgyu med pa can rañ dbaṅ du skye ba la gaṅ thag ñe ba las res ’ga’ ’gyur ba dan thag ñe ba med pa las dus gžan du mi ’gyur ba ste / ltos¹ par bya ba cuñ zad kyañ yod par ’gyur ba ma yin no // de bas na khyad par med pa’i phyir ’byuñ bar ’dod pa’i dus na’an mi ’gyur ro // ’byuñ ba’i dus ma yin par² khyad par med pa’i phyir rtaḡ tu yod par ’gyur ro //* ¹ltos D : *bltos* P. ²This expression is unclear to me; should one read something like *’byuñ bar mi ’dod pa’i dus na’(añ)*, or understand the Tibetan as reflecting something like Skt. *anutpattikāle*?

²⁰ PV 1.35 = PVin 2.58: *nityaṃ sattvaṃ asattvaṃ vāhetor anyānapekṣaṇāt / apekṣāto hi bhāvānām kādācitkatvasambhavaḥ //* On this stanza, its context and its autocommentary, see Steinkellner 2013: I.54–61, and especially 56–57. See above, n. 18.

if smoke occurred without a cause, it would never fail to occur because it would not depend [on anything], for nothing would be missing for its occurrence, as [it is the case] at the time when it is acknowledged [to occur]. Or it would not occur even at that time, because [then] it [can]not differ from the time when it does not [yet] exist. [It is] indeed [only] due to [their] dependency [on a suitable time and place that] real things occur occasionally, because the time [and place] at which [the effect] exists and [the time and place at which it] does not exist have (*yoga*, Tib. *ldan pa*) and have not the capacity to bring it about[, respectively]. Because [if they had not,] it would not be possible to limit the possession of the [effect] and the contrary [i.e., the non-possession of the effect,] to two times and places whose capacity and incapacity are [exactly] the same. And this capacity, what else can it be than the very being (*bhāva*, Tib. *dnos po*, presence?) of the cause? Therefore, a real entity is said to depend on *x* when it exists at a certain time and place *x* to the exclusion of another time and place *y*. To explain: To depend is nothing but to exist in such a way, because [something] that does not depend on the assistance provided by these [time and place] cannot be limited to them. Therefore, since it is limited to [a certain] place and [a certain] time, its [= smoke's] nature is generated by that in [the presence of] which smoke is perceived [be it only] once and in the absence [of which] it is not perceived anymore, because otherwise [i.e., if its nature were not generated by that], it would not even exist once. How could that [smoke] which is restricted to the [causal complex of fire, etc.,] occur with [something] different [from fire]? Or if it could, it would [simply] not be smoke, for what we call "smoke" is a certain nature that is generated by this [causal complex of fire, etc.]. Similarly, the cause itself has the nature of generating an effect of that type. If this [smoke] also occurred with [something] different [from fire], one would [certainly] not say that it is its [= fire's] nature. [And since fire would not have the nature of generating smoke,] it would not generate [it] even once. Or that [which is generated by something different from fire] is not smoke, because it arises from [something] whose nature is not to generate smoke. And if this [other cause] has this nature, [then] it is just fire. There is therefore no deviation [between smoke and fire].²¹

²¹ PVSV 22,22–23,13: *sa hi dhūmo 'hetur bhavan nirapekṣatvān na kadācin na bhavet / tadbhāve vaikalyābhāvād iṣṭakālavat / tadāpi vā na bhavet / abhāvakālāviśeṣāt / apekṣayā hi bhāvāḥ kādācitkā bhavanti / bhāvābhāvakālayos tadbhāvayogyatāyogyatāyogāt / tulyayogyatāyogyatayor deśakālayos tadvattetarayor niyamāyogāt / sā ca yogyatā hetu-bhāvāt kim anyat / tasmād ekadeśakālaparihāreṇānyadeśakālayor vartamāno bhāvas tadapekṣo nāma bhavati / tathā hi tathāvṛttir evāpekṣā tatkr̥topakārānapekṣasya tanniyamāyogāt / tan niyatadeśakālatvād dhūmo yatra dṛṣṭaḥ sakṛd vaikalye ca punar na dṛṣṭas tajjanyo 'sya svabhāvaḥ / anyathā sakṛd apy abhāvāt / sa tatpratīniyato 'nyatra katham bhavet / bhavan vā na dhūmaḥ syāt / tajjanīto hi svabhāvaviśeṣo dhūma iti / tathā hetur api tathābhūtakāryajananasvabhāvaḥ / tasyānyato 'pi bhāve na sa tasya*

This should suffice to show that, physical or not, real things or events such as smoke and suffering are occasional to the extent that they depend on other things or events. More on this below.

As PV 2.180 makes clear, however, the conclusion that suffering cannot be without a cause is not unanimously accepted: “Some say that, just as there is no cause for the sharpness, etc., of [things] such as thorns, in the same way, this [suffering] must be without a cause.”²² Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin identify Dharmakīrti’s opponent as a *svabhāvavādin* (*rañ b’zin du smra ba*),²³ rightly so I think, for the example, the thorns’ sharpness, is ubiquitous in ancient Indian and especially Buddhist literature and almost invariably ascribed to the *svabhāvavādins*.²⁴ One of its earliest occurrences can be found in Aśvaghoṣa’s BC: “Who fashions the sharpness of the thorn or the varied nature of beast and bird? All this takes place by natural development. There is no such thing in this respect as action of our own will, *a fortiori* no possibility of effort.”²⁵ Other early occurrences include the NSū, the LASū and, closer to Dharmakīrti, Candrakīrti’s MAV.²⁶ In his commentary, Devendrabuddhi alludes to several other characteristic elements of the *svabhāvavādin*’s repertoire. Commenting on the second “etc.” (*ādi* in *kaṇṭakādiṣu*, “of [things] such as thorns”), he says: “The word ‘etc.’ includes [things] such as the stalk (*nāla*), the petals (*dala*), the filaments (*kesara*) and the pericarp (*karṇikā*) of the lotus.”²⁷ As for the first “etc.,” he explains it as follows: “The word ‘etc.’ includes [things] such as the form (*saṃsthāna*), the color (*varṇa*), the hardness (*kārkaśya*), and the softness (*ślakṣṇatā*, *mṛduta*).”²⁸ Directly or indirectly, Devendrabuddhi’s explanation is borrowed from

svabhāva iti / sakṛd api na janayet / na vā sa dhūmo ’dhūmajananasvabhāvād bhā-vāt / tatsvabhāvatve ca sa evāgnir ity avyabhicārah / Cf. Steinkellner 2013: I.56–57, Steinkellner 1979: 104–105 and Dunne 2004: 336–337.

²² PV 2.180: *taikṣṇyādīnām yathā nāsti kāraṇam kaṇṭakādiṣu / tathā’kāraṇam etat syād iti kecit pracakṣate //*

²³ PVP D78b4/P90a4 and PVV 73,9.

²⁴ See Bhattacharya 2002: 77–78. See also above, n. 3. For Caraka’s critique of *svabhāvavādin* arguments against rebirth, see Filliozat 1993: 98–101.

²⁵ BC 9.62: *kaḥ kaṇṭakasya prakaroti taikṣṇyam vicitrabhāgam mṛgapakṣiṇām vā / svabhāvataḥ sarvam idaṃ pravṛttaṃ na kāmākāro ’sti kutaḥ prayatnaḥ //* Translation Johnston 1984: II.135–136. For parallels, see Johnston 1984: II.135–136, n. 62, and 1932: 158–159.

²⁶ See NSū 4.1.22, LASū 184,7–9, and MAV 205,13–206,2.

²⁷ PVP D78b2–3/P90a2–3: *sogs smos pas ni padma’i sdoñ bu dan’ dab¹ ma dan’ ge sar dan’ lte ba la sogs pa bzuñ no //* ¹dab D : mdab P.

²⁸ PVP D78b3/P90a3: *sogs smos pas ni dbyibs dan’ kha dog dan’ rtsub pa dan’ ’jam pa la sogs pa bzuñ ste //*

an oft-quoted stanza of Āryaśūra's JM: "What causes qualities such as form, color, structure and softness in the stalk, petals, filaments and pericarp of a lotus? Who applies the various colors to the feathers of birds in the world? The world is therefore fixed and has an inherent nature."²⁹

In the fourth chapter of his TS, Śāntarakṣita also criticizes *svabhāvavādins* "who explain that the arising of real things is independent of any cause."³⁰ According to Kamalaśīla, the *svabhāvavādins* "provide [the following] reasoning for this: Whatever fulfills the conditions for being perceived but is not perceived as existing (*anupalabhyamānasattāka*) is treated as nonexistent by rational people, like a rabbit's horn. Now, the cause of real things is not perceived as existing. [The logical reason involved in the argument is] the non-perception of a nature."³¹ To prove that the logical reason (*yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sad anupalabhyamānasattākam*) is not unestablished (*asiddha*),³² Śāntarakṣita's *svabhāvavādins* adduce the following example: "Who creates the diversity of the filaments of the lotus, etc.? Who makes the eyes of the peacock's tail [so] variegated?"³³ And in order to prove that, just as external (*bāhya*) things such as lotuses are seen to be without a cause, internal (*ādhyātmika*) events such as suffering can be inferred to be without a cause,³⁴ the *svabhāvavādins* speak as follows: "Just as [properties] such as the sharpness of the thorns, etc., are causeless

²⁹ JM 23.17: *kaḥ padmanāladalakesarakarṇikānām saṃsthānavarṇaracanāmṛdutādihetuḥ / patrāṇi citrayati ko 'tra patatrīṇām vā svābhāvikaṃ jagad idaṃ niyataṃ tathaitva* // Translation Meiland 2009: II.95. Vibhūticandra (Vibh. 73n1) quotes this stanza (without mentioning its author) while commenting on PVV on PV 2.180. See also MAV 205,13–206,2.

³⁰ According to TS 110a_c: *sarvāhetunirāśaṃsaṃ bhāvānām janma varṇyate / svabhāvavādibhiḥ [...]* // Note TSP_K 62,9–11/TSP_S 57,6–7: *sāmprataṃ svabhāvavādinō nirasyante / ta evaṃ āhuḥ – na svato nāpi parato bhāvānām janma kiṃ tarhi sarvāhetunirāśaṃsaṃ svaparākāraṇanirapekṣaṃ ity arthaḥ* / "The *svabhāvavādins* are now being refuted. They speak as follows: Things arise neither from themselves nor from others, but independently of any cause, i.e., independently of themselves or others as causes. Such is the meaning."

³¹ According to TSP_K 62,14–16/TSP_S 57,11–13: *atra ca yuktiṃ varṇayanti – yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ sad anupalabhyamānasattākaṃ tat¹ prekṣāvātām asadvya-vahāraviśayaḥ / yathā śaśaviśāṇam / anupalabhyamānasattākaṃ ca bhāvānām kāraṇam iti svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ / ¹tat TSP_K : tataḥ TSP_S.*

³² TSP_K 62,16/TSP_S 57,13.

³³ TS 111: *rājīvakesarādīnām vaicitryaṃ ka[h] karoti hi / mayūracandrakādir vā vicitraḥ kena nirmitaḥ* //

³⁴ According to TSP_K 62,22–23/TSP_S 57,19–20: *syād etat – yadi nāma bāhyānām bhāvānām kāraṇānupalabdher ahetutvaṃ siddham ādhyātmikānām tu kathaṃ siddham ity āha...*

inasmuch as they are [purely] occasional, suffering, etc., are causeless.”³⁵ One easily recognizes the argument of Dharmakīrti’s opponent in a more developed form, which Kamalaśīla explicits as follows:

Even if the causelessness of [internal events] such as suffering is not established through perception, it is certainly established by inference. To explain: Whatever is occasional is ascertained as being causeless, like the sharpness of the thorns, etc. Now, [an internal event] such as suffering is occasional. The logical reason [involved in the argument] is an essential property.³⁶

As an answer, Dharmakīrti states the following definition of causality:

[Against them, advocates of causality such as we Buddhists]³⁷ claim that *x* is the cause of that [*janmin* or *vikārin*] *y* that arises when *x* is present or that transforms itself when *x* transforms itself. Now [all] this is also the case of [thorns, etc., which arise when the seed, water, earth, etc., are present, and transform themselves according to the relative augmentation of these factors³⁸].³⁹

The first aspect of the theorem is well known and is nothing but a fairly common adaptation of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). As Inami has it, according to Dharmakīrti, “causality is not an actual relation between A and B [...], but their existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*). It is nothing but the fact that only when B exists, A exists, and when B does not exist, A never exists. Such A and B are called effect and cause, respectively.”⁴⁰ However, Dharmakīrti’s usual characterizations of causality do not include the aspect of transformation, a specific feature of PV 2 which, still according to Inami, could be due to the fact that, “[r]efuting the causal relation between body and mind [...], Dharmakīrti regarded not only existence and non-existence (*bhāvābhāva*) but also change

³⁵ TS 112: *yathaiva kaṇṭakādīnām taikṣṇyādikam ahetukam / kādācīkatayā tadvad duḥkhādīnām ahetutā* // Note TSP_K 62,19–20/TSP_S 57,16–17: *ādigrahaṇān nāladala-karṇikādīnām kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādīnām ca grahaṇam / vaicitryam iti samsthānavarṇa-kārkaśyādibhedam* / TS 110–112 are quoted in BCAP 381,14–19 on BCA 9.117.

³⁶ TSP_K 63,1–3/TSP_S 57,23–25: *yadi nāma pratyakṣato nirhetukatvaṃ duḥkhādīnām na siddham tathāpy anumānataḥ siddham eva / tathā hi yat kādācīkaṃ tad ahetukaṃ niścitaṃ yathā kaṇṭakataikṣṇyādi / kādācīkaṃ ca duḥkhādīti¹ svabhāvahetuḥ / ¹duḥkhādīti* TSP_S : *duḥkhādīnīti* TSP_K.

³⁷ PVP D78b5/P90a5–6: *rgyur smra ba saṅs rgyas pa la sogs pas so* //

³⁸ According to PVV 73,14–16: *saty eva bījodakaprthivyādīṣu tadutkarṣāpakarṣādivikāre ca vikṛtatvaṃ teṣāṃ kaṇṭakādīnām apy astīti te ’pi sahetukā eva / evaṃ skandhā api* /

³⁹ PV 2.181: *saty eva yasmin yajjanma vikāre vāpi vikriyā / tat tasya kāraṇaṃ prāhus tat teṣāṃ api vidyate* //

⁴⁰ Inami 1999: 134, where the author quotes several *loci* from Dharmakīrti’s works.

(*vikāra*, *vikriyā*) as a mark of causality.”⁴¹ Whatever the case may be, Dharmakīrti notoriously regarded the determination of causality as proceeding through perception and non-perception (*pratyakṣānupalambha*): “If a thing (A), which was not perceived in spite of having its conditions [to be perceived], is perceived when other things (B, C, D...) are perceived, and if A is not perceived when even one thing (B) among them disappears, then A is the effect of B.”⁴² This dual mode of determining causality is precisely what Śāntarakṣita relies upon while rejecting the *svabhāvavādins*’ logical reason as being unestablished and their thesis as being contradicted by perception.⁴³ “If it is ascertained by perception and non-perception that [things] such as a seed, earth and water, when they have reached a special state, are the cause of the lotus, the filaments, etc., with which they have co-presence and co-absence, why on earth should we ask for another cause?”⁴⁴ Here is Kamalaśīla’s explanation:

To explain: *x* is said to be the cause of *y* if *y* exists only when *x* exists and if *y* transforms itself because *x* transforms itself. [Now] in [exactly] this way, [things] such as a seed, once they have reached a special state such as [that of being] swollen, are ascertained by perception and non-perception to be of [exactly] that kind with regard to [things] such as a lotus and a filament, with which they have co-presence and co-absence. Therefore, the logical reason [resorted to by our *svabhāvavādin* opponent] is unestablished.⁴⁵

According to Dharmakīrti and his successors, then, there is no need to resort to *svabhāva* or to appeal to causelessness in order to explain the sharpness of the thorns, for such phenomena can be empirically accounted for by the method of perception and non-perception, which clearly reveals that they are the effects of factors such as seed, earth, and water.

⁴¹ Inami 1999: 134, n. 12, where PV 2.183 is also quoted.

⁴² PVSV 22,2–3 (as quoted in Inami 1999: 135): *yeṣāṃ upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdham yad upalabhyate, tatraikābhāve ’pi nopalabhyate, tat tasya kāryam* / Translation Inami 1999: 135. For literature on this much discussed passage, see Steinkellner 2013: II.183.

⁴³ According to TSP_K 63,13/TSP_S 58,5: *anena hetor asiddhiṃ pratyakṣavirodham ca pratiññārthasya darśayati* /

⁴⁴ TS 113–114: *sarojakesarādīnām anayavyatirekavat / avasthātiśayākraṇṭam bījapaṅkajalādikam // pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ niścitaṃ kāraṇam yadā / kim ity anyas tadā hetur amīṣāṃ pariprcchate* /

⁴⁵ TSP_K 63,15–18/TSP_S 58,7–10: *tathā hi yasmin saty eva yasya janma bhavati yasya ca vikārād yasya vikāras tat tasya kāraṇam ucyate / tathaivambhūtaṃ¹ bījādikam ucchūnādiviśiṣṭāvasthāprāptaṃ rājivakesarādīnām anayavyatirekavat [...] pratyakṣānupalambhābhyāṃ niścitaṃ ity asiddho hetuḥ* / ¹Note TSP_{Tib} D ze 186b6: *de yan de liar bur gyur pa*, which suggests something like **tac caivambhūtaṃ*, which makes much better sense here.

According to the *svabhāvavādin*, however, Dharmakīrti's definition of a cause is fallacious (*vyabhicārīn*), or, in Manorathanandin's explanation, suffers from over-extension (*ativyāpti*), for one observes cases in which two things are concomitant without being causally related. This is supposedly the case of tangible matter (*sparśa*)⁴⁶ and visual cognition (*caḥsurvijñāna*): “[Objection:] When tangible matter exists, a visual cognition (*caḥsurvijñāna*) arises, and [the latter] does not arise when [the former] is not present. However, [tangible matter] is not the cause of a visual cognition. Hence [your] definition of the causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) is fallacious.”⁴⁷ Here is Dharmakīrti's answer: “[There is no fallacy here because,]⁴⁸ since tangible matter [i.e., the elements,] is the cause of [something] visible, it is [indeed indirectly] the cause of vision.”⁴⁹ Kamalaśīla's explanation is worth quoting here:

And what you have said [above, i.e.], that [our] definition of the causal relation is fallacious, this is unestablished, for, inasmuch as tangible matter is also a cause of [something] visible, it is accepted as a cause of a visual cognition, too. For tangible matter refers to the [four great] elements, and it is by deriving from them that [something] visible occurs. It is therefore the case that tangible matter is a cause with regard to a visual cognition.

⁴⁶ *sparśa* is defined as *bhūtāni*, “(great) elements,” by Devendrabuddhi (PVP D78b7/P90a8–b1: *reg bya žes bya ba ni 'byuñ ba dag yin no //*) and Kamalaśīla (TSP_K 63,20/TSP_S 58,13: *sparśa iti bhūtāny ucyante //*). Both authors then explain that *rūpa*, “something visible,” occurs by deriving from them (*ibid.*, *de dag rgyur byas nas rgyur byas pa'i gzugs rab tu 'jug pa; tāni copādāyopādāya rūpaṃ vartate*). This seems to correspond to the distinction between *bhūta*, “(great) elements,” and *bhautika*, “derived/secondary matter,” as it is discussed with reference to the *dhātus* in AKBh 23,18–21 (on AK 1.35a₁; see *Kośa* I.63–64): whereas *spraṣṭavya* is both *bhūta* and *bhautika*, the four other physical objects and the five physical senses are just *bhautika*. Vibh. 73n3: *sparśībhūta-catuṣkātma upādāya rūpasya hetuḥ* is very likely mistaken; one is tempted to read: *sparśo bhūtacatuṣkātma / upādāya rūpasya hetuḥ* (the facsimile edition is not currently available to me). PVT P *ñe* 158a8–b2 provides no explanation.

⁴⁷ PVP D78b6–7/P90a7–8: *gal te reg bya yod na miḡ gi rnam par šes pa 'gyur žiñ / med na mi 'byuñ¹ ba de ltar na yañ miḡ gi rnam par šes pa'i rgyu ma yin pa de ltar na rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po'i mtshan ñid² de 'khrul pa yin no že na / 'byuñ P : 'gyur D. ²ñid em. : ñid can DP. TSP_K 63,3–7/TSP_S 57,25–28 provides a useful parallel: *na cāpi yasya bhāvābhāvayor yasya bhāvābhāvau niyamena bhavatas tat tasya kāraṇam iti yuktam vyabhicārāt / tathā hi sati sparśe caḥsurvijñānam bhavaty asati ca na bhavati / atha ca nāsau caḥsurvijñānakāraṇam / tasmāt kāryakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇam etad vyabhicārīty atah siddham sarvahetunirāsaṃsaṃ bhāvānām janmeti / Cf. also PVV 73,17–18: *nanu sparśe sati bhavati caḥsurvijñānam asati ca na bhavati / na ca tatkāraṇam ato 'tivyāptir iti...***

⁴⁸ PVP D78b7/P90a8: *de ni 'khrul pa ma yin te / 'di ltar...*

⁴⁹ PV 2.182ab : *sparśasya rūpahetutvād darsane 'sti nimittatā /*

What makes the difference [between tangible matter and something visible is] simply [their being] direct or indirect [causes of the visual cognition].⁵⁰

Having rejected the causelessness of suffering, Dharmakīrti then turns to the hypothesis according to which suffering has a permanent entity for its cause (PV 2.182cd–183a₁). Dharmakīrti of course targets God, but, as his commentators make clear, his answer is also relevant against the Sāṅkhyas' primordial matter (*pradhāna*), *puruṣa*, etc.⁵¹ “Moreover, inasmuch as permanent [things] have been refuted [in another context,⁵² suffering] does not arise from [entities] such as God, because [permanent things] are not capable [of bringing about any effect].”⁵³ It is well known that, in the so-called *sattvānumāna* (“inference [of momentariness] from existence”), Dharmakīrti demonstrates real things' momentariness by showing that it is impossible for permanent entities to produce an effect either serially (*kramēṇa*) or simultaneously, all at once (*yugapad*, *yaugapadyena*), and this is indeed Manorathanandin's explanation of the reason *asāmarthyāt* (“because [permanent things] are not capable [of bringing about any effect]”) in the stanza.⁵⁴ According to Devendrabuddhi,

to begin with (*tāvat*), suffering does not come from [permanent entities] such as God (*īśvarādi*); [for] even if they exist, permanent things have no capacity to [produce] effects. Therefore, suffering is not due to them. To explain, [what is] permanent is capable at every moment (*sarvakāle*, *sarvatra kāle*), [and] therefore, as it does not depend on [any] cooperating

⁵⁰ TSP_K 63,18–21/TSP_S 58,11–14: *yac cāpy uktam –kāryakāraṇalakṣaṇam vyabhicārīti tad asiddham*¹ / *sparsāsyāpi rūpahetutayā*² *caḥsurvijñāne* 'pi *nimittabhāvasyeṣṭatvāt* / *tathā hi sparśa iti bhūtāny ucyante* / *tāni copādāyopādāya rūpaṃ vartate* / *tataś caḥsurvijñānam prati sparśasya nimittabhāvo* 'sty *eva* / *kevalam sāksātpāramparyakṛto viśeṣaḥ* / ¹*tad asiddham* TSP_K : *tad apy asiddham* TSP_S . ²*rūpahetutayā* TSP_K : *nīrūpahetutayā* TSP_S .

⁵¹ According to PVP D79a2–3/P90b4: *sogs pa smos pas ni gtso bo dan skyes bu la sogs pa bzun no* // Cf. PVV 74,4: *ādighrahaṇāt pradhānapuruṣādeḥ*.

⁵² In this connection, Vibhūticandra (Vibh. 74n1) quotes CS 209ab = 9.9ab: *kāraṇam vikṛtiṃ gacchaj jāyate* 'nyasya *kāraṇam ityādinā* / “[C'est] en subissant une modification [que] la cause devient cause d'autre chose.” Translation May 1981: 86; on this stanza, which is reminiscent of the Sautrāntika doctrine of the *santānapariṇāma*(*viśeṣa*), see May 1981: 86, n. 43. See also Lang 1986: 90.

⁵³ PV 2.182cd–183a₁: *nityānām pratiṣedhena neśvarādeś ca sambhavaḥ* // *asāmarthyāt*...

⁵⁴ PVV 74,3: *nityānām kramākramābhyām arthakriyāyām asāmarthyāt*... On the *sattvānumāna* and its origin, see Yoshimizu 1999 and 2011, and Steinkellner 1968–1969; on the refutation of God, see Krasser 2002: II.20–21 (esp. PV 2.7–8) and Eltschinger/Ratié forthcoming (around ĪBhK 6–7).

factor (*sahakārin*), it produces everything all at once; or if it doesn't, [then] because nothing can make it change, it is never capable – this has [already] been said abundantly.⁵⁵

What Dharmakīrti's argument in PV 2.179–183a₁ comes down to is that, “because suffering is not without a cause and does not have a permanent cause, it has an impermanent cause.”⁵⁶ He can thus safely conclude: “[Suffering being neither without a cause nor with a permanent cause, its] cause is therefore [one's] longing for [re]existence, because human beings obtain⁵⁷ a specific [existential] situation due to [their] aspiration to obtain it.”⁵⁸ Both Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin gloss *bhavavāñchā* as *janmatṛṣṇā*, “craving [re]birth.”⁵⁹ Devendrabuddhi then explains *bhavavāñchā* as “desire (*abhilāṣa*) for a [particular] place of birth (*janmasthanā*), a [particular] condition (*avasthā*) [such as that of a human being or a god], paraphernalia[?] (*upakaraṇa*) [such as sandal], and [particular] beings (*sattva*) [to accompany her/him].”⁶⁰ Still according to Devendrabuddhi, the argument (*prayoga*) at stake as well as its meaning (*prayogārtha*) have been presented in detail (*vistareṇa*) by Dharmakīrti in PV 2.80ff.:⁶¹

⁵⁵ PVP D79a4–6/P90b6–8: *re zig dbaṅ phyug la sogs pa las sdug bsñal 'di 'byuñ ba ma yin žin / yod na yañ rtag pa rnams ni 'bras bu la nus med phyir / de dag las sdug bsñal ma' yin no // de ltar na rtag pa ñid ni dus thams cad na nus pa yod pa ñid yin pa'i phyir /² lhan cig byed pa la ltos³ pa med par cig car thams cad byed pa 'am / mi byed na⁴ cis kyañ khyad par med pa'i phyir / 'ga' žig gi tshe yañ nus pa med pa yin no žes mañ du bśad zin to // 'ma em. : DP ba. ²phyir / D : phyir ro // P. ³ltos D: bltos P. ⁴na D: P om. na.*

⁵⁶ PVP D79a6/P90b8–91a1: *gañ gi phyir sdug bsñal 'di rgyu med pa can ma yin žin / rgyu rtag pa can yañ ma yin pa de bas na mi rtag pa'i rgyu can yin no //*

⁵⁷ PVP D79b1/P91a3: *yoñs su len pa ste / mñon par 'dod pa sñon du soñ ba can gyi ñe bar len pa'o // “parigraha, i.e., a [type of] appropriation (*upādāna*) that presupposes desire (*abhilāṣapūrvaka*?).”*

⁵⁸ PV 2.183a₂d: *...ato hetur bhavavāñchā parigrahaḥ / yasmād deśaviśeṣasya tatprāptyā-śākṛto nṛṇām //*

⁵⁹ PVP D79a7/P91a1 and PVV 74,5.

⁶⁰ PVP D79a7/P91a2: *skye ba'i gnas dan gnas skabs dan ñe bar mkho¹ ba dan sems can la sogs pa la mñon par 'dod pa'o // 'mkho D: 'kho P.* The Sanskrit equivalents are warranted by PVV 74,5: (*bhavavāñchā*) *janmasthanāvasthāsattvādyabhilāṣātmikā*, and Vibh. 74nn2–3: *avasthā (manuṣyadevādi) / (sahāyāḥ) sattvā upakaraṇam (candanādi / garbhādi /)*. Note AKBh 286,3–4 (partial example of *bhavatṛṣṇā*): *aho batāham airāvaṇaḥ syām nāgarāja ityevamādi* / “I wish I could be(come) Airāvaṇa the king of the Nāgas!” AKVy 457,19: *ādiśabdena kuberaḥ syām strī syām ity evamādikā grhyate* / “The word ‘etc.’ includes [wishes] such as ‘I wish I could be(come) Kubera,’ [or] ‘I wish I could be(come) a woman.’” Tib. *ñe bar mkho ba* = Skt. *upakaraṇa* is somewhat obscure to me. Should it be understood as “(mode/instrument of) reverence(/worship)”?

⁶¹ PVP D79b3/P91a6–7.

Incapable of being guided by another being [such as God, a creature] obtains a vile [existential] situation because, possessing self-love, (s)he wishes to avoid suffering and to obtain pleasure. Misconception (*viparyāsamati*) about suffering and craving are the [two] causes of bondage. The living creature for whom neither of them exists [due to having repudiated the belief in a self]⁶² does not obtain rebirth [anymore and is thus released from *saṃsāra*]⁶³.⁶⁴

According to Devendrabuddhi,

the [underlying] argument [is as follows]: For a [creature] that cannot be guided by another being [such as God], obtaining a vile [existential] situation presupposes this self-loving [creature]’s desire to avoid suffering and to obtain pleasure, as [it is the case of] a fly enjoying a filthy place or a lustful man enjoying [even] a woman’s corpse. Now, a creature that cannot be guided by another being [such as God] obtains a vile [existential] situation, i.e., takes a place such as the embryo. [The reason resorted to in this argument is] effect as a logical reason (*kāryahetu*).⁶⁵

The logical reason “obtaining a vile [existential] situation...” is not inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).⁶⁶ To be sure, “a person who has fallen asleep or is inattentive

⁶² PVP D37b1/P42a7: *bdag tu mñon par žen pa spañs pa’i phyir ro //*

⁶³ PVP D37b1/P42a7: *de’i tshe ’khor ba las grol bar ’gyur ro //*

⁶⁴ PV 2.80–81: *ananyasattvaneyasya hīnasthānaparigrahaḥ / ātmasnehavato duḥkha-sukhatyāgāptivāñchayā //* *duḥkhe viparyāsamatis tṛṣṇā cābandhakāraṇam / janmino yasya te na sto na sa janmādhigacchati //*

⁶⁵ PVP D37a2–4/P41b7–42a2: *sbyor ba yañ gañ žig sems can gžan gyis¹ bkri bar bya ba ma yin pa dman pa’i gnas yoñs su len² pa de ni bdag la chags pa dan ldan pas sdug bñal dan bde ba dor ba dan³ thob par ’dod pa snon du soñ ba can yin te / dper na sbran bu dag mi gtsaṇ ba’i gnas yoñs su len pa’am* / ’dod chags can dag bud med kyi ro’i lus la sogs pa yoñs su len pa lta bu’o** // sems can gžan gyis bkri ba ma yin pa yañ dman pa’i gnas yoñs su len pa ste / srog chags rnams mñal la sogs pa’i gnas yoñs su len⁴ to žes bya ba ni ’bras bu’i gtan tshigs so // ¹gyis D: gyi P. ²len D: śes P. ³dan P: D om. dan. ⁴len P: lan D. *Cf. Vibh. 40n1: ...*makṣikāṇām aśucisthānagrahakāminām*... (read -*grahaḥ*; *kāminām* is to be read with what follows [**]). **Cf. Vibh. 40n1: [*kāminām*] *strikuṇapaśārīrādiparigrahavat / Devendrabuddhi’s prayoga* is the likely source of Jinendrabuddhi’s PST 1 10,6–10: *yo ’nanyasattvaneyasyābhiratipūrvako hīnasthānaparigrahaḥ sa ātmasnehavato duḥkhasukhatyāgāptivāñchāpūrvakaḥ / tadyathā makṣikāṇām abhiratipūrvako ’śucisthānaparigrahaḥ / ananyasattvaneyasyābhiratipūrvakaś ca garbhā-dihīnasthānaparigrahaḥ prāñina iti kāryam /* None of Jinendrabuddhi’s three occurrences of *abhiratipūrvaka* is represented in the PVP (on the reason for introducing *abhiratipūrvaka*, see below); PST has no equivalent of Devendrabuddhi’s *’dod chags can dag bud med kyi ro’i lus la sogs pa yoñs su len pa lta bu’o* (i.e., *kāminām strikuṇapaśārīrādiparigrahavat*, Vibh.).*

⁶⁶ The following is based on (Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation of) PVP D37a4–6/P42a2–4: *skyes bu gñid log¹ pa las ltuñ ba’am bag med pa² mi gtsaṇ ba dan g.yañ sa la sogs pa’i*

(*pramatta?*) falls (*pāta*) into a filthy (*aśuci?*) place or into a hole (*prapāta?*),” and therefore, an opponent may claim, “although [this creature] obtains a vile [existential] situation, neither does (s)he wish to obtain pleasure nor does (s)he wish to avoid suffering, and thus [the logical reason] must be inconclusive.”⁶⁷ However, it is not with pleasure (*mñon par dga' ba*) that this person does so. In other words, “the word ‘obtaining’ expresses [i.e., involves,] satisfaction (*mñon par chags pa = abhirati?*)” and “thus the logical reason, [once] specified (*saviśeṣaṇa, viśiṣṭa?*) as ‘obtaining a vile [existential] situation with satisfaction (*mñon par chags pa sñon du soñ ba can = abhiratipūrvaka?*),’ does not occur in the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*).”⁶⁸

Does Dharmakīrti's conception conform with Buddhist scriptures?

Turning to a Buddhist opponent, Dharmakīrti then tries to show, in an exegetical vein, that his account of the origin of suffering as *bhavavāñchā* (“longing for [re]existence”) conforms to the Buddhist scriptures and to the following canonical definition of *duḥkhasamudaya*: “What is the noble truth of the origin of suffering? It consists in craving, which leads to rebirth [and] which, accompanied by desire for joys, takes delight here and there, i.e., craving for sensual pleasure, craving for existence, and craving for nonexistence.”⁶⁹ The opponent criticizes

gnas su ltun ba^{3**} de bdag ñid 'dod pa dan gnas de len pa dan / mñon par dga' bas ma yin pa de ltar na 'dis ma ñes pa yin par dogs par mi gyur cig sñam pa de ñid kyi phyir / yoñs su len pa'i sgras mñon par chags pa bstan pa yin no //* ¹log D: lo P. ²pa D: par P. ³ba D: P om. ba. *See PVT P ñe 129b8–130a1. **Cf. Vibh. 40n3 (*pariṇato 'bhiratipuraḥ-sarah*) *prapātāpātādivilakṣaṇaḥ* /

⁶⁷ PVT P ñe 130a1–2: *dman pa'i gnas ni yoñs su len na yañ 'di bde ba dan sdug bsñal thob pa dan dor bar 'dod pa med pa de ltar na ma ñes pa ñid du 'gyur ro ze na* / The logical reason is not unestablished (*asiddha*) either, because God has been refuted earlier in the treatise (PVP D37a6/P42a4: *ma grub pa yañ ma yin te / sñar dbaṅ phyug bsal ba'i phyir* /; see also PVT P ñe 130a3–6).

⁶⁸ PVT P ñe 130a2–3: *de ltar na gañ mñon par chags pa sñon du soñ ba can gyi dman pa'i gnas ni yoñs su len pa zes bya ba khyad par dan bcas pa'i gtan tshigs mi mthun pa'i phyogs la 'jug pa med do //* Tib. *mñon par dga' ba* (see above, n. 66) is a more frequent rendering of Skt. *abhirati* than *mñon par chags pa*; Jinendrabuddhi's insistence on *abhiratipūrvaka* in this context (see above, n. 65), however, makes it likely that *mñon par chags pa* renders *abhirati*, and *mñon par dga' ba* something like *abhinanda(na)* (see below, n. 69, where *mñon par dga' ba'i nañ tshul* obviously renders *abhinandin*).

⁶⁹ PVP D799b3–4/P91a7–8: *de la sdug bsñal kun 'byuñ 'phags pa'i bden pa gañ ze na / gañ sred pa 'di ni yañ srid par 'byuñ ba can dga' ba'i 'dod chags dan bcas pa de dan de la mñon par dga' ba'i nañ tshul can / 'di lta ste 'dod pa'i srid pa dan srid pa'i sred pa dan 'jig pa'i sred pa yin no zes gsuñs so //* PVA 134,33–135,2 (cf. PVV 74,10–11): *uktam hi bhagavatā – tatra katamat samudaya āryasatyam / yeyam tṛṣṇā paunarbhavikī*

Dharmakīrti's definition for resorting to only one of those three forms of suffering, i.e., *bhavatrṣṇā* ("craving for existence") and not to the other two.⁷⁰ Dharmakīrti's answer is as follows:

The [afore-mentioned longing for (re)existence]⁷¹ is [what is traditionally referred to as] the desire for [re]existence. And since a living being acts with a desire to obtain pleasure and to avoid suffering, these two [i.e., what prompts a living creature to obtain what is pleasurable⁷² and to get rid of suffering,]⁷³ are [to be] regarded as desire for sensual pleasures and desire for annihilation[, respectively].⁷⁴

Insofar as living beings wish to obtain pleasure (= *kāmatrṣṇā*) and to annihilate displeasure (= *vibhavatrṣṇā*), they are longing for a particular type of existence (= *bhavatrṣṇā*). In other words, *bhavatrṣṇā* presupposes the other two or, as Manorathanandin has it, includes them: "And since the two of them are included in craving for [re]existence, which presupposes [one's] desire to obtain pleasure and to exclude displeasure [and] consists in [one's] desire to obtain a [certain] rebirth place (*garbhassthāna*), there is no contradiction [with scripture]."⁷⁵ Dharmakīrti can thus conclude: "And for him(/her) who [wrongly] takes (*-sañjñā*) what is unpleasurable to be pleasurable,⁷⁶ [craving] pertains to everything, because love

nandīrāgasahagatā tatrātrābhīnandinī yad uta kāmā¹trṣṇā bhavatrṣṇā vibhavatrṣṇā ceti... ¹*kāma-* em.: *kāya-* Ed. Vin. I.10 (quoted in Vetter 1990: 87, n. 1): *idaṃ kho pana bhikkhave dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ – yāyaṃ taṇhā ponobbhavikā nandīrāgasahagatā tatrātrābhīnandinī seyyathidaṃ kāmataṇhā bhavataṇhā vibhavataṇhā* / The Sanskrit versions of the so-called first sermon I am aware of lack the last part of the description; note, e.g., CPSū §14.6–7 (Waldschmidt 1957: 160) = SBhV I.137,25–27: *duḥkhasamudaya āryasatyam katarat / trṣṇā paunarbhavikī nandīrāgasahagatā tatrātrābhīnandinī...* See also LV 4177–9 and AVSū 15,4–5. On the three types of *taṇhā* / *trṣṇā*, see DN III.216 and 275, and *Kośa* IV.29–30, n. 2.

⁷⁰ PVV 74,12: *tat katham ekā bhavatrṣṇocyate samudayasatyam iti / atrāha...*

⁷¹ Or, according to PVP D79b5/P91a8–b1: *bśad ma thag pa'i skye ba'i gnas su ñe bar 'gro ba'i sred pa gaṇ yin pa de...*, "the afore-mentioned craving for attaining a [specific] place of [re]birth."

⁷² I.e., craving for sensual pleasure (PVP D79b7/P91b4 and PVV 74,16–17).

⁷³ I.e., craving for annihilation (PVP D79b7–80a1/P91b4–5 and PVV 74,17).

⁷⁴ PV 2.184: *sā bhavēcchāptyanāpticchoḥ pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhaḥ / yato 'pi prāṇinaḥ kāmavibhavecche ca te mate //*

⁷⁵ PVV 74,17–18: *bhavatrṣṇāyāṃ sukhaduḥkhaḥprāptiparihārecchāpūrvikāyāṃ garbhassthānopādānecchātmikāyāṃ dvayor api saṅgrahād avirodhaḥ /*

⁷⁶ But also what is impermanent to be permanent, what is not a self(/selfless) to be (with) a self, and what is not one's own to be one's own (PVP D80a3/P91b7–8).

for the self is the cause [of one's desire to obtain pleasure and to avoid suffering]. Therefore, craving is the basis of existence [i.e., the cause of bondage⁷⁷]."⁷⁸

Against a Cārvāka opponent

In PV 2.186–187, Dharmakīrti briefly addresses the objection of a Materialist who claims that, contrary to the Buddhist as well as several non-Buddhist teachers' belief that craving is responsible for rebirth, hence the cause of the (new) body, it is the body that is the cause of craving. The Cārvāka opponent's argument is as follows: "[Objection:] Masters proclaim that, since dispassionate [persons] are not seen to be [re]born[, rebirth is due to craving]; and [in the very same way, we Cārvākas claim that,] since bodyless [things] are not seen to have desire, desire originates from the body [and not the other way around]."⁷⁹ According to Devendrabuddhi, "masters" (*ācāryāḥ*) refers to teachers such as Vasubandhu who claim that, "since persons lacking desire, etc., are not seen to be [re]born, [re-]birth is caused by desire (*rāganimitta*)."⁸⁰ According to Manorathanandin, however, *ācāryāḥ* rather refers to teachers such as the Naiyāyika Gautama.⁸¹ The similarity in wording between PV 2.186a (*viraktajanmādrṣṭeh*) and NSū 3.1.24 (*vītarāgajanmādarśanāt*) is indeed striking. For Dharmakīrti's Cārvāka opponent anyway, the wider the extension of *ācāryāḥ*, the more legitimate his proposition: Just as most teachers agree that whatever is reborn is passionate, or that nothing is reborn that is not passionate, Materialists claim that whatever has a body has desire, hence that nothing with a body is without desire. As Manorathanandin has it, the Cārvāka's conclusion is that no possessor of a body is dispassionate (*tato na dehī vītarāgaḥ*),⁸² i.e., liberated.

⁷⁷ According to PVP D80b2–3/P92b1: *sred¹ pa ñid skye ba'i kun du 'chiñ ba'i rgyu yin no...* ¹*sred em.: srid DP.*

⁷⁸ PV 2.185: *sarvatra cātmasnehasya hetutvāt sampravartate / asukhe sukhasañjñasya tasmāt trṣṇā bhavāśrayaḥ //*

⁷⁹ PV 2.186: *viraktajanmādrṣṭer ity ācāryāḥ sampracakṣate / adeharāgādrṣṭeś ca dehād rāgasamudbhavaḥ //*

⁸⁰ According to PVP D89b3–4/P92b1–2: *gañ gi phyir 'dod chags la sogs pa dan bral ba skyes bu'i skye ba ma mthoñ ba de'i phyir skye ba ni 'dod chags kyi rgyu mtshan can yin no źes slob dpon dByig gñen la sogs pas...* I am not sure whether this is intended as a direct quotation from a work by Vasubandhu, or if Devendrabuddhi is referring to Vasubandhu's and other teachers' ideas. See also Vibh. 75n2.

⁸¹ PVV 75,9–10.

⁸² PVV 75,10–11.

Here is Dharmakīrti's reply to the above objection: "[Answer:] Inasmuch as we accept [the body as] the cause [of desire], we do [in fact] agree; what we deny, however, is [that the body is] the material cause of [desire]. But when he assents to the reasoning [that he ascribes to the masters, the Cārvāka]⁸³ himself contradicts his own doctrine [i.e., materialism]."⁸⁴ According to Devendrabuddhi, PV 2.187a denounces a *siddhasādhana*.⁸⁵ In other words, the Cārvāka attempts to prove something already established for the Buddhist proponent. Indeed, "inasmuch as the body, in the same way as [factors] such as an object (*viṣayādi*), directly or indirectly assists (*upakāraka*) desire, etc., it is accepted as [its] cause (*nimitta*), i.e., it is accepted as an auxiliary cause (*sahakārikāraṇa*) in the production of a certain assistance."⁸⁶ As Dharmakīrti makes clear, however, this is not to accept the body as the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of desire, for "desire alone is the material cause of desire."⁸⁷ His position entails no contradiction, for "what we deny is that these [auxiliary causes] are instrumental (*upayoga*, *upayogitva*?) in the continuation or the neutralization of [re]birth; in this way, there is no

⁸³ PVP D90a2/P93a1 and PVV 75,20.

⁸⁴ PV 2.187: *nimittopagamād iṣṭam upādānaṃ tu vāryate / imāṃ tu yuktim anvicchan bādhate svamataṃ svayaṃ //*

⁸⁵ PVP D89b5–6/P92b5.

⁸⁶ PVP D89b6–7/P92b5–6: *dños sam brgyud pa rnam pa*¹ 'ga' žig gis yul la sogs pa dan 'dra bar lus kyañ 'dod chags la sogs pa la phan 'dogs par byed pa'i phyir rgyu mtshan khas blañs pa'i phyir te / phan 'dogs pa³ 'ga' žig 'byuñ ba la lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu ñid du khas blañs pa'i phyir ro // ¹rnam pa P: rnam D. ²gis P : gi D. ³pa P: D om. pa. Cf. PVV 75,14–15: *nimittasya sahakārikāraṇasyopagamād deho 'sya rāgasya sahakārikāraṇam iṣṭam tato nāñiṣṭam āpadyate* / "Inasmuch as we accept [it as] the cause, i.e., an auxiliary cause, we admit that the body is an auxiliary cause of desire, and therefore, it does not follow that [our Cārvāka opponent's claim] is not accepted."

⁸⁷ PVV 75,15: *rāga eva tūpādānakāraṇam* / The distinction between material and auxiliary causes is made clear in TBh 28,9–14: *nanūpādānasahakārikāraṇayor anva-yavyatirekānuvidhānasya kāryaṃ prati tulyatvāt ko bhedaḥ / ucyate / yadvikriyayā yanniṣpattir ekasantāne tat kāryaṃ prati pūrvakam upādānam / yat santānāntare viśeṣodayanimittaṃ tat sahakārikāraṇam / yathā śālyāṅkure janayitavye śālibījaṃ upādānaṃ kṣitisalilādi tatra sahakāri* / "Objection: Since the material and the auxiliary causes are the same in their compliance with positive and negative concomitance with regard to the effect, what difference is there [between them]? Answer: With regard to an effect [y], the cause (*pūrvaka*, litt. 'antecedent') [y] by the modification of which x arises in one and the same [psychophysical] series is the material cause, [whereas] what causes the rise of a difference in another [psychophysical] series is the auxiliary cause. For example, when a rice sprout is to be produced, the rice grain is the material [cause, whereas factors] such as earth and water are the auxiliary [causes] therein." To be compared with Kajiyama 1998: 75. In n. 192, p. 75, Kajiyama refers to HBT 94,26–95,9.

contradiction in both accepting and refusing the body as the cause [of desire].”⁸⁸ In contradistinction to this, the Cārvāka contradicts his own doctrine when he accepts the *ācāryas*’ “reasoning that, since dispassionate [persons] are not seen to be [re]born, desire is the cause of [(re)birth].”⁸⁹ For

if he accepts that the body and desire are the cause of one another (*anyonyahetu?*), [then] since the body comes from the complex of desire, etc., and the complex of desire, etc., in turn comes from the body, [and so on ad infinitum,] the series of the living being (*sattvasantāna?*) turns out to be beginningless (*anādi*), and this is why he contradicts himself.⁹⁰

In addition, the Cārvāka jeopardizes his own doctrine when he accepts a dispassionate person.⁹¹

To dismiss desire’s instrumentality in the rise of the body, the Cārvāka resorts to a new argument: “Objection: [Desire] occurs together with birth[, and not before], because [beings] are seen to have desire [only] when they are born. [Answer: Desire] exists (*siddhi*) before because it arises from [something] similar [to it, i.e., from previous desire].”⁹² According to Dharmakīrti’s Cārvāka opponent, “since one [only] observes desire among living beings that are born, but not before (*na prāk*), desire arises together with birth. Therefore desire, which has the property of arising simultaneously (*samānakālabhāvin?*) with the body, is not the cause of the body, because it is ineffective (*akiñcitkara?*) in the realisation of

⁸⁸ PVP D90a1/P92b7–8: *de dag skye ba’i rgyun¹ dan gags byed pa la sogs pa la ñe bar sbyor ba ñid bkaḡ pa de ltar na lus rgyu ñid du khas blañs pa dan bkaḡ pa dag la² yañ ‘gal ba yod pa ma yin no ||* ¹rgyun P: rgyu D. ²la D: pa P. Note also PVV 75,16–17: *na ca rāgo janmahetur viraktasya karuṇayā janmasambhavāt / raktasyāpi tṛṣṇayaiva janmagrahaḥ /* “Moreover, desire is not the cause of [re]birth, because a desireless [person] can be reborn in virtue of his/her compassion; [and] even a [person] with desire takes rebirth due to craving alone.”

⁸⁹ PVP D90a1–2/P92b8–93a1: *‘dod chags med par skye ba ma mthoñ phyir ‘di’i ‘dod chags rgyu yin no źes bya ba’i rigs ‘di...* Or: “since one is not seen to be [re]born without desire...” PVV 75,20: *viraktajanmādr̥ṣṭer itīmām yuktim...*

⁹⁰ PVP D90a2–3/P93a1–3: *de ltar na lus dan ‘dod chags dag phan tshun rgyu ñid du khas len pa na / ‘dod chags la sogs pa’i tshogs las lus dan lus las yañ ‘dod chags la sogs pa’i tshogs yin pa de ltar na sems can gyi rgyun thog ma med pa can yin pas na de dag ni bdag ñid la ‘gal ba byed pa yin no ||* Cf. PVV 75,21: *rāgañhetuko dehas taddhetukaś ca rāga ity anyonyahetutvājanmaprabandhasiddheḥ /* “[Our Cārvāka opponent contradicts himself] since, because the body is caused by desire and desire in turn is caused by the [body], they are the cause of one another, and therefore the continued series of [re]births is demonstrated.”

⁹¹ According to PVV 75,22: *vītarāgābhyupagamāc ca svamatabādhāsyā /*

⁹² PV 2.188ac: *janmanā sahabhāvaś cej jātānām rāgadarśanāt / sabhāgajāteḥ prāk si-ddhiḥ...*

the effect [that is the body].”⁹³ However, according to Dharmakīrti’s commentators, the Cārvāka’s argument – the simultaneousness or co-occurrence of the body and desire – threatens his own position, for “if it is so, then by this very reasoning (*anayaiva yuktyā?*), the complex of desire, etc., does not depend on the body either, so that there is no mutual causality between them [anymore]. But [desire] is not without a cause either. Therefore, it arises from a previous similar cause (*pūrvasabhāgaheṭu?*),”⁹⁴ i.e., from a previous event of desire, and the pre-existence of desire is demonstrated,⁹⁵ so that it is not possible to think along the line of the arising of a substance (*dravya*, viz. the body) endowed with a quality (*saguṇa*, viz. endowed with desire).⁹⁶

Why mention only craving and not ignorance and action?

Before concluding his exposition of the origin of suffering, Dharmakīrti addresses a final objection: “[You claim] that it is a mistaken cognition (*viparyastamati?*) concerning what is [in reality] devoid of permanence, pleasure, self and one’s own that prompts the living beings to obtain a [new existential] situation, etc. [But] why do you disregard this and present craving alone as the cause [of rebirth]?”⁹⁷

⁹³ PVP D81a4–5/P93a3–5: *gañ gi phyir srog chags skyes par gyur pa dag la ’dod chags mthoñ gi sñar ma yin pa de’i phyir skyes pa dañ lhan cig ’dod chags ’byuñ ba yin no // de bas na lus dañ dus mtshuñs par ’byuñ ba’i ñaṇ tshul can gyi ’dod chags ni lus kyi rgyu ma yin te / ’bras bu grub pa la cuñ zad kyañ mi byed pa’i phyir ro že na /* Note also PVV 75,22–23: *janmanā sahabhāvo rāgādīnām / na pūrvam rāgo ’sti jātānām rāga-darśanāt / ato na rāgo dehaheṭur iti cet /* “Objection: [Defilements] such as desire occur together with birth. Desire does not exist before, because one [only] observes desire among [beings] who are born. Therefore, desire is not the cause of the body.”

⁹⁴ PVP D81a5–6/P93a5–6: *gal te de lta yin pa de’i tshes rigs pa ’di ñid kyi lus la ’dod chags la sogs pa’i tshogs kyañ rag lus pa med pa de ltar na de dag phan tshun rgyu ñid ma yin žiñ rgyu med pa can yañ ma yin no // de bas na sñar gyi skal pa mñam pa’i rgyu las ’di skyes pas na...* On the *sabhāgaheṭu* as one of the six types of causes in the *Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma*, see *Kośa* I.255–267.

⁹⁵ PVV 76,1–2: *nanv evaṃ deho ’pi na syād rāgaheṭuḥ sahabhāvāt / na cāhetukatā / tataḥ sabhāgāt sajātīyād rāgāj jāter utpādāt prāg rāgasya siddhir ity āyātam /* “But in this way, the body would not be the cause of desire either, because they are simultaneous. But it is not without a cause [either]. Therefore, since it arises, i.e., since it is born from a similar, i.e., a homogenous [event of] desire, previous desire is established.” Manorathanandin’s explanation is derived from PVA 136,5–6.

⁹⁶ According to PVP D81a6/P93a6–7: *sñar grub pa’i phyir yañ yon tan dañ bcas pa’i rdzas skye ba yin no žes rtog pa mi ruñ ño //*

⁹⁷ PVP D81a6–7/P93a7–8: *srog chags dag gnas la sogs pa yoñs su len pa la rtag pa dañ bde ba dañ bdag dañ bdag gi dañ bral ba la phyin ci log pa’i blo ’jug par byed pa yin no žes bya ba de bor nas ci’i phyir sred pa ñid rgyu ñid yin par bstan ce na /*

Moreover, “just as ignorance (*ajñāna*) is not stated as a cause, action (*karman*) is not mentioned as the cause of suffering either. Why?”⁹⁸ In other words, how is it that ignorance and *karman*, which are traditionally held responsible for rebirth and suffering, are not presented as the cause of rebirth?⁹⁹ Here is Dharmakīrti’s answer:

Although it is also a cause [of (re)existence], ignorance is not [explicitly] stated [as a cause of suffering]; craving alone is presented [as its cause], because it [is that which] directs the series toward existence, and because [existence] results immediately [from craving, and not from ignorance]; nor [is] action [explicitly mentioned as a cause], because [even] if it exists, [existence] does not [necessarily] occur.¹⁰⁰

Dharmakīrti first explains why ignorance/nescience is not mentioned as a cause of suffering and provides two reasons for that, viz. “because [craving is that which] directs the series toward existence” (*santānapreraṇād bhava*) and “because [existence] results immediately [from craving, and not from ignorance]” (*ānantaryāt*). Commenting on the first reason, Devendrabuddhi states that

craving triggers (*samutthāpayati*) the effort that is the cause (*nimitta*) for obtaining a [certain desired] object, etc. (*viṣayādī*), and it is due to [this] effort that the constituents which are clung to (*upādānaskandha*) develop in a series of cause and effect (*hetuphalabhūtasantāna*?) arising at each and every moment (*anyānyakṣaṇotpattilakṣaṇa*?). As a consequence, one reaches a rebirth place (*garbhasthāna*), etc., and thus, because it [is that

⁹⁸ PVP D81b3/P93b4–5: *ji ltar mi śes pa rgyur ma brjod pa de ltar las kyaṅ sdug bsñal gyi rgyur ma bśad do // ci’i phyir že na /*

⁹⁹ PVV 76,3–4: *nanv avidyā tṛṣṇā karma ca janmakāraṇaṃ tat kathaṃ tṛṣṇaiva kevalā samudaya ukta ity āha...* “[Objection:] But nescience, craving and action are the cause of [re]birth; how is it then that the origin [of suffering] is said to consist in craving alone? [Against this, Dharmakīrti] says what follows.”

¹⁰⁰ PV 2.188d–189: *...kāraṇatve ’pi noditam // ajñānam uktā tṛṣṇaiva santānapreraṇād bhava / ānantaryāc ca karmāpi sati tasminn asambhavāt //* How to construct *bhave*? PV_{Tib Miy.} reads it together with *kāraṇatve ’pi*, “although it is also a cause of (= with regard to) (re)existence” (*mi śes srid pa’i rgyu yin yaṅ*). The *pratīka* in PVP D81b1/P93b1 is ambiguous insofar as it apparently renders *bhave* twice: *srid la mi śes rgyu yin na’aṅ... srid par rgyud ni ’phen par byed phyir*, i.e., once with *kāraṇatve ’pi* and once with *santānapreraṇāt*. Read together with *santānapreraṇāt*, one understands (as I have done): “because it [is that which] directs the series towards existence.” Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin seem to favor the second interpretation, who gloss *santānapreraṇād bhava* as *srid pa’i rgyu mtshan te* (“is the cause of [re]existence,” *bhavanimittam*)/*janmanimittam* (“is the cause of [re]birth”).

which] directs the series [toward existence]/[sets the series in motion], craving for existence is presented [as the cause of rebirth and suffering].¹⁰¹

As for the second reason, Devendrabuddhi explains it as follows: “Ignorance may well exist, yet one does not act in the absence of desire, and [since,] in this way, action follows immediately upon desire, it is desire that is presented as the cause [of rebirth and suffering].”¹⁰² As for the reason why *karman* does not necessarily entail rebirth and suffering, it is stated here from the standpoint of the liberated mind:

For [someone] whose mind is released (*vimukticitṭa*), even though action exists as a seed (*bījabhūta*), it will not yield fruit (*phalada*?) as long as it has not developed (*viśiṣṭa*?) in the fields (*rajas*?) of nescience (*avidyā*) and has not been sprinkled (*pariṣṭa*?) by the desire for existence (*bhavarāga*?); in this way, action is not presented as a cause [of suffering and rebirth] either.

Nirvāṇa is traditionally regarded as the elimination of desire (*rāga*, a synonym of craving), hostility (*dveṣa*) and delusion (*moha*, a synonym of ignorance). A person with a liberated mind inevitably acts, but in the absence of craving and ignorance, his actions are not conducive to rebirth.

Philosophy as the mirror of the (future) Buddha’s reflections

As we have seen, Dharmakīrti’s exposition of the cause of suffering starts with a critique of two hypotheses regarding that cause, i.e., the *svabhāvavādins*’ causelessness and the theists’ *īśvara*:

Since it is occasional, suffering is known to have a cause, [for if it were] without a cause, it would either eternally exist[, like space,] or it would never exist[, like a rabbit’s horn], because it would not depend on anything else. [...] And inasmuch as permanent [things] have been refuted [in another context, suffering] does not arise from [entities] such as God, because [permanent things] are not capable [to bring about any effect].¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ PVP D81b1–2/P93b1–3: *sred¹ pa ni yul la sogs pa thob pa’i rgyu mtshan gyi rtsol ba kun nas sloṅ bar byed pa yin la / ’bad rtsol las ñe bar len pa’i phuṅ po rgyu daṅ ’bras bur gyur pa’i rgyun skad cig ma gzan daṅ gzan² sbye ba’i mtshan ñid can du ’gyur ro // de’i phyir mñal gyi gnas la sogs pa yoṅ su len pa de ltar na rgyud ’phen par byed pa’i phyir srid pa’i³ sred pa ñid bśad pa yin no // ¹sred P: srid D. ²gzan P: D om. gzan. ³srid pa’i D: P om. srid pa’i.*

¹⁰² PVP D81b2–3/P93b4: *mi śes pa yod du¹ zin kyaṅ ’dod pa med par ’jug pa med pa² de ltar na ’dod pa las ’jug pa chod pa med pa yin pa ’di ñid rgyu ru bśad do // ¹du D: na P. ²med pa P: D om. med pa.*

¹⁰³ PVP D81b4–5/P93b5–6: *rnam par grol ba’i sems la* las¹ sa bon du gyur pa yod du zin kyaṅ ma rig pa’i rdu² gyis³ khyad par⁴ du ma⁵ byas pa daṅ / srid⁶ pa’i ’dod chags kyis*

Recall also that, toward the end of his commentary on PV 2.179–183a,¹⁰⁴ Devendrabuddhi concluded that, “because suffering is not without a cause and does not have a permanent cause, it has an impermanent cause.”¹⁰⁴ This is reminiscent of Devendrabuddhi’s and Prajñākaragupta’s explanation of PV 2.131cd–135, a key passage in which Dharmakīrti discusses the Buddha’s *śāstrīva* (“being a teacher,” i.e., making himself in a position to teach suffering living beings in a reliable manner). Here are PV 2.131cd–135:

[Wishing to eradicate other people’s suffering,] the compassionate [Bodhisattva] applies himself to [salvational] means in order to eliminate [his own] suffering, because [a person] for whom the end and its cause are imperceptible cannot explain them [properly to others].¹⁰⁵ Reflecting [upon the salvific means and its end] by means of reason(ing) and scriptures,¹⁰⁶ he examines the cause of suffering, and, on account of the [very] characteristics of suffering itself, the nature of this [cause, which, he concludes, must necessarily be] impermanent, etc., because he [who wishes to get rid of suffering] sees that if the cause [constantly] remains as it is (*tathā*), [its] effect [can]not cease to exist. In order to eliminate the cause, [the Bodhisattva] examines its antidote [i.e., that which is contradictory with its cause or that by the cultivation of which its cause ceases to exist]. Its antidote, too, is ascertained by way of understanding the nature of the cause: The cause consists in the attachment [or craving] produced by [one’s] belief (*graha*) in a self and what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [an attachment] that bears on the conditioning factors. What opposes (*bādhaka*) it is the perception of selflessness, [which is] contradictory [with it inasmuch as it has contrary object-support and aspect].¹⁰⁷

*yoñs su brlan par ma gyur pa / de srid du de dag ’bras bu ’byin par mi ’gyur ba de ltar na las kyañ rgyu ñid du ma bśad do // ¹las D: bltos P. ²rdul P: sdug bsñal D. ³gyis D: gyi P. ⁴par D: P om. par. ⁵ma em.: DP om. ma. ⁶srid D: sred P. *PVP 76,12: vimukticitṭasya.*

¹⁰⁴ For the Sanskrit original, see above, nn. 18 and 53.

¹⁰⁵ For the Tibetan text, see above, n. 56.

¹⁰⁶ Note PVP D54b7/P62a7–8: *lam mi śes pas phyin ci ma log pa’i lam ston pa’i skabs med pa’i phyir* re źig rtog¹ pa dañ ldan pa ñid sems can rnams la de ñid dañ de’i rgyu ji ltar gnas pa bźin du ’chad par bźed pas mñon sum du mdzad pa yin no // ¹rtog D: rtogs P. ²ñid D: ñid ñid P. *Cf. Vibh. 57n2: na hy amārgajño ’viparītamārgopadeśe ’dhikriyate / “Since [someone] who does not know the path is not qualified to indicate the correct path [to others], the [practically] rational (*prekṣāvat*) [Bodhisattva] first realizes [the path for himself], desirous [as he is] to teach living beings (*sattva*) this very [path] and its cause.”*

¹⁰⁷ Note PVP D55a3–4/P62b4–5: *re źig luñ mañ po de la dmigs nas des bstan pa ’am sgrub pa rnam par dpyod pa yin gyi rigs pa ñid kyis ’ga’ źig gi tshe ’jug par ’gyur ba de ltar na luñ smos pa yin no // de lta ma yin na gañ las ’di rnam par dpyod pa ñe bar mkho ba can ñid yin / “To begin with (*tāvat*), he bases himself on numerous scriptures (/religions traditions) (*āgama*) and analyzes what they teach or demonstrate/posit(?), but it is thanks to reason(ing) alone (*yuktyaiva*?) that he is going to act at a certain time;*

In PV 2.132d–133 (“he examines the cause of suffering [...] [its] effect [can] not cease to exist”), Dharmakīrti does not expatiate upon the form and contents of the future Buddha’s cogitations, entrusting his commentators to read into the Buddha’s mind. This Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta did by putting the arguments of PV 2.179–183a₁ into the Buddha’s mind, thus presenting the future Buddha as first assessing the very possibility of salvation by determining the extent to which the cause of suffering can be eradicated. And as we have seen, suffering must have an impermanent cause in order to be eliminated, as Devendrabuddhi’s commentary on PV 2.132d–133 makes clear:

[The Bodhisattva examines the cause of suffering in the following way:] “What is the cause of the [type of] suffering consisting in (re)birth (*janmalakṣaṇa*), [a cause] by the elimination of which (*yadupaśama* ?) [suffering] can be eliminated?” By thus examining causality in general (*hetumātra*), he understands that [suffering] cannot be without a cause and concludes that by eliminating the cause, it is possible to destroy its effect. For otherwise [i.e., if suffering were without a cause], how to eliminate [something] independent (*svatantra*) that is without a cause? After this,¹⁰⁸ he analyzes whether [this cause] is permanent or not. If it is permanent, [suffering will in fact be] without a cause inasmuch as [something]

the word ‘scripture/(religious tradition)’ is [to be understood] in this way, for otherwise, how would this analysis be [at all] useful?” Śākyabuddhi (PVT P *ñe* 143a2–3) defines *yukti* as *anumāna*, “inference,” and *des bstan pa* as *luṅ gis bstan pa’i thabs*, “the means that is/(are) taught by [those] scriptures” (according to Śākyabuddhi [PVT P *ñe* 143a4–5], this includes *upāya* and *upeya*: *luṅ gis bstan pa’i thabs dan thabs las byuṅ ba rnam par dpyod pa yin*, “he analyses the means and the end [as they are] taught by [those] scriptures”). Note also Vibhūticandra’s (Vibh. 57n3) interesting comment: *etena yuktyā yuktiśūnyāgamāgrahaḥ / tarkamātratyaḥ āgamena / tatra nigrāsthānāntatattvajñānān¹ mokṣa iti naiyāyikāḥ² / prakṛtipuruṣāntajñānād iti sāṅkhyāḥ / karmakṣayād iti digambarāḥ / ¹nigrāsthānāntatattvajñānān conj.: nigrāsthānāntatattvajñānān Ed. ²naiyāyikāḥ em.: naiyāyikāḥ Ed.* “Thanks to reason(ing) he does not admit scriptures/(religious traditions) that are devoid of [any] reason(ing) [i.e., argument, and] by means of scripture he abandons mere ratiocination. Among the [religious traditions that he critically examines,] the Naiyāyikas claim that liberation comes from [one’s] knowledge of the [sixteen] principles ending with ‘points of defeat.’ The Sāṅkhyas claim that [liberation] comes from [one’s] knowledge of the difference between Nature and Spirit. The Digambaras claim that [liberation] comes from the exhaustion of [past] action.”

¹⁰⁸ PV 2.131cd–135: *dayāvān duḥkhaḥānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate // parokṣopeya-taddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duḥkaram / yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimrśan duḥkhaḥetum parīkṣate // tasyānityādirūpaṃ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ / yatas tathā sthite hetau nivṛttir neti paśyati // phalasya hetor hānārtham tadvipakṣam parīkṣate / sādhyate tadvipakṣo ’pi heto rūpāvabodhataḥ // ātmātmīyāgrahakṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ / hetur virodhi nairātmīyadarśanaṃ tasya bādhakam //* On this passage, see Vetter 1990: 39–43 and Eltschinger 2005: 397–404.

permanent has no agency (*nityasyaiva na kartṛtvam?*); therefore, it will not be possible to cut off suffering. Similarly (*api*), if [this cause] is a permanent agent(/an agent [acting] permanently), it is never incomplete (*avaikalya?*) [and thus] its effect cannot be interrupted; therefore it is not possible to get rid of it. On account of what does he analyze the [nature of the cause of suffering]? He analyzes the nature of the cause on account of the characteristics of suffering itself, i.e., on account of properties (*dharma*) of suffering such as occasionality (*kādācitkatva*)[, and this in the following way:] Since a particular pain (*duḥkha*) occurs on a certain occasion, it is not without a cause, for [otherwise, i.e., if it were without a cause,] it would either constantly exist or never exist [at all]. And he understands that since it is occasional, [its] cause must be occasional[, too].¹⁰⁹

As for Prajñākaragupta, he comments on the same passage in the following way:

To begin with, [the Bodhisattva] examines just the cause of suffering so as to eliminate suffering by eliminating [its] cause, and once the cause of suffering has been determined, [he examines] the nature of this [cause] – impermanence, etc. – so as to determine its eliminability by way of its examination. For if [its] eliminability were not determined, there could be no endeavour at all in order to eliminate [suffering] due to the fact that, if [suffering] is without a cause or has a permanent cause, no action (*vyāpāra*) [ever will be] successful in eliminating [suffering]. Indeed, what has no cause is permanent, [and] how to destroy what has a permanent cause? How can something cease to exist if [its] cause does not become incomplete [hence incapable]? That whose existence is due to a cause should cease to exist due to the absence of this [cause, but] if it exists even in the absence of this [cause], how can it [ever] be made not to exist? Something whose cause is impermanent ceases to exist in the absence of [its] cause, [but since] a permanent cause is never absent, the cause does not cease to exist. If suffering had a certain permanent cause such as God, suffering would not cease to exist due to the incompleteness of the [cause]. Such is/(might be) [the Bodhisattva's] train of thought (*mati*). Hence one does not act so as to destroy its effect, for nobody acts towards [something] inefficacious (*aśakya*). Or if (s)he acts, (s)he will/(might) experience deception.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ See PVT P *ñe* 143a7–8.

¹¹⁰ PVP D55a4–b2/P62b6–63a5: *skye ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi sdug bsñal 'di'i rgyu ni gañ yin / gañ ñe bar bcom pa las 'di bsal bar bya ba yin ze na / de de ltar na rgyu tsam yon's su dpyad pa las 'di rgyu med pa can du mi 'gyur bar mkhyen nas rgyu bkag pas de'i 'bras bu bcom par nus so zes bya bar thugs su chud pa yin no // de lta' ma yin na rgyu med pa can gyi rañ dbañ can bcom pa gañ yin / [...] de las dus phyis ci 'di rtag pa yin nam 'on te ma yin / rtag pa ñid yin na rtag pa ñid la byed pa po ñid med pa de ltar na rgyu med pa can ñid yin pa'i phyir sdug bsñal gcad par mi nus pa can ñid du 'gyur ro // rtag² par byed pa po ñid yin na yañ ma tshañ ba med pa can de'i 'bras bu rgyun chad pa med³ pa'i chos can yin pa de ltar na bsal bar nus pa ma yin no zes brtag par mdzad do // [...] gañ gis⁴*

By the first to second century CE at the latest, perhaps in a predominantly (Mūla-) sarvāstivāda environment, certain Buddhist intellectuals came to picture with increasing frequency and consistency the (future) Buddha as a paragon of practical and theoretical rationality whose “mission” was, first and foremost, to defeat the non-Buddhists by any means, magical as well as philosophical.¹¹¹ Dharmakīrti and his commentators exhibit a very similar attitude while describing how the Bodhisattva dealt with the non-Buddhist scriptures and how he determined the path and its possibility. In these two cases, it is easy to show that Dharmakīrti’s philosophical agenda reflects what and how he thought the Buddha thought, and conversely, how his representation of the Buddha’s reflections is modelled after his own philosophical conclusions. This should come as no surprise, since the Buddhist epistemologists, like all other Buddhists, needed to construe an image of the Buddha that suited their polemical interests and provided legitimation for their theoretical program and philosophical attitude.

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*brtag pa mdzad ce na / sdug bsñal ñid kyi khyad par gyis // sdug bsñal de’i chos res⁵ ‘ga’
 ’byuñ ba la sogs pa⁶ gañ yin pa de dag gis rgyu’i rañ bñin ji ltar sdug bsñal cuñ zad ’di ni
 res ‘ga’ ’jug pa yin pa de ltar na rgyu med pa can ma yin te / rtag tu yod pa dañ med par
 thal ba’i phyir ro // res ‘ga’ bar ’gyur ba de’i phyir rgyu res ‘ga’ ba yin no źes rtogs par
 mdzad do // ¹lta P : ltar D. ²rtag em. : brtag DP. ³pa med D : P om. pa med. ⁴gis D : gi P.
⁵res em. : re P, des D. ⁶pa D : P om. pa.*

¹¹¹ See Eltschinger 2019 and forthcoming b.

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Pleasure, Desire, and Welfare in Buddhist and Hindu Texts

Christopher Framarin and Stephen Harris

Introduction

The central question posed by the philosophical study of well-being is what, at the deepest conceptual level, makes a life go well for an individual. There is general agreement amongst multiple theories that certain items, such as dependable friendships and basic material goods, typically make a life go better. However, the most influential theories of well-being in the Western philosophical tradition give different responses to the question of what grounds these positive assessments of well-being value. The hedonist takes a subset of mental states, in particular pleasure and the absence of pain, as having intrinsic value. Friendships, then, have instrumental value because they are reliable sources of pleasure; they are good for me because I enjoy them. For the desire-theorist, by contrast, what makes a life go better for the individual, at the deepest conceptual level, is the satisfaction of his or her wants. Friendships increase my well-being, according to the desire theorist, because I want to have friendships, or the more particular events constituting a friendship, such as companionship, shared activities and so on. In the Western tradition, for the most part, philosophical study of well-being depends on getting to the conceptual foundations of what has value in itself.

When we turn to Hindu and Buddhist texts, it is a natural cross-cultural question to ask whether they would accept some version of one of these dominant Western theories of well-being, or some other kind of theory, or whether they might reject this question altogether. Moreover, given their negative assessments of pleasure and desire, initially it might seem that at least these two particular well-being theories are non-starters for most Buddhist and Hindu authors. John Taber, in his article “Did Dharmakīrti think the Buddha had Desires?” is one of the recent commentators on Buddhist and Hindu texts who has shown that

matters are not so simple. Through engagement with both Buddhist and Hindu sources, in particular the Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti and the Vedāntin Maṇḍanamiśra, Taber's analysis reveals the considerable care both traditions show in considering whether there might be kinds of motivational states (whether we call them "desires" or something else) which are liberative, or at least not intrinsically problematic. Taber limits his interest in the article to the question of whether these authors accepted the possibility that liberated beings possess desires. In our contribution to this collection in his honor, we take his analysis as a starting point for considering the validity of hedonism and desire-theory as categories for understanding the commitments of certain Buddhist and Hindu texts on the topic of well-being.

In the first section, we lay out the initial case for the *prima facie* incompatibility of understanding proponents of either tradition as hedonists or desire-theorists. The next two sections reconstruct what we take to be a plausible initial characterization of the forms hedonisms and desire theories would have to take to be compatible with either tradition. An important part of our analysis here depends on the distinctions drawn by Dharmakīrti and Maṇḍana, regarding good and bad forms of motivational states, as illustrated in Taber's article. In the final section, we consider whether hedonism or desire theory fits best with the initial evidence we have assembled. Our conclusion is that at least much of the Buddhist and Hindu traditions may be compatible with, but uncommitted to either hedonism or desire-theory, in terms of their foundational conceptual commitments to well-being value. In so doing, we show that both traditions remain viable resources to be drawn upon by contemporary well-being theorists working from a hedonic or desire-theoretical perspective.¹

1. Pleasure, desire, and disvalue in Buddhist and Hindu texts

In the past 10 years or so, interest in the topic of welfare in Buddhist and Hindu texts and traditions has increased markedly. Most of the scholars who work on this topic concede that Buddhist and Hindu texts and traditions do not explicitly endorse a specific theory of welfare. They tend to assume, however, that some theory of welfare might be inferred from these texts' and traditions' explicit claims about what to pursue and what to avoid (Keown 2001; Clayton 2006;

¹ In this essay, we are arguing for the compatibility of hedonism and desire-theory with at least many of the commitments of each tradition. This is not to say that other interpretations or developments of the traditions, such as a *eudamonic* objective list theory, are not viable. We take no position on this question here.

Goodman 2009; Harris 2014; Irvine 2009; Salagame 2004, 2013; Banth and Talwar 2012; Framarin 2016, 2017).

This kind of project might seem unpromising. Two of the most popular types of theories of welfare in Western philosophy, after all, are hedonist theories and desire theories. A hedonist theory states that the intrinsic value of a life for the person whose life it is derives exclusively from the intrinsic values of the experiences of pleasure and pain within that life. On this view, pleasure and only pleasure makes a life good, and pain and only pain makes a life bad.

A desire theory states that the intrinsic value of a life for the person whose life it is derives exclusively from the intrinsic values of desire satisfactions and frustrations. Desire satisfaction and only desire satisfaction makes a life good, and desire frustration and only desire frustration makes a life bad. Hedonist and desire theories about welfare seem especially out of place in many Buddhist and Hindu texts and traditions, however, because these texts and traditions discourage both pleasure and desire.

Buddhist references to the disvalue of pleasure are frequent, beginning with early Buddhist texts and continuing for much of the Indian tradition. For instance, the *Greater Discourse on the Mass of Suffering Sutta*, in the early Pali canon, claims that pursuit of sense pleasure causes physical hardship, emotional distress when wealth is lost, animosity and warfare amongst and between communities, as well as theft and other kinds of non-virtuous behavior (M i 85–88, trans. Bodhi and Ñāṇamoli 1995: 181–182). Moreover, the great Buddhist poet Aśvaghoṣa likens pursuit and attainment of pleasure to stoking fire with firewood, suggesting cycles of addiction in which pleasure stimulates waves of unsatisfiable craving.

For men overwhelmed by pleasures (*kāma*) find no relief

In triple heaven, much less in this mortal world;

For pleasures do not sate a man full of desires (*trṣṇā*),

As firewood a fire accompanied by the wind. (Aśvaghoṣa, *Buddhacarita*, trans. Olivelle 2008: 304–305)

Some of the most incisive language critiquing pleasure comes from the 8th century CE Buddhist poet philosopher, Śāntideva.

In the cycle of existence, there is no satisfaction in sensual desires (*kāma*), which are like honey on a razor's edge. (Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, trans. Wallace and Wallace 1997: 7.64)

This quote provides an example of what Buddhist texts often call *vipariṇāma duḥkha*, or the suffering of change. This refers to the dissatisfactory aspect of

pleasure, in being followed by physical and emotional pain. Pleasure is enjoyable, but dangerous in that it stimulates craving and future dissatisfaction. Moreover, Śāntideva does not limit his attention to the disvalue of sense pleasure, but also draws attention to the emotional distress which follows attaining the longer term goals which we pursue.

At the loss of praise and fame, my own mind appears to me just like a child who wails in distress when its sand castle is destroyed. (Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, trans. Wallace and Wallace 1997: 6.92–93)

We can notice that the disvalue referenced in most of these quotes is closely linked to pernicious desire. This is explicit in the quotation by Aśvaghoṣa, in which enjoyment of sensual pleasure results in an intensification of craving. However, it is also implicit in the other quotations, such as Śāntideva's reference to the drawbacks of praise and fame. It is not only the enjoyment of worldly success, but our craving for its continuation, which sets us up for emotional anguish when a pleasant experience or situation ends. This indicates that in many Buddhist texts, the disvalue of pleasure and desire are closely linked; at least in part, pleasure is bad because it stimulates craving. This is formalized in the 12 links of dependent origination, in which the feeling (*vedanā*) link, which includes pleasure, is the causal condition for the arising of desire (*taṇhā/tṛṣṇā*) and craving (*upādāna*). Moreover, as suggested in the Aśvaghoṣa passage, such craving is unsatisfiable; temporarily achieving our aims simply stokes the fires of desire even higher. The solution, as represented in the relationship between the second and third Noble Truths, is to eliminate desire, and therefore the entire round of rebirth and suffering.

These Buddhist treatments of the interlinked disvalue of pleasure and craving show what at least appears problematic about developing a hedonism or desire-theory which is compatible with Buddhist commitments; pleasure and desire satisfaction, which are the fundamental units of well-being for these two theories, are problematized by numerous Buddhist texts.

Hindu descriptions of pleasure and desire are equally forbidding. In his *Nyāyabhāṣya*, Vātsyāyana explains that pleasure predictably produces desire. “The self, having experienced that pleasure (*sukham*) which is due to the proximity of an object of a certain type, experiencing [it again], desires to acquire (*upādātum icchatī*) an object of that very type” (1.1.22). When a person sees something that they have enjoyed in the past, they want it. The experience of pleasure produces the desire for that which produced the pleasure in the first place.

Yogaśāstra 2.7 also explains desire as the state produced by pleasure. “Desire (*rāgaḥ*) is the consequence of pleasure (*sukhānuśayī*).” The *Nārada-parivṛāja Upaniṣad* 142 attests to the connection between pleasure and desire as well. “Desire (*kāmaḥ*) is never pacified by the enjoyment (*upabhogena*) of what is desired (*kāmānām*). It [only] grows (*abhivardhate*), as a fire only grows (*kṛṣṇa-vartma... bhūya eva*) from an oblation” (cf., *Mānavadharmaśāstra* 2.94, *Bhagavadgītā* 3.39).

Desire, in turn, causes problems for the agent in a number of ways. First, desires are often frustrated, and desire frustration causes pain. The sagely butcher of the *Āraṇyakaparvan* explains that “people are connected with pains (*duḥkhair*) due to contact with the undesired (*aniṣṭasamprayogāc*) and separation from the desired (*viprayogāt priyasya*)” (*Mahābhārata* 3.206.16). When a person desires something, but does not get it, they experience pain. They also experience pain when they experience something they desire to avoid. Vidura says the same thing in his counsel to Dhṛtarāṣṭra after the war. “Because of contact with the undesired (*aniṣṭa*) and separation from the desired (*prayasya*), people are joined with pain (*duḥkhair*)” (*Mahābhārata* 11.2.18).²

Desire harms the agent in other ways as well. In a famous passage from the *Bhagavadgītā*, Kṛṣṇa outlines a series of consequences that originate from desire.

For the person focused (*dhyāyato*) on objects, pleasure (*saṅga*) in them arises. From pleasure, desire (*kāma*) arises, from desire, anger (*krodho*) arises. From anger, there is bewilderment (*saṁmohaḥ*). From bewilderment, the confusion of memory (*smṛtīvibhramah*). From the confusion of memory, the destruction of the mind (*buddhināśo*), and from the destruction of the mind, [the person] is ruined (*praṇaśyati*) (*Bhagavadgītā* 2.62–63).

In his commentary to this passage, Śaṅkara explains *saṅga* as *prīti* – pleasure (*Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* 2.62). A person takes pleasure in those objects that grab and hold their attention.³ This pleasure produces desire. Desire, in turn, leads to anger, which presumably arises – like pain – when the desire is frustrated.

² Both passages specify that mental pains (*mānasam duḥkham*), in particular, arise from desire frustrations. The distinction between mental pain and bodily pain is not explicit in the discussion that follows. For an interpretation of this distinction in the *Mahābhārata*, see Framarin 2019. For an interpretation of this distinction in Buddhist contexts, see Harris 2014.

³ In the passage just below, the sage Śaunaka outlines a similar chain of events. He describes the initial state as one in which the mind is *coditam* – driven, impelled, or incited. This supports the interpretation here, of *dhyāna* as a focus or fixation of the mind – a state in which the attention of the mind is seized and retained by its object.

Once a person becomes angry, Śaṅkara explains, they become bewildered with regard to right and wrong actions in particular (2.63). Confusion of memory amounts to the loss of “impressions (*saṃskāra*) deposited by scripture and the instruction of teachers.” This amounts to the destruction of the mind, which Śaṅkara again explains in terms of “the failure of the mind in discriminating between right and wrong actions” (2.63). One ultimate consequence of desire, then, is the loss of moral agency. Along the way, the harms of anger and confusion also arise.

Other passages from the *Mahābhārata* repeat and elaborate links in this causal chain. In his counsel to the exiled Pāṇḍavas, the sage Śaunaka compares the onset of desire to an attack of arrows.

The person whose mind is incited (*coditam*) toward the objects of the senses, his desire (*autsukyaṃ*) arises, and activity occurs. Then, that person is pierced by desire (*kāmena*)... Due to [being pierced by] arrows of the objects [of desire], the person falls in the fire of greed (*lobhāgnau*), like a moth from its greed for fire. Then, stupefied (*mohitaś*) by pleasures and foods, the person is plunged in the mouth of great confusion (*mahāmoha*), not knowing the self (3.2.64–66).

Here desire grows into greed, which pushes the person into profound confusion and – like the moth – personal destruction.

The person’s ignorance with regard to the self, in particular, guarantees rebirth in *saṃsāra*. The end of the passage explains that desire, confusion, and consequent actions result in rebirth.

In this way, a person falls into *saṃsāra*, into these and those wombs in the world. Thus, like a wheel, the person wanders, due to ignorance, action, and desire (*trṣṇā*). The person is reborn in beings, beginning with *brahmā* and ending with grasses, being born again and again in water, on earth, and likewise in the sky (3.2.67–68).

These endless rounds of rebirth, in turn, are pervaded by significant pain. All of these negative consequences for the agent, again, originate in pleasure and desire.

So both Buddhist and Hindu texts discourage pleasure and desire. They note – often in graphic detail – the harms associated with both pleasure and desire. These harms include pain, loss of self-control and moral agency, ignorance, rebirth, despair in the forms of confusion, addiction, and anger, and so on. In both traditions, pleasure and desire invite endless suffering – often literally – on those whom they afflict.

If Buddhist and Hindu texts discourage pleasure, then it seems implausible that they derive the intrinsic value of a life from the intrinsic values of the pleasures and pains within that life. And if Buddhist and Hindu texts and traditions discourage desire, then it seems implausible that they derive the intrinsic value of a life from the intrinsic values of the desire satisfactions and frustrations within that life. All of this makes the project of inferring a theory of welfare from Buddhist and Hindu texts and traditions seem misguided.

2. Hinduism, Buddhism, and hedonism

In the last section, we surveyed passages in both Buddhist and Hindu texts which express negative attitudes towards pleasure. Initially, it might seem that this would rule out the possibility of developing a plausible hedonism from Hindu or Buddhist texts. There are broadly two strategies for replying to this concern. First, Buddhist and Hindu authors can distinguish between different kinds of pleasure, some of which are *saṃsāric* and impoverished and some of which are conducive to well-being. The claim then is that negative evaluations of pleasure found in Buddhist and Hindu texts refer only to the impoverished kinds of pleasure, and are thereby compatible with a refined hedonism, which emphasizes only certain kinds of pleasure as having well-being value. In this section, we provide evidence that both Buddhist and Hindu authors claim that at least some kinds of pleasure possess positive well-being value.

A second kind of response is to argue that pleasure is characterized as negative by Buddhist and Hindu texts, not because it has intrinsic well-being disvalue, but because it has instrumental disvalue in stimulating desire and leading to other negative circumstances. Here, the idea is that pleasure of itself is intrinsically good, but is recognized as potentially harmful in its conduciveness to various negative circumstances, and above all to the arising of pernicious desires. Such a position is consistent with hedonism, since it claims that pleasure of itself has positive well-being value. In this section, we argue that both of these strategies are plausible for interpreting Buddhist and Hindu texts. Therefore, we conclude that hedonism remains consistent with Buddhist and Hindu attitudes towards pleasure.

In terms of the first of these strategies, Buddhist authors are often explicit that certain kinds of pleasure accompany virtuous mental states. Śāntideva, for instance, discusses the joyful mind (*tuṣṭāmanāḥ*) which accompanies generous action (Śāntideva, *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, trans. Goodman 2016: 28), and rejoicing (*muḍitā*) in other's achievements (Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, trans. Wallace and Wallace 1997: 3.1, 3.3, 5.77, 6.77) as being positive forms of pleasure. Moreover,

in the Pali canon, the Buddha frequently references the salubrious pleasures of meditation which are without the drawbacks of sensual pleasure. A particularly striking passage occurs in the *Shorter Discourse on the Mass of Suffering*, in which the Buddha boasts that his enjoyment of pleasure in meditation is many times greater than that enjoyed by the richest king.

But, friends, I can abide without moving my body or uttering a word, experiencing the peak of pleasure for one day and night. ... for two, three, four, five, and six days and nights ... For seven days and nights. What do you think, friends? That being so, who dwells in greater pleasure, King Seniya Bimbisara of Magadha or I? (M i 94, trans. Bodhi and Ñāṇamoli 1995: 189).

The pleasure referenced in this quotation is regarding two kinds of meditational experience, pleasure (*sukha*) and bliss (*pīti/prīti*), both of which are conducive to developing deep states of concentration (Gunaratana 1980: 128–140). Moreover, the Buddha is clear that this pleasure experienced in meditation has none of the negative drawbacks of sensual pleasure, such as stimulating pernicious craving.

One way to develop a plausible hedonism in regards to Buddhist texts, therefore, is to distinguish sense pleasure from other kinds of pleasure, such as that accompanying virtuous action or that which is experienced in subtle meditational states. It can then be claimed that a Buddhist hedonism takes only certain kinds of non-sensual pleasure, like those just listed, as having intrinsic well-being value. This is not the only option open to a Buddhist hedonist, however.

We have already seen that many of the passages in which Buddhist texts critique pleasure do so by indicating its propensity to stimulate craving, as well as to lead to negative situations like societal strife and non-virtuous behavior. We also saw that the 12 links of dependent origination characterize pleasure as the causal factor which gives rise to craving (*taṇhā*) and eventually negative karma, future rebirth, and future suffering. These remarks suggest a complimentary but distinct approach to developing a hedonistic reading of Buddhist texts. According to this second interpretation, all pleasure has intrinsic well-being value. However, some kinds of pleasure, and much sense pleasure in particular, has instrumental disvalue in stimulating craving and leading to other negative circumstances. This is consistent with hedonism's basic commitments; all hedonisms accept that pleasure and its pursuit can lead to negative consequences, and that therefore some kinds of pleasure are best avoided.⁴ In doing so, however, they can still maintain that all pleasure is, of itself, good. We have then two strategies interpreters can

⁴ The strategy here will be similar to that developed by the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus.

take in understanding Buddhist critiques of pleasure in a way that is compatible with hedonism. First, they may simply take Buddhists to differentiate between good and bad kinds of pleasure; in this interpretation, Buddhists can be hedonists, but of a variety which accepts only a subset of pleasurable mental states as having intrinsic well-being value. Second, they may take a stronger position and claim all pleasure has intrinsic well-being value, but that some kinds of pleasure should not be pursued because of its instrumental disvalue.

When we turn to Hindu texts, we find resources for the same replies. Texts commonly describe the experience of the successful renunciate as a state of perfect, unending bliss. *Kuṇḍika Upaniṣad* 27, for example, says that the renunciate “always enjoys the *ātman* (*ātmārāmaḥ sadā*).” *Maitreya Upaniṣad* 110 says that the liberation seeker, “attains imperishable joy (*sukham avyayam*).” *Nirvāṇa Upaniṣad* 226 reports that the renunciate experiences “the highest bliss (*paramānandī*).” The *Bhagavadgītā* says that “the person whose self is joined in yoga with *brahman*, they attain unending pleasure (*sukham akṣayam*)” (5.21). Some Buddhist texts also describe the awakened state as joyful. Joy (*pīti*), for example, is one of the seven factors of awakening present at the moment of enlightenment (Gethin 2001: 154–155). Likewise, numerous Buddhist texts describe nirvana as the highest happiness (Collins 1998: 207–213).⁵

The emphasis that these and other texts place on the pleasure of the renunciate suggests that they take certain pleasures to contribute intrinsic value to the life of the person whose pleasures they are. The life of such a person is exceedingly good for them because it contains immense and constant pleasure. This appears to support a hedonistic interpretation of welfare in these texts.

This assessment is consistent with the extensive claims about the disvalue of pleasure described earlier. While the pleasures that the renunciate takes in *brahman*, *ātman*, and so on contribute intrinsic value to their life, other pleasures – perhaps paralleling the sensory pleasures of Buddhist traditions – diminish the intrinsic value of a life. Such a theory would not be a *universal* hedonism. It would not assert that all experiences of pleasure are intrinsically valuable. It would be a hedonist theory nonetheless, however, if it claims that only pleasure states contribute positive intrinsic value to a life.

The second strategy discussed above is also available in certain Hindu contexts. The fact that Hindu texts claim that certain pleasures should be avoided does not entail that these pleasures are intrinsically bad, or even neutral. The fact

⁵ On the other hand, when final *nirvāṇa* is attained, then the *skandha* of *vedanā*, which includes pleasant sensation, has ceased. See Collins 1998: 207–213 for a discussion of this apparent contradiction.

that many pleasures cause wide-ranging harm to the person explains why many Hindu texts discourage them. The fact that these pleasures have these consequences, however, is consistent with the claim that they contribute positive intrinsic value to a life. The point, instead, is that the positive intrinsic value that these pleasures contribute to a life is inevitably outweighed by the negative value that they contribute by causing eventual harm.

In both Buddhist and Hindu traditions, most pleasurable experiences only further immiserate a person, by causing desire, pain, anger, confusion, rebirth, and so on. This is consistent, however, with the claim that even these pleasures have intrinsic value. Indeed, so long as the intrinsic value of these pleasures is invariably outweighed by the disvalue of the harms that they cause, the prescription to avoid pleasure is sound hedonist advice.

So both Buddhist and Hindu texts might reply to the initial arguments against hedonist interpretations in either of two ways. First, they might draw a distinction between pleasures that contribute positive intrinsic value to a life, and pleasures that contribute negative intrinsic value to a life. Claims that pleasure should be avoided, on this reading, refer to pleasures that contribute negative intrinsic value to a life. Second, they might insist that all pleasures contribute positive intrinsic value to a life, but allow that the negative instrumental value of a wide subset of pleasures outweighs the positive intrinsic value of the pleasures themselves. On this reading, only pleasures of the latter sort should be avoided.⁶

3. Hinduism, Buddhism, and desire theory

Parallel arguments can be developed to support a desire theory interpretation of welfare in Buddhist and Hindu texts. The first argument for a hedonist theory draws a distinction between pleasures that are conducive to well-being, and pleasures that are not. The parallel argument for a desire-based theory might draw a distinction between desire-satisfactions that are conducive to well-being and those that are not. The claim, then, is that negative evaluations of desire found in Buddhist and Hindu texts refer only to impoverished desires, and are thereby compatible with a desire theory that emphasizes only certain kinds of desire-

⁶ Both interpretations might be taken to assume that pain has intrinsic disvalue. It is the disvalue of pain, after all, that seems to make the overall value of pleasure – or at least most pleasures – exceedingly negative. If this assumption is accurate, then even if the relevant texts deny the intrinsic value of (certain) pleasures, they assert a form of hedonism. This kind of account can be described as an asymmetric form of hedonism, according to which experiences of pain contribute intrinsic disvalue to a life, but experiences of pleasure do not contribute intrinsic value to a life.

satisfactions as having well-being value. John Taber's work is especially helpful in developing a case for this interpretation. John Taber begins by considering Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā* 1.12, in which Dharmakīrti cites the Buddha as a counter-example to the claim that action entails desire. The Buddha, Dharmakīrti says, is not motivated by desire (*rāga*), but compassion (*karuṇa*) (Taber 2011: 439).

Some might object that compassion is a desire. Dharmakīrti replies that there is an important distinction between a motivation (*prayojana*) that is based on ignorance, and a motivation that does not arise from error (Taber 2011: 440). The word "desire" is typically used to refer to motivations based on ignorance. Dharmakīrti mentions false beliefs that things are eternal, pleasant, self, or belong to the self, in particular, as paradigmatic examples. The motivations that arise from such false beliefs are desires in the usual sense. If this is the sense of the word "desire" here, then the opponent is mistaken to classify the compassion of the Buddha as a desire, since his compassion is not based on any erroneous conception. If, instead, "desire" is used to refer to motivations more broadly, with no implication about their basis in ignorance, then compassion is indeed a desire. Even in this case, however, there is no fault (*doṣa*) in the compassion of the Buddha (Taber 2011: 441).

Taber notes that the Advaitin Maṇḍanamiśra draws a parallel distinction in his *Brahmasiddhi*. Maṇḍana denies that the successful liberation seeker is motivated by desire (*rāga*). Instead, they are motivated by "mere wishing (*icchāmātram*)."¹ The opponent might insist that this mere wishing is desire. Maṇḍana, like Dharmakīrti, replies that the word "desire (*rāga*)" normally refers to motivating states based in false beliefs. Desire usually refers to "attachment to a non-existent quality brought about by ignorance" (Taber 2011: 443). The motivation of the liberation seeker (*mumukṣu*), however, cannot be characterized as desire in this sense, since the motivation of the liberation seeker is "due to the purification brought about by the vision of reality" (Taber 2011: 443).

If the word "desire" is instead used to refer to motivations more broadly, with no suggestion that it must be based on ignorance, then the liberation seeker's desire for liberation is of course a desire. But the fact that the liberation seeker is motivated by desire in this sense is consistent with the insistence that their motivation is importantly different from that of the ordinary person.

Both of these passages suggest two ways to describe motivations. First, motivating states might be described as a broad class of states that includes, but is not limited to desires. On this reading, all desires are problematic, but motivations that are not desires are unproblematic – and potentially advantageous.

The Buddha and the liberation seeker are entirely desireless, on this reading, but retain those motivations required to act.

Second, motivating states might be taken as coextensive with desires. On this reading, all motivations are desires, but only some of these desires are problematic. Others are unproblematic, and potentially advantageous. The Buddha and the liberation seeker are not entirely desireless on this reading. They retain those desires that are required to act, but without incurring or causing harm as a result.

Having noted the distinction between problematic and unproblematic motivating states, the desire theory interpretation of welfare in Buddhist and Hindu texts seems more plausible than it initially appeared. If all motivating states are counted as desires, then the desire theory interpretation might claim that Buddhist and Hindu texts count the satisfaction of desires based in knowledge as conducive to welfare. When they claim that desire should be eliminated, on this reading, they claim that desires based in ignorance should be eliminated. If, instead, there are motivating states that are not desires, then the desire theory interpretation might claim that Buddhist and Hindu texts count the satisfaction of non-desire motivations based on knowledge as conducive to welfare. On this reading, all desires are based in ignorance, and all desires should be eliminated. In either case, Buddhist and Hindu texts might plausibly be taken to endorse the satisfaction of motivations that are based in knowledge. When they claim that desire should be eliminated, then, they claim that motivations based in ignorance should be eliminated.⁷ The classification of this latter view as a desire theory

⁷ Either interpretation might be an actual desire theory or an ideal desire theory. An actual desire theory claims that the satisfaction of desires that the agent actually has contributes intrinsic value to their life. An actual desire theory in the Buddhist and Hindu contexts might claim that only the satisfaction of those actual desires/non-desire motivations that are grounded in knowledge contributes intrinsic value to a life. The satisfaction of actual desires that are grounded in ignorance, unsurprisingly, does not contribute intrinsic value to a life. This view would imply that the satisfaction of most of the actual desires that an ordinary person might have would not increase the intrinsic value of that person's life. And this would make good sense of the generally discouraging attitude toward desire found in many Buddhist and Hindu texts and traditions.

An ideal desire theory claims that the satisfaction of ideal desires contributes intrinsic value to a life. Ideal desires are often characterized as desires that a fully informed, rational agent would have. An ideal desire theory in the Buddhist and Hindu contexts might claim that only the satisfaction of those desires/non-desire motivations that a fully informed, rational agent would have contributes intrinsic value to a life. This seems roughly identical to the claim that only the satisfaction of those desires/non-desire motivations grounded in knowledge, rather than ignorance, contribute intrinsic value to a life. The satisfaction of desires that a fully informed and rational agent would not have, in contrast, do not increase welfare value.

might seem strange, since it denies that any desire-satisfaction has intrinsic value. The basic intuition of the desire theorist, however, is that a life goes well for a person insofar as they get what they want. If the word “want” in this context refers to motivating states, and if those states include both desire and non-desire states, then this view is consistent with the basic intuition of desire theory. A life goes well for the person whose life it is insofar as (certain) motivating states are satisfied.

The second argument for a hedonist interpretation of welfare in Buddhist and Hindu texts, which we reviewed in the last section, claims that all pleasures contribute intrinsic value to a life. It explains the negative characterizations of a wide subset of pleasures in Buddhist and Hindu texts by citing the disvalue of the consequences of these pleasures. These consequences include the pain of desire frustrations, anger, confusion, rebirth, and so on.

The parallel argument for a desire theory interpretation of these traditions claims that all desire-satisfactions contribute intrinsic value to a life. It explains the negative characterizations of a wide subset of desires by citing the disvalue of the consequences of these desires. Indeed, most of the consequences of pleasure arise because pleasure produces desire. So the consequences of problematic desires are generally identical to the consequences of problematic pleasures.

Since desire causes a wide range of harms, it has significant negative instrumental value. The negative value of the further ends toward which desire is a means, however, does not affect the intrinsic value of the desire satisfactions themselves. The negative instrumental value of desire is sufficient to explain the prohibition on desire in certain Buddhist and Hindu texts and traditions. In the long run, most desires only further immiserate a person, by causing pain, anger, confusion, and rebirth. This conclusion is consistent, however, with the claim that desire satisfactions have intrinsic value. So long as the intrinsic value of desire satisfactions is invariably outweighed by the disvalue of the harms that desires cause, the prescription to avoid desire is sound advice.

So both Buddhist and Hindu texts might reply to the initial arguments against desire interpretations in either of two ways. First, they might draw a distinction between problematic and unproblematic motivations, and claim that the satisfaction of unproblematic motivations contributes intrinsic value to a life. Unproblematic motivations, in turn, are those based on knowledge. Claims that desire should be eliminated, on this reading, refer to those problematic motivating states – again, whether they are called desire motivations or non-desire motivations – that are based on ignorance. Second, they might insist that all desire satisfactions contribute positive intrinsic value to a life, but allow that the

negative instrumental value of a wide subset of desire satisfactions outweighs the positive intrinsic value of the satisfactions themselves. On this reading, only desires of the latter sort should be avoided.

4. Indeterminacy about welfare

The preceding suggests that Buddhist and Hindu texts might be taken to imply a hedonist theory of welfare or a desire theory of welfare after all. Initially, however, there seem to be good reasons to prefer the hedonist theory over the desire theory. Buddhist and Hindu texts describe *saṃsāra* as exceedingly painful. They also endorse the pursuit of certain pleasures – like those that arise as a result of virtuous mental states, those that arise in meditation, those that arise in relation to *ātman* and *brahman*, and so on.

The hedonic explanation of these claims seems straightforward. *Saṃsāra* should be avoided because lives within the cycles of rebirth are exceedingly painful. Pain contributes negative intrinsic value to the life of the person whose life it is. The pain of *saṃsāra* makes the life of the person who experiences it intrinsically bad. Experiences of virtuous mental states, meditation, *ātman/brahman*, and so on, in contrast, are good for a person because they are pleasurable. Pleasure contributes positive intrinsic value to the life of the person whose life it is. The pleasure of these states makes the life of the person who attains them intrinsically good.

The desire theory, in contrast, offers a more complicated explanation of these claims. The desire theory must say that Buddhist and Hindu texts prescribe escape from *saṃsāra* because it satisfies a desire – or because it precludes desire frustrations. Likewise, it must claim that Buddhist and Hindu texts endorse the pursuit of virtuous mental states, meditation, *ātman/brahman*, and so on because the attainment of these states satisfies a desire.⁸ Given the emphasis that these texts place on pleasure and the avoidance of pain, a desire theory presumably must say that Buddhist and Hindu texts prescribe escape from *saṃsāra* because it satisfies the desire to avoid pain. It must claim that these texts endorse the pursuit of virtuous mental states, meditation, *ātman/brahman*, and so on because they satisfy a desire for pleasure.⁹

⁸ See footnote seven above for the distinction between actual and ideal desire theories.

⁹ Śāntideva can be understood as making this point. “When happiness is equally dear to others and myself, then what is so special about me that I strive after happiness for myself alone? When fear and suffering are disliked by me and others equally, what is so special about me that I protect myself and not the other?” (Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, trans. Wallace and Wallace 1997: 8.95–96).

So while both the hedonist and desire theories might explain the relevant prescriptions found in the texts, the desire theory must add an additional layer of explanation. Texts claim that *saṃsāra* is painful, and that *saṃsāra* should be avoided. The hedonist interpretation draws the simple inference that *saṃsāra* should be avoided *because it is painful*. Texts endorse the pursuit of virtuous mental states, meditation, *ātman/brahman*, and so on, and claim that these states are pleasurable. The hedonist interpretation draws the simple inference that these states are good *because they are pleasurable*.

The desire theory, in contrast, takes the claim that *saṃsāra* is painful, and the claim that *saṃsāra* should be avoided, to imply that *saṃsāra* should be avoided, not because pain is intrinsically bad, but *because people desire to avoid pain*. It takes the endorsement of virtuous mental states, experiences of meditation, *ātman/brahman*, and so on, and the claim that these states are pleasurable, to imply not that pleasure is intrinsically valuable, but that these states are endorsed *because they satisfy a desire for pleasure*.

In short, the hedonistic interpretation seems preferable on the grounds of Ockam's Razor. As Mark Siderits and others note, Buddhist and Hindu texts frequently invoke the same exegetical principle, according to which the theory that posits the fewest unevidenced claims/entities is counted as the more plausible, all other things being equal (Siderits 2015: 12, n. 6).

The problem with this argument is that it fails to recognize that in many conversational situations, there will be no attempt to distinguish instrumental and intrinsic value in relation to items of well-being. In such cases, whatever unit of well-being value is relevant will be referred to directly, with no characterization of what explains its well-being value at the deepest conceptual level. Simplicity in expression, therefore, should not be taken as evidence for a commitment to intrinsic value of a referenced item. In explicating this response, it is helpful to reemphasize that assigning importance to a given item of well-being does not entail that it has intrinsic value. For a hedonist, curing a contagious disease is important, not because bodily health has intrinsic value, but because it has instrumental value in preventing painful states from arising. Likewise, marking a given item as having intrinsic well-being value does not of itself mean it is especially important. The pleasure of eating skittles has intrinsic value for hedonists who like candy, but not very much of it. Curing cancer is more important than experiencing the pleasure of eating skittles for hedonists, even though the second item, and not the first, has intrinsic value (see also Harris 2015).

Moreover, in many philosophical and non-philosophical conversations, it is the importance of elements of well-being, rather than the question of their

intrinsic value, which structures conversations and debates. We can imagine two doctors, one of whom is a hedonist and one of whom is a desire theorist, debating the treatment of a patient. Both doctors agree that it is important to lessen the patient's pain; their disagreement lies at a deeper level of conceptual foundations in which the ultimate conceptual grounding of the disvalue of pain is at issue. However, in the practical context of the doctor's office, there is no reason to raise these theoretical questions. Both doctors would simply refer to pain, since it is the relevant item with importance. Simplicity of expression, here, does not indicate that the desire theorist has become a hedonist, but rather that the conversation is not one in which discussions of the conceptual foundations of value are relevant. Likewise, we need not assume that an individual is always committed to a given foundational theory of well-being value; we can imagine the two doctors consulting with a third who had formed no theoretical commitments as to whether pain has intrinsic or instrumental disvalue. What is important in the conversation between the doctors is the importance of the pain itself, not its underlying conceptual foundations.

Arguably, the medical example parallels discussions of pain and pleasure found in many Buddhist and Hindu texts. It is true that such authors often speak of the value and disvalue of pleasure and pain, and typically do not explicate this in terms of the frustration of a deep seated desire for happiness or the avoidance of suffering. However, it may be that these philosophers are only interested in considering the importance of pleasure and pain in terms of our well-being, rather than the conceptual foundations for that value. The fact that Buddhist texts often use medical analogies to characterize the role of the Buddha in lessening suffering is worth emphasis. Since the primary purpose of Buddhism is to eliminate suffering, it may be that positing the additional question of whether pleasure and pain have a conceptually deeper explanation for their value or disvalue is not necessary.

We can see, then, that an appeal to Ockham's Razor cannot settle the question of whether there is a hedonic element to Buddhist and Brahmanical texts. It may be that these authors have simply not raised the question of whether important items of well-being have intrinsic or instrumental value. If this is the case, the vocabulary they will use to discuss items of well-being will follow non-philosophical customs for talking about terms of value. Both hedonists and desire-theorists simply talk about the value of pleasure and pain in contexts in which their foundational well-being commitments are not in question. This does not imply that desire-theorists are inconsistent; it simply shows that a certain kind of philosophical precision is not required in all contexts.

A potential worry at this point is to wonder whether we can still take Indian philosophers seriously, as ethicists, if they do not take a position on the central question of what, at the deepest conceptual level, constitutes well-being. But this is to assume that Buddhist and Hindu texts share the common assumption in Western philosophy that determining which items have intrinsic well-being value is among the most important topics of philosophical work on well-being. Much of the philosophically important work which Buddhists and Hindu thinkers do is in considering the importance of specific common elements of well-being for human life. Buddhists, for example, claim that humans massively overestimate the value of sense pleasure, and give a variety of reasons in support of their position (Harris 2014). Since all plausible theories of well-being must give careful attention to the value and potential disvalue of pleasure in a life, Buddhist reflections on this topic will be helpful for these theorists. Similar responses could be developed regarding distinctions Buddhist and Hindu authors make regarding good and bad desires, as well as virtuous and afflictive mental states that promote or decrease well-being respectively. All of these philosophical insights are valuable, whether or not they are built into a theory which takes a position on what has intrinsic or instrumental well-being value.

Conclusion

Initially, it may seem that hedonism and desire theories are unlikely candidates for understanding Buddhist and Hindu commitments to well-being, given these traditions' emphasis on the disvalue of pleasure and desire. In this essay, we have shown that matters are not so simple. Buddhist and Hindu authors have at least two options for developing viable versions of hedonism and desire theory. First, the hedonist can distinguish between good and bad kinds of pleasure, and the desire theorist can distinguish between good and bad kinds of desire-satisfaction. The claim then will be that Buddhist and Hindu critiques of pleasure and desire refer only to the bad kinds of each relevant item. Second, they may accept that all pleasures or desire-satisfactions have intrinsic well-being value, but that this can be outweighed by instrumental disvalue. Here, Buddhist and Hindu critiques of pleasure and desire-satisfaction refer to this instrumental disvalue of the item in question. We concluded, therefore, that hedonism and desire-satisfaction theory remain viable options for ethicists working from Buddhist or Hindu frameworks.

Finally, we considered whether the Ockham's Razor might make a hedonistic interpretation of at least certain passages surveyed more plausible. We concluded that it is likely such passages may not be intended to spell out the deepest conceptual foundations of well-being. If this is the case, reference to the value of pleasure

may simply indicate simplicity of expression in line with conversational norms, rather than a commitment to a particular foundational theory. What this suggests is that authors working from Buddhist and Hindu frameworks have the resources within their traditions to develop interesting and sophisticated versions of hedonism and desire theory, even if the traditions themselves may not be explicitly or implicitly committed to either.

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The *Bhāvikāraṇavāda* of Jitāri*

A Tenth-Century Buddhist Treatise on Backward Causation

Eli Franco

John Taber has been a cherished friend for some thirty-five years. I am therefore honored and delighted to contribute to the present volume which celebrates an exceptional scholar. His unique voice in our field of studies reflects John's extraordinary sensitivity both in the attention to philological details and in grasping fundamental philosophical issues. The topic I have chosen, the Buddhist doctrine of backward causation, is one on which I have written before and in which John has shown a vivid interest. I hope that the present contribution, which consists of an edition and translation of the *Bhāvikāraṇavāda* of Jitāri, will find favor with him, in spite of its many imperfections.

It has been known for some time that a large number of rare Sanskrit manuscripts are preserved in Lhasa. In 1961 a collection of 250 manuscripts was sent to the library of the Palace of National Minorities, Beijing. Most of the manuscripts were returned to Lhasa in 1993, but photocopies and microfilms of them were made in 1987 and are kept now in the China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC), Beijing. An agreement between the CTRC and the Austrian Academy of Sciences has already enabled some major publications in the area of Buddhist philosophy, notably, Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (so far chapters 1 and 2) and Dharmakīrti's most systematic work, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. Further publications based on these precious materials are now under preparation. One of the largest (112 leafs) and most important manuscripts, photocopies of which are kept in the library of the CTRC, contains several works, some hitherto completely unknown, of the renowned Buddhist philosopher and Tāntrika Jitāri

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(ca. A.D. 940–980). This manuscript has been the subject of a research project at the Institute of Indology and Central Asian Studies, Leipzig University. A generous fund by the German Research Council (DFG) has allowed my colleague Dr. Junjie Chu to work full time for two years on this and a related manuscript. The following is based on these precious photocopies as well as on Chu's preliminary transcription of them.

In the beginning of the above-mentioned manuscript, after a salutation to the Buddha and a somewhat Tantric *maṅgala*-verse, Jitāri prefaces his work as follows:

suhṛdām anurodhena yathāśakti yathāsmṛti |

hriyam vihāya likhyante vādashānāni kānicit ||

In compliance of the wish of friends, putting my shyness aside, some topics of debate [between Buddhists, Brahmins and Jainas] are written here according to my ability, according to my recollection (or according to the tradition).

It thus seems that *Vādashānāni* was the title of the collection as a whole. However, titles of philosophical works in Sanskrit do not usually appear in plural form, and the term could have been used merely as a description for the content of the work, not as its title. Since no colophon in the end of the manuscript is available, certainty on this matter cannot be reached, but for lack of anything better, we use *Vādashānāni* as the title of the work.

According to a preliminary transcription of the manuscript prepared by Dr. Chu, to whom I am greatly indebted here,¹ it contains some twenty short treatises, or better chapters, each ending with a short colophon providing a title and attributing the work to Jitāri. These are:

1. *Sāmānyanirākṛti* (1b1–5b6), 2. *Sāmānyanirākṛti* (6a1–8a5),² 3. *Īśvara-nirākaraṇa* (8a5–11b3), 4. *Nairātmyasiddhi* (11b3–12a3), 5. *Vedaprāmāṇya-nirākṛti* (12a3–14b4), 6. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (14b4–20a6), 7. *Avayavinirākaraṇa* (20a6–24b6), 8. *Apohasiddhi* (24b6–32b1), 9. *Kṣaṇabhaṅgaprākaraṇa* (32b1–46a1), 10. *Dvijātīdūṣaṇa* (46a1–57b4), 11. *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (57b4–62b), 12. *Sarvajñāsiddhi* (62b2–64a4), 13. *Bhāvikāraṇavāda* (64a4–69b3), 14. *Jātivāda* (69b3–70b3), 15. *Śrutikarṭṛsiddhi* (70b3–77b4),

¹ Dr. Junjie Chu plans a diplomatic edition of the entire manuscript.

² Several of the chapters have identical names, but they are not identical; rather they form different arguments on the same topic; for instance, the first two chapters and chapter fourteen consist in three different arguments against the existence of the universal. For a diplomatic edition of the first two chapters, see Chu and Franco 2016.

16. *Śabdāprāmaṇya* (77b5–85b4), 17. *Sāmagrībhaṅga* (85b5–87b1), 18. *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (87bb1–93b4), 19. *Digambaramataparīkṣā* (93b4–97b5), 20. *Dvijātīdūṣaṇa* (97b5–112b2).

In the following, I attempt a semi-critical edition of the *Bhāvikāraṇavāda*. Needless to say, an edition based on a single manuscript, which is at places illegible or barely legible, and which is not free of scribal mistakes, could hardly be perfect. Nevertheless, I hope that the edition is, on the whole, reliable and the main arguments are clear.³ I am greatly indebted to my friend Phyllis Granoff who patiently read through the first draft of this translation and suggested many improvements on it. I am also very grateful to Professor Lambert Schmithausen, who was kind enough to read through the final draft and suggested further improvements to it. Sincere thanks are also due to Vincent Eltschinger for his careful editorial work. The remaining mistakes are, of course, entirely my own.

Edition

praṇamya⁴ mañjughoṣasya śāstuś caraṇapaṅkajaṃ |

bhāvikāraṇasiddhyartham⁵ adhunā prayatāmahe ||

iha yad yenānuvihitā_(64a5)nvayavyatirekam, tat tasya kāraṇam, yathā dahano dhūmasya. svahetunā⁶nuvihitānvayavyatirekaṃ cāvaśyambhāvikāryaṃ sarvaṃ⁷ iti svabhāvahetuḥ.

nanv ayam asiddho hetu₍₆₎ḥ kāryasya bhāvitvenāsato⁸ 'nvayavyatirekānuvidhānāyogāt.⁹ na hi tāvad asyānvayam anuvidhatte¹⁰ hetur anvayasyaivābhāvāt.¹¹ bhāvalakṣaṇo¹² hy anvayaḥ, na cedam kāraṇoda_(64b1)yasamaye samastīti kathaṃ tadīyam anvayam anviyād dhetuḥ? vyatirekam apy asya na hetur anuvidhatte.

³ For an earlier paraphrase and discussion of this treatise see Franco 2015; in the translation here several points are better understood and more clearly presented, or so I hope.

⁴ praṇamya : pramāsy Ms.

⁵ artham : amram Ms. (The reading -amram is not impossible in itself: the mango fruit which consists in a proof of the future cause; however, *prayatāmahe* is intransitive.)

⁶ nā added in bottom margin, probably by a different hand.

⁷ Cf. PVA(o) 70.10–13 and 71.10–11.

⁸ bhāvitvena- : bhāvaṃtvana- Ms.

⁹ -ayogāt : -yogāt Ms. (There is an insertion sign before -yo-, but there is no correction in the margins or between the lines.)

¹⁰ anuvidhatte : anuvidhīyate Ms.

¹¹ bhāvā added in bottom margin, probably by a different hand.

¹² bhāva- : bhāvi Ms.

yadi hy eṣa tadīyam abhāvam anukuryāt, na kadācid utpattim ātmasātkuryāt. na hy asya ka₍₂₎ dācid api kāraṇodayakāle sattā sambhavati.

tatredaṃ nirūpyate – anāgatabhāvābhāvānuvidhānābhāvaḥ kṣaṇikavādinā¹³ vā bhavatābhīdhiyetaḥkṣaṇikavādinā vā. pra₍₃₎thame pakṣe yathā bhavān atītasya kāraṇakṣaṇasyānvayavyatirekānuvidhānam icchati, tathānāgatasyāpi kiṃ necchati? na hy anāgatenāparāddhaṃ nāma kiñcit.

atha manya₍₄₎se – yady apy atītasya sattā kāryakāle nāsti, tathāpy abhūt. tatas tadbhāvānuvidhānaṃ vartamānasya nāyuktam. evaṃ¹⁴ tarhi bhāviny api samānam etat. tathā hi yady api kā₍₅₎ryakāle sattā nāsti bhaviṣyati,¹⁵ tathāpi bhaviṣyati. tatas tasyāpi bhāvābhāvānuvidhānaṃ vartamānasya nāyuktam. na hy atītājātayoḥ svakāle sattāṃ kālāntare₍₆₎ vāsattāṃ prati kaścid viśeṣaḥ. na cāsati viśeṣe 'nyataraparigraho jyāyān.¹⁶

dvitīyapakṣāśrayo 'pi na śreyān. akṣaṇikapakṣe 'pi hi yad eva kāryāt prāg bhāvīkāraṇa_(65a1)syā svarūpam, tad eva tadutpattau nimittam. akṣaṇike 'py arthe¹⁷ tad anupayujyamānam api kāryakālam anuvartate. na hi labdhātmanaḥ kāryasya kāryaṃ kiñcid asti, yena tadātanaḥ kāraṇātmo₍₂₎payogam āśādayet. sa ca prāgbhāvī svabhāvo bhāvī ca kāryakāle nāsti. tato yathaitasyānvayavyatirekānuvidhānaṃ tathānāgatasyāpīti katham asiddhir he₍₃₎toḥ?

nanu nāśotpādaḥ samaṃ dvayam iti. kāraṇavyayakāryodayayoḥ samānakālatvāt kāryakāraṇasattayor asattayā vyavadhānābhāvād atītānvayānu₍₄₎vidhānam upapadyata eva, na tv anāgatasya, tasyāsattayā vyavadhānāt. yadi hi kāraṇe naṣṭe kāryotpattiḥ syād asaty eva kāraṇe syāt. vinaṣṭe ca kāraṇaṃ tadānīm₍₅₎ kāryotpattiḥ syāt, yadi tv a.. ādiṣu kṣaṇeṣu syāt.¹⁸ na tv etad asti, kāraṇasattāsamanantaram eva kāryasyābhinirvṛtteḥ. tasmād anantarātītasya sattvāt tadbhāvānuvidhānaṃ nyā₍₆₎yyam, na tu bhaviṣyataḥ, tadā tasyāsattvāt.

¹³ kṣaṇikavādinā : kṣaṇaṃkavādinā Ms.

¹⁴ evaṃ : eva Ms.

¹⁵ bhaviṣyati : viṣyati Ms. (However, there is an illegible mark in the bottom margin.) Read as loc. sing.

¹⁶ jyāyān: jyāyan Ms.

¹⁷ akṣaṇike 'py arthe : akṣaṇikatvārthe Ms.

¹⁸ These two sentences seem problematic; at least I do not know how to construe them. Note that *kāryotpattiḥ syāt* and *tv a.. ā-* are barely legible and thus the reading is not certain. One may be tempted to read *kāraṇe* instead of *kāraṇaṃ*, but the conditional would then be a mere repetition of the previous sentence.

tatredaṃ cintyate – kasyānāgatasyāsattvam ucyate? kim anantarasya kiṃ vā viprakṛṣṭasya? tatrānantarasyānāgatasyāsattvavyavadhānāsūnya^(65b1) tvād¹⁹ āsannasyevātītasya katham asattvam? kāryāt prāg asattvam iti cet, atītasyāpi paścād asattvam iti na viśeṣaṃ paśyāmaḥ. paścādasattvam abādhakam iti cet, prāgasattvam apy abā⁽²⁾ dhakam iti bruvāṇasya na kasyacin mukham vakrībhavati. asato janakatvāyogāt prāgasattvam bādhakam iti cet, kim idaṃ janakatvam nāma? kāryotpattāv avaśyambhāvaḥ.²⁰ ya⁽³⁾ dy evam anāgatasyāpi janakatvam aviruddhaṃ, tasyāpy avaśyambhāvāt. anāgatasyāvaśyambhāvo nābhūd iti cet, atītasyāpi na bhaviṣyati. iti samāno²¹ nyāyaḥ. ⁽⁴⁾ kāryakāle tv anāgatasyāsattvam anupanyasanīyam, atītasyāpi tadānīm²² asattvāt.

atha viprakṛṣṭam²³ anāgatam asad ity ucyate. viprakṛṣṭam atītam apy asad eveti na kiñcid e⁽⁵⁾ tat. tasyājanakatvād asattve 'py adoṣa iti cet, na tarhi mūrcchādivyapagame vijñānena bhavitavyam, śārīrasya kāraṇatve paralokasādhhanoktena nyāyena niṣiddhe, vijñā⁽⁶⁾ ne ca tadānīm niruddhe. yadi cirātītam api vijñānaṃ na hetuḥ, tadā katham ahetukā vijñānotpattir yuhyate? ātmahetukatvān nāhetuketi cet, nityatvād dheto mūrcchādāv api ta^(66a1) rhi vijñānena bhavitavyam. saha-kāripratyayasya vaikalyāt tadā tasyābhāva ity api vārttam. na hi sa sāhitye 'pi pararūpeṇa kartā. svarūpaṃ cānyadāpi tad eveti katham kadācit kri⁽²⁾ yāviraṃmaḥ? etena pariśāmaḥ pratyuktaḥ, tasyāpi svarūpamātrādhīnatvāt kādācitkatvāyogāt.

atha mūrcchādāv api jñānam abhyupagamyate, nirodhāsañjñīsamāpattyor api⁽³⁾ kiṃ nābhyupagamyate?

atha sarvatra itad iṣyate jñānasya samantarapratyayapūrvakatvena siddhāyāṃ vyāptau mūrcchādi-prabodha-prathamabhāvino vijñānasya tathāsiddheḥ. tad asat. jñā⁽⁴⁾ naṃ hi jñānamātrapūrvakatvena vyāptam, na tv anantarajñānapūrvakatvena. na cānantaryam drṣṭāntena²⁴ drṣṭam iti sarvatra tad anuvartanīyam. mā bhūd anityatvasādhhanopāttaghaṭādidrṣṭānta⁽⁵⁾ drṣṭasya kāritvāder²⁵ apy anuvartanam iti. tataś ca prabodhajñānāt kāryāt kāraṇaṃ sidhyac cirātītam eva setsyati.

cirātītasyāsattvād akāraṇatvam iti cet, a⁽⁶⁾ nantarasyāpi tarhy asattvād akāraṇatvaprasaṅgaḥ. kāryakāle hy asattvam prāk tu sattvam anayor dvayor apy

¹⁹ -śūnyatvād : -śūnya' .ād Ms.

²⁰ avaśyam- : aśyam Ms. (A correction mark before śya is visible, but I cannot see any correction in the margins.)

²¹ samāno : sāmāno Ms.

²² tadānīm : tadanīm Ms.

²³ viprakṛṣṭam : viprakraṣṭam Ms.

²⁴ Read *drṣṭānte*?

²⁵ kāritvāder : yāmvivatvāder Ms.

aviśiṣṭam. na hy anantarasyāpi prāgbhāvād anyad eva hetutvam, tac cāntaravato²⁶ 'pi_(66b1) samānam.

cirātīṭasya kāryāt prāg asattvam api na kevalam sattvam, anantarasya tu sattvam evety ayam anayor bheda ity api nihsāram, tasyāpi niyatakalatvāt, svarūpalābhasya tata₍₂₎h prāgbhāvāt kevalam sattvopayogāt. tasmān naiva mūrcchādyavasthāsu jñānam anumātuṃ śakyam. asattvam api²⁷ katham niścīyata iti cet, saṃvedanābhāvāt. yad āha bhāṣya₍₃₎ kārah²⁸

asaṃvedanarūpaṃ hi na saṃvedanam iṣyate |

tathāpi yadi tadbhāvo mṛtasyāpy astu vedanam iti ||

nanu na²⁹ tāvan mūrcchādikāle saṃvedanābhāvaniścayo 'sti, tathā₍₄₎ tve tadayogāt.³⁰ paścāt tat³¹ katham pūrvakālasaṃvedanābhāvaḥ sidhyati? ucyate – utpadyata eva tāvan mūrcchādivibuddhasyāyam niścayo nāham iyantaṃ kalam kim apy ajñā₍₅₎siṣam iti. tataḥ ko 'yaṃ paryanuyogānām?

syād etat – tadātanānām anubhavānām svasaṃviditānām³² api svaviśaya-smaraṇakaraṇaghaṭanābhāvād³³ ayam adhyavasāyo₍₆₎ ghaṭata eva. tad ayaṃ na saṃvedanavirahasādhānāya paryāpnoti. na tarhīdānīm kadācid api jñānābhāvaḥ³⁴ sidhyati, viśayāntarādvadhānādivaiguṇyayor api योग्यदेशपा_(67a1)ricchedāsi-ddhiprasaṅgāt. śakyam eva hīttam abhidhātuṃ viśayāntarātyantāsaktamanaso nidropadrutasya nāsty eva sannikṛṣṭārthasākṣātkāri jñānam. tatra kevalam ajñānam³⁵ vānusmarya₍₂₎ta iti, avasthāntare 'pi vā lakṣamāṇajñānasahasrakalpanām prati³⁶ pratibandhābhāvāt,³⁷ katham middhādu manaskāravaiguṇyāj jñānotpattiḥ? mūrcchādāv api tarhi ta₍₃₎thaivāstu. yo 'pi hi mūrcchādu jñānam

²⁶ cāntaravato : cānantaravato Ms.

²⁷ api : ami Ms.

²⁸ PVABh 75.10, v. 2.466.

²⁹ nanu na : na nanu Ms.

³⁰ -ayogāt : -yogāt Ms.

³¹ The function of *tat* here is not clear to me.

³² svasaṃviditānām : .āsaṃviditānām Ms. (What seems like the illegible akṣara .ā could also be only a space-filler.)

³³ -ghaṭanābhāvād : -ghaṭa{v}ābhāvād Ms. (I.e., v deleted by the scribe.)

³⁴ The Ms has a daṇḍa after *jñānābhāvaḥ* and it is indeed not impossible to begin a new sentence with *sidhyati*.

³⁵ ajñānam : aghaṭ{ā}a Ms. (I.e., a long ā deleted by the scribe.)

³⁶ prati : {pratinā} Ms. (I.e., *pratinā* deleted by the scribe.)

³⁷ I think there is a lacuna here or perhaps after *iti*.

icchatī, tenāpi vyāpārvyāhārasvagocarasmaraṇanirmāṇasamarthasya³⁸ bhāvāt,³⁹ jñānasyābhāva eṣitavyaḥ. sati caivaṃ jñāna₍₄₎mātrābhāva eva kiṃ neṣyate. evaṃ hy anubhāvavirodhasyātiprasaṅgasya ca parihāraḥ kṛto bhavati. tasmād yasyām avasthāyām niyameṇa jñānaṃ na lakṣyate, tasyām tan nāsty e₍₅₎va ity ayam ekānta iti. sati caivaṃ yathā cirātītakāraṇānvayavyatirekānuvidhānam adhunātanasya, tathā cirabhāvyānvayavyatirekānuvidhānam apīti na ta₍₆₎dapekṣayāpy asiddhir hetoḥ.

syād etat – avaśyambhāvināḥ kāryasya dharmināḥ svahetvanukṛtānvayavyatirekatayā kāraṇatvam iha sisādhayaṣyata eva. kāryasyāvaśya_(67b1)mbhāvitā bhāvikī, kāraṇānām tadārambhaniyamābhāvāt. yathāha – nāvaśyaṃ kāraṇāni kāryavanti bhavantīti.⁴⁰ tad ayaṃ dharmāsiddher āśrayāsiddho hetur iti. tad etad asat. na hi tāvad ana₍₂₎ntarakāryam anavaśyambhāvīti śakyam vibhāvayitum, tatra kālakṣayābhāvena pratibandhābhāvāt. tathā hi

sāmagrīphalaśaktīnām pariṇāmānubandhini |

anaikāntikatā kā₍₃₎rye pratibandhasya sambhavāt ||⁴¹

hetusattāsannidhānamātrādhīne tu kārye pratibandhakākīñcitkaratvāt kuto 'nāikāntikatā? athāsaty api pratibandhe samarthasyāpi kā₍₄₎ryākaraṇaṃ sambhāvya, mātūr api vandhyātvam kiṃ na sambhāvya?

viprakṛṣṭasyāpi na sarvasya kāryasyāvaśyakābhāvaḥ kasyacid āvaśyakasyāpi⁴² darśanāt, ariṣṭā₍₅₎d⁴³ viprakṛṣṭasyāpi dṛṣṭāntasya⁴⁴ dṛṣṭaikāntatvāt. vyavahitasya kāryasya katham āvaśyambhāva iti cet, ata eva hetutvam anumāpyate. na hi bhāvasyāvaśyambhā₍₆₎vo nihnotuṃ śakyāḥ. sa cānimittako na yujyate. na ca nimittatvād anyanimittatvam adhyavasyate.⁴⁵ tad evaṃ na kathamcid asiddho hetur iti.

³⁸ Read *vyavahāra*? *vyāhāra* is a rare synonym. I would also tend to delete *vyāpāra* which could well be a scribal mistake. In any case, I leave it untranslated below.

³⁹ bhāvāt : bhāvat Ms.

⁴⁰ See PVABh 175.1: *nāvaśyaṃ kāraṇāni kāryavanti bhavantīti nyāyaḥ*. See also PVSv 5.21 : *nāvaśyaṃ kāraṇāni tadvanti bhavanti* Cf. HBT 210.24, etc.

⁴¹ PV I 8.

⁴² āvaśyakasyāpi : āvaśyakāsyāpi Ms.

⁴³ For this example see PVABh 68.29–30.

⁴⁴ *dṛṣṭāntasya* seems to be used here in the meaning of death; cf. Apte and MW s.v.

⁴⁵ -nimittatvam adhyavasyate : -nimitta syate Ms.

viruddhatvādhyavasāyo 'pī_(68a1)ha na nidheyaḥ. yo hi na⁴⁶ sapakṣe⁴⁷ vipakṣe param asti, sa viruddha iti buddhir buddhimatām. asya ca hetoḥ sapakṣe sambhavo dṛṣṭa⁴⁸ iti na viruddhatām sambhāvayati vipaścit kaścit.

anai₍₂₎kāntikatāpy⁴⁹ asya na sambhāvanīyā. sā hi sambhavantī niścīyamānavyabhicāratayā⁵⁰ vā syāt sambhāvyamānavyabhicāratayā vā, prakārāntarasyātraivāntarbhāvāt. a₍₃₎tra na tāvad ādyo vikalpaḥ kalpanām⁵¹ arhati. niścite vipakṣe vṛttniścayābhāvāt tasyān⁵² tenānuvihitānvayavyatirekatā ca⁵³ bhaviṣyati. na ca ... dvi₍₄₎tīyaprakāraparigrahaḥ⁵⁴ kāryaḥ. na cāsau yujyate. na hi tāvad ayam anibandhana eva tatkāraṇavyavahāro viṣayapratiniyamāyogāt. na ca kārye 'py anuvihita₍₅₎bhāvābhāvātātiriktaṁ asya gocaracārinimittāntaraṁ sambhāvayati. dahanāder api hi dhūmādikāraṇatāvyavahāro dhūmādi₍₆₎bhāvābhāvānuvidhānādhīna eva.

na kāryānukṛtānvayavyatirekatāsyā nimittam, api tu kārye vyāpāra iti cet, nanv asāv api vyāpāro 'sya kādācitkatvāt kāryam e_(68b1)va. tatas tatrāpi kāraṇatā vyāpāravatteti vyāpāraparamparāparikalpanāyām anavasthā syāt. anvayavyatirekamātreṇa tatkāraṇatve tad anyatrāpi tathaivāstām. alam alika₍₂₎vyāpārakalpanayā.

kāryāt prāg upalabhyatā⁵⁵ tarhi nimittam astv iti cet, na, anupalabdhānām akāraṇatāprasāṅgāt. tad āha.⁵⁶

yasyopalabdhīḥ prathamam tat tasya₍₃₎ yadi kāraṇam |
na khalāntargataṁ bījaṁ hetuḥ syād ānkurodaye || iti

⁴⁶ *na* appears in the margins.

⁴⁷ A correction mark is added on this akṣara; it looks more like *kākapada* than *e*.

⁴⁸ sambhavo dṛṣṭa : sambhavādṛṣṭa Ms.

⁴⁹ anaikāntikatāpy : anaikāntikāntikatāpy Ms.

⁵⁰ niścīyamāna-: niścīyamānā Ms.

⁵¹ kalpanām : kalpānām Ms.

⁵² I leave *tasyān* without the usual sandhi change of *n* to *anusvāra* to indicate the possible ambiguity of the text. As a locative, *tasyān* could only refer to *vṛtti*, but “in the residence/presence” does not seem to make sense. One could read perhaps *tasya-antena* or *tasya-ante na*, but these readings seem even more problematic to me. I would certainly not exclude the possibility that the text contains a short lacuna here. See next note.

⁵³ The *ca* indicates that *anuvihitānvayavyatirekatā* or *tenānuvihitānvayavyatirekatā* begins a new sentence and that probably the previous sentence contains a short lacuna. I would expect *nānaikāntikatā*.

⁵⁴ dvitīya : tadvetatoti dvitīya Ms.

⁵⁵ upalabhyatā: upalabhyate Ms.

⁵⁶ See PVABh 69.4.

upalambhopalakṣitaṃ prāgbhāvamātraṃ nimittam iti cet, sarvasya tarhi prāgbhāvinaḥ sarvatra kā₍₄₎rye kāraṇatā syāt. niyamavataḥ prāgbhāvasya nimittatvād ayam aprasaṅga iti cet, tāv eva tarhi bhāvābhāvau śabdāntareṇopāttāv iti priyapriyeṇa⁵⁷ pratiṣṭhitam.⁵⁸ ta₍₅₎dvācakaḥ pratikūlo 'nukūlam āharati.⁵⁹ saty eva prāgbhāve kāryānuvīhitānvavyatirekatā nimittam na kevalam iti cet, nanu kevalaiveyaṃ kāra₍₆₎navyavahārahetutayā pratītā nyāyyā ca, tat kim anena prācyena. yad āha.⁶⁰

tadbhāvabhāvitāmātrād yadi kāraṇakāryatā |

ko virodhas tadā pūrvāparabhāvaḥ kimarthakaḥ ||_(69a1) iti

asati viśeṣaṇe bhaviṣyati bhaviṣyakāraṇatvaprasaṅga⁶¹ iti cet, kiṃ punar atra bhavato 'nāgatenāparāddham yēnāsyā hetutvaṃ necchati? anāgatakāraṇavāde ca₍₂₎ bhāviparalokānumānam anavadyaṃ syād iti guṇam evotpaśyāmaḥ.⁶² tat ko 'yam anibandhano dveṣaḥ. tadbhāve bhāvitāmātraṃ eva ca kāryakāraṇabhāvaṃ₍₃₎ lokaḥ pratipadyate. tathāhur ācāryapādāḥ.⁶³ yasya bhāvābhāvābhyāṃ yasya bhāvābhāvau sa hetur itaro hetumān iti hetuhetumator lakṣaṇam ācakṣete hai₍₄₎tukā⁶⁴ iti. kīrtipādāś ca na hy anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ anyo hetuphalayos tadbhāva⁶⁵ ity āhuḥ.⁶⁶

⁵⁷ priyapriyeṇa : priyapriye Ms. (cf. AA 8.1.13).

⁵⁸ pratiṣṭhitam : ... ṣṭhitam Ms.

⁵⁹ āharati (very tentatively) : āvarataḥ Ms.

⁶⁰ PVABh 69.9, v. 440.

⁶¹ bhaviṣya- : bhāvisya- Ms.

⁶² evotpaśyāmaḥ : eva pā .. tpaśyāmaḥ Ms. (Jitāri alludes perhaps to PVA(o) 74.5–6: *yuktam utpaśyāmaḥ*.)

⁶³ ĀP on 7a: 'di ltar gtan tshigs pa dag ni yod pa dan med pa dag gi de dan ldan pa nīd ni rgyu dan rgyu dan ldan pa rim gyis skye ba dag gi yañ mtshan nīd yin par smra'o. See also AKBh 84.24–25 on 2.51d: *yasya bhāvābhāvayor yasya bhāvābhāvau niyamataḥ sa hetur itaro hetumān iti*.

⁶⁴ haitukā : hetukā Ms.

⁶⁵ tadbhāva : tadbhāvā Ms.

⁶⁶ PVin I 3.12f.

tasmāt kār्याbhimatānvayavyatirekānukṛtatvaṃ⁶⁷ kārāṇa₍₅₎vyavahārapravartane nirapekṣatvena⁶⁸ vyāptam. dahane prasiddhaṃ yad⁶⁹ api, tan na <svī?>kuryād. vyaktam anyāpekṣam⁷⁰ asmin prasajyet.⁷¹

tato vyavahārapravartanalakṣaṇād vipakṣā₍₆₎d vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ. vyāvartamānaṃ kār्याsammatārthavihitabhāvābhāvatvaṃ⁷² kārāṇavyavahārapravartane viśrāmyat tena vyāpta iti kutaḥ prakārāntareṇāpy anaikā_(69b1)ntikatāśaṅkā niḥkalaṅkadhiyām?

tad evaṃ amunāsiddhādidoṣatrayaviyoginā hetunā yat [siddhaṃ sattvāt]⁷³ tad upādeyam. alam atijalpitenā.

anāgataṃ⁷⁴ sādhatyāpy alaṃkāreṇa⁷⁵ kārāṇam |₍₂₎

kār्याkārāṇabhāvasya viṣṭatattvaṃ prasādhitam ||

vicāravirahenaiva ramaṇīyeṣu viṣṭeṣu⁷⁶ te nābhiniveṣṭavyam⁷⁷ ity eva sūcayaty ayam.

śamayitvā yathānyāyam avamānaṃ maṇīṣi₍₃₎ṇi |

yan mayādhigataṃ puṇyam, tenāstv eṣa jano jinaḥ ||

bhāvikārāṇavādaḥ samāpto⁷⁸ mahāpaṇḍitaśrīṇāṃ jītaripādānām. likhitam idaṃ jambhaladharaṣya.

⁶⁷ -ānvayavyati- : -ānvayāvyati- Ms.

⁶⁸ -apekṣatvena : -apekṣetvena Ms.

⁶⁹ yad : yadi yad Ms.

⁷⁰ Read *anyāpekṣatvam*?

⁷¹ On optative in *-yet* see Kulikov 2006.

⁷² -bhāvābhāva- : -bhāvo bhāva- Ms.

⁷³ Words in [] are barely legible.

⁷⁴ anāgataṃ : anāgata- Ms.

⁷⁵ sādhatyādyaṃkāreṇa Ms., but *ādy* does not make sense to me.

⁷⁶ viṣṭeṣu : viṣṭaṣu Ms.

⁷⁷ One could read *tena*, but I expect a negation. One may consider *te<na> nābhiniveṣṭavyam*, but I do not know what *tena* would refer to in this case; it cannot mean “therefore” here. Perhaps a 2nd person pronoun?

⁷⁸ samāpto : [s]āmāpto Ms.

Translation

Having bowed to the lotus feet of Mañjughoṣa, the teacher, we make an effort now in order to prove [the doctrine of] the future cause.

In this world, that whose positive and negative entailments are complied to by something is the cause of that thing, for instance, fire of smoke. And all necessary effects have positive and negative entailments that are complied to by their cause.⁷⁹ Thus, [the inference employs] *svabhāva*hetu.

[Objection:] The reason is unestablished because for an effect, which does not exist inasmuch as it is [still] future [at the time of its cause], compliance with [its] positive and negative entailments is impossible. To begin with, the cause does not comply with the positive entailment to that [effect] because the positive entailment itself does not exist. For positive entailment (viz., that one thing exists, if/when another exists) is characterized by existence, and this [effect] does not exist when the cause arises. How could the cause comply with positive entailment belonging to that [non-existent effect]? The cause also does not comply with the negative entailment of that [effect] (i.e., that the cause is absent when the necessary effect is absent), for if the [cause] would imitate (i.e., would comply with or conform to)⁸⁰ the absence belonging to that [effect], it would never arise. For the existence of this [effect] is never possible at the time of the arising of the cause.

[Reply:] In respect to this, the following is examined: The non-compliance with the presence and absence of a future thing would be maintained by you either as advocating momentariness or as advocating non-momentariness. Under the first position, why don't you accept the compliance with positive and negative entailments for a future [cause-moment or a moment that is a cause], just as you accept it for a past cause-moment? The future thing is not guilty of any crime.

Now, you may think: even if the past [cause] does not exist in the time of the effect, nevertheless it existed. Therefore, compliance with its existence is not impossible for a present thing. [If you think] so, then the same holds good for the future [cause] as well. To wit, even if the future [cause-moment] does not exist at the time of the [present] effect, nevertheless it will exist. Therefore, compliance with its existence and non-existence is not impossible for a present thing. For there is no difference whatsoever between past and future [momentary things]

⁷⁹ This is a statement of *pakṣadharmatā* and the conclusion is left unstated. If I understand correctly, all necessary effects are causes of their own causes.

⁸⁰ From the use of *anukṛtatva* below it is clear that Jitāri uses the term as a synonym to or as interchangeable with *anuvidhāna*.

in respect to existence in their own time and non-existence in another time. And when there no difference, holding on to the one [and rejecting the other] is not the better option.

The basis for the second position (i.e., of non-momentariness) is also not splendid. Even under the position that things are not momentary, whatever is the own nature of the cause that exists before [the arising of] the effect, precisely that is the condition for the arising/production of that [effect]. Even in the case of a non-momentary thing, [the cause] follows to the time of the effect (i.e., continues to exist up to the time of the effect) even though that [cause] is not being useful (i.e., even though it is not active at the moment the effect arises). For there is nothing to be done for an effect that has already arisen, by virtue of which the nature of the cause that exists at that time would be useful to it. And this own nature [of a cause], which exists before [the effect] and the one that is future (i.e., exists after the effect), do not exist at the time of the effect. Therefore, just as there is compliance with positive and negative entailments for this [past cause], so also for the future [cause]. Thus, how is the reason not established?

[Objection:] The production and destruction are an identical couple (i.e., are two that are actually one). Because the destruction of the cause and the production of the effect happen at the same time, there is no interval/separation by the non-existence [of the cause at the time] between the existence of the cause and the existence of the effect. Therefore, the compliance with the positive entailment is indeed established for a past [cause], but not for a future [cause] because for it, there is an interval/separation that is due to its non-existence [at the time between the existence of the cause and the existence of the effect]. For if the effect would arise when the cause has already perished, it would arise when the cause does not exist at all. ...⁸¹ But this is not the case because the effect is accomplished immediately after the existence of the cause. Therefore, because the immediately preceding past [cause] exists [without separation in time from the effect], the compliance with its existence is correct, but not [with the existence] of the future [cause] because it does not exist at that time.

[Reply:] On this, the following is deliberated: Which future [cause] is said not to exist? The immediately subsequent or the remote one? In respect to these [alternatives], because the immediately subsequent future [cause] is not separated by non-existence [from the effect], just like the proximate (i.e., immediately preceding) past [cause], how could it be [said to be] non-existent [at the time of the effect]?

⁸¹ See n. 18 above.

[Objection:] It does not exist before the effect.

[Reply:] This past [cause], in turn, does not exist after the effect. Thus, we see no difference.

[Objection:] The later non-existence does not obstruct [the cause from producing its effect].

[Reply:] Previous non-existence too does not obstruct. Whoever says so does not get a crooked face (viz., there is nothing impossible in saying so).

[Objection:] Because the non-existing cannot be a producer, the previous non-existence is obstructing.

[Reply:] What does it mean to be a producer?

[Objection:] Being necessary in the production of an effect.

[Reply:] If so, this does not contradict that the future thing is a producer because it too is necessary [for the production of the effect].

[Objection:] The future thing *was not* necessary.

[Reply:] The past thing too *will not* be [necessary]. Thus, the rule is common [to both]. However, the non-existence of the future thing at the time of the effect should not be stated [as a barrier to production] because at that time the past [cause] also does not exist.

[Objection:] The remote future [cause] is said to be non-existent [at the time of the production].

[Reply:] The remote past [cause] is also non-existent [at that time]. Therefore, this is nonsense.

[Objection:] [The remote past object] is not a producer. Therefore, even if it does not exist [at the time of the effect], there is no fault [in our position].

[Reply:] Then when the swoon etc., goes away, a cognition should not arise, given that [the tenet that] the body is the cause [of cognition] was refuted by the reasoning stated in the proof of rebirth,⁸² and given that that cognition/consciousness is suppressed/destroyed at that time (i.e., of swoon). And if a remote past cognition is also not a cause [of cognition], then how could the arising of cognition be possible without a cause?

[Objection:] Because it has the soul (*ātman*) as a cause, it is not without a cause.

⁸² This could refer to a chapter in Jitāri's work which did not survive; if such chapter existed, it was presumably based on Dharmakīrti's proof in PV II 34ff. See Franco 1996: 159ff.

[Reply:] Then because the cause is permanent, there should be a cognition even in a state of swoon. It is also useless to say that it does not arise then (at the time of swoon) because the co-producing conditions are incomplete. For that [soul] is not an agent of production even in association with something else. And the own nature [of the soul] is the same even in another time. Thus, how could its action [of producing cognitions] stop sometimes? By this, the complete cessation [of cognition] is refuted, for it (the cessation) too depends only on its own nature because its occasional [cessation] is impossible.

[Objection:] Cognition is accepted [to exist] in swoon etc., too.

[Reply:] Why isn't it accepted in *nirodhasamāpatti* and *asañjñīsamāpatti*?

[Objection:] It is accepted in all these cases because given that the pervasion/universal concomitance [between cognitions] was proved by the fact that a cognition is always preceded by [another cognition, which is its] *immediately* preceding homogenous cause, the cognition which arises first after awakening from swoon etc., is established in this manner (i.e., as being preceded by another cognition as its preceding homogenous cause).

[Reply:] This is not true. A cognition is pervaded only by precedence by a cognition as such, and not by precedence by an immediately preceding cognition. And an immediate precedence is not observed by means of the example [of swoon]. Thus, this [same reasoning] is to be repeated in all cases (i.e., not only in swoon, but also in *nirodhasamāpatti*, *asañjñīsamāpatti*, deep sleep without dreams, etc.). Let this not be the case because [otherwise] it will also apply to the property of producing something observed in the example such as a pot used in the proof of impermanence.⁸³ And thus, [when] the cause (i.e., the previous cognition) is being established from the effect, i.e., from the [first] cognition of awakening, this will prove nothing but the remote-past [cognition before the state of swoon and so on].

[Objection:] Because the remote-past [cognition] does not exist [at the time of the effect], it is not a cause.

[Reply:] Then the immediately preceding one too would not be a cause because it does not exist [at the time of the effect]. Non-existence at the time of the effect and existence before [it] are the same for both (i.e., the remote-past and the

⁸³ The statement is elliptic and probably slightly corrupt; see n. 25. I assume it means that in the proof “sound is impermanent, because it is produced, like a pot,” one should not use the property present in the example of a pot, such as “produced by effort.” An alternative interpretation: In the above inference one does not use the property “being produced by the immediately preceding cause” but “being produced in general.”

immediately preceding cognitions). For it is not the case that [the following are both true:] because the immediately preceding [cognition] exists before, the property of being a cause is different (i.e., distinguishes it from the remote past cognition), and [yet] this [property] is also common to the [cognition] that is separated [in time from the effect].

[Objection:] For the remote-past [cognition] there is also non-existence before the effect, not only existence (i.e., it is both existing and non-existing before the effect, existing in the remote past, non-existing immediately before the effect), but the immediately preceding is only existing. Thus, there is a difference between the two.

[Reply:] This is also not good because it (the immediately preceding cognition) is also limited to its own time because what attains its own form/nature from being only prior to it (i.e., being immediately preceding) is only auxiliary to [the effect's] existence.⁸⁴ Therefore, it is impossible to infer cognition in states of swoon etc.

[Objection:] Then how is non-existence [of cognition in a state of swoon] determined?

[Reply:] From the absence of awareness. As the author of the *Bhāṣya* says:

“Something that does not have the form of awareness is not accepted as awareness. If, in spite of that, its presence [is admitted], the dead too would have awareness.”⁸⁵

[Objection:] First, there is no determination at the time of swoon etc., that there is no awareness because it is impossible in this state. [Second] how could the absence of awareness earlier be established later?

[Reply:] It is explained: First, the following determination arises for the person who awakes from swoon and so on “for some time, I did not cognize anything.” Therefore, what is the point of these questions?

One could object: This determination is possible because the experiences at that time (i.e., of swoon), even though they were self-perceived, lack the connection to the instrument [that enables] the recollecting of their objects. Therefore, that [determination] is not enough for a proof that there is no awareness [in swoon etc.].

⁸⁴ If I understand correctly, the immediate precedence is not the main cause (*upādāna*), but only an auxiliary cause (*sahakārin* or *nimittapratyaya*).

⁸⁵ Cf. Franco 1996: 266.

[Reply:] Then the absence of cognition is never established, even in the case of attention to another object and so on or defects [that prevent the arising of awareness], the lack of determination of a capable (i.e., visible) object, place [etc.] would not be established. However, it is possible to say the following: The person knocked out by sleep, whose mind is entirely connected to another object, does not have an immediate cognition of the object in contact [with his senses]. In that case, either it is said (*iti*) that absence of cognition is recollected or because in a different state too nothing would prevent the assumption of a thousand cognitions being perceived, how [could it be said that] a cognition arises from deficient concentration in a state of torpor and so on? [If one would assume that,] then in swoon etc., too the same would be the case. Also the one who accepts cognition in a state of swoon etc., even that person has to admit the absence of cognition [in some cases] because one is capable of the illusion of recollecting one's own object in everyday practice. And when this is the case, why is the mere absence of cognition not accepted? For in this manner, the contradiction to direct experience and absurdities [pointed out in our criticism] are avoided. Therefore, in whichever state a cognition is invariably not perceived, it is conclusive [to maintain] that in that state it just does not exist. And when this is the case, just as the present [effect] complies with positive and negative entailments of a cause in the remote past, similarly it also complies with the positive and negative entailments of a remote future [cause]. Thus, with relation to that as well, the reason [of the inference in the beginning of the chapter] is not unestablished.

One could object: You want to establish here a property-possessor that is a necessary effect as a cause by having positive and negative entailments that are complied to by its own cause. But the necessity of the effect is future because [at present] there is no necessity that causes undertake production of that [effect in a future time]. Just as [Prajñākara-gupta] said: "The causes do not necessarily have effects." Therefore, this reason is unestablished in its substratum because the property [having positive and negative entailments complied to by the cause] is not established [in a future entity/effect].

[Reply:] This is not true. First, it is impossible to assume that the immediately following effect is not necessary, because in relation to it there is no obstruction, because there is no lapse of time [between the cause and the effect]. To wit,

"When the effect depends on (or is entailed by) the transformations of the capacities, which are the fruit of the causal complex, [is inferred, the reason] is inconclusive, because an obstruction may occur."⁸⁶

⁸⁶ PV I 8. See also the German translation in Steinkellner 2013: 18.

But when the effect depends only on the proximate existence of the cause, because the obstructing factor does nothing at all [in this case], how [could the reason] be non-conclusive? If it is assumed that although there is no obstruction, a capable [cause] does not produce the effect, why not assume that a mother too is a barren woman?

[Concerning the second alternative,] not all remote effects are unnecessary, because one observes also that certain [remote effects] are also necessary, because death, even if remote, is definitely observed from the omen of death.

[Objection:] How could an effect that is separated [in time from its cause] be necessary?

[Reply:] Precisely for this reason, one makes [you] infer⁸⁷ that [something remote and future] is a cause. For the necessary existence of an entity cannot be denied, and this [necessary existence] cannot be without a cause. And it is not the case that because [an entity has] a cause, another cause (i.e., other than the future cause) is determined. Thus, the reason is not unestablished in any way.

The determination of a reason as contradictory should also not be put forward here. Whatever is not present in an appropriate manner(?)⁸⁸ in the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* (i.e., exists in the *vipakṣa* and is absent in the *sapakṣa*) is contradictory. This is the opinion of those who understand/rational people. And this reason is observed to exist in the *sapakṣa*. Thus, no intelligent person would assume that it to be contradictory.

Inconclusiveness of the [reason] should also not be assumed. For this (the assumed inconclusiveness) is possible either as a determined deviation or as an assumed deviation [of the reason from the *sādhya*] because [all] other forms [of inconclusiveness] are included in these [two].

To begin with, the first alternative is not worthy of assumption. Because there is no determination of residence/presence [of the reason] in the determined *vipakṣa*, in the residence ... and there would not(?) be positive and negative entailments complied to by that.⁸⁹

And ...; therefore, one should also not embrace the second mode (i.e., the alternative of assumed deviation). And it is also not correct. First, everyday practice/speaking about that [future] cause is not arbitrary/without a cause, because the

⁸⁷ This is presumably a reference to the *parārthānumāna* in the beginning of the chapter.

⁸⁸ Or if the correction in the margins of the leaf (see n. 46) is not accepted: What is present in a contrary manner in the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*.

⁸⁹ See nn. 53–54 above.

allocation of the objects [to their cognitions] is impossible [otherwise]. And in relation to a [subsequent] effect as well, one does not assume that it has another cause/condition which appertains to the domain (comes within the range of perception?), which is beyond presence and absence that are complied to. For fire etc., too, speaking of it as being the cause of smoke and so on⁹⁰ depends on the compliance with presence and absence by smoke and so on.

[Objection:] [When it comes to fire etc.] the condition [for it to be considered/talked about as a cause of smoke] is not the fact that positive and negative entailments are complied to by the effect [such as smoke etc.], but its activity towards the effect.

[Reply:] But surely, this activity too is nothing but an effect because it is occasional (i.e., sometimes exists and sometimes not). Therefore, in its case too being a cause [means] having an activity. Thus, when one assumes a succession of activities, there would be an infinite regress.⁹¹ Given that [in the case of fire] it is [considered to be] a cause only because of positive and negative entailments, in other cases too [such as a future cause], that alone suffices. Enough with this false assumption of activity.

[Objection:] Then let the condition [for being a cause be] what can be perceived before the effect.

[Reply:] No, because non-perceived things [such as seeds in the ground] would not be a cause. [Prajñākara-gupta] says that:

“If what is perceived first is the cause of that [which is perceived later], a seed in the ground would not be a cause in the production of the sprout.”

[Objection:] The condition is mere previous existence insofar as it is indicated by an apprehension.

[Reply:] Then everything that exists before would be a cause for every effect [which exists later].

[Objection:] Because a previous entity that has a restriction is the condition, the undesired consequence does not arise.

[Reply:] Then it's precisely these two, presence and absence (i.e., positive and negative entailments) that are attained (i.e., expressed) by another word (i.e., the

⁹⁰ For instance, cooking, giving light, etc.

⁹¹ If activity is an effect, it must have a cause, which has another activity, but this other activity is also an effect, and so on.

word “restriction”). This is easily established. The adversary who says that [actually] puts forth support [to our position].

[Objection:] The compliance with positive and negative entailments by the effect is the condition [for something be considered a cause] only when [the cause] is prior to the effect, not alone.

[Reply:] Surely, this [the fact of having entailments complied to by the effect] *alone* is perceived as the reason for speaking about something as the cause, and it is correct. What’s the use of the precedence? As [Prajñākara Gupta] said:

“What is the contradiction if the causal relation is only due to existence if the other exists? [None!] Then what is the purpose of prior and posterior existence?”

[Objection:] If there is no qualification [of the cause as prior to the effect], something future would also be a cause.

[Reply:] What is the offence committed by a future thing, due to which you do not allow it to be a cause? And according to the doctrine of a future cause, the inference of future rebirth would be inevitable. Thus, we see only a good quality [in in this doctrine]. Therefore, why this aversion without a cause? People perceive causal relation only as existence of something if something else exists. Thus, the venerable teacher [Dignāga] says:

“That by the presence and absence of which something else is present and absent is the cause, the other is the effect. In this way, the logicians explain the characteristics of cause and effect.”

And the respected Dharmakīrti says:

“Being cause and effect is nothing other than positive and negative entailment.”⁹²

Therefore, the compliance with (*anukṛtatva*) positive and negative entailments by what is considered to be an effect is pervaded [by the property of being a cause] without being dependent on the cause undertaking an activity in everyday practice. Even though it is well established in everyday practice in relation to fire, it should not be accepted. It is clear that it would depend on something else.⁹³

Therefore, one perceives something contradictory to the pervader⁹⁴ from the *vipakṣa*, which is characterized as not undertaking activity in everyday

⁹² Or more literally: “There is nothing except positive and negative entailment for cause and effect to be that (i.e., to be cause and effect).”

⁹³ This is a reference to the argument of infinite regress above?

⁹⁴ On *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* see NB II.38 (Stcherbatsky 1930–32: 90). The example given by Dharmakīrti is: Here there is no sensation of cold because there is fire.

practice.⁹⁵ When the fact that presence and absence complied to by an object that is considered to be an effect is being excluded/rejected [and] because of the cause ceasing to act in everyday practice, how could there be another way for the pure-minded to presume conclusiveness in an assertion that one thing is pervaded by another?

Therefore, what is established by this reason, which is free from the three faults of being unestablished etc.,⁹⁶ that should be appropriated (accepted) because it exists. Enough with the excessive wrangling.

The penetrated (inner) essence of the relationship between cause and effect has been proved also by the Ornament (=PVABh) while establishing the future cause.

This/He indicates the following: When the penetrated (i.e., deeply/correctly understood) [things/objects] can be enjoyed without deliberation; you should not insist on false determinations.

Having pacified by means of reason the disrespect/aversion to the teacher [Prajñākaragupta], whatever merit was acquired by me, let it make the people victorious.

The Bhāvikāraṇavāda of the great pandita, the venerable Jitāri, has been completed. This [manuscript] was written for (by?) Jambhaladhara.

Discussion⁹⁷

The structure of the treatise is fairly clear. After a *maṅgala-śloka* addressed to Mañjuḥṣa,⁹⁸ the chapter begins, as all chapters in the *Vādashānāni* do, with a *parārthānumāna*, in this case that necessary effects are the causes of their causes because their causes comply with them by positive and negative entailments. Practically the entire chapter is then dedicated to a discussion that aims to prove

⁹⁵ If the *vipakṣa* is non-acting in everyday practice, the *sādhya* must be acting in everyday practice. The inference would be: Something acts on something in everyday practice, because it is its cause. This is the opponent's position. I am not quite sure what the *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* is in this case. Perhaps: something does not act because it is a cause.

⁹⁶ The other two are being contradictory and being inconclusive.

⁹⁷ I repeat here parts of Franco 2021.

⁹⁸ This is rather unusual and testifies perhaps to the importance of this chapter; only few of chapters in the *Vādashānāni* (e.g., the 1st, the 9th, the 12th) begin with a *maṅgala-śloka*. The invocation of Mañjuḥṣa goes well with the Tibetan hagiographic tradition (see Taranatha 1990: 290–292) that Jitāri was helped in his studies by an *abhiṣeka* of Mañjuḥṣa.

that the reason in this inference does not commit any of the three major faults of being *asiddha*, *viruddha* or *anaikāntika*.

The discussion of *asiddhatā* is the most extensive and crucial. In a nut-shell, it consists of the question whether a future entity can be complied to by positive and negative entailments (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). The former seems problematic because positive entailment requires existence (when the effect, or the pervaded property, exists, the cause, or the pervading property, exists) and the future cause does not yet exist at the time of the effect. The latter is also problematic because if the future cause is absent when the effect is absent, none of them would ever arise because the absence of the effect in the present would prevent the arising of the cause in the future.

This topic is then considered from two possible perspectives, depending on whether the opponent professes momentariness or not, the latter case allowing the cause to exist at the same time as the effect. The main argument of Jitāri is that no matter how the opponent may try to define the condition for something to be a cause in the past, the same condition applies to a cause in the future. For instance, if one says that to be a producer of something means to be necessary for that thing (*janakatva* = *avaśyambhāva*), Jitāri argues that a future thing may also be necessary for a past thing.

Following in Prajñākaragupta's footsteps, Jitāri insists that a cause may be separated in time from its effect (i.e., the cause does not have to exist immediately before the effect). This is illustrated by the state of swoon or by the "attainment of the cessation (of consciousness)" (*nirodhasamāpatti*), where the first moment of consciousness after one awakes from swoon, sleep without dreams and so on must be produced by the last moment of consciousness before one has fainted and so on.⁹⁹ Further, if one allows that a remote past cause does not exist at the time of its effect, there is no reason not to allow a remote future cause not to exist at the time of the effect. If, on the other hand, one considers that there is

⁹⁹ Jitāri is thinking here of cause as a *samanantarapratyaya*; cf. the relatively extensive discussion in AKBh on 2.62ab. The position that the last cognition before entering *nirodhasamāpatti* and *asañjñīsamāpatti* produces the first cognition coming out of these states (*vyutthānacitta*) is clearly expressed by Yaśomitra, AKV, vol. 1, 347.13–14: *samāpattivyutthānacittaṃ samāpattipraveśacittajanitam. ataś cittasamanantaraṃ na cit-tanīrantaraṃ samāpattikṣaṇavyavahitatvāt*. "The cognition of coming out of the [two] *samāpattis* is produced by the cognition of entering the *samāpattis*. Therefore [this cognition of exiting the *samāpattis*] has a cognition as a *samanantara*, but not cognition without an interval, because it is separated [from its *samanantarapratyaya*] by the moments of the *samāpattis*." See also La Vallée Poussin 1928–1929: 248–249. I owe these references to the Professor Schmithausen.

no interval of time between a past cause and an immediately subsequent effect, there is also no interval of time between a future cause and an immediately preceding effect. Necessary effects can be immediate or remote in time, and that holds good for both time-directions.

The discussion of the second possible fault of reason is relatively brief. It is clear that the reason is not contradictory because it exists in the *sapakṣa*.

The reason is also not inconclusive because the compliance with positive and negative entailments is the correct definition of the causal relation. The opponent attempts to suggest other definitions of causality. First he raises the notion of activity (*vyāpāra*). The cause has to act upon the effect (i.e., it is not enough that something is a necessary condition). Jitāri rejects the notion of activity because it leads to an infinite regress (the activity, being an effect, would require another activity, and so on).

A second definition of a cause as being perceived before the effect is also not satisfactory, because the perception of a cause first is not always possible. This alternative has already been rejected by Prajñākaragupta with the example that the seed in the earth, which is not seen, would not be considered to be the cause of the sprout. Jitāri repeats this example.

A third definition of a cause as something previously existing is also easily rejected because everything that exists before would be the cause of everything that exists after. If, however, one would attempt to restrict or limit the property of being a cause to something more than just having previous existence, one would end up exactly with positive and negative entailments as the limiting factors and thus end up using them as the defining features of causal relation.

Jitāri concludes that the reason is free of all three faults and is therefore well established, and thus the doctrine of the future cause is well established. The chapter concludes with what seems to be a variant on the Madhyamaka saying that things can be enjoyed as long as they are not deliberated upon (*avicārita-ramaṇīya*); here, when things are “penetrated,” that is, well understood, they can be enjoyed. Jitāri then dedicates the merit acquired from the composition of the treatise to the aim that people may be victorious.

In order to assess Jitāri’s contribution to the doctrine of future cause we have to contrast it with Prajñākaragupta’s statements on the same doctrine.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ This doctrine was conceived by Prajñākaragupta and we have no information about anyone between Prajñākaragupta and Jitāri dealing with it. Note also that the time separating Prajñākaragupta and Jitāri is shorter than assumed so far. The terminus ante quem for Prajñākaragupta is to be determined by Bhāsarvajña’s date. The dating proposed

The difference in form is clear. While Prajñākaragupta elaborates his theory at different places in his commentary, as the occasion arises,¹⁰¹ Jitāri presents it in a systemic manner as a formal proof (inference for another) and arranges the discussion in relation to the formal aspects of this proof, namely, whether the reason is not unestablished, contradictory or non-conclusive. The difference in form, and perhaps also further philosophical and argumentative considerations, dictates the scope of the discussion. It is obviously more limited in Jitāri's work than in the PVABh.

As far as Jitāri's thesis is concerned, it can be found almost verbatim in the PVABh, but interestingly, not in the context of the main discussions of backward causation, but as an alternative suggestion in the discussion of efficient action (*arthakriyā*) (PVA(o) 70.10–13):

Or a necessary effect is nothing but a cause because [its] cause is pervaded by it. And a pervader that is different [from the pervaded]¹⁰² is nothing but a cause, because without it the [effect] does not exist/arise. [If one objects:] How could something non-arisen be a cause? [We answer:] How could something already arisen be a cause? Thus, the fault is common.¹⁰³

The argument is clear and in my understanding shared by both philosophers: Given that a necessary effect fulfils the condition of being a cause (namely being a necessary condition) in respect to its cause, necessary effects are the causes of their own causes. In other words, necessary effects and their causes are causes of each other. Further, given that causes and effects are separated in time, in each pair of two mutual causes, one cause must exist before the effect, the other after it, and thus be a future cause.

However, unlike Jitāri, Prajñākaragupta does not limit the discussion to causes that have necessary effects. Jitāri may have felt that in the case of a necessary

by Ono (750–810) is based on a false dating of Vidyānanda and seems to be too early.

¹⁰¹ Prajñākaragupta deals with this theory in at least four occasions; when discussing concomitance (*vyāpti*), general validity (the relation of a valid cognition to an efficient action), causation with reference to dependent origination, and perception of yogis; see Franco 2021.

¹⁰² This qualification is necessary in order to distinguish the causal relation from that of identity of nature.

¹⁰³ PVA(o) 70.10–13: *atha vā tad avaśyambhāvikāryaṃ kāraṇam eva, tena vyāptatvāt kāraṇasya. yac ca vyatiriktaṃ vyāpakam, tat kāraṇam eva, tena vinā tadabhāvāt. anu-tpannam katham kāraṇam? utpannam api katham? iti samāno doṣaḥ.* also 71.10–11: *avinābhāvitāmātraṃ tu bhāviny api vidyate 'vaśyambhāvikāryasya kāraṇasyāpi. tato bhāvy api kāraṇam.*

effect, it is easier to prove a future cause. It is indisputable that necessary and sufficient conditions are independent of any time relation; a necessary condition can have its conditioned before, after or at the same time, and the same holds good for a sufficient condition. Thus, given that a cause is a sufficient condition (and of course also necessary condition, like any cause) for its necessary effect, the necessary effect becomes a necessary condition (and of course sufficient condition too, like any effect) for its cause. Consequently (given that the cause and the effect do not arise at the same time), the opponent must admit that one of these two causes is posterior to its effect. The only point that may still be disputed is whether there are necessary effects at all. In a creative interpretation of Dharmakīrti's theory of causality, Jitāri maintains (on the basis of PV I 6, and in an argument than I have not seen in the PVABh) that an immediate effect, which is not separated in time from its cause, is a necessary effect because no obstructing factor can intervene in the (non-existing) interval of time between the cause and the effect.

Further, we find in Jitāri's work some arguments that are absent in the PVABh and vice versa. For instance, the rejection of the activity (*vyāpāra*) as a necessary characteristic of a cause is discussed by Jitāri in some detail, but as far as I can see, it is absent in the PVABh. On the other hand, the discussion of the *kāraṅkas* is entirely absent in Jitāri's treatise. We also note difference in emphases; the argument from omens that played an important role in the PVABh is barely mentioned and used differently by Jitāri and the explicit connection of the doctrine of the future cause to the doctrine of *prāṭīyasamutpāda*, which was the starting point for the most extensive discussion of future cause in the PVABh on PV II 49, is equally absent. Jitāri may have found that reading the doctrine of the future cause into the general formulation of *prāṭīyasamutpāda* was a bit far-fetched.

More difficult and important is the question whether the future cause is conceived by the two authors to produce its past effect. To be sure, the main idea that *anvaya* and *vyatireka* suffice for the determination of causal relations is common to both authors. However, does a future cause actually act in some way upon a past or present object or is it merely a necessary condition? Perhaps the clearest statement that the future cause actually acts backwards in time can be found in Prajñākaragupta's treatment of omens. In PVABh 68.1–2 he says (my punctuation differs from Sāṅkṛtyāyana's): *ayaṃ vikāra eva na syāt, yady abhyudayena na bhavitavyam. tatkrto 'yam vikāra iti lokavyavahāraḥ*. "This transformation [of consciousness (*cetanā*) at present] would not have taken place, if the [future] good fortune would not necessarily arise. People say: 'This transformation is

caused/made (*krta*) by it.”¹⁰⁴ One has to note, however, that Prajñākaragupta attributes and substantiates this opinion by “everyday practice of (common or ordinary) people” (*lokavyavahāra*). He does not endorse it as being entirely or absolutely correct, but of course the entire philosophical discourse and causation itself take place on *vyavahāra* level. In a different context Prajñākaragupta uses the perception of yogis (*yogipratyakṣa*) as an argument for future cause. Indeed if the yogi perceives a future object directly, then the object must be counted among the factors that produce his cognition. This too may suggest that for Prajñākaragupta the future cause is not only a necessary condition, but can also, to use the modern terminology, fulfil the past.¹⁰⁵ However, this statement has to be interpreted in relation to Prajñākaragupta’s notion of time, which states that the past and future objects seen by the yogi are actually present and merely cannot be seen by ordinary people. In the final analysis, the actual operation of a future cause on a past entity remains unexplained; nevertheless we see in the PVABh a genuine effort to find convincing examples for backward causation.

In Jitāri’s work, on the other hand, I fail to see that he considers the future cause to be anything other than necessary (and in some cases sufficient) condition. We saw that he explicitly denies using activity as a characteristic of being a cause not only under that presupposition of momentariness (for action implies duration), but also for everyday practice such as in the causal relation between fire and smoke. Consequently, he does not attempt to argue that something can act from the future on the present. It is significant, I believe, that Prajñākaragupta and Jitāri use the example of the omen of death (*ariṣṭa*) differently. For Prajñākaragupta it is the *result* of the future death, for Jitāri it is a *cause*, which has a necessary result (death) in a more or less distant future.

Concluding words: The above is not intended to be the last word on Jitāri’s treatise on the issue of a future cause. I am fully aware that the edition is imperfect and the translation is in several places only tentative. Nevertheless, I hope that I could offer here a solid foundation for the further study of Jitāri’s contribution

¹⁰⁴ The interpretation and translation of Prajñākaragupta’s statement may vary according to one’s understanding of the scope of the particle *iti*, namely, whether it stops with *tatkrto* or includes also sentence *ayaṃ vikāra eva na syāt, yady abhyudayaena na bhavitavyam*.

¹⁰⁵ To illustrate the difference, one may use the example of a falling barometer as predicting rain. The future rain may be a necessary condition for the falling barometer, but not its necessary cause. Rather, both the falling of the barometer and the rain may be products of the same cause in the past, which produces one effect (falling of barometers) before it produces another (rain).

to this fascinating and still little-known topic. If this estimation will be shared by the reader and especially by John Taber to whom this volume is dedicated, my endeavor to honor and celebrate a good friend and excellent scholar would be fully rewarded.

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Mīmāṃsā between Epistemology and Hermeneutics: The History of *Arthāpatti**

Elisa Freschi

1. Introduction

Arthāpatti is, according to Mīmāṃsā authors starting with Śābara, a distinct instrument of knowledge, leading one to know out of a given set of facts that something else needs to be the case. The standard examples of it are “Caitra, who is known to be alive, is not home,” leading to “Caitra is outside” and “The fat Devadatta does not eat at day time,” leading to “Devadatta eats at night.” Mīmāṃsā authors contend, against most Naiyāyika ones, that *arthāpatti* is distinct from inference.¹ They also claim that it delivers certain knowledge, i.e., that it is not just what contemporary philosophers might call “inference to the best explanation” or “abduction.” This is confirmed by the fact that since the time of the Vṛttikāra (see section 1.1) the standard example of *arthāpatti* starts with “Caitra, *who is alive*,

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Last, I would like to add here also my most heartfelt thanks to John Taber for having helped me at the very beginning of my Mīmāṃsā journey, when I was full of curiosity but had hardly any grasp of this school.

¹ In the following, I will use *anumāna* and “inference” interchangeably and the same applies to the other names of the instruments of knowledge.

is not home,” whereas “Caitra is not home” would be a suitable start for an inference to the best explanation.²

The present article takes the above facts as given and attempts to reconstruct the early history of the theory of *arthāpatti* and its development within Mīmāṃsā. This allows one to shed light on the early history of Mīmāṃsā and its inner controversies, showing that it was much more manifold than one might have thought.

1.1. Mīmāṃsā from hermeneutics to epistemology and back

The Mīmāṃsā is a school of Sanskrit philosophy which developed since the last centuries BCE. Its foundational text, the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (or *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra*, henceforth PMS) is traditionally attributed to Jaimini (2nd c. BCE?) and is probably the most ancient among the foundational texts of the various philosophical schools in India.³ The PMS has been commented upon by one or more authors whose work is lost and who are mentioned by later ones. Notable among them is especially the so-called Vṛttikāra “author of the commentary,” a term which is mentioned by Mīmāṃsā authors and by authors of various Vedānta schools (although it is not completely sure whether one and the same person is meant by all). The first extant commentary is the one which became the standard one, namely the one authored by Śabara (5th c. CE?).⁴ Śabara’s commentary (or *Bhāṣya*, henceforth ŚBh) has been in turn commented upon by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (6th–7th c?) and by his younger contemporary Prabhākara Miśra.⁵ To these two is attributed the foundation of the two sub-schools of Mīmāṃsā, named after them Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. Jaimini and Śabara do not appear to be interested in epistemology as distinct from the core mission of Mīmāṃsā, namely the hermeneutics of Vedic texts; Prabhākara keeps the primary focus on

² I derive this point from Yoshimizu 2020.

³ I use the abbreviation PMS for practical reasons and not as a hint to the alleged original unity of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* and the *Brahmasūtra*.

⁴ For the dates of Jaimini and Śabara see Freschi and Pontillo 2013.

⁵ On the date of Dinnāga, Bhāvivēka and Dharmakīrti, and, consequently, of Kumārila and Prabhākara, see Krasser 2012, which revises Frauwallner’s traditional dates and moves Dharmakīrti (and consequently Kumārila and Prabhākara) back to ca. 550. Steinkellner 2013 (with some caution) and Eltschinger 2014 follow Krasser’s suggestion, whereas Franco 2015–2018 opposes it. Crucial in this connection are the relationship between Bhāvivēka and Dharmakīrti, the statements of some Chinese pilgrims travelling to India and Candrakīrti’s lack of mention of Dharmakīrti. Directly on the chronology of Kumārila see Yoshimizu 2015: n. 1, where the dates suggested are “ca 560–620,” on the basis of Bhāvivēka as *terminus post quem* and the poet Subandhu as *terminus ante quem*.

Vedic hermeneutics. By contrast, Kumārila's target audience is clearly that of the broader arena of Sanskrit philosophers.⁶ For instance, Kumārila's work would not be conceivable without taking into account that of the Buddhist philosopher Dīnāga (approximately 480–540 CE) and he is often engaged in countering his and others' objections to the Mīmāṃsā epistemological tenets. This inclination will not change in Kumārila's commentators.⁷

1.2. Etymology and identity of *arthāpatti*

How should one interpret the compound *arthāpatti*? And its single terms? As for the interpretation of the compound, several early śāstric works (Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, the *Carakasamhitā* and the *Suśrutasamhitā*) use expressions like *arthād āpanna* "obtained because of the *artha*."⁸ Looking at the respective contexts, this expression might mean something like *arthāt*, i.e., "(obtained) implicitly," "on the strength of things." This interpretation of the compound is explicitly found already in Vātsyāyana's *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 2.2.1.

As for its constituent terms, *artha* is a complex term, since it has at once an ontological, epistemological, linguistic and deontic meaning. In the first case, it denotes an object, a fact or a state of affairs and can also be used indefinitely as the English "thing." In the second it denotes the content of a cognition, in the third the meaning of a linguistic expression and in the last case it denotes a purpose. Within Mīmāṃsā, all these aspects intersect, since the Mīmāṃsā's main focus lies in the deontic sections of the Veda and an *artha* is therefore at once a purpose to be realised and the meaning of a Vedic sentence. At the same time, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas were direct realists in regard to worldly experience, so that an *artha* in the worldly sense was for them a meaning in Frege's sense of *Bedeutung*, thus linking together linguistic and ontology through an epistemologically sound cognition.⁹

Āpatti is a *nomen actionis* from the verb *āpad-* and it indicates the fact of obtaining automatically something, like *prasañj-*. In classical Sanskrit, like *prasaṅga*,

⁶ Traces of this inclination can be found also in the section on the instruments of knowledge by the Vṛttikāra quoted by Śabara in his commentary on PMS 1.1.5.

⁷ Reasons of space forced me to leave out here the discussion of the views on *arthāpatti* of Kumārila's commentators. This can be read in Freschi forthcoming.

⁸ I could locate these occurrences since they are listed and reproduced in Oberhammer, Prets, and Prandstetter 1991: s.v.

⁹ On *artha* in a Nyāya author who knew a lot of Mīmāṃsā, Jayanta Bhāṭṭa, see Freschi and Keidan 2017, which includes also a discussion of possible translations inspired by Frege and other philosophers of language.

it indicates also a negative consequence, even a calamity. By looking at Śālikanātha (see section 5) one sees that he was understanding *arthāpatti* in this way, namely as the getting in trouble of a thing by means of a (possibly different) thing. However, looking back at earlier Mīmāṃsā, *arthāpatti* does not have this meaning. Thus, the term might have witnessed a development leading from “obtainment” (*Mahābhāṣya*, *Carakasamhitā*, *Suśrutasamhitā*) through the possible intermediate step of “automatic obtainment (due to the logical or factual inconsistency of the situation prior to its obtainment)” (Śābara, *Ṛttikāra*, *Yuktidīpikā* (see section 2.2)) and until “endangerment” (Śālikanātha). In all these cases, *artha* could be understood as the reason for the *āpatti* (i.e., as *arthād āpatti*, like in the pre-Mīmāṃsā occurrences and in the *Yuktidīpikā*). In the post-Jaimini Mīmāṃsā occurrences, *āpatti* links however *two arthas*, one out of which the *āpatti* takes place and one which is obtained through it.

The difference is not only terminological, since the issue has to do with the definition of *arthāpatti* and the way it is differentiated from inference. This was possibly not an issue for the early Mīmāṃsā (Jaimini is not part of the epistemological debate), so that it is only after the *Ṛttikāra* – whose quotations are embedded in Śābara’s commentary – that Mīmāṃsā authors became aware of the need to distinguish it from inference. It is possibly because of that, that the *Ṛttikāra* identified the “impossibility otherwise” as the distinctive mark of *arthāpatti*.

However (as discussed in the *Prakaranapañcikā*, see sections 5 and 4), the characteristic of being otherwise impossible could be shared also by inference (if we take as instance the case of a sprout which leads one to infer a seed, one could also say that the sprout is impossible if not through a seed). Hence, some Mīmāṃsā authors felt the need to further specify this impossibility otherwise in a distinctive way. This procedure took two distinctive ways:

1. Explaining that the impossibility otherwise leads to a real epistemological doubt in the knower (this path was taken by the unnamed Mīmāṃsā author embedded in Dinnāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 2¹⁰ and by Śālikanātha, and it could be the reason for the critique of *arthāpatti* found in the **Tarkaśāstra*¹¹ and in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, for which see section 2.2).

¹⁰ As reconstructed on the basis of the quotes within Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary in Steinkellner, Krasser, and Lasic 2005.

¹¹ **Tarkaśāstra* is the reconstructed title of a logic text of which only a Chinese translation is extant. The translation dates to the Liang Dynasty (552–557 CE). Giuseppe Tucci attempted to reconstruct the Sanskrit text on its basis (see Tucci 1929). If Tucci’s reconstruction is reliable, the **Tarkaśāstra* is a key text for the theory of *anumāna* “inference.” I am grateful to Malcolm Keating for having mentioned the passage on *arthāpatti* within the **Tarkaśāstra*.

2. Noting the specific distinctive elements of *arthāpatti* (this path was taken by Prabhākara and Kumārila).

The unnamed Mīmāṃsā opponent quoted within Dinnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* evoked doubt (which will play a decisive role in Śālikanātha's reconstruction of the way *arthāpatti* works), possibly with not much emphasis. Dinnāga ruled out the proposal immediately by saying that if doubt played a role within it, *arthāpatti* would not be an instrument of knowledge. This powerful argument might have been the reason why Kumārila preferred a completely different strategy, remained on the safe side of undoubted cognitions and stressed other dissimilarities between *arthāpatti* and inference. By contrast, Śālikanātha might have decided to grasp back to this more ancient proposal because of his desire to differentiate them more strongly, even at the risk of having to face objectors claiming that in this way one loses part of the epistemic security of *arthāpatti*.

1.2.1. Etymology and interpretation of *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* and *śrutārthāpatti*

The Vṛttikāra mentions a *śruta*- and a *dr̥ṣṭārtha* in connection with *arthāpatti* (see section 2.1). This led to long discussions about *dr̥ṣṭa*- and *śrutārthāpatti* in Kumārila and among the Prābhākaras. But how are these terms to be interpreted in early Mīmāṃsā and among later authors?

Out of symmetry with *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*, possibly meaning “reaching an *artha* out of something experienced,” we can assume that the compound *śrutārthāpatti* was originally meant to be interpreted as “reaching an *artha* out of something heard.” Out of the below discussion (see section 3.3), however, it will be clear that in later Mīmāṃsā, its distinctive element was no longer the fact of being *originated* out of an auditory cognition, but rather the fact of *resulting* in one. In this sense, a *śrutārthāpatti* became rather an *arthāpatti* resulting in the postulation of something hearable. In Uṇveka's words: “Since the *śrutārthāpatti* has as its content an instrument of knowledge (i.e., a sentence), it is different from the *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*” (ad ŚV *arthāpatti* 76).

Why this dissymmetry? The question has to do with the distinction of two types of *arthāpatti*, possibly already in the Vṛttikāra's quote within Śabara, for which see section 2.1. It is, as will be seen, possible that the Vṛttikāra conceived of *dr̥ṣṭa* and *śruta arthas* in a way different than what became of the two *arthāpattis* at a later stage. The later elaboration of what was the distinctive element in the two *arthāpattis* led the two further from each other (see section 8 in Freschi forthcoming).

2. *Arthāpatti* in early Mīmāṃsā

2.1. *Śruta* and *dr̥ṣṭa* objects in Jaimini and the Vṛttikāra: epistemological and hermeneutic concerns at stake

Jaimini does not define *arthāpatti*, whereas the Vṛttikāra defines it in just the following short passage:

arthāpattir api dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā, yathā jīvato devadattasya gr̥hābhāvadārśanena bahirbhāvasya adr̥ṣṭasya kalpanā.

And the *arthāpatti* is the postulation of something when a seen or heard thing would not otherwise make sense. For example: One has experienced that Devadatta, who is alive, is not at home. Through that one postulates that he is outside, which had not been experienced.

It is noteworthy, given the shortness of the definition, that the Vṛttikāra feels the need to distinguish between a *dr̥ṣṭa* “seen” and a *śruta* “heard” *arthāpatti*. In fact, Kumārila and his subcommentators all discussed the issue at length and offered acute epistemological explanations (see section 8 in Freschi forthcoming), which are, however, unlikely to be the ones the Vṛttikāra had in mind.

The term *arthāpatti* is used several times as designating a hermeneutical device already in the PMS (PMS 7.4.16; 7.4.18; 10.1.30; 10.3.35; 10.4.35), with no further attribute. There it is (as mostly the case within the PMS) applied to Vedic sentences. This makes one think that *arthāpatti* developed within Mīmāṃsā as a hermeneutic device to be applied to the Veda. Furthermore, the PMS in general and the specific context of these quotes in particular point in the direction of *artha* in a non-descriptive sense as “effect,” with *arthāpatti* as “obtainment of an *artha* (i.e., obtainment of an effect),” against the interpretation of *arthāpatti* as deriving from *arthād āpattiḥ* in the **Tarkaśāstra* and in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (see section 1.2).¹²

Given the Vedic context of the first usages of *arthāpatti* in Mīmāṃsā, the worldly use of *arthāpatti* could be a secondary development, or at least the connection of both under a single hat could be. This innovation would have called for a distinguishing label. Hence, it might be imagined, the Vṛttikāra’s decision to distinguish a *śruta* and a *dr̥ṣṭa* case, which would refer respectively to an *arthāpatti* regarding the Veda (generally called *śruti*) and one regarding common experience (generally called *darśana*). This would also explain why the Vṛttikāra

¹² See the discussion of these passages in Yoshimizu 2000b and an excerpt of it below, section 2.2.

felt the need to add an example only of the second type: the first one was assumed to be clear to the Vṛttikāra's readers, who were Mīmāṃsakas and therefore conversant with Vedic exegesis. Last, the criticism of *arthāpatti* as not leading to certain knowledge as attested in Vātsyāyana and in the **Tarkaśāstra* might have been current already before the time of the Vṛttikāra and have prompted him to insert the qualification *jīvan* "alive" to the example of the person absent from home. In this way, the Vṛttikāra was sure to link *arthāpatti* to certainty. All three moves will be reinforced by Kumārila's systematization.

Why taking these decisions? The Vṛttikāra was probably the first Mīmāṃsā author who attempted to emphasise the general epistemological side of Mīmāṃsā, as attested by the fact that he was the first one discussing *pramāṇas* "instruments of knowledge" as worldly epistemic instruments and no longer only as Vedic exegetical devices. In this sense, the Vṛttikāra possibly anticipated Kumārila's agenda of placing Mīmāṃsā in the middle of the philosophical arena. This attitude was possibly at play also in the treatment of *arthāpatti*.

The early history of *arthāpatti* as exegetical device was possibly lost in the background after Kumārila's reconfiguration of the topic as a chiefly epistemological problem, so that his commentators had to argue at length about the need and the correct way of distinguishing a *śruta* and a *drṣṭa* type of *arthāpatti* (see section 8 in Freschi forthcoming).

2.2. *Arthāpatti* in pre-Kumārila philosophy: epistemological and hermeneutic trends

Traces of a competing discourse on *arthāpatti* can be detected in the **Tarkaśāstra*, the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, Diñnāga's refutation of a Mīmāṃsā Vṛttikāra and also in the *Yuktidīpikā* (henceforth YD) (Wezler and Motegi 1998: 73).¹³ Diñnāga's text (available in Tibetan and in a German translation in Frauwallner 1968: 91 and then within Jinendrabuddhi's commentary thereon in Steinkellner, Krasser, and Lasic 2005) mentions the same example of Devadatta's being out of home (incorrectly or alternatively construed as an example of *abhāva* "absence as an instrument

¹³ Here and in the following I am assuming that the Mīmāṃsā position embedded in the YD is older than Kumārila's. Wezler and Motegi date the YD to 680–720 due to an alleged quote from the *Kāśikāvṛtti*, which is however not necessarily a quote and could be only a similar grammatical formulation. I owe this argument to Karin Preisendanz, who discussed it in a class on the YD in 2008, but the same point is made in Bronkhorst 2003: 247 (I am grateful to Isabelle Ratié who kindly pointed it out). Even if the YD had been written after Kumārila, its position on *arthāpatti* attests of a pre-Kumārila stage of the reflection on this instrument of knowledge, since it elaborates on examples, such as the one about natural enemies which were rejected by Kumārila.

of knowledge”) but before that divides *arthāpatti* in conclusive and false. The same partition can be found in the YD which calls them *vyabhicārin* “deviating” (from truth) and *avyabhicārin* “not deviating.” By that, authors opposing the idea of *arthāpatti* as a distinct instrument of knowledge refer to the cases of *arthāpatti* which are just misleading and the cases of *arthāpatti* which yield valid cognitions, but should be considered inferences. Both texts then speak of worldly examples. More in detail, Dīnnāga’s text mentions the example of knowing out of seeing prepared food that it must have been cooked. It also mentions the snake-mongoose example (you see a dead snake and conclude that it must have been killed by a mongoose), but as a case of inference, possibly because it was considered as such by Sāṅkhya authors and these were for Dīnnāga more influential as opponents than Mīmāṃsā authors (see Steinkellner, Krasser, and Lasic 2005). The YD mentions the same example in connection with *arthāpatti*, but using boar and lion instead of snake and mongoose. It also mentions the case of knowing sweetness upon seeing jaggedness or hearing the word jaggedness. The YD account, though short, contains further elements which will be found again in Mīmāṃsā discussions, so that it seems plausible that it is reacting to a position held by a Mīmāṃsā author. These are the mention of the relation (*sambandha*) between trigger and thing known (which are used by the *siddhāntin* to show that the alleged *arthāpatti* is nothing but an inference) and the mention of *darśana* “seeing” and *śravaṇa* “hearing” as two alternative sources for *arthāpatti*, as in the Vṛttikāra.

Within Nyāya, the *Nyāyasūtras* mention *arthāpatti* as not being an instrument of knowledge, insofar as it is not conclusive (NS 2.2.3). Vātsyāyana (late fifth century?) mentions *arthāpatti* while commenting on the *Nyāyasūtras* 2.2.1–6. His short comments are interesting for several reasons. First, Vātsyāyana analyses *arthāpatti* as *arthād āpattiḥ*. Second, he criticises *arthāpatti* as not a conclusive instrument of knowledge on the basis of the following example: rain does not occur when there are no clouds, hence, when there are clouds there is rain. This might be the remote cause of an example mentioned by Gaṅgeśa (see section 6). According to Giuseppe Tucci’s reconstruction, the same etymology for *arthāpatti* and the same example are found already in the **Tarkaśāstra*.¹⁴

¹⁴ See Tucci 1929: 25 of the **Tarkaśāstra* Sanskrit text: *ko 'sau nyāyo yenaitad arthād āpattir bhavet. yad anabhivyaktaṃ tad atyantam asad iti naitad arthād āpadyate. abhivyaktaṃ dvidvidham anarthāpattir arthāpattiś ca. yadi vṛṣṭir bhavati tadā meghenāpi bhavitavyam. mege saty api tu kadācid vṛṣṭir bhavati kadācin na bhavatyā anaikāntikatā. dhūmenāgner anumānam. nārthād āpattiḥ. [...] kasmād iti cet. taptāyahaṇḍe lohitaṅgāre ca dhūmābhāve 'py agneḥ sadbhāvaḥ. tasmād abhivyakteṣv arthāpattikhaṇḍanam abhūtam* (“What is this rule through which one should attain [knowledge] out of the force of things? What is non-manifest is absolutely non-existent, hence it cannot be

Summing up, *arthāpatti* must have been already discussed as an instrument of knowledge different from inference, possibly at the same time of the Vṛttikāra, and was possibly criticised because it did not attain certainty.

One wonders, therefore, if there were not two competing trends on *arthāpatti*, the hermeneutical one found in Jaimini and the epistemological-worldly one reflected in the *Nyāyasūtra* and its *Bhāṣya*, the **Tarkaśāstra*, Dinnāga and in the YD already before the time of Kumārila. On a more speculative note, one might even suggest that the mention of *darśana* and *śravaṇa* in the YD might be a hint of the fact that some thinkers were already trying to bring the two together under the same hat.

The Mīmāṃsaka Vṛttikāra “author of the comment” quoted by Dinnāga would thus be, like the one quoted by Śabara,¹⁵ an engaged epistemologist, opposing the (possibly more traditional) trend of purely Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics.

Śabara falls somehow in between, as in many other cases. Among his usages of *arthāpatti*, several ones are hermeneutically-oriented (e.g., when he uses some form of what Kumārila would call *śrutārthāpatti* in his commentary on PMS 3.1.10, 3.3.14, 3.6.37, 6.1.1, 6.1.3 in order to justify a given Vedic interpretation), but *arthāpatti* is also mentioned (interestingly, by opponents) within epistemological issues such as the postulation of an author of the relation between linguistic expressions and meanings (ŚBh on PMS 1.1.5), of a capacity of language to convey the sentence-meaning independently of the word-meanings (ŚBh on PMS 1.1.25) and of an author of the Veda (ŚBh on PMS 1.1.30). However, the fact that *arthāpatti* is mentioned in these cases by opponents embedded in the ŚBh could also be read as confirming that this trend was present in Mīmāṃsā, but remained marginal until Kumārila.

These two trends ideally continued in the work of Prabhākara (more hermeneutical and Veda-centered, for whom *arthāpatti* is essentially a hermeneutical device and there is no need to separate between a *drṣṭa*- and a *śruta*-type) and

attained out of the force of things. What is manifest is of two types, namely not obtained out of the force of things or obtained out of the force of things. If there is rain, there must also be clouds. But even if there are clouds, at times there is rain, at times there is not, hence the ambiguity [which prevents one from attaining knowledge just out of the force of things]. Out of smoke, you can infer fire, [but] you do not attain it out of the force of things. [...] Why? Because there is fire also in the absence of smoke, for instance in a heated iron-ball or in a heated charcoal. Therefore, in the case of manifest things, the obtainment out of the force of things is not refuted [whereas it is refuted in the case of non-manifest ones].”)

¹⁵ See Frauwallner 1968: 98 for a refutation of their identification.

Kumārila (more epistemological and interested in wider philosophical debates). It is, accordingly, not surprising that Kumārila’s commentators struggled with finding a possible explanation for the opposition between *śruta* and *dr̥ṣṭa* in the ŚBh. The opposition had in fact originated within a different context (the conflation of a primarily epistemological and primarily hermeneutic *arthāpatti*) than the one of these commentators’ philosophical engagement.

A further element which is typical of early Mīmāṃsā is that it is much more variegated than it became later. The opponents embedded in Dinnāga and in the YD, as well as the voices found in the **Tarkaśāstra* and in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* use different examples and the YD even avoids mentioning the one which later became the standard one, namely “Caitra, who is alive, is not home, therefore he must be somewhere outside.”

A last question needs some closer examination, namely whether the two understandings of *arthāpatti* are originally fully unrelated. In order to answer, let me start by summing up the difference between *arthāpatti* as used by Vedic exegetes and by epistemologists:

	exegetes	epistemologists
field of application	Vedic sentences	worldly experience
examples	Vedic sentences	absence from home, eating, snake...
<i>artha</i>	dynamic	descriptive

Table 1: Exegetes’ and epistemologists’ views on *arthāpatti*

One could now imagine that one has to do with two radically different concepts, one of which developed within Mīmāṃsā whereas the other came to it from outside. This hypothesis is the one endorsed in the only rigorous study of the pre-history of *arthāpatti*, namely Yoshimizu 2000b:

In the JS [=PMS], the term “*arthāpatti*” always means “take effect” (**artham āpadyate*). Therefore, we may say that Mīmāṃsaka’s convention of calling a kind of *pramāṇa* “instrument of knowledge” with the term “*arthāpatti*” cannot be traced back to the time of the compilation of the JS, but rather it was introduced from outside, such as the tradition of *tantrayukti*. One and the same word was established in a totally different meaning.¹⁶

A benefit of this view is that it accounts for the competing etymologies of *arthāpatti* and for the presence of the term *arthāpatti* in different contexts, i.e., as a

¹⁶ Since I cannot read Japanese, I completely depend on the explanation of the article Kiyotaka Yoshimizu was kind enough to offer me. The passage above is the conclusion of the first section of Yoshimizu 2000b: 1113.

pseudo logical reason (called *arthāpattisama hetu* or *arthāpattyābhāsa*). The problem with this view is that it presupposes the existence of a group of people (let me call them again “the epistemologists”) who were outside Mīmāṃsā but did not influence *any other school but* Mīmāṃsā. Therefore, I would like to fine-tune Yoshimizu’s theory by rather speaking of different trends active not only outside of Mīmāṃsā, but also already *within* early Mīmāṃsā, some of which were represented in the PMS and some not. The PMS would be the chief text for (part of) the exegetical component within Mīmāṃsā, but not necessarily for the whole of Mīmāṃsā. In this view, the first two differences mentioned in the table above could be explained as part of a difference in the main focus. The different understanding of *artha* could also be explained on the basis of the Vedic vs. worldly focus, insofar as having a Vedic focus means focusing on the deontic dimension and therefore on *artha* as something to be done and not as the description of a state of affairs.

Further, the very inner-Mīmāṃsā history of the term *arthāpatti* discussed by Yoshimizu would have been problematic from the viewpoint of the “epistemologists,” so that it is difficult to imagine that *they* devised such a label for the instrument of knowledge they had in mind (and which they could have more easily called *anyathānupapatti* “impossibility otherwise” or *kalpanā* “postulation”). The re-semanticisation of a term which was already in use in the school appears, by contrast, to be more convincing. Lars Göhler has pointed out similar cases of an epistemological re-semanticisation within Mīmāṃsā, e.g., in the case of *upamāna* “analogy” (Göhler 2011).

Last, the *arthāpatti* examples mentioned in the **Tarkaśāstra* (and by Vātsyāyana), by Diñnāga and in the YD (and by Diñnāga’s commentator Jinendrabuddhi) will be ignored or explicitly refuted (in the case of the snake-mongoose one) by Kumārila and later Mīmāṃsā authors. At least one of the examples which became standard for *arthāpatti* is discussed by Diñnāga in the topic of *abhāva*, whereas further examples will be recognised as cases of inference. It appears, in sum, that the pre-Diñnāga or pre-Kumārila philosophy was still struggling to find uniform definitions for each *pramāṇa*.

3. Kumārila: *arthāpatti* within the epistemological landscape

All Sanskrit philosophical schools but the Cārvākas accept that sense perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference are instruments of knowledge. All the remaining ones but the Vaiśeṣika and the Diñnāga-Dharmakīrti school accept also linguistic communication as a distinct instrument of knowledge (*śabda*). Among the remaining ones, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā accept also *upamāna* “analogy.” Mīmāṃsakas

remain alone in accepting also *arthāpatti* and the Prābhākara subschool of Mīmāṃsā parts company from the Bhāṭṭa subschool when it comes to *abhāva* “absence as an instrument of knowledge,” since the Bhāṭṭas accept it and the Prābhākaras do not. The schools which do not accept linguistic communication, analogy, *arthāpatti* and absence as independent instruments of knowledge, generally try to reduce them to a form of inference. This choice is due to the basic distinction between sense perception and inference and to the clear precinct of application of the former, so that reductionism automatically translates into reduction to inference.¹⁷

It is therefore important to highlight the basic features of inference in Sanskrit thought. In its basic form accepted by all schools, this links a known property which is present in a given locus to an inferable property present in the same locus. The non-accidental nature of the relation between the known property and the inferable one needs to be confirmed with an example of the same concomitance. The known property (or probans) is called *liṅga*, *dharma* or *hetu* (H), the locus is called *pakṣa* (P) or *dharmin* and the inferable property (or probandum) is called *sādhya* (S). Unlike in Ancient Greek philosophy, the possibility of syllogisms with empty terms is ruled out by the necessary presence of an example in which S and H co-occur. The example is called *dr̥ṣṭānta* (D) or *udāharaṇa*. Thus:

$$H(P) \rightarrow S(P)$$

That is: the presence of the probans (H) in the locus (P) leads one to infer that the probandum (S) is also found in the locus (P). In the standard example used by Sanskrit authors:

On the mountain (P) there is fire (S), because there is smoke (H), as in the kitchen (where smoke and fire occur together) (D).

At least one generation before Kumārila, Diṇnāga formulated the three requirements for a valid inference (*trairūpya*), namely:

1. Presence of the probans in the locus (e.g., presence of smoke in the mountain)
2. Presence of the probans in locations similar to the locus (called *sapakṣa*) (e.g., presence of smoke in the kitchen)
3. Absence of the probans in locations dissimilar from the locus (called *vipakṣa*) (e.g., absence of smoke from the lake)

¹⁷ A partial exception is the Nyāya attempt to read *abhāva* as perception of something else and Udayana's isolated attempt to reduce *upamāna* to *śabdapramāṇa*.

This defined the key elements of a valid inference as follows:

fire: *sādhya* or thing to be inferred

smoke: *hetu* or inferential reason

mountain: *pakṣa* or locus

kitchen and other fiery places: *sapakṣa* or similar instances

lake and other places devoid of fire: *vipakṣa* or dissimilar instances

Much of the anti-reductionist discussion in the chapters of Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika* (henceforth ŚV, the commentary dedicated by Kumārila to the epistemological section of the PMS and the ŚBh) dealing with linguistic communication, analogy, *arthāpatti* and absence focuses on whether or not a correct inference can be built in these cases.¹⁸ For instance, the chapter on language refutes the idea that linguistic communication can be reduced to inference by explaining how the relation between *śabda* "linguistic expression" and *artha* "meaning" cannot be formalised as above, since linguistic expressions would figure as both the locus and the probans. A similar strategy will be implemented by Kumārila also in the chapter on *arthāpatti* (see below, section 3.2).

A further building block of Kumārila's refutation of the reduction of *arthāpatti* to inference presupposes his main epistemological tenet. In fact, as for epistemology in general, Kumārila's school upholds the *svataḥ prāmāṇya*, that is the "intrinsic validity" of cognitions, according to which each cognition should be credited with validity without further verifications immediately and until it is falsified by a *bādha* "subsequent invalidating cognition."¹⁹ The topic of intrinsic validity is often evoked in the context of *arthāpatti*, since the reductionist side contends that if *arthāpatti* is not reduced to inference, and is therefore not seen as grounded on an invariable concomitance, there is no strong basis for its validity. Kumārila and his commentators answer that the relation of invariable concomitance is indeed the cause for the *production* of inferential cognitions, but it is not the cause for the *validity* of neither these nor any other cognition. By contrast, they claim that a cognition is valid until an invalidating cognition arises (see vv. 79–86 and Sucarita's commentary on v. 29).

¹⁸ Several studies have been dedicated to the various articulations of the Mīmāṃsā anti-reductionism. On *abhāva* in Mīmāṃsā see Taber 2001, on *śabda* and inference, see Taber 1996 and Taber 2002.

¹⁹ For more on the topic, see the groundbreaking and insightful Taber 1992.

3.1. Structure of the argument in the *Ślokavārttika*

The *arthāpatti* section is a comparatively short one and it is located in the section of the ŚV dedicated to an analysis of all instruments of knowledge. Kumārila's main purposes in this section are:

1. Highlighting the main features of *arthāpatti*
2. Proving that it is different from inference
3. Distinguishing between a *dr̥ṣṭa* and a *śruta* type of *arthāpatti*

The first and the second objectives are deeply connected, since showing the specific characters of *arthāpatti* amounts to proving that it is not just an inference.

3.2. Kumārila's strategy

Just like throughout the *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila's strategy in the *arthāpatti* chapter is characterised by some leitmotifs:

1. Defending *arthāpatti* as part of an epistemological debate. The impact on Mīmāṃsā of the admission of *arthāpatti* is dealt with only laterally, and Kumārila clearly wants to ground the validity of *arthāpatti* independently of Vedic hermeneutical reasons. Therefore, he postpones the discussion on the variety of *arthāpatti* which would be more relevant for Vedic exegesis, namely the *śrutārthāpatti*, after a first, purely epistemological, discussion on *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*. Similarly, the discussion of its Vedic applications is only dealt with at the end of the epistemological analysis of *śrutārthāpatti*. Last, one of the fields of application of *arthāpatti*, namely the existence of *apūrva*, is not discussed by Kumārila (it will be, by contrast, discussed by Gaṅgeśa, see section 6).
2. Elasticity in the approach: Kumārila is radically non-dogmatic and is always willing to adopt one or the other solution, if only the main tenets of the system are preserved (see his willingness to consider the deduction of past rain on the basis of a flooded river as an inference or an *arthāpatti*, v. 18; or his openness towards calling *arthāpatti anumāna*, if one wants, v. 88).²⁰
3. Antireductionism: Kumārila is against the attempt to reduce the multifaceted processes of cognition-acquisition to the rigid scheme of inference.

The above points converge in Kumārila's epistemological agenda, which mainly aims at justifying as much as possible common cognitions (as explained in

²⁰ For the same attitude in the chapter on sense perception, see the introductory study in Taber 2005.

Taber 2001 with regard to absence as an instrument of knowledge). It provides therefore a framework which is flexible enough to accommodate as much as possible common cognitions which can be interpreted as instances of *arthāpatti*. It therefore deliberately avoids proposing an all-too-rigid scheme for the functioning of *arthāpatti*.

Concerning the antireductionism, Kumārila has three main arguments:

1. *Arthāpatti* lacks the formal structure of inference (see ŚV *arthāpatti* vv. 11–24).
2. In *arthāpatti* one does not need to be aware of an invariable concomitance (see ŚV *arthāpatti* v. 30 and vv. 79–86).
3. In *arthāpatti*, the conclusion is implied in the premises (see ŚV *arthāpatti* v. 29).

The confutation of the identification of *arthāpatti* with a sort of inference starts, just like the confutation of the identification of linguistic communication with a sort of *anumāna* in the relevant chapters of the ŚV (*śabdapariccheda* and *vākyādhikaraṇa*), with a **formal analysis**. This shows that it is impossible to detect the fixed constituents of a valid *anumāna* in the case of *arthāpatti*. That is, and using the standard examples of *arthāpatti* (“Caitra, who is alive, is not at home, therefore he is outside”) and inference (“On the mountain there is fire because there is smoke”), the former lacks the constituent elements of the latter, namely a probans (smoke), a locus (the mountain) and a probandum (fire).²¹

The second point might look controversial, since one could object that one does need to know something about Caitra’s being either home or outside in order to move from the knowledge of his absence from home to his presence outside. However, Kumārila is quite straightforward in denying the pre-existing knowledge of a relation. Rather, he explains, one becomes aware of the relation only at the end, *through arthāpatti*, so that, paradoxically, at the end of the whole process, one knows the relation of invariable concomitance on the basis of which one could be able to start an *anumāna* (which would be useless for the current case). I will come back to this topic in a few lines (section 3.2.1).

The third point is discussed also as point (ii) in Yoshimizu 2020 and in Yoshimizu 2007 and it is the one which more directly suggests that *arthāpatti* is deductive in nature, since the conclusions are contained in the premises.²²

²¹ See ŚV *arthāpatti* vv. 11–15, translated and analysed in Freschi and Ollett 2020b.

²² Unlike that, in inference based on causal connections, there is nothing intrinsic in the effect itself (e.g., smoke) which would necessarily lead to its cause (e.g., fire), unless one knew about their connection. The conclusion is, by contrast, contained in the premises in the inference based on *tādātmya* “identity,” such as the one from *śimśapā* “Aśoka tree” to its being a tree. On causality and identity as the two kinds of relation accepted

Kiyotaka Yoshimizu (Yoshimizu 2007: 321–324 and Yoshimizu 2020) elaborates on a further move by Kumārila, which is largely implicit in Kumārila; Yoshimizu needed to dig it out through a formalisation of Kumārila’s arguments:²³

In the view of Kumārila, the basic operative unit for *arthāpatti* is a sentence (proposition), not a term, unlike in the case of Dinnāga’s logic, which used single terms for expressing the universal relationship between *dharma* and *dharmin* in a certain domain of discourse (see ŚV *arthāpatti* v. 64).

In other words, an inference operates on the basis of general valid connections among properties and property-bearers. By contrast, an *arthāpatti* works on specific situations, which – insofar as they are specific – can only be represented through sentences, not names (as explained in ŚV *vākyādhikaraṇa*). It does not work, e.g., on the basis of the general connection between the property of being somewhere and the property of being absent anywhere else. Rather, it works on the basis of Caitra’s concrete absence from home. Although Kumārila does not spell out this difference, it is in this sense telling that he always speaks of Caitra and not of “someone” in general. The only exception is v. 46, speaking of a person (*puruṣa*) but this verse is part of the reasoning explaining that *arthāpatti* is preliminary to inference. In fact, Kumārila explains that one cannot possibly grasp the invariable concomitance between being in one place and not being anywhere else (or vice versa) as long and until one does not know both the connected elements (*sambandhin*) and one does not know them before the *arthāpatti* has taken place because one of the two (for instance, Caitra’s being somewhere else) is just not available to one’s awareness. Kumārila explains that once one has known both connected elements, one can implement an inference.

3.2.1. On *arthāpatti* and the establishment of the invariable concomitance

It appears that (see v. 32) one first needs to use *arthāpatti* and then can use inference in future occurrences of a similar case.²⁴ What does this exactly mean? The *pars destruens* of the argument is clear, namely that one cannot perform an inference since one does not know the invariable concomitance. But in what

in Dharmakīrti’s theory of syllogism and on their application to the problem of reducing linguistic communication to a case of inference, see Taber, Krasser, and Eltschinger 2012: n. 113.

²³ I gratefully acknowledge Kiyotaka Yoshimizu’s help (per email and in person) in understanding this aspect of Kumārila’s strategy.

²⁴ This move is particularly clear in Sucarita’s commentary.

sense can one then perform an *anumāna* after having performed the *arthāpatti*? Which invariable concomitance did one become aware of? The invariable concomitance between Caitra's being alive and not home and his being outside? If so, then this means that one will only be able to infer that *Caitra* is outside the next time one knows that he is alive and sees that he is not home. This seems limited. Alternatively, one could imagine that, after having known through *arthāpatti* that *Caitra* is outside, one were able to infer that *Devadatta* is outside by knowing that he is alive and seeing that he is not home. If it were so, however, *arthāpatti* would work on the basis of terms which can be generalised, and not just particular sentences. Could it be that one cannot infer that *Caitra* is outside because one is *not aware* of the invariable concomitance between being home and alive and being outside, and that *arthāpatti* is needed in order to become aware of something which was implicit in the premises, but not cognitively available to the epistemic subject? In this sense, *arthāpatti* would be needed to become aware of the invariable concomitance. This interpretation comes close to Prabhākara's idea that in the case of *arthāpatti* one only knows the connection in general between two things and not the particularised one, see section 4. Kumārila does not discuss this interpretation, possibly because he was not aware of Prabhākara's view.

3.2.2. Who are Kumārila's main opponents in this chapter?

In the first part, dedicated to the epistemological foundation of *arthāpatti*, the main opponent is an epistemologist, who wants to reduce *arthāpatti* to *anumāna*. Among Sanskrit philosophical schools the two which were more committed to reductionism to inference are the Nyāya (later enlarged to embrace Vaiśeṣika) and the Dinnāga-Dharmakīrti school. Against the identification of Kumārila's main opponents with philosophers of the Dinnāga-Dharmakīrti school runs the fact that the authors of this school dedicate much energy to the reduction of linguistic communication to inference, whereas *arthāpatti* is not a relevant topic for them. By contrast, Nyāya authors have extensive sections on it and *arthāpatti* is criticised already in the *Nyāyasūtra*. However, the Nyāya school is never mentioned in Kumārila's *arthāpatti* section, whereas an explicit mention of *bauddha* "Buddhists" is found in Sucarita's commentary on v. 40 and, more significantly, in Pārthasārathi's commentary on v. 83. Last, Kumārila himself points out again and again that the same discussion has been raised in the context of the *śabdādhikaraṇa*, in the section where the (Vaiśeṣika) opponent tried to construe an inference on the basis of the relation between linguistic expression and meaning. That the first section of the *arthāpatti* chapter is devised against this type of opponent is confirmed by the fact that nowhere does Kumārila

hint at the possibility that Caitra's absence from home could be known through *abhāvapramāṇa* "absence," an instrument of knowledge rejected by all schools apart from Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, whereas he discusses *anupalabdhī* "non-apprehension," which is a valid probans in an inference according to the Dīnāga-Dharmakīrti school. Summing up, the first part of the *arthāpatti* chapter is targeted to non-Mīmāṃsakas, possibly to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas or Buddhist epistemologists. It is possible that scholars know only little about the latter's position on *arthāpatti* because the texts of their own school had no direct interest in recording the polemics with Mīmāṃsā on *arthāpatti*.

The situation changes in the second part of ŚV *arthāpatti*, dedicated to *śrutārthāpatti*, where the interlocutors are mainly other Mīmāṃsakas and what is at play is chiefly the correct interpretation of Vedic hermeneutical devices such as *ūha* (about which see below, the text corresponding to n. 28). Interestingly, Kumārila does not seem to be aware of Prabhākara's position, which refuses the distinction between two types of *arthāpatti* and which became the topic of a hot debate in later texts. Kumārila does not address at all the question of whether *śrutārthāpatti* should be denied a separate position and seems to start with the assumption that one only needs to define what is *śrutārthāpatti*.²⁵

3.3. *Śrutārthāpatti*

It has already been stated that what will be later called *śrutārthāpatti* was probably the first kind of *arthāpatti* devised by early Mīmāṃsā authors, who were by far more interested in Vedic exegesis than in finding out whether Devadatta's being outside once he has not been seen at home is epistemologically grounded.

The hermeneutical background of the *śrutārthāpatti* is acknowledged by Kumārila too in ŚV *arthāpatti* vv. 87–88, where he states that many Mīmāṃsā hermeneutic strategies would become invalid if *śrutārthāpatti* were not accepted.²⁶

Still, in harmony with his general agenda (see section 3.2), Kumārila tries to establish his epistemology independently of the needs of Vedic exegesis, so that Mīmāṃsā is made fit to fight a purely philosophical battle, without having to recur to hermeneutical applications of it.

²⁵ This could be a further hint at the idea that Kumārila, though aware of some Prabhākara-like ideas, was not aware of Prabhākara himself and was therefore most likely a senior contemporary of him. On the major arguments for this date, see Yoshimizu 1997.

²⁶ Further notes on Kumārila's introduction of *śrutārthāpatti* can be read in Freschi forthcoming.

Accordingly, Kumārila (or perhaps one or the other Vṛttikāra before him, see section 2.2) proposed a worldly example for *śrutārthāpatti*, namely:

“The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime.”

The linguistic incongruity raised by this sentence, according to Kumārila, expects a linguistic completion, namely the sentence:

“He eats at night.”

The latter sentence is not actually heard and needs therefore to be postulated through *śrutārthāpatti*. An opponent in v. 77 asks whether the linguistic incongruity could not be appeased by a fact, rather than a sentence, such as seeing the same person eating at night. The commentators have troubles answering and find different ways to deal with it. Actually, the example mentioned by Kumārila to prove the need of a separate *śrutārthāpatti* is only partly adequate, since the incongruity in the sentence “The fat Devadatta does not eat at daytime” seems to be more a factual than a linguistic one, more similar to the incongruity of Caitra’s²⁷ absence from home than to a purely linguistic incongruity (such as, perhaps, the lack of a verb in a sentence). The examples of *śrutārthāpatti* derived from Vedic hermeneutics appear to be much more convincing, since within Vedic exegesis it is often the case that one needs to supply linguistic expressions, not just concepts. For instance, mantras need to be adapted by means of specific words, when they need to be uttered in a way which fits the changed circumstances (e.g., a mantra for a given deity may need to be uttered in a different ritual and be dedicated to a different one, so that the deity’s name needs to be updated).²⁸

A further role for *śrutārthāpatti* could be the establishment of *apūrva*.²⁹ This is, in Kumārila’s reinterpretation, the unseen force bridging the gap between a sacrifice and its result.³⁰ This needs to be postulated, according to Kumārila, in order to solve the seeming paradox between two facts:

²⁷ Kumārila appears to be the first one who uses Devadatta as the name used for the example about the fat person and Caitra as the name used for the example about being outside. I will stick with this use in order to keep them apart, even while discussing Prabhākara, who goes back to the Vṛttikāra and uses the name Devadatta for the person absent from home.

²⁸ This procedure is called *ūha*.

²⁹ This is suggested in Yoshimizu 1999 and is explicitly present in Gaṅgeśa’s discussion of *arthāpatti* in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. I discussed the topic with Stephen Phillips during the workshop on *arthāpatti* organised in Singapore by Malcolm Keating (August 2018).

³⁰ Clooney 1990 (chapter VII.4) and (in more detail) Yoshimizu 2000a explain how Kumārila innovated with regard to Śābara’s and Jaimini’s concept of *apūrva*.

- a) The Veda must be true when it says that a sacrifice leads one to its corresponding result.
- b) The sacrifice is completed since a long time by the time the result should arise, hence it cannot be its cause.

The solution is that the sacrifice produces a new (*apūrva*) force leading to the result. This argumentation seems to suggest that the instrument to know about *apūrva* must be *arthāpatti*. More in detail, in the *Tantravārttika* (henceforth TV) commentary ad PMS 2.1.5 (p. 394), Kumārila states that the *apūrva* can be known out of *śrutārthāpatti*. However, as noted by Yoshimizu (1999), *apūrva* is a content, not a linguistic expression and in this sense it should be obtained through *drṣṭa*-, not *śrutārthāpatti*, notwithstanding Kumārila's assertion. Yoshimizu therefore concludes that there are indeed some discrepancies in Kumārila's attempt to embed *apūrva* in his theory, due to the fact that he needed to embed two pre-existing theories (*arthāpatti* and *apūrva*) into his new interpretation. I would add that the idea of linking *apūrva* with *śrutārthāpatti* makes sense if one considers the early history of *śrutārthāpatti* as described above (section 2.1). Kumārila's *apūrva* could be obtained through Jaimini and Śabara's *śrutārthāpatti* because it is a Vedic concept, although one cannot use Kumārila's *śrutārthāpatti* for it, since it is a concept, not a sentence. The TV passage could be interpreted in this light as a slip into the preceding terminology about *śrutārthāpatti*. Alternatively, it could be interpreted as just the abbreviated form of the whole argument: Through *śrutārthāpatti* one postulates a further Vedic sentence about *apūrva*, in order to make sense of the contrast between Vedic sentences about a) and the fact b) (above). Out of this postulated sentence, through *śabdapramāṇa*, one knows about *apūrva* as concept. The latter interpretation is the one presented by Gaṅgeśa (see below, section 6).

3.4. Distinct terminology for *arthāpatti*

Since Kumārila is adamant in distinguishing *arthāpatti* and inference, he and his commentators need to avoid the terminology employed in the case of the latter and to devise new ways to refer to the constituent elements of *arthāpatti*. In most cases, this amounts to the fact that Kumārila and his commentators use more generic terms than the ones used in the context of inference. For instance, they speak of the absence from home as a *gamaka* "element causing one to understand" (in the following, "trigger"), instead of calling it a *hetu* "inferential reason," of the being outside as a *gamya* "thing to be understood" instead of a *sādhya*, and of the concomitance of absence from home and presence outside as

a *sāhitya* “co-occurrence” instead of *avinābhāva* “invariable concomitance.” The term *sambandha* “connection” appears also to be used covering both cases.

By contrast, some terms acquire a technical meaning in the context of *arthāpatti* and are so strongly characterised as connected to it that they can be used as synonyms of the very term *arthāpatti*. The foremost among them is *anyathānupapatti* “impossibility otherwise,” of two cognitions, such as Caitra’s being alive and his being out of home, which is the real trigger of *arthāpatti*. Similarly, *kalpanā* “postulation” defines the cognitive process which cannot be called inferential and out of which one reaches the conclusion that, e.g., “Caitra is outside.” Although *kalpanā* may have a negative connotation in other contexts, here it refers to the productive aspect of *arthāpatti* which leads one to a new conclusion, while at the same time preserving the same level of certainty.

4. *Arthāpatti* in Prabhākara

Prabhākara’s commentary (called *Bṛhatī*, henceforth Br) on the relevant passage of the ŚBh is relatively short and focuses on three elements:

1. Distinct features of *arthāpatti*
2. *Arthāpatti* as distinct from inference
3. Denial of a distinct *śrutārthāpatti*

As with Kumārila (see above, section 3.2), the points 1 and 2 are deeply connected. Prabhākara is also aware of the objection from the side of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (or from the Dinnāga-Dharmakīrti school) concerning the identity of inference and *arthāpatti*.

On top of that, further (*ekadeśin*-)objectors, possibly from a Bhāṭṭa or proto-Bhāṭṭa standpoint, propose two other theories of *arthāpatti*, which are both refuted:³¹

1. *Arthāpatti* is due to the impossibility otherwise (*anyathānupapatti*), which consists in the fact that a thing X is not possible without another thing Y.
2. *Arthāpatti* is as defined above, but it is distinct from inference because the latter presupposes that one knows the connection (*sambandha*) between trigger and thing to be known.

The first theory is just sketched, but seems to be tantamount to Kumārila’s one insofar as it is based on the clash of cognitions due to *anyathānupapatti*. It is refuted,

³¹ One could also consider the second theory as just a clarification of the first one.

since it is said to define nothing but an inference of the cause on the basis of its effect. In fact, as Śālikanātha explains in his commentary, also smoke is impossible without fire, so that this definition does not uniquely distinguish *arthāpatti*.

The second position is also akin to Kumārila's and states that the difference lies in the fact that in the case of inference one needs to know the relation beforehand (cf. YD, p. 73, and see above, section 2.2). This position will be refuted insofar as if one did not know of any connection, no impossibility (*anyathānupapatti*) would be grasped.

Prabhākara's final position will be connected to this refutation, but with the nuance that in the case of *arthāpatti* one knows a connection in general and not the specific one needed. He calls the connection one needs for *arthāpatti sambandhamātrajñāna* "the cognition of a connection in general" and the one that one does not need *jñātasambandhitā* "the fact of having a connected element already known."

According to Śālikanātha's commentary on the Bṛ, called *Rjuvimalā*, this means that one only needs to know about the correlation between being alive and being in one place, not the one between not being home and being outside, so that the connection with the specific trigger of the *arthāpatti* (the absence from home) is not known. Why would Prabhākara not say, like Kumārila, that a relation is not needed at all in the case of *arthāpatti*? Because he is convinced that one needs some background information in order for the impossibility to be perceived. One might add that a very simple person, a child or an alien, would not perceive any inconsistency at seeing someone's absence from home (after all, the missing person could have become invisible or disappeared from this dimension etc.). One needs to be aware of the general connection between being alive and being somewhere in the world in order to grasp that there is something out of place if someone who is alive is not in her usual place or even just that something cannot take place without something else (as in Prabhākara's theory of *anyathānupapatti*, see below).

Having ruled out the two proposals by the *ekadeśins*, what can be the distinct specificity of *arthāpatti*? Prabhākara's formalisation of inference is possibly less strict than Kumārila's, insofar as Kumārila has been in this respect deeply influenced by Dinnāga's theory of the *trairūpya* (see section 3). Since Prabhākara's formulation of inference is less strictly formalised, the main reason for the distinction between *arthāpatti* and inference cannot rely – like in Kumārila – on technical aspects about the formalisation of *pakṣa* "locus" and *hetu* "inferential reason." Moreover, Śālikanātha even explicitly states that also in the case of

inference there is an impossibility otherwise (*anyathānupapatti*) at stake, since the smoke would not be possible without the fire.

In contrast, Prabhākara distinguishes *arthāpatti* from inference since in the former the thing which would not be possible is exactly the thing to be known. In the case of inference, it is the *hetu* (smoke) which would be impossible without the *sādhya* (fire), whereas in the case of *arthāpatti*, by contrast, it is the thing to be known (*gamya*) which would not be possible without its trigger.

Prabhākara adds in this connection an etymological explanation of *arthāpatti*, highlighting the identity of *gamya* and *anupapanna* elements:

anyathānupapadyamānatām āpādayann arthāntaraṃ gamayati.

It causes one to know a different thing by causing [it] to attain the condition of not being possible otherwise. (Rāmanātha Śāstrī and Subrahmanya Sastri 1934–1967: 113)

This possibly means that he analysed the compound *arthāpatti* as “the fact of causing to attain a thing.” Śālikanātha will then elaborate further and add a different understanding of *artha* in the compound (see below, section 5.3.1).

4.1. Identification of the *gamya* of *arthāpatti*

Having said that according to Prabhākara the difference between *arthāpatti* and inference lies in the fact that in the former it is the *gamya* which would not make sense without its trigger, what exactly is this *gamya*? The first solution examined is that it must be the “not being in another place” (*anyatrābhāva*), which cannot make sense once one has seen Caitra’s absence from home. The not being elsewhere would in fact clash with the fact of not being present at home. Not being outside does indeed clash with not being home, so that it could make sense to call it an *anupapatti* “logical impossibility,” since it cannot be the case that one is not at home while not being elsewhere.

However, the non-presence elsewhere would not do, because Prabhākara has already postulated that the thing which does not make sense needs to be the *gamya*, in order to distinguish *arthāpatti* from inference, and what one knows out of the mentioned example is the fact that Caitra is outside, and not that he is not outside. The argumentation moves therefore to (a) further candidate(s) in the short and somehow enigmatic conclusion of the discussion:³²

³² Since the text is terse one might be tempted, as often with Prabhākara, to lean back and use Śālikanātha’s clear and engaging commentary to make sense of Prabhākara’s text. However, as will be discussed in section 5, Śālikanātha was an original philosopher in his own right and had the strategic advantage of being familiar with Kumārila’s positions.

*kasya tarhi. bhāvasya, na cāsau gṛhābhāvarśanenopapadyate.*³³ *bāḍham nopapadyate. na hi gṛhābhāvarśanena vinā bahirbhāva upapadyate.*

What is then [the *gamyā*]? The existence. And this does not make sense since one has seen the absence [of Caitra] from home.

Surely it does not make sense! For, it is not the case that the existence outside makes sense without the experience of the absence from home.

The first line seems to say that existence (*bhāva*) does not make sense once one has seen the absence from home. And the context suggests that after the proposal of *anyatrābhāva*, now a different proposal for something *anupapanna* is made. The problem here is that the next line seems to state the opposite, namely that *bhāva*, now better specified as *bahirbhāva* does not make sense *without* the absence from home. What should one make of this? I am inclined to think that the latter suggestion is to be taken as Prabhākara's conclusive view, since it closes the discussion on the topic and is followed by a new objection (introduced by *nanu* and clearly recognizable as such). Prabhākara would then have moved from the idea of *anyatrābhāva* to that of *bhāva* in general and finally to *bahirbhāva* as the *gamyā* which is *anupapanna*. The position about the *bhāva* in general (possibly to be identified, as in Śālikanātha, with the "being alive") being *anupapanna* would be an intermediate step in this direction.³⁴

Hence, he often reinterpreted and innovated on Prabhākara, rather than just clarifying his thoughts. This is particularly evident in the case of the discussion on *arthāpatti*, where Śālikanātha needs to offer a rather abstruse reading of Prabhākara in order to have him say what Śālikanātha indeed wants to say, as will be shown below.

³³ The general context of this sentence is that Prabhākara has explained that the *gamyā* must be the element which does not make sense (*anupapanna*) and is here exploring various possible identifications thereof, after having dismissed that the *gamyā* is the *anyatrābhāva* "not being elsewhere." *Bhāvasya* is a new possible candidate, either suggested by the *siddhāntin* or by an interlocutor trying to make the hypothesis work. Therefore, this sentence cannot be parsed as *na cāsau gṛhābhāvarśane nopapadyate*, which would amount to an emphatic assertion that this *gamyā* does indeed make sense once one has noticed the absence from home. In order to parse the sentence in the above way, one would need to attribute it to an opponent, i.e.: [*anuyoga*:] *kasya tarhi. [siddhāntin:] bhāvasya. [pūrvapakṣin:] na cāsau gṛhābhāvarśane nopapadyate* "What is then [the *gamyā*]? The existence. [Obj:] But this does indeed make sense once one has seen the absence [of Caitra] from home." But what would be this *bhāva* which makes indeed sense once one has noticed Caitra's absence from home? It can only be his presence elsewhere, but this is the position which has been dismissed immediately before this one, and it would be meaningless to repeat it. It is also impossible to attribute the entire *bhāvasya na cāsau gṛhābhāvarśane nopapadyate* to an objector, since the sentence is uttered by someone trying to find a suitable candidate for the *gamyā*.

³⁴ Alternatively, one might suggest that the first line of Prabhākara's passage simply

If this interpretation is correct, Prabhākara identifies the *gamya* to be, rather, the “*presence outside*” (*bahirbhāva*). As will be shown below, Śālikanātha will identify a flaw within this argument.

In which sense can one now say that there is an *anyathānupapatti*? Prabhākara explains *anyathānupapatti* as *anena vinā na upapadyate* “it does not take place without it” and goes on specifying that without having seen Caitra’s absence from home, one would not come to the conclusion that he is outside.³⁵

Given that Prabhākara has given up the requirement of a logical inconsistency, it is very much likely that his *arthāpatti* will not be deductive, like Kumārila’s. But what can lead from one state of affairs to another, only loosely connected to the first, if not a deduction? What happens, according to Prabhākara, is that one rephrases in a new way the loose connection so as to become aware of a new conclusion. In other words, a light form of belief revision is at stake in his *arthāpatti*. Belief revisions never start with one’s most strongly held beliefs, but rather with one’s weaker ones. In this case, there is no negation of a previous belief, but rather its update in reference to the case at stake. Why would one update the loose connection instead of giving up other beliefs (e.g., distrusting one’s sense perception of the empty house or one’s knowledge of Caitra’s being alive)? Because the update has the least epistemic consequences, insofar as it does not force one to give up any other belief.³⁶

misses a long *a* and should be read as *grhābhāvādarśanena*.

³⁵ The whole passage reads: *asyānena vinā sadbhāvo nopapadyate* “The real existence of this does not take place without that.” The passage is attributed to an objector, but the interpretation of *anyathānupapatti* is not refuted (rather, the missing distinction from *anumāna* is). Śālikanātha glossing on the same passage writes: *nopapadyate ity anenāpi nāstitvam* “Even through the clause ‘it does not make sense’ [Prabhākara indicates] that it does not exist.”

³⁶ “Even if all sentences in a belief set are accepted or considered as facts (so that they are assigned maximal probability), this does not mean that all sentences are of equal value for planning or problem-solving purposes. Certain pieces of our knowledge and beliefs about the world are more important than others when planning future actions, conducting scientific investigations, or reasoning in general. We will say that some sentences in a belief system have a higher degree of *epistemic entrenchment* than others. This degree of entrenchment will, intuitively, have a bearing on what is abandoned from a belief set, and what is retained when a contraction or a revision is carried out. [...] [W]hen a belief set *K* is revised or contracted, the sentences in *K* that are given up are those having the lowest degree of epistemic entrenchment. Fagin, Ullman, and Vardi (1983: 358ff.) introduce the notion of ‘database priorities’” (Gärdenfors 1992: 17, emphasis original).

I came to the idea of belief revision in the case of Prabhākara’s theory of *arthāpatti* during a long discussion on the topic with Malcolm C. Keating and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu (Tsukuba, March 2018). I am grateful to Kees van Berkel for helping me with my first

In formal terms, and assuming that being home is A , being outside is B and being alive is C :

Step 1. $C \Rightarrow (A \vee (\neg A))$ (*sambandhamātrajñāna*: being alive is being somewhere, either home or not)

Step 2. $[C] \wedge \neg A$

Step 3. $\therefore B$ (belief revision: $(\neg A)$ in Step 1. is tantamount to B)

Note that Prabhākara does not spell out that one needs to be aware of the fact that Caitra is alive in Step 2 (hence my use of square brackets), he appears to imagine it as obvious. That this is the case is confirmed by the fact that otherwise the knowledge that Caitra is outside could not be reached. In fact, if one puts $C \Rightarrow (A \vee B)$ (as in the revision of the Step 1 belief in Step 3), in a truth table, the sheer fact of not being home could lead to either being outside as true or being outside as false. In the latter case, the falsity of not-being outside and the truth of not-being at home would imply the falsity of the antecedent (i.e., being alive) (which would make the implication true). Thus, the only way to come to the conclusion Prabhākara asserts is to assume C in Step 2. As will be discussed below, Śālikanātha will examine the risk of falsifying the antecedent. Prabhākara, instead, does not even hint at this possibility, so that I think we can safely assume that he, like Kumārila, considered the absence from home to go together with the fact of being alive. Prabhākara most likely does not spell this out for the same reasons why Kumārila did not feel he needed to explain the reasons for our knowledge that C is the case. The doubt about the premise, though present in the early history of Mīmāṃsā (see above, section 1.2) was most probably a minority position by the time of Śābara, Kumārila and Prabhākara, so that no much energy was needed to rule out this option. By contrast, after Śālikanātha's reaffirmation of this position, later Mīmāṃsakas will feel the need to spell out why they are so sure about Caitra's being alive (their typical explanation, as found, e.g., in Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, will be that one has checked Caitra's astrological table and knows that he will live a long life).

The above reconstruction implies also that *anyathānupapatti* has in Prabhākara a well different meaning than in Kumārila. For Kumārila, it represented a clash between two cognitive data, possibly to be understood as a logical inconsistency (see Yoshimizu 2020). For Prabhākara, it seems to represent just the impossibility of something without something else, i.e., a precondition. In this sense,

steps in this logic and to Malcolm Keating for pointing out Gärdenfors 1992.

na upapadyate ends up being a synonym of *na sambhavati*, both in the sense of “is not possible” as well as “does not take place.” Accordingly, he constantly glosses *anyathā* as *vinā*.

The next two tables sum up (in Sanskrit and English respectively) the main differences between Kumārila’s and Prabhākara’s understanding of *arthāpatti*. More details on the Prabhākara position can be read in section 5.3.

	<i>gamaka</i>	<i>gamyā</i>	<i>anupapanna</i>
Kumārila	<i>jīvato grhābhāvadārśana</i>	<i>bahirbhāva</i>	<i>jīvato grhābhāva</i>
Prabhākara	<i>(jīvato) grhābhāvadārśana</i>	<i>bahirbhāva</i>	<i>gamyā</i>

Table 2. Kumārila’s and Prabhākara’s position on the elements of *arthāpatti* (Sanskrit version)

	trigger	thing to be known	non-sensical element
Kumārila	not-being-home & alive	being out	not-being-home & alive
Prabhākara	not-being-home (& alive)	being out	thing to be known

Table 3. Kumārila’s and Prabhākara’s position on the elements of *arthāpatti* (English version)

Thus, the *anupapanna* element is the existence outside, not in the sense that it is logically inconsistent with the experience of Caitra’s not being home, but rather insofar as the cognition of being outside would not have taken place without the experience of Caitra’s not being home.

The identification of the otherwise impossible element with the *gamyā*, however, leads to a hermeneutical problem, since Śābara had stated the following:

arthāpattir api dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho ’nyathā nopapadyate ity arthakalpanā
(ŚBh ad PMS 1.1.5, p. 32 in Frauwallner 1968).

Which could be straightforwardly interpreted as:

As for *arthāpatti*, a seen or heard thing does not make sense otherwise, hence there is the postulation of a thing.³⁷

This seems to imply that once something does not make sense, one postulates something else. Hence, it seems to support Kumārila’s identification of the impossible

³⁷ Since, as discussed above, *arthāpatti* always links two things, *arthakalpanā* could here mean “postulation of [another] thing” (postulation of the *gamyā*) or “postulation on the basis of the [inconsistent] thing” (postulation on the basis of the *gamaka*).

element with the *gamaka* rather than with the *gamyā*. Prabhākara must find a solution and reads, therefore, the passage by Śabara as follows:

As for *arthāpatti*, a seen or heard thing [when] the ensuing cognition does not make sense, is the postulation of the thing.

That is, he connects *dr̥ṣṭaḥ śruto vā* directly with *ity arthakalpanā* and adds an unspoken *pramiti* to be connected with *anyathā nopapadyate*. The proposal is inventive, since it manages to force Śabara's text in a direction quite far from its most natural interpretation, and it can hardly be thought to be Śabara's original intention.

4.2. Rejection of a distinct *śrutārthāpatti*

Last, Prabhākara concludes the discussion with the explanation that Śabara's wording does not mean that there is a distinct *śrutārthāpatti*, because the expectation of incomplete sentences is appeased by meanings, not words. An objector then asks why would have Śabara used both words, given that *dr̥ṣṭa* "experienced" would have been enough. The reply is that it is just another expression. Śālikanātha will explain in his commentary thereon that "we are worldly people" and that therefore it does not make sense to discuss worldly linguistic usages.

The striking element here is that Prabhākara's discussion is short and essential. Prabhākara's main concern is to explain why Śabara mentioned a *śrutāḥ arthaḥ* but he does not attack Kumārila's arguments in favour of a *śrutārthāpatti*. Why so? Possibly because Prabhākara thought that he was just mentioning the standard traditional approach to *arthāpatti*, so that he did not need to explain much. This could be confirmed by the fact that, by contrast, Kumārila addressed a Prabhākara-like objection, so that one can assume that it was Kumārila who was innovating here.

5. Śālikanātha: distinction from inference because of doubt

The following sections deal with the part on *arthāpatti* within Śālikanātha's *R̥juvimalā* commentary on Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* (in turn commenting on the short quote by the Vṛttikāra on *arthāpatti* embedded in the ŚBh), and with the chapter on *arthāpatti* in Śālikanātha's *Pramāṇaparāyaṇa* of the so-called *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (henceforth PrP). The PrP is a collection of essays on various topics which already soon after Prabhākara became the standard reference work for the Prabhākara philosophy.³⁸ Śālikanātha is in fact a clearer and more systematic

³⁸ The PrP was most probably put together after the composition of its constituent books,

writer than Prabhākara, so that most authors attacking Prabhākara positions indeed attacked Śālikanātha rather than Prabhākara directly.

As will be explained, both texts by Śālikanātha discuss all the main issues about *arthāpatti*, namely:

1. How is *arthāpatti* distinguished from inference?
2. How does *arthāpatti* work?
3. Is there a *śrutārthāpatti* distinguished from the normal *arthāpatti*?

Like in the case of Kumārila and Prabhākara, the first two issues will be dealt with jointly, since they are deeply intertwined. I will then discuss in detail the third one. Since Śālikanātha is one of the earliest authors dealing with the topic of *arthāpatti* after Kumārila, I will pay special attention to a comparison between the two.

5.1. Śālikanātha's indebtedness to Kumārila

Śālikanātha appears to have been heavily influenced by Kumārila's approach to the topic. First of all, he starts the discussion by stating his own position, which overtly differs from Kumārila's. However, as a second step, he introduces a Naiyāyika objector who seems to directly react to Kumārila's attacks, insofar as he tries to construe the *arthāpatti* as a valid inference and especially focuses on the possibility of identifying a locus. Now, this seems at first sight difficult, because inferences depend on the fact that the probans and the probandum co-occur in the same locus, but the being outside of Caitra and his being home have necessarily two spatially distinct substrates. Therefore, the Naiyāyika proposes two alternative loci, namely the same time in which both occur and the same person in relation to which they occur. As an example of the first kind of co-occurrence he can quote the case of high tide and the raise of the moon, which are clearly causally linked not because they occur in the same place, but because they occur at the same time. The third and fourth steps consist, as with Kumārila, in Śālikanātha's refutation of these suggestions. Apart from adding a new reason, namely that the probans would be doubtful and this is impossible in an inference, Śālikanātha also repeats an argument found in Kumārila, namely that a possible probans, the sheer absence from home, would lead to excessive consequences (namely, the being outside also of people who do not exist at all), whereas another one (the absence from home of someone who is alive) would only work if it were made redundant (as in ŚV *arthāpatti* v. 25).

but this does not change anything in the case of the book on epistemology.

To elaborate: the Naiyāyika objector suggests to use the absence from home of Caitra as probans as soon as the moment of doubt has been overcome. But the upholder of the concluding view explains that the doubt is overcome exactly through *arthāpatti*, so that after that moment nothing is left to be inferred. In this sense, the argument is akin to Kumārila's one about the fact that a valid inference could in fact take place only after the seeming impossibility has been cleared out through *arthāpatti* – and would therefore be useless (see ŚV *arthāpatti* v. 24, and especially Pārthasārathi's commentary thereon).

Then, as a fifth step, Śālikanātha, just like Kumārila before him, examines the different elements needed for inference and *arthāpatti*. The distinctions between the detailed analysis of these elements in Kumārila and its much less deep discussion in Śālikanātha is discussed in section 5.3.

5.2. Śālikanātha on *anyathānupapatti*

In *arthāpatti* an element causes another element (see section 4.1 on how these are differently identified) to be impossible unless one postulates a third element, namely Caitra's being out. Kumārila's and Prabhākara's schools discuss at length the identification of the first two elements, whereas they remain relatively silent concerning the third one and the nature of the impossibility (see also above, section 4.1).³⁹

The impossibility appears to be twofold, in the sense that it is based on a material impossibility (how comes that our old friend Caitra, who is always home and did not die, is not there?) but is explicitly said by Prabhākara and by Śālikanātha (not in the PrP but in the *Rjuvimalā*) to be something the subject needs to be aware of. In other words, an ontological impossibility itself is not enough, one rather needs to be in the epistemological condition of being aware of what looks like an impossibility. This will then be appeased through the postulation of, for instance, Caitra's being out of home.

Summing up, for Kumārila *anyathānupapatti* is a logical inconsistency.⁴⁰ Prabhākara differs slightly, since he interprets the *anyathānupapatti* as the impossibility of something without something else, i.e., as expressing merely a pre-condition, with no need of a cognitive or logical clash (see 4.1). By contrast,

³⁹ I also discussed the topic from the point of view of Śālikanātha here: <http://elisafreschi.com/2019/03/08/against-arthapatti-as-only-technically-distinguished-from-inference-in-salikanatha/>, last accessed April 12, 2021.

⁴⁰ The logical nature of the impossibility has been shown in Yoshimizu 2020.

for Śālikanātha the *anyathānupapatti* appears to be a factual impossibility of which one needs to be aware. In short:

Kumārila	Prabhākara	Śālikanātha
logical inconsistency	impossibility without	factual impossibility one is aware about

Table 4. Kumārila's, Prabhākara's and Śālikanātha's views on what is the *anyathānupapatti* "impossibility otherwise"

5.3. How is *arthāpatti* conceptualised?

Śālikanātha's understanding of *arthāpatti* shares some elements with Kumārila's, but also diverges significantly from it. What they share is:

- *Arthāpatti* is a separate instrument of knowledge, different than inference.
- In *arthāpatti* there is a clash between a background knowledge and a newly acquired one (in the standard example: between one's knowing that Caitra is alive and one's seeing that he is not home).

The first point is a concern shared by all Mīmāṃsakas and hotly debated, mainly against Naiyāyika opponents. By contrast, Mīmāṃsakas diverge as for:

1. what is the trigger (and the thing known) in the process of *arthāpatti*,
2. the interpretation of *anyathānupapatti*,
3. the role of doubt,
4. the reasons why *arthāpatti* is not an inference.

Concerning point 1 (see also the table in section 4.1), the trigger is for Kumārila the absence from home of Caitra specified by the fact that he is alive. By contrast, the trigger for Śālikanātha (see below, and Subrahmanya Sastri 1961: 274) is the sheer absence from home. How can this be? An opponent embedded in Śālikanātha's text can easily object that if the sheer absence from home were the trigger of the cognition of a person's being outside, then it would lead one to conclude that also a dead person X or an unborn person Y, who are also absent from home, are somewhere outside. Śālikanātha can explain away this objection through point No. 2. In fact, for Kumārila the clash between cognitions is given in the very moment you enter Caitra's home and see he is not there. Since these cognitions could not be possible otherwise, one postulates that Caitra is (alive and) outside. For Śālikanātha, by contrast, one reaches the awareness of an impossibility through the experienced trigger only. In other words, Caitra's

absence from home makes his being alive look impossible and the trigger is such exactly insofar as it leads one to think that something one thought to know seems impossible. Accordingly, Caitra's absence from home is a trigger of the cognition of his being outside because it leads one to think that what one knew about Caitra, namely his being alive, is impossible. By contrast, the absence from home of X (a dead person) or Y (an unborn one) does not have the same effect, since it does not lead to any impossibility. According to Śālikanātha, this impossibility makes one doubt for a moment about Caitra's being alive ("How can he be alive, given that he is not home?," Subrahmanya Sastri 1961: 273). Next, one postulates something (such as Caitra's being outside) which appeases the doubt and the seeming impossibility and harmonises again all one's cognitions.

Thus, Śālikanātha deeply innovates on Prabhākara not just concerning the role of doubt, but also concerning the identification of what does not make sense and what is the *gamyā*, which is no longer the being outside, but the being (alive and outside). Why? Possibly because he was convinced of a logical flaw of Prabhākara's argument. In the *Rjuvimalā* he explains, in fact, that the existence outside in itself is not impossible. This means that he is again reading *anyathānupapatti* as involving a (factual or logical) impossibility and not just as the fact that a given cognition does not take place (as in Prabhākara). In contrast to Prabhākara's proposal, having seen a person's absence from home it is very much (logically or factually) possible that she is outside. Nor can the being outside in itself, i.e. independently of the experience of her absence from home, be said to be (logically or factually) impossible. By contrast, the only thing which may look logically or factually impossible once one has experienced someone's absence from home is her being still alive. Śālikanātha can nonetheless keep the identity between *gamyā* and *anupapanna* element, thus remaining faithful to a crucial point in Prabhākara's account of *arthāpatti*. Śālikanātha can keep this identity insofar as both the *gamyā* and the *anupapanna* element (see the table below) are defined as just *bhāva* "existence." In the case of the *gamyā*, this existence is further to be understood as the existence connected with an external place (i.e., *bahirdeśasambaddhabhāva*). By contrast, in the case of the definition of the *anupapanna* element, "existence" should be understood as a synonym of "being alive."

In this connection it is also worth mentioning that, although Śālikanātha clearly knew Kumārila, unlike Kumārila he did not enter into the detailed discussion of the elements of the inference and how they are missing in the case of *arthāpatti*. In fact, whereas Kumārila explained at length how one cannot construe a valid locus and probans on the basis of the elements at hand in the standard example of *arthāpatti*, Śālikanātha chiefly deals with the identification

of the trigger alone. Why so? Possibly for reasons similar to the ones discussed in the case of Prabhākara. Kumārila accepted Dinnāga's formal definition of inference as entailing a locus, a probans and a probandum, as well as a similar and dissimilar instances (see section 3), whereas Śālikanātha follows Śabara and defines (perhaps less technically) inference as a cognition of the other correlate due to the experience of one correlate for one who knows their invariable concomitance.⁴¹

Nonetheless, Śālikanātha probably considered that Prabhākara's defence of *arthāpatti* as a distinct instrument of knowledge was weakened by the flaw discussed above, but also by his loose theory of inference. In fact, Prabhākara's theory of inference is still pre-Dinnāga, whereas Kumārila and then Śālikanātha could not ignore the new bases for inference laid down by Dinnāga and, at least in the case of Śālikanātha, Dharmakīrti (his knowledge of the *trairūpya* distinction is evident in the *Rjuvimalā*, where the summary verses refer to the concept of *vipakṣa* "dissimilar instance").

Consequently, the distinction of a *sambandhamātrajñāna* vs. *jñātasambandhitā* (about which see section 4 above) would no longer be enough as the basis of a distinct instrument of knowledge, since the distinction depended on an imprecise definition of the connection at stake. Kumārila's solution would not be viable either since Śālikanātha shares Prabhākara's idea that in order for one to perceive an impossibility one must have some expectation of what should have been the normal case, so that some (though vague) connection must be known beforehand.

Therefore, unlike Kumārila (who mostly focused on technical reasons distinguishing *arthāpatti* and inference and on the absence of prior knowledge of the relation) and Prabhākara (who focused only on the absence of a specific prior knowledge and on the impossibility pertaining to the *gamya* not to the *gamaka*), Śālikanātha chose to add *doubt* as the distinct element of *arthāpatti*. He thus had a direct and easy way to distinguish *arthāpatti* and inference, but one that risked to jeopardise the epistemic status of *arthāpatti* as an instrument of necessarily *valid* cognition.

In other words, one comes to visit Caitra expecting him to be home and sees that he is not there. At this point, one's belief about his being alive is endangered, but one does not want to give it up. Immediately, one comes to the right solution:

⁴¹ Cf. *jñātasambandhaniyamasyaikaśāstra darśanāt | ekadeśāntare buddhir anumānam abādhitē ||*, PrP, *pramāṇaparāyaṇa, anumāna* v. 1 (1961: 196).

He is alive, but elsewhere. In logical terms, one could say that starting with the situation

(A) *being alive (being home v being outside)

one risks a belief revision (as explained in section 4.1, “being alive” could be false), but does not really perform it, since the two conflicting beliefs are not on the same level, and there is a metarule stating that the first one should not be given up, so that one automatically opts for the second solution (Caitra is outside). However, this reconstruction has the disadvantage that it transgresses the requirement of Prabhākara that the *gamyā* and the *anupapanna* element are the same thing. More precisely, the unity of *gamyā* and *anupapanna* can be maintained only by tweaking the two a little bit and making them the same although one of the two (the *anupapanna*) is the existence alive and the other (the *gamyā*) is the existence outside.

In order to keep a real unity, one can, by contrast, suggest the following reconstruction. One starts with the *sambandhamātrajñāna* that whoever is alive must be somewhere, but misconstrues it as being a bidirectional relation linking being alive (*C*) and being home (*A*) (whenever there is *A* there is *C* and vice versa). One then notices that *A* is not the case, something which would necessarily lead to the negation of *C*, if the bidirectional link were the case. However, one knows *C* to be the case, therefore one reconsiders the other seemingly conflicting belief, namely one’s initial belief, the *sambandhamātrajñāna*.⁴² In this way, one understands it as entailing not the bidirectional link, but a simple material implication, linking *A* and *C*. In a material implication, the antecedent is not negated if the consequent is negated (affirming that by negating the antecedent you negate the consequent is the fallacy of denying the antecedent). Similarly, smoke and fire are linked by a material implication and in fact if there is no smoke, there can still be fire (e.g., in the case of melting gold). Once one has rephrased one’s initial belief in this way, one can discover that given the absence of *A*, the persistence of *C* needs to be the persistence of *C* understood in a slightly different way, i.e., as *C* devoid of *A*. It is still *bhāva* “existence,” but it is existence outside of one’s home, i.e., it is *bahirbhāva*.

(B) Step 1: being alive \Leftrightarrow being somewhere (*sambandhajñānamātra*)

Step 2: $A \Leftrightarrow C$ (misattribution)

Step 3: $\neg A \wedge C$

⁴² Readers will notice that also in this case, the belief revision proceeds according to a parsimony principle, see n. 34.

Step 4: $((\neg A \wedge (A \Leftrightarrow C)) \Rightarrow \neg C) \wedge C$ (*anupapatti*)

Step 5: $A \Rightarrow C$ (belief revision: new construction of *sambandhajñānamātra*)

Step 6: $\neg A \wedge C$

This reconstruction makes clear also why the risk of doubt is not enough, as Śālikanātha explains, to make the *arthāpatti*-delivered cognition unsure. In fact, *C* only *risks* to be put into doubt, but in fact one knows it surely to be the case and therefore moves immediately to the revision of another, weaker belief.

This partial innovation concerning the *gamyā* and the *anupapanna* elements leads Śālikanātha to force the interpretation of a terse statement by Prabhākara. He reads a statement as part of an objector and re-reads another one with a somehow forced syntax (just like Prabhākara had done with Śabara). In the following quote, first comes Prabhākara's text and its straightforward translation, then Śālikanātha's interpretation as explained in the *Rjuvimalā*:

kasya tarhi. bhāvaśya, na cāsau gṛhābhāvarśānenopapadyate. bādham nopapadyate. na hi gṛhābhāvarśānena vinā bahirbhāva upapadyate.

Prabhākara: What is then [the *gamyā*]? The existence. In fact, this does not make sense once one has seen the absence from home. It surely does not make sense, for, without the experience of the absence from home the existence outside does not make sense.⁴³

Śālikanātha: What is then [the *gamyā*]? [Obj.:] It is the existence [outside]. In fact, this does not make sense once one has seen the absence from home (so, the *gamyā* would be the existence outside). [(Alleged) reply by Prabhākara:] Surely not. This (existence outside) does make sense. For, once one has experienced the absence from home, it is the existence, without the outside, which does not make sense (thus, the *gamyā* is the sheer existence).⁴⁴

⁴³ Note that Prabhākara reads *anyathā* in *anyathānupapatti* as *vinā* "without." Also Śālikanātha comments *anyathāśabdena vināśabdārtha evocyate* "With the word *anyathā* 'without' only is meant" (Subrahmaniya Sastri 1967: 112). For various proposals concerning the meaning of this passage in Prabhākara, see section 4.1.

⁴⁴ *kasya tarhi. bhāvaśya. na cāsau gṛhābhāvarśānenopapadyate iti. bahirdeśe bhāvo 'vagamyate. [...] bādham nopapadyate iti siddhānti vadati. atredam ākṛtam: nātra gṛhābhāvarśānena vinānupapattir ucyate. kiṃ tu gṛhābhāvarśānena bahir vinā bhāvo nopapadyata iti.* "Now the proponent of the accepted position speaks: **Surely it does not make sense.** Here is the idea: it is not the case that we say that his presence outside does not make sense without observing his absence from home, but rather that when we observe his absence from home, his presence does not make sense without being outside."

The last sentence means that one should not read the *vinā* "without" with *gṛhābhā-*

The following two tables sum up the key elements of *arthāpatti* in the authors examined:

	<i>gamaka</i>	<i>gamya</i>	<i>anupapanna</i> element
Kumārila	<i>jīvato gṛhābhāvadarśana</i>	<i>bahirbhāva</i>	<i>jīvato gṛhābhāva</i>
Prabhākara	<i>gṛhābhāvadarśana</i>	<i>bahirbhāva</i>	<i>gamya</i>
Śālikanātha	<i>gṛhābhāvadarśana</i>	(<i>bahirdeśe</i>) <i>bhāva</i>	(<i>jīvana</i> =) <i>bhāva</i>

Table 5. Key elements of *arthāpatti* in Kumārila, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha (first part)

	<i>sambandha</i>	<i>anupapatti</i>	<i>lakṣaṇa</i> of <i>arthāpatti</i>
Kumārila	existent, but not known	logical inconsistency	no <i>sambandha</i> no <i>pakṣadharmatā</i> no univ. quantification
Prabhākara	<i>sambandhamātrajñāna</i>	not taking place	<i>gamyaśyānupapatti</i> <i>sambandhamātrajñāna</i>
Śālikanātha	<i>sambandhamātrajñāna</i>	factual impossibility of which one is aware	<i>gamyaśyānupapatti</i> <i>sambandhamātrajñāna</i> <i>sandeha</i>

Table 6. Key elements of *arthāpatti* in Kumārila, Prabhākara and Śālikanātha (second part)

The following table summarises the innovations by Śālikanātha:

	distinction from inference	<i>gamya</i>	<i>anupapanna</i> element
Kumārila	<i>ajñātasambandha</i>	<i>bahirbhāva</i>	<i>jīvato gṛhābhāva</i>
Prabhākara	<i>gamyaśyānupapatti</i>	<i>bahirbhāva</i>	<i>bahirbhāva</i>
Śālikanātha	<i>sandeha</i>	(<i>bahirdeśe</i>) <i>bhāva</i>	(<i>jīvana</i> =) <i>bhāva</i>

Table 7. Śālikanātha's innovations on *arthāpatti*

5.3.1. A second Prābhākara way of understanding *arthāpatti*

The above interpretation is adversed by some unidentified opponents within the PrP, who claim that the real trigger of the process is not the absence from home, but the well-known fact of Caitra's being alive. Caitra's being alive itself makes

vadarśanena, but rather with *bahiḥ*. This forced reading is motivated by Śālikanātha's desire to bend Prabhākara's position towards his own one.

one doubt about it and then postulate something else (namely, its being connected with a new location, outside of home), in order to appease the doubt. Why this different interpretation? The reason is not spelt out in full, but Śālikanātha does say that this position depends on perception (*darśana*). This might mean that it does not depend on something unseen, like an absence. In this sense, these opponents might want to avoid the idea of having absence from home as the trigger of the process, because they want to avoid absences in general as playing any role, since, according to the Prābhākara epistemology, absences are nothing but the existence of something else. Accordingly, these opponents try to say that the being alive is then thrown into doubt by the fact that one experiences it in a new form (*rūpa*), namely, in connection with a different location. The text summarises this and the previous position in two verses (Subrahmanya Sastri 1961: 275), which also attempt an etymological explanation of *arthāpatti*, analysed respectively as the “falling [into doubt] because of a state of affairs” or as the “falling [into doubt] of a state of affairs.” The two positions are then also evoked succinctly at the end of the general discussion (Subrahmanya Sastri 1961: 278), where the active and passive understanding of “falling [into doubt]” are also highlighted: in one case, the stress is on the trigger, insofar as it causes something else to fall into doubt, in the other it is on the trigger, insofar as it is itself the thing which is fallen into doubt. Thus, the thing which falls into doubt (the being alive) is the same in both cases, and the differences are partly lexical and partly more fundamental:

1. The thing fallen into doubt, e.g., Caitra’s being alive, is fallen into doubt because of his absence from home (Śālikanātha) or because of its being in a different modality (opponents within the Prābhākara group).
2. The trigger of the postulation, which then appeases the seeming inconsistency, is in one case the thing which causes the doubt (Śālikanātha) and in the other the thing fallen into doubt (Prābhākara opponents).

Therefore, there are many similarities between the two explanations and Śālikanātha seems more than keen on playing down the differences, by neglecting the first one and explaining that the second one is not important. In his summary (as found at the end of the general discussion, Subrahmanya Sastri 1961: 278), both interpretations see a same thing, namely the absence from home, putting in doubt the same other thing, namely the fact that Caitra is alive. A contemporary reader may, however, note that these objectors negate the main characteristic of *arthāpatti* according to Prābhākara, namely the fact that it is the *gamya* and not the *gamaka* which is *anupapanna*.

5.3.2. Śālikanātha's summary verses

Like Kumārila in the TV and Jayanta in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Śālikanātha writes mostly in prose, but then adds some verses summarising his position. These verses are not explicitly attributed and summarise distinctly Śālikanātha's original contribution, so that one can safely attribute them to Śālikanātha himself.

The initial verse in Śālikanātha's presentation in the PrP describes the *arthāpatti* as a postulation triggered by a seen thing (e.g., Caitra's absence from home) which leads an unseen thing (Caitra's being alive) to a state of logical impossibility unless something else (Caitra's being outside) is postulated.

Further two verses indicate the end of a section and the beginning of a new one in the *arthāpatti* section of the PrP. Within the *Rjuvimalā* commentary on *arthāpatti*, Śālikanātha mentions seven verses which condense his contribution, at the end of the general discussion and before entering into the refutation of a distinct *śrutārthāpatti*.

The summary verses in the *Rjuvimalā* are also a way for Śālikanātha to condense what he considered to be his contribution to the teaching on *arthāpatti*. This is described as being threefold: 1. *Arthāpatti* is established to be a distinct instrument of knowledge, 2. It is distinct due to the role of doubt, 3. Both *arthāpatti* and inference can be construed as a link between a *gamaka* "trigger" and a *gamya* "triggered" (the thing to be known), but in the case of inference it is the *gamaka* (for instance, smoke) which does not make sense without the *gamya*, whereas in the case of *arthāpatti* it is the *gamya* itself which would not make sense otherwise.

6. How does the story continue?

The discussions on *arthāpatti* show how different authors supporting it share hardly more than the label and the fact that *arthāpatti* is a method of reasoning connecting premises with conclusions but different than inference.

This state of affairs is very much present in the early history of *arthāpatti*, ranging from the **Tarkaśāstra* (pre-Dignāga) as reconstructed by Giuseppe Tucci to Vātsyāyana (see Oberhammer, Prets, and Prandstetter 1991 and section 1.2). This article cannot accommodate the successive developments of the debate, but I would like to anticipate that later authors continue to diverge in their approaches to *arthāpatti*. As a rapid survey, Vācaspati (10th c.) in his Nyāya work (*Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭīkā*) seems to have been the first one to introduce the topic of *virodha* "conflict" among cognitions as the standard interpretation of *anyathānupapatti*. Vācaspati is also apparently the first author referring to

Śālikanātha's position as just implying doubt, although he does not discuss it separately from the Bhāṭṭa version. This then became the standard way Nyāya and Bhāṭṭa authors attacked the Prābhākara position. Cidānanda, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā who lived in the early 14th c., rephrases the *virodha* as a conflict between a general and a specific cognition. This idea has been then popularised by Nārāyaṇa Bhāṭṭa in his 17th c. *Mānameyodaya*, which became a standard textbook of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.

Śāntarakṣita (8th c.), in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* representation of Kumārila's view, adds that one knows that Caitra is alive because of linguistic communication (*śabda*) (TS 1644). This might mean that the mention of *śabda* was already present in Kumārila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā*. Gaṅgeśa (14th c.), possibly following some previous thinker(s), seems to have been the first one to develop rationalisations for the cogniser's reasons to believe that Caitra should be home and that he is alive, namely the general habit of old people to stay home and astrological charts about the length of his life. Gaṅgeśa also attacked the idea of doubt as a foundation of *arthāpatti*, and made clear that a purpose of *arthāpatti* is the establishment of *apūrva*. Kumārila does indeed use *arthāpatti* to establish *apūrva*, but he does not address the problem within the *arthāpatti* section.

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (16th c.), a genial commentator on Gaṅgeśa, explained how *arthāpatti*, according to the own standards of Nyāya, should be a separate instrument of knowledge (see Das 2020).

As for supplying parts of a missing statement, called by Kumārila *śrutārthāpatti*, it also took a path which led it further away from *dṛṣṭārthāpatti* after Kumārila's attempt to bring them together as two cases of *arthāpatti*. After Jayanta's mention of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) in connection with *śrutārthāpatti*, which is followed by Sucarita's emphasis on it (about which, see Freschi forthcoming), *śrutārthāpatti* becomes part of a discussion having important bearings on philosophy of language, and focusing especially on the case of ellipsis.

7. Conclusions

Arthāpatti is an interesting case study for the intersections of distinct currents already within early Mīmāṃsā. On the one hand, one notices a hermeneutic concern, which probably constitutes the historical reason for the development of *arthāpatti* according to the hypothesis by Lars Göhler (Göhler 2011). On the other, the epistemological concern is well delineated at an early stage and becomes pre-eminent in the work of Kumārila.

The case of *arthāpatti* also shows how the two thinkers later credited with the creation of the two subschools of Mīmāṃsā, namely Kumārila and Prabhākara, at times ignored each other completely. In the case of Kumārila, his neglect of Prabhākara's position might be a sign of the fact that there were no important predecessors for the latter's distinctive positions on *arthāpatti* (especially for the identification of the nonsensical element with the thing to be known). In the case of Prabhākara, he attacks Kumārila's position in the case of the definition of *arthāpatti* in general, which could be a further evidence of the fact that Prabhākara was innovating and needed to persuade his audience of his new interpretations. By contrast, in the case of *śrutārthāpatti* Prabhākara does not refer at all to Kumārila's positions, perhaps because here Prabhākara was just grasping back to what he considered to be the mainstream position of Mīmāṃsā.

Besides, the discussions on *arthāpatti* show how different Mīmāṃsā authors presupposed and implemented different approaches, corresponding to what contemporary readers could identify as different logical theories, ranging from natural deduction and first order logic (Kumārila)⁴⁵ to belief revision logic (Prabhākara and Śālikanātha). The exact formalisation behind each of such approaches as conceived by Mīmāṃsā authors themselves will probably never be settled. Nonetheless, attempting to reconstruct and formalise them can help us in making sense of the own words of the various authors at stake and of the seeming paradoxes they entail (e.g., as for the identity of the *gamya* and the *anupapanna* element in Śālikanātha).

Abbreviations

Bṛ – *Bṛhatī* by Prabhākara. See Rāmanātha Śāstrī and Subrahmanya Sastri 1934–1967.

PMS – *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* by Jaimini. See Apte (Āpaṭe) 1929.

PrP – *Prakaraṇapañcikā* by Śālikanātha Miśra. See Subrahmanya Sastri 1961.

ŚBh – *Śābarabhāṣya* by Śābara. See Apte (Āpaṭe) 1929.

ŚV – *Ślokavārttika* by Kumārila. See Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī 1978.

TS – *Tattvasaṅgraha* by Śāntarakṣita. See Embar Krishnamacharya 1926.

TV – *Tantravārttika* by Kumārila. See Apte (Āpaṭe) 1929.

YD – *Yuktidīpikā*. See Wezler and Motegi 1998.

⁴⁵ For a fuller discussion of natural deduction and first order logic in Kumārila, see Yoshimizu 2020.

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Epistemology Meets Poetry: Jayanta on *Dhvani*

Alessandro Graheli

1. Abstract

In his *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta curtly dismisses the new *dhvani* theory (“theory of suggestion”) discussed by poets in ninth-century Kashmir, at a time when the pristine discipline of poetics was gaining popularity and authority.

This paper sheds light on Jayanta’s theory of meaning, on the connection between poetic suggestion and epistemic postulation, on the relation between poetic truths and epistemological truths, on Jayanta’s own attitude towards poetry, on the scientific status of poetics at Jayanta’s time, and more generally on the scholastic foundations of ninth-tenth century Sanskrit philosophy.

2. The text, the context and the topic

This¹ mighty power of words² averts even that sort of *dhvani* resorted to by a self-fancied scholar³ to explain the prohibitions conveyed by injunctions

¹ I’m indebted to Elisa Freschi and Daniele Cuneo for their most valuable comments and corrections on an early draft of this paper. Extant errors, however, are of course my own responsibility. I’m also responsible for the translations from Sanskrit, wherever no specific source is credited.

² The word for “might” is *mahiman*, derived as *pr̥thvādibhya imaniḥ vā* [*taśya bhāva ity arthe*] (A, 5.1.122). It also denotes one of the eight yogic powers. See AKo, *Rāmāśramī* ad 1.1.36ab: *aṇimā laghimā prāptiḥ prākāmyaṁ mahimā tathā / īśitvaṁ ca vaśitvaṁ ca tathā kāmāvaśāyitā* //

³ *paṇḍitammanyah* is an *upapadasamāsa* in the sense of *paṇḍitam ātmānaṁ manyate iti*, see A, 3.2.82 *manaḥ*, A, 3.2.83 *ātmamāne khaś ca*, A, 3.2.24 *ejeḥ khaś* [*khakaro mumarthaḥ*]. See also AKo, 3.3.103cb, *atas triṣu samunnaddhau paṇḍitammanyagarvitau*, *Viśvakośa*, p. 84, *dhacatuṣkam*, 35cd, *samunnaddhaḥ samudbhūte paṇḍitammanyadhṛṣṭayoḥ*, and *Medinikośa*, p. 82, *dhacatuṣkam*, 48cd, *samunnaddhaḥ samudbhūte paṇḍitammanyagarvite*.

V. Eltschinger, B. Kellner, E. Mills, I. Ratié (eds.), *A Road Less Traveled : Felicitation Volume in Honor of John Taber*. (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 100) Wien 2021, pp. 219–246.

as well as injunctions conveyed by prohibitions,
 as in “Go freely, holy man”
 and “Traveler, please do not enter my house.”
 When conveying things that are known,
 by means of some other epistemic sources,
 the words have their power, adapting to the circumstances.
 Or rather, with poets,
 this serious discussion becomes unbecoming,
 when even true scholars are baffled,
 in search of the track traversing the thicket of sentence meanings.⁴

This intriguing, allusive and historically significant passage occurs in (NM, I.1297–15), at the end of the section on the epistemological role of “postulation” (*arthāpatti*) and more specifically right after the section on “postulation of unspoken words” (*śrutārthāpatti*).⁵ The wider context is Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s general definition of “epistemic instrument” (*pramāṇa*). In Jayanta’s own tradition of logic and epistemology *arthāpatti* is not accepted as an autonomous epistemic instrument and it is rather reduced to a particular type of inference. The stanzas concerning poetic meanings are appended by Jayanta to his detailed treatment of *arthāpatti* because, just like *śrutārthāpatti*, the *dhvani* theory introduced in the DhĀ is an attempt to explain the communication of non-spoken or implicit messages, i.e., implicatures.

⁴ NM, I.1299–130,2: *etena śabdāsāmarthyamahimnā so ’pi vāritaḥ / yam anyañ paṇḍi-tammanyañ prapede kaṃcana dhvanim // vidher niṣedhāvagatir vidhibuddhir niṣedha-taḥ / yathā / bhama dhammiya vīsatto mā sma pāntha gṛhaṃ viśa // mānāntarapari-cchedyavasturūpadeśinām / śabdānām eva sāmartyaṃ tatra tatra tathā tathā // atha vā nedrṣī carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate / vidvāṃ so ’pi vimuhyanti vākyaṛthagahane ’dhvani //* The passage is discussed and translated elsewhere, too, notably in McCrea 2008: 216–217, Graheli 2016 and Graheli 2020a.

Regarding the expression *vākyaṛthagahane ’dhvani*, in AKo, 2.4.1 *gahana* is listed as a synonym for *vana*. The compound should be a *karmadhāraya*, *vākyaṛthaś cāsau gahanam ca*. The sensitive reader may notice the *dhvani/adhvani* alliteration, too.

⁵ For a detailed treatment of *arthāpatti* from the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara angles, see Freschi and Ollett 2020a, Freschi and Ollett 2020b and Freschi and Ollett 2020c. For an annotated translation Jayanta’s refutation of *śrutārthāpatti*, see Graheli 2020a: 172–179. For more details about the controversy on *śrutārthāpatti* within Mīmāṃsā, see Freschi in this very *Festschrift*.

Jayanta is here alluding to other crucial themes debated throughout the NM, as will be shown in the next pages. These remarkable lines were written at the end of the ninth century in Kashmir, while the investigation on *alaṅkāras* (“poetic tropes”) was gaining ground as an autonomous discipline (*śāstra*), apparently in disagreement with the admission of poeticians into the upper echelon of Sanskrit scholarship.

Jayanta is dismissing the *dhvani* theory with two distinct rhetorical moves, firstly by appealing to his own theory and secondly by insinuating the incompetence of the *dhvani* theory’s propounder: (1) the already available theory of meaning, along with well-established epistemological processes, is sufficient to account for the knowledge of any linguistic meaning, including poetic meanings; (2) there are scholarly disputes on such accounts, but poets are unqualified to enter the epistemological debate. The theoretical argument is backed by elaborate discussions throughout the monumental NM; this terse passage implies the reader’s knowledge of some crucial concepts that will be fleshed out in the next pages. The insinuation may be rhetorically effective only in a specific historical context, which will be briefly discussed and reconstructed.

The text provokes several historical, philosophical and methodological questions. Here I will focus on these:

- What is the evidence that the unnamed target of Jayanta’s disdain is Ānandavardhana, as commonly assumed?
- Does Jayanta refer to the *kārikās* or the *vṛtti* of the DhĀ?
- What is “the mighty power of words”? Is Jayanta here evoking the Mīmāṃsaka or the Naiyāyika theory of meaning?
- Why are poets deemed to be unqualified as interlocutors?
- Why does Jayanta depict even scholars as baffled?

3. “Resorted to by a self-fancied scholar”

The only extant commentary to the NM, Cakradhara’s *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, was likely written in eleventh-century Kashmir.⁶ He glosses Jayanta’s demeaning words as follows:

⁶ For Cakradhara’s date and place see Muroya 2010: 214–215. To Muroya’s thorough examination of the available evidence I can add that the *Granthibhaṅga* is sporadically quoted in the margins of the earliest Śāradā manuscript of the NM, namely BORI 390 (fifteenth century), which supports a Kashmirian origin of the commentary.

Jayanta is here thinking of the master Ānandavardhana, creator of the *dhvani*. He is the one who labeled as *dhvani* the type of poetry in which both expressed meanings and expressions, assisted by contextual factors (*prakaraṇādi*), suggest an implied (*pratiyamāna*) and predominant meaning, above the level of expressed meanings.⁷

One must keep in mind that these words were written about a couple of centuries after Jayanta's and Ānandavardhana's times. Even if we assume that Cakradhara's identification of Jayanta's "self-fancied scholar" with Ānandavardhana is correct, neither Jayanta's terse mention nor Cakradhara's words confirm whether the target of scorn is the so-called *kārikākāra* or *ṛttikāra*, or whether these two are thought to be identical or different, and whether Ānandavardhana himself was this *kārikākāra* and/or *ṛttikāra*.⁸ The references to the *bhama dhammiya* and the *mā sma pāntha* verses are not conclusive either, because although the first of the two catch-phrases is unequivocally linked to the first example in the *ṛtti* of DhĀ, 1.4, the second one does not tally.

In any case, while suspending the judgment about the authorship of the DhĀ, why was this propounder of the *dhvani* considered a "self-fancied" scholar by Jayanta? Jayanta comes through as a traditionalist, who could not stand any breach

⁷ GBh, p. 32,1–4: *etena paṇḍitaṃmanya ity ānandavardhanācāryaṃ dhvanikāraṃ parāmrśati. sa hi yasmin kāvyaprabhede vācyavācakau prakaraṇādisahāyau vācyadaśo-tīrṇasya pratiyamānasya prādhānyena sthitasya vyañjakatāṃ pratipadyete taṃ kāvyaprabhedaṃ dhvanim āha.*

⁸ At the very beginning of his treatise (DhĀ, 1.1, p. 9,1), the *kārikākāra* himself states that the topic is "the soul of poetry, *dhvani*, that had been transmitted by scholars in the past" (*kāvyasyātmā dhvanir iti budhair yaḥ samāmnatapūrvam*). See Krishnamoorthy 1947 for an analysis of this line. A thorough discussion about the conflicting evidence can be found in Kane 1962: 162–199, who does not commit to a final judgment, and Krishnamoorthy 1955b: 46–90, who thinks that the evidence supports the notion that Ānandavardhana himself was the author of both *kārikā* and *ṛtti*. Ingalls adduces two reasons in favor of Ānandavardhana being both *dhvanikāra* and *ṛttikāra* (Ingalls 1990: 27), which seem rather inconclusive: (1) there is unity of intent and no substantial disagreement between *kārikās* and *ṛtti*; (2) If the *kārikā* text were not by Ānandavardhana, he would have mentioned the name of its author in the *ṛtti*, because this would be an "an instance of disrespect to an intellectual master without parallel in Sanskrit literature." In relation to the presently examined passage of the NM, Krishnamoorthy (1955b: 76) argues that it does not support "the duality of the authorship of the Dhvanyāloka," but obviously this is also not a positive proof in favor of a single author. Kane (1923: 189) thinks that the aorist *prapade* used by Jayanta, which he translates as "resorted to or adopted" and which "cannot mean 'propounded,'" reveals that in Jayanta's eyes "there was already a theory of *dhvani*," either "in a separate work or in the *kārikās*," and that "the *ṛttikāra* only adopted it."

in the scholastic tradition he embodies throughout the NM. His viewpoint, however, needs to be further qualified from three angles.

Firstly, Jayanta's idea of scholarship was the expression of his times. In the NM, at the very outset, he lists the accepted disciplines and emphatically states that "these sciences have specific competences."⁹ For the most, the three disciplines of Vyākaraṇa (grammar), Mīmāṃsā (hermeneutics), and Nyāya (epistemology) constitute the backbone of Jayanta's own scholarship throughout the NM. These are often listed together and described, respectively, as the discipline of words, of sentences, and of epistemology (*padavākyapramāṇaśāstra*), for instance in the AVM (verse 14a) of Mukula, another pioneer of Sanskrit poetics who was Jayanta's contemporary (see Section 6 below). This means that Jayanta's theory of meaning is based on Vyākaraṇa insofar as morphology and semantics are concerned, on Mīmāṃsā insofar as the theory of sentence meaning and pragmatics are concerned, and on Nyāya insofar as epistemology is concerned.¹⁰ Poetics was not yet a reliable discipline in Jayanta's eyes, and in fact groundbreaking works like the DhĀ or Mukula's *Abhidhāvṛttamātrkā* were written in Kashmir right before or during Jayanta's life.

Secondly, Jayanta values theoretical economy and perspicuity, so it is not surprising that the proliferation of *śaktis* triggered by the *dhvani* theory was not acceptable to him. Unseen forces, he argued, may be postulated if there is no other way to explain visible phenomena, and not if such phenomena can be explained through already established laws.¹¹ The existence of a *śakti*, which is

⁹ NM, I.10,4 and II.136,1, *prṭhak prasthānā hīmā vidyāḥ*. Jayanta was himself the author of a lost grammatical commentary and was therefore also known as "Vṛttikāra," as we know from his own words in NM, II.717, ĀḌ, p. 32, and KKS, 1.11. Incidentally, regarding this nickname of Jayanta, the "Navavṛttikāra" variant is triggered by the faulty reading *anvārtho navavṛttikāra* found in NM, II.718,6 and the other editions of the NM. It is a corruption of the original *anvarthena ca vṛttikāra* corroborated by the better manuscripts, namely ms. BORI 390 in Pune, as aptly noticed in Muroya 2016: 300, as well as ms. AL 70179b at the Adyar Library. See Graheli 2015, ch. 3 for details about these manuscripts.

¹⁰ On Nyāya versus Mīmāṃsā, see NM, I.10,5, *sā ca vākyārthavidyā na pramāṇavidyeti*, and NM, II.136,1–2, *pramāṇavidyā ceyam ānvikṣikī, na vākyārthavidyeti*.

¹¹ Jayanta's appeal to theoretical conciseness is among his main argumentative devices. For instance, see NM, I.113,4 against postulating both an operativity (*vyāpāra*) and a power (*śakti*) of epistemic instruments, *kim ubhayakalpanāgauraveṇa*; NM, I.588,12 on the economy of postulating a single author of the Veda, *nānāvakalpanāyāṃ pramāṇābhāvāt kalpanāgauravaprasaṅgāc ca*; NM, I.644,7 on postulating a single omniscient being, *nānāsarvajñakalpanāyāṃ yatnagauravaprasaṅgāt*; NM, II.168,12 against the postulation of the *sphoṭa*, *tasmād ayam api na kalpanāgauravaparihāraḥ samahāḥ panthāḥ*;

an invisible power, cannot be established by perception, so it needs to be either proven through a regular inference from the effect, as Naiyāyikas would do, or postulated through *arthāpatti*, as the Mīmāṃsakas would do. Jayanta's strategy is to infer two powers of words, referentiality and intentionality, to explain every possible signification at sub-sentential, sentential, and supra-sentential level. In his mind the addition of further inferred or postulated powers weakens the general theory.

Third, Jayanta is discussing *śabda* as a means to know reality, and he does not want poetical theories to invade this epistemological domain of Nyāya. Rather than being a criticism of the DhĀ's assessment of poetic meanings, this passage wards off a new theory that may threaten the hegemony of the Mīmāṃsaka exegesis and the Naiyāyika epistemology of the Veda.

4. "That sort of *dhvani*"

With the catchphrase "Wander freely, holy man" Jayanta recalls a stanza of *Gāthāsaptasatī*, 2.75, quoted in DhĀ, *vṛtti* ad 1.4, p. 52 as an instance of an injunction implying a prohibition. The verse is introduced in the *vṛtti* of the DhĀ as the first example of *dhvani*, after these three *kārikās*:

A meaning praised by connoisseurs¹² is the true soul of poetry.

Two types of it are known,

the "expressed" and the "implied" meanings.

The expressed meaning is well known;

others have been dissecting it, by tropes such as the simile,

Hence we are not going to extend its discussion here.

But the implied meaning, found in the words of great poets,

is a quite distinct entity.

It shines, distinguished from evident parts,

just as the enchanting beauty of ladies.¹³

NM, I.249,14 on correct and corrupt words as synonyms, *anyathā ca sambandhe yatna-gauravaprasaṅgāt*. On the general legitimacy of assuming invisible powers, see NM, I.112,9–12: *atrocyate. yady adṛṣṭam antareṇa dṛṣṭam na siddhyati kāmam adṛṣṭam kalpya-tām. anyathā 'pi tadutpattau kiṃ tadupakalpanena. darśitā cānyathā 'py upapattiḥ*.

¹² Ingalls 1990: 74 has "sensitive critics" for *sahṛdaya*, and Krishnamoorthy 1955a: 3 has "cultured critics."

¹³ DhĀ, I.2–4, pp. 42–49: *yo 'rthaḥ sahṛdayaślāghyaḥ kāvyātmēti vyavasthitaḥ / vācyapra-tīyamānākhyau tasya bhedaḥ ubhau smṛtau // tatra vācyāḥ prasiddho yaḥ prakārair*

The Vṛtti to *kārikā* 1.4 runs as follows:

This implied meaning, which is entailed by means of the power of the expressed meaning, is subdivided according to the multiple varieties of objects, tropes, and aesthetic experiences. In all these varieties it is distinct from the expressed meaning. Accordingly, already the first variety is quite distinct from the expressed meaning, because it takes the form of a prohibition whereas the expressed meaning has the form of an injunction. For instance,

Go your rounds freely, gentle monk; the little dog is gone. Just today from the thickets by the Godā came a fearsome lion and killed him.¹⁴

Sometimes it takes the form of an injunction, whereas the expressed meaning has the form of a prohibition. For instance,

Mother-in-law lies here, lost in sleep; And I here; thou shouldst mark These before it is dark. O traveller, blinded by night, Tumble not into our beds aright.¹⁵

Notably, this last verse does not contain the words *mā sma pāntha gṛhaṃ viśa*. We do not know whether Jayanta, with this phrase, was paraphrasing the verse of

upamādibhiḥ / bahudhā vyākṛtaḥ so 'nyaiḥ kāvyalakṣmavidhāyibhiḥ // pratīyamānaṃ punar anyad eva vastv asti vāṇīṣu mahākavīnām / yat tat prasiddhāvayavātiriktaṃ vibhāti lāvaṇyam ivāṅganāsu //

¹⁴ Trans. Ingalls 1990: 83. *bhama dhammia vīsatto so suṇao ajja mārio tena / golāṇai-kacchaku aṅgavāsīṇā dāriasiṇheṇa //* (*chāyā: bhrama dhārmika viśrabdha sa śunako 'dya māritas tena / godāvārīnadīkulalatāgahanavāsīṇā daryasiṇhena //*), The variant *bhava dhammiya vīsatto* (“Be confident, holy man”), in place of *bhama dhammia vīsatto*, is found in NM, I.129,13. The reading is intriguing because it is also found in the *codex unicus* (JT 386, 29v3) of the *Granthibhaṅga* commentary to the NM, corrected back into *bhama* by the editor, N. J. Shah, in GBh, p. 32. As for the NM transmission, however, the manuscript evidence supports *bhama*. See MDUC 2606, 50r6 and BORI 390, II 37r11, and Graheli 2016: 248, n. 40 for further details on this variant. For other variant readings in this verse, see *Sattasāi*, 175, p. 63: *bhama dhammia vīsatto so suṇao ajja mārio tena / golāda viadakuḍaṅgavāsīṇā dāriasiṇheṇa //* Ingalls 1990: 84 argues in favor of the reading *daryasiṇhena* and against *ḍṛptasiṇhena* in the *chāyā*.

¹⁵ Trans. Krishnamoorthy 1955a: 4. *attā ettha ṇimajjai ettha ahaṃ diasaaṃ paloehi / mā pahia rattiaṇḍhia sejjāe maha ṇimajjahisi //* (*chāyā: śvaśrūr atra ṇimajjati atrāhaṃ divasakaṃ pralokaya / mā pathika rātryaṇḍhaka śayyāyāṃ avayor māṅkṣīḥ //*). Ingalls 1990: 98, instead, translates “Mother-in-law sleeps there, I there: / look, traveler, while it is light. / For at night when you cannot see / you must not fall into my bed” and adds that the verse “is a variant of *Sattasāi* 7.67.” *Sattasāi*, 7.67: *ettha ṇimajjai attā ettha ahaṃ ettha pariāṇo saalo / paṇṭhia rattiaṇḍhaa mā maha saāṇe ṇimajjihisi //* (*chāyā: atra ṇimajjati śvaśrūr atrāhaṃ atra pariāṇaḥ sakalaḥ / pathika rātryaṇḍha[ka] mā mama śayante nimaṅkṣyasi //*).

the *ṽṛtti* in the DhĀ, or rather if he had a different quotation in mind. Cakradhara tentatively completes Jayanta's reference with a different verse not found in the DhĀ, while suggesting the uncertain origin of Jayanta's reference (*ity evaṃprāyaślokaikadeśo 'yam*):

I live, here, so young and lone,
with a blind and deaf mother-in-law,
and a husband who is long gone.
So you, traveler, shall not enter my abode.¹⁶

Both verses, the one in the DhĀ *ṽṛtti* and the one quoted by Cakradhara, are examples of a hidden invitation dressed as a prohibition, so they serve the same purpose. Jayanta's second catch-phrase, however, casts a doubt over his precise knowledge of the *ṽṛtti*. Jayanta may be quoting from memory, of course, but in any case the two phrases must be intended to evoke well-known examples.

5. "This mighty power of words"

In the first example, the hidden prohibition can be grasped only by knowing the context. In particular, it is necessary to have an educated guess of the speaker's background, because the interpretation depends upon the assumption of her licentious character. The same sentence, in fact, would just yield the literal meaning if uttered by a chaste woman. As soon as one comprehends the final end of the sentence – the "thing to be done" (*kārya*) in the Prābhākara jargon, and the *tātparya* in Jayanta's theory –, the literal meaning, the injunction, is interpreted as subordinate to this end, because it serves the purpose of conveying the prohibition, the main message. Here Jayanta claims that there is no need of positing an additional "power of suggestion" to explain a process that can rather be justified through the regular causal capacity of words assisted by standard cognitive tools, according to the general theory of language and epistemology developed by the experts (see further Section 6 below).

5.1. The context of the passage: pragmatics of postulation

To determine what Jayanta means by "the mighty power of words," we need some context. This rebuttal of the *dhvani* theory occurs in the first book of the NM. The broader context is Jayanta's classification of epistemic instruments (*pramāṇa*) in defense of the Nyāya position, where four such instruments are traditionally

¹⁶ GBh, p. 334–5: *taruṇy ekāham evāsmiṃ sārddham dṛcchrutihīnayā / śvaśrvā ciragato bhartā pāntha mā me gr̥ham viśa //*

accepted: perception, inference, analogy, and verbal testimony (*śabda*). The closer context is the discussion on postulation (*arthāpatti*), an additional epistemic process accepted in Mīmāṃsā, and the even more immediate context is a sub-type of postulation, namely the “postulation of words” (*śrutārthāpatti*), accepted in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.

This peculiar postulation is a cognitive process through which an unknown element is assumed as a necessary condition to justify the existence of a known phenomenon which would otherwise be inexplicable. In *śrutārthāpatti*, specifically, the unknown element that needs to be postulated is an unspoken portion of the sentence.

5.1.1. The Bhāṭṭa claim

According to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, postulation is of two types: (1) postulation of an object of knowledge (*dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti*), and (2) postulation of the unspoken parts of sentences (*śrutārthāpatti*).¹⁷ This second type of postulation is crucial in Bhāṭṭa epistemology because it is presented as a solution for the exegesis of apparently incomplete passages of the Veda.

The stock example of *śrutārthāpatti* is *pīno devadattaḥ divā na bhuṅkte*, the statement “The fat Devadatta does not eat at day time.” What the listener understands from this statement is “Devadatta eats at night.” According to the Bhāṭṭa view, upon hearing this elliptic statement the *sui generis* cognition of the words “he eats at night” occurs. Such a cognition cannot be caused by any of the other accepted means of knowledge, namely perception, inference, and analogy, and even *śabda* is not a suitable candidate, because one single sentence cannot simultaneously convey two distinct and conflicting meanings such as the negation “he does not eat” and the assertion “he eats.” Moreover, the words “night,” etc., are neither uttered nor heard, so how can their referents be conveyed at all? In the Bhāṭṭa theory of compositionality (*abhihitānvaya*) the cognition of the denoted word-referents is a necessary condition for the cognition of the sentence meaning. Therefore, if the referents “night” etc. were understood from

¹⁷ More literally, *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* and *śrutārthāpatti* may respectively be translated as “postulation of a known object” and “postulation of a heard object.” In Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, the two types of postulation serve two quite distinct epistemological purposes: *dr̥ṣṭārthāpatti* is the postulation of an object of knowledge, a *prameya*, while *śrutārthāpatti* is a postulation of the missing part of an incomplete sentence, a missing portion of *śabdapramāṇa*. See Graheli 2020a: 146, 154–155.

the spoken words there would be the absurdity of having a meaning generated by absent words.¹⁸

The Bhāṭṭa defense of *śrutārthāpatti* is not confined to such trivial cases, but is rather motivated by the extensive application of this tool in the Vedic exegesis, with a significant impact on the epistemology and exegesis of apparently incomplete passages of the Veda.

Jayanta disagrees on the need of *śrutārthāpatti* and counters from the two distinct standpoints of Nyāya and of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. Quite significantly, the Prābhākara rebuttal is the last and much more nuanced argument, which reveals at least some degree of Jayanta's commitment to it.

5.1.2. The Naiyāyika rebuttal

The Naiyāyika strategy (NM, I.121–123) is to reduce *śrutārthāpatti* to an inference from the effect: Devadatta's fatness serves as an inferential mark, leading to the knowledge of its natural cause, eating food. Through repeated observations, one knows that fatness is invariably caused by eating, just as one knows that smoke is caused by fire. The Bhāṭṭas may argue that the application of inferences is not legitimate in the case of elliptic Vedic passages, because the authority of the Veda must be purely derived from its words in order to preserve its status of independent epistemic source. This, however, is not an issue for Naiyāyikas, who do not have any problem in using well-formed inferences to confirm the truth of the Veda.

5.1.3. The Prābhākara rebuttal

The Prābhākara strategy (NM, I.124–128) is to argue in favor of an autonomous and more direct signification of Vedic utterances, without relying on any *arthāpatti* at all. The power of words allows them to have variable and contingently adaptable depths of reach. Words are compared to arrows, which have a piercing power which adapts to situational conditions such as the quality of the tip, the arrow's speed, and the characteristics of the target.¹⁹ In the *comparandum* the ultimate

¹⁸ See NM, I.101,2–11: *pīno divā ca nātfīti sākāṅkṣavacanaśruteḥ / tadekadeśavijñānam śrutārthāpattir ucyate // iha evaṁvidhasākāṅkṣavacanaśravaṇe sati samupajāyamānam rajanībhojanavijñānam na [om. NM] pramāṇāntarakaraṇakam bhavitum arhati, pratya-kṣāder asannidhānāt. [...] śabdaś ca na śrūyamāṇa imam artham abhivaditum alam, ekasya vākyasya vidhiniṣedharūpārthadvayasamarpaṇasāmarthyasūnyatvāt, atra ca rātryādīpadānām āśravaṇād, apadārthasya ca vākārthatvānupapatteḥ.*

¹⁹ *vākyasya dūrāvidūravyavasthitaguṇāguṇakriyādyanekakāraḥkalāpoparakta kāryātma-kavākārthapratītau iṣor iva dīrghadīrgho vyāpāraḥ* (NM, I.124,5–8).

target is the sentence-meaning, which for Prābhākaras is typically the optative or deontic meaning, “what-ought-to-be-done” (*kārya*), i.e., the duty prescribed by the sentence, which is qualified by the various factors contributing to the activity. For the sake of this ultimate aim of a sentence, even unspoken words may be taken as necessary conditions for the completion of the sentence meaning. For instance, in the case of the Vedic prescription of the “World-conquering” ritual (*viśvajit*), the question arises: to whom is the prescription directed, who is expected to perform the ritual? The prescription is not actually meaningful until this element is understood. The answer is that “whoever desires heaven” should perform this ritual. Though these words are not present in the letter of the “World-conquering” prescription, their meaning is the necessary condition that makes the heard words plausible because the prescription can be actualized only once the required competence of the performer is known and the performer then puts it into practice.²⁰ In the “fat Devadatta” and the “World-conquering” examples, the activity, respectively “eating at night” and “it ought to be done by heaven-desiring people,” is the core of the sentence-meaning. In both cases the sentence meaning is generated because of the wider context of the elliptic sentence, which is perceived as a unit. The causality of present or absent words is assessed in conformance to this final end, the sentence meaning. There is no need of a distinct epistemic source called *śrutārthāpatti*.²¹

One may object that in both examples the words conveying the meanings “eating at night” and “ought to be done by heaven-desiring people” are not heard, so what is then generating the knowledge of such meanings, if not a postulation? Furthermore, until these meanings are known what sort of temporary meaning can one construe, to search for the missing meanings on its basis? The Prābhākaras reply that the causality of the heard words is not based on their sheer power, but is rather assumed through their compliance to the effect; the same applies to unheard words conducive to the effect. When one understands the meaning of words such as *yajeta* (“one ought to sacrifice”) or *svargakāma* (“heaven-desiring”), one neither hears the instrumental ending of “through sacrifice” implied in the verbal root *yaj-*, nor the accusative ending of “heaven” implied in the compound “heaven-desiring,” and yet one does cognize their respective

²⁰ *naimittikānukūlyaparyālocanayā kvacid [kvacic ca NM] aśrūyamāṇānyapi tāni nimittatām bhajante, viśvajidātau svargakāmapadādivat* (NM, I.125,1–4).

²¹ *tasmāt prathamāvagataikaghanākāravākyaṛthānusāreṇa satām asatām vā padānām nimittabhāvavyavasthāpanād aśrūyamāṇatathāvidhaikadeśād api vākyaṭ tadarthāvagati-sambhavāt kiṃ śrutārthāpattiyā* (NM, I.125,7–10).

meaning. In the same way, from the words spoken in the “World-conquering” prescription, on the strength of the expected end, one does understand the meaning “by heaven-desiring people.”²²

One may further object that if the causality of the means is known after knowing the final end, there is the fatal consequence that any word could potentially have the universal capacity to mean everything. And then how could one distinguish primary or literal meanings from secondary or figurative ones? And how could one then apply exegetical rules based on the specification of meanings?

As for the universal force of words, the Prābhākaras reply that this is not a flaw, because even if words could potentially mean anything a specific congruence is always reached by the situational interaction of the various types of words – verbs, nouns, cases, etc. – used in a given sentence. Indeed, the cognition of the effect does not disappear once the universal force of the individual words is eclipsed through their mutual specification.

As for the distinction of primary, secondary or figurative meanings, the cognition generated by the word “lion” in relation to the lion’s progeny is different from the cognition generated by “Devadatta is a lion.” When one hears “he dives into the Ganges” and “the herdsmen reside on the Ganges,” respectively, the word “Ganges” does not have the same causal force.

As for the exegetic rules – explicit utterance (*śruti*), indicator of purpose (*liṅga*), unity of the sentence (*vākya*), unity of wider context (*prakaraṇa*), relative position (*sthāna*), name (*samākhyā*) –²³ they all have a specific proximity or distance from the main target of a prescription, i.e., the duty that ought to be done. Therefore even in this case the possibility of an indistinct application does not ensue.²⁴

²² *ucyate. śruteṣv api padeṣu teṣāṃ nimittabhāvo na svamahimnā avakalpate, kiṃ tu naimittikānusāradvāraka evaṃ aśruteṣv api bhaviṣyati. na yajau karaṇavibhaktim śṛṇu-maḥ, na svarge karmavibhaktim, nāgnicidādiṣu kvippratyaṃ, nādhunādiṣu prakṛtim, na samāsataddhiteṣu ca [om. NM] yathocitāṃ vibhaktim / atha [api NM] ca prafīma eva tadartham. evaṃ viśvajidādāv api yajeta iti naimittikabalād eva svargakāmādīpadārthaṃ pratyeṣyāmaḥ* (NM, I.125,10–126,6).

²³ These are criteria used in the exegesis of the Veda, pre-dating the use of the term *pramāṇa* as “epistemic instrument.” There are two distinct sets of such *pramāṇas* that assist the exegesis, respectively, of the *vinīyogavidhi* and of the *krama*. See *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, 3.3.14, *śrutiliṅgavākyaṇaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyānāṃ samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviprakaṣāt* and MNP, p. 234, *śrutyarthapaṭhanasthānamukhyapravṛttākhyāni*.

²⁴ *nanv evaṃ sati sarvatra śabdavyāpārasambhavāt / mukhyasyāpi bhavet sāmyaṃ gauna-lākṣaṇikādibhiḥ // śrutiliṅgādīmānāṃ virodhe yac ca varṇyate / pūrvapūrvabaliyastvaṃ*

This refutation of *śrutārthāpatti* is based on an autonomous capacity of words to generate sentence meanings, which extends even to cases of elliptic, figurative, or other types of apparently incongruous expressions. After wrapping up his discussion on *śrutārthāpatti*, “Thus ends this long digression, presented here in the light of another discipline (*śāstra*),”²⁵ Jayanta embeds his presently discussed dismissal of the *dhvani*.

5.2. The power of words: a Naiyāyika tenet or a Mīmāṃsaka one?

Cakradhara links Jayanta’s appeal to “the power of words” to his trademark “power of intentionality,” and interprets “other cognitive instruments” as “epistemic instruments” in their Naiyāyika and epistemological acceptation. Although one can certainly appreciate the attempt to find an internal consistency in Jayanta’s theories, I am arguing that Cakradhara is here ignoring the factor of the position of the *dhvani* dismissal, which is placed right after Prābhākara’s argumentation. Besides, the very phrases *śabdasāmarthyamahimnā* and *anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ* are ambiguous enough to be related, respectively, to the universal “denotative power of words” (*abhidhāna*) maintained by Prābhākaras, and to “exegetical instruments” such as *śruti* and *līṅga* mentioned right above.

In any case “this power of words” (*śabdasāmarthya*) evokes a general theory of meaning accepted by Jayanta, which is purportedly capable of accounting for any meanings, including the suggestive meanings of the two examples at hand.²⁶ The term “power” (*sāmarthya*), refers to a causal power, elsewhere called *śakti* by Jayanta and defined by him as “the co-operation of factors having the capability to produce the effect.”²⁷ In the extensive discussion found in the fifth and sixth

tat katham vā bhaviṣyati / ucyate. saty api sarvatra śabdavyāpāre tatprakārabhedopapatter eṣa na doṣaḥ. na hi padānām sarvātmanā nimittabhāvam apahāyaiva naimittikaprafitir upaplavate. [...] anyathā siṃhaśabdena matiḥ kesariṇīsute / anyathā devadattātau prafitir upajanyate // gaṅgāyām majjati atra gaṅgāśabdo nimittatām / upayāti yathā naivam ghoṣādivasatau tathā // śrutilīṅgavākyaprakaraṇasthānasamākhyānām api arthasannikarṣaviprakarṣakṛto ’sty eva viśeṣa iti tatrāpi na viniyogasāmyam (NM, I.126,9–127,11).

²⁵ *ity alam anayā prasaktānuprasaktyāgataśāstrāntaragarbhakathāvistaraprastāvanayā* (NM, I.128,9–128,10).

²⁶ Here the expression is *śabdasāmarthyamahimnā*, where the words *sāmarthya* and *mahiman* are to be understood as synonyms for *śakti*, “causal power.” Jayanta uses *mahiman* elsewhere as well, but not in compound with *sāmarthya*.

²⁷ See NM, I.182,11, *svarūpasahakārisvabhāvaiva* and NM, II.403,8, *yogyatāvacchinna-svarūpasahakārisannidhānam eva*. In his general discussion on causation, Jayanta distinguishes two types of *śakti*, (1) fixed or inherent (*avasthitā*), and (2) situational or accidental (*āgantukī*). In the causation of an earthen vessel, for instance, the material causes, the atoms of earth, have an inherent causality, while the co-operation of the

books of the NM Jayanta argues in favor of two such powers of words, namely “referentiality” (*abhidhāśakti*) and “intentionality” (*tātparyāśakti*). Referentiality is the causal relation between discrete words and knowledge of their referents, and intentionality the one between words in a sentence and knowledge of the sentence meaning.²⁸

In Nyāya, individual word-referents are considered already complex entities. These referents are described as qualified entities (*tadvat*, lit. “possessor-of-that”), most typically universal-qualified particulars.²⁹ This Nyāya theory, however, does not amount to a complete theory of sentence meaning, as Jayanta apologetically

potter’s stick and wheel has an accidental causality (NM, II.403,8–10: *saiveyaṃ dvividhā śaktir ucyate avasthitā āgantukī ca. mṛttvādyavacchinnāṃ svarūpaṃ avasthitā śaktiḥ. āgantukī ca daṇḍacakrādisaṃgarūpā*). It seems to me that whenever Jayanta mentions *śakti* in the NM the reader is left wondering whether he is considering it as a postulated power, as a Mīmāṃsaka would do, or as another name for “causation,” from a Naiyāyika slant.

²⁸ Since intentionality is conditioned by the situational presence of other factors, one may argue that it is an accidental or contingent causation (*śakti*). Moreover, the relation between words and referents is based on a stipulation established at the dawn of creation, as Jayanta and Nyāya in general want it to be in contrast to the Mīmāṃsā tenet of a fixed word-meaning relation – see NM, I.601,17–602,21: *tad evaṃ śabdasya naisargika-śaktyātmakasambandhābhāvāt īśvaraviracitasamayānibandhanaḥ śabdārthavyavahāraḥ nānādiḥ. [...] tasmād īśvaraviracitasambandhādhiḡgamopāyabhūtavṛddhavyavahārālabdhataadvutpattisāpekṣaḥ śabdaḥ artham avagamayaṭīti siddham* – so even referentiality may be considered accidental. Besides, for the uneducated person a word does not produce any meaning, so it is in any case difficult to postulate such an inherent power of words.

²⁹ The Nyāya stance on the referents of words can be traced back to the very *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.66, *vyaktiākṛtijātayaḥ tu padārthaḥ*. Vātsyāyana (*Nyāyabhāṣya*, 2.2.66, p. 132,11–15) explain how in different contexts (*tad etad bahulaṃ prayogeṣu*) the word *go* can respectively denote the particular (*vyakti*), the shape (*ākṛti*) or the natural kind (*jāti*), in a mutual relation of predominance and subordination (*pradhānāṅgabhāva*), i.e., where one of the three aspects emerges as predominant (*pradhānāṅgabhāvasyānīyamena padārthatvam*), although Vātsyāyana does not use the term *tadvat*. This Nyāya position was challenged by Dignāga: “A class noun is not the referent of a particular possessing a universal, because it is not independent in referring to such a universal-possessing particular” (trans. Hattori 2000: 142). The Sanskrit version of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* passage, in *Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram*, 607, is *tadvato nāsvatantratvād upacārād asambhavāt / bhinnatvād buddhirūpasya rājñi bhṛtyopacāravat*. It is also quoted in GBh, 137–138, albeit with *vṛttirūpasya bhinnatvād* in the third foot of the verse. Dignāga’s critique is then fended by Uddyotakara (see NV, 1.1.1, p. 4,16; 1.1.3, p. 28,3; 1.1.29, p. 100,3; 2.2.66, pp. 306–312) and then by Jayanta himself. Jayanta’s position on this “possessor-of-that” has been articulated in Ganeri 1996 and Ganeri 1999, § 4.1, 4.2. Ganeri’s interpretation is discussed in Graheli 2020b: 230–231.

explains in NM, II.135,15–136,2: “Nyāya is about theory of knowledge, while the science of sentence meanings is Mīmāṃsā,” and “wherefrom could I learn about the nature of sentence meanings, in order to explain it here?”³⁰ Jayanta thus elaborates a brand of sentence compositionality which draws inspiration from the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara views, and yet is meant to fit the Nyāya ontology and epistemology.³¹ Most importantly, along with the Prābhākaras, he does not want to compromise the direct causal link between testimony (*śabda*) and the knowledge it generates, because testimony, and particularly Vedic testimony, must be an independent epistemic source. This epistemic autonomy is defended by postulating a deeper power of words by the Prābhākaras of the NM: “Concerning the cognition of the sentence meaning ... the sentence itself has a farther and farther reaching operativity, like that of an arrow.” In the passage under examination, as I understand it, the pronoun *etena*, “by this,” in *etena śabdāsāmarthyamahimnā*, evokes the passage of NM, I.124,4–9, where the Prābhākara refutation of the Bhāṭṭa *śrutārthāpatti* begins.³²

³⁰ *vākyaṛthas tu na kvacid api sūtrakārabhāṣyakārābhyāṃ sūcita iti kutaḥ śikṣitvā vākyaṛthasvarūpaṃ vāyam ācakṣmahe. kim iti tābhyāṃ asau na sūcitaḥ iti cet pṛthakprasthānā himā vidyāḥ. pramāṇavidyā ceyam ānvikṣikī, na vākyaṛthavidyeti.* Jayanta must have been particularly proud of this achievement, judging from the mention of his examination of the theories on sentence meaning at the very end of the NM. See NM, II.717,18, *kāṃcid vākyaṛthacarcām api viracayatānukrameṇāvaṫirṇaṃ*.

³¹ From the immediate context of the Prābhākara refutation of *śrutārthāpatti* one may assume that it is the power of denotation (*abhidhā*) that words exercise even in sentence signification, according to the model of *anvitābhidhāna* and in opposition to the Bhāṭṭa model of *abhihitānvaya*. But the conclusion of Jayanta’s own discussion on the two views, in NM 5 and 6, words themselves possess two distinct powers of words denotation (*abhidhāśakti*) and intentionality (*tātparyaśakti*). Jayanta agrees with the Prābhākaras that language invariably works by sentences, and not by individual words, as explained in NM, II.217,7, *ata eva padaṃ loke kevalaṃ na prayujyate*.

³² *prabhākaraṣ tu drṣṭaḥ śruto vā iti bhāṣyaṃ laukikam abhidhānāntaram evedam upalabdhihvacanam iti varṇayantaḥ śrutārthāpattiṃ pratyācakṣate. śrūyamāṇasyaiva śabdasya tāvaty arthe sāmartyam upagacchantāḥ tam arthaṃ śābdam eva pratijānate. vākyaṣya dūrāvidūravayavasthitagunāgunakriyādyanekakārakakalāpoparaktakāryātma-kavākyaṛthapratītau iṣor iva dīrghadīrgho vyāpāraḥ. aviratavyāpāre ca śabde sā pratītir udeti, tadvyāpāraviratau nodeti, tadutpādakakārakābhāvāt. vṛddhavyavahāraś ca śabdeṣu vyutpadyamāno lokaḥ tathābhūtavākyaavyavahāriṇo vṛddhān paśyan vākyaṣyaiva tādrīśavākyaṛthe sāmartyam avadhārayati. tadanuvārṇi tu padāni tasmīn naimittike nimitṭāni bhavanti.* The analogy of the arrow is repeated in NM, II.209,11, in the same context of the word-generated knowledge of sentence meanings (*anvitābhidhāna*) and opposed to the Bhāṭṭa theory of *abhihitānvaya*. I’m not aware of any occurrence of this analogy in pre-Jayanta sources, including Prabhākara’s own *Bṛhatī*. The analogy, however, is found in several later works. For instance, cf. DhĀ, Locana ad 1.4, p. 64,2–3, *yo ’py anvitābhidhānavādī “yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ” iti hṛdaye grahitvā śaravad*

And yet Jayanta cannot afford to fully embrace a Mīmāṃsaka theory of meaning, which presupposes crucial doctrinal differences with respect to Nyāya. Among such differences, most importantly, Naiyāyikas argue in favor of a conventional nature of semantic relations, because their epistemology of testimony is founded on the trustworthiness of the authority and, consequently, on the Veda's having an author. By contrast, according to Mīmāṃsā semantic relations are fixed and beginningless and the authority of the Veda is based on the fact that it is beginning-less and author-less, the characteristic that guarantees the absence of any possible human bias or defect in it. Relatedly, in this context of sentence meaning and verbal testimony Jayanta takes care to distinguish intentionality (*tātparyasakti*), a power of words, from intention (*vivakṣā*), a mental state of the speaker or author which can be inferred and not conveyed by the words themselves.³³

6. “By means of other epistemic sources ... even true scholars are baffled”

Cakradhara comments on this kind of power of words and its capacity to generate any meaning with the assistance of other epistemic instruments as follows (GBh, p. 33,11–34,4):

In the sentence “the village is on the Ganges” there is an indicatory process (*lakṣaṇā*). Here the operation of words culminates in the communication of the meaning “the village is on the shore of the Ganges,” as dictated by another epistemic instrument, because the object “stream of the Ganges” is not apprehended as the substratum of the village. And in the metaphor “the boy is a lion,” the word “lion” has the power of communicating a specific quality, namely courage, because the conflation (*samāveśa*) of two conflicting universals in a single object is just impossible.³⁴

In the case of the metonymy “the village is on the Ganges” the assisting epistemic instrument would be perception because of the “non-apprehension” indicated by the phrase “is not apprehended as the substratum of the village” (*ādhāratvānupalambhāt*), which in Nyāya is considered a type of perceptual cognition. In the case of the metaphor “the boy is a lion” the primary meaning is

abhidhāvyaṣṭāpāram eva dīrghadīrgham icchati, tasya yadi dīrgho vyāpāras tad eko 'sāv iti kutaḥ, and ŚPr, p. 425, where this NM passage is found.

³³ Unlike in later Nyāya, where *tātparya* and *vivakṣā* may be easily conflated. See NSM, 84cd, for instance: *vaktur icchā tu tātparyam*.

³⁴ *tathā hi. yathā “gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ” iti lakṣaṇāyāṃ srotorūpasyārthasya ādhāratvānupalambhāt pramāṇāntarānugūṇyena tatapratipādana eva paryavasayati śabdavyāpāraḥ, yathā ca gaṇe “siṃho māṇavakaḥ” ityādaḥ dvayor aparajātyor viruddhayor ekatra samāveśasambhavād guṇaviśeṣa eva śauryalakṣaṇe pratipādanaśaktiḥ siṃhaśabdasya.*

blocked because of the impossibility of the presence of two incompatible universals, namely human-hood and lion-ness, in the single particular denoted by the co-referential words. Since neither Naiyāyikas nor Mīmāṃsakas accept *sambhava* as an independent epistemic source, I suppose that Cakradhara is thinking of postulation (*arthāpatti*), or more likely of inference (*anumāna*) from the Naiyāyika standpoint.

Analogously, in the present case the power of referentiality culminates in an injunction, but since the power of intentionality (*tātparyasakti*) is not yet exhausted and since with an injunction the word-referents can not be congruously correlated,³⁵ the prohibition “do not go!” appears at once as the sentence meaning. Therefore, in this case, even if the activity of wandering is prescribed on the basis of a removal of the fear of the purportedly dead dog, obviously the prescription of wandering cannot be the final sentence meaning, because a contrasting cause is apprehended, namely the cause of fear communicated by the menace of a raging lion on the path, as evinced from the referent “lion” specified by the word “raging.” Rather, what emerges as the ground of reference (*nimitta*) is the prohibition of that activity, which becomes the sentence meaning. Even though what is directly understood is a prescription conveyed by the imperative mode of the verb, in want of a correlation [with “raging lion”] the prohibition of wandering is communicated by the imperative “wander!,” by dint of an opposite indication (*viparītalakṣaṇā*). The usage of opposite indications is quite common, for instance in the case of the word *darśa* (“appearing”) which by opposite indication conveys the new moon, though it is actually a non-appearing moon. If upon hearing such a sentence there is the cognition of the effect, one needs to account for the grounds for this effect. This is what Jayanta has in mind with the pronoun *etena*.³⁶

³⁵ By contrast, cf. DhĀ, Locana ad 1.4, p. 564–57, *tato viśeṣarūpe vākyārthe tātparyasaktiḥ parasparānvite*, “*sāmānyāny anyathāsiddher viśeṣaṃ gamayanti hi*” *iti nyāyāt. tatra ca dvitīyakakṣyāyāṃ “bhrama” iti vidhyatiriktaṃ na kiñcit pratīyate, anvayamātrasyaiva pratipannatvāt.*

³⁶ *evam atra yadyapi vidhāv abhidhānaśaktiḥ paryavasitā tathāpi tātparyasakter aparyavasānād vidhau ca padārthānanvayād mā bhramiḥ iti niṣedha eva jhagiti vākyārthatayāvabhāṣate. tato 'tra yadyapi śvavyāpādanopanyāseṇa bhayanivṛttiṃ kṛtvā bhramaṇam eva vidhīyate tathāpi dṛṣṭapadaviśeṣitasimhapadārthaparyālocanāyāṃ sadarpapañcānanabādhitādhvapratipādanena sutarāṃ bhayahetūpanyāsād viruddhakāraṇopalambhād bhramaṇavidhiḥ na vākyārthatām upagantum alam, pratyuta tanniṣedhasyaivodbhūtanimittatvam iti tasyaiva vākyārthatopārohaḥ. yadyapi ca sāksāloṭṭhā pratipādyamāno vidhiḥ śrūyate tathāpy ananvayabalād bhramety anena viparītalakṣaṇayā bhramaṇaniṣedha eva pratipādyate. dṛśyate ca viparītalakṣaṇayāpi vyavahārah. tathā hi. candrādarśasvabhāvām amāvāsyāṃ darśasabdena viparītalakṣaṇayā pratipādayanti. api ca, asti tāvad evamprāyād vākyād ithambhūtanaimittikāvagatiḥ, asyāṃ cāvagatau yathā nimittānāṃ nimittatvam avakalpyate tathā kalpyam iti. etad eva cetasi nidhāya “etena*

Cakradhara's main point is that the *bhama dhammīya* sentence, just like “the village is on the Ganges” and “this boy is a lion,” conveys its meaning through an indication (*lakṣaṇā*). The primary meaning lacks congruity, and this incongruous primary meaning indicates (*lakṣ-*) an alternative meaning. Specifically, here there is an “opposite indication,” where the indicated meaning stands in opposition to the preliminarily denoted meaning. The preliminary meaning is denoted by the power of referentiality of words, and the indicated meaning by their power of intentionality, which fulfills its role with the final sentence meaning.³⁷

Cakradhara's words, however, do not explain the status of this indication. It cannot be a third power of words, because Jayanta unequivocally states that words have only the powers of referentiality and intentionality. It cannot be the *lakṣaṇā* of the Bhāṭṭa theory of sentence meaning, where any sentence meaning, no matter if figurative or not, is “indicated” by the referents of the individual words. Rather, the interpretation of poetic passages like *bhama dhammīya* is assisted by “other epistemic sources,” as in the comprehension of the absurd sentence “One hundred elephants sit on the fingertip.” This is not the place to open a discussion on the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara views on metaphors and metonymies, but it is worthwhile citing an extract of Jayanta's rendition of the debate around this “fingertip” sentence, which occurs in NM, sixth *āhnika*, II.211, where the Prābhākara voice states:

The *śabda*'s operation is by nature revelation, while the reason for falsehood or truth lies rather in the flaws and virtues of us human beings. Here, too, there is the knowledge, born from *śabda*, of an interconnection between a verbal action and grammatical factors. The absence of a correspondence with reality is due to an error of human cognition.

As stated, “Here the knowledge (*darśana*) of another epistemic source is invalidated (*badhyate*).”³⁸

This is exactly why this *śabda*, as an epistemic source, is intrinsic and unimpeded: because even there, within the operation of *śabda* those

pañcītaṁmanyah” ity atra etena iti sarvanāma prayuktam.

³⁷ The “opposition” (*viparītya*) is listed as one of the five conditions of incongruity that trigger an indication, in an often-quoted stanza attributed to Bhartṛmītra, *abhidheyena sambandhāt sādṛśyāt samavāyataḥ / viparītyāt kriyāyogāl lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā* // See AVM, p. 50. In contrast with Cakradhara's assessment, Abhinavagupta argues that there is no opposite indication here. Cf. DhĀ, Locana ad 1.4, p. 57,5–6, *ata eva mukhyārthabādhā nātra śaṅkyeti na viparītalakṣaṇāyā avasaraḥ*.

³⁸ Verbal knowledge in itself is not invalidated. “Any other epistemic instrument,” such as perception and inference, with the exception of *śabda*. This line, *pramāṇāntaradarśanam atra badhyate*, is an often-quoted passage from *Bṛhatī*, ad 1.1.2, vol. 1, pp. 26,15–16, where it is used in the same context of the final view on the “fingertip” sentence.

invalidators cannot enter. This is why in the sentence “on the fingertip,” the syntactic relation of *śabda* obtains.³⁹

In short, “other epistemic sources” may assist the operation performed by words in the case of secular language, but not in the case of the Veda, which is an autonomous epistemic authority. This is the Prābhākara view and Jayanta does not refute it. Cakradhara further comments:

In the Veda the organization (*vyavasthā*) of meant objects is exclusively linked to words, so the organization of those objects must exactly match the words (*yathāśabdam*).⁴⁰ In common language, instead, words are used to convey already known objects for the benefit of someone else. This knowledge is achieved through additional epistemic instruments. The thing (*vastu*) communicated by the words can be apprehended as it was known [by the speaker] only if it is not in conflict with other epistemic instruments, and not if it is in conflict. It should thus be assessed according to the absence or presence of a conflict with other epistemic instruments.⁴¹

If other epistemic instruments are involved, namely perception and inference, then the listener’s cognition of the meaning is not caused just by the words, and so it is not purely verbal (*śabda*) anymore. This fact would corroborate the choice of terms in the DhĀ, where a fundamental distinction between verbal (*vācya*) and cognized (*pratīyamāna*) meanings is drawn. But Cakradhara explains:

It is also plausible that the cognition of the implied meaning (*pratīyamāna*) remains a verbal cognition, because otherwise, after knowing the meaning, the listener would have the awareness “I have conjectured this meaning, I have not comprehended it from words.” On the contrary, a cognition generated by words is definitely there, and so this is simply a verbal cognition. One who grasps the plain meaning and is satisfied by a cognition of the simple prescription has not truly understood the sentence meaning. As someone stated, if upon hearing the exhortation “go, look at the sun” one exits, comes back, and declares “I’ve seen the sun. It is pure and radiant,” he has not done what he was told, because the sentence aims at conveying a specific time of the day. Similarly, “Even a child, when

³⁹ “Syntactic relation” (*samanvaya*), lit. “mutual correlation,” intended in the *Bṛhatī* as purely grammatical relation without any real correspondence.

⁴⁰ I understand *yathāśabdam*, “matching exactly the words,” as an *avyayībhāva* compound in the sense *padārthānavṛttau*. For the other possible senses of *yathā* in such a compound, see *Kāśikā*, ad 2.1.6.

⁴¹ GBh, p. 33,7–10: *vede śabdanibandhanatvād arthavyavasthāyās tatra yathāśabdam arthavyavasthāstu, loke punar jñātam arthaṃ paraṃ pratipādayituṃ śabdān prayuñjate jñānam ca pramāṇāntarāt. tat śabdapratipāditam vastu yadi pramāṇāntareṇa na virudhyate tad yathāvagatam eva grāhyam, virodhe tu na. yathāvirodho bhavati tathā tasyārtho vyavasthāpyaḥ.*

ordered to guard the butter from the crows, will not fail from protecting it from dogs, because the sentence concerns the possible damage” (VP, 2.312).⁴²

7. “With poets, this serious discussion is unbecoming”

In a historical perspective, in Jayanta’s frame of reference poetics and poetry were not yet distinct genres. The discipline later called *alaṅkāraśāstra* had yet to gain due scholarly recognition. The pioneering works that were attempting to fill this gap were mostly based upon ideas from Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya, as seen in the DhĀ and in Mukula’s AVM, another coeval attempt at building a general theory that could explain poetic meanings.⁴³ The very phrase *alaṅkāraśāstra* is attested only later and is used neither in the DhĀ or the AVM,⁴⁴ nor in the NM or the GBh. The authors of the DhĀ and the AVM, however, did not provide any articulated presentation and refutation of the various theses developed in the authoritative disciplines of Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya, so in Jayanta’s eyes they had no right to challenge these three recognized strongholds of scholarship.

In this historical context Jayanta’s words betray his discomfort in admitting poets to a technical discussion on theories of meaning. This should not be taken as a condemnation of poets or poetry in any sense. Elsewhere, indeed, Jayanta does refer respectfully to poets. In the context of the defense of the Naiyāyika views on the authorship of the Veda, Jayanta argues that a variety in composition can be explained only if there is a variety of authors. There (NM, I.581–582) he writes:

⁴² GBh, p. 34,4–11: *yuktaṃ ca pratīyamānārthapratipatteḥ śābdatvam eva, anyathā īdṛśam artham avagamya pratipattuh “utprekṣito mayā ayam artha, na tu śābdāt pratipannaḥ” iti pratītiḥ syāt. asti ca śābdatvena pratītiḥ, ataḥ śābda evāyam. yasya tu yathāśrutagrāhiṇo vidhimātrapratītyaiva santoṣaḥ so ’navadhāritavākyaārtha eva. yad āhuḥ, “gantavyaṃ dṛśyatām sūryaḥ” ity ukte bahir niḥsr̥tya praviśya yo brūyād “dṛṣṭaḥ sūryo nirmalaḥ prakīrṇaśmīḥ” iti na tena yathoktaṃ kṛtaṃ ity ucyate, kālaviśeṣopalipsānibandhana-tvād vākyaśyeti / tathā, “kākebhyo rakṣyatām sarpīr” iti bālo ’pi coditaḥ / upaghātapare vākye na śvādibhyo na rakṣati //* This last stanza is a quotation from VP, 2.312.

⁴³ On the history of the status of *śāstra* of poetics, see Bronner 2020, who concludes that “It was still a long while before literary theorists could actually claim their intellectual independence, confidently look down on other fields, and turn from being constant borrowers of paradigms and ideas to being prominent lenders of them. This happened only on the eve of colonialism in India, when Sanskrit poetics fully absorbed scholastic thinking and textual practices.”

⁴⁴ Mukula, in AVM, p. 73,2, christens “literary science” (*sāhityaśāstra*) as the fourth discipline in addition to *vyākaraṇa*, *mīmāṃsā* and *tarka*.

Sprinkled, as if with nectar, anointed, as if with sandal, cleansed, as if by moonlight, are Kālidāsa's stanzas.

Extended alliterations yielding aesthetic emotions savored by every poet; such are the expressions of Bāṇa. Similar peculiarities are evidently found in every poem. To claim that the absence of an author of the Veda is inferred from the form, on the ground that there is some peculiar variety of nouns, verbs, etc., would certainly be an unprecedented argument (NM, I.582,1–6).⁴⁵

Despite their talents, however, poets were neither grammarians, nor exegetes, nor epistemologists or logicians, and thus not admitted to the debate on theories of knowledge.

The two examples evoked by Jayanta, *bhama dhammīya* and *mā sma pāntha*, qualify as poetry. If the truth of utterances is understood as the reference to an external reality, then it seems pointless to discuss about the truth of poetic compositions, because a poetic truth, if there is any such truth, cannot be understood in this plain sense. Therefore, why bothering with poetic meanings in this epistemological discussion of the NM? And why embroiling poets in the controversy, if they themselves do not claim any expertise on truth? After all, the DhĀ, *vr̥tti* ad 3.33, p. 455 states that “In the domain of poetry it is pointless to describe the suggestions as true or false; here, an epistemological scrutiny would become the object of ridicule.”⁴⁶ Abhinavagupta adds that in poetry it is pointless to establish any epistemological validity, “because poetry aims at pleasure” (*pr̥timātraparyavasāyivāt*) (DhĀ, Locana ad 3.33, p. 455). And if the hallmark of poetry is to generate pleasure by beauty, it is indeed improper to relate this gratuitous beauty to any “prosaic” truth.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ *amṛteneva saṃsiktāḥ candaneneva carcitāḥ / candrāṃśubhir avonmṛṣṭāḥ kālidāsasya sūktayaḥ || prakṛta-rasānugūṇa-vikāṭākṣara-racanā-camatkārita-sakalakavikulāḥ bāṇasya vācaḥ. pratikāvyam ca tāni tāni vaicitryāṇi dṛśyanta eva. nāmākhyātādivaicitryamātreṇa kartrabhāvo vede rūpād eva pratīyata iti nūtaneyam vācayuktīḥ.*

⁴⁶ *kāvyaṣiṣaye ca vyaṅgyapratīṭhāṇi satyāsatanirūpaṇasyāprayojakatvam eveti tatra pramāṇāntaravyāpārāparīkṣopahāsāyaiva sampadyate.*

⁴⁷ Later, *alāṅkāraśāstra* will openly claim for poetry a status of moral instruction and thus an ethical and utilitarian purpose: “Poetry teaches that one should behave like Rāma, and not like Rāvaṇa” (*rāmādivat pravartitavyaṇ na rāvaṇādivad ity upadeśam ca yathāyogaṃ kaveḥ sahr̥dayasya ca karoti*) (*Kāvyaaprakāśa*, p. 5,2–3), and even before Mammaṭa, in DhĀ, Locana ad 1.1, p. 40, Abhinavagupta mentions the instructional function of poetry, which “counsels as a wife” (*jāyāsammitatvalakṣaṇaḥ*), unlike the Vedas and epic literature which respectively instruct like a master and a friend. Abhinavagupta's take on the role of poetry and drama is eloquently and thoroughly examined in Cuneo 2015.

What is at stake is not the presence or absence of a correspondence between the words and the imaginary world devised by the poet,⁴⁸ but rather whether any truth or falsehood about *this* world is conveyed by poetry. And yet, what is the status of truth of statements which refer to a reality fulfilled by themselves?

Poetry is a specific type of literary text. Gadamer (1980: 5–6) calls it “eminent text,”⁴⁹ a term that he defines as follows:

My thesis is that explication is essentially and inseparably bound to the poetic text itself, precisely because it is never to be exhausted through explication. No one can read a poem without penetrating ever more into understanding, and this includes explication ... Just as the word “text” really means an inter-woven-ness of threads that does not ever again allow the individual threads to emerge, so, too, the poetic text is a text in the sense that its elements have merged into a unified series of words and sounds. This unity is constituted not only by the unity of spoken sense but also – and in the same breath – by the unity of an audible construct. A poetic text is not like a sentence in the ongoing flux of speech, but rather it is like something whole which lifts itself out of the stream of speech that is flowing past.

Furthermore, poetry may claim a better adherence to truth than non-poetic statements. In the context of French hermetism, Gadamer (1980: 10) writes that “In all this there is the stamp of a norm of truthfulness and truth which expressly belongs to the essence of poetry ... An enigmatic form of the non-distinction between what is said and how it is said gives to art its specific unity and facility and so, too, its own manner of being true.”⁵⁰

It is easy to draw a parallel between the “eminence” of poetry, as discussed by Gadamer, with that of the Veda, as seen by Mīmāṃsakas and Jayanta. Unlike in

⁴⁸ “Such a relation poetry shares with philosophy. If, in accordance with tradition, one understands truth as *adaequatio intellectus ad rem*, then this means that the question of truth must remain without an answer as long as poetry is understood as poetry and is acknowledged to have its own unique claim” (Gadamer 1980: 4).

⁴⁹ Thinking of “eminent” from Latin *ē-minēre* “standing out,” I guess.

⁵⁰ Incidentally, Gadamer (1980: 8) also discusses eminent texts in terms of their translatability, a quite relevant aspect of our interpretation of Sanskrit texts: “The full equivalency of sense and sound, which turns the text into an eminent text, finds very different kinds of fulfillment in different literary genres. This is reflected in a sliding scale of translatability of poetic texts into other languages. On this scale, the lyric poem ... stands at the top. Just as clearly, the novel takes the bottom place ... But ‘literature’ ought to be definable in quite general terms by virtue of the fact that its translation always involves a loss and in the case of poetry it is an enormous loss. What is unique, the unity of sense and sound, remains untranslatable.”

plain communication, where the epistemic effects of language are conditioned by other epistemic processes, the truth of poetry can be told only by poetry, just like the truth of the Veda is told by the Veda alone.⁵¹

For Jayanta, however, poetry is just fiction, unlike the Veda, and so he may well endorse the following words of the DhĀ to underscore the detachment of poetry from reality and truth. The poet is an *artifex* fully free to express in a poetic license, but his creation remains a figment of imagination:

In poetry's endless worlds
the poet alone is God;
the universe revolves
according to his nod.⁵²

8. Back to the text

Jayanta is offering two conditions for the rebuttal of the *dhvani* claims: (1) the “power of words,” with the assistance of standard epistemic instruments, is enough to account for any meaning, including poetic ones, and (2) even if the extant theories of meaning are disputed, the solution cannot come from poets who have no scholarly status. Furthermore, (1) and (2) are interlinked because the *dhvani* propounder is a poet and a “self-fancied scholar” without recognition.

The NM does not provide any clues in favor of the identification of the author of the *vṛtti* and the *kārikās* of the DhĀ. As for Cakradhara's commentary, where Ānandavardhana is mentioned as the target of Jayanta's criticism, it should not be taken for granted, because Cakradhara was writing at least two centuries after the composition of the DhĀ and NM and was most likely influenced by Abhinavagupta and other authors of *alaṅkāraśāstra*.

Jayanta prided himself for not introducing novelties in his NM, so an acceptance of a creative concept such as the poetical *dhvani* would anyway be out of character. But there are three more substantial reasons why this interpretive

⁵¹ Cf. Gadamer 2000: 992, “Es ist wahr, daß die dichterische Aussage etwas Zweideutiges an sich hat, genau wie die des Orakels” and Gadamer 2000: 956 “Hölderlin hat gezeigt, daß das Finden der Sprache eines Gedichtes die totale Auflösung aller gewohnten Worte und Redeweisen voraussetzt ... Die dichterische Aussage ist spekulativ ... den neuen Anblick einer neuen Welt im imaginären Medium dichterischer Erfindung darstellt.” Gadamer 2000: 992, however, also underscores how “darin liegt ihre hermeneutische Wahrheit.”

⁵² Trans. Ingalls 1990: 639. *apāre kāvyasaṃsāre kavir ekaḥ prajāpatiḥ / yathāśmai rocate viśvaṃ tathedaṃ parivartate* // (DhĀ, 3.42 *vṛtti*, p. 498,2–3)

device was to be abruptly dismissed. First, from his scholastic viewpoint, it came from an unscientific source. Second, unlike most poetics he was attempting to correct and justify a consistent philosophical system based on general theories; the acceptance of the *dhvani* would have burdened his own theory of meaning with a third unseen entity, when he already had accepted two, the referentiality and the intentionality of words. Third, Jayanta was discussing words as testimony, a means to know reality, and so in his worldview such poetical theories could not have been considered useful contributions to a general theory of knowledge.

Jayanta's "power of words" refers to his general theory of meaning, discussed at length in fifth and sixth books of the NM. Since Naiyāyikas are mostly characterized as *abhihitānvayavādins*, the influence of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā on Jayanta's theory often goes unnoticed, while there are textual elements, in the NM, to argue for some deep appreciation of Prābhākara views on his part. The assistance of "other epistemic instruments" in the interpretation of poetic passages, evoked here by Jayanta, offers further clues of a Prābhākara inspiration of the *tātparyaśakti* idea, which is not just a surrogate of the Bhāṭṭa *lakṣaṇā*. A fine-grained analysis of the Prābhākara-Jayanta connection, however, shall be discussed elsewhere.

Why is Jayanta depicting scholars as "baffled"? I understand this statement as a candid assessment of the scholarship on sentence meaning available to him. The three authorities, in this field of language, are Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya. The Vaiyākaraṇas were backing the theory of the indivisible sentence (*akhaṇḍavākya*) based on the concept of the *sphoṭa*, a fictitious entity in Jayanta's eyes. Mīmāṃsakas were disputing about the two radically opposing theories of compositionality labeled *abhihitānvaya* and *anvitābhidhāna*. Naiyāyikas had not even developed any wholesome theory of sentence meaning. The epistemological analysis of figurative language added further complications and occasions for dispute.

In Jayanta's worldview there was no disciplinary distinction between poetry and literary criticism, simply because the latter genre was still in gestation. Besides, there were rigid traditional rules about the foundations of scholarship. Poets would typically have been ill-fitted to debate epistemological issues, particularly so in the context of the naive realism of Nyāya, as they were by definition experts of fiction.

As for a present-day assessment of this debate, there are merit and flaws on either side. From a methodological point of view, while Jayanta and Nyāya are trying to justify and buttress a consistent system through theoretical ingenuity and simplicity, in works of *alaṅkāraśāstra* we typically find a piecemeal approach to specific application and a proliferation of categories, such as the many different

taxonomies of tropes. While Jayanta's stance made perfect sense in his own Weltanschauung, it was possible only because of the idiosyncratic scientific developments of his times. To most present-day observers his scathing rebuke of the *dhvani* may sound unfounded and arrogant in tone. On poetic meanings, specifically, Jayanta's approach could be rightly accused of being a gross oversimplification, though it might become more nuanced and justified in the light of a Prabhākara-Jayanta continuity.

As for the *dhvani* theory, its main weaknesses seem to be the endlessness of phenomena (*ānantya*) and the ambiguity of general rules (*vyabhicāra*) that both Jayanta and the Mīmāṃsakas are trying to avoid with their general theories. Because of the endless possible types of poetic creations to be described and because of the difficulty of formulating over-arching rules describing them, the very purpose of a *śāstra* as a teachable and learnable discipline is defeated.

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Kumārila on *Sādhuśabda**

Kunio Harikai

The third section (*Pāda* 3) of the first volume (*Adhyāya* 1) of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (JS) deals with the authority of the texts of the sacred tradition (*Smṛti*), which according to the Brahmanical standard has secondary authority compared to the *Veda* (*Śruti*), the authority of which was considered so absolute that the authority of *Smṛti* literature derived from it. Brahmanical culture and the Mīmāṃsā tradition alike regard Grammar as one of those *Smṛti* texts. The first scholar who discussed the authority of Grammar, and of Pāṇini's *sūtra* in particular, was Kātyāyana (ca. 3rd c. BCE) in the introductory chapter, or “lecture” (*Paspaśāhnika*) of his *Mahābhāṣya* (MBh). A key word regarding the authority of Grammar coined by Kātyāyana is the compound *dharmaniyama*, which Kātyāyana regarded as expressing the most important purpose (*prayojana*) of Sanskrit grammar. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (6th to 7th c. CE), in his *magnum opus* the *Tantravārttika* (TV), tried to analyze and interpret this compound so as to accommodate it to his own ideas concerning *dharma* as *adr̥ṣṭa* or *apūrvā*, the invisible and transcendental merit originating from the use of correct words (*sādhuśabda*) based on grammar.

1.

Principle (A): *niyamaḥ pākṣike sati*

vidhir atyantam aprāptau niyamaḥ pākṣike sati /

tatra cānyatra ca prāptau parisamkhyeti kīrtiyate //¹

An injunction is of that which lays down something not got at by any other means; we have a Restriction where the thing in question is already got at

* The present author owes many valuable remarks and materials for this paper to Dr. Kiyotaka Yoshimizu.

¹ TV on JS 1.2.42 (TV [A] 152,11–12, TV [A'] 60,4–5), quoted in MNP §241.

V. Eltschinger, B. Kellner, E. Mills, I. Ratié (eds.), *A Road Less Traveled : Felicitation Volume in Honor of John Taber*. (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 100) Wien 2021, pp. 247–267.

partially; and we have an Exclusion where the thing is found to exist in two contrary positions (trans. Jha 1983: I, 92).²

We find this verse explaining the occurrence of three kinds of Vedic prescription in Kumārila's TV on JS 1.2.42. The prescription most relevant to this paper is the second one, i.e., *niyamah*, the restrictive prescription. The verse makes clear that such a prescription occurs when an alternative (means) exists but is not yet established (*pākṣike sati*). This restriction (*niyama*) on the means (*upāyanīyama*: the *niyama* on the *upāya*) prescribes to limit oneself to one means in order to achieve a certain object. An example is the prescription of husking rice grains for preparing the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*) by way of beating them (*avaghāta*) *vr̥hīn avahanti*. This injunction restricts the means for husking to beating (*avahanana*) them with pestle in the mortar and thus to refrain from applying other means, e.g., husking with nails (*nakhavidalana*) or by forcefully rubbing together (*mardana*).

Principle (B): *dr̥ṣṭe saty adr̥ṣṭakalpanā 'nyāyyā*³

Another principle of Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics relevant here concerns the postulation of an invisible and transcendental result (*adr̥ṣṭa*). *dr̥ṣṭe saty adr̥ṣṭakalpanā 'nyāyyā* means that if a visible effect (*dr̥ṣṭa*) results from the actions enjoined it is improper to postulate in addition another invisible effect (*adr̥ṣṭa*).⁴

This *nyāya* could be derived from the two anonymous (but likely Mīmāṃsaka) verses Śabarāsvāmin quotes in his commentary on JS 2.2.1 (*śabdāntare karma-bhedaḥ kṛtānubandhatvāt*):

adr̥ṣṭo yo 'śruto vārthaḥ sa nāstīty avagamyate /
tasminn asati dr̥ṣṭas cet śruto vā na virudhyate //

² Alternative translation in Edgerton [1929] 1986: 134: "A [new, *apūrva*] injunction is (found) in the case of something wholly unestablished; a fixation (necessary-arrangement, or restriction) where it is partially so; and where there is establishment on this side and on that (where more than one alternative is equally established), exclusive-specification is said to be used (naming the alternative which alone is allowed)."

³ Other expressions of similar import include *dr̥ṣṭe sambhavaty adr̥ṣṭasyānyāyyatvam*, *dr̥ṣṭaṃ prayojanam utsrjya nāśakyam adr̥ṣṭaṃ kalpayitum* (see Kane 1962: 134) and *dr̥ṣṭe sambhavaty adr̥ṣṭasyā 'nyāyyā* (MNP §§187 and 239).

⁴ *Adr̥ṣṭa* in the sense of an invisible effect might originally be a Vaiśeṣika concept referring to natural forces or effects of human deeds which determine and govern human fate. See Halbfass 1991: 311–315.

When a thing is neither seen nor heard, it is understood that it does not exist; but only if its non-existence does not involve the inconsistency of a fact that has been perceived or heard of (trans. Jha 1933: I, 222).

virudhyamāne kalpyaḥ syāj jāyate tena so 'rthavān /

viśeṣaś cen na gamyeta tato naiko 'pi kalpyate //

In case, there is such inconsistency, it would be right to assume the existence of the thing which had been understood to be non-existent; as on being thus assumed, it serves the useful purpose (of rendering consistent and explaining the perceived fact). In case however, this special circumstance (of the inconsistency of a perceived fact) is not duly recognized, then there can be no assumption of anything at all (trans. Jha 1933: I, 222–223).

The importance of this rule in the Mīmāṃsā system lies in the fact that, if it were permitted to postulate unseen effects resulting from Vedic actions without limitation, the ritual world based on the Veda would become unintelligible. As a consequence, Śābarasvāmin proclaims that “the postulation of something unseen (*adr̥ṣṭa*) should be minimal.”⁵

In the philosophy of Kumārila the concept of *adr̥ṣṭa* is akin to that of *apūrva*, an invisible religious merit or capacity (*śakti*) bringing rewards as heaven, etc., to the performer of the sacrifice. The *adr̥ṣṭa* is an unempirical effect that is neither visible nor physically tangible. On the contrary, the *dr̥ṣṭa* is an empirical effect that can be seen and touched physically. It is to be noted, however, that Kumārila curiously does not refer to principle (B) but formulates the following principle instead:

In those cases, however, in which we do not find any particular desirable results following, either directly or indirectly (from the Action), – as, for instance, the action of the libation reaching the Fire, and being burnt to ashes, – we give up the idea of the necessity of the desirable element in the result, and assume a transcendental result to follow from the action itself (trans. Jha 1983: I, 18).⁶

Kumārila’s postulation on the recourse to *adr̥ṣṭa* does not completely exclude the principle (B), but rather includes it by implication. In the light of Kumārila’s remark, principle (B) could be reformulated as follows: *asati puruṣārthatve 'dr̥ṣṭakalpanā*

⁵ ŚBh on JS 2.1.7 (ŚBh 380,8): *alpīyasy adr̥ṣṭakalpanā nyāyyā*. See also Kataoka 2011: 137.

⁶ TV on JS 1.2.7 (TV [A] 113,23–25; TV [A'] 11,18–20): *yatra tv anantaram* (Oxford Ms.: *anantarabhāvi*) *dr̥ṣṭam kāryam na svayam puruṣārtho nāpi pāramparyeṇa tam āpnoti yathā homasyā* ”*havanīyaprap̥tir bhasmasādbhāvo vā tatra tadatikrameṇa sākṣāt karmaṇa evādr̥ṣṭakalpanā*.

nyāyyā “When nothing beneficial for a human being occurs, it is proper to postulate an invisible entity.”

On every topic (*adhikaraṇa*) of Mīmāṃsā exegesis, some sentences from the Veda or Smṛti literature are provided as illustrations. These sentences are called *viṣayavākya*, i.e., the scriptural sentence to be discussed. In the *Vyākaraṇa Adhikaraṇa*, however, Śabarasvāmin does not present any *viṣayavākya*, but merely adduces the correct word *gauḥ* and some incorrect words such as *gāvī*, etc.,⁷ where as Kumārila provides three sentences in his TV (TV [A] 279, TV [A'] 216). For the sake of convenience, I shall call them *viṣayavākya*s (a), (b), and (c).

Viṣayavākya (a): *brāhmaṇeṇa na mlecchitavai*. “A *brāhmaṇa* should not speak barbarian language.”

This sentence, though obviously a prohibition, indirectly expresses a positive prescription to speak just correct words. According to Someśvara, the author of the *Nyāyasudhā* (Nsudhā, a commentary on the TV), this prohibition occurs in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* rite.⁸ This sentence is selected by Kumārila as an example of the *niyama*(-vidhi).

Viṣayavākya (b): *ekāḥ śabdaḥ samyagjñātaḥ suprayuktaḥ sāstrānvitaḥ sarge loke kāmādhuḥ bhavati*. “A single word, which is known rightly, used correctly and well connected with Grammar, is [like] a cow yielding all desires in heaven and in this world.”

This sentence, which is dealt with in the *Paspaśāhnika* of Patañjali’s MBh, is an example of *arthavāda*. In addition, Kumārila quotes the following sentence to make it a *viṣayavākya*.

Viṣayavākya (c): *tasmād eṣā vyākṛtā vāg udyate*.⁹ “Therefore this [grammatically] well analyzed speech is to be uttered.”

2.

What is the purpose of using correct Sanskrit language? The *Paspaśāhnika* of Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya* offers several answers to this question, most of which are concerned mainly with the preservation of the Veda and the Vedic world. But the person who first tried to answer this question in a general way could well be

⁷ See ŚBh on JS 1.3.24 (ŚBh 182,6): *gaur gāvī goṇī gopotalikā ityevamādayaḥ śabdā udāharaṇam*. *gāvī*: Jaina Mahārāṣṭrī; *goṇī*: Ardhamāgadhī/Jaina Mahārāṣṭrī; *gopotalikā*: Apabhraṃśa; *gotā*: Apabhraṃśa. See Kawamura 2017: 107.

⁸ I cannot identify the source in the Vedic chapters on the Agniṣṭoma ritual. Cf. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 3.2.1.24; *tasmān na brāhmaṇo mlecchet*. Cf. also MBh I. 2,7–8.

⁹ *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 6.4.7.3, with *iyam* for *eṣā*.

Kātyāyana (3rd c. BCE). In his first *Vārttika*, Kātyāyana expresses the following opinion:

When [it is assumed that] the use of words is occasioned by the thing-meant, grammar [provides] a restriction [on the use of words] for sake of *dharma* “religious merit” (trans. Joshi and Roodbergen 1986: 117).¹⁰

Kātyāyana raises two questions. The first pertains to the meaning of the compound “*dharmaniyama*.” We will deal with the second question later in section 3 of the present paper. To solve the first question, it might first be useful to check Patañjali’s MBh. MBh ad loc. (I. 8.5–6) runs as follows:

kim idaṃ dharmaniyama iti. dharmāya niyamo dharmaniyamaḥ. dharmārtho vā niyamo dharmaniyamaḥ. dharmaprayojano vā niyamo dharmaniyamaḥ.

What is this [thing called] *dharmaniyama* “restriction for the sake of religious merit”? [The word *dharmaniyama* may be explained as follows:] [In the sense of] *dharmāya niyamaḥ* “a restriction for religious merit” [we derive] *dharmaniyamaḥ*. Or, [in the sense of] *dharmārtho niyamaḥ* “a restriction for the sake of religious merit” [we derive] *dharmaniyamaḥ*. Or, [in the sense of] *dharmaprayojano niyamaḥ* “a restriction aiming at religious merit” [we derive] *dharmaniyamaḥ* (trans. Joshi and Roodbergen 1986: 117).

According to Patañjali’s first interpretation of the compound, *dharmaniyama* is to be analyzed as *dharmāya niyamaḥ*, i.e., as a dative *tatpuruṣa* compound meaning “*niyama* for *dharma*.” According to the second and the third interpretations, the compound is a *karmadhāraya* meaning that the restriction has *dharma* for its object or purpose. Commenting on this sentence, Bhartṛhari in his *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (MBhD)¹¹ states that the last interpretation, *dharmaprayojano dharmaniyamaḥ*, is the one favoured by the Mīmāṃsakas. For judging whether this interpretation is correct, it is necessary to clarify what is mentioned with the word “*dharma*” in this statement. As Vyākaraṇa is traditionally considered authoritative as one

¹⁰ MBh I. 8,3: *lokato ’rthaprayukte śabdaprayoge śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ.*

¹¹ According to Bhartṛhari’s MBhD the meaning of the *Vārttika* 1 is as follows: *artha-prayukte* means that when people are instigated by the purpose; according to ordinary people they learn (the use of language) but they make mistakes (in learning language). And they teach both the correct and incorrect words. And the meaning (*artha*) which prompts the use of words for making understand itself instigates to use *gauḥ* (correct words) and *gāvī*, etc. (incorrect words) at the same time. In order to restrict for the *dharma*, therefore, the Vyākaraṇa is set in motion. How is it possible without Vyākaraṇa to exclude incorrect words? (MBhD I. 24,20–23: *arthena prerite arthaprayukte. yasmāl lokād ayaṃ śikṣate sa lokaḥ sāparādhaḥ. sādḥūn asādḥūmś ca śikṣayati. yaś cātma-pratyāyane ’rthaḥ prerayitā saḥ. yathaiva gaur ity etaṃ prerayaty evaṃ gāvīyādīn api. ataḥ śāstrapravṛttir evaṃ arthā katham asādḥavo nivarterann iti.*)

of the auxiliary sciences of the Veda (*vedāṅga*), it would seem natural to take the word “*dharma*” to refer to the Vedic *dharma*. It may thus be appropriate to suppose that the meaning of *dharma* is the same here as in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. JS 1.1.2 claims that “*dharma* is the useful entity characterized by a [Vedic] prescription” (*codanālakṣaṇo ’rtho dharmah*). In other words, *dharma* as understood in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* refers to the Vedic sacrifices. Correct Sanskrit language must be used in the sacrifices so that these do not lose their proper efficacy. The *Paspaśāhnika* alludes to a number of sacrifices that were ruined due to the use of corrupt words (*duṣṭaḥ śabdah*, etc.). The Vedic sacrifices are thus one meaning of the word *dharma* in *dharmaniyama*. This interpretation is advocated by Kaiyaṭa who, it may be noted, inclines towards Prabhākara rather than Kumārila.¹²

As far as the Veda is concerned, *dharma* refers to the sacrifices prescribed by the Veda, whereas another meaning of *dharma* emerges in the context of the ordinary usage of correct words. As there is no direct relationship with the Vedic sacrifice in the ordinary world, *dharma* in this case has the meaning of “(religious) merit,” which is invisible (*adṛṣṭa*). Kātyāyana’s *Vārttika* 1 (see above) claims that the use of correct words has its foundation in the ordinary world (*loka*).

In *Vārttika* 6, Kātyāyana argues that, should *dharma* lie in the grammatical knowledge of the correct words, then *adharma* would be equally possible due to the fact that whoever knows the correct words also knows the corrupt words. Kumārila understood *dharma* in this sentence as denoting invisible (*adṛṣṭa*) religious merit and *adharma*, religious demerit, and interpreted *dharma* in *dharmaniyama* in the same way. In Kumārila’s understanding, *dharma* is equivalent to *adṛṣṭa* or *apūrva*. It is far from certain, however, that Patañjali’s use of *dharma* in this case was the same as Kumārila’s.

While commenting on Patañjali’s third interpretation of *dharmaniyama* (*dharmaprayojano vā niyamo dharmaniyamah*), Kaiyaṭa in his *Pradīpa* explains that it is “motivated by the *dharma* called enjoinder (*niyoga*), which is the object of the exhortative suffix such as the optative, etc. (*linādi*)” (*linādiviṣayeṇa niyogā-khyena dharmeṇa prayukta ity arthah*). According to Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, Kaiyaṭa’s interpretation is indebted to the theory of Prabhākara, who holds the meaning of the *linādi* verbal suffixes as duty (*kārya*) *alias* *apūrva*.¹³ But Prabhākara and Kumārila hold fairly different views concerning the meaning of the *apūrva*.¹⁴ According

¹² Regarding Kaiyaṭa’s preference to Prabhākara, see note 13 below.

¹³ MBh (C), Uddyota of Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, p. 46: *prabhākarāṅgīkṛtamatenā-idam. tanmate hi linādīnām apūrvasaṃjñakam kāryam vācyam*.

¹⁴ See Ramaswami 1937: 36ff.; Yoshimizu 1997: 96ff.; Freschi 2012: 19ff. On the concept of the *apūrva* according to Kumārila, see Harikai 1977a and 1977b.

to Kumārila, the *apūrva* is a kind of capability (*śakti*) generated by the actions enjoined by Vedic texts broadly speaking, i.e., including Smṛti literature. Now, *apūrva* is accumulated in the self (*ātman*) of the performer of the sacrifice. *apūrvas* accumulated in the *ātman* are integrated into the highest *apūrva* (*paramāpūrva*), which finally brings a certain reward to the performer. Kumārila claims that Kātyāyana himself used the word *dharma* in reference to the *apūrva* in the sense of the capacity newly effectuated by the use of correct Sanskrit words. This opinion is corroborated by the wording of Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* 9 (MBh I. 10,21):

Prosperity occurs when the use is preceded by [the study of] grammar
(*śāstrapūrvake prayoge 'bhyudayaḥ*).

In Kumārila's reflection, then, the *apūrvas* newly accumulated by using correct Sanskrit words bring prosperity to their users. The causality in this case can be represented as follows:

Prescription of the *niyama* to use correct words → usage of correct words
→ production of *dharma* (merit) → prosperity (*abhyudaya*) for the user of
correct words

Such an understanding of the causality is common to the Mīmāṃsā postulation of the *niyamādr̥ṣṭa* or *niyamāpūrva*, i.e. unseen effect or *apūrva* that accrues from an action that follows the Vedic restriction (*niyama*). Kātyāyana might have been influenced by Mīmāṃsakas in the 3rd century BCE.

How did Kumārila elaborate on the relation between the use of correct words and its result? In what follows, I would like to consider this issue based on Kumārila's *magnum opus*, the TV. Kumārila does not deal with the third interpretation – the one Bhartṛhari regarded as the Mīmāṃsaka theory – and only explains Patañjali's first interpretation, maintaining that the meaning of *śāstra*, which is referred to by Kātyāyana in his first *Vārttika* (*śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ*), differs according to whether one considers the Veda or the Vyākaraṇa:

The author of the *Vārtika* [*vākyakāra* = Kātyāyana, KH] has, however, distinctly pointed out the use of Grammar to lie in the laying down of certain restrictions, which help in the fulfilling of *Dharma*; and of such restrictions, one is based directly on the Veda itself, while the other is based upon Grammar. That is to say, Grammar serves the purpose of laying down two restrictions – (1) that one should use only the correct forms of words – the knowledge and the using of such words leading the person to Heaven and helping to accomplish the sacrifices; and this is known from the Veda itself; and as such, not depending upon any other authority, this restriction

must be accepted as laid down by the Veda itself; (2) that such and such words are correct – which is pointed out by Grammar alone; as without Grammar, the correct words could not be rightly distinguished from the incorrect ones. Thus then, we find that the methods of Grammar, being a part of the Vedic *Dharma* that consists of the use of the duly discriminated correct forms of words, serves the purpose of pointing out such correct forms as are rightly expressive (trans. Jha 1983: I, 319–320).¹⁵

Kumārila thus provides a twofold explanation of Kātyāyana's *dharmaniyama* compound. The great Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, however, does not refer here to the relationship between the use of correct words and its reward. But in the sentences preceding the above description he explains the *apūrva* as the resulting entity which is to be generated by the utterance of correct words:

When one has got to say something, it is just possible that though he may at times express himself in correct words, yet at times he might either make use of corruptions, or mere silent gestures of the eye; and hence it is only right that we should have an Injunction that would lay down the necessity of using the correct words, for those that wish well of themselves; and hence by adhering to such usage a man would be creating an excellent *Apūrva* (Potentiality) for himself.

Even though it be absolutely necessary to have something to be set aside by a Restrictive Injunction, yet we can have, in the case in question, a setting aside of those words, that slightly resemble the correct words, and as such being found to denote the correct meaning indirectly through the correct words, come to be accepted on account of their long-continued currency, as really expressive; because the use of such words is not impossible (Jha 1983: I, 311).¹⁶

¹⁵ TV on JS 1.3.27 (TV [A] 287,13–18; TV [A'] 226,12–20): *dharmāya niyamaṃ cāha vākyakāraḥ prayojanam / vedamūlas tu tattraika eko vyākaraṇāśrayaḥ // niyamadvaya-prayuktaṃ vyākaraṇam. sādhuśabdajñānāt tatpūrvaprayogād vā svargayaājñopakāra-siddhir ity etat tāvad vedamūlam ananyapramāṇakatvāt. ataś cāyaṃ tāvad vedākhyena śāstreṇa dharmaniyamaḥ.*

tathā vyākaraṇākhyena sādhurūpaṃ niyamate / aviśeṣeṇa siddhiḥ syād vinā vyākaraṇasmṛteḥ // tena vedāvagatasamyagjñātasādhuśabdaprayogātmakadharmāṅgatvena vyākaraṇapra-kriyā-itikartavyatayā nityavācakaśabdarūpajñānaniyamaḥ kriyate.

¹⁶ TV on JS 1.3.27 (TV [A] 282,18–24; TV [A'] 220,8–14): *sati bhāṣitavye kadācid avinaṣtena bhāṣeta kadācit pramādaśaktija-apabhraṃśenāpy akṣinikocanādinā vā śabda-rahitenaiva pratyāpayet.*

atra śreya 'rthino 'vaśyaṃ sādhubhāṣā niyamate / niyogena hi tāṃ kurvann apūrvam sādhaṃ syati // yady api ca niyame 'nyanivṛttir avaśyaṃ kalpanīyā tathā 'pi sādhuśabdasmṛtivyavahitānām kālārūḍharūpabhrāntivācakatvagrhitānām cāpaśabdānām sambhavinī (Mss.) prayoga-

In the above explication, it is claimed that corrupt words (*apaśabda*) have no capacity to express the meaning. According to Mīmāṃsakas, a corrupt word is unable to express its meaning by itself, but can only do so through the mediation of a correct word which possesses the power of direct expression. The reasons for the corrupt words' ostensibly expressive capacity are detailed by Kumārila in the last portion of the above description.¹⁷

Here Kumārila explains the *niyama* regarding the use of correct words and suggests that using correct words in conformity with *niyama* brings *apūrva* to the performer. The *apūrva* that is thus generated from *niyama* is called *niyamāpūrva*. It is also called *niyamādr̥ṣṭa* because it is an invisible force promising good rewards such as future prosperity. Kumārila further maintains that this *apūrva* is for the sake of the sacrifice (*kratvartha*) as well as for the sake of a human being (*puruṣārtha*) according to the exegetic principle “the separate connection [of one and the same means to two different purposes]” (*saṃyogapr̥thaktva*). To explain:

Another argument of the *Pūrvapaksha* is that, “inasmuch as we find words fulfilling the visible purpose of the denoting of a certain meaning, Grammar cannot be held to be a scripture dealing with such usages as would lead to a transcendental result.”

And to this we make the following reply: Even though there is a visible result, yet we hold a transcendental result to follow from the Restriction; and this transcendental result belongs either to the sacrifice or to the Agent, according as it is separately connected to one as well as to the other (*saṃyogapr̥thaktva*) (vide *Sūtra* IV-iii-5). It is only such separate connection that make the same (result) to be both; and this, in the present instance, is ascertained in the following manner: the result that is mentioned in a sacrificial context is accepted as belonging to the sacrifice; while that which is described apart from any sacrifices, is held to belong to the Agent (trans. Jha 1983: I, 313, the translation of *saṃyogapr̥thaktva* being modified).¹⁸

prasaṅge sādhanīyamena vyāvṛttiḥ. (On Mss. see Harikai 2011: 267–268.)

The following five manuscripts (Mss.) were utilized for my edition of the TV (Harikai 2011): Asiatic Society, Calcutta S.C. 2388; Oriental Institute, Baroda No. 11566; Bodleian Library, Oxford Wilson No. 325; British Library, London Eggeling No. 2151 and 2161.

¹⁷ This view is common among Vaiyākaraṇikas. See VP 1.175–183.

¹⁸ TV on JS 1.3.27 (TV [A] 283,22–25; [A'] 221,19–24): *yat tu dr̥ṣṭārthapratyāyana-nirākāṅkṣād adr̥ṣṭārthaprayogotpatty aśāstratvam iti. tatrocyaṭe – dr̥ṣṭe saty apī sarvatra niyamādr̥ṣṭam iṣyate / kratvarthaṃ puruṣārthaṃ ca tatsaṃyogapr̥thaktvataḥ // ekasya tūbhyatve saṃyogapr̥thaktvam* (JS 4.3.5) *kāraṇam* (Mss.) *tac ceha prakaraṇānā-rabhyavādābhyām avagatam*. Cf. Kurata 1980.

Kumārila's concept of *niyamādrṣṭa* apparently seems to oppose Principle (B) regarding the postulation of *adrṣṭa* (*drṣṭe saty adrṣṭakalpanā 'nyāyyā*). Therefore, it would be worth asking why *niyamādrṣṭa* is to be assumed to originate from an action that has a visible result. The reason may be that the *Veda* prescribes *dharma* (the sacrifice) for the benefit of human beings. If it does not prescribe *dharma* it incurs a self-contradiction. As the action performed according to a restriction (*niyama*) generates a *drṣṭārtha* result, e.g., the knowledge of the meaning of words or the change into flour of rice grain by acting *avaghāta* etc., it becomes necessary to assume an *adrṣṭa* or *apūrva* when one chooses a means the *niyama* prescribes.¹⁹ In other words, inasmuch as why the *Veda* restricts the action to be done in a particular manner cannot be intelligible for human beings, a merit named *niyama-adrṣṭa* or *niyama-apūrva* is to be postulated insofar as the *Veda* is meaningful. The selection of the means prescribed by *niyama* is a perspective gained from the human side, but it is, at the same time, a result of the restrictive injunction (*niyamavidhi*).²⁰

¹⁹ This reason why an invisible effect (*adrṣṭa*) is to be postulated when one performs an action following a restriction (*niyama*) is adduced by Jha ([1942] 1964: 244–245): “The reason for this is that, according to Kumārila, every Vedic injunction, by its very nature, must be related to an *Apūrva*; and as the *Thumping and Threshing* have been enjoined, it must be related to an *Apūrva*; but as the act of *Thumping and Threshing* itself is found to be productive of a *visible* Result, in the shape of the removal of the Chaff, the *Apūrva* to which it is related can be due only to the *choice* of that particular method of removing the Chaff in preference to other methods; and the real reason underlying all this lies in the fact that the Vedic Injunction must lay down a *Dharma*, – and if that *Dharma* were not conducive to an *Apūrva*, the said Injunction would lose its character of ‘being an Injunction of *Dharma*,’ and hence as the act itself is found to be conducive to only a visible end, we must accept an *Apūrva* as proceeding from the *choice* that is exercised.” With this explanation by Jha, however, Dr. Kiyotaka Yoshimizu disagrees for the reason that a human being has no “choice” by free will in adopting a particular method that is exclusively prescribed in advance by the Vedic restriction (*niyama*).

²⁰ Concerning a *mantra*, the need to assume a *niyamādrṣṭa* when it is recited is explained in the *Mīmāṃsā* school as follows: *Mantras*, in particular, *yajus mantras* to be recited in the process of ritual actions, are intended to express their own meanings, and therefore effectuate the *drṣṭārtha* only. A prescription of *niyama* is postulated to exist on the basis of the exegetic principle “it (i.e., a prescription) is to be recollected even by *mantras*” (*mantrair eva smartavyam*). Thus to choose the means of recollection of the process prescribed by this *niyama* generates *adrṣṭa*, i.e. *niyamādrṣṭa*. On the *niyamādrṣṭa* concerning *mantra*, see Harikai 1990: 191–195. Śabara made a reference to *niyamādrṣṭa* on JS 5.3.36 as *kramāniyamādrṣṭam*, which exists in the context of questions regarding the sequence of the text (*pāṭhakrama*), therefore, doesn’t directly have any relation to the *upāyanīyama*, the restriction on one means. For the present author, the phrase of the TV “*drṣṭe saty api sarvatra niyamādrṣṭam iṣyate*” (*kratvarthaṃ puruṣārthaṃ ca tatsaṃyoga-prthaktvataḥ* //) seems to be a new proclamation of Kumārila regarding the postulation

Someśvara comments on Kumārila's explanation of the *saṃyogapṛthaktva* of *niyamādrṣṭa* as follows:

Viṣayavākya (a): *brāhmaṇena na mlecchitavai*. "A *brāhmaṇa* should not speak barbarian language."

Because this statement is given in the context [of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice], one indirectly understands that speaking barbarian language damages the sacrifice. Therefore, the restriction (*niyama*) to speak only in a correct way [during a sacrifice] is for the sake of the sacrifice.

Viṣayavākya (b): *ekah śabdaḥ samyagjñātaḥ suprayuktaḥ sāstrānviṭaḥ svarge loke kāmādhug bhavati*. "A single word, which is known rightly (and), used correctly and well connected with Grammar, is [like] a cow yielding all desires in heaven and in this world."

This statement is irrelevant to a particular sacrifice, and the word "*sāstra*" customarily expresses a field of science (*vidyāsthāna*). Moreover, it becomes impossible to explain that [this statement] gives a restriction (*niyama*) to speak using only correct words in accordance with the science of grammar, if this restriction is for the sake of the handing down [of the Veda]. Therefore, it comes to be understood that this restriction is for the sake of a human being.²¹

Someśvara explains in this way the *saṃyogapṛthaktva* of *niyamādrṣṭa*. The distinction between *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha* is a Mīmāṃsaka method aimed at discriminating actions prescribed by sacred texts. The *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* defines *puruṣārtha* as that which produces pleasure in a human being (JS 4.1.2: *yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya tasya lipsā 'rthalakṣaṇā 'vibhaktatvāt*). For instance, all the main sacrifices of the *darśapūrṇamāsa* are for the sake of a human being.²² On the other

of *niyamādrṣṭa*, to be specific in case of *upāyanīyama*. Cf. JS 5.3.36: *syād vidyārthatvād yathā pareṣu sarvasvārāt*. ŚBh on JS 5.3.36 (ŚBh V. 158,19–159,2): *syād arthavān kramapāṭhaḥ, asaty api prayoge krame, vidyāgrahaṇārthatvāt, karmāvbodhanārthāyām vidyāyām kramanīyamādrṣṭam tadāśrayam eva bhaviṣyātīti, yathā, tvatpakṣe, pareṣu sarvasvārāt, yasyāpi kramo 'ṅgam iti pakṣaḥ, tasyāpi sarvasvārāt pareṣāṃ sarvasvāreṇa yah kramas tasyādrṣṭārthatāvaśyam kalpanīyā*.

²¹ Nsūdḥā 319,17–23: *brāhmaṇena na mlecchitavā iti prākaraṇikenāsādhubhāṣaṇasya kratuvaiguṇyāpādakatvāvagater arthāt sādhubhāṣaṇanīyamasya kratvarthatāvaśīyate. ekah śabdaḥ samyagjñātaḥ suprayuktaḥ svarge loke kāmādhug bhavatīti cānārabhyavādeṇa sāstraśabdasya rūḍhyā vidyāsthānavācitvāt sampradāyaparatayā vyākhyānānupapattter vyākaraṇasāstrānuḡatasādhūśabdabhāṣaṇanīyamasya svargasādhanatvāvagategḥ puruṣārthatāvaśīyata ity arthaḥ*.

²² Cf. ŚBh on JS 4.1.1 (ŚBh V. 1,12–13): *aṅgam kratvarthaḥ, pradhānam puruṣārthaḥ. phalavidhiḥ puruṣārthaḥ, arthavādaḥ kratvarthaḥ. prayojakaḥ kaścīt puruṣārtho 'prayojakaḥ kratvarthaḥ*.

hand, *kratvartha* is that which helps to effectuate what is for the sake of a sacrifice, and it does not directly bring its reward to the sacrificer (*yajamāna*). For instance, all subsidiary actions (e.g., *prayājas*) belonging to main sacrifices are for the sake of the sacrifice. According to Someśvara, an action is *kratvartha* if it is connected to a particular sacrifice, whereas it is *puruṣārtha* if it is not connected to any particular sacrifice. *Viṣayavākya* (a) indicates a connection (*saṃyoga*) of the *kratvartha* type, whereas *viṣayavākya* (b) exhibits a connection of the *puruṣārtha* type. This is Someśvara's explanation of *saṃyogapṛthaktva* in JS 4.3.5.

Kumārila explains whether the reward produced by an action is for the sake of a sacrifice or for the sake of a human being as follows:

And again in the case of a passage whose main result belongs to the sacrifice, if there be a mention of certain results accruing to the Agent, who is something other than the sacrifice, – this very fact imparts to such mention the character of an *Arthavāda* (vide *Sūtra* IV-iii-1); whereas in the case of a passage describing certain results as belonging to the Agent (when the passage is not found in connection with any sacrifice) the result, being described as such, cannot but be accepted as really following from the action in question (viz., the using of correct words) – as has been held by the revered Ātreya (vide *Sūtra* IV-iii-18). That is to say, the *Apūrva* bearing upon the sacrifice, not having the means of its accomplishment fully known, is capable of containing within itself all the transcendental results in connection with it; and as such it withdraws within itself the *Apūrva* following from the Restriction (of usage to correct words), and then relegates the mention of the accruing of certain results of the human agent to the realms of *Arthavāda*. Whereas in the case of the Restriction being for the sake of the Agent, it becomes absolutely necessary to assume a purpose for such Restriction; and as for the comprehension of meaning, this is often found to be obtained even by means of the corruptions of words as also through certain silent gestures; and hence the Restriction by itself, having all its wants fulfilled as shown above, is not capable of setting up the *Apūrva* or transcendental result; and as such it becomes absolutely necessary to accept as the true result (of following the restriction), the *attainment of all desirable things both here and in heaven*, which is mentioned in the corresponding *Arthavāda* passage (trans. Jha 1983: I, 313–314).²³

²³ TV on JS 1.3.27 (TV [A] 283,26–284, 1; [A'] 222,1–7):

kratvarthāṃśe parārthatvād arthavādaḥ phalaśrutih /

puruṣārthe tu nirdeśāt phalam ātreyaadarśanāt //

kratvartham hy anirjñātopāyatvāt sarvādṛṣṭopasaṃgrahakṣamam iti niyamāpūrvam ātmasāt kurvāt puruṣārthāṃśe phalaśrutim arthavādī karoti. puruṣārthasya niyamasya tv avaśyakaḥ paṇīyaprayojanatvād arthapratipatteś cāpabhramśebhyo (Mss.) 'py akṣīnikocādibhyo vā sūtaraṃ siddhatvād anākāṅkṣitanīyamāpūrvopajīvanasāmarthyam

Kumārila's explanation is based on his interpretation of *viṣayavākya* (b): *svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati*. This *arthavāda* states that the rewards generated by the use of correct words can be compared to a cow yielding all desires both in heaven and in this world. In case the *niyama* to utter only correct words (*sādhubhāṣaṇa-niyama*) is for the sake of the rite, the statement of the result (*phalaśruti*) being an *arthavāda* comes to be construed according to JS 4.3.1:

dravyasaṃskārakarmasu parārthatvāt phalaśrutir arthavādah syāt, “The mention of results in connection with substances, embellishments, and acts should be regarded as commendatory; because they subserve the purposes of another (action)” (trans. Jha 1983: I, 789).

According to this *sūtra*, it is not for the sake of a human being, but merely for the sake of rites that a Vedic statement declares that an effect accrues from adopting a particular kind of substance, its embellishment, or a secondary action. These statements are *arthavāda*, recommendatory sentences. Although *viṣayavākya* (b) is not part of a ritual process, the mention of a reward (*phalaśruti*: *svarge loke kāmadhug bhavati*) is to be regarded as an *arthavāda* that induces the *yajamāna* to use correct words by way of praising them. The phrasing of JS 4.3.1 (“being subservient to others [*parārthatva*]”) indicates this function as an *arthavāda*. To the extent that the *niyama* is for the sake of the rite, it generates *niyamāpūrvas* which help the highest *apūrvā* (*paramāpūrvā*) that itself bestows the final rewards of sacrifice (heaven, etc.) to the *yajamāna*.

In case, however, the *niyama* that prescribes to speak only with correct words (*sādhubhāṣaṇaniyama*) is for the sake of a human being (*puruṣārtha*), this is a case in which one applies an exegetic rule called *Rātrisatranyāya* (the rule concerning the sacrificial session at night), which is given in JS 4.3.18:

phalam ātretyo nirdeśād aśrutau hy anumānam syāt, “It is the opinion of Ātreya that there is a reward under the [Vedic] command and where there is no command, it can be inferred” (trans. Sandal 1993: 67).²⁴

*nāstīty avaśyam arthavādopāttam eva svargaloke kāmadhugādy eva phalatvenā śraya-
ṇīyam.*

²⁴ The *viṣayavākya* of *rātrisatranyāya* runs as follows: “*pratitiṣṭhanti ha vā ete ya etā upayanti* (=vidhi); *brahmavarcasvino ’nnādā bhavanti ya etā upayanti* (=arthavāda)” “Those who have recourse to these sacrifices become famous; those who have recourse to these become endowed with Brahmanic glory and also eaters of food” (trans. Jha 1933: II, 808). Italic phrases mention the result. The implication of the *rātrisatranyāya* is as follows: In case there is no reward mentioned in the *vidhi* sentence, the remark of the reward in the *arthavāda* is supplied as the (true) reward by an extended application (*atideśa*).

Kumārila thus tries to explain different types of relationship between *niyamādr̥ṣṭa* (*niyamāpūrvā*) and the *phalaśruti* in the *arthavāda*, considering whether it is for the sake of a sacrifice or for the sake of a human being. As an instance of the latter case, Kumārila interprets the compound *dharmaniyama*, which Kātyāyana regarded as stating the purpose of Grammar.

3.

The second question Kātyāyana raises is the following: Concerning the relationship between the correct words and religious merit (*dharma*), it is argued whether *dharma* occurs when one comes to know the correct words or rather at the time when one uses them. Incidentally to this argument, Kumārila differentiates between the knowledge required for rites and the cognition of *ātman*.

Patañjali presents the issue at stake while introducing *Vārttika* 6 (MBh I. 10,4):

kiṃ punaḥ śabdasya jñāne dharmāḥ, āhosvit prayoge. “Does *dharma* lie in the knowledge of [correct] words or rather in [their] use?”

According to Kaiyaṭa, this presentation of the problem is made in accordance with *viśayavākya* (b). To be more specific, the question can be formulated as follows: Does the reward *kāmadhug bhavati* in the phrase *svarge loka kāmadhug bhavati* take place at the time when the words are correctly known (*saṃyagjñātaśabda*) or at the time when words are used correctly (*suprayuktaśabda*)? First, Kātyāyana discards the former alternative.

Vārttika 6: “If [it is argued] that *dharma* [lies] in [grammatical] knowledge, [then we say that] there would be a chance for *adharma* as well.”²⁵

Kātyāyana’s argument is based on the fact that those who know the correct words know the incorrect words as well at the same time. And as shown by the example of “cow” (*gauḥ*), there are many incorrect words (*apaśabda*) such as *gāvī*, *goṇī*, *gotā* and *gopotalikā*. Therefore, if those who know the correct words obtain some reward for this, numerous bad rewards (*adharma*) should eventually accrue to them, too. Kātyāyana’s argument continues in the next *Vārttikas*:

Vārttika 7 (MBh I. 10,10): *ācāre niyamāḥ*, “The restriction (on the use of correct words) [holds] relating to custom.”

Vārttika 8 (MBh I. 10,13): *prayoge sarvalokasya*, “If [*dharma* lies] in the use [of words irrespective of correct or incorrect, then *dharma* and hence prosperity might accrue] to everybody.”

²⁵ See above, section 2.

The import of Kātyāyana's argument is to deny that the mere usage of words generates *dharma*. *Vārttika* 9 presents Kātyāyana's conclusion:

Vārttika 9 (MBh I. 10,21): *sāstrapūrvake prayoge 'bhyudayas tat tulyaṃ vedaśabdena*, "When people use correct words according to the Grammar, the prosperity occurs for them [as a result in future], which fact is the same with the word of the *Veda*."²⁶

After proposing two interpretations of the phrase *tat tulyaṃ vedaśabdena*, Patañjali brings forward again the view once denied in *Vārttika* 6 :

Or rather, let *dharma* "religious merit" [lie] again in *jñāna* "[grammatical] knowledge" alone. But hasn't been pointed out that if [it is argued] that *dharma* "religious merit" [lies] in *jñāna* "[grammatical] knowledge," [then] there would be a chance for *adharma* "religious demerit" as well? No difficulty. We go by words. What the words say, that is our authority. And the words say that religious merit [lies] in the knowledge of [correct] words. They do not say that religious demerit [lies] in the knowledge of incorrect words (trans. Joshi and Roodbergen 1986: 152).²⁷

According to Nāgeśabhaṭṭa, the (*veda*-)*śabda* Patañjali refers to here is, e.g., *viṣayavākya* (b), *ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyagjñātaḥ*. This *śabda* pertains to correct words, not to corrupt words. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa further mentions that the sentence that introduces *viṣayavākya* (a), *te 'surā helayo helaya iti kurvantaḥ parābabhūvuḥ*, "Demons cried (with incorrect words) 'he 'layo he 'layaḥ,' and were therefore defeated," means that *adharma* accrued to the demons when they used corrupt words but not when they knew the corrupt words.²⁸

Kumārila, however, does not approve of this view. He first defends Patañjali as an authority on Grammar:

Kātyāyana has said – "If the knowledge of the correct word be said to constitute a *Dharma*, then, as such knowledge would also indirectly (*tantreṇa prasaṅgena vā*) involve that of the incorrect word, it would be mixed with an *Adharma*;" and having thus pointed out the chance of *Adharma* in this

²⁶ Thieme (1931: 29–30) suggests a *karmadhāraya* interpretation of the compound *dharmaniyama* as "*niyama* ist *dharma*." According to him, the meaning of *tat* (in the phrase *tat tulyaṃ vedaśabdena*) is (*vyākaraṇa*-)*sāstram*.

²⁷ MBh I. 10,26–11,2: *atha vā punar astu jñāna eva dharma iti. nanu cuktam, jñāne dharma iti cet tathādharmaḥ (= Vārttika 6) iti. naiṣa doṣaḥ. śabdapramāṇakā vāyam, yac chabda āha tad asmākaṃ pramāṇam. śabdaś ca śabdajñāne dharmam āha nāpaśabda-jñāne 'dharmam*.

²⁸ MBh (C), Uddyota, p. 56: *śabdaś ca śabdajñāne iti. ekaḥ śabdaḥ samyagjñāta ityādiḥ. helayo helaya ityādi tu apaśabdaprayoge 'dharmam āha. na tu jñāne iti bhāvaḥ*. See Eltschinger 2017: 322–323 and note 59; Ozono 2014: 80.

theory, he comes to the conclusion that it is the actual *using* of the correct forms of words, in accordance with grammatical rules, that constitutes *Dharma*, and brings happiness to the agent. And though the *Mahābhāṣya* has again resumed the former rejected theory, in the sentence – “Or the knowledge of correct word may be said to constitute *Dharma*,” yet this has been added only with a view to show that the argument urged against this theory is not quite irrefutable; and hence this resumption is not with a view to casting any aspersion upon the *Vārtika*, but simply as a gratuitous prolonging of the discussion (*kṛtvācintānyāya*) (trans. Jha 1983: I, 320).²⁹

Concerning Patañjali’s *Bhāṣya* on *Vārttika* 9, Kumārila insists that with the phrase “Or rather, let *dharma* ‘religious merit’ [lie] again in *jñāna* ‘[grammatical] knowledge’ alone” (*atha vā punar astu jñāne dharmah*), Patañjali holds it possible to cast away the flaw claimed by *Vārttika* 6 to occur if it is assumed that one can gain religious merit when one knows correct words. According to Kumārila, Patañjali makes this argument for the sake of precaution applying “a gratuitous prolonging of the discussion,” in other words, “an argument for the sake of argument (*kṛtvācintānyāya*).”³⁰

How Kumārila uses the two concepts, *tantra* and *prasaṅga*, in the statement quoted above needs to be explained. According to Someśvara,³¹ if grammar aims to distinguish correct words from incorrect words (*sādhvasādhuvivekārthatve*), it must teach not only correct words but also incorrect words, and the knowledge of the latter brings about *adharma*. This is a case of *tantra* because more than one effects occur by a single performance of action.³² Even if grammar aims to teach only correct words (*sādhvanuśāsanamātrārthatve*), the student cannot but come to know incorrect words in addition to correct words. This is a case of *prasaṅga*

²⁹ TV on JS 1.3.27 (TV [A] 287,18–22; TV [A’] 226,20–227,1): *yac ca kātyāyanena jñāne dharma iti cet tathā ’dharmah (Vārttika 6) iti tantreṇa prasaṅgena vā ’paśabdajñānād adharmatvāpattidoṣam abhidhāya śāstraprayoge ’bhyudayaḥ (Vārttika 9) iti niḥśreyasa-siddhyupāye ’vadhārite yat punaḥ prāvṛtṭya bhāṣyakāreṇoktam, atha vā punar astu jñāne dharma ity abhyupetyavādamātraṃ tat pūrvoktadoṣaparihārasāmarthyapradarśanārthaṃ kṛtvācintānyāyenoktam.*

³⁰ For the *kṛtvācintānyāya*, see Apte 1998: Appendix, p. 59.

³¹ Nsudhā 325,10–13: *śabdānuśāsanārthād vyākaraṇāt katham apaśabdajñānam ity āśaṅkya sādhvasādhuvivekārthatve vyākaraṇasya tantreṇa sādhvanuśāsanamātrārthatve prasaṅgena – ity uktam.*

³² Jha [1942] 1964: 307: “There are certain Subsidiaries which, if performed once, effectually help, by that single performance, more than one Acts; this help accorded by a single performance of the Subsidiary to several Primaries has been called ‘Tantra.’” See also Freschi and Pontillo 2013: 35–64.

because an extra effect incidentally comes about by a single performance of action in addition to the intended effect.³³

This is after all an explication of Kumārila. Patañjali must have been confident that *dharma* is generated to those who know correct words (*jñāne dharmah*). Kumārila explicates that *dharma* is not generated simply after correct words are known, but generated only after they are used:

As a matter of fact, however, the mention of the result as following from a knowledge of the correct word cannot be accepted as literally correct, but only as an *Arthavāda*, which latter character is distinctly pointed out by the fact of the *knowledge* being auxiliary to something else, as is shown by the fact of this something else becoming absolutely useless (if the said auxiliary be accepted as actually accomplishing the mentioned result). As for instance, in the case of the passage – “One who performs the *Aśvamedha*, and one who knows it becomes freed from the sin of Brāhmaṇa-slaughter,” – if mere knowledge of the sacrifice were to actually accomplish the said result, who would be foolish enough to undertake the performance of the expensive and troublesome sacrifice itself? and as such the Injunction of the sacrifice would become absolutely useless. In the same manner, if the mere knowledge of the correct word were to accomplish this *Dharma*, who would ever undertake the trouble of pronouncing the word, and thereby tiring out his organs of speech? Hence we conclude that, as in the case of the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice, so in that of words also, it is the use (of the correct word duly discriminated) that constitutes *Dharma* (and not the mere knowledge of it) (trans. Jha 1983: I, 320).³⁴

In short, Kumārila concurs with the view recorded by Kātyāyana in *Vārttika* 9. He then proceeds to explain how the use of correct words contributes to ritual as follows:

³³ Jha [1942] 1964: 310: “the single performance of a Subsidiary, – even though prescribed and intended to help *one* Primary, – is accepted as helping another Primary also. ... This is called ‘Prasaṅga.’” See also Freschi and Pontillo 2013: 71–81.

³⁴ TV on JS 1.3.27 (TV [A] 287,22–26; TV [A'] 227,1–6) *paramārthatas tv anyānarthakya prasaṅgavijñātapārārthyāpāditārthavādatvāt phalaśrutir na phalapratipattikṣamā vijñāyate. yathā yo 'śvamedhena yajate ya u cainam evaṃ veda (Taittirīya Saṃhitā 5.3.12.2) iti jñānamātrād eva brahmahatyātarāṇaṃ yadi sidhyet ko jātucid bahudravavyayāyāsasādhyam aśvamedhaṃ kuryāt. tadvidhānaṃ cānarthakam eva syāt. evaṃ śabdajñānāc ced dharmah sidhyet ko nāmānekatālvādivyāpārāyāsakhedam anubhavet? tasmāt kratuvad eva jñānapūrvaprayogasyaiva phalam.*

Specially as according to the conclusion arrived at under the Sūtra 4.3.1,³⁵ the knowledge of the word having its sole end in purifying the word used by the man, it cannot have anything to do with any other result (trans. Jha 1983: I, 320–321).³⁶

Having established that the knowledge of the correct form of words contributes only to their correct use, but not to the occurrence of *dharma*, Kumārila proceeds to argue how to distinguish the cognition of *ātman* from other kinds of knowledge in terms of usefulness:

In all cases, cognition is recognized to be a means for purification, and also subservient for only one primary, with the determined exception of the cognition of *ātman*.

That is to say, the cognition of *ātman* is recognized to be for the sake of a sacrifice (*kratvartha*) as well as for the sake of a human being (*puruṣārtha*) in accordance with the exegetic principle “the separate connection [of one and the same means to two different purposes], because without that (i.e., the cognition of *ātman*), concerning the actions that bring their reward in the next world, no one would undertake [those prescribed in the Veda] or abstain [from those prohibited in the Veda].”³⁷

After thus stating that the cognition of *ātman* is useful for the sake of performing a sacrifice that brings its result in the next life, Kumārila begins to discuss how it is also directly useful for a human being (*puruṣārtha*) without the intermediary by a sacrifice, quoting some sentences from *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Because this topic is not dealt with in the *Ātmavāda* of the *Ślokavārttika*, it is necessary to thoroughly examine these lines of the TV in order to understand Kumārila’s idea on the *ātman* and *Upaniṣads*. The author would like discuss on this topic on other opportunities as it goes beyond of this short essay.

³⁵ JS. 4.3.1: *dravyasaṃskārakarmasu parārthatvāt phalaśrutir arthavādaḥ syāt* “The text regarding the reward as to the materials, their purification and acts by reason of their being subservient to others is recommendatory” (Sandal 1923–1925: 66).

³⁶ TV on JS 1.3.27 (TV [A] 288,2–4; TV [A’] 227,8–14): *dravyasaṃskārakarmasu parārthatvāt phalaśrutir arthavādaḥ syāt* (JS 4.3.1) *ity anena nyāyena jñānasya puruṣaśabdasaṃskāratvena nirākāṅkṣasya phalasaṃbhavāt*.

³⁷ TV on JS 1.3.27 (TV [A] 288,5–6; TV [A’] 227,11–14):

*sarvatraiva hi vijñānaṃ saṃskāratvena gamyate /
parāṅgaṃ cātmavijñānād anyatrety avadhāraṇāt //*
ātmajñānaṃ hi saṃyogaprāthaktvāt kratvarthapuruṣārthatvena jñāyate. tena vinā paralokaphaleṣu karmasu pravṛttinivṛtṭyasaṃbhavāt. The *Śloka* (*sarvatraiva hi...*) is quoted by Nāgeśa in his *Uddyota*, with two variant readings (underlined): *sarvatraiva hi vijñānaṃ saṃskāritvena gamyate / parāṅgaṃ cātmavijñānād anyatrety avadhāryatām //* For an older attempt at translating and explaining these lines, see Harikai 1990: 133–145. See also Yoshimizu 2007: note 139 and *passim*.

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- MNP – See Edgerton [1929] 1986.
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- VP – *Vākyapadīya*. W. Rau, *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya. Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem pada-Index versehen*. Wiesbaden 1977.

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The **Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra* of a Late Candrakīrti

Matthew T. Kapstein

To John Taber, *paṇḍitānāṃ paṇḍitaḥ*, in friendship.

Introduction

In an article that appeared not long ago, I promised an edition and translation of a short philosophical tract, the **Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra* (MPA, Tib. *Dbu ma shes rab la 'jug pa*) by a certain Candrakīrti (Kapstein 2018: 3, n. 9). The present essay redeems that promise.

The brief colophon of the MPA attributes the work to the “great master” (*mahācārya*) Candrakīrti and the translation to the author together with the Tibetan 'Gos Khug-pa Lha-btsas. It is perhaps odd that the Tibetans routinely seem to have classed it as a work by Nāgārjuna's famous commentator, who also wrote the *Madhyamakāvatāra*, despite the colophon's clear affirmation that the author participated in the translation in collaboration with 'Gos, a well-known figure during the early part of the “later spread of the doctrine” (*bstan-pa phyi-dar*) in Tibet, corresponding to the eleventh century.¹ Candrakīrti, the author of the MPA, is probably to be identified with a scholar from Kashmir who independently translated the *Trisvabhāvapraveśasiddhi*, which he attributed to Nāgārjuna, a text that is in fact nothing but an alternate version of the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* credited

¹ Ruegg (1981: 81) has already called attention to the fact that the author must be a late Candrakīrti and to uncertainties about the proper form of the title. He writes: “The **Madhyamakāvatāraprajñā* or **Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra* translated into Tibetan by its author together with 'Gos-khug-pa-lha(s)-bčas must be by another Candrakīrti who lived much later [than Nāgārjuna's commentator], in the eleventh century.” This is, to the best of my knowledge, the only discussion of the MPA in the secondary literature to date. It is, of course, duly listed in the standard catalogues of the Tibetan canons: in Ui et al. 1934 it is no. 3863; and in Suzuki 1961, no. 5264. In both cases, its placement immediately following the *Madhyamakāvatāra* offers further evidence that the Tibetan editors of the canon did not care to distinguish the several Candrakīrti-s from one another.

to Vasubandhu and translated into Tibetan by the same 'Gos Khug-pa Lha-btsas, but with Ratnākaraśānti's disciple Śāntibhadra acting as *pañḍita* (Kapstein 2018). We do not know much about the Kashmiri Candrakīrti beyond what is implied here, namely that he belongs to the mid-eleventh century and apparently knew some Tibetan.

Following a preamble giving the title of the text in Sanskrit and Tibetan, as well as the customary “translator’s homage” (*'gyur-phyag*), addressed in this case to Mañjuśrīkumārabhūta, the main body of the work consists of 77 seven-syllable lines, which may be divided for convenience into nineteen verses each of two to six lines and assigned roman numerals in the text given below. I have marked the Sanskrit title I have adopted, **Madhyamakaprajñāvatāra*, as conjectural, and I take it to mean the “Introduction to the Discernment of the Middle Way,” that is to say, to *prajñā* as understood and taught in the Madhyamaka. The Sanskrit title as found in the text itself, however, is *Madhyamakāvatāraprajñā*, which does not precisely accord with the Tibetan version, for, if the Sanskrit as we find it here is correct, we would expect the Tibetan to have been rendered *dbu ma la 'jug pa'i shes rab*.² This does not make very good sense to me, though it might be interpreted to mean *prajñā* which introduces, or enters into, the Madhyamaka, or even perhaps “*prajñā* as taught in the *Madhyamakāvatāra*.” Some such interpretation would find support in both the author’s name, identifying him in some sense with his more famous predecessor, as well as in the general pattern of the text, which may appear to offer a sort of résumé of the earlier Candrakīrti’s great work. However, the preference that we find in our present text for the “neither one, nor many” argument favored by Śāntarakṣita, but not highlighted by the first Candrakīrti, as well as the title as given in Tibetan, urge caution about this. We may note, too, that the Tibetan translator, 'Gos Khug-pa Lha-btsas, was primarily known for his transmission to Tibet of the so-called Ārya Tradition of the Guhyasamājatantra (*gsang-'dus 'phags-lugs*), the line of teaching that was passed down through a group of tantric masters cognate to the great Madhyamaka teachers – Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, and Candrakīrti – and supposed by Tibetan tradition to have been the very same persons.³ The fact that the Candrakīrti with whom we are concerned here seems also to have credited the *Trisvabhāvapraveśasiddhi* to Nāgārjuna suggests that his lineage similarly

² In fact, I believe that the Sanskrit title as we find it in the Tibetan canonical versions of the MPA, like many of the Sanskrit titles found in the Tibetan canons, is most likely a Tibetan back-translation and not original.

³ On 'Gos Khug-pa Lha-btsas and the Ārya tradition of the Guhyasamāja, refer to BA, pp. 359–364, and 'Jam-mgon 1985. On the history of the Ārya tradition in general, see also Wedemeyer 2007: 3–63.

claimed the mantle of the Madhyamaka founders. However, in the accounts available to us of 'Gos Khug-pa Lha-btsas's transmission of the Guhyasamāja, his collaborator Candrakīrti is nowhere mentioned.⁴

Although the MPA never seems to have played an important role in Tibetan Madhyamaka studies, it was nevertheless familiar to scholars, particularly to those of the Sa-skyapa school, for we find it cited in the writings of the great specialist of the *Abhisamayālaṅkāraśāstra*, G.yag-sde Paṅ-chen Sangs-rgyas-dpal (1350–1414),⁵ as well as in works by Tsong-kha-pa's noted critic Go-rams-pa Bsod-nams-seng-ge (1429–1489)⁶ and by *dge-slong* Kun-dga'-bkra-shis.⁷ Much later, we find it cited, too, in the encyclopaedic *Shes-bya kun-khyab mdzod* of the eclectic master Kong-sprul Blo-gros-mtha'-yas.⁸

One point of interest in the citations of Go-rams-pa and Kun-dga'-bkra-shis is that both occur in distinctively tantric contexts, referencing an apparent similarity between MPA XII and a celebrated verse from the *Hevajratāntra*, I.v.11a–b: “there is neither meditator, nor meditation; neither mantra, nor deity.”⁹ Though the MPA can by no means be considered a tantric text, the reference is perhaps intentional and may tell us something of the milieu in which the work was composed. The hint of a tantric connection is strengthened by the mention of the “three vows” (*sdom gsum*, Skt. *trisaṃvara*) in verse XIV, if this phrase is to be understood as it typically was in Tibet, as designating the *prātimokṣa*, *bodhisattvasaṃvara*, and the tantric *saṃaya*.¹⁰ These observations tend to support the hypothesis sketched in Kapstein 2018, that the MPA and *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* are likely to have been philosophical *précis* produced and circulated within predominantly

⁴ Unless, that is, he is to be identified with the Candrarāhula who was from Kashmir and was also one of the major teachers of 'Gos Khug-pa Lha-btsas. Refer to BA, pp. 360, 758.

⁵ G.yag-ñik (vol. 1, p. 39) cites verse IV; p. 227 reproduces the entire text from X.3 to XVII.4.

⁶ Go-rams-pa (2007: 294) cites verse XII.

⁷ Kun-dga'-bkra-shis (2007: 221) cites verse XII.1–3. I have not so far succeeded in locating biographical information on Kun-dga'-bkra-shis. The colophon of the work to which I refer here, p. 268, states that it was written in a fire female ox year on behalf of the Sa-skyapa heir Ngag-dbang bsod-nams dbang-po grags-pa rgyal-mtshan dpal-bzang-po, who is no doubt to be identified with the Sa-skya khri-chen Byams-pa Ngag-dbang bsod-nams dbang-po grags-pa rgyal-mtshan (1559–1621), in which case the year of composition must be 1577.

⁸ Kong-sprul 2002: 561 (= Sde-dge xylographic edition, vol. ĀḤ, fol. 270a), reproduces the entire passage X.3–XIII, following which Kong-sprul adds that “this is the culminating Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika tenet” (*dbu ma thal 'gyur ba'i bzhed pa mthar thug pa'o*).

⁹ Snellgrove 1959: vol. 2, p. 16: *nāsti bhāvako na bhāvo 'sti mantran nāsti na devatā*.

¹⁰ A detailed survey of Tibetan treatments may be found in Sobisch 2002.

tantric milieux. Be this as it may, the brief presentation within the MPA of Madhyamaka thought in relation to contemplative practice, resembling indigenous Tibetan works of the *blo-sbyong* (“mind-training, spiritual exercise”) and *lta-khrid* (“guidance on views”) genres, may be of interest in connection with current discussions of Buddhist philosophy responding to the idea of “spiritual exercise” as developed in the writings of philosopher Pierre Hadot.¹¹

Variants in the Tibetan text, among the five editions of the Tanjur consulted (and recorded below as C., D., G., N., and P.), are mostly minor alterations of orthography and make little difference for our understanding of the work. The editors of the *Dpe bsdur ma* composite edition of the Tanjur have in general accepted the readings of D. (and hence usually C.), even in the cases in which G., N., and P. are clearly preferable, though the variants from N. and P. are entered into their notes. A particularly striking example of problems stemming from this practice may be found in verse IV, line 12, where only an unbending adherence to the principle of *lectio difficilior* would justify the C. and D. reading of *slong ba'i dngos po*, adopted in the *Dpe bsdur ma* text, against the alternative *snang ba'i dngos po*, which I have accepted.

The contents of the nineteen verses into which I have divided the work may be outlined as follows (with Sanskrit section headings that I have assigned):

- | | | |
|----------|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (I) | <i>śāstrārambha</i> | The author's statement of intent (<i>pratijñā</i>). |
| (II) | <i>piṇḍārtha</i> | Summary. |
| (III) | <i>adhiśīlāśikṣā</i> | The practice of moral discipline. |
| (IV–XII) | <i>adhiprajñāśikṣā</i> | The practice of discernment: (IV) general statement of the neither-one-nor-many argument; (V) critique of atomism; (VI) critique of aggregations; (VII) the falseness of phenomenal features (<i>alīkākāra</i>); (VIII) the neither-one-nor-many argument applied to mental states (<i>caittasika</i>); (IX) no contradiction with unanalysed experience; (X) ordinary convention requires no proof; (XI) the nature of the “unborn;” (XII) no final affirmations are possible. |

¹¹ Refer to Fiordalis 2018, which includes a thorough bibliography of work on Buddhism in relation to Hadot.

(XIII–XV)	<i>adhicittasīkṣā</i>	The practice of meditation: (XIII) absorption (<i>samāhita</i>); (XIV) awareness following absorption (<i>prṣṭhalabdhajñāna</i>); (XV) contemplative lifestyle (<i>cārya</i>).
(XVI)	<i>phala</i>	The fruit, awakening as buddha.
(XVII)	<i>sārasaṅgraha</i>	Brief recapitulation.
(XVIII)	<i>upadeśa</i>	Concluding advice to the reader.
(XIX)	<i>pariṇāmanā</i>	Dedication of merit.

It will be evident to students of Buddhist philosophy that very substantial annotation might be added to the present text and translation, to identify parallel passages and to fill out the arguments and doctrines referenced herein. For reasons of space and time, however, I have not undertaken to do that here: *alaṃ ativistareṇa*! Rather, in the spirit of the mathematics textbooks in use when I was in school, these matters may be left as exercises to be completed by astute readers at home.

Text and translation

(Preamble)

dbu ma shes rab la 'jug pa zhes bya ba bzhugs so//
 rgya gar skad du/ ma dhya ^ama kā^a ba tā ra pra dznyā nā ma/
 bod skad du/ dbu ma shes rab la 'jug pa zhes bya ba/
 'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo//

^a C. D. mi ka a

Herein is The Introduction to the Discernment of the Middle Way

In Sanskrit: *Madhyamakāvatāraprajñānāma*

In Tibetan: dbu ma shes rab la 'jug pa zhes bya ba

Namo Mañjuśrīkumārabhūtāya! Homage to Mañjuśrī in Princely Form!

(Body of the text)

(I) dbu ma shes rab la 'jug pa'i//^b
don ni bdag gis bshad^c bya ste//

^b C. D. 'jug pa'i

^c C. D. bshad par

What I am to explain is the significance
Of the introduction to the discernment
of the middle way.

(II) dgag sgrub^d gnyis ka dgag 'ba'
zhig//
dngos la dgag sgrub 'ga'^e yang med//
de lta bu ni goms byas na// 5
phun sum tshogs pa thob par 'gyur//

^d C. D. bsgrub, ^e C. D. gang

Refutation and proof are both only
refuted.

In reality, there is no refutation or
proof at all.
If you cultivate contemplation in this
way,
You will obtain the perfect goal.

(III) mi dge bcu ni spangs nas ni//
dge ba bcu ni dang du blang^f//
dngos por zhen pa bkag nas ni//
rang la bsgrub^g tu cung zad med// 10

^f G. N. P. blangs, ^g C. D. sgrub

Having abandoned the ten
unwholesome deeds,
One undertakes the ten that are
wholesome.
Having stopped obsession with entities,
You have nothing more to achieve.

(IV) snang^h ba'i dngos po 'di yang ni//
yang dag pa yi rang bzhin med//
du ma dang ni gcig bral phyir//
sgyu ma'i glang po ji bzhin no//

^h C. D. slong

As for these apparent entities,
They are without genuine essence.
Because they are free from many and
one,
They are just like an apparitional
elephant.

(V) cha shas sna tshogs gnas pa
na// 15
rdul phran gcig pu nyid ma yin//
de nyid med pas du ma gang//
phan tshun spangs te gnas paⁱ na//
gzhan gyi dngos po ga la yod//

ⁱ C. D. pas

In that various parts subsist,
The atom is not at all unitary.
If, because it is not just so [i.e.,
unitary], the many [parts]
Subsist in mutual exclusion,
Then where is that thing-constituted-
by-another?

(VI) de nyid med pas de bsags
pa'i// 20
rags pa'i gzugs dang rdzas sogs gang//
rnam pa sna tshogs snang ba dang//
shes pa tha ni mi dad pas//
shes pa du ma nyid du 'gyur//

Because that is not, the aggregated
gross forms,
Substances, and so forth,
Their varied apparent features,
And cognition are no different;
Hence, cognition must be manifold.

(VII) rnam pa rdzun^j pa nyid kyis
ni// 25
shes pa de yang rdzun^k par 'gyur//
de lta min na bden nyid 'gyur//

Because the features are non-veridical,
That cognition, too, must be
non-veridical;
For, otherwise, it would be truth.

^j, ^k C. D. brdzun

(VIII) de nyid phyir na sems byung^l
gang//
gcig dang du ma spangs pa yi//
dngos po gang yang mi gnas te// 30
phan tshun spangs te gnas phyir ro//

Therefore, what mental states there are
Subsist not as things at all,
In the absence of one and many,
For those abide as mutually exclusive.

^l G. N. P. 'byung

(IX) mngon sum la sogs 'gal zhe na//
ma yin ma brtags nyams dga' ba//
de ni bdag gis bkag pa med//

If you object that this contradicts
perception, etc.,
That is not so; for I have not negated
Unanalysed, spontaneous experience
(*avicāra-ramaṇīya*).

(X) tha snyad tsam zhig bsgrub^m pa'i
phyir// 35
dam bca' gtan tshigs nyid ma yin//
ye nas skye med ngang 'diⁿ la//
dgag bya med la bsgrub^o bya med//

To establish mere convention alone,
There is no call for assertion and reason.
For, with respect to this primordially
unborn nature,
There is neither *negandum* nor
probandum.

^m G. N. P. sgrub, ⁿ C. D. nyid, ^o G. N. P.
sgrub

(XI) mya ngan 'das dang ma 'ongs
pa//
skye med ngang du khyad par
med// 40
skye med nyid kyang ma yin te//
skye ba'i dngos po med phyir ro//

Nirvāṇa and the future
In their unborn nature are no different.
The unborn itself is not,
For there is no thing that is born.

(XII) kun rdzob med la don dam
med//
sangs rgyas med la sems can med//
lta ba med cing sgom pa med// 45
'bras bu med cing spyod pa med//

There is no relative, no absolute,
Neither buddha, nor sentient being.
There is no view, no meditation,
Neither result, nor conduct.

(XIII) de yi don ni bsgom bya ste//
rtog med blo ni rang zhir bzhag//
^p dngos gzungs med cing g.yeng ba^p
med//
mtshan ma med cing gsal bar
bsgom^q// 50

Its significance is to be meditatively
cultivated:
Free from conceptualization, the mind
is placed in natural peace.
Without apprehension of things,
undistracted,
Without attributions, one lucidly
meditates.

^p C. D. ngos gzung med cing yengs pa

^q G. N. P. sgom

(XIV) langs la dngos por snang ba
kun//
sgyu ma tsam du shes byas nas//
sdom pa rnam gsum 'bad pas bsrung//
yan lag bdun pa la sogs bya//
snying rjes^r phan sems che bar bya// 55

On arising, knowing all appearing
things
To be mere apparition,
One diligently preserves the three
vows (*trisaṃvara*),
Performs the seven-fold service, etc.,
And with compassion magnifies
altruism.

^r G. N. P. sgom

(XV) yul la chags pa spang bya
zhing//
'gron po'i tshul gyis gnas par bya//
sangs can ma dad spangs nas ni//
bdag nyid dgon par gnas par bya//

Desire toward objects is to be
renounced,
One should dwell in the manner of a
visitor.
Abandoning faithless creatures,
One should stay by oneself in retreat.

(XVI) de yi 'bras bu sangs rgyas
kyi^s// 60
'bras bu chen po thob pa ste//
chos kyi sku dang longs spyod rdzogs//
sprul pa'i sku ru gnas pa yis//
sangs can thams cad sgrol bar byed//

The fruit of that is the acquisition
Of the great fruit of awakening;
By abiding in the bodies of reality,
Perfect rapture and emanation,
One liberates all sentient beings.

^s G. N. P. kyi

(XVII) de phyir 'bad pa^t thams cad
kyis// 65
dang^u po lta ba^v thag bcad de//
bar du bsgom^w pas nyams su blang//
tha mar 'bras bu thob par 'gyur//
de bas 'bad de brtson par bya//

^t G. N. pas, ^u C. D. dngos, ^v G. N. bar

^w C. D. pa

(XVIII) de ltar bdag gis bshad 'di
la// 70
phyogs 'dzin pa yi sems bor la//
rigs pa yis ni dpyad par bya//
chos la skur ba gdab mi bya//
g.yeng ba thams cad spangs nas ni//
*bsgrub pa la ni^x brtson par bya// 75

^x G. N. P. sgrub ni rab tu

(XIX) bdag gis 'di byas bsod nams
kyis//
sems can thams cad grol gyur cig//

Therefore, making all efforts,
One should first ascertain the view,
In between cultivate spiritual
experience in meditation,
And in the end obtain the fruit.
Thus, making efforts should one strive.

Thus, regarding what I've explained
here,
Abandon biased thought,
And examine it through reason.
One should not blaspheme the dharma.
Having renounced all distraction,
One must earnestly strive for
attainment.

By the merit of my composing this
May all sentient beings be liberated.

(Colophon)

dbu ma shes rab la 'jug pa zhes bya ba// slob dpon chen po zla ba grags pas
mdzad pa rdzogs so// paṇḍi ta de nyid dang lo tstsha ba 'gos khug^y pa lha btsas
kyis bsgyur ba'o// //

^y G. N. P. khu

The Introduction to the Discernment of the Middle Way, composed by the great
master Candrakīrti, is completed. It was translated by that very *paṇḍita* and the
translator 'Gos Khug-pa Lha-btsas.

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Bhāviveka and Kumāṛila on Omniscience and Scripture: Reconsidering the New Chronology

Kei Kataoka

1. The old and new chronologies

Bhāviveka's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* presupposes Kumāṛila's *Ślokavārttika*. This is one of the important remarks made by Krasser 2011 (= Krasser 2012).¹ Krasser investigates relevant passages of Bhāviveka and Kumāṛila that deal with the same topics including the existence of an omniscient being (*sarvajña*) and the authoritativeness of scripture (*āgamaprāmāṇya*). Krasser's conclusion, if it is correct, compels us to reconsider the dating of Kumāṛila. Instead of placing him in the first half of the seventh century as Frauwallner (1962: 90) does, the new chronology impels us to place him in the middle of the sixth century at the latest.² Bhāviveka's dating to ca. 490–570 AD is more or less fixed, for Sthiramati, who criticizes Bhāviveka, is assigned to ca. 510–570 AD on the basis of a piece of epigraphical evidence of the king Guhasena (reg. 558–566 AD).³

	Old chronology	New chronology
500	Dignāga 480–540	Dignāga
		Kumāṛila
		Dharmakīrti
	Bhāviveka 490–570	Bhāviveka
	Sthiramati 510–570	Sthiramati
	Dharmapāla 530–561?	Dharmapāla

¹ Krasser 2011: 228 = Krasser 2012: 577: “Whatever the circumstances of the composition of the MHK/TJ may have been, the material on the notion of omniscience suggests that the MHK, or at least portions of it, presuppose Kumāṛila.”

² Krasser 2011: 235 = Krasser 2012: 587: “I would nevertheless like to propose, as a working hypothesis, the time of activity of Kumāṛila and Dharmakīrti to be the middle of the 6th century.”

³ See Frauwallner 1961: 136 and Krasser 2011: 231 = Krasser 2012: 581.

	Old chronology	New chronology
600	Kumāṛila	
	Dharmakīrti 600–660	

Table 1. Old and new chronologies.

It is true, as Krasser demonstrates, that Bhāviveka and Kumāṛila share many arguments in common. But this phenomenon alone does not prove anything, because old issues or arguments fixed by tradition are repeatedly discussed by subsequent scholars. What we need to do is investigate which of the two theorists has more developed ideas and more careful treatment of the same issues and which of the two introduces new issues or more sophisticated arguments not yet discussed by the other. The degree of the development of their theories can determine their chronological relation even though neither of them explicitly refers to the other. In the following I reinvestigate, though not exhaustively, some of the important passages dealt with by Krasser, looking more closely at the development and maturity of the theories they contain.

2. *Sarvajña* and *buddhavaśana*

2.1. The *adarśana* argument

2.1.1. Nāgārjuna

In pseudo-Nāgārjuna's *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*,⁴ translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva in 405 AD, an opponent raises the following objection: omniscient beings do not exist in this world, because omniscient beings are not seen (**na sarvajño dṛśyate*).⁵ To this Nāgārjuna replies:

Not correct. For [the state of] not being seen is of two kinds (**adarśanam dvividham*). One cannot conclude that something does not exist just because it is not seen (**nādarśanamātreṇa nāstīty vaktum śakyate*). In the first type, it (the unseen thing) actually exists, but it is not seen because it is obstructed due to [various] causes (**hetupratyayāvaraṇaśān na dṛśyate*). For example, the origin of the human race, the weight of the Himālaya mountain, and the number of sands in the Gaṅgā river. Although these things exist, none of them can be cognized. In the case of the second type, it is not seen because it does not actually exist (**vastuto nāstīti na*

⁴ For authorship, see Lamotte 1970: VIII–LV.

⁵ *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, Taisho 25, 74b: 問曰。世間不應有一切智人。何以故。無見一切智人者。(Krasser (2011: 214, n. 61 = 2012: 559, n. 60) quotes Lamotte's translation.)

drśyate). For example, a second head and a third hand.⁶ The opponent has not obtained the four kinds of *śraddhā* and thus his mind is terribly tainted. Therefore, the opponent does not perceive omniscient beings because of this obstruction which is due to [various] causes.⁷

– In Nāgārjuna’s view, although an omniscient being exists, he cannot be seen by the opponent because the opponent’s mind is tainted due to lack of belief.

2.1.2. Bhāviveka

In Bhāviveka’s *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* a Mīmāṃsaka opponent raises a similar objection: there is no omniscient being, because he is not seen now.⁸ This opponent adds to this objection a reason why the Buddha is alleged to be omniscient although he is in fact not omniscient: It is postulated (by himself or by his followers) that the Buddha is omniscient in order to obtain people’s devotion (*lokabhaktaye*).⁹ This addition fits with the Mīmāṃsā idea that human beings will tell a lie out of greed and for similar reasons. The source of this idea is found in *Jaiminīsūtra* 1.3.4: *hetudarśanāc ca* and its commentarial tradition. Authors of *Smṛti* may tell lies out of greed. Therefore, if one finds impure motives concealed in their teaching, one does not have to consider it to be authoritative.

Bhāviveka replies to this criticism as follows: the word *sarvajña* is true with regard to a certain referent. This is similar to the word *siṃha*, which is true in some cases but is figurative (and therefore not true) in other cases.¹⁰

⁶ *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, Taisho 25, 74b: 答曰。不爾。不見有二種。不可以不見故便言無。一者事實有。以因緣覆故不見。譬如、人姓族初、及雪山斤兩、恒河邊沙數。有而不可知。二者實無無故不見。譬如第二頭、第三手。

⁷ *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, Taisho 25, 74b: 未得四信、心著惡邪。汝以是因緣覆故、不見一切智人。

⁸ MHK IX 15ab (Kawasaki 1992: 411, Lindtner 2001a: 93, Krasser 2011: 213 = Krasser 2012: 559): *na cāsti kaścīt sarvajñō nedānīm drśyate yataḥ*/ For translations, see Kawasaki 1992: 165, Lindtner 2001b: 13, and Krasser 2011: 213.

⁹ MHK IX 15cd (Kawasaki 1992: 411, Lindtner 2001a: 93, Krasser 2011: 214, n. 62 = Krasser 2012: 559, n. 61): *sarvajñatā hi buddhasya kalpitā *lokabhaktaye*// (**lokabhaktaye*] emendation according to Kawasaki’s note which states “Possible also *lokabhaktaye*, supported by Tib. *ljig rten gus byaḥi phyir*,” *lokabhaktaye* Kawasaki, Lindtner, Krasser.) For translations, see Kawasaki 1992: 377, Lindtner 2001b: 13, and Krasser 2011: 214 = Krasser 2012: 559.

¹⁰ MHK IX 159 (Kawasaki 1992: 466; also quoted in Krasser 2011: 205, n. 34 = Krasser 2012: 548, n. 34): *kun mkhyen zes bya’i sgra ‘di yañ yul ‘ga’ žig la ji bžin yin/ señ ge’i sgra yañ la la bden kha cig ñe bar btags pa ñid*// (My tentative reconstruction: **sarvajñāśabdo ‘yam api kvacid arthe yathārthakaḥ/ siṃhaśabdo ‘pi kaścīt tu satyaḥ ko ‘py aupacārikaḥ*!))

Instead of appealing to the lack of belief in the opponent's defiled mind, which Nāgārjuna identified as the main reason why the opponent cannot perceive an omniscient being, Bhāviveka gives an argument that is more convincing for Mīmāṃsakas. Mīmāṃsakas believe that words, which are essentially eternal, refer to real entities. The connection between words and their corresponding objects are eternal (*nitya*), too.¹¹ A hearer can correctly understand the object through this eternal connection between a word and its object.¹² In this way Bhāviveka reworks Mīmāṃsakas' own reasoning to prove that the word "omniscient being" does refer to a real omniscient being through its eternal connection. The word "lion" primarily refers to a lion and in some cases, figuratively, to a young man: "Devadatta is [like] a lion" (*siṃho devadattaḥ*). Similarly the word "omniscient being" must primarily refer to a real omniscient being and in some cases, figuratively, to a person who is not omniscient. The *Tarkajvālā* mentions Jaimini, Kapila, and Kaṇāda as being examples of figurative omniscient beings.

"*siṃha*" → *siṃha* –(*guṇa*)→ *māṇavaka*
 "*sarvajña*" → *sarvajña* –(*guṇa*)→ *asarvajña* (**sarvajñābhāsa*)

One can see that Bhāviveka refines the argument of *adarśana* in order to convince his Mīmāṃsaka opponent. The idea of a non-primary, figurative usage (JS 3.2.3: *ayathārtham*; JS 3.2.4: *guṇād abhidhānam*) that assumes eternal connection (< JS 3.2.1: *nityasaṃyogāt*) between words and their primary meanings (*artha*) is already found in *Jaiminisūtra* 3.2.4: *guṇād vāpy abhidhānaṃ syāt saṃbandhasyāśāstrahetutvāt*. The straightforward interpretation of this *sūtra* is as follows: "But expression [though secondary] is also possible through a [common] property [i.e., similarity], because the relationship [between a word and its meaning] is [objective and] not based on what has been taught." The word "Indra" primarily denotes the god Indra but it can also secondarily refer to the Gārhapatya fire through the similarity between the god and the fire. In this way even a secondary expression is possible through the connection which is reliable due to its objectivity. Therefore, one should worship the fire and not the god with the Indra mantra (JS 3.2.3: *aindrī*; ŚBh ad 3.2.3: *aindreṇa mantreṇa*).

"*indra*" → *indra* –(*guṇa*)→ *gārhapatya*

For translations, see Kawasaki 1992: 400 (and Kawasaki 1992: 184, which also contains a translation of the *Tarkajvālā*) and Lindtner 2001b: 51–52. See also explanations of Bhāviveka's discussion in Krasser 2011: 205 = Krasser 2012: 548.

¹¹ MHK IX 6ab (Kawasaki 1992: 408, Lindtner 2001a: 92): *nityaḥ śabdo dhvanivyāṅgyaḥ saṃbandho 'rthena nityataḥ*

¹² MHK IX 6cd (Kawasaki 1992: 408, Lindtner 2001a: 92): *pratipattur yato 'rtheṣu pratipattiḥ prajāyate*//

One can see that Bhāviveka's counterargument is based on a traditional Mīmāṃsā idea that is already found in the *Jaiminīsūtra*.

- In Bhāviveka's view, although an omniscient being is not seen now, he must exist because the word "omniscient being" has an eternal connection with its real object.

2.1.3. Kumāṛila

Kumāṛila mentions the same argument of *adarśana* in his critique of omniscience in order to prove that an omniscient being does not exist. "First, people like us do not see an omniscient being now."¹³ This is exactly the same objection that Bhāviveka mentions, namely, the present non-perception of an omniscient being (*nedānīm dṛśyate*).¹⁴ But Kumāṛila reformulates this argument from a different perspective, i.e., from the point of view of *pratyakṣābhāva* or the absence of perception. In subsequent discussions in the *Ślokavārttika*, Kumāṛila rejects the idea that inference (*anumāna*) or verbal testimony (*śabda*) may prove or serve as witness to the existence of an omniscient being: "Nor is it possible to postulate (i.e., infer) that there was [such a being], as [one can] deny [it]."¹⁵ "Nor [can one postulate] an omniscient being on the basis of scripture."¹⁶ Kumāṛila's strategy becomes clearer and gets more sophisticated in his revised work, the *Bṛhatṭīkā*, in which he additionally rejects the role of *upamāna* and *arthāpatti*.

MHK IX 15:

na cāsti kaścit sarvajño
nedānīm dṛśyate yataḥ
sarvajñatā hi buddhasya
kalpitā lokabhaktaye

ŚV Codanā 117

sarvajño dṛśyate tāvan
nedānīm asmadādibhiḥ
 (→ to be discussed in TV)

nirākaraṇavac chakyā

na cāśīd iti kalpanā

(*śabdābhāvaḥ*: ŚV 118–120; TS 3186–3213)

(*upamānābhāvaḥ*: TS 3214–3215)

(*arthāpattiyabhāvaḥ*: TS 3216–3228)

¹³ ŚV Codanā 117ab: *sarvajño dṛśyate tāvan nedānīm asmadādibhiḥ*/ The verse is quoted in Krasser 2011: 214 = Krasser 2012: 559.

¹⁴ Cf. Krasser 2011: 229 = Krasser 2012: 579: "We have a verse found in the works of both that is nearly identical (§2.1)."

¹⁵ ŚV Codanā 117cd: *nirākaraṇavac chakyā na cāśīd iti kalpanā*//

¹⁶ ŚV Codanā 118a: *na cāgamena sarvajñas*.

Kumārila's argument can be summarized as follows:

- An omniscient being does not exist, because there is no evidential *pramāṇa* such as *pratyakṣa* for such a being.

2.1.4. Remarks

The reason *adarśana* alone does not constitute a strong argument, as Nāgārjuna already pointed out. Nevertheless, it seems that Mīmāṃsakas continue referring to this reason with additional arguments or refinements. Probably the *adarśana* argument had become a traditional issue, or a fixed topic to be discussed or at least mentioned, well before Bhāviveka and Kumārila.

Bhāviveka presents this argument as the first of his four arguments (MHK IX 15, 16ab, 16cd, 17). Probably he regards this argument as the most basic and therefore the first to be picked up. Bhāviveka's opponent mentions the tainted motive of the Buddha or his followers, who claim omniscience "in order to acquire people's devotion" (*lokabhaktaye*). This additional issue is a natural extension of the typical Mīmāṃsā idea found in *Jaiminisūtra* 1.3.4.

Bhāviveka's response with the use of *sarvajñaśabda* fits the actual situation of the debate. It is a good answer to embarrass his Mīmāṃsaka opponent in the debate. From the perspective of a system of philosophy, however, we can say that the reasoning regarding the word *sarvajña* does not hold good for the Buddhist side, because Buddhists do not believe that words refer to real entities. Bhāviveka's reply applies only to his opponent. His reply is a typical Mādhyamika cavil that refutes the opponent's claim on the basis of the opponent's own system. Bhāviveka's solution to this issue is more destructive than constructive. He gives a counterattack in order to silence his opponent without really solving the problem of why an omniscient being is not seen now.

Kumārila also places the *adarśana* argument first, i.e., at the beginning of his denial of the three (or five in the case of the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*) evidential *pramāṇas* (*ŚV Codanā* 117ab, 117cd, 118–120). Kumārila's entire argument is thorough and aims at doctrinal perfection as is also suggested by the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*.

When comparing the treatments of the *adarśana* argument by Bhāviveka and Kumārila, one is inclined to place Bhāviveka before Kumārila because of the degree of the development of the latter's theory. Whereas Bhāviveka's treatment of *adarśana* reflects an actual debate in which a mere counterargument can sometimes be effective, Kumārila's discussion is highly sophisticated and systematized. Furthermore, the difference between Bhāviveka and Kumārila reflects the general development of Indian philosophy in this period from *vāda* to *pramāṇa*.

If Bhāviveka had known of Kumārila's criticism with its appeals to *pratyakṣābhāva* (*adarśana*, *anupalabdhi*) and *pramāṇābhāva*, Bhāviveka should have refuted it by means of the *adṛśyānupalabdhi* theory as Dharmakīrti does. If Bhāviveka had known Dharmakīrti as Krasser claims in his article,¹⁷ it would not have been difficult for him to revive Nāgārjuna's argument of *adarśana* in a completely new format, one that incorporated Dharmakīrti's famous theory of *anupalabdhi*: The omniscience of an omniscient being is absolutely imperceptible (*adṛśya*; *atyantaparokṣa*) and not perceptible (*dṛśya*), i.e., it is not endowed with the condition of being perceivable (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*); therefore his omniscience cannot be denied through non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), because non-perception of something totally imperceptible (*adṛśyānupalabdhi*) concludes nothing.¹⁸

2.2. The *kṛtakatva* argument

2.2.1. The *Jaiminisūtra*

Although there is no explicit expression such as *nityatvāt pramāṇam* or *anityatvād apramāṇam* in the *Jaiminisūtra*, the text assumes the basic idea that eternity logically leads to authoritativeness and non-eternality to non-authoritativeness.

$$\begin{aligned} nitya &\rightarrow pramāṇatva \\ anitya &\rightarrow apramāṇatva \end{aligned}$$

For example, in JS 1.2.1 (*āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthhānām tasmād anityam ucyate*) an opponent proclaims that *arthavādas* do not serve to teach any action and therefore are useless (*ānarthakya*). He concludes that *arthavādas* are “non-eternal” (*anitya*). The connotation of the word *anitya* in this context is “not being an eternal, authoritative Veda,” which amounts to non-authoritativeness.

The case for *akṛtakatva* and *kṛtakatva* is similar. Although there is no explicit expression such as *akṛtakatvāt pramāṇam* or *kṛtakatvād apramāṇam* in the *Jaiminisūtra*, the text assumes that the nature of not being produced by human beings proves authoritativeness and the nature of being produced by human beings proves non-authoritativeness. For example, in JS 1.1.27 (*vedāṃś caike*

¹⁷ Krasser 2011: 234 = Krasser 2012: 585: “In any case, if we accept that Bhāviveka had knowledge of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti and if we push their time of activity back into the middle of the 6th century, which I consider the only way to make sense of the material presented above...”

¹⁸ For *adṛśyānupalabdhi*, see Tillemans 1999: 151–169.

sannikarṣaṃ puruṣākhyāḥ) an opponent proclaims that the Vedas are not eternal but mere recent products (*sannikarṣa*) because the Vedas were produced and stated (*ākhyāyate*) by human beings such as Kaṭha.

akṛtakatva → *pramāṇatva*
kṛtakatva → *apramāṇatva*

Śabara glosses *sannikarṣa* as *sannikṛṣṭakālāḥ kṛtakā vedā idānīntanāḥ*. In other words, according to the opponent, the Vedas are new products whose time (*kāla*) of composition is recent (*sannikṛṣṭa*). Their authors (ŚBh ad 1.1.27: *kartā puruṣaḥ*) are Kaṭha and other teachers. The notion that the Vedas are authorless, eternal, and therefore authoritative is a traditional Mīmāṃsā idea.

2.2.2. Bhāvivēka

The *Jaiminīsūtra* and the *Śābarabhāṣya* do not pay much attention to non-brahmanical works, simply because they mainly aim at investigating Vedic sentences or works related to the Vedas such as Smṛtis. In Bhāvivēka's *Madhyamakahr̥daya-kārikā* a Mīmāṃsaka opponent applies the well-established notion of *kṛtakatva* to the statements of the Buddha. For Mīmāṃsakas, the application of the *kṛtakatva* argument to non-brahmanical works is a natural extension. Bhāvivēka's opponent proclaims as follows: "The statement of the Buddha is not a *pramāṇa*, because it is produced [and not eternal], just like statements of [people] other than him [e.g., Kapila or Kaṇāda]."¹⁹

The basic idea of the opponent is clear. The Vedas are authoritative because they are not produced, whereas the Buddha's statements, i.e., the Buddhist *āgamas*, are not authoritative because they are produced.

Veda: *akṛtakatva* → *pramāṇatva*
 Sūtra: *kṛtakatva* → *apramāṇatva*

¹⁹ MHK IX 16ab (Kawasaki 1992: 411, Lindtner 2001a: 94, Krasser 2011: 216 = Krasser 2012: 562): *apramāṇaṃ vaco bauddhaṃ kṛtakatvāt tadanyavat*/ For translations, see Kawasaki 1992: 377, Lindtner 2001b: 13, and Krasser 2011: 216 = Krasser 2012: 562. Krasser (2011: 216 = 2012: 562) also quotes a similar passage from Bhāvivēka's *Prajñā-pradīpa*.

To this Bhāviveka replies:²⁰ even if one substitutes the *pakṣa* with commentary (*śāstra*), cognition (*buddhi*), or *sūtra* (*śabda*), the reason (*hetu*) proves the same conclusion for Buddhists and their opponents.²¹ If the opponent tries to prove that the Buddhist source of knowledge is invalid, the same logic applies to the Mīmāṃsā source of knowledge regardless of the choice of *pakṣa*, i.e., regardless whether it may be *śāstra*, *jñāna*, or *sūtra*.

bauddham śāstram apramāṇam, kṛtakatvāt, jaiminīyādivat

On the other hand, if the opponent gives up the previous proof and rather tries the opposite proof that proves the validity of the Buddhist source of knowledge,

²⁰ In the *pūrvapakṣa* Bhāviveka's opponent first mentions *kṛtakatva* in 16ab and then *puruṣatva* in 16cd. But the sequence of Bhāviveka's responses is inverted. The *kṛtakatva* argument is dealt with in 166 and the *puruṣatva* argument in 160. (Verses 161–165 deal with the comparison of the cognition of the Buddha with that of Śāṅkara, Viṣṇu, and others (161: *bde byed khyab 'jug sogs*), the comparison of the cognition of the Buddha with that of Jaimini and others (163: *mdze mi ni sogs*), and the issue concerning the distinction between *kiṃcijjñā* (164: *cui žig śes*) and *sarvajñā*. As the corresponding passages of the *Prajñāpradīpa* suggest, *puruṣatva*, *jñānatva*, and *śarīratva* are regarded by Bhāviveka as a set of false reasons classified as *asiddha*.)

	<i>pūrvapakṣa</i>	<i>uttarapakṣa</i>
<i>kṛtakatva</i>	16ab	166
<i>puruṣatva</i>	16cd	160

Krasser (2011: 225 = 2012: 573–574), however, writes that “MHK 9.16ab is not really answered in MHK/TJ” and that “[i]n the digression in the PP, this mistake is not found, as this argument is treated as belonging to the refutation of MHK 9.16cd.” But, as shown above, one can solve this problem simply by considering that 16ab is answered in 166, after 16cd and related problems have been answered in 160–165. The opposite sequence in the *uttarapakṣa* in the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* is also supported by the corresponding part of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (see Krasser 2011: 222–225 = Krasser 2012: 570–574). See also the Chinese translation of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, in which Bhāviveka refutes *puruṣatva*, *jñānatva*, and *śarīratva* before *kṛtakatva* (Taisho 30, 118c–119a):

1. 如來無一切智。是人故。譬如餘人。復有說言。如來智者、非一切智。是智故。譬如凡夫智。復有說言。如來身者、非一切智所依止處。是身故。譬如凡夫身。論者言。是等所說非也。若第一義中如來無一切智而令信解、是人故、是凡夫智故、是凡夫身故、而爲因者、此等因義咸皆不成。法身者、永離人故、智故、身故、諸有戲論故、三界所不攝故、是出世間無漏法聚故。名爲法身。
2. 復次若更有人說言。如來無一切智。是作故。廣說如是。諸因者、如前所立與其過咎。

²¹ MHK IX 166ab (Kawasaki 1992: 467): *bstan bcos blo sgra'i phyogs byas kyañ gtan la dbab par 'dra ba yin/* (My tentative reconstruction: **śāstrabuddhiśabde pakṣe kṛte 'pi nirṇaye samam/*) For translations, see Kawasaki 1992: 401 and Lindtner 2001b: 53. For a translation of the *Tarkajvālā*, see Kawasaki 1992: 188.

the same logic applies to the Mīmāṃsā one, too. But clearly the validity of Buddhism is not what Mīmāṃsakas want to prove.

bauddhaṃ śāstram pramāṇam, kṛtakatvāt, jaiminiyādivat

In this way, a reason that is introduced to prove that the Buddhist source of knowledge is invalid turns out to be inconclusive because of the Mīmāṃsā source of knowledge, which the Mīmāṃsaka opponent regards as valid.²² The reason “being produced,” which Mīmāṃsakas introduce in order to prove that the statement of the Buddha is invalid, is flawed, because the statement of Jaimini is also produced.²³

Mīmāṃsā: *bauddhaṃ vaco 'pramāṇam, kṛtakatvāt*

Bauddha: *jaiminivaco 'py apramāṇam, kṛtakatvād eva*

Here again, Bhāṣiveka's argument reflects an actual debate. His strategy is essentially to turn the same logic back on the opponent. The *kṛtakatva* argument equally applies to both Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas.

– For Bhāṣiveka, the reason (*hetu*) “being produced” (*kṛtakatva*), which his Mīmāṃsaka opponent posits in order to prove the invalidity of the Buddha's words, similarly applies to Jaimini's words.

2.2.3. Śābara and Kumārila

Like Bhāṣiveka's opponent, Śābara regards the *kṛtakatva* argument as basically valid. He differentiates man-made statements (*puruṣakṛtaṃ vacanam*; *pauruṣe-yaṃ vacanam*) and Vedic statements (*vedavacanam*) as being sometimes faulty and never faulty respectively.²⁴ As Śābara's expression *puruṣakṛta* indicates, he regards *kṛtakatva* as the most distinguishing feature of the sometimes faulty man-made statement.

puruṣakṛtaṃ vacanam: (*kṛtakatvāt*) *vitatham api*

vedavacanam: (*akṛtakatvāt*) *avitatham eva*

²² MHK IX 166c (Kawasaki 1992: 467): *dpyod pa can sogs ma ñes ñid* (*mīmāṃsa-kāḍyanekāntam). For translations, see Kawasaki 1992: 401 and Lindtner 2001b: 53. For a translation of the *Tarkajvālā*, see Kawasaki 1992: 188.

²³ MHK IX 166d (Kawasaki 1992: 467): *byas pa'i phyir na skyon dan ldan* (/*kṛtakatvāced doṣavat or *kṛtakatvaṃ ca doṣavat*/). For translations, see Kawasaki 1992: 401 and Lindtner 2001b: 53. For a translation of the *Tarkajvālā*, see Kawasaki 1992: 188.

²⁴ ŚBh ad 1.1.2, Frauwallner 1968: 18.12–15: *viplavate khalv api kaścit puruṣakṛtād vacanāt pratyaḥ. na tu vedavacanasya mithyātve kiñcana pramāṇam asti*. “For, as is well known, sometimes cognition derived from a man-made statement can be faulty. But there is no evidence that proves the invalidity of a Vedic statement.”

Śabara then refers to an opponent who claims that a Vedic statement, too, can be faulty because it is a kind of statement just as a man-made statement is a kind of statement.²⁵

Commenting on this passage of the opponent, Kumārila states: “Not knowing this intention, the opponent raised [the following objection]: ‘Surely there is an inference based on similarity,’ considering that [Mīmāṃsakas] hold ‘being made’ and ‘not being made’ to be the cause of falsity and truth [respectively].”²⁶ For Kumārila, *kṛtakatva* and *akṛtakatva* are not direct causes of falsity and truth. Rather the existence or absence of a speaker’s cognition as an intermediate (*vaktṛjñānāntaritatva*) is the direct reason for assuming truth or falsity.

<i>kṛtakatva</i>	→	<i>vaktṛjñānāntaritatva</i>	→	<i>vitatham api</i>
<i>akṛtakatva</i>	→	<i>vaktṛjñānāntaritatvābhāva</i>	→	<i>avitatham eva</i>

One can see that for Kumārila the *kṛtakatva* argument has become out-of-date and old-fashioned. He finds the opponent’s argument weak and insufficient. Although Kumārila does not explicitly say so, he must have found Śabara’s discussion here, which assumes the basic framework of the *kṛtakatva* argument, insufficient in itself. Kumārila feels it necessary to update Śabara’s discussion. When Kumārila states that the opponent does not know Śabara’s intention, he implies that Śabara does not know what really counts for validity and invalidity. For Kumārila it is *jñānāntaritatva* and not *kṛtakatva* that counts for invalidity when it comes to man-made speech.

– It is not the nature of being produced (*kṛtakatva*) but the nature of being mediated by someone’s cognition (*jñānāntaritatva*) that can cause invalidity.

2.2.4. Remarks

The idea that “being made” (*kṛtakatva*) is the cause of invalidity is an old Mīmāṃsā notion. Bhāviveka’s opponent and Śabara assume this basic scheme. For Kumārila, however, the *kṛtakatva* argument has become out-of-date and needs to be supplemented with *jñānāntaritatva*, which really counts for invalidity.

²⁵ ŚBh ad 1.1.2, Frauwallner 1968: 18.16–17: *nanu sāmānyatodrṣṭaṃ bhaviṣyati. pauruṣeyaṃ vacanaṃ vitatham upalabhya vacanasāmānyād vedavacanaṃ mithyety anumīyate.* “[Objection:] Surely there is an inference based on similarity. After having perceived that a man-made statement is faulty, one infers that a Vedic statement is faulty due to the similarity of its being a statement.”

²⁶ ŚV Codanā 174: *ajñātvainam abhiprāyaṃ kṛtakākṛtakatvayoḥ/ samyāmithyātvahetū-ktimātrajñānāt paro ’bravūt/*

When comparing the attitudes of Bhāviveka and Kumārila toward the *kṛtakatva* argument, one is inclined to place Bhāviveka before Kumārila.

2.3. The *puruṣatva* argument

2.3.1. Bhāviveka

Śabara has a clear notion that human beings cannot independently know dharma. He explicitly states: “a human being cannot cognize dharma without resorting to a Vedic statement” (Frauwallner 1968: 18.5–6: *aśakyam hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum ṛte vacanāt*). This naturally implies the negation of the existence of an omniscient being who knows dharma independently. But Śabara is not concerned with an omniscient being such as the Buddha. Bhāviveka’s Mīmāṃsaka opponent, however, posits the following powerful syllogism: “And the Buddha is not omniscient, because he is a human being, just like [human beings] other than him.”²⁷

<i>tadanya:</i>	<i>puruṣatva</i>	→	<i>asarvajñatva</i>
<i>buddha:</i>	<i>puruṣatva</i>	→	<i>asarvajñatva</i>

Probably this argument based on *puruṣatva* was the hottest and most disputed issue in Bhāviveka’s time. It must have been the most recent and therefore the most powerful attack from the Mīmāṃsā side in his period. In addition to *puruṣatva*, Bhāviveka also mentions similar reasons (*hetus*) such as *jñānatva* (in *Tarkajvālā* ad 161 and the *Prajñāpradīpa*) and *śarīratva* (in the *Prajñāpradīpa*).²⁸ This assumption is also supported by Bhāviveka’s sharp reaction to the syllogism. He replies to this and other related issues in six verses in the *Madhyamakahrdaya-kārikā* (160–165)²⁹ and at considerable length in the *Prajñāpradīpa*. In verse 160

²⁷ MHK IX 16cd (Kawasaki 1992: 411, Lindtner 2001a: 94, Krasser 2011: 216 = Krasser 2012: 562): *asarvajñāś ca sambuddhaḥ puruṣatvāt tadanyavat*||

²⁸ See Krasser 2011: 223 = Krasser 2012: 571 for the Tibetan translation of the *Prajñāpradīpa*. The corresponding Chinese translation is as follows (Taisho 30, 118c):

1. 如來無一切智。是人故。譬如餘人。
2. 復有說言。如來智者、非一切智。是智故。譬如凡夫智。
3. 復有說言。如來身者、非一切智所依止處。是身故。譬如凡夫身。

The syllogism can be reconstructed as follows:

1. *tathāgato na sarvajñāḥ, puruṣatvāt, anyapuruṣavat.*
2. *tathāgatajñānam na sarvajñajñānam, jñānatvāt, prthagjanajñānavat.*
3. *tathāgataśarīraṃ na sarvajñajñānāśrayaḥ, śarīratvāt, prthagjanaśarīravat.*

²⁹ For the Tibetan text, see Kawasaki 1992: 466–467. For the translation of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* and the *Tarkajvālā*, see Kawasaki 1992: 184–188. The corresponding passages in the *Prajñāpradīpa* are quoted in Krasser 2011: 223 = Krasser 2012: 571. These mention *śarīratvāt* in addition to *puruṣatvāt* (mentioned in the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*

he points out that the reason *puruṣatva* is *asiddha*, i.e., not established with regard to the Buddha, because he is not a human being in the normal sense of the word, just as the *dharmakāya* and *nirmāṇakāya* are not human beings.³⁰

Bhāviveka's solution is not philosophically sophisticated. One has to admit, just as Dharmakīrti does, that the Buddha is a human being. This also suggests that the Buddhist side did not have a mature answer to this new issue. Bhāviveka should have sought another way out as Dharmakīrti does. Instead of sticking to the inappropriate *asiddhatva*, which only Buddhist devotees can accept, he should have elucidated the inconclusiveness of the reason (*hetu*) as Dharmakīrti actually does. In other words, Bhāviveka should have pointed out that human beings can be omniscient in some (exceptional) cases, although in most cases they are not. Bhāviveka's discussion can be summarized as follows:

- It is true that human beings are not omniscient. But the Buddha is not a human being. Therefore he is omniscient.

2.3.2. Kumārila

Although Kumārila does not refer to the *puruṣatva* syllogism, he does posit a similar syllogism which can be reconstructed as follows:³¹

buddhādīnām asārvajāñyam, prameyatvāt, (ghaṭavat)

and the *Tarkajvālā*) and *jñānatvāt* (in the *Tarkajvālā*).

³⁰ MHK IX 160 (Kawasaki 1992: 466): *chos dan sprul pa'i sku dag ni ña la mi ñid du ma grub/ de bzin gsegs pa'an ma grub ste des na ma ñes pa ñid yin/* (**dharmanirmāṇakāyānām asiddhā me manuṣyatā/ tathāgatasyāpy asiddhā, tata anaikāntikatvam(?)*)). For translations, see Kawasaki 1992: 401, Lindtner 2001b: 52, and Krasser 2011: 223 = Krasser 2012: 572. See also Kawasaki 1992: 185 for a translation of the *Tarkajvālā*. I am not sure whether the underlined reading *anaikāntikatvam* is original to the Sanskrit text. The *Tarkajvālā* explains only *asiddhatva* and never *anaikāntikatva* in this context. The corresponding part of the Chinese translation of the *Prajñāpradīpa*, too, explains only *asiddhatva* (Taisho 30, 118c–119a): 論者言、是等所說非也。若第一義中如來無一切智而令信解、是人故、是凡夫智故、是凡夫身故、而爲因者、此等因義咸皆不成。法身者、永離人故、智故、身故、諸有戲論故、三界所不攝故、是出世間無漏法聚故。名爲法身。I would like to substitute *tato hetor asiddhatā* for *tata anaikāntikatvam*. This correction makes the meter perfect.

³¹ ŚV Codanā 132: *pratyakṣādyavisaṃvādi prameyatvādi yasya ca/ sadbhāvivāraṇe śaktam ko nu taṃ kalpayiṣyati/* “And who indeed would postulate this [omniscient being] if [a reason (*hetu*)], such as ‘being an object of a valid cognition,’ which is not inconsistent with perception and so on, is capable of denying his existence?”

In the corresponding *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* verse (TS 3156) Kumārila shows that *prameyavādi* refers to *prameyatva*, *jñeyatva*, *vastutva*, *sattva*, and so on.³² Kumārila's intention is to demonstrate that any available reason, even a very general one such as *prameyatva*, can work to deny the existence of omniscient beings.

buddha: prameyatva → asarvajñatva

He probably assumes the *puruṣatva* syllogism and reformulates it into a more general one in order to not just defeat but deride his Buddhist opponent. That Kumārila must have also intended *puruṣatva* in *prameyavādi* is supported by Ratnakīrti, who includes *puruṣatva* in the list.³³ Kumārila's intention can be reconstructed in the following way:

– Not only *puruṣatva*, but also any reason such as *prameyatva* can refute omniscience.

In the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* Kumārila mentions the reason *puruṣatva* in order to deny the view that Brahṁā and others are the authors of the Vedas. He states that Brahṁā and so on are not the authors of the Vedas, because they are human beings, just like ordinary men.³⁴

prākṛtā narāḥ: puruṣatva → avedakartṛtva

brahmādayaḥ: puruṣatva → avedakartṛtva

This syllogism also suggests that Kumārila is familiar with the *puruṣatva* syllogism that Bhāvivēka knows.

2.3.3. Remarks

Comparing Bhāvivēka's *puruṣatva* syllogism and Kumārila's *prameyavādi* syllogism, which both aim at denying the existence of omniscient beings, one can see that Kumārila's syllogism assumes the *puruṣatva* syllogism. Kumārila's criticism is more developed and mature.

³² TS 3156: *yasya jñeyaprameyatvavastusattvādilakṣaṇāḥ/ nihantuṃ hetavaḥ śaktāḥ ko nu taṃ kalpayiṣyati//*

³³ RNĀ 21.3–6: *sugato 'sarvajñāḥ, jñeyatvāt, prameyatvāt, sattvāt, puruṣatvāt, vaktṛtvāt, indriyādimattvād ityādi, rathyāpuruṣavat*. Cf. also PVSV ad I 311.

³⁴ *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (PVSVT 444,8–9): *brahmādayo na vedānāṃ kartāra iti gamyatām/ puruṣatvādihetubhyas tadyathā prākṛtā narāḥ//*

2.4. The *jinavat* argument

2.4.1. Bhāviveka

Bhāviveka's Mīmāṃsaka opponent criticizes the authoritativeness of the Buddha's words as follows: "The statement of the Buddha is *apramāṇa*, because it criticizes views [taught] in the three Vedas. Like the Jaina view, every [statement] which is made in this manner is said to be so [*apramāṇa*]." ³⁵ The main objective of this syllogism is to equate the Buddha (or Buddhists) with the Jina (or Jainas). The Jina, whose view is regarded as invalid by the Buddhists, criticizes the three Vedas. Therefore, the words of the Buddha must be invalid, because he similarly criticizes the three Vedas. Anti-Vedic views are all invalid.

nagnāṭadarśana: *trayīdarśanadūṣaṇa* → *apramāṇatva*
bauddhaṃ vacas: *trayīdarśanadūṣaṇa* → *apramāṇatva*

To this Bhāviveka replies as follows: "We Buddhists are regarded as equal to the Jainas because of the similarity that [both of us] criticize the three Vedas. Therefore, because [invalidity], which is the property to be proved, is missing [in the Jaina view], [the syllogism] lacks a proper example." ³⁶ Contrary to the opponent's expectations, Bhāviveka accepts the validity of the Jaina view at least with regard to the denial of the three Vedas. Therefore the Jaina view is (to a certain extent) valid for Buddhists and as such it cannot become an example of an invalid view. Thus, the syllogism of the opponent lacks a proper example (*dr̥ṣṭāntanyūnatā*).

nagnāṭadarśana: *trayīdarśanadūṣaṇa* → *pramāṇatva*
bauddhaṃ vacas: *trayīdarśanadūṣaṇa* → *pramāṇatva*

Bhāviveka's solution can be summarized as follows:

- The Jaina view is not a good example to show the invalidity of the Buddhist view, because the Jaina view is regarded as valid by us Buddhists at least in its denial of the three Vedas.

³⁵ MHK IX 17 (Kawasaki 1992: 411, Lindtner 2001a: 94): *apramāṇaṃ vaco bauddhaṃ *trayīdarśanadūṣaṇāt/ yat *tathoktaṃ tathoktaṃ tad, yathā nagnāṭadarśanam//* (**trayīdarśanadūṣaṇāt*) Lindtner; *trayīdūṣaṇadarśanāt* Kawasaki **tathoktaṃ*] em.; *yathoktaṃ* ed.)

³⁶ MHK IX 167 (Kawasaki 1992: 466): *gsum po sun 'byin par 'dra bas gcer bur rgyu ltar bdag 'dod pas/ bsgrub bya'i rjes su 'gro med phyir dpe ni med pa ñid yin nol/* (**trayīdūṣaṇasāmānyān nagnāṭavad vāyam iṣṭāh/ atah sādhyadharmāsamanvayād dr̥ṣṭāntanyūnatā//*). For translations, see Kawasaki 1992: 401 and Lindtner 2001b: 53. See also a translation of the *Tarkajvālā* in Kawasaki 1992: 189.

2.4.2. Kumāṛila

In the *Ślokavārttika* Kumāṛila criticizes the *ekadeśasaṃvāda* type of inference that the Buddha's statement must be true with regard to religious matters because it is a statement of the same person who made statements with regard to worldly matters. Among many counterarguments, Kumāṛila uses the *jinavat* argument in composing a counter-syllogism. His intended syllogism can be reconstructed as follows:³⁷

pratijñā: *alaukike 'rthe tadvacanam mithyā*
hetuḥ: *alaukikārthatve sati puṃvākyatvāt*
dṛṣṭāntaḥ: *vedabāhyānyavākyavat*

One can see that Kumāṛila reformulates the *jinavat* syllogism into a generalized form. One can easily reconstruct from this general syllogism a subtype of syllogism as follows:

pratijñā: *alaukike 'rthe **buddh**avacanam mithyā*
hetuḥ: *alaukikārthatve sati puṃvākyatvāt*
dṛṣṭāntaḥ: ***jin**avākyavat*

One can also confirm that Kumāṛila uses the *puruṣatva* argument in a different form in this syllogism (underlined). A statement of the Buddha must be false with regard to religious matters, because it is the statement of a human being dealing with religious matters, just like a statement of the Jina. Kumāṛila also restates the same syllogism in a slightly different form, one in which *bauddhādeḥ* is explicitly mentioned.³⁸

For Kumāṛila anti-Vedic, heterodox *vedabāhyas* can be good examples of each other. The Buddha is just like the Jina. Kumāṛila carefully adds the Sāṃkhyas (*ŚV Codanā* 127), because it is clear that Sāṃkhya views contradict with Buddhist views and that the Buddhists do not agree with them even concerning mundane matters.

³⁷ *ŚV Codanā* 126: *api cālaukikārthatve sati puṃvākyahetukam/ mithyātvaṃ vedabāhyānām syād anyonyasapakṣataḥ*// “Furthermore, [statements] outside the Veda, if they deal with non-worldly [imperceptible] objects, should be false – the cause of which is [their being] man-made statements – because they are examples that are similar to each other.”

³⁸ *ŚV Codanā* 128: *alaukikārthavāditvāt puṃvākyatve satīti ca/ parasparam apekṣyaiva bauddhādeḥ syān mṛṣārthatā*// “And [statements] of the Buddha and so on, merely by presupposing each other [as examples], should be [concluded as being] false, because, while being man-made statements, they deal with [imperceptible,] non-worldly objects.”

In the corresponding *Bṛhaṭṭikā* verses Kumārila goes further and takes an indifferent position in which his role is to calmly witness the low-level quarrels between the Buddha, the Jina, and Kapila. He intends to play both ends against the middle. One can see that the *jinavat* argument is highly generalized and already in a mature form in Kumārila's discussions. Kumārila's famous verse in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* shows the degree of its development: "If the Buddha is omniscient, what is the proof that Kapila is not? Or if both are omniscient, how [can] there be a difference of opinion between them?"³⁹

– Anti-Vedic outsiders who quarrel with each other can be a good example of each other to show that their teachings are invalid.

2.4.3. Remarks

Bhāviveka's solution to the *jinavat* argument is not yet matured. In order to respond to the *jinavat* syllogism Bhāviveka admits that the Jaina teaching is valid. His reply looks ad hoc and is not well systematized. The Buddhist side in his time was not ready for tackling the difficulty that had probably been newly introduced by the Vedic orthodoxy. On the contrary, Kumārila's treatment of the *jinavat* argument is highly generalized and sophisticated. On this basis, one can naturally place Bhāviveka before Kumārila.

3. Conclusion

Among the four arguments that Bhāviveka's opponent resorts to, the first two, *adarśana* and *kṛtakatva*, look traditional and the latter two, *puruṣatva*, and *jinavat*, seem to have been newly introduced around Bhāviveka's time. Bhāviveka's solutions to the first two are well prepared in order to silence his Mīmāṃsaka opponent. They reflect an actual debate in which a mere counterattack can be sometimes effective, especially if it accords with the opponent's system and thereby devastates it from its core. Bhāviveka, who is captious in disputation rather than philosophically constructive, does not give final solutions to these issues. This is particularly the case for the *adarśana* argument.

His solutions for the latter two look ad hoc and are mere quibbles. Probably the *puruṣatva* and *jinavat* arguments are relatively new attacks and Bhāviveka must therefore respond with his own invented answers. He is not yet ready to dispose of them in a refined manner, probably because he does not have traditionally well-prepared "ready-made" answers to use.

³⁹ TS 3148: *sugato yadi sarvajñāḥ kapilo neti kā pramāḥ athobhāv api sarvajñau mata-bhedas tayoh katham//*

1. Although an omniscient being is not seen now, he must exist because of the word “omniscient being.”
2. The Buddha’s words are produced, but Jaimini’s are too.
3. It is true that human beings are not omniscient. But the Buddha is not a human being.
4. True, we Buddhists are like Jinas, but our view on the Veda is valid.

Kumārila is well acquainted with all four arguments. The *adarśana* argument is integrated into the *pramāṇābhāva* argument. The *kṛtakatva* argument already looks old-fashioned in the eyes of Kumārila. The *puruṣatva* argument is sublimed into the general *prameyatva* argument and partly reused in the *jinavat* argument. The *jinavat* argument is highly generalized and expressed in a matured formulation.

1. Non-existence of an omniscient being is proved by the absence of perception and so on.
2. It is not “being produced” but “being mediated by cognition” that can cause invalidity.
3. Not only “being a human being” but any reason such as “being an object of means of valid cognition” can disprove omniscience.
4. Anti-Vedic teachers contradict each other. Their teachings are all false.

At least with regard to these issues, we have no convincing evidence that may support the new chronology. Bhāviveka does not presuppose Kumārila.⁴⁰ We had better place Bhāviveka before Kumārila, because in all these cases Kumārila’s arguments are more mature.

Of course this conclusion does not necessarily imply the complete opposite of Krasser’s observation, namely, I do not conclude that Kumārila’s *Śloka-vārttika* presupposes Bhāviveka’s *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*. It is, however, unlikely that Kumārila regards Bhāviveka as his direct opponent or that he intends to refute Bhāviveka’s arguments. Kumārila’s discussions, at least his discussions of the issues investigated above, do not contain direct responses to Bhāviveka.⁴¹ Both

⁴⁰ Cf. Krasser 2011: 218 = Krasser 2012: 565: “We have seen that in their treatment of the Buddha’s omniscience, Bhāviveka and Kumārila share a lot of ideas and that one can easily read Bhāviveka as refuting Kumārila...”

⁴¹ Kumārila’s later work, the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, contains an interesting discussion dealing with one of the same issues as the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*. In *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* IX 161–162 Bhāviveka compares the Buddha with Śāṅkara, Viṣṇu, etc., and distinguishes the Buddha from them. In the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* (quoted in *Tattvasaṃgraha* 3198–3211ab) Kumārila compares Brahmā, Śāṅkara (Maheśvara), and Viṣṇu with the Buddha and shows their

of them treat the same issues but from different perspectives. The degree of the development and maturity of his theory, however, indicates Kumārila's chronological posterity. Comparisons of the theories of the two thinkers can hardly suggest the opposite sequence.

The conclusion that Bhāviveka is to be allocated an earlier position in history than Kumārila is corroborated by another fact. Kumārila refutes the existence of an omniscient being by pointing out that by definition an omniscient being is free of passion and so on (*rāgādirahita*) and therefore cannot engage in any action (*nirvyāpāra*) including the action of teaching (*upadeśa*). This must have been one of the most serious attacks on Buddhism from the Mīmāṃsā side. Responding to Kumārila's *vairāgya* argument, Dharmakīrti logically shows how the omniscient Buddha can be a speaker (*vaktr*) although he is free of passion (*vītarāga*, *virakta*) (see Kataoka 2011: 47ff.).

If Bhāviveka had known Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, as Krasser assumes, Bhāviveka should have referred to this most pressing issue and presented the essence of Dharmakīrti's brilliant answers (as given in the PVSV) explaining that there can be such an exceptional human being. But nowhere in the *Mīmāṃsā-tattvanirṇayāvatāra* chapter do we find him mentioning this most important topic. Kumārila's *vairāgya* argument and the logical fallacy that Dharmakīrti points out there as being a *śeṣavad anumānam* are most probably not known to Bhāviveka.

Furthermore, it is almost certain from another piece of evidence that Bhāviveka does not assume that Kumārila is his Mīmāṃsaka opponent. When Bhāviveka mentions the Mīmāṃsā view of ritual action, he refers not to the *bhāvanā* theory but to the theory which I tentatively call *dharmābhivyaktivāda*.⁴² Bhartṛhari, too, refers only to this view. The *dharmābhivyaktivāda* seems to be an old, pre-Kumārila Mīmāṃsā doctrine that dharma or *apūrva* is made manifest by a ritual action. This is a view that is completely different from Kumārila's *bhāvanā* theory. The two theories are incompatible and cannot coexist in a single coherent doctrinal system. Kumārila, too, refers to this view with the word *apūrvajanman* and holds that it belongs to a different school (ŚV *Codanā* 195). Thus Bhāviveka's Mīmāṃsaka opponent is different from Kumārila and most probably predates Kumārila.

differences from the mortal Buddha. But here again Kumārila's perspective is different from Bhāviveka's. He rejects the opponent's objection that the eternal scripture, i.e., the Veda, attests the existence of (mortal) omniscient beings. In a wider context this piece of discussion belongs to the section of *śabdābhāva* in which Kumārila shows the absence of verbal testimony.

⁴² See Kataoka 2000 for various sources of this theory.

	MHK _P	MHK _U	ŚV	BṬ(TS)
1. <i>adarśana</i>	15	159	117ab	3185ab
2. <i>kṛtakatva</i>	16ab	166	174	
3. <i>puruṣatva</i>	16cd	160	132	3156
<i>jñānatva</i>		TJ, PP	18cd–19ab ⁴³	
<i>śarīratva</i>		PP		
<i>śaṅkaraviṣṇvādi</i>		161–162		3198–3211ab
<i>jaiminyādi</i>		163		
<i>kiṃcijiñña</i>		164–165		3195–3197
4. <i>jinavat</i>	17	167	126–128	3147–3149

Table 2. List of sources (MHK_P: MHK-Pūrvapakṣa, MHK_U: MHK-Uttarapakṣa).

Abbreviations and bibliography

Primary sources

BṬ – *Bṛhatṭikā*.

JS – *Jaiminisūtra: Śrīmajjaiminipraṇītaṃ mīmāṃsādarśanam*, ed. Subbāśāstrī. Poona 1929–1934.

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MHK – *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*. See Kawasaki 1992 and Lindtner 2001a.

PP – *Prajñāpradīpa*. Taisho No. 1566, Vol. 30.

PVSV – *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary*, ed. R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.

PVSVṬ – *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti-ṭīkā: Ācārya-Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (Svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) Svopajñāvṛtṭyā Karṇakagomi-viracitayā Taṭṭīkayā ca sahītam*, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Allahabad 1943.

RNĀ – *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī: Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*, ed. A. Thakur. Patna 1957.

ŚBh – *Śābarabhāṣya*. See JS. For ŚBh ad 1.1.1–5, see Frauwallner 1968.

⁴³ Kumāṛila is well aware that mere *jñānatva* does not prove the invalidity of cognition. In the *Anumāna* chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* Kumāṛila refers to *jñānatva* as an *aprayojakaheṭu* when it is applied in order to prove the invalidity of cognition. ŚV *Anumāna* 18cd–19ab: *hetudvayaprayukte ca mithyātve sarvabuddhiṣu// jñānatvotpattimattvādisādhako na prayojakah/* “Being a cognition and being produced are not real reasons that prove the invalidity of any cognition, because [invalidity is in fact] subject to the two factors [i.e., *kāraṇotthadoṣa* and *bādhakajñāna*].” See also Yamakami et al. 1983: 12 for a translation.

ŚV – *Ślokavārttika: Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāya-ratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*, ed. Swāmī D. Śāstrī. Varanasi 1978. See Kataoka 2011 for the *Codanā* section.

TJ – *Tarkajvālā*. Derge: dBu ma vol. 3, no. 3856, Dza 40b7–329b4.

TS – *Tattvasaṃgraha: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary Pañjikā of Shri Kamalashīla*, ed. D. Śāstrī. 2 vols. Varanasi 1981–1982.

TV – *Tantravārttika*. See JS.

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“*Prapañca*” in Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna

Ethan Mills

Why can't Buddhas vacuum the corners?
Because they have no attachments.

Using the same word in two different senses often results in an equivocation that might become the basis of a joke, such as the example given above. Alternatively, using the same word in different senses might enter into a philosophical disagreement such that two parties seem to be saying the same thing, but nonetheless they may be talking past each other. Examples of the latter tendency abound in philosophy, from Hobbes and Descartes on the idea of an “idea”¹ to internalists and externalists in contemporary epistemology on the truth conditions of “S knows that p.”²

Classical Indian philosophy is no different. One of the most conspicuous examples of the tendency to talk past one another is found in the case of Advaita Vedānta and Mahāyāna Buddhism. These traditions often seem so similar that Advaitins were often called “crypto-Buddhists” and Bhāvaviveka answers the charge that Madhyamaka is a form of “crypto-Vedānta.”³ A similar debate

¹ Hobbes claims that there cannot be an idea of God or any other innate ideas, because he has the empiricist (or proto-empiricist) notion that an idea is composed of images that ultimately derive from sensory experience. Descartes has the rationalist view that an idea is what is perceived by the mind and becomes quite exasperated in his reply to Hobbes: “I cannot possibly satisfy those who prefer to attribute a different sense to my words than the one I intended” (Descartes and Hobbes 1984: 128).

² Ernest Sosa suggests that internalists and externalists aspire to explain two different senses of knowledge: internalists are after “reflective knowledge” and externalists (especially reliabilists) are generally content with “animal knowledge” (Sosa 2000: 31). Stephen Phillips has recently used a similar distinction in his interpretation of Nyāya epistemology, describing what he calls “two levels to the Nyāya theory, *pramā*, raw animal knowledge, so to say, and knowledge self-consciously certified, *nirṇaya* and *siddhānta*” (Phillips 2012: 5).

³ For discussion of these charges, see King 1995: 183. For some general discussions of

continues today in the question of how and to what extent Gauḍapāda was influenced by Buddhism. I consider the contention that Buddhists and Advaitins are fundamentally the same to be unfounded, because, while Buddhists and Advaitins share some basic terms, arguments, and ideas, what they *do* with these terms, arguments, and ideas is radically different.

In this essay I focus on the term, “*prapañca*”⁴ and its use by Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda, each of whom is in some sense the founder of his respective tradition.⁵ My thesis is that Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda use the word “*prapañca*” quite differently, and this difference can shed some light on contemporary debates about the interpretation of these two important philosophers. Concerning Gauḍapāda, understanding his use of “*prapañca*” has some bearing on the interpretive question of whether he is a metaphysical idealist or whether some of his text might be best taken as a kind of phenomenology. I will argue that his use of “*prapañca*” gives some reasons in favor of an idealist interpretation. Concerning Nāgārjuna, a correct understanding of his use of “*prapañca*” is compatible with mystical and anti-realist interpretations of his overall philosophical aims, but it also gives some reasons in favor of what I call a quietist skeptical interpretation. Near the end of the paper, I will turn to the question of Gauḍapāda’s relation to Buddhist philosophy. In particular, I will suggest that it is possible that Gauḍapāda was simply unintentionally mistaken in his understanding of Buddhist terms. He and his Buddhist counterparts may have been simply talking past each other.

1. Occurrences of Buddhist terms in Gauḍapāda’s *Āgamaśāstra*

There are several Buddhist terms that figure prominently in Gauḍapāda’s *Āgamaśāstra*.⁶ For instance, the words “*ajāti*” and “*ajāta*” (“birthless” or “non-production”

similarities between Gauḍapāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism, see La Vallée Poussin 1910, Wood 1990, Kaplan 1992, Bouy 1997, and Bouy 2000.

⁴ I will use quotation marks to mention words rather than use them. For instance, when I write “*prapañca*” (with quotation marks), I intend to say something about that particular Sanskrit word, but when I write *prapañca* (without quotation marks), I intend to employ one of the meanings of that word.

⁵ Of course, in another sense, neither is the founder of a tradition, since Nāgārjuna would claim the Buddha as the founder of his tradition and Gauḍapāda would claim the Veda as the foundation of Advaita. Nonetheless, Nāgārjuna is, if not the first, clearly the most prominent early Mādhyamika and Gauḍapāda is likewise the earliest prominent expositor of Advaita.

⁶ I will assume that “Gauḍapāda” refers to the author or authors of all four chapters (*prakaraṇas*) of the *Āgamaśāstra* (for detailed discussions of the problem of authorship of the *prakaraṇas* see Bhattacharya 1989: lxiii–lxii, Wood 1990: 137–145, King 1995:

and “unborn” or “unproduced”) occur many times throughout the *Āgamaśāstra*, especially in the fourth *prakaraṇa* (for instance, ĀŚ 4.3–5, 4.19, 4.29, etc). Likewise, these same words appear in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārika*, for instance, at 7.7 and 24.38 and the synonyms “*anutpanna*” and “*anutpāda*” appear more frequently. It might seem that both the ĀŚ and MMK support the position of *ajātivāda*. However, despite these apparent similarities, the ultimate conclusions are radically different. Whereas Gauḍapāda concludes that there is an unborn thing, Nāgārjuna concludes that there is neither a born thing nor an unborn thing. Richard King suggests that this difference involves “two different conceptions of negatives such as ‘*ajāti*.’ In English, the distinction is reflected in the following two statements, 1. ‘There is no birth.’ (Madhyamaka), and 2. ‘There is an Unborn.’ (Advaita Vedānta)” (King 1995: 138). In other words, the first Madhyamaka negation is “non-implicatory negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*)” and the second Advaita negation is “implicatory negation (*paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*)” (King 1995: 138).⁷ Hence, despite using the same words, Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna come to different conclusions.

The words “*saṃvṛti*” or “*saṃvṛta*” also occur in ĀŚ 2.1, 2.4, 4.73–74, and in MMK 24.8. In the MMK, these words have the usual meaning of “conventional,” but at some places in the ĀŚ, for instance at 2.1 and 2.4, “*saṃvṛta*” means “enclosed” in the sense of being enclosed within the mind.⁸ Also, both Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna make use of “*svabhāva*” and “*prakṛti*” (for instance, ĀŚ 3.21 and 4.9 and MMK 15.1–4 and 15.8–9). The similarity here goes a bit deeper, since Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna agree that having a nature would entail that something would be eternal, birthless, and changeless. However, while Nāgārjuna uses this

21–35, Bouy 1997, and Bouy 2000). In any case the problem of authorship is not my concern here, since, as I will argue, all four *prakaraṇas* have an Advaita aim whoever the author or authors may have been.

⁷ The stock example of a *prasajya* negation is “this is not a brahmin” whereas a *paryudāsa* negation is “this is a non-brahmin.” The first negation does not assume that there is a person or object present, it simply denies the *proposition* “this is a brahmin.” The second negation, on the other hand, assumes that there is a person present who belongs to some other class; this is a negation of the *term* “brahmin.” Jan Westerhoff quite sensibly calls *prasajya* and *paryudāsa* negations “non-implicational propositional negation” and “implicational term negation” respectively (Westerhoff 2006: 369). Westerhoff gives a clear exposition of the *prasajya-paryudāsa* distinction and its role in understanding the Madhyamaka *catuṣkoṭi*. He also makes an interesting comparison to the contemporary distinction between choice negation and exclusion negation (Westerhoff 2006: 368–370).

⁸ For more on Gauḍapāda’s use of *saṃvṛta*, see King 1995: 125. Wood translates the occurrences of *saṃvṛtatva* in ĀŚ 2.1 and 2.4 as “being enclosed” (Wood 1990: 16). Bouy translates these occurrences in French as “est restreint” (Bouy 2000: 113, 115).

entailment to reject the notion that anything has *svabhāva*, Gauḍapāda uses this argument to claim that there *is* something eternal, birthless, and changeless, namely, truly existing *brahman* (for instance, ĀŚ 3.33).⁹

Gauḍapāda also uses words that are important to Yogācāra philosophers. For instance, Gauḍapāda uses the words “*citta*” (mind) and “*viññāna*” (consciousness) in ĀŚ 4.45–46. However, as Michael Comans points out, Gauḍapāda claims that both *citta* and *viññāna* are unborn, whereas Yogācāras would maintain that *citta* and *viññāna* are dependently arisen (Comans 2000: 99, 112). Also, Gauḍapāda’s use of dreams in 2.1–10 to argue for the ultimate unreality of both dreaming and waking states has obvious similarities with Vasubandhu’s *Viṃśikākārikā*. An adequate comparison of Gauḍapāda and Vasubandhu on this point would require a far more in-depth treatment than I can provide here; others have done so elsewhere.¹⁰ For my purposes here, it suffices to point out that as a Buddhist Vasubandhu would not possibly accept the existence of the *ātman* as Gauḍapāda clearly does (e.g., ĀŚ 2.12).

2. Occurrences of *prapañca* in the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, *Āgamaśāstra*, and *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*

The word “*prapañca*” occurs in a compound with “*upaśama*” in the seventh and twelfth prose passages of the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* in the description of the fourth state of consciousness (*turiya*):

*nāntaḥprajñam na bahiṣprajñam nobhayataḥprajñam na prajñānaghanam
na prajñam nāprajñam /*

*adrṣṭam avyavahāryam agrāhyam alakṣaṇam acintyam avyapadeśyam ekā-
tmapratyayasāram **prapañcopaśamaṁ** śāntam śivam advaitam caturtham
manyante sa ātmā sa vijñeyah // 7 //*

*amātraścaturtho vyavahāryah **prapañcopaśamah** śivo dvaita evam omkāra
ātmaiva samviśaty ātmanātmānam ya evam veda // 12 //*

I translate these as:

Not knowing internally, not knowing externally, not knowing due to both, not nothing but knowledge, neither knowing nor not knowing, not seen, not to be employed, not to be grasped, uncharacterized, not to be thought, not to be designated, the essence of the cognition of one *ātman*, **that in which**

⁹ For discussion of Nāgārjuna’s and Gauḍapāda’s differences on *svabhāva*, see Comans 2000: 93–94, Wood 1990: 74–75, and King 1995: 135.

¹⁰ See Comans 2000: 23–30, King 1995: Ch. 5, and Kaplan 1992. I have also compared Vasubandhu with contemporary external-world skepticism in Mills 2016.

there is the cessation of the phenomenal world (*prapañcopaśamaḥ*), peace, the auspicious, the non-dual... [all of this] they think is the fourth. That is the *ātman*. That is to be known. (MU 7)

The fourth is measureless, not to be employed, **that in which there is the cessation of the phenomenal world** (*prapañcopaśamaḥ*), the auspicious, the non-dual. In this way the syllable “om” just is the *ātman*. One who knows in this way enters into the *ātman* by means of the *ātman*. (MU 12)

“Prapañca” also occurs in *Āgamaśāstra* 1.17 and 2.35.

prapañco yadi vidyeta nivarteta na saṃśayaḥ /
māyāmātram idaṃ dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ // ĀŚ 1.17 //

vītarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ /
nirvikalpo hy ayam dr̥ṣṭaḥ prapañcopaśamo 'dvayaḥ // ĀŚ 2.35 //

There is no doubt that if the **phenomenal world** (*prapañco*) were to exist it would vanish. This duality is only illusion. From the ultimate truth there is non-duality. (ĀŚ 1.17)

By the sages who have gone to the opposite shore of the Veda and who are free from passion, fear and anger, this [*ātman*], **in which there is the cessation of the phenomenal world** (*prapañcopaśamo*), which is without a second, is indeed seen without imagination. (ĀŚ 2.35)¹¹

In the MMK, “*prapañca*” occurs in a compound with “*upaśama*” in the dedication (*maṅgalaṃ*) and in 25.24.

anīrodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvataṃ /
anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anīrgamaṃ //

¹¹ I have followed Comans, who in turn follows the commentator (most likely Śaṅkara), in translating this occurrence of “*prapañcopaśama*” as a *bahuvrīhi* compound modifying an implied “*ātman*,” although he translates it as “where there is the cessation of the phenomenal world” (Comans 2000: 130–131; 152, n. 12). I agree with Comans that this is better than viewing the pronoun as a demonstrative adjective for “*prapañcopaśama*” (making “this cessation of the phenomenal world” the subject of the verse), since a *bahuvrīhi* fits better with the use of “*prapañcopaśama*” in MU 7 and 12, where it is a *bahuvrīhi* modifying “*turīya*,” which is in turn identified with the *ātman*; I also agree with him that “*ayam*” in several of the previous verses (such as ĀŚ 2.33) also refers to “*ātman*” (Comans 2000: 131). I would add that the *ātman* has been the explicit topic of discussion in all the verses starting with ĀŚ 2.12 up until the previous verse, so it is most likely that a masculine pronoun in ĀŚ 2.35 would modify “*ātman*.”

*yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ /
deśayāṃ āsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varaṃ //*

*sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ /
na kva cit kasyacit kaścīd dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ // MMK 25.24*

I bow to him, most excellent among speakers, perfectly awakened, who has taught dependent origination, **the pacification of conceptual proliferation** (*prapañcopaśamaḥ*), and peace (*śivaḥ*), which is non-cessation, non-origination, non-destruction, non-permanence, non-identity, non-difference, non-coming, and non-going.

The pacification of all cognitive grasping and the **pacification of conceptual proliferation** (*prapañcopaśamaḥ*) are peace. Nowhere, to no one has any dharma at all been taught by the Buddha. (MMK 25.24)

The deeper meaning of these verses is controversial, but for now I want to defend my decision to translate “*prapañca*” differently in the MU and ĀŚ than in the MMK. First, I will show some of the different nuances of the meaning of the word. Second, I show that it most likely has a different meaning in the Upaniṣadic and Gauḍapādan contexts than in Nāgārjuna’s Buddhist context.¹²

According to Monier-Williams, “*prapañca*” comes from the root \sqrt{pac} or $\sqrt{pañc}$ and has primary meanings of “expansion, development, manifestation.” It can also mean “manifoldness, diversity... diffuseness” or “appearance, phenomenon.” In philosophy, it is said to mean “the expansion of the universe, the visible world.” In other contexts, it could even mean “deceit, trick, fraud, error” (Monier-Williams 1994: 681).

In the context of MU and ĀŚ, the primary meaning of “*prapañca*” is something like “phenomena” or “visible world.” Also, there is a connotation of “expansion” and “diversity” in the creation of an ultimately false phenomenal world, which in turn also captures the connotation of “fraud” or “error.” I conclude that the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* and Gauḍapāda mean for us to see that *prapañca* is the created, ever-changing manifold of ultimately false reality as opposed to the eternal, non-dual reality of *ātman/brahman*. Also, I think rendering “*upaśama*” as “cessation” rather than “pacification” makes sense. By focusing on the *ātman* itself, which is in itself essentially non-dual, one can cease one’s ignorance of the ultimate source of our experience of phenomenal reality. Another possible interpretation

¹² I am not the first person to notice a difference between Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda in the usage of “*prapañca*,” although my analysis of this distinction and the importance I see in it are different. See Comans 2000: 74, n. 28 and Bhattacharya 1989: 43.

is that since the *ātman* is the *locus* of the cessation of the phenomenal world, focusing solely on the *ātman* would even cause the phenomenal world to cease entirely. Whether the goal is to end one’s cosmological ignorance or to make the phenomenal world disappear entirely, for Gauḍapāda it is not merely a matter of calming or pacifying our conceptualizations about the world, as I will suggest is the case for Nāgārjuna. Thus, for Gauḍapāda it is dwelling in the *ātman*, in which there is the cessation of *prapañca*, that brings about the realization of the ultimate reality of *brahman*.¹³

In Nāgārjuna’s context, however, we need to take into account the specific Buddhist history of this word. According to Edgerton’s *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, “*prapañca*” comes from the Pāli “*papañca*,” which is “very hard to define.” The word has been rendered into a Tibetan word that means “spreading out, enlargement,” and “activity,” and into Chinese as a word meaning “frivolous talk” or “falsehood.” Edgerton adds that, “The freedom from *prapañca* is always praised” and that the word is “closely associated with *vikalpa*, and the contexts suggest *vain fancy, false imagining*” (Edgerton 2004: 380–381). In discussing the Nikāyas, Steven Collins points out that “*papañcā* are said to have ideas (or perception) as their cause; the ‘root of imaginings and estimations’ is said to be the idea ‘I am the thinker’ ... an idea described as an ‘internal craving’” (Collins 1982: 141). For Madhyamaka, this idea came to be associated closely with language.¹⁴ According to Paul Williams, “‘*prapañca*’ in the Madhyamaka seems

¹³ Whether the cessation of *prapañca* brings about the end of any experience whatsoever or whether it merely allows a person to see the illusion *as an illusion* while still going about their daily life became a large issue in later Advaita, probably giving the impetus for the doctrines of *māyāvāda* and *anirvacanīya*. Given the meaning of “*prapañca*” in this context, I think it could mean that the phenomenal world literally ceases to exist. However, many scholars disagree. Wood claims that there is still experience in the highest fourth state of consciousness and goes so far as to claim that the *Māṇḍūkya* and Gauḍapāda cannot be plausibly interpreted as *māyāvāda* (Wood 1990: 159–161), but King criticizes him for misunderstanding both *māyāvāda* and *anirvacanīya* (King 1995: 25). Comans claims that, “Such negation does not involve the physical destruction of the unreal, but it is the appreciation of the apparent nature of things; it is akin to the knowledge that the blueness of the sky is unreal...” (Comans 2000: 127). For a treatment of *māyāvāda*, see Deutsch 1969: Ch. 3 and for a thorough translation and commentary on Maṇḍanamiśra’s explanation of *anirvacanīya*, see Balasubramanian 1976: Ch. 2.

¹⁴ Candrakīrti’s commentary on MMK 25.24 describes the meaning of “*prapañcōpaśama*” as follows: “that which is the pacification, or cessation, of all bases of conceptual proliferation, that is *nirvāṇa*. ... Also, pacification of conceptual proliferation, because there is non-activity of words, is peace, because of the non-functioning of thought” (PP, p. 236). Candrakīrti seems to take it as the cessation of all thought and perception whatsoever, which may be right, but it may also be that Nāgārjuna means a certain *kind*

to indicate firstly the utterance itself, secondly the process of reasoning and entertaining involved in any articulation, and thirdly further utterances which result from this process” (Williams 1980: 32). Thus, in the Buddhist tradition *prapañca* came to be understood as a psychological and linguistic process rather than as a word indicating the phenomenal world itself. While Gauḍapāda puts forward a position that the phenomenal world (*prapañca*) is ultimately illusory, Nāgārjuna’s purpose is to pacify the mind’s tendency toward conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*) about the world as we experience it.

I prefer “pacification” for “*upaśama*” in this context instead of “cessation,” because the root *śam* means not only “cessation” but “to become tired ... be quiet or calm or satisfied or contented” (Monier-Williams 1994: 1053). Also, the Sanskrit etymology resonates nicely with the Latin root of “pacification,” which is “*pax*” (peace). Furthermore, *śam* is the root for “*śamatha*” (tranquility), which refers to one of the forms of meditation practice recognized by Buddhists, the other being *vipaśyana* (insight). This latter connotation may have been obvious to Nāgārjuna’s Buddhist readers. Thus, Nāgārjuna means for us to see that the Buddhist path leads to the “pacification of conceptual proliferation,” which is not the cessation of the phenomenal world, but rather pacification or calming of the propensity to conceptualize.

Having defended the different meanings of *prapañca* in Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna, in the next two sections I’ll look into what these differences might teach us about how to interpret each philosopher.

3. Gauḍapāda and the phenomenal world (*prapañca*)

Gauḍapāda is commonly read as a precursor to the monistic idealism many see as the position of later Advaita, especially Śaṅkara.¹⁵ On this view, which I will refer to as a traditional idealist interpretation, the *ātman* in some sense creates or projects the phenomenal world (*prapañca*), which is ultimately illusory. Āś 1.17, cited in the previous section, says, “There is no doubt that if the phenomenal world (*prapañca*) were to exist it would vanish. This duality is only illusion. From the ultimate truth there is non-duality.” If Gauḍapāda is a monistic idealist, this verse should be taken as a metaphysical point that the dualistic phenomenal world

of thinking, namely, the proliferation of unhelpful conceptualization. For a history of “*prapañca*” in Madhyamaka, see Williams 1980: 29–34.

¹⁵ For overviews of Vedānta, including non-Advaita schools, see Frazier 2014, Gupta 2012: Ch. 13, and Taber 2011. For more on Advaita, see Mills 2018: Ch. 6, Timalisina 2009, Deutsch and Dalvi 2004, Comans 2000, Bilimoria 1997, Hacker 1995, Isayeva 1995, Chakrabarti 1992, Wood 1990, Taber 1983, Potter 1981, and Deutsch 1969.

is in its entirety an illusion. If it did really exist, it would vanish when an individual soul (*jīva*) awakens to the truth of Advaita (ĀŚ 1.16), but the phenomenal world cannot really vanish because it does not really exist in the first place.¹⁶ Two examples of scholars who support a traditional idealist interpretation are Vidhushekhar Bhattacharya and Natalia Isayeva. Bhattacharya, in his discussion of Gauḍapāda’s use of dreams in the second *prakaraṇa*, says, “In both the cases, dreaming and waking, things are only imagined by the mind” (Bhattacharya 1989: cxxix). Isayeva explains, “the world of individual souls and external objects is ultimately nothing but the projection of a sole and undivided consciousness” (Isayeva 1995: 45). This has been a popular way to read Gauḍapāda.¹⁷

Stephen Kaplan and Richard King have questioned the traditional idealist interpretation, claiming instead that we could read Gauḍapāda as presenting a kind of phenomenology.¹⁸ Much as in the case of some non-idealist interpretations

¹⁶ Wood notes that the argument he sees implied in ĀŚ 1.17ab is an example of the logical fallacy of denying the antecedent. He reconstructs the argument as follows: “(1) If the world existed, it could be said to disappear when its true nature is discovered; but (2) it does not exist; (3) therefore it cannot be said to ever disappear” (Wood 1990: 193, n. 4). The argument as Wood reconstructs it certainly does commit the fallacy of denying the antecedent, but it may not be what Gauḍapāda intends. Wood suggests that it could be turned into the valid form *Modus Tollens* by instead denying the consequent (“it could be said to disappear”) “from which the nonexistence of the world would be inferred” (Wood 1990: 193, n. 4). King, after somewhat confusingly reconstructing the argument with the same structure as Wood’s reconstruction and claiming it to be “logically consistent,” suggests that the real argument is: “If this world really existed then it would vanish with the experience of non-duality, but it remains precisely because it is duality and is to be taken as merely illusion” (King 1995: 28–29). Although he doesn’t put it this way, King’s version turns the basic argument of 1.17ab into a valid *Modus Tollens* as Wood suggests. I would more precisely characterize the resulting argument as: (1) If this world really existed, then it would vanish with the experience of non-duality, (2) The world does not vanish with the experience of non-duality, (3) Therefore, this world does not really exist. To make sense of this argument we need background from ĀŚ 1.16 concerning the experience of non-duality and a reason to accept the truth of the second premise, which is supplied by 1.17cd.

¹⁷ Another example of a traditional idealist reading can be found in Cole 1982: Chs. 4 and 5.

¹⁸ Karl Potter (1979) has also challenged the traditional idealist reading, but in a different way. Potter claims that Gauḍapāda is an illusionist rather than an idealist, since it is not individual *jīvas* who produce the illusion of the phenomenal world, but rather “God is responsible for the concealment of our waking experience – He produces the appearances which constitute the objects experienced in the waking state” (Potter 1979: 188). I won’t consider Potter’s view in depth, but for now I’ll note that he translates “*prapañca*” as “world” much as I have suggested (Potter 1979: 185).

of Vasubandhu's Yogācāra works,¹⁹ we should take Gauḍapāda to be concerned more with the way in which our experience is presented to us than with how things really are. King claims that neither Yogācāra nor Gauḍapāda are examples of "subjective idealism," but instead adopts a "phenomenological" interpretation in which one "'brackets out' discussion of the reality or unreality of the external world" (King 1995: 168). For Kaplan, "The term phenomenology is specifically being employed to indicate the investigation or study of that which appears, that which is presented in, or to, consciousness" (Kaplan 1983: 340).

Kaplan suggests that Gauḍapāda's use of "*cittaspaṇḍita*" (movement of the mind) does not have the metaphysical meaning that the mind literally creates objects, but rather "that when the mind does not move, it does not perceive the appearance of duality (*dvayābhāsam*, *grāhyagrāhaka*). It seems that the movement of the mind presents the epistemological object to the mind as knower, and the cessation of movement removes the epistemological object" (Kaplan 1992: 209). In other words, the mind (either as *citta* or the individual *jīva*) doesn't literally create illusory objects, but rather an ignorant mind structures its experience with illusory concepts of dualism, such as the dualism of grasped (*grāhya*) and grasper (*grāhaka*).²⁰ Kaplan takes Gauḍapāda's discussion of dreams in ĀŚ 2.1–10 to be making the point that "the nature of phenomenological experience is the same in waking and dreaming as regards their being enclosed – contained within – the mind" (Kaplan 1983: 344). Kaplan is careful to note that he is not denying that the ultimate metaphysical truth for Gauḍapāda is that *brahman* alone ultimately exists; rather his point is that at least some of Gauḍapāda's statements about *māyā* and *cittaspaṇḍita* should be taken phenomenologically rather than metaphysically (Kaplan 1983: 339–340).

Kaplan distinguishes his view from the traditional idealist view as follows: "... the problem according to Gauḍapāda is that we 'wrongly-interpret' (*vikalpa*) the phenomenological appearance of objects within our experiences to be the object (*vastu*) itself. The problem is not, as V. Bhattacharyya would maintain, that we imagine – create – an external world" (Kaplan 1983: 345).²¹ Thus, the crux of this debate is whether the phenomenal world is entirely the creation of the

¹⁹ Some examples of non-idealist readings of Vasubandhu are Kochumottum 2008, Hall 1986, Willis 1979: 20–36, Hayes 1988: 96–104, and Trivedi 2005. See Mills 2016 for an overview of contemporary interpretations of Vasubandhu, especially the *Vimśikā*.

²⁰ Kaplan gives a similar phenomenological account of the grasper and grasped in Kaplan 1983: 351–352.

²¹ Kaplan supports Potter's contention that $\sqrt{k}lp$ and $vi + \sqrt{k}lp$ have different meanings for Gauḍapāda in that $\sqrt{k}lp$ means "apparent-production" while $vi + \sqrt{k}lp$ means "wrong-interpretation" (Kaplan 1983: 345; Potter 1979: 184–185).

mind (conceived of as an individual *citta*, *jīva*, or *ātman*), as in the traditional idealist reading, or whether at least some of Gauḍapāda’s text should be taken as a phenomenological analysis of our experience. To give a quick example, a traditional idealist Gauḍapāda would say that my experience of a cup is in some sense a creation or projection of the *ātman*, but that no cup actually exists outside of my experience of it; on the other hand, a phenomenological Gauḍapāda would say that my dualistic experience of the cup *qua* experience is a mental phenomenon “enclosed” (*saṃvṛta*) within my mind, but to say this is not – at least at this point – to make any metaphysical claim about whether the cup exists or does not exist outside of my subjective experience.

If we read Gauḍapāda as engaging in a sort of phenomenology as King and Kaplan suggest, then “*prapañca*” can still mean “phenomenal world,” if “phenomenal world” can mean the dualistic way in which our experience is presented to us. Beings who are ignorant of the truth of non-dualism mistakenly believe this dualistic experience to represent ultimate reality. Of course, it could be that the verses in which “*prapañca*” appears are meant to be taken metaphysically even though other verses are meant to be taken phenomenologically; however, both King and Kaplan discuss Āś 1.17 from a phenomenological perspective.

While I think my understanding of Gauḍapāda’s use of “*prapañca*” is compatible either with a traditional idealist interpretation or with a phenomenological interpretation, I think a careful reading gives a tentative reason in favor of an idealist interpretation: a metaphysical and idealist understanding of how I have translated “*prapañca*” in the previous section makes for a less strained understanding of the text.

Let’s consider the phenomenological understanding of “*prapañca*” in Āś 1.17 given by King and Kaplan. Recall that I have translated this as, “There is no doubt that if the phenomenal world (*prapañca*) were to exist it would vanish. This duality is only illusion. From the ultimate truth there is non-duality” (Āś 1.17). Although Kaplan doesn’t specifically discuss “*prapañca*,” he explains the second half of the verse (1.17cd) as follows: “This duality is nothing but *māyā* because that which is presented as perceiver is the mind and that which is presented as the perceived is also the mind” (Kaplan 1983: 349). If *māyā* is being used phenomenologically, then, (assuming Kaplan wants to read the whole verse phenomenologically) it follows that “*prapañca*” must mean something like the way in which our experience appears to us.

King does discuss “*prapañca*,” which he initially translates as “multiplicity” in his translation of Āś 1.17 (King 1995: 28). He goes on to link Gauḍapāda’s use of the term with the Buddhist usage in several ways.

Prapañca primarily denotes the idea of plurality (literally “fiveness” or *pañca*). It is a common Buddhist technical term denoting the empty “conceptual proliferation” of all (false) views... Just as ultimate reality is *nirvikalpaka* – without conceptualization, so it is *prapañcopaśama* “the stilling of the multiplicity.” ... One should not be led into the error of thinking that the world is merely a mental construction of an individualized ego and this is precisely the type of “egocentricity” that causes the proliferation (*prapañca*) of duality. (King 1995: 29–30)

King’s explanation here makes Gauḍapāda’s intended meaning of “*prapañca*” quite a bit closer to Nāgārjuna’s psychological understanding of the term than I took it to be in the previous section. For him “the stilling of the multiplicity” means something like the stilling of the mind’s propensity to take its dualistic experience to represent reality. Furthermore, King seems to make a connection to Vasubandhu in understanding that grasping at an ego “causes the proliferation (*prapañca*) of duality” (King 1995: 30). In fact, both Kaplan and King suggest that Vasubandhu and Gauḍapāda are close with regard to their understanding of non-dualistic experience (Kaplan 1992: 209; King 1995: 156–157).

While it’s possible that Gauḍapāda had in mind something more like the Buddhist connotations of “*prapañca*,” I think it’s more likely he had in mind something like “expansion of the universe” or “the visible world,” which Monier-Williams attests as definitions from philosophy (Monier-Williams 1994: 681). Granted, it’s likely that Monier-Williams is reporting meanings from philosophers other than Gauḍapāda, but I think there is at least one reason to think this is what Gauḍapāda means by “*prapañca*,” namely, the occurrence of “*prapañca*” in ĀŚ 2.35 simply doesn’t make much sense when construed in the more Buddhist sense suggested by phenomenological interpretations.

What does the phrase “cessation of the phenomenal world” (*prapañcopaśama*) mean in MU 7 and 12 and ĀŚ 2.35? Let’s focus on ĀŚ 2.35, which I have translated as, “By the sages who have gone to the opposite shore of the Veda and who are free from passion, fear and anger, this [*ātman*], **in which there is the cessation of the phenomenal world** (*prapañcopaśamo*), which is without a second, is indeed seen without imagination.”

If this verse were taken phenomenologically, “The cessation of the phenomenal world” would mean something like this: the sages realize that when the *ātman* dwells in itself, the mind stops taking its dualistic experience, including the subject-object dualism of grasper and grasped, to represent ultimate reality – the world itself does not cease, merely our false way of apprehending it. Of course, in ĀŚ 1.17, we learned that *prapañca* doesn’t really exist in the first place, so therefore it cannot cease to exist. Either a phenomenological or idealist explanation

of *prapañca* ultimately has to be “for the purpose of teaching” (*upadeśāt*) (ĀŚ 1.18). What is Gauḍapāda trying to teach in 2.35? Since “*prapañcopaśama*” is a *bahuvrīhi* compound modifying the implied “*ātman*,”²² Gauḍapāda is trying to tell us something about the *ātman*. It can’t simply be the case that the *ātman* neglects to believe its dualistic experience to reflect ultimate reality. I think it’s problematic to introduce Buddhist nuances when discussing the non-Buddhist notion of an *ātman*, but the real problem is that for Gauḍapāda, the *ātman* is non-dual, birthless, etc. – thus, the *ātman* is incompatible with the phenomenal world. Here I think a metaphysical idealist interpretation makes more sense. On this interpretation, the *ātman* contains the cessation of the phenomenal world, or to put it more precisely, the *ātman*, being non-dual, birthless, etc., never contained the phenomenal world in the first place. The phenomenal world (*prapañca*) is an illusion. The *ātman* is real. This is clearly a metaphysical point. It is also some kind of idealism. Gauḍapāda’s final Advaita position is that *ātman/brahman* alone exists non-dualistically as pure consciousness. This position is easily distinguished from materialism (the metaphysical thesis that everything is matter) and dualism (the metaphysical thesis that there are two kinds of existing things: matter and mind or soul).²³ Even if some of Gauḍapāda’s assertions are phenomenological, I would argue that his ultimate point remains a kind of metaphysical idealism.²⁴

²² See footnote 11 for my argument for this translation choice.

²³ I agree that Gauḍapāda is not a “subjective idealist” if that means, as King, Kaplan, and Potter sometimes seem to think, that individuals are constructing all of reality (King 1995: 29; Kaplan 1983: 345; Potter 1979: 194). At best individuals only construct phenomenal reality (ĀŚ 2.12), which is after all ultimately illusory. Gauḍapāda is not a subjective idealist like George Berkeley for whom *esse est percipi* for the simple reason that for Gauḍapāda that which is perceived outside the *turīya* state does not actually exist. Nonetheless Gauḍapāda supports some kind of idealism in opposition to materialism and dualism. I’m also not so sure that the traditional idealist interpretation requires that an individual *citta*, *jīva*, or *ātman* be responsible for the creation of the phenomenal world. Such creation or projection could be the work of the deeper *ātman* or *brahman*, which is not an individual consciousness and which can be taken either as ultimately theistic or non-theistic (see Wood 1990: xiv–xv for an overview of the issue of theism in Advaita and Potter 1979 for a theistic interpretation). The *ātman* referred to in verses such as ĀŚ 2.12 is best understood in this deeper sense instead of as an individual *citta* or *jīva*.

²⁴ Kaplan and King claim that Gauḍapāda’s phenomenological descriptions apply to the way in which our experiences arise at the level of the phenomenal world, while *brahman* remains the ultimate truth (Kaplan 1983: 339–340; King 1995: 174). But surely this is *some* kind of idealism, if idealism is a metaphysical thesis about the kind of things that ultimately make up reality. As Colin Cole points out, Gauḍapāda “is not a ‘subjective idealist.’ Rather, he is an ‘Absolute Idealist’ in that he posits a basis for all experience. Consciousness alone is real, it has no beginning nor end. It alone is the substratum

Of course, Kaplan or King might admit that ĀŚ 2.35 is meant to be taken metaphysically while ĀŚ 1.17 is still meant to be taken phenomenologically. This may be a plausible line of interpretation, and I am not claiming that a phenomenological interpretation is completely untenable. My claim is that an idealist reading gives a less strained understanding of Gauḍapāda's use of the word "*prapañca*," since it allows us to employ the metaphysical meaning attested by Monier-Williams throughout the text while making sense of the connection between *prapañcopaśama* and the *ātman* in ĀŚ 2.35 and avoiding a problematic imposition of Buddhist nuances into non-Buddhist territory. Nonetheless, I have not solved the dispute about whether Gauḍapāda is an idealist here. I have simply pointed to some considerations engendered by my discussion of "*prapañca*" in the previous section. Next, I'll consider some possible implications for Nāgārjuna.

4. Nāgārjuna and the pacification of conceptual proliferation (*prapañcopaśama*)

There has been a panoply of interpretations of Nāgārjuna among his fellow Madhyamaka Buddhists, among his Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents, and among contemporary scholars.²⁵ Here I will focus on three types of interpretations: mystical, anti-realist, and skeptical. While I think the understanding of "*prapañca*" defended in section two above is compatible with mystical and anti-realist interpretations of Nāgārjuna, a correct understanding of Nāgārjuna's use of "*prapañca*" gives some reasons in favor of what I call a quietist skeptical interpretation.

According to mystical interpretations, the pacification of conceptualization is intended to clear one's cognitive ground to make room for ineffable direct awareness of reality. For instance, T. R. V. Murti claims, "This ever-vigilant dialectical consciousness of all philosophy is another kind of absolute. For, it rises above all positions, transcending the duality of the thesis and antithesis which eminently contain the whole universe" (Murti 1955: 328). He states elsewhere, "the Real is

of all knowledge" (Cole 1982: 61).

²⁵ To get a sense of the range of interpretations of Nāgārjuna, see Wood 1994 and Burton 1999 for nihilist interpretations, Magliola 1984 for a Derridean deconstructive interpretation, Huntington 2007 for an irrationalist interpretation, Arnold 2005 for a transcendental metaphysical reading, McGagney 1997 for a reading of Nāgārjuna as advocating a position of philosophical openness, Gandolfo 2016 for an interpretation of philosophical deflationism, and Kalupahana 1986 for an empiricist interpretation. For historical overviews of Madhyamaka, including issues concerning Nāgārjuna's authorship, see Williams 1989: Ch. 3, Ruegg 1981, Westerhoff 2009: Ch. 1, and Siderits and Katsura 2013: Introduction.

transcendent to thought” (Murti 1955: 330). For Murti, Nāgārjuna’s negative dialectical practice leads to transcending all conceptualization and then to the direct apprehension of the Absolute or the Real.²⁶ I see this as a mystical interpretation. Consider the characterization of mystical experience popularized by William James. According to James, a mystical experience is characterized by “1. *Ineffability* 2. *Noetic quality* ... 3. *Transiency* ... 4. *Passivity*” (James 1958: 319). I follow James in claiming that the first two criteria are most important. An experience is mystical primarily in being ineffable: “The subject of immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to others” (James 1958: 319). A second essential ingredient of mystical experience is its “noetic quality:” “Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect” (James 1958: 319). Thus, if Nāgārjuna is a mystic, he intends for his readers to come to *know* something, although such knowledge cannot be adequately described, nor is it the result of conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*).

Anti-realist interpretations see Nāgārjuna as having a positive claim. For Mark Siderits, the most well-known proponent of an anti-realist interpretation, anti-realism is first and foremost a semantic theory, that is, it is a theory about the truth conditions of statements. As the name implies, it is a rejection of semantic realism, which states that the truth conditions of a statement are set by mind-independent reality. Semantic realism is one part of a broader theory of metaphysical realism, which Siderits defines as being composed of three theses: “(1) truth is correspondence between proposition and reality; (2) reality is mind-independent; (3) there is one true theory that correctly describes reality” (Siderits 2000: 11). The rejection of these theses is what Siderits takes Nāgārjuna’s project to be: “To say that all ‘things’ are empty is just to make the anti-realist point that we cannot give content to the metaphysical realist’s notion of a mind-independent reality with a nature (whether expressible or inexpressible) that can be mirrored

²⁶ Another mystical interpretation is offered by John Taber, who suggests that the purpose of the MMK is to describe a vision “which for Nāgārjuna is ultimately based not on discursive reasoning but on some kind of non-discursive insight” (Taber 1998: 237). In a similar vein, Masao Abe explains that ultimate truth (*paramārtha-satya*) is “*śūnyatā*, Emptiness completely free from conceptual distinction and beyond verbal expression. From the point of view of ultimate truth, conventional or mundane truth ... is nothing but ignorance or falsehood” (Abe 1983: 57). Stephen Phillips offers another mystical interpretation: “The most important point ... for an overall understanding of Nāgārjuna is, apparently, the mystical motivation” (Phillips 1995: 16).

in cognition” (Siderits 2000: 24). Since semantic realism is false, metaphysical realism as a whole must also be false. This leads Siderits to the conclusion that “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth” (Siderits 2007: 202).²⁷

On an anti-realist reading, Nāgārjuna’s goal of the pacification of conceptual proliferation is focused on conceptualizations involving entities with natures (*svabhāva*), since believing things to have mind-independent natures leads to harmful conceptualizations about what those natures really are. The anti-realist medicine, then, cures us of the tendency to conceptualize about natures by denying that those natures exist.

There are several versions of skeptical readings of Nāgārjuna.²⁸ Here I’ll focus on what I call quietist skepticism, an interpretation I develop in more detail elsewhere (e.g., Mills 2018: Chs. 2–3). Some scholars have noted that one way to distinguish between skeptical and non-skeptical interpretations of Madhyamaka is whether the interpreter thinks that Mādhyamikas are ultimately making truth-claims (Burton 1999: Ch. 2; Arnold 2005: 134; Dreyfus 2011: 92). Non-skeptical interpretations, which include mystical and anti-realist interpretations, take Nāgārjuna to be putting forward some truth-claim. Skeptical interpreters, on the other hand, do not. Dreyfus states the question clearly: “Is skepticism a doctrine that makes truth claims by asserting a thesis ... or is it an altogether different approach that avoids the commitment to any claim through a complete suspension of judgment?” (Dreyfus 2011: 92). As a quietist skeptic, Nāgārjuna intends the latter option. His goal is to suspend judgment by pacifying any conceptual proliferation to which one might become attached. Nāgārjuna presents a sort of therapy for intellectuals prone to grasping at philosophical conceptualization.

It might be objected that a quietist skeptical interpretation of Nāgārjuna neglects other essential Buddhist goals of insight into the true nature of reality, knowledge of things as they are, and the notion of Right View as one of the parts of the Eightfold Path. It might be thought that as a Buddhist Nāgārjuna simply cannot be a quietist skeptic of this sort since a Buddhist must aim for some kind of liberating knowledge (such as mystical knowledge or a truth claim about anti-realism).

My response is that there are two phases of Nāgārjuna’s philosophical practice, which are representations of two tendencies that can be traced back to early

²⁷ Jan Westerhoff is also in the anti-realist camp (Westerhoff 2006, 2009). He explicitly refers to “the metaphysical anti-realism defended by Nāgārjuna” (Westerhoff 2009: 207).

²⁸ See, for instance, Matilal 1986: 46–68; Matilal 2002; Garfield 2002: 3–23; Kuzminski 2008.

Buddhist texts. As Steven Collins points out, “One approach to the attainment of the ‘emptiness’ of *nibbāna*, naturally, was a direct assault on any form of conceptualization, any view whatsoever ... The other approach ... was to proceed through an analysis of what does have conceptual content, in order to classify it into known categories; the ability to classify any experience or concept into a known, non-valued impersonal category was held to be a technique for avoiding desire for the object thus classified” (Collins 1982: 113).²⁹ This second tendency is the more popular one in which the purpose of Buddhism is to decrease desire through insight into the true nature of reality. The other tendency is what Collins calls “Quietism,” which is “an attitude which emphasizes passivity in religious practice, and which seeks to attain as its final goal a state of beatific ‘inner quiet’” (Collins 1982: 139).

A quietist skeptical interpretation shows Nāgārjuna’s innovation in bringing these two seemingly-opposed tendencies together into a cohesive dialectical practice: he tries to show that the practice of analysis, when pursued all the way to the emptiness of emptiness, can be used as a *means to* the practice of quelling conceptualization. Nāgārjuna is working within Buddhist parameters by synchronizing two seemingly disparate strands of Buddhist philosophy.

My understanding of Nāgārjuna’s use of “*prapañca*” is compatible with mystical and anti-realist interpretations, but I do think Nāgārjuna’s emphasis on the pacification of *prapañca* gives reasons in favor of a quietist skeptical interpretation. First, this interpretation makes sense of the central importance Nāgārjuna places on the pacification of conceptual proliferation in the dedication (*maṅgalaṃ*) and 25.24 of the MMK. If his ultimate goal is the pacification of conceptual proliferation and not the promotion of some mystical or anti-realist insight, it makes sense to say, “Nowhere, to no one has any *dharma* at all been taught by the Buddha” (MMK 25.24). On a quietist skeptical reading, Nāgārjuna means precisely what he says: the goal of Buddhism is not to accept a *dharma* in the sense of the tenets of a particular worldview, but to avoid any such conceptualization about worldviews. Second, a quietist skeptical interpretation helps us make sense of Nāgārjuna’s expressions of positionlessness. The MMK famously ends with: “I bow to him, Gautama, who, by means of compassion, taught

²⁹ For another example of Early Buddhist quietism, see the following line from the *Suttanipāta*: “(only) when a man renounces all opinions, does he make no quarrel with the world” (Collins 1982: 130). Also, Richard Hayes has identified a kind of skepticism within the Buddhist tradition from the Nikāyas up until at least Dignāga; Hayes calls this “skeptical rationalism ... according to which there is no knowledge aside from that which meets the test of logical consistency, and moreover very few of our beliefs meet this test” (Hayes 1988: 41). For more on early Buddhist quietism, see Mills 2018: Ch. 1.

the true *dharma* for the purpose of abandoning all views” (MMK 27.30).³⁰ There is, of course, a long-standing debate among Indian, Tibetan, and Western scholars about whether “all views” (*sarvadṛṣṭi*) here means all views whatsoever, or all *false* views.³¹ I think we could take Nāgārjuna at his word. If he is a quietist skeptic interested in the pacification of conceptual proliferation, Nāgārjuna would see the Buddha’s *dharma* (here taking *dharma* in the sense of a practice rather than a worldview as in 25.24) existing quite literally “for the purpose of abandoning all views.” This is in line with the quietist tendency in Early Buddhism.³²

Likewise, on my interpretation Gauḍapāda retains his adherence to Advaita despite his use of Buddhist terms. Even though they have obvious similarities, Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda remain true to their respective traditions. I have not attempted to give definitive interpretations of the whole corpus of either Gauḍapāda or Nāgārjuna here. I have instead pointed to some considerations that result from my understanding of how each philosopher uses the word “*prapañca*” in the texts in question.

5. The debate about Gauḍapāda’s Buddhist influence

Given the examples cited in the previous sections, it is obvious that Gauḍapāda used certain Buddhist terms, and it is likely that he was doing so self-consciously. But it is not at all obvious what it was he was trying to accomplish by doing so. Although Buddhist terms appear in all four *prakaraṇas*, the fourth *prakaraṇa*, the *Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa*, is so imbued with Buddhist concepts that some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that it *is* a Buddhist text. Wood lays out three common interpretations of the fourth *prakaraṇa* (or “ALP”):

³⁰ *sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat /
anukampām upādāya taṁ namasyāmi gautamaṁ* // MMK 27.30

³¹ Proponents of the “false views” interpretation argue that “*dṛṣṭi*” often has negative connotations in Buddhist contexts as “a wrong view” (Monier-Williams 1994: 492). While it is possible Nāgārjuna meant “wrong views,” it is also possible he meant views in general. The same Sanskrit word is used for the element of the Eightfold Path known as “right view” (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*), which has a positive connotation. An appeal to the text itself cannot solve this debate. My point is that *if* we want to take “*dṛṣṭi*” as meaning views in general, it is possible to do so in a way that makes sense of the text. In favor of my interpretation, though, I would point out that a major reason in favor of the “false views” interpretation – namely, that the text cannot make sense otherwise – is not the case.

³² Perhaps the closest historical precedent for a quietist skeptical interpretation of Nāgārjuna is the Tibetan philosopher Patsab Nyimadrak (Dreyfus 2011).

- (1) The ALP is, in fact, a Buddhist text, and it was written by a Buddhist ...
 (2) The ALP is a purely Vedāntic treatise which uses Buddhist terminology for an ulterior purpose – perhaps to proselytize Buddhists or persons sympathetic to Buddhism ... (3) ... the ALP is a purely Vedāntic treatise, but ... it is *not* critical of the Buddha. (Wood 1990: 72)³³

I think the first option can be ruled out, given the evidence I considered from the fourth *prakaraṇa* in section one of this essay. For instance, Gauḍapāda’s use of words such as “*ajāti*” in ĀŚ 4.3–5 as well as “*citta*” and “*viññāna*” in ĀŚ 4.45–46 can’t be in line with Buddhism, since Gauḍapāda views *ajāti*, *citta*, and *viññāna* in an eternalist fashion incompatible with Buddhism. It is extremely likely that, whatever Gauḍapāda³⁴ had in mind, Buddhist terms were not used with their full Buddhist meanings in any of the *prakaraṇas*, including the fourth. The text has Advaita goals all the way through even though some terms associated with Buddhism are used, as I have demonstrated most specifically concerning the word “*prapañca*.”

The second and third options are both compatible with my assessment of the text, although the text would not be particularly successful in either case. If Gauḍapāda intends to convert Buddhists, he is talking past them. Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras may be amused by what they would see as an eternalist misconstrual of their basic philosophical vocabulary, but I highly doubt any Buddhist would be convinced by Gauḍapāda that Advaita is correct, at least not on the basis of his use (or misuse) of their terms. On the other hand, if Gauḍapāda intends to demonstrate that “in the final analysis, the teachings of the Buddha are in fact Vedāntic teachings” (Wood 1990: 72), then he has also failed in his task. Not only is he talking past the Buddhists and using their terms in different senses, his use of Buddhist terms is selective in that he never discusses the core Buddhist idea of dependent origination and he accepts the existence of an *ātman* (Comans 2000: 91). Of course, Gauḍapāda may believe that Buddhists are right up to a certain point; for instance, he may think that dependent origination, emptiness, etc. correctly describe the phenomenal world while leaving the reality of *ātman*/*brahman* untouched. In fact, this may be his point, but it remains a point that

³³ Wood attributes the first view to Bhattacharya, but I think Bhattacharya is more cautious and tentative on this point than Wood believes. He does say, “In Book IV, Gauḍapāda has discussed nothing directly of the Vedānta ... Gauḍapāda seems to have accepted the middle theory [i.e., the Buddhist ‘Middle Way’]” but he also points out that, “Or it may be that Gauḍapāda has here simply mentioned the views of the Buddhists...” (Bhattacharya 1989: cxliv–cxlv).

³⁴ Recall that I am using “Gauḍapāda” as the name for whoever the author or authors of the four *prakaraṇas* might be without entering into the controversy of the authorship of the ĀŚ. See footnote 6.

no Buddhist would possibly accept. Hence, I don't think it's possible for Gauḍapāda to be the Advaitin he clearly is without at some point criticizing Buddhism.

To what extent was Gauḍapāda *consciously* changing the meaning of these terms? It is difficult to answer this question, but I think we should add a fourth option to Wood's list of interpretations: perhaps Gauḍapāda *unintentionally* misinterpreted Buddhist terms. Perhaps he sincerely believed that Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and Advaita used terms such as "*ajāti*" and "*prapañca*" in similar ways. I hope to have demonstrated how he could have done this in at least one case by taking the word "*prapañca*" in its more metaphysical sense rather than in the Buddhist psychological sense. While "*prapañca*" doesn't appear in the fourth *prakaraṇa*, I think there is enough evidence (i.e., the eternalist gloss of other Buddhist terms in the fourth *prakaraṇa*) to suggest that Gauḍapāda uses terms such as "*ajāti*" in the fourth *prakaraṇa* quite differently than Nāgārjuna just as Gauḍapāda uses "*prapañca*" in the first and second *prakaraṇas* quite differently than Nāgārjuna. As I've already argued, this different construal rules out Wood's first option above. This cannot be a Buddhist text. Furthermore, Gauḍapāda's misinterpretation of several Buddhist terms need not necessarily relegate him to a kind of proselytizing in which he intentionally shoehorns Buddhist concepts to fit an Advaita worldview (contrary to Wood's second option). Nor do we need to commit Gauḍapāda to the obviously mistaken view that Buddhism and Advaita are identical, since he still might admit (contrary to Wood's third option) that Buddhists are to be criticized at some point – namely, in their refusal to accept the metaphysical truth of *brahman*. On the fourth option I am suggesting, Gauḍapāda made a philosophical mistake, but it was an honest mistake. This would in no way impugn his greatness as a philosopher, since many other great philosophers have done the same. Speaking somewhat facetiously, I might say that talking past other philosophers is a time-honored philosophical activity in India just as it has been in other philosophical traditions.

6. Conclusion

I hope to have shown that, despite using many of the same words, Gauḍapāda and Nāgārjuna are firmly within their respective traditions. I have focused on the word "*prapañca*," which Gauḍapāda uses to mean "phenomenal world" and Nāgārjuna uses to mean "conceptual proliferation." This different usage reveals that Gauḍapāda intends for his readers to realize the metaphysical truth of Advaita doctrines while Nāgārjuna has the more psychological concern of helping his readers avoid unnecessary conceptualization. This distinction gives some reasons in favor of an idealist interpretation of Gauḍapāda and some

reasons in favor of a quietist skeptical interpretation of Nāgārjuna. It also sheds some light on how and why Gauḍapāda uses Buddhist terms. It is quite possible that although they may be using many of the same words, Mādhyamikas and Advaitins can still talk past one another.³⁵

Abbreviations

ALP – *Alātaśāntiprakaraṇa* of the *Āgamaśāstra*.

ĀŚ – *Āgamaśāstra*. Sanskrit text in Karmarkar 1953 and Wood 1990. Bouy 2000 also consulted.

MMK – *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Sanskrit text in McGagney 1997. Siderits and Katsura 2013 also consulted.

MU – *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*. Sanskrit text in Wood 1990. Bouy 2000 also consulted.

PP – *Prasannapadā*. Sanskrit text in Vaidya 1960.

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Moral Motivation and Hindu Ethics

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Finding the real identity beneath the apparent contradiction and differentiation, and finding the substantial diversity beneath the apparent identity, is the most delicate, misunderstood and yet essential endowment of the critic of ideas and the historian of historical developments.

Antonio Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*

I was delighted to be invited to contribute to this volume honouring John Taber and his work on Indian philosophy, since I gratefully acknowledge how much I have learned about that subject from reading John's writings and from conversations and correspondence with him – notwithstanding that my essay here will doubtless display how much more Indian philosophy I also failed to learn from him! But then the epigraph from Gramsci above is invoked as a description of what seems to be a possible intellectual ideal for the study of Indian philosophy, with no suggestion that my own work perfectly exemplifies that ideal. Moreover, the ideal is surely only plausible as a *collective* ideal. After all, how could any mere mortal feasibly master in a single lifetime all the requisite historical, philological, and philosophical learning?

That said, it is also obvious that some individuals succeed in approaching the ideal more closely than others. And John is a case in point. Trained in Western philosophy and working for decades in a U.S. philosophy department, he is an eloquent defender of the importance of engaging *philosophically* with Indian philosophical texts (see further Taber 2013) and of the fruitfulness of informed comparisons of Western and Indian philosophy. But he is also deeply engaged with the philological and historical traditions of Indology (especially as these are practised in the German-language universities) and has collaborated extensively with scholars working in that milieu.

I do not possess the degree of John's dual expertise in this regard, but I do share with him a keen philosophical interest in exploring those regions of logical space occupied by Indian and Western philosophies (where by "logical space" I mean the space of all possibilities). This essay is offered in that spirit as a cross-cultural mapping of some positions in a matrix of possible positions one can take on the problem of moral motivation, and a tiny piece in the mosaic that the collective study of Indian philosophy is continuously constructing.

I

It is well known that although classical Indian philosophy is incredibly rich in rigorous discussions of topics in epistemology, logic, and metaphysics, comparable discussions in ethics were not as extensive as might have been expected. To be sure, classical Indian philosophers offered and debated competing proposals on how to live, how to act, or what sort of person to be. But it also has to be acknowledged that ethics was not a distinct field within classical Indian philosophy in the manner of *pramāṇavāda*, the systematic Indian theory of epistemology and logic. Instead Indian ethical discussions are to be found scattered across many works and genres. This means Western philosophers sometimes have to know how to look for the relevant discussions in unfamiliar places and learn to read their unfamiliar styles of discourse.

Confining ourselves to just the classical Hindu philosophical tradition though, we can at least quite readily identify well-developed work in *normative ethics*, i.e. the part of philosophical ethics concerned with questions like "What is of value?" and "What are our moral obligations?" So, for example, we have an ordered pluralist theory of the good in the *puruṣārtha* schema; an intricate cataloguing of duties and moral factors in the *dharmaśāstra* texts on jurisprudence; the outlines of a deontic logic in *Mīmāṃsā*; and so on. But what we do not so readily encounter is comparably well-developed work in *meta-ethics*, i.e. that part of philosophical ethics concerned with second-order questions about the nature of morality like: "Are some moral judgements true?", "If so, what makes them true?", "If not, why do we think and talk as if they are?" and "Does recognizing what we ought to do intrinsically motivate us to do it?" These sorts of questions have much exercised Western philosophers, but arguably have less exercised Indian philosophers. But this is not to say that Hindu ethicists have had nothing to say about them. Sometimes, though, their contributions are to be found in what might seem to be unlikely places: after all, who would have immediately expected to find so much relevant material buried in an apparently *recherché* Indian debate about the meaning of the optative suffix in Sanskrit? And sometimes too other

philosophical commitments of the Indians mean that they construe the logical space of the relevant theories rather differently than Westerners typically do. A good example here are the Indian debates about moral motivation, a meta-ethical topic addressed seriously by various Indian philosophers, but in ways both similar to and different from how they have been treated by Western philosophers writing on meta-ethics.

II

Let us begin with the Western tradition, where the peculiarly motivating force of normative judgements and the implications of this have been the subject of philosophical discussion since ancient Greece (Rosati 2016, Vasiliou 2016). Contemporary discussions of the phenomenon, however, have often been framed as centred on worries about the individual plausibility and conjoint compossibility of three widely accepted ethical claims and the consequences of these for meta-ethics (Smith 1994, McNaughton 1988).

The first of these three claims is

Cognitivism: Moral judgements express beliefs and are truth-apt (i.e. they are the sort of things that can be true or false).

This is, of course, a very familiar assumption of Western commonsense morality, one that if true would justify our conviction that genuine moral disagreements are possible. It should not be confused, however, with the stronger claim that any moral judgements are *actually* true. Hence, meta-ethical error theorists (Mackie 1977, Joyce 2001) can consistently accept cognitivism but deny that there are any moral values that correspond to our moral beliefs – in which case moral judgements are systematically all false. Cognitivism so defined, then, is to be distinguished from *moral realism*, which is the view that there really are objective moral values (even if we may have difficulty knowing what they are). The real opposite of cognitivism is *non-cognitivism*, i.e. the view that moral judgements are not truth-apt and hence cannot express beliefs. Instead they express other kinds of mental states (like feelings, attitudes, intentions, commands, etc.).

The second of our three claims is

Internalism: Moral judgements are intrinsically motivating.

This too is a familiar tenet of Western commonsense morality, but it may come in strong or weak varieties. Strong internalists claim that moral judgement brings motivation with it *simpliciter*: i.e. if an agent judges that something is the morally

right thing to do, then they are automatically *motivated* to do it, whether or not they actually do it. (This view is often, albeit disputably, attributed to Plato.) Weak internalists, wanting to make room for *akrasia*, allow instead that there is a defeasible connection between moral judgement and motivation: namely, that if an agent judges that something is the morally right thing to do, then they are motivated to do it, or they are practically irrational.

Finally, the third of our three claims is

Humeanism: Motivation requires an appropriate belief-desire pair.

The idea here is that a belief on its own is motivationally inert and it is only when we *desire* something that the belief will move us. Hence an agent is motivated to act if and only if they have both a desire and an appropriately related belief, and there is no *necessary* link between beliefs and desires. (I follow contemporary practice in calling this claim “Humeanism” here even though it very likely was not Hume’s own view of the matter: see Millgram 1995.)

While each of our three claims is individually plausible as a commonplace of Western commonsense morality, their conjunction seems to construct an inconsistent triad. Suppose, for instance, that cognitivism is true and moral judgements express beliefs. Suppose further that internalism is true and moral judgements necessarily motivate. Then Humeanism must be false, for it claims that motivation requires desires, not just beliefs.

Suppose instead that Humeanism is true, and also that internalism is true. Then cognitivism is false, for beliefs alone are not necessarily motivating and hence moral judgements cannot express beliefs. Instead such judgements must be expressions of non-cognitive states.

Finally, suppose alternatively that both cognitivism and Humeanism are true. Then internalism is false, for moral judgements cannot be intrinsically motivating if they are expressions of beliefs and beliefs alone are not necessarily motivating. Perhaps then we should instead embrace *externalism*, i.e. the view that the link between moral judgement and motivation is contingent. But though externalism would have no difficulty in explaining weakness of will, it is less clear that it can explain successfully the widely observed empirical fact that a change in moral motivation follows reliably upon a change in moral judgement (Smith 1994).

Of course, all of these escape routes and their implications have been much discussed by contemporary Western meta-ethicists. But for my present purposes I want to set aside the details of this – often intricate – literature in order to concentrate instead on two different questions. First, how did classical Indian

philosophers view the related cluster of concepts I have just outlined here? Second, how might their views of these concepts have precluded the development of quite the same sort of meta-ethical worries that have concerned Western philosophers.

III

In what follows I shall be focusing on the views of just four classical Hindu philosophical schools – Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, and Advaita Vedānta – and exploring what these schools have to say that is relevant to those three individually *prima facie* plausible meta-ethical claims – cognitivism, internalism, and Humeanism – that jointly form the inconsistent triad.

Consider first *Humeanism*, the claim that moral motivation requires an appropriate belief-desire pair. Although some contemporary Western philosophers have thought this claim controversial, among classical Indian philosophers something like it was widely accepted. In the popular seventeenth-century Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manual the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, for example, a voluntary action is roughly understood to require the presence of a number of factors, representable as a causal chain: agent, cognition, desire to act, and effort (*kartṛ* → *jñāna* → *cikīrṣā* → *pravṛtti*). And broadly speaking, Mīmāṃsā agrees with this too – even though there are significant disagreements between the schools about the content of the relevant cognition and desire conditions (more on this later). But before exploring those debates I want to raise and then lay to rest two possible objections to my attribution of something close to a belief-desire model of voluntary action to our Indian authors.

The first such objection is that I mistakenly identify the relevant Indian concept of a cognition (*jñāna*) with the Western concept of a belief. But a *jñāna* is a momentary episodic event, whereas a belief is a dispositional state. So even if an appropriate cognition is taken by our Indian philosophers to be a necessary condition of a voluntary action, this does not mean that they take belief to be so. The second objection to my belief-desire attribution is that there is in Indian philosophy a well-known valorization of the notion of “desireless action” (*niṣkāma karma*), most famously in the *Bhagavadgītā*. But if Hindu philosophers believe that desireless action is indeed possible, then we cannot reasonably suppose they believe desire is a necessary condition for action. And, of course, these two objections conjoined imply that (*pace* Humeanism) moral motivation does not always require either belief or desire.

Neither objection, however, is persuasive. In the first place, while it is true that Indian epistemology is centred on cognitive episodes of a certain sort, rather than on a dispositional approach to knowledge, it is not true that episodic notions of belief are unfamiliar to Western epistemologists. Consider in this respect the widely recognized distinction between *occurrent* and *dispositional* beliefs. A dispositional belief is one that is held by the subject but that is not currently being actively entertained, whereas an occurrent belief is one currently being actively entertained by the subject. The Indian cognition (*jñāna*) that is a causal condition of a voluntary action can be thought of as analogous to a Western occurrent belief, which is episodic. Hence at least the belief part of my attribution of a belief-desire account of action to our Indian authors is plausible.

What about the second objection: namely, that many Hindu philosophers apparently believe in the possibility of desireless action, and hence cannot consistently also believe desire to be a necessary condition for action? Now it is certainly true that we find valorizations of desirelessness present in many different Indian texts, of which the best-known example is surely the *Bhagavadgītā*'s teaching that moral action is action performed with a special impersonal psychological attitude of detachment, and where the content of that action is determined by the agent's particular *svadharma*. More specifically, the *Gītā* teaches that we should perform those actions without regard to their "fruits" (*phala*). The Indian commentarial tradition epitomizes this in a punning Sanskrit slogan: the *Gītā* does not teach non-action (*naiṣkarmya*), but detached action (*niṣkāma karma*, literally "desireless action").

Since the *Gītā* prescribes "desireless" action and classical Hindu theories of action make desire a necessary condition of action, the obvious resolution of this apparent contradiction (and one favoured by many authors, both classical and modern) is to understand "desireless" here to mean free of some particular *kind* of desire. As to which kinds of desire have to be eliminated, there is a range of opinions. Popular candidates include selfish desires, attached desires, or (more generally) some combination of those desires which have inappropriate objects or are inappropriately intense (see Framarin 2009 for a critical review of some of the proposals). For our present purposes, however, we can set aside the issue of how best to gloss "desireless action" since the Hindu philosophical schools we are concerned with here all do affirm that desire (of some sort) is a necessary condition for voluntary action. Hence at least the desire part of my attribution of a belief-desire account of action to our Indian authors is also plausible.

Of course, all I have claimed so far is that our Indian philosophers have tried to understand action in terms of beliefs and desires so that we can explain why an

agent acted as they did by pointing to what they wanted and what they believed. As to the nature of what the agent must have wanted or believed in order to so act, we now need to say a little more. On these further issues, however, there is significantly less consensus among Indian philosophers, and their disagreements bear directly upon they have to say about the thesis of moral *internalism*. But to set the scene here we need first to sketch the context of these Indian debates about moral motivation.

IV

For our Hindu philosophers the paradigm of a fundamental moral utterance is a Vedic injunction (*vidhi*). The Mīmāṃsā exegetes hold that such injunctions prescribe various actions (especially ritual sacrifices), and are also the primary source of our knowledge of what ought to be done (*dharma*). Or as Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2 famously puts it: "*Dharma* is the thing conveyed by Vedic prescriptions (*codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmah*)."¹ How do such Vedic injunctions motivate us to do what ought to be done? And how does understanding the words of a Vedic injunction have imperative force for an agent who hears them? These two questions, though related, seem to be theoretically separable – even if they were not always very sharply separated in the Indian context. The first seems to be more of an issue in moral psychology: what are the causal conditions necessary for an agent to be motivated to act upon a moral injunction? The second seems more of an issue in the philosophy of language: how does a Vedic utterance convey its linguistic force?

Since Vedic injunctions are in Sanskrit, this second question is typically framed by Indian philosophers in terms of certain grammatical features of that language. So, for example, the Sanskrit injunctive sentence is analysed as involving a verbal root plus an inflected verbal ending in the optative mood. Then our second question becomes understood as being about how an optative affix enables an utterance to convey its linguistic force and be understood as injunctive. The two sub-schools of Mīmāṃsā disagree on how this is done. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas hold that the deep structure of a command brings this about through *bhāvanā* (see further Edgerton 1929, Ollett 2013). *Bhāvanā* or "efficient-force" is a composite of three factors: the bringing into being of a thing which is its goal, the means to achieve that goal, and the procedure of actualisation it enjoins. Mīmāṃsā distinguishes two kinds of *bhāvanā* expressed by injunctive verbs: "end-efficient-force" (*ārthī bhāvanā*) and "word-efficient-force" (*śabdī bhāvanā*). The former denotes the activity enjoined on the hearer by the injunction; the latter is the injunctive force expressed by the "optativeness" (*līntva*)

of the verbal suffix. Since Mīmāṃsakas hold the Vedas to be unauthored, Vedic language that expresses moral injunctions supposedly thus has *inherent* illocutionary force (Taber 1989: 158).

On the other hand, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas (see Freschi 2012, Sastry 1956) deny that the verb ending of a Vedic utterance communicates two kinds of force (linguistic and result-producing). Rather, a Vedic utterance conveys command (*niyoga*). Command here is both what must be done, and what instigates the doing of it. The optative verb ending impels by inducing in the hearer an awareness that they are commanded, and then this awareness causes the hearer to actually act so as to obey that command.

One useful way to think about the difference between the two Mīmāṃsā sub-schools here is in terms of an analogy with hypothetical and categorical imperatives (Stcherbatsky 1971). Thus, the Bhāṭṭas regard the Vedic injunctions as implicit hypothetical imperatives of the form “One desiring X, should do Y,” where the resulting obligation is a *prudential* one since failing to obey it would be in conflict with the hearer’s desire for X. The Prābhākaras, in contrast, view Vedic injunctions as categorical imperatives of the form “X should be done,” where the resulting obligation is purely *deontic*. Vedic injunctions are accordingly understood by the Prābhākaras as commands, rather than practical advice.

Nyāya holds yet a third position on all this, one shaped at least partly in self-conscious response to these earlier Mīmāṃsā debates. Thus, in the *vidhivāda* chapter of Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Jha 1987) we find both an elaborate critique of previous theories and a presentation of a rival Navya-Nyāya account. Although Gaṅgeśa accepts that a Vedic injunction is the indirect cause of an inducement to an act since it generates the verbal cognition which directly induces a person to an action, he rejects both the *bhāvanā* theory of the Bhāṭṭas and the *niyoga* theory of the Prābhākaras as to how this occurs. Those theories he claims fail to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for being the inducing awareness since we see both cases where the candidate awarenesses are present but inducement to activity is absent, and cases where inducement to activity is present but where none of the candidate awarenesses are present.

Note that the disagreement here between Gaṅgeśa and the Mīmāṃsakas is not about whether injunctive affixes induce agents to act, but rather about whether the *meaning* of the injunctive sentence includes all three belief conditions he takes to be necessary conditions for voluntary action. For our present purposes, however, what is more interesting is the Navya-Nyāya account of these three doxastic conditions necessary for an agent to be motivated to act upon a moral injunction.

According to Kṛṣṇadāsa's *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (following Gaṅgeśa), the relevant kind of desire here requires that the agent believes that (i) the action in question is achievable by the agent, (ii) performing the action is conducive to the agent's good, and (iii) the action is also incapable of causing harm to the agent. In the absence of any of these three factors, the desire to perform the action will not arise in the agent. Moreover, a Vedic injunctive sentence has the power of conveying these three meanings.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā philosophers accept a broadly similar account of voluntary action, but deny that injunctive sentences directly mean that an action can be accomplished by one's volition. Instead, when we understand a Vedic injunctive sentence we also come to believe that the action enjoined is conducive to the desired goal of achieving the highest good and it is this belief that causes us to act.

The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā philosophers have a simpler theory still. Conduciveness to good is not a sufficient condition for action; all that is necessary for action is the belief that the action should be done. And "being something to be done" (*karyātva*) is a quite different property from "being conducive to the good of the agent."

The major difference between the first two theories and the third Prābhākara theory is that the former parties claim that a belief about an action's conduciveness to good necessarily plays a mediating role, whereas the latter denies that it plays such a role.

What are the implications of all this for the question of how far our Hindu philosophers are committed to motivational *internalism*, the second thesis in the inconsistent triad of commonsense propositions we identified earlier? Do our Indian ethicists accept that moral judgements are intrinsically motivating?

The Naiyāyikas clearly do not. Consider, for instance, what the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* says about this:

It is not possible that there would be inclination (only) from the notion that a certain act is to be done, since the Vedas inculcate this; for unless one knows that it is a means to what one desires, there can be no inclination even from a thousand such notions (Madhavananda 1940: 249).

The Nyāya account of moral motivation, then, is *externalist*: recognizing that an action is morally obligatory is in itself insufficient for moral motivation. What is instead required is at least a belief that the action conduces to the good of the agent involved.

The Bhāṭṭa account is also a variety of externalism insofar as it is the belief that the action enjoined is conducive to the desired goal of achieving the highest good that causes us to act. If that goal is not desired by the agent, then the act will not be performed. Thus, Kumārila states in the *Tantravārttika* (in words seemingly echoed by the later *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* passage above) that “even if he is addressed by a hundred orders, a person acting intentionally will never carry out an activity that does not serve any human end (*puruṣārtha*)” (translation in Ollett 2013: 252).

The Prābhākara account, on the other hand, is overtly *internalist*: the belief that an action is morally obligatory is itself supposed to be enough to motivate action. The idea of duty is all that is required to mediate between the hearing of a moral injunction and the performance of the action enjoined.

V

So far, then, we have seen that all our Indian ethicists accept something like the Humean belief-desire theory of action, but that at least two Hindu philosophical schools effectively deny motivational internalism. What about the last of the three theses in the inconsistent triad of Western commonsense propositions we identified earlier? In other words, where do our Hindu philosophers stand on moral *cognitivism*, the claim that moral judgements are truth-apt?

Curiously enough given their apparent conservatism, both sub-schools of Mīmāṃsā seem effectively to deny that the most fundamental moral utterances have truth values. This is surely an implication of their belief that the Veda is both the source of *dharma* and purely injunctive, even if this implication may not be one that is widely acknowledged. Yet it seems intuitively obvious that injunctions do not have truth conditions and hence cannot be true or false. (They may have compliance or obedience conditions, but that is a different matter.) Of course, many contemporary Western ethicists are expressivists who deny that moral judgements are truth-apt. And some of these have offered *ersatz* accounts of how an imperative will semantically determine, without having as its meaning, a modal truth-condition which figures centrally in accounting for various aspects of its meaning (see further Charlow 2014). But arguably these attempts do not quite seem to capture anything that can adequately replace the truth-conditional analysis of meaning.

Be that as it may, however, there is a different issue about the Mīmāṃsā treatment of Vedic injunctions that needs addressing. It seems that if the Veda is basically injunctive, then its utterances cannot be true or false. But it is also the case that Mīmāṃsakas describe the Vedic texts as having the property of *prāmāṇya*, where that is customarily identified with truth. How do we resolve this apparent contradiction?

Many classical Indian philosophers and modern scholars have thought that this apparent contradiction cannot be resolved, and that it only seemed resolvable to the Mīmāṃsakas because they were wedded to a mistaken coherence theory of truth. According to this diagnosis, the problem is that Mīmāṃsakas believe falsely that all there is to truth is non-falsification (*abādhitva*) in the face of subsequent experience.

We can see how combining such a view of truth with a belief in the beginninglessly unauthored nature of the Vedas would entail the truth of the Vedas. According to Mīmāṃsā, the Vedas are authorless (*apauruṣeya*) and their authority derives from precisely this property, for if they did have an author they would be fallible (as are other authored texts of our acquaintance). Since they do not have an author, however, they must be infallible because their falsity could have no possible cause (the possibility of falsity always depending on some person or other).

Mīmāṃsā concedes that there is no positive proof of the validity of the Vedas, for this would require the assumption of something prior or external to the eternal revelation. Supposedly, however, this is epistemically unproblematic for them, since they hold a negative theory of confirmation according to which no theory can ever be positively proved true. Non-falsification is the criterion of truth and every statement is assumed true unless contradicted by another statement. (This is the theory of the intrinsic validity of knowledge known as *svataḥprāmāṇya-vāda*.)

This is roughly the way Nyāya interprets Mīmāṃsā as being committed to a coherence theory of truth that is supposed to underwrite the infallibility of the Vedas (on Nyāya views see further Mohanty 1989). In contrast, Nyāya rejects intrinsic truth-determination (*svataḥprāmāṇya*) in favour of extrinsic truth-determination (*parataḥprāmāṇya*). Whereas the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the truth of a cognition is intrinsically apprehended and hence there is no need for a criterion of truth, the Naiyāyikas reply that in fact the Mīmāṃsā coherence theory of the nature of truth is really only plausible as a *criterion* of truth. That a cognition has not so far been falsified does not show not that it is true.

But is this what Mīmāṃsā really meant by *svataḥprāmāṇya*? Plausibly, it is not (see Taber 1992 and the further elaborations in Arnold 2005 and Freschi 2016). The key point here is that the Mīmāṃsā commitment to the intrinsic validity of the Vedas is not to be understood as a commitment to the *truth* of the Vedas, which are injunctive and thus effectively not truth-apt. Instead *prāmāṇya* in Mīmāṃsā is better thought of as *warrant*, rather than truth (where warrant is whatever needs to be added to true belief to get knowledge). So, the Mīmāṃsā claim that the Vedas are *svataḥprāmāṇya* is really about cognitions of Vedic injunctions being – like all cognitions – *self-justifying* just in virtue of those cognitions being unfalsified cognitions. And such an epistemic claim is still logically compatible with a realist theory of truth, i.e. a theory of truth that imposes – as a non-realist coherence theory does not – a certain *ontological* condition on the truth of a truth-bearer (see Kirkham 1992: 74).

Of course, in contrast Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does explicitly espouse a realist theory of truth, and a theory of extrinsic truth-determination (*parataḥprāmāṇya*). Naiyāyikas also deny that the Vedas are unauthored. Instead they were composed by a divine author (*Īśvara*) whose omniscience and benevolence guarantees their reliability. Finally, the Vedas are not claimed to be purely injunctive, so Nyāya can quite consistently affirm that the Veda includes some moral utterances that are truth-apt. Understandably, then, Naiyāyikas see themselves as firmly opposed to what they take to be the Mīmāṃsā position on cognitivism about Vedic utterances.

So far I have concentrated on just the views of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, even though I mentioned earlier I intended to touch too upon Advaita Vedānta. One reason for this silence is that the precise status of ethics in Advaita is a little tricky to determine since so much ethical discourse is about action, which assumes a duality between self and other that is precluded by the ultimate truth of the non-duality of *ātman* and *Brahman*. Thus, for Śaṅkara and his followers only those still enmeshed in the everyday worldly life have any concern with action and the moral demands of *dharma*.

With respect to the Advaitin position on the ethical obligations of such worldlings, I omitted any explicit discussion of an Advaitin stance on the issues of Humeanism and internalism on the assumption that their view on those matters could be subsumed under the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view, in keeping with the tradition's oft-quoted maxim that in matters relating to the everyday world the view of the Bhāṭṭas is preferred (*vyavahāre bhāṭṭanayaḥ*). When it comes to the issue of cognitivism and the truth-aptness of the Vedas, however, Advaita has an

explicit position distinct from both Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Thus, from Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* we learn that Advaita, like Mīmāṃsā but unlike Nyāya, holds the Vedas to have no source external to themselves. So, God is not their author, and their authority is internally justified. However, like Nyāya but unlike Mīmāṃsā, Śaṅkara believes that the sole purpose of the Vedas is not just to teach which actions are obligatory or forbidden. Instead he holds that they give us special knowledge of the imperceptible supernatural world, i.e. of something not already known by other means of knowledge. Now for Advaita this knowledge of *Brahman* is both cognitive and axiological. While those deontic moral judgements to do with action and distinct actors can be subsumed under the Bhāṭṭa treatment of injunctions, for Advaita the ultimate truth the Vedas reveal is the identity of *ātman* and *Brahman* and that teaching is not so much about the theory of right action as about the theory of the ultimate good, which is unknowable except through the Vedas. Thus, with respect to the third member of the inconsistent triad we began with, Advaita may not affirm cognitivism about right and wrong action, but it does implicitly affirm cognitivism about axiological judgements of what has ultimate value.

VI

Our investigation has thus addressed explicitly the two questions we began with: (i) how our classical Hindu philosophers viewed the related cluster of concepts around moral motivation, and (ii) how might their views of these concepts have precluded the development of quite the same sort of meta-ethical worries that have concerned Western philosophers.

With respect to the three Western commonsense meta-ethical theses – cognitivism, internalism, and Humeanism – the conjunction of which constructs our original inconsistent triad, the positions of our four Indian philosophical schools are as follows (see Figure 1). Cognitivism is affirmed by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita Vedānta, but denied by both Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. Internalism is affirmed by Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, but denied by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, and Advaita Vedānta. Humeanism is affirmed by all four schools. None of our Indian schools is thereby committed to an inconsistent triad, and we now have a better sense of how and why that is so.

	Cognitivism	Internalism	Humeanism
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika	✓	X	✓
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā	X	X	✓
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā	X	✓	✓
Advaita Vedānta	✓	X	✓

Figure 1 The Logical Space of the Theories

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A History of Time in the Sāṃkhya Tradition*

Isabelle Ratié

Pour John – remarquable savant, authentique amoureux des Idées, merveilleux ami – avec mon admiration et mon affection profondes, ainsi que l’heureuse conviction que nous continuerons de travailler ensemble aussi longtemps que nous serons tous deux là pour constater *l’ādiṭyapariṣpanda*.

The secondary literature on the definition of time in Sāṃkhya¹ offers a somewhat frustrating picture: most of those who have investigated this topic point out that the position of Sāṃkhya is essentially a staunch denial of time’s existence as a distinct causal power or substance, but they also insist on the puzzling variety of views on time found in (or ascribed to) the Sāṃkhya tradition – views often deemed irreconcilable, and sometimes presented as contradicting the basic tenet

* The following text lacks many qualities that are typical of John Taber’s work, including concision and a healthy balance between philosophical and historical considerations. My only excuse for thus failing so spectacularly to follow his example is that I discovered too late that the topic I had chosen for this contribution deserved a monograph, and this text would probably have become one had I not written it from the start with John in mind, as a sort of silent conversation with him; hence this bonsai of a study, which I prevented from growing into the book that it aspired to be so that it could be included in this volume in his honour (readers who have no time to explore its ramifications can go straight to §9). Heartfelt thanks are due to the friends and colleagues who greatly helped improve it: Marion Rastelli, to whom I owe many references from Purāṇas and Saṃhitās, and who generously shared secondary literature and etexts; Bill Mak, who provided an article that I could not find; Johannes Bronkhorst, Vincent Eltschinger, Harunaga Isaacson and Philipp Maas, who read a draft of it, corrected typos and mistakes, and offered numerous insightful remarks.

¹ Studies discussing the Sāṃkhya view of time that were consulted include Garbe 1894: 286–287; Schayer 1938: 13–14; Chakravarti 1951: 254–257; Jhaveri 1955; Śāstrī 1963: 190–193; Sen 1968; Shah 1968: 68–70; Sinha 1983; Balslev 1983: 44–47; Kumar 1983; Prasad 1984a; Panda 1997: 108–109. Frauwallner (1953: 321–327) only mentions the issue of time in connection with the Yoga tradition (on which see below, §7–8).

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that *kāla* has no existence of its own.² It has been suggested that this confusing situation finds its explanation in the fact that Sāṃkhya was never actually interested in defining time. Thus according to Stanislaw Schayer,

The classical Sāṃkhya manifested strikingly little interest in the Time-problem and..., apart from the negation of Time as a separate substance, it confined itself to copying the view of the rejected *kālavāda*.³

This opinion – already voiced for instance by Theodore Stcherbatsky, who also saw the Sāṃkhya position on time as hopelessly superficial and contradictory –⁴ is contrasted by Schayer himself with that of Richard Garbe, who judged the Sāṃkhya viewpoint “superior” to that of Vedānta and Vaiśeṣika in that contrary to them, it supposedly presented time and space as qualities rather than substances.⁵ Yet Garbe, just as Schayer and Stcherbatsky, considered the philosophical treatment of time in Sāṃkhya to be superficial and incidental.⁶

Garbe’s, Stcherbatsky’s and Schayer’s assessments – besides being probably biased, to some extent at least, by the implicit belief in the superiority of the Kantian approach of time –⁷ rested on scarce and late sources (namely, Vācaspatimiśra’s tenth-century TK and the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century commentaries on the SSū). Because they had so few sources at their disposal, they projected onto the TK a view of time that only belongs to the much later commentators on the SSū,

² See e.g. Panda 1997: 108–109: “The atheistic Sāṃkhya school does not accept the existence of time. There are also several other views found within the system. According to one view, *kāla* is not altogether non-existent, and is an evolute of *Prakṛti*. Another view accepts time itself is *Prakṛti*. According to some other view, ‘action’ is designated as time. The other view found there is – *kāla* is nothing besides, and independent of objects spoken of as past, present and future. The way *kāla* is described in the Sāṃkhya school also appears that it accepts *kāla* as both *nitya* (eternal) and *anitya* (non-eternal).” This presentation is strikingly similar to Shah 1968: 68–70, and mentions the same sources (but does not acknowledge Shah 1968).

³ Schayer 1938: 14.

⁴ Stcherbatsky 1926: 17: “En général, les questions relatives au temps et à l’espace ne sont touchées qu’en passant et d’une façon très superficielle dans le système Sāṃkhya; les contradictions résultant de ces conceptions sont insolubles.”

⁵ See Garbe 1894: 286 and n. 4.

⁶ See Garbe 1894: 287: “Merkwürdiger Weise wird das schwierige Problem in der Sāṃkhya-Literatur – wie überhaupt in der indischen Philosophie – nur ganz beiläufig und nebensächlich behandelt.”

⁷ See e.g., besides the remark by Garbe quoted in the previous note, Keith [1918] 1924: 212, which notes in passing that the SSū’s definition of time “is not much superior to the view of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, which call space and time substances, nor in any of the cases is the real problem of either space or time seriously faced or realized.”

and, considering the Sāṃkhya notion of time *sub specie aeternitatis*, they could not see that at least some of the doctrinal differences that they took to be pure and simple contradictions result from the fact that the Sāṃkhya definition of time underwent important changes in the course of Sāṃkhya's long history. In the past decades, research on time in the Sāṃkhya tradition has come to include many other sources; but the studies of which I am aware still make use of a fraction of the classical Sāṃkhya literature that is now available;⁸ some appear to treat on a par Sāṃkhya sources and testimonies provided by other traditions;⁹ and very few attempt even a cursory summary of the most important philosophical development on time offered in a preserved Sāṃkhya work – namely, the YD.¹⁰ The following pages can offer nothing more than a tentative and incomplete outline of the history of Sāṃkhya's denial of time as an independent reality; but hopefully this very imperfect attempt can convince other scholars that, although Garbe rightly pointed out that time is but a minor topic in the surviving Sāṃkhya literature, the issue is not as nonexistent in this tradition as it is often said to be; and that, more importantly perhaps, the history of the way in which Sāṃkhya authors claimed to justify this relative silence in their tradition is, in and of itself, a fascinating philosophical and historical issue that deserves a more thorough study.

⁸ As far as I know, only Kumar 1983 attempts to review the definitions of time in all the important phases of classical Sāṃkhya, but the order in which they are examined and some of the conclusions offered seem at best debatable.

⁹ See e.g. Shah 1968 and Panda 1997.

¹⁰ Thus Jhaveri (1955: 1) asserts that among the commentaries on the SK, “only the *Sāṃkhya-tattva-kaumudī* incidentally touches it.” Balslev 1983: 55 claims that “a search through the available Sāṃkhya literature shows that a direct reference to the problem of time is scarce” (cf. *ibid.*: 48); yet the book, which only mentions the SK, TK and SPraBh, remains silent on the YD's argument. Sen 1968 mentions the YD's thesis but makes no attempt to explain the reasoning that claims to establish it, contrary to Kumar 1983, which, however, only offers a partial paraphrase of the YD's most important argument. Sinha 1983 is to my knowledge the only monograph devoted to the problem in “Sāṃkhya-Yoga;” however, not to mention its highly problematic chronology of Sāṃkhya works (*ibid.*: 160–181, the author assumes that the GBh is the earliest commentary on the SK, believes that the YD could be posterior to the TK, considers the latter to be “fixed beyond doubt” to the 9th century, etc.), it overlooks many important passages in the Sāṃkhya literature, including the main argument on time in the YD (although it mentions the YD in several instances, it mainly rests in fact on the TK and the PYBh), and it makes no mention at all of the PYV.

1. The earlier attitude towards time in the SK commentaries: time is no cause and belongs to the *vyakta* category

The commentaries on the SK can be divided into three groups according to the particular stanza(s) under which they discuss the nature of time: the *Suvarṇasaptati**¹¹ (only preserved in Chinese translation), the SV, SSV, GBh and MV all deal with time under SK 61, whereas the YD, which discusses it under stanza 15 and reminds its readers about it under stanza 50,¹² is in a category of its own;¹³ as for the JM and TK, they both mention it under SK 33. The three groups also have strikingly different ways of dealing with the issue of time.

Despite a somewhat problematic chronology¹⁴ and the evidence pointing to the fact that some of them must have been composed centuries apart,¹⁵ the commentaries belonging to the first group are obviously based on a common interpretation of the SK. Now, all of them, while explaining a stanza on the cessation of the cosmic display by Nature (*prakṛti*), point out that the latter is the only cause (*kāraṇa*), and in this connection they vigorously deny any merit to the ideas that God (*īśvara*), the person (*puruṣa*), the nature [of things] (*svabhāva*) and time (*kāla*) may be ascribed any causal role.¹⁶ As regards time, they all quote a

¹¹ This is the Sanskrit title that the Chinese title translates according to Takakusu 1904: 4; I do not know Chinese, so I have to rely entirely on the French translation in Takakusu 1904 for this source. According to Solomon 1974: 170, the work translated into Chinese is the SV, and may have been composed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself; the author, however, acknowledges some differences between the two texts (ibid.: 92) that she tries to explain by postulating that the translator Paramārtha was also “acquainted” with the SSV (ibid.: 171) – a justification that does not seem very convincing as far as the passages on time quoted below are concerned.

¹² In fact all the preserved commentaries mention time under SK 50 (the very word *kāla* appears in the stanza), but as will be seen below (n. 87), most of them do not discuss the nature of time. Similarly, although SK 33 mentions the past, present and future, only the JM and TK take this as an opportunity to discuss the nature of time.

¹³ It may also have discussed time under SK 61 (there is a lacuna from the midst of the commentary on SK 59 to that of SK 64).

¹⁴ Solomon 1974 argues in favour of the sequence 1=SV, 2=SSV, 3=*Suvarṇasaptati**, 4=GBh, 5=MV. This is questioned in Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 21, according to which, on the basis of the evidence adduced, one could as well argue for the priority of the *Suvarṇasaptati**, or postulate “some sort of original Ur-commentary upon which all five commentaries are based.”

¹⁵ Paramārtha’s Chinese translation was produced between 557 and 569 (Takakusu 1904: 3), whereas the MV, which quotes the *Hastāmalakastotra*, *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* and VPu, must have been composed several centuries later (Mishra 1930; Solomon 1974: 180).

¹⁶ SK 61: *prakṛteḥ sukumāratarāṃ na kiñcid astīti me matir bhavati | yā drṣṭāsmīti punar na darśanam upaiti puruṣasya* || “It seems to me that there is nothing more delicate than

verse from the MBh that presents it as an inescapable cosmic force responsible for maturation and destruction:

Time makes beings mature; time destroys creatures; time is awake when [all are] asleep; for time cannot be escaped.¹⁷

The SV, for its part, appears to distinguish those who defend this position from “others” who simply state that “time is a cause.”

But other masters consider that time is the cause of the worlds. Since it has been said: “Time makes beings mature; time destroys the world; time is awake when [all are] asleep; for time cannot be escaped,” worlds arise from time. Others say that time is a cause.¹⁸

Nature, who, [thinking]: ‘I have been seen,’ no longer shows [herself] to the person.” The connection between this verse and the discussion on the causality of *īśvara*, *puruṣa*, *svabhāva* and *kāla* is not obvious (one would rather have expected it e.g. under SK 15–16, which show how *prakṛti* must be inferred as a cause – and indeed, the YD discusses this under SK 15). Tilak 1915 attempts to explain this by postulating a missing stanza immediately after SK 61 that may have denied the causality of *īśvara*, *svabhāva*, *puruṣa* and *kāla* – which would explain why there are only 69 stanzas commented upon by Gauḍapāda (whose commentary remains silent on SK 70–72) whereas the SK are supposedly 70. Suryanarayanan 1931: 636 has shown, however, that there are other ways of solving the problem of the stanzas’ number and that the passage in question seems to fit well at least within the commentary on SK 61 in the *Suvarṇasaptati**: the latter understands the verse as stating that Nature is the cause of the manifested world and of liberation, because the *puruṣa* obtains liberation (and therefore ceases perceiving the manifested world) as soon as it sees Nature for what it is, namely, the most subtle (*sukumāra*) cause of the manifested world. The commentary therefore proceeds to examine a series of objections according to which a certain entity more subtle than Nature (*īśvara*, etc.) is in fact the cause in question, so that liberation cannot result from the correct understanding of *prakṛti*.

¹⁷ According to the editors of the MBh, this verse is inserted in most of the manuscripts belonging to the Northern recension after 11.2.14: *kālaḥ pacati* bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ** | kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ**** || [**pacati* MBh, SV, GBh; *srjati* SSV, MV. ***saṃharate prajāḥ* MBh, SSV, MV; *saṃharate jagat* GBh; *saṃkṣipate jagat* SV. ****kālo hi duratikramaḥ* MBh, SV, GBh; *tasmāt kālas tu karaṇam* SSV, MV.] Cf. Takakusu 1904: 1051: “Le temps mûrit tout ce qui existe, il détruit tout ce qui existe; quand le monde dort, le temps veille; qui peut tromper le temps?” The verse is often quoted, including in Buddhist and Jaina sources (see e.g. Lamotte 1949: 76; Frauwallner 1956: 75; May 1981: 83).

¹⁸ SV, p. 60 (unless otherwise stated, E. Solomon’s conjectures in the SV and SSV were adopted): *apare punar ācāryā manyante kālaḥ karaṇam lokānām iti, yasmād āha kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃkṣipate jagat | kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālo hi duratikramaḥ || tasmāt kālāl lokānām utpattiḥ. apare bruvate kālaḥ karaṇam iti.*

It is tempting to identify the “others” with the Vaiśeṣikas, who contend that time is a cause in the sense that it produces our awareness that things are temporally determined while also exerting a limited power on things themselves as one of the conditions of their arising, existence and destruction.¹⁹ In any case, all the other texts in this group of commentaries on the SK either entirely conflate the positions seemingly distinguished by the SV, or at least remain ambiguous as to whether they are understood as being held by the same persons.²⁰ They reject the idea that time may thus play any causal role by arguing that it is not a constitutive element of reality or a distinct category (*padārtha*), since – as pointed out by the SK themselves from the outset –²¹ there are only three such categories: the unmanifest (*avyakta*), the manifest (*vyakta*) and the person (*puruṣa*); and time,

¹⁹ See below, nn. 89 and 91. On the difference between time as an all-powerful cosmological force in the epic *kālavāda* and the Vaiśeṣikas’ understanding of time as one causal condition among others – or, as Vyomaśiva puts it, an auxiliary cause (*sahakārin*) –, see e.g. Keith 1921: 233; Frauwallner 1956: 111; Prasad 1984b: 235; Halbfass 1992: 212–213.

²⁰ SSV, p. 73: *kālacintakā bruvate kālaḥ kāraṇam iti yasmād āha kālaḥ sṛjati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ | kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti tasmāt kālas tu kāraṇam || iti*. “Those who have pondered over [the nature of] time say that time is a cause, which is why it has been said: ‘Time creates beings; time destroys creatures; time is awake when [all are] asleep – therefore time is a cause.’” GBh, pp. 54–55: *tathā keśāṃcit kālaḥ kāraṇam ity, uktaṃ ca kālaḥ pacati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate jagat | kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti kālō hi duratikramah ||* “Thus according to some, time is a cause; and it has been said: ‘Time makes beings mature; time destroys the world; time is awake when [all are] asleep; for time cannot be escaped.’” MV, p. 56: *kecit kālaṃ kāraṇatayā varṇayanti, kālaḥ sṛjati bhūtāni kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ | kālaḥ supteṣu jāgarti tasmāt kālas tu kāraṇam ||* “Some explain time as a cause: ‘Time creates beings; time destroys creatures; time is awake when [all are] asleep – therefore time is a cause.’” Cf. Takakusu 1904: 1051: “Il y a encore quelques autres opinions. Il y a des hommes qui considèrent le temps comme la cause; ainsi il est dit dans une stance: ‘le temps mûrit tout ce qui existe, il détruit tout ce qui existe; quand le monde dort, le temps veille; qui peut tromper le temps? Toute chose dérive du temps.’”

²¹ According to SK 2, the means of eliminating pain taught in Sāṃkhya is superior “due to the knowledge of the manifest, the unmanifest and the knower” (*vyaktāvyaktajñānavijñānāt*). The commentaries identify the unmanifest with Nature; the manifest, with its evolutes; the knower, with the person – and they add that these constitute the only twenty-five principles (*tattva*). See e.g. SV, p. 6: *buddhir ahaṅkāraḥ pañcatanmātrāṇy ekādaśendriyāṇi pañcamahābhūtānī etad vyaktam, avyaktaṃ pradhānam, jñāḥ puruṣaḥ. evam etāni pañcaviṃśatitattvāni parisaṃāptāni*. “The manifest is the intellect, the sense of ego, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs [and] the five gross elements; the unmanifest is matter; the knower is the person. Thus the twenty-five principles are complete (*parisaṃāpta*).” The parallel passage in *Suvarṇasaptatī**, p. 982, also specifies that “les vingt-cinq vérités (*tattva*)... ne doivent pas être augmentées ou diminuées.”

far from having any reality of its own, is included (*antarbhūta*) within these three. Thus the SV:

What [we] call time is not a constitutive element of reality: for the Sāṃkhyas, the constitutive elements of reality are the manifest, the unmanifest [and] the person, [and] time is included in them; that is to say, it is nothing distinct [from them]. Thus only matter is a cause.²²

The parallel passages in the SSV,²³ GBh²⁴ and MV²⁵ are almost identical. Oddly, however, the translation of the *Suvarṇasaptati** offered by J. Takakusu states the contrary – namely, that the three categories *do not include time* –,²⁶ and it seems to rest on a Sanskrit reading that involved a negation of *antarbhūta*.²⁷ One might wonder whether the other commentaries are not faulty in this instance:

²² SV, p. 60: *kālo nāma na kaścit padārtho 'sti. vyaktam avyaktam puruṣa iti padārthāḥ sām̐khyānām teṣu kālo 'ntarbhūtaḥ. nānyad*ity arthaḥ. evaṃ**pradhānam eva kāraṇam. [*nānyad conj.; nātad ms.; nānya conj. Solomon. ** evaṃ conj.; evam etebhyaḥ ms.; evam etebhyaḥ anyat conj. Solomon].* (I assume that *etebhyaḥ* was originally a marginal gloss explaining *nānyat*).

²³ SSV, p. 73: *kālo nāma na kaścit padārtho 'stīti. vyaktam avyaktam puruṣa iti trayāḥ padārthās teṣu kālo 'ntarbhūtaḥ. evaṃ nāsty anyat kāraṇam pradhānam muktveti.* “What [we] call time is not a constitutive element of reality: there are three constitutive elements of reality, [namely] the manifest, the unmanifest and the person, [and] time is included in them. Thus there is no other cause besides matter.”

²⁴ GBh, p. 55: *vyaktāvyaktapuruṣās trayāḥ padārthās tena kālo 'ntarbhūto 'sti, sa hi vyaktaḥ. sarvakarṭṛtvāt kālasyāpi pradhānam eva kāraṇam.* “The manifest, the unmanifest and the person are the three constitutive elements of reality; time is included in this, for it is a manifest [entity] (*vyakta*). Only matter is a cause – [and it is the cause] of time too, because it is the agent [that produces] everything.”

²⁵ MV, p. 56: *kālo nāma na kaścit padārtho 'sti, vyaktam avyaktam puruṣa iti traya eva padārthāḥ. tatra kālo 'ntarbhūtaḥ. evaṃ pradhānam hitvā nāsty anyat kāraṇam.* “What [we] call time is not a constitutive element of reality: there are only three constitutive elements of reality, [namely] the manifest, the unmanifest and the person, [and] time is included in them. Thus there is no other cause besides matter.”

²⁶ Solomon 1974: 78, considers that all commentaries are in agreement here, and asserts that Paramārtha's translation of the commentary “explains that Kāla is not included in the Sāṃkhya categories (– all say this much –)...” This is of course true in the sense that all commentaries point out that there are only three categories, and that none of them is time; but four of these texts also state that time is nothing over and above them because it is included in them, in stark opposition to the *Suvarṇasaptati** as translated in Takakusu 1904: 1051.

²⁷ Takakusu 1904: 1051 (my emphasis): “L'opinion qui considère le temps comme étant la cause est erronée, car le temps *ne se trouve pas* parmi les trois catégories, la Nature, ses produits et l'Âme, qui renferment toute chose qui existe. En dehors des trois catégories il n'y a rien; elles *ne renferment pas* le temps; nous savons donc que le temps n'existe pas.”

the argument might have originally pointed out that time cannot be considered a cause because it does not exist, since it is *excluded* from the *padārthas*. It seems, however, that it is rather the *Suvarṇasaptati** (or its French translation?) that should be corrected here, since immediately after this passage, the commentary that Paramārtha translated into Chinese evidently specified (as does the GBh)²⁸ that *time does belong to the category of the manifest (vyakta)*: according to the *Suvarṇasaptati** itself, it is nothing but a “modality” or “epithet” of it –²⁹ that is, it has no reality of its own, independently of the three kinds of entities that constitute the universe, since it is but a part of the manifest.

So these texts are not so much concerned with defining time as they are with denying its causality; they do so by asserting that time has no existence over and above the three constitutive elements of reality acknowledged in Sāṃkhya, and two of them explicitly connect it with the *vyakta* category. Besides, although the SV possibly alludes to the Vaiśeṣika understanding of time as a second target of this criticism, these commentaries first and foremost engage in the refutation of an understanding of time as a distinct efficient force that is usually called *kālavāda* in secondary sources³⁰ and that, as pointed out by these works themselves, is found in the MBh (often in connection with a *svabhāvavāda*, also criticized in the same passage by this group of texts). It is unclear to what extent this so-called *kālavāda* was in fact a unitary doctrine, or by whom it was defended; in any case it is sometimes attributed in the *Mokṣadharmaparvan* to thinkers who are presented as Sāṃkhya masters, such as Asita Devala.³¹ It has also been pointed

²⁸ See above, n. 24.

²⁹ Takakusu 1904: 1051 (the translator renders the Chinese equivalent of *vyakta* by “produit,” see e.g. *ibid.*: 993): “Ce qu’on appelle temps est une modalité d’un produit; le temps passé, c’est un produit passé, et le présent et le futur sont de même des produits présents et futurs. Nous savons donc que ‘temps’ n’est qu’une épithète des produits. Pour cette raison nous considérons la Nature comme étant la vraie cause.”

³⁰ On this *kālavāda*, see Schrader 1902: 16–30; Stcherbatsky 1926: 14–16; Schayer 1938: 4–12; Bedekar 1961; Halbfass 1992: 212–213; and Vincent Eltschinger’s contribution to this volume.

³¹ The latter (whose name only seems to appear in the MV among commentaries on the SK, but who is presented as a Sāṃkhya teacher in MBh 12: see Motegi 2007: 357–358), explains that time creates all beings out of the five *mahābhūtas* (MBh 12.267.4): *yebhyaḥ sṛjati bhūtāni kālo bhāvapracoditaḥ | mahābhūtāni pañceti tāny āhur bhūtacintakāḥ ||* “Those who have pondered over [the nature of] beings (*bhūta*) say that it is from the five great elements (*mahābhūta*) that time, impelled by [its own] nature, creates beings (*bhūta*).” He also counts time among the eternal “elements” of the universe (MBh 12.267.9): *pañcaiva tāni kālāś ca bhāvābhāvau ca kevalau | aṣṭau bhūtāni bhūtānām śāśvatāni bhavāpyayau ||* “Those [great elements,] which are only five, [plus] time, existence and nonexistence – [that is,] arising and disappearing –, and nothing else, are the

out in this connection³² that according to the ABSaṃ, Sāṃkhya and Yoga count four categories (presented as mere aspects of a single power), and that the fourth happens to be time:

O wise one, it is the same power that is designated in Sāṃkhya and Yoga by the four names “manifest,” “unmanifest,” “person,” and “time.”³³

According to Shujun Motegi, “Although the role of Time is not clear here, the testimony of the ABSaṃ suggests the possibility that in the earlier period there was a certain Sāṃkhya or Yoga school which regarded Time as a basic principle.”³⁴ The same author notices that the fourfold list also occurs in the VPu, which, like the ABSaṃ, insists that its items are ultimately a single reality – namely, Viṣṇu³⁵ (in fact the same list appears in the LT³⁶ as well as in a number of Purāṇas,³⁷ as an enumeration of aspects of a single divinity who is most often

eight eternal elements (*bhūta*) of beings (*bhūta*).” On this doctrine see Chakravarti 1951: 44–45, Brockington 1999: 476, and Motegi 2007; on the *bhūtacintakas* see Bhattacharya 2007 (which makes no reference to Sāṃkhya but distinguishes them from the Cārvākas).

³² Chakravarti 1951: 257; Motegi 2007: 360.

³³ ABSaṃ 51.42: *vyaktāvyaktapumākhyābhis tathā kālākhyayā mune | uktā catasṛbhiḥ saiva śaktir vai sām̐khyayogayoh ||*

³⁴ Motegi 2007: 360.

³⁵ Ibid., n. 20, quoting VPu 1.2.18ab: *vyaktaṃ viṣṇus tathāvyaktaṃ puruṣaḥ kāla eva ca*.

³⁶ LT 17.42cd (in an enumeration of epithets qualifying Viṣṇu): *vyaktāvyaktañā-kālākhyakṣatābhāvacatuṣṭaya ||* “O [You] who are the four states [the enumeration of which is] complete³ (*kṣipta*) [and that are] called the manifest, the unmanifest, the knower and time...”

³⁷ GPu 1.4.5ab: *vyaktaṃ viṣṇus tathāvyaktaṃ puruṣaḥ kāla eva ca |* “Viṣṇu is the manifest, as He is the unmanifest, the person, and time.” KPu 2.3.1: *avyaktād abhavat kālāḥ pradhānaṃ puruṣaḥ paraḥ | tebhyaḥ sarvaṃ idaṃ jātaṃ tasmād brahmamayaṃ jagat ||* “From the unmanifest arose time, matter, the supreme person; all this [phenomenal reality] has arisen from them; so the world is full of the Brahman.” LPu 2.16.3–5: *kṣetrajñāḥ prakṛtir vyaktaṃ kālātmēti muniśvaraiḥ | ucyate kaiścid ācāryair āgamārṇavapāragaiḥ || kṣetrajñāṃ puruṣaṃ prāhuḥ pradhānaṃ prakṛtiṃ budhāḥ | vikārajātaṃ niḥśeṣaṃ prakṛter vyaktaṃ ity api || pradhānavyaktayoh kālāḥ pariṇāmaikakāraṇaṃ | tac catuṣṭayaṃ tāsya rūpāṇāṃ hi catuṣṭayaṃ ||* “Certain masters who are the best among sages [and] have crossed the sea of scriptures say that [He is] the knower of the field, Nature, the manifest, [and] consists in time. The wise proclaim that the knower of the field is the person; Nature is matter; the manifest is everything that results from Nature’s transformations; time is the only cause of transformation of matter and the manifest. For these four are the four forms of the Lord.” Cf. ŚPu 7.2.5.18–21ab: *pradhānapuruṣavyaktakālātmā kathyate śivaḥ | pradhānaṃ prakṛtiṃ prāhuḥ kṣetrajñāṃ puruṣaṃ tathā || trayaviṃśatitattvāni vyaktaṃ āhur manīṣiṇaḥ | kālāḥ kāryaprapaṇcasya pariṇāmaikakāraṇaṃ || eṣāṃ tīso ’dhipo dhātā pravartakanivartakaḥ | āvirbhāvatirobhāvahetur ekaḥ svarād ajaḥ || tasmāt pradhānapuruṣavyaktakālasvarūpavān |* “Śiva is said to consist of matter, the person,

Viṣṇu). The hypothesis of an earlier Sāṃkhya tradition that included time as a “basic principle” had already been put forward by Pulinbihari Chakravarti on similar grounds,³⁸ although the latter had rightly pointed out that the “Bhāgavata colouring” of the ABSaṃ renders its testimony questionable;³⁹ and the current consensus that it must postdate the 11th century⁴⁰ makes it even less trustworthy in this respect. Yet it is striking that whereas the discourse of Asita Devala in Chapter 267 of the MBh’s *Śāntiparvan* makes no mention of a list of four items comprising *vyakta*, *avyakta*, *puruṣa* and *kāla*,⁴¹ all the commentaries on the SK quoted above insist that *kāla* is not a fourth element.⁴² So although very little can be said of Sāṃkhya views on time that largely predate the SK commentaries, it seems probable that when the commentary on the SK translated into Chinese by Paramārtha was composed, there were still competing views within movements that called themselves Sāṃkhya⁴³ as to whether time should be considered a distinct entity and causal power: this could explain the emphatic denial found in all the SK commentaries quoted above. Besides, around the time of the SK’s

the manifest and time; they say that matter is Nature, and the person is the knower of the field. The wise say that the manifest are the thirty-three principles; time is the only cause of the transformation of the whole apparent unfolding (*prapañca*) of effects. The Lord rules over these [four], arranges them, prompts them and stops them; He is the sole, sovereign and unborn cause of their appearance and disappearance; therefore He possesses the forms of matter, the person, the manifest and time.”

³⁸ Chakravarti 1951: 257.

³⁹ Ibid.: 120; see also Motegi 2007: 360, n. 18. As already pointed out in Frauwallner 1953: 480, n. 177, and Oberhammer 1960: 85–86, n. 45, it is problematic to try to gain any knowledge regarding the lost *Śaṣṭitantra* (of which the SK are, according to their own author, a mere summary) from the list of “sixty topics” (*śaṣṭitantra*) enumerated in the ABSaṃ (on which see Schrader 1914); for, not to mention that the ABSaṃ’s account widely differs from the known fragments of the *Śaṣṭitantra*, it uses the term *śaṣṭitantra* to designate the Sāṃkhya traditions in general, and while acknowledging their diversity, it favours one that is clearly incompatible with the SK commentaries.

⁴⁰ See Rastelli 2018: 423 for a synthetic account of this issue (Sanderson 2001: 35–38, has shown that it must postdate Kṣemarāja; Begley 1973 had already argued on iconographical grounds that it could hardly be earlier than the 12th or 13th century).

⁴¹ This is already observed in Motegi 2007: 360.

⁴² Surprisingly, they are not taken into account by Chakravarti and Motegi as regards the issue of time, who both merely remark (Chakravarti 1951: 257, Motegi 2007: 360) that the conception of time found in Asita Devala’s discourse is rejected by the YD.

⁴³ On the great doctrinal diversity of what is called Sāṃkhya in the MBh, and the process of unification that it must have undergone, see Bakker and Bisschop 1999, which shows that this process must have started in the course of the redaction, transmission and revision of the *Mokṣadharma*, and adds (ibid.: 468) that it “may have been concomitant with the rise of the classical school of Sāṃkhya.”

composition and in the following centuries during which their commentaries were written, Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva movements that did not define themselves as Sāṃkhya but tended to absorb Sāṃkhya notions within their own metaphysical frame developed various systems in which time was counted as a fourth *padārtha* or distinct *tattva*,⁴⁴ and the commentaries on SK 61 might have been responding in part to this external pressure (hence, perhaps, the SV's insistence that "for the Sāṃkhyas," there are only three categories).⁴⁵ In any case, the early interpretation of the SK seems to have offered little more than an argument of authority regarding the ontological and causal status of time, namely: since the SK do not mention *kāla* as a separate item in the enumeration of categories, it cannot be one. And while emphatically denying *kāla*'s distinct reality or causality, it did not offer any clear definition of it.

2. The YD's thesis: time is nothing but actions

From this point of view, as often, the approach of the YD⁴⁶ is strikingly different. It discusses the nature of time under SK 15, and briefly comes back to it under SK 50; its main target is no longer the epic *kālavāda*, but the Vaiśeṣika concept of time; contrary to all other SK commentaries, it explicitly identifies time with action (*kriyā*);⁴⁷ and it advances arguments against the notion of an ontologically

⁴⁴ On *kāla* as a *tattva* in Vaiṣṇava sources, see Brunner, Oberhammer and Padoux 2004, s.v. *kāla*, §3; for Śaiva sources, see Torella 1998 and Goodall 2016. Torella 1998: 55 notes from the outset that the group of *tattvas* named *kañcukas* in Śaiva sources forms "a foreign body with respect to the Sāṃkhya basis of *tattvas*, much more foreign for example than the first five *tattvas* (Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Śuddhavidyā...) also being an addition by the Śaiva tradition." The article further notices (ibid.: 59, n. 23) that *kāla* and *niyati* "are sometimes excluded from the list of the *kañcukas*" and "seem generally to have a somewhat peripheral role with respect to the other cuirasses," including on the ritual plane. This, however, might only be true of relatively late sources, as shown in Goodall 2016, which, while analyzing the *Uttarasūtra* of the *Niśvāsātattva-saṃhitā*, points out that "there was an early Śaiva tradition in which *kalā*, *vidyā* and *rāga* were omitted, and in which the only so-called *kañcukas* that existed were *kāla* and *niyati*" (ibid.: 89).

⁴⁵ It is also possible that some of the Vaiṣṇava texts mentioned above insisted on the existence of a fourth *padārtha* as a reaction to this commentarial tradition on SK 61.

⁴⁶ According to Wezler and Motegi 1988: xxviii, its author knew Dignāga but apparently not Dharmakīrti, yet the work must be posterior to the *Kāśikāvyūtti*, which it quotes, and so was probably composed ca. 680–720 CE; Bronkhorst 2003 has pointed out, however, that the quotation in question was not necessarily borrowed from the *Kāśikāvyūtti*, so that the YD could be somewhat earlier.

⁴⁷ As will be seen below (§5), the TK's reasoning rests on this idea, but does not actually state it.

independent substance called “time” that are not found in any other surviving commentary on the SK.

Under SK 15⁴⁸ (which states the reasons why, as concluded in SK 16, “the unmanifest, which is the cause, exists,” *kāraṇam asty avyaktam*), the YD’s author wants to show that indeed, Nature, although imperceptible, must be inferred as the cause of the world because no other cause can account for it; he therefore endeavours to demonstrate that other entities seen as causes in rival systems cannot in fact play such a role, and it is in this connection that he critically examines the causality of atoms (*paramāṇu*), a creator God (*īśvara*), acts that require a retribution (*karman*), time (*kāla*), chance (*yadṛcchā*) and nonexistence (*abhāva*). Here is how the passage on time begins:

As for what has been claimed, [viz.], that the world must arise due to time – it is not possible either. Why? Because this word [“time”] only refers to the movement of causes (*kāraṇapariśpanda*). For according to us, what is called “time” is not a [constitutive element of reality]; rather, actions that are in the process of being performed – such as the movement of the sun, the milking of cows, the ringing of a bell and so forth – are the causes of the cognition that [something] similar [viz. another action] has a limited duration (*avadhi*) that is particularized (*viśiṣṭa*) [by them];⁴⁹ and nothing else (*eva*) [causes this cognition].⁵⁰

As the other SK commentaries examined above, the YD is concerned with showing that time has no reality of its own; but contrary to them, it attempts to explain what the object of our awareness of time really is if time is not a distinct entity – namely, “actions that are in the process of being performed.” We say that something lasts for a specific amount of time because we compare a given action to

⁴⁸ See above, n. 13.

⁴⁹ For a different interpretation of this sentence see Oberhammer 1977: 196: “Es gibt nämlich für uns keine Zeit [als Realität], sondern lediglich den Umstand, daß die Veränderung sich verändernder [Gegebenheiten] wie zum Beispiel der Lauf der Sonne, das Melken der Kühe, der Glockenschlag usw. Ursache einer einer bestimmten Abgrenzung entsprechenden Vorstellung ist.” My understanding of *viśiṣṭāvadhisarūpa-pratyayanimitatvam* is based on the parallel explanations in the PYV and ĪPVV (see below, §7, nn. 168 and 171) as well as on the MBhāṣya passage (see below, n. 69) to which the YD alludes.

⁵⁰ YD, p. 161: *yad apy uktaṃ kālāḥ jagadutpattir bhaviṣyatīti tad anupapannam. kasmāt. kāraṇapariśpandasyaiva* tadabhidhānasanniveśāt. na hi naḥ kālo nāma kaścid asti. kiṃ tarhi kriyamāṇakriyāṇāṃ evādityagatigodohaghaṇṭāstanitādīnāṃ viśiṣṭāvadhisarūpa-pratyayanimitatvam.* [**kāraṇapariśpandasyaiva* is the reading found in all mss. (see Ed., n. 7); the editors have emended it to *kāraṇapariśpandasyaiva*, although the compound appears again 12 lines below (*kāraṇaspaṇḍasya*, p. 162), and the manuscripts’ reading was kept in the second case.]

another one, such as the movement of the sun (as when we say that a trip takes X days, or that an individual is X years old). Our awareness of time is therefore nothing but our measuring one action in terms of other actions; or, as the reader is reminded under SK 50:

What [we] call time is not a constitutive element of reality (*padārtha*); rather, the word “time” [merely] refers to actions.⁵¹

Although the connection of this definition with what is said of time in the commentaries examined above is far from obvious, it is certainly compatible with the assertion that time is but an aspect of the manifest. Thus the definition of the *vyakta* category in SK 10 specifies that the latter is “endowed with action” (*sakriya*), and it is quite possible that the author of the YD saw this characteristics as the very definition of time – unfortunately, the part of the YD that probably discussed this term is currently missing.⁵² Besides, immediately after reminding its readers that “the word ‘time’ [merely] refers to actions,” the YD points out that the treatise has already shown that actions are the activity of organs (*karaṇavṛtti*), so that those who believe in the distinct existence and causality of time really confuse consciousness with their organs.⁵³ This is probably an

⁵¹ YD, p. 247: *na kālo nāma kaścit padārtho 'sti. kiṃ tarhi kriyāsu kālasaṃjñā.*

⁵² YD, p. 127 gives a short gloss of it (*saha kriyayā sakriyam*), but the remainder of the commentary as it has survived only examines the two first elements of definition provided in the stanza, i.e., *hetumat* and *anitya*. The other commentaries (Takakusu 1904: 992; SV, p. 16; SSV, p. 19; GBh, p. 11; MV, p. 14) explain that the manifest is endowed with action, understood here as movement – which is impossible for the unmanifest, since *prakṛti* is omnipresent –, and they point out in this respect that this is also true of the subtle body, the transmigration of which is a movement.

⁵³ YD, p. 247: *tās ca karaṇavṛttir iti pratipāditam. na cānyā vṛttir vṛttimataḥ. tasmāt karaṇacaitanyapratijñāḥ kālātmakā iti.* “And [the treatise] has [already] demonstrated that these [actions] are the activity of the organs; and this activity is not distinct from its agent – therefore those who identify with time (*kālātmaka*) [are those who] think that consciousness is the organs.” That is to say, those who believe in the distinct existence and causal power of time are “content” with this idea that prevents them from achieving liberation (on this “contentment,” *tuṣṭi*, see below, nn. 86–88). The author of the YD is responding here to an interlocutor who has remarked that in the case of other such contentments, the principle with which the *yogin* confuses his self is clearly defined; the interlocutor therefore demands a similar explanation for time. See YD, p. 247: *prakṛtyātmakasya tāvad yogino 'ṣṭau prakṛtayo viśaya ity uktam purastāt, upādānātmakasya ca prthivyādīni mahābhūtāni, kālabhāgyayos tu na tathoktam, tasmād vaktavyam kasya tattvasya iṣaḥ samākhyeti. ucyate: na, uktatvāt. prāg evaitad apadiṣṭam. na kālo nāma kaścit padārtho 'sti.* “[– Question:] To begin with, for a *yogin* who identifies with Nature, it has been said previously that the object [of the contentment] is the eight natures; and for one who identifies with the material cause (*upādāna*), [the object]

allusion to SK 33, which teaches that the external organs of action and perception only have to do with the present, whereas the internal organ constituted by the intellect (*buddhi*), sense of ego (*ahaṃkāra*) and mind (*manas*) pertains to the past, present and future.⁵⁴ The YD's explanation of this stanza does not say anything of time's nature, but under SK 13, which describes the constituent *rajas* as a "prompter" and as "changing" (*upaśṭambhakaṃ calaṃ ca rajaḥ*),⁵⁵ the YD states that action (*kriyā*) belongs to the nature of *rajas*⁵⁶ (and later authors such as Helārāja⁵⁷ and Abhinavagupta⁵⁸ present the Sāṃkhya thesis on time as boiling

is the great elements that are earth and so on; but for [the contentments called] time and good fortune, no such explanation has been given. So [you] must explain to what principle (*tattva*) [the words 'time' and 'good fortune' really] refer. – Answer: [this is] not [necessary,] because it has [already] been explained; this has already been taught: what we call 'time' is not a constitutive element of reality..."

⁵⁴ See below, n. 118.

⁵⁵ It is unfortunate that the commentary on SK 12, which already describes the goal of *rajas* as "undertaking action" (*pravṛtti*), is not preserved in the YD.

⁵⁶ YD, p. 135: *yaḥ kaścid upaśṭambhaś calatā copalabhyate tad rajo rūpam ity avagantavyam. tatropaśṭambhaḥ prayatnaś calatā kriyā*. "Whatever prompting and change is observed must be understood to be the nature of *rajas*. Among them, prompting is effort; change is action (*kriyā*)."

⁵⁷ Helārāja interprets VP 3.2.53 (*dvau tu tatra tamorūpāv ekasyālokavat sthitiḥ | atītam api keśāmcit punar viparivartate ||* "Among these [three powers that are the past, present and future], two consist in darkness [and] one exists as light; for some, even the past returns.") as a depiction of time according to Sāṃkhya and explains (PP 2, p. 60): *atītānāgatāv adhvānau bhāvāvaraṇahetutvāt tamaḥsvabhāvau, varaṇaṃ hi tamodharmaḥ, guru varaṇakam eva tama ity uktam. vartamāno 'dhvā prakāśatulyaḥ sattvasadrśaḥ, sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam iṣṭam iti. rajas tu pravṛttisāmānyaṃ kālasvarūpaṃ sarvatrānvayī pratibandhābhyānujñābhyāṃ pravartakaṃ preraṇarūpaṃ rajaḥ kālātmakam eva*. "The past and future paths have *tamas* as their nature because they cause the concealment of entities; for concealment is a property of *tamas*: it has been said [in SK 13] that '*Tamas* is heavy, it is what conceals.' The present path is similar to light, [that is to say,] it is similar to *sattva*: '*Sattva* is admitted to be light, [it is] what illuminates' [according to the same stanza]. As for *rajas*, which is activity (*pravṛtti*) in general, the nature of which is time (*kālasvarūpa*), it is present in everything [and] prompts [everything] by inhibiting and permitting (*pratibandhābhyānujñā*): *rajas*, which consists in prompting, is nothing but time." Although Helārāja quotes the SK, his use of the word *adhvan* is rather reminiscent of the PYBh (see PYBh 4.12, quoted below, n. 152), and he also uses a terminology that belongs to the VP: it is Bhartṛhari who describes the "power of time" in terms of *abhyānujñā* and *pratibandha* – i.e., as that which lets only certain events arise, thus producing succession (see VP 3.9.4–5; cf. e.g. VPV on VP 2.22, p. 202; for more references see Cardona 1991: 448–449, n. 20).

⁵⁸ See ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 5: ... *kāpilānām rajaḥsvabhāvaḥ pravartanātmakatvāt*... "For the followers of Kapila, [time] has *rajas* as its nature, because it consists in activity (*pravartana*)..."

down to the statement that time is activity, which in turn is none other than the *rajas* constituent). Now, while explaining the characteristics of *rajas* given in SK 13, the YD proceeds to define action as either transformation (*pariṇāma*) or movement (*praspanda*, a synonym for the *parispanda* with which time is identified); and it further defines the latter by distinguishing the movements that are the activities of organs (the five kinds of breathing, which constitute the common activity of the internal organ,⁵⁹ and the respective activities of the five organs of action) from those that belong to external substances –⁶⁰ so the actions with which time is identified must be both the movements of organs and those of external substances.⁶¹

There is another important passage in the YD regarding the identification of time with actions. Under SK 56, which mentions the stir (*ārambha*) performed by Nature (*prakṛtikṛta*) and describes it with a verb in the present tense (*pravartate*), the YD specifies that this action is never past or future, but only present:

⁵⁹ See SK 29cd: *sāmānyakaraṇavṛttiḥ prāṇādyā vāyavaḥ pañca* || “The activity common to the [internal] organs is the five breathings: inhaling, etc.”

⁶⁰ YD, p. 135: *sā ca dvividhā pariṇāmalakṣaṇā praspandalakṣaṇā ca. tatra pariṇāmalakṣaṇayā sahakāribhāvāntarānugrhitasya dharmināḥ pūrvadharmāt pracyutiḥ praspandalakṣaṇā prāṇādayaḥ karmendriyavṛttayaś ca vacanādyāḥ. bāhyānām dravyānām utpatananipatanabhramaṇādīni*. “And [action] is twofold: it consists either in transformation (*pariṇāma*) or in movement (*praspanda*). Among these, the [action] consisting in transformation results in the fact that a property-bearer that is assisted by other entities [constituting] auxiliary causes ceases to have a property formerly [possessed; as for the action] consisting in movement, it is the [breathings constituted by] inhaling and so on, and the activities of the organs of action (*karmendriyavṛtti*), [i.e.] talking, etc.; for external substances, [action] is the movements up, down and around, etc.” The YD is the only commentary to provide such a definition of action (and among the first group of commentaries, only the SSV explicitly understands *calatā* as action; see SSV, p. 26: *calatā kriyety arthaḥ*). Vācaspatimiśra, without providing any definition of action, also insists on the identification of *rajas* with *kriyā* (TK, p. 112): *sattvatamasī svayam akriyatayā svakārye pravṛttiṃ praty avasīdantī rajasopaṣṭabhyete**, *avasādāt pracyāvya svakārya utsāham prayatnam kāryete*. [**rajasopaṣṭabhyete* corr.; *rajasopaṣṭabhyete* Ed.] “[The constituents] *sattva* and *tamas*, being incapable of undertaking [the production] of their respective effects due to their being devoid of action (*akriyā*) by themselves, are prompted by *rajas*; [that is to say], they are made to make effort towards their respective effects [and] to undertake [their production] after being made to abandon their inertia.”

⁶¹ Under SK 50, the YD seems to equate all actions with the sole activity of organs (see above, n. 53), probably because those who “identify with time” (*kālātmaka*) confuse their own organs (rather than substances that they apprehend as “external” to them) with their true self.

This action never takes a past or future form; rather, it only takes a present form, as in [the sentences] “rivers flow,” “mountains stand.”⁶²

This is an allusion to Patañjali’s commentary on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.123,⁶³ according to which a verb conjugated in the present tense refers to an action that is currently happening.⁶⁴ As pointed out by Kātyāyana, the definition could be seen as problematic “because, in cases where [an action] is eternally performed, there are no temporal distinctions,”⁶⁵ and the examples of such beginningless and endless actions provided by Patañjali in this connection happen to be precisely those given in the YD: “mountains stand, rivers flow.”⁶⁶ Patañjali further clarifies the nature of the problem thus:

In this respect, the present time is relative to its opposites (*pratidvandva*), [namely,] the past and future; but in this case [of an eternal action], there are no past and future times!⁶⁷

Kātyāyana responds by asserting that “in fact there are temporal distinctions,”⁶⁸ and Patañjali explains the reply as follows:

And there are actually time distinctions [in such cases]; [thus we may say] “mountains stand,” [but also] “mountains will stand” [or] “mountains stood.” How could such words be used [otherwise]? Therefore there are indeed temporal distinctions. And this does not have to be so just because of the usage [of these words]: the actions of kings who are past, future and present in the [mountains’ area] are the point of reference (*adhikaraṇa*) for the [mountains’] action of standing. To begin with, [we may say that] “mountains stand” relatively to the present actions of the kings [who live] there now; relatively to the future actions of kings who will live there later, [we may say] “mountains will exist;” relatively to the past actions of kings who lived there [before, we may say] “mountains stood.”⁶⁹

⁶² YD, p. 261: *neyaṃ kriyā kadācid api bhūtabhaviṣyadrūpā bhavati, kiṃ tarhi vartamānarūpā, yathā vahanti nadyas tiṣṭhanti parvatā iti.*

⁶³ As already noted by the editors of the YD (p. 261).

⁶⁴ *vartamāne laṭ*. “The affix *laṭ* indicates the present.” On discussions about this rule see Cardona 1991: 450ff.

⁶⁵ Vārttika 3.123.2: *nityappravṛtte ca kālāvibhāgāt.*

⁶⁶ MBhāṣya, vol. II, p. 123: *tiṣṭhanti parvatāḥ, sravanti nadya iti.*

⁶⁷ Ibid.: *iha bhūtabhaviṣyatpratidvandvo vartamānaḥ kālo na cātra bhūtabhaviṣyantau kālau staḥ.*

⁶⁸ Vārttika 3.1.123.5: *santi ca kālāvibhāgāḥ.*

⁶⁹ MBhāṣya, vol. II, p. 123: *santi khalv api kālāvibhāgāḥ, tiṣṭhanti parvatāḥ, sthāsyanti parvatāḥ, tasthuḥ parvatā iti. kiṃ śakyanta ete śabdāḥ prayoktum ity atah santi kālāvibhāgāḥ. nāvaśyaṃ prayogād eva. iha bhūtabhaviṣyadvartamānānām rājñāṃ yāḥ kriyās tās tiṣṭhater adhikaraṇam. iha tāvat tiṣṭhanti parvatā iti samprati ye rājānas teṣāṃ yāḥ*

The author of the YD certainly had in mind this explanation of temporal distinctions, and his definition of time as a purely relative concept was probably influenced by Patañjali's statement that temporal determinations are always relative and result from the comparison of several actions. It is also noteworthy that according to Patañjali, even permanent actions can be subjected to temporal distinctions because we can always think of them relatively to other actions, whereas according to the YD, Nature's action, that is, the universal *pariṇāma*, as opposed to all local movements (*parispanda/praspanda*),⁷⁰ *can never take a future or past form*. Does the author of the YD mean that we can never speak of Nature in the past and future tenses? In fact he seems to be highlighting a similarity between Nature and the examples found in the MBhāṣya rather than opposing them, and he cannot have ignored that Patañjali used these very examples to show that *even permanent entities* can be talked about in a temporal way. He therefore seems to mean that Nature's transformation never has a past or future form (since Nature and its dynamism are one and the same ever present entity), *although* it may be talked about as past or future relatively to other, limited actions. In any case, it is noteworthy that under SK 15, the YD repeatedly uses the word *parispanda*, and never *pariṇāma*, to describe the type of action with which time is to be equated: although several sources that do not belong to the SK commentarial tradition ascribe to Sāṃkhya the thesis that time is Nature's *pariṇāma*,⁷¹ the YD as it has come down to us never states this, and rather seems

kriyās tāsu vartamānāsu. sthāsyanti parvatā itīta uttaram ye rājāno bhaviṣyanti teṣāṃ yāḥ kriyās tāsu bhaviṣyantiṣu. tasthuḥ parvatā itīha ye rājāno babhūvus teṣāṃ yāḥ kriyās tāsu bhūtāsu.

⁷⁰ See e.g. YD, p. 163, which excludes that *praspanda* may be found in Nature itself: *dvividhā hi kriyā praspandalakṣaṇā pariṇāmalakṣaṇā ca, tatra praspandaḥ pradhānasya sauḥkṣmyāt pratiśidhyate*. "For action is twofold, [i.e.] it consists in movement and transformation; among them, movement is excluded for Nature due to [the latter's] subtlety."

⁷¹ This idea is found in the medical tradition: besides the SuSaṃ and its commentaries mentioned below (§8, nn. 190–192), as pointed out to me by Philipp Maas, it occurs in the first-century *Carakasamhitā* (*Sūtrasthāna* 11.42: *kālāḥ punaḥ pariṇāma ucyate*, "But time is called transformation;" cf. *Vimānasthāna* 8.76), but without any explanation as to how "transformation" should be understood, and according to Philipp Maas (personal written communication, 06/09/2019), although "the eleventh-century commentator Cakrapāṇidatta refers transformation to temporal changes like that of seasons rather than to the transformation of Nature, in view of the general orientation towards pre-classical Sāṃkhya, I would not rule out the possibility that *pariṇāma* may be understood... here as referring to a transformation of Nature." See also Rāmakaṇṭha's depiction of Sāṃkhya's view on time in MatV, *Vidyāpāda* 12, p. 338: *atha sāmṣkhyadrśā prakṛteḥ svabhāva eva pariṇatyātmako 'sāv ity ucyate. yad āhuḥ: pariṇāmaḥ pṛthagbhāvo vyavasthākramataḥ sadā | bhūtāḥ yadvartamānātmā kālārūpo vibhāvyaḥ ||* "But according to the Sāṃkhya

to emphasize the fundamental distinction between transformation, understood as the infinite dynamism of the ever active matter, and time, defined as the mere sum of purely relative determinations (shorter and longer, prior and posterior, etc.) that result from our measuring various limited actions with one another.

We cannot rule out the possibility that the thesis according to which time is only a word for actions had already been formulated in the lost *Ṣaṣṭitantra*; but the complete silence of the SK and the entire first group of their commentaries on this point makes it very unlikely. The MBhāṣya, as shown above, was certainly a source of inspiration for the YD; but although Patañjali did point out that temporal distinctions result from a comparison of actions, apparently he did not consider this as necessarily entailing a denial of the existence of time as a distinct entity exerting a causal power.⁷² It therefore seems that the YD innovated in this regard, or at least borrowed an idea that had first appeared outside Sāṃkhya circles and integrated it to the system as a way of justifying the absence of time in the SK's list of realia. Thus it is striking that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa – who demonstrably knew the YD –⁷³ does not explicitly attribute this thesis to the followers of Kapila, and ascribes at least a part of it (and possibly its entirety, although this is unclear) to “experts on time” (*kālavīd*), that is, “astrologers/astronomers” (*jyotiṛgaṇaka*).⁷⁴

doctrine, what [we] call [time] is nothing but the nature of Nature, which consists in transformation. This is what is declared in: ‘Transformation, which is the permanent existence of individual [entities]² according to³ the succession of [their] states, [and] which is the essence of [what is] past, future and present, appears as time.’” Aghoraśiva borrows the passage almost word for word (MṛVD, p. 266: *nanu sāmṃkhyaiḥ prakṛteḥ parīṇatyātmako 'śāv ity ucyate. yad āhuḥ...*, followed by the same quotation). The source of the quotation is unknown to me (as it was to N.R. Bhatt, see MatV, p. 338, n. 9: *ākaro na labhyate*; cf. Goodall, Kataoka, Acharya and Yokochi 2008: 360, n. 75, which mentions it as an “unattributed Sāṃkhya verse”). The translation given here is very tentative and I may well have misunderstood the gist of the quotation; cf. Hulin 1980: 229: “L'évolution est une existence séparée, dérivant de la succession des états; elle est reconnue comme le Temps qui revêt la forme du passé, du futur et du présent.”

⁷² See MBhāṣya, vol. I, p. 409: *yena mūrtānām upacayās cāpacayās ca labhyante taṃ kālam āhuḥ. tasyaiva hi kayācit kriyayā yuktasyāhar iti ca bhavati rātrir iti ca. kayā kriyayā. ādityagatyā. tayaivāsakṛdāvṛttayā māsa iti bhavati saṃvatsara iti ca*. “They say that time is that thanks to which things endowed with a specific shape increase and decrease. For this very [time] receives [the names] ‘day’ and ‘night’ [when it is] associated with a certain action. Which action? The movement of the sun. And [it receives the names] ‘month’ and ‘year’ [when associated] with the same [action] that is repeated many times.” This, in fact, resembles a depiction of the position held in the VS (see below, §3).

⁷³ On the quotation of the YD in the NM, already spotted by P. Chakravarti in YD_p, p. 42, n. 2, see in particular Wezler 1974: 451.

⁷⁴ See below, §4 and n. 113.

The compound *kālavid* suggests that Jayanta had in mind the opinion already mentioned by Bhartṛhari in the following way:

Others, who are experts on time (*kālavid*), know that time, which is the movement of the sun, planets and stars, is differentiated according to the varying number (*bheda*) of repetitions [of these movements]. With respect to [any] action, the measurement of which is [already] known [and] which is used to measure other actions, [we] use the word “time.”⁷⁵

Helārāja explains:

The course of the sun and [other celestial bodies] is called “day,” etc.; and a particular action such as the milking of cows is [also] given the name “time” because, given that its measurement has [already] been determined, it is the cause [that enables us] to measure a particular action such as sitting down, which is different from the [first action], and the measurement of which is not well known.⁷⁶

His testimony is unfortunately difficult to interpret as regards the identity of the “experts on time;”⁷⁷ but the Śaiva Saiddhāntika Rāmakaṇṭha (who may be influenced here by Jayanta) designates them as astronomers immediately before quoting Bhartṛhari’s verse:

But in accordance with [what is] common knowledge in the tradition of astronomical treatises (*jyotiḥśāstra*), [time] is admitted to be nothing but a particular action. This is what they say [in]...⁷⁸

⁷⁵ VP 3.9.76–77: *ādityagrahanakṣatraparisṇandam athāpare | bhinnam āvṛttibhedena kālām kālavidō viduḥ || kriyāntaraparicchedapravṛttā yā kriyām prati | nirjñātaparimāṇā sā kāla ity abhidhīyate ||*

⁷⁶ PP 2, p. 70: *sūryādīnām gatipracāro divasādisabdavācyaḥ, godohādikriyāviśeṣaś ca paricchinna-parimāṇatvāt tadaparāprasiddhaparimāṇāsyādikriyāviśeṣaparicchedaheturvāt kālākhyām āśādayati.*

⁷⁷ PP 2, p. 70: *yataś ca jyotirgatya kālanānātvavyavahāras tataḥ saiva kāla ity arvāgdarśanāḥ kecin manyante...* “And some, whose perspective is mundane² (*arvāgdarśana*), are of the [following] opinion: ‘since [we] talk about diversity as regards time due to the movement of astral bodies, time [must be] this [movement] itself.’” The paraphrase in Iyer 1974: 59, makes no mention of the meaning of *arvāgdarśana*; Sharma 1972: 100, translates “some modern (i.e. superficial, whose vision is directed to proximity) (scholars).” Helārāja does mention astronomical/astrological treatises, but only to point out that the various time units are defined there (*ibid.*): *evam anyeṣām api grahanakṣatrāṇām jyotiḥśāstraprasiddhena gatipracārabhedena yugamanvantarakālpamahākālpādivibhāgaḥ kālō ’nusartavyaḥ.* “And time must also be thought of [as being] divided into *yugas*, *manvantaras*, *kalpas*, *mahākalpas* and so on in accordance with the variety of courses of other planets and stars that is well known from astronomical/astrological treatises.”

⁷⁸ MatV, *Vidyāpāda* 12, p. 337: *atha jyotiḥśāstraprasiddhyā kriyāviśeṣātmaka evā-*

Whether Bhartṛhari did have astronomers in mind or not,⁷⁹ it is hardly surprising that later authors took the term *kālavida* to refer to astronomers, since those who composed *jyotiṣa* works seem to have considered their own discipline to be primarily the science of measuring time,⁸⁰ and mathematical and astronomical treatises provide temporal units that are explicitly defined as actions: to take but one example, the third chapter of the famous fifth-century *Āryabhaṭīya*, which is devoted to the measures of time and entitled *Kālakriyā*, “the Action of Time” – that is to say, as its seventh-century commentator Bhāskara explains, the action that enables us to know time –⁸¹ uses as time units various actions constituted by the movement of astral bodies, breaths or the pronunciation of syllables;⁸² and this practice of measuring time with actions is explicitly acknowledged by authors of philosophical treatises as the province of mathematicians and astronomers.⁸³ Now, Bhāskara’s attitude with respect to the issue of the nature of time and its relationship with action is quite telling:

bhyupagamyate. tad āhuḥ... The passage is immediately followed by VP 3.9.73. Aghoraśiva (MṛVD, p. 265) borrows the sentence almost word for word (with °*drṣṭyā* for °*prasiddhyā* and the omission of *tad āhuḥ*); Hulin 1980: 228, does not translate the word *kriyā*, despite its crucial importance here (“Selon le point de vue des traités d’astronomie, le Temps n’est qu’un aspect particulier des astres”).

⁷⁹ The same compound appears for instance in the PYBh, where it does not designate astronomers but *yogins* (see below, n. 144).

⁸⁰ See e.g. the concluding verse in the *Paitāmahasiddhānta*: *vedā hi yajñārtham abhipravṛttāḥ kālānupūrvā vihitāś ca yajñāḥ | tasmād idaṃ kālavidhānaśāstraṃ yojyotiṣaṃ veda sa veda sarvaṃ* || “For the Vedas concern themselves with sacrifices; and sacrifices are prescribed according to [certain specific] times; therefore he who knows *jyotiṣa*, this science of measuring time (*kālavidhānaśāstra*), knows all.” See Pingree 1967–1968: 506.

⁸¹ ĀBh, p. 172: *kriyā vyāpāraḥ, kālasya kriyā kālakriyā. kālaparijñānārthā kriyeti yāvat. sā ca kriyā gatiḥ. tayā kriyayā kālo jñāyata ity etat pratipādayiṣyati*. “Action [means] activity; [the compound] *kālakriyā* [is to be understood as] the action of time – that is to say, the action the point of which is to make [us] know time. And this action is movement; [the author] is going to show that time is known thanks to this action.” See Shukla 1976: 85.

⁸² See *Āryabhaṭīya* 3.1–2ab: *varṣaṃ dvādaśa māsās triṃśad divaso bhavet sa māsas tu | ṣaṣṭir nāḍyo divasaḥ ṣaṣṭis ca vināḍikā nāḍī | gurvākṣarāṇi ṣaṣṭir vināḍikārṇkṣi ṣaḍ eva vā prāṇāḥ* | “A year is twelve months; a month is thirty days; a day is sixty *nāḍis*; a *nāḍī* is sixty *vināḍikās*; a stellar *vināḍikā* is sixty long syllables or six respirations...”

⁸³ See e.g. NK, p. 169 (about Praśastapāda’s mention of various conventional time units): ... *akṣipakṣmakarmopalakṣitakālo nimeṣa ityādi gaṇitaśāstrānusāreṇa pratyetavyam*. “[The time unit called] *nimeṣa* is the time marked by the act of blinking – this and the rest must be understood in accordance with the treatises of mathematics (*gaṇitaśāstra*).”

But what is time, or what is action? In this regard some say [that] time is distinct from action; others [say] that time is action. Let [us] admit that time is distinct from action – [still:] what is the point of [such an independent time]? Whereas for us [mathematicians], the sun and moon's greatest movement away from each other [after a conjunction] is a fortnight; and their moving back towards each other is a month. Similarly, twelve months are a year, and so on – this is time!⁸⁴

Bhāskara's position is resolutely – and somewhat sarcastically – pragmatic: he seems to mock the metaphysicians who indulge in speculative debates on the nature of time, pointing out in contrast that mathematicians do not care whether time exists over and above actions or not, because they are only concerned with measuring it. Yet his conclusion is clear: for Bhāskara and his peers, time is actions, and nothing else.⁸⁵ Whether or not the author of the YD borrowed this idea from mathematico-astronomical works so as to give some substance to the denial of time in classical Sāṃkhya, and whatever the actual identity of the “experts on time” to which Bhartṛhari already ascribed a doctrine so close to that defended

⁸⁴ ĀBh, p. 172: *atha kaḥ kālaḥ, kā vā kriyā. atra kecid vadanti kriyāvyatiriktaḥ kālaḥ. apare kriyā kāla iti. kriyāvyatirikto 'stu kālaḥ, kim etena. asmākaṃ tu sūryācandramasoḥ paro viprakarṣaḥ so 'rdhamāsaḥ. yaś ca tayoḥ sannikarṣaḥ sa māsaḥ. evaṃ dvādaśa māsāḥ saṃvatsara ityādi kālaḥ.*

⁸⁵ This is not to say, however, that all such works would conform to Bhāskara's opinion. See e.g. Ḍaḥaṇa's NiSaṃ (quoting the initial verse in Śrīpati Bhaṭṭa's JRM), p. 285: *kāla eva jagataḥ sṛṣṭisthitiprayalanimittam iti kālakāraṇikāḥ, uktaṃ ca jyotiḥśāstravidā śrīpatinā prabhavaviratimadhyajñānavandhyā nitāntaṃ viditaparamatattvā yatra te yogino 'pi | tam aham iha nimittaṃ viśvajanmātyayānām anumitam abhivande pragrahaiḥ* kālam īśam || iti. [*bhagrahaiḥ JRM, cf. Panse 1956: 377; pragrahaiḥ NiSaṃ.]* “Specialists of time [say] that it is time that is the cause of the world's creation, maintenance and destruction; and this has been said by the expert in astrology/astronomy Śrīpati: ‘I pay homage to Lord Time, about whose birth, cessation and existence even the yogins who know the ultimate reality are entirely clueless, [and] which is inferred in this [world] from the stars and planets as the cause of the world's arising and disappearance.’” Stcherbatsky 1926: 15, suggests that the epic *kālavāda* may have been integrated in later times in astronomical works, but the evidence adduced (that the compound *kālavāda* can designate astronomy, and that Śrīdhara refers his readers to astronomical treatises when commenting on time units: see above, n. 83) seems entirely inadequate. To my knowledge, the thorough study of conceptions of time's nature in *jyotiṣa* and *siddhānta* literature is still a desideratum.

in the YD, there is an undeniable similarity between the Sāṃkya's understanding of the nature of time and that found in some influential astronomical treatises.

3. The YD's argument against the Vaiśeṣika inference of time

Under SK 50, while explaining the list of contentments (*tuṣṭi*) provided in the stanza and presented by the commentaries as incomplete points of view above which one must rise in order to achieve liberation, the first group of SK commentaries explains the contentment called "time"⁸⁶ as a fatalistic belief that is reminiscent of the MBh's *kālavāda*, and according to which the effort to gain knowledge is vain because only time may bring about liberation.⁸⁷ In contrast, the YD's explanation of the item *kāla* in this list⁸⁸ rings like a depiction of the

⁸⁶ SK 50ab: *ādhyātmikyaś catasraḥ prakṛtyupādānakālabhāgyākhyāḥ* | "The four internal [contentments (*tuṣṭi*)] are called 'nature,' 'material,' 'time' and 'good fortune.'"

⁸⁷ Takakusu 1904: 1037: "On demande au troisième brahmane: 'Quelle est la connaissance pour laquelle vous êtes devenu un ascète?' Il répond: 'Que peuvent faire la Nature et les nécessaires? Je sais qu'ils ne nous procurent pas la Délivrance, [et je pense qu'elle viendra avec le temps]. C'est pourquoi j'ai désiré devenir un ascète.' Ce troisième brahmane ne peut pas non plus atteindre la Délivrance. Pourquoi? Parce qu'il ignore le sens des vingt-cinq catégories (*padārtha* [sic]). Voilà 'le contentement relatif au temps.'" SSV, p. 64: *kālākhyā yathā kaścid anabhiḡatatattvajñō bravīti kālena mokṣo bhaviṣyatīti, jñānāgamam na karoti kiṃ jñāneneti, evaṃ santuṣṭasya nāsti mokṣa ity eṣā kālākhyā trītyā tuṣṭiḥ*. "The [contentment] called 'time' is for instance when someone who has not acquired the knowledge of the principles says 'Liberation will come in time' and does not study [to acquire] knowledge, [thinking:] 'What is the point of knowledge?' There is no liberation for him who is thus content; this is the third contentment called 'time.'" GBh, p. 46: *kālena mokṣo bhaviṣyatīti kiṃ tattvābhyāsenā, ity eṣā kālākhyā tuṣṭiḥ, tasya nāsti mokṣa iti*. "[Thinking:] 'Liberation will come in time, what is the point of studying the principles?' – this is the contentment called 'time.' There is no liberation for him." MV, p. 49: *kaścid evaṃ brūte kālena svaḡam mokṣo bhāvī kiṃ tattvavijñāneneti. jñāne 'pravṛtṭyaiva tuṣṭaḥ. tasyāpi na mokṣa iti kālatuṣṭiḥ*. "Someone speaks thus: 'Liberation will come by itself in time; what is the point of the knowledge of principles?' It is the fact that he does not make effort to [acquire] knowledge that makes him content. There is no liberation for him either. This is the contentment of time." The passage is not preserved in the SV. On the *tuṣṭis* see Oberhammer 1977: 37ff.

⁸⁸ YD, pp. 245–246: *yadā ca saty upādānasāmarthyē na tāvataiva bhāvānām prādurbhāvaḥ, kiṃ tarhi sannihitasādhanānām api kālam praty apekṣā bhavati. kālaviśeṣād bījād aṅkuro jāyate 'ṅkurān nālam nālāt kāṇḍam kāṇḍāt prasava ityādi. anyathā tūpādānānām sannidhānamātrāt kṣaṇenaivāmiṣām avasthāviśeṣāṇām abhivyaktiḥ syāt. kiṃ ca kālaviḡparyayeṇotpattiprasaṅgāt, upādānapūrvakam viśvam ity abhyupagacchataḥ śaradi yavānām vasante vr̥hīṇām utpattiḥ prāpnoti, na caitad iṣṭam. kiṃ ca tadanuvīdhānāt. dr̥ṣyante ca prāṇinām kālānūrūpāḥ svabhāvāhāravihāravyavasthāḥ. tasmād asāv eva kāraṇam*. "And [the contentment of time occurs] when [one thinks that] although the

Vaiśeṣikas' understanding of time as a causal condition or auxiliary cause in all productions:⁸⁹ the main target as regards the belief in time has clearly shifted.⁹⁰ This is even clearer under SK 15, where, in order to justify its reduction of time to actions, the YD examines the Vaiśeṣikas' contention that time must be inferred as a distinct substance because there has to be a cause for our awareness of anteriority, posteriority, simultaneity and so on, and nothing else can be such a cause.⁹¹ Here is the YD's lengthy reply to this reasoning:

material cause is exerting its power, it is not sufficient to make things appear. Rather, they require time even though the means of producing them are present: it is due to a specific time that the sprout arises from the seed, that the stalk arises from the sprout, that the joints of the stalk arise from the stalk, that the flower arises from the stalk, etc. Otherwise, these various states should appear in a single moment due to the mere presence of [their] material causes. Moreover, [if it were not so,] as a consequence [things] would arise at unsuitable times: for someone who claims that everything requires [nothing but] material causes, barley must grow in the fall and rice in the spring – and this [can]not be admitted. Besides, [time must be a cause] because [living beings] conform to it, and [we] see that the various states of living beings conform to [specific times] as regards their nature, diet and activities. Therefore time is indeed a cause.” (On *āhāra* and *vihāra* see Wezler 1990: 144; Angermeier [2007] 2010: 74, n. 340).

⁸⁹ See PDhS, p. 165: *sarvakāryāṇāṃ cotpattisthitivināśahetus tadvyapadeśāt*. “And [time must also] be the cause of the arising, existence and destruction of all effects, because [they] are [all] described (*vyapadeśa*) in terms of [time].” Cf. *Vyomavatī*, p. 349: *tathā niyata eva kālē kusumādeḥ kāryasyopalambho na kālāntara ity anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tasya kāraṇatvaṃ vijñāyate. tathā hi vasantasamaya eva pāṭalādikusumānāṃ udbhavo na kālāntara ity evaṃ kāryāntareṣv apy ūhyam. tathā prasavakālam apekṣata iti vyavahārāt kāraṇatvaṃ kālasya. tathā hi – sahakāriṇy apekṣopalabdheḥ kālasya sahakāritām antareṇa prasūtāv ayam vyavahāro na syāt*. “Thus, the perception of an effect such as a flower [occurs] only at a specific time and not at any other; therefore the fact that this [specific time] is a cause is known through invariable co-presence and co-absence. To explain: the arising of flowers such as [those of] the *pāṭala* [tree] only [occurs] in the season of spring, not at any other time[, so spring must be a cause of this arising; and this causality] can be thus assumed [to exist] with respect to other effects as well. Similarly, the causality of time [is inferred] from the fact that [we] say that [something] ‘requires a time of maturation.’ To explain: because the perception [of an effect such as a flower] requires an auxiliary cause (*sahakārin*), if time were not an auxiliary cause, [we] could not talk thus about maturation.”

⁹⁰ As pointed out e.g. in Motegi 1994, the YD is very much concerned with criticizing Vaiśeṣika tenets.

⁹¹ VS 2.2.6: *aparasmīn paraṃ yugapad ayugapac ciraṃ kṣipraṃ iti kālalingāni*. “The inferential marks of time are: with respect to that which is close (*apara*), [the idea that something is] distant (*para*); [the ideas that something is] simultaneous [or] not simultaneous, slow [or] quick.” The words *para* and *apara* often mean “prior” and “posterior,” but this is not quite how they are understood here, the idea being rather that our awareness of time involves a distance or proximity *that cannot be explained*

If [our Vaiśeṣika opponent argues] that [we] understand [the existence of time] from the presence of an inferential mark such as [things' properties of being] distant and close,⁹² [we reply:] no; because these [properties] cannot occur in [things] that are not produced: it is only with respect to that which is produced that [we] observe [having] such cognitions as “distant” and “close.” If this [cognition] had a cause distinct from action [itself], it would occur indifferently with respect to permanent (*nitya*) and impermanent (*anitya*) [entities]! [Our opponent] could [reply] (*cet*): there is no [such] fallacy [in our thesis,] because [time] is [only] capable [of causing such properties as distant and close] in certain [entities], just as [a new colour] resulting from heating [only arises in certain entities. The opponent] might [thus put] the [following] reasoning [forward]: just as the cause [of the new colour] resulting from heating is the conjunction with fire, and yet, although there is no difference [as regards this conjunction,

in spatial terms. See VSV, p. 17: *etāny aparatvavyatikarādīni kālalingāni. tatra pareṇa dikpradeśena saṃyukte yūni paratvajñāne jāte sthavire cāpareṇa dikpradeśena saṃyukte 'paratvajñānotpattau kṣṇakeśādivālipalitādiparyālocanayā yena nimittena yūny aparatvajñānam sthavire ca paratvajñānam jāyate sa kālāḥ. tathā tulyakāryeṣu kartṛṣu yugapat kurvanti, ayugapat kurvantīti yataḥ pratyayo jāyate sa kālāḥ. tathaikaṃ kriyāphalam uddiśya odanākhyam bhūyasīnām adhiśrayaṇādikriyānām prabandhapravṛttau tulye kartari ciram adya kṛtam, kṣipram adya kṛtam iti yataḥ pratyayau bhavataḥ sa kāla iti.* “These, [i.e.] the contrast between being close [and yet distant], etc., are the inferential marks of time. With respect to that, when the cognition of distance has arisen [in us] with respect to a young man who is connected with a distant place, and when the cognition of proximity has arisen [in us] with respect to an old man who is connected with a place that is close, time is the cause due to which, through [our] examination of [things] such as [the young man's] black hair and the [old man's] wrinkles and grey hair, the cognition of proximity arises with respect to the young man [despite his spatial distance], and the cognition of distance, with respect to the old man [despite his spatial proximity]. Similarly, when some agents have similar effects, time is that thanks to which a cognition arises [in the form] ‘these are acting simultaneously’ [or] ‘these are not acting simultaneously.’ Again, when one undertakes a series of numerous actions – placing [a cooking pot] on the fire, etc. – with a view [to obtain] a single effect called ‘cooked rice,’ when the agent is the same, time is that from which cognitions arise [in the form] ‘this has been done slowly today’ [and] ‘this has been done quickly today.’” Cf. PDhS, p. 164: *kālāḥ parāparavyatikarayaugapadyāyugapadyacirakṣiprapratyayalingāḥ. teṣāṃ viśayeṣu pūrvapratyayavilakṣaṇānām utpattāv anyanimittābhāvād yad atra nimittam sa kālāḥ.* “Time has as its inferential marks the cognitions of the contrast between [being] distant and [yet] close, of being simultaneous or not, and of [being] slow or quick. Since these [cognitions] arise with respect to objects while being distinct from [all the other] cognitions already [described], their cause must be time because they [can]not have any other cause.”

⁹² See above, n. 91.

which occurs in all cases,] the [additional] cause (*nimitta*)⁹³ of this arising of [a new colour] resulting from heating is only found in the earth, not in ether and [the other elements]; in the same way, time too is the cause [of] such [properties] as “distant” and “close,” and yet [such a property] can only occur in impermanent [entities], not in eternal ones. But this [argument] is not sound. Why? Because [as regards fire,] the difference [between cases where it produces a new colour and cases where it does not] can be rationally accounted for: fire is the cause of the change regarding [qualities] such as colour, so it is right [to say] that it may bring about [qualities] resulting from heating in a substance that possesses this [quality such as colour] and not in a [substance] such as ether, which does not possess it; but time [supposedly] plays a causal role merely through [its] relation [with all entities, and] it is not the [very] cause of change[, which you admit to be e.g. fire in the case of the new quality of colour!]⁹⁴ Therefore this [reasoning] is incorrect. Thus if [you] hold that time is different from actions, [you end up showing that] the [property of] causing the world belongs to the movement of causes [and not to time], but it is something quite different that [you were] trying to prove!⁹⁵

⁹³ Halbfass 1992: 210 has rightly pointed out that the usual translations “efficient cause” and “instrumental cause” for *nimitta* seem “too strong and potentially misleading, as far as the terminology of Pāśāpāda and his commentators... is concerned,” and renders it as “regulative cause.” It seems to me that the latter expression is also potentially misleading because of some of its uses in Western philosophy, but I cannot think of a better equivalent, so I prefer to translate *nimitta* in such contexts as “[additional] cause” or simply as “cause.”

⁹⁴ According to Chakravarti 1951: 257, the idea that time is *sambandhamātropakārin* (understood as the thesis that it only helps bring about relations) is the very position defended by the YD (see also e.g. Sinha 1983: 49; Prasad 1984a: 37). It seems to me, however, that this interpretation – according to which the YD concedes a causal role, however limited, to an entity called time – cannot be accepted, because the whole point of the passage is to show that *in the Vaiśeṣika perspective*, time can only have a causal role through its relation with all things (since it is allegedly all-pervasive, and since Vaiśeṣikas themselves admit that fire for instance is the cause of change in the case at hand), but then the reason why it only affects produced things remains a mystery.

⁹⁵ YD, p. 161: *parāparādīlingasadbhāvāt pratipattir iti cen na, akṛtakeṣu tadanupapatteḥ. yad eva kṛtakam tatraiva param aparam ityādih pratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ. sa yadi kriyāvyatiriktanimittaḥ syād aviśeṣān nityānityeṣu syāt. kvacit sāmāthyāt pākajavad adoṣa iti cet, syān matam – yathāgnisamyogaḥ pākajahetus tathā cāviśeṣe ’pi pṛthivyām eva pākajotpattinimittam bhavati nākāśādiḥ. evaṃ kālō ’pi parāparādihetur atha cānityeṣv eva syān na nityeṣv iti. tac cāyuktam. kasmāt? viśeṣopapatteḥ. rūpādivikriyāhetur agnis tad yuktam yad asau tadvatī dravye pākajān ādadyāt, nātadvaty ākāśādaḥ. kālas tu sambandhamātropakārī na vikriyāhetuḥ. tasmād asad etat. evaṃ yadi kriyābhyo ’nyaḥ kālā iṣyate kāraṇaparispandasya jagatkāraṇatvam athānyat sādhyam.*

Since, according to the Vaiśeṣika himself, temporal determinations are only observed to exist in things that are impermanent and therefore produced, the Vaiśeṣika's so-called demonstration of time only proves the thesis held by Sāṃkhya that time is nothing but actions, given that things that are not produced – and are therefore alien to action – are free of any temporal determination, whereas all produced entities are temporally restricted; there is thus no good reason to assume that temporal determinations have any other cause besides action itself. The Vaiśeṣika opponent could argue in response that, just as a conjunction with fire is the cause of the arising of a new colour within atoms, and yet fire only produces this colour if the element being heated is earth,⁹⁶ similarly, although the connection with time is always the cause producing the arising of cognitions such as anteriority, time only produces temporal awareness with respect to impermanent entities. According to the author of the YD, however, there is an important difference between the two cases that the Vaiśeṣika presents as equivalent, because fire is a cause that produces a change in certain substances only, whereas time cannot produce change, since the Vaiśeṣika acknowledges that this role has to be played by the cause itself – i.e., in the Vaiśeṣika's own example, the fire heating the earth atoms. Time must therefore be efficient merely through its being in relation with the things that it determines; but if it is all-pervading, as the Vaiśeṣika surmises, and therefore in a relation with everything, why should it not determine permanent entities as well as impermanent ones? The Vaiśeṣika claims to demonstrate the existence of time as the cause enabling us to account for effects that could not be explained otherwise, while also acknowledging that all effects in the world result from the action of the cause(s) that bring them about – his position is therefore untenable.

The YD's argument, which rests on the fact that the Vaiśeṣika himself admits that temporal determinations are only found in entities that are *anītya*, is certainly an allusion to VS 2.2.9–11:

The diversity (*nānātva*) [in temporal determinations] is due to the fact that [they] are particularized by the effects (*kārya*); since [this diversity] does not exist in permanent (*nītya*) entities, [whereas] it exists in impermanent (*anītya*) ones. The word “time” refers to [their] cause.⁹⁷

The translation just given is based on what seems to be Praśastapāda's understanding of the passage; for according to the latter,

⁹⁶ On this point see e.g. Bhaduri 1947: Chapter 5.

⁹⁷ VS 2.2.9–11: *kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvam. nītyeṣv abhāvād anītyeṣu bhāvāt. kāraṇe kālā-khyā*.

Although literally speaking, [time] is one since [all] its inferential marks [can] indifferently [be called] “time,” [we] talk [about time] figuratively (*upacāra*) as if it were diverse (*nānā*) due to the variety in extrinsic properties (*upādhi*) [which are superimposed onto time, and which consist in] the undertaking of all effects (*kārya*), the performance of the action [that produces them, their] persisting existence and destruction – just as, in the cases of a gem or a cook, [we talk figuratively of a diversity whereas these entities are really one].⁹⁸

According to the VS, the diversity in temporal determinations is not due to time itself but rather, to a particularization brought about by effects, and Praśastapāda describes this particularization as the superimposition onto time of extrinsic properties that really belong to the process of production of impermanent entities. He therefore seems to understand VS 2.2.10 (“since [it] does not exist in permanent entities, [whereas it] exists in impermanent ones”) as the reason why we should admit that the apparent diversity in time does not belong to time itself and is only due to this superimposition onto time of extrinsic properties that are the various actions:⁹⁹ we should do so because these various temporal determinations are only ascribed to things that are produced. The author of the YD can thus point out that the Vaiśeṣikas themselves admit that temporal determinations only affect impermanent (and therefore produced) entities, and he can accuse them of not seeing that if it is the case, there is no valid reason for postulating the existence of an additional cause of these determinations that would be time, since action itself is enough to account for their existence.

⁹⁸ PDhS, p. 170: *kālalingāviśeṣād añjasaikatve 'pi sarvakāryāṇām prārambhakriyābhinirvṛttisthitinirodhopādhibhedān mañivat pācakavad vā nānātvopacāra iti*.

⁹⁹ Cf. e.g. Vyomavatī, p. 351: *atha katham nānātvam upacaryata ity āha mañivat pācakavad veti. yathā mañeḥ svarūpāparityāgenaivopādhibhedād upacaryate nānātvam pīto rakta iti, tadvad ihāpi bhinnakriyopādhiśāśād vartamānādibheda iti. yathā vā svarūpāparityāgenaiva puruṣasya nānakriyāśāśāt pācakādibhedas tadvad ihāpīti*. “But how is this diversity figuratively applied to [time]? [Praśastapāda] answers: ‘just as in the cases of a gem or a cook.’ [That is to say,] a [transparent] gem is said to be diverse figuratively [in such sentences as] ‘it is yellow, it is red,’ due to a variety of extrinsic properties [superimposed onto it owing to the proximity of coloured objects], whereas the gem does not abandon its [unitary] nature at all; in the same way, in the [case of time] too, the difference between ‘present,’ [‘past’ and ‘future’] is due to the extrinsic properties that are the various actions; or again, for a man, the difference between such [a property] as being a cook [and the properties of being the agent of any other action] is [simply] due to [his] diverse actions, whereas he does not abandon [his unitary] nature at all; the same goes in the [case of time] too.”

4. Reactions to this argument in Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya

Now, Candrānanda, who is heavily indebted to Praśastapāda and usually follows his interpretations,¹⁰⁰ has a very different way of understanding VS 2.2.9–11:

[VS 2.2.9 says:] **“The diversity [in time] is due to the particularity of the effects.”** [Here] “effect” [stands for] “action;” [that is to say:] after seeing the actions of beginning, subsisting and disappearing of a real entity particularized by [these] actions, [we] talk about “the time of beginning” [and other such times] because [we] figuratively ascribe [this] diversity to time, although [in fact it remains] one. [– Objection:] But [then] time is nothing but actions! The reason why [one might formulate this objection is stated in VS 2.2.10]: **“Because of [its] absence in permanent [entities and] because of [its] presence in impermanent [entities].”** [That is to say: because of the absence] of the inferential marks [of time in permanent entities, and because of their presence in impermanent entities. For] if there were a permanent time over and above actions, then the inferential marks of time would be manifest in permanent [entities] such as ether as well; but they only exist in impermanent [entities]. Therefore time is only the limited duration (*avadhi*) of [things] that are being produced; so time is nothing but action. [– We answer this objection as follows]: This is not [true]; the inferential marks of time [only] exist in impermanent [things simply] because [these marks] arise after the completion of a real entity [i.e. after its beginning, subsisting and disappearing], and not because action [itself] would be time. On the contrary, [VS 2.2.11 says that] **“The word ‘time’ refers to the cause”** – [that is to say, the word “time” refers to the cause] of the [inferential marks]. Since these inferential marks could not arise if they were causeless, [they must have a cause, but] if their cause were action, [we] would not [say] that [something occurs] “simultaneously,” but [only] that “[it] has been done” – therefore the word “time” refers to their cause.¹⁰¹

Candrānanda reads VS 2.2.10 as the reason adduced by an opponent whose thesis is strikingly close to that held by the author of the YD: we must admit that time is the limited duration (*avadhi*) of things that are being produced, i.e., it is action (*kriyā*) itself, because temporal determinations are only found in impermanent,

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. Isaacson 1995: 142.

¹⁰¹ VSV, pp. 17–18 with VS 2.2.9–11: *kāryaviśeṣeṇa nānātvaṃ. kāryaṃ kriyā, kriyā-viśeṣeṇāviśeṣasya vastuna ārambhasthitivinaśakriyā dṛṣṭvaikasyāpi kālasya nānātvo-pacārād ārambhakālādivyapadeśaḥ. nanu kriyāmātraṃ kālaḥ, kutaḥ. kālalingānāṃ nityeṣv abhāvād anityeṣu bhāvāt. yadi kriyāvyatiriktaḥ syān nityaḥ kāla evaṃ nityeṣv apy ākāśādiṣu kālalingāni pratibhāseran. anityeṣv eva tu bhavanti. tasmād abhinirvartya-māneṣv evāvadhiḥ kālaḥ. tasmāt kriyāiva kāla iti. naitat, vastunirvṛtyuttarakālabhāvitvāt kālalingāny anityeṣu bhavanti, na tu kriyāyāḥ kālātvaṃ. teṣāṃ tu kāraṇe kālākhyā. eṣāṃ kālalingānāṃ nirmittānāṃ asambhavāt kriyānimittatve kṛtam iti syāt, na yugapad iti. tasmād eṣāṃ yat kāraṇaṃ tasmin kālākhyā.*

i.e., produced, entities. The commentator has to supply the entirety of this objection so as to make the reason in VS 2.2.10 sound like that of an opponent; and if his interpretation sounds forced,¹⁰² it could very well be because he is aware that the YD targets this passage, and because he is trying to rescue it from this attack by presenting the targeted aphorisms themselves as an anticipation of the objection and a response to it. This response, according to him, consists in pointing out that temporal determinations are only found in impermanent entities owing to the fact that we distinguish different times after seeing the different stages undergone by a produced entity, but this does not mean that time would be nothing but actions, because if actions were the sole cause for temporal determinations, *our awareness of time could not be distinguished at all from our awareness of action*, so that we would not say that something is simultaneous or successive, slow or quick, etc., but only that it “has been done.”

¹⁰² Apparently it was not very successful. Thus in the recension of the VS that pertains to Śaṅkaramiśra’s fifteenth-century commentary, *nityeṣv abhāvād anityeṣu bhāvāt* forms a single *sūtra* (VS 2.2.9) with *kāraṇe kālākhyā* – which by itself suggests that *nityeṣv abhāvād anityeṣu bhāvāt* was not read as part of an opponent’s discourse; and Śaṅkaramiśra simply takes it as the reason showing that time plays a causal role for all produced entities. See *Upaskāra*, p. 102: *idānīm sarvotpattimatām kālāḥ kāraṇam ity āha nityeṣv iti*. “Now, [the next aphorism beginning with] *nityeṣu* explains that time is a cause of all produced [things].” Cf. *ibid.*: *nityeṣv ākāśādiṣu yugapaj jātaḥ, ciraṃ jātaḥ, kṣipraṃ jātaḥ, idānīm jātaḥ, divā jātaḥ, rātrau jāta ityādipratyayasyābhāvād anityeṣu ca ghaṭapaṭādiṣu yaugapadyādipratyayānām bhāvād anvayaavyatirekābhyām kāraṇam kālā ity arthaḥ. na kevalaṃ yaugapadyādipratyayabalāt kālasya sarvotpattimannimittakāraṇatvam api tu puṣpaphalādīnām haimantikavāsantikaprāvṛṣeṇyādīsaṃjñābalād apy etad adhyavaseyam*. “Because with respect to permanent [things] such as ether, there are no cognitions such as ‘this has arisen simultaneously,’ or ‘slowly,’ or ‘quickly,’ ‘now,’ ‘during the day,’ ‘at night,’ etc., and because with respect to impermanent [things] such as pots or cloths, there are cognitions such as simultaneity, [we establish] through co-presence and co-absence that time is a cause – this is what this [aphorism] means. And [we] must conclude that time is a cause of all produced things on the grounds of the cognitions of simultaneity and so on, but also on the grounds that we say of [produced entities] such as flowers or fruit that they belong to the winter, spring, monsoon, etc.” As for Vāḍindra’s thirteenth-century discussion of time under these *sūtras* (*Tarkasāgara*, pp. 232–235), it is too long and problematic to be examined here, but it seems at least clear that Vāḍindra (who knows of several readings of the *sūtra*, see p. 232: *yadā tu nityeṣu bhāvād iti pāṭhaḥ*...) does not take *nityeṣv abhāvād anityeṣu bhāvāt* as the reason invoked by an objector who would deny the distinct existence of time and identify it with action, but as the Vaiśeṣika’s response to an objection (which is not entirely clear to me, in part due to a lacuna in the previous sentence).

This brief rebuttal of the reduction of time to actions sounds very close to Vyomaśiva's strategy¹⁰³ in his lengthy commentary on the portion of *Praśastapāda's* PDhS devoted to time: the *Vyomavatī* argues that if temporal determinations only arose from actions, we could not talk about time or temporal distinctions but only of action, since there would be no grounds for distinguishing time from action.¹⁰⁴ Vyomaśiva further endeavours to show that action and time must be distinct, because we do not think of action as time,¹⁰⁵ and because our awareness of temporal particularities affecting a given agent or effect cannot be accounted for solely thanks to the generic notions of agent or effect.¹⁰⁶ Śrīdhara, who knows Vyomaśiva's work,¹⁰⁷ also mentions in passing in his commentary on the PDhS

¹⁰³ I am in no position to judge which author predates the other. For a synthetic account of the scant information regarding Candrānanda's date, see Isaacson 1995: 140–141 (after Uddyotakara, before Helārāja); on Vyomaśiva's date and for more bibliographical references, see Slaje 1986, according to which Vyomaśiva must have been a contemporary of Jayanta active around 900 CE.

¹⁰⁴ *Vyomavatī*, p. 343: *athādityaparivartanam evāstu kiṃ kāleneti cet, na, yugapadādī-pratyayānūmayatvāt, na cādityaparivartanād eva yugapadādīpratyayāḥ sambhavanātīti, ekasminn evādityaparivartane sarveṣāṃ anutpādāt, vyapadeśābhāvāc ca, tathā hi, yugapatkāla iti vyapadeśo na yugapadādityaparivartanam iti.* “But if [the opponent says]: let [us] admit that only the movement of the sun exists – what is the point of time? [We reply: we can]not [admit this], because [time] can be inferred from cognitions such as ‘simultaneous,’ and cognitions such as ‘simultaneous’ cannot arise from the mere movement of the sun, because all [simultaneous events] do not occur within one single revolution of the sun, and because this is not how we talk; to explain: [we] talk about ‘a simultaneous time,’ not ‘a simultaneous revolution of the sun!’”

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*: *na ca kriyā kāla iti pratīyate.* “And action is not cognized as time.”

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*: *tathā hi yugapad ete kurvantīti kartrāmbanam jñānam yugapad etāni kṛtānīti kāryāmbanam ca dṛṣṭam. na cātra karṣmātram kāryamātram cāmbanam atiprasaṅgāt...* “To explain: [we] observe that [when we think:] ‘these [agents] are acting simultaneously,’ or ‘these [effects] were produced simultaneously,’ these cognitions respectively rest on objects that are agents and effects; and these objects on which they rest cannot be just agents or just effects, because there would be an overextension.” Cf. *ibid.*, p. 344: *ayugapad ete bruvantīti kartrāmbanam jñānam ayugapad etat kṛtam iti kāryāmbanam jñānam. atrāpi viśiṣṭayoḥ karṣkarmaṇor āmbanatvāt kṣityādivilakṣaṇam nimittaṃ vācyam iti kālasiddhiḥ.* “The cognition ‘these [people] are talking in turn (*ayugapad*)’ rests on an object [consisting in] the agent; the cognition ‘this [result] has been achieved one step at a time (*ayugapad*)’ rests on an object [consisting in] the effect; [and] in these cases too, because [these cognitions] rest on objects [that are] the agent and object [but are] particularized (*viśiṣṭa*), [we] must state a cause [for this particularization] distinct from [the substances] earth and so on – this is the demonstration of time.” Cf. VSV, p. 17, quoted above, n. 91.

¹⁰⁷ See Varadachari 1961.

that time cannot be just action, because the cognitions of time and action are distinct.¹⁰⁸

On the Nyāya side, as far as I know, the first to have criticized something comparable to the YD's position on time is Jayanta; but as mentioned above, although he must have known the YD, Jayanta seems to attribute the thesis, or at least one version of it, to astronomers/astrologers, so that it is not certain whether he intended at all to target Sāṃkhya. After arguing that temporal determinations cannot merely result from actions because the latter themselves may be affected by temporal determinations such as being slow or quick,¹⁰⁹ he dismisses as follows the suggestion that this can be accounted for by the very nature of actions:¹¹⁰

This [explanation] is far from pleasing; for the quickness and slowness in the movements too must in turn be produced by some other cause! Even with respect to the movement [that you present as the cause of a temporal determination, we] see [that people have] cognitions such as “slow” or “quick” [when they think for instance] that someone “is walking slowly” [or] “is running quickly.”¹¹¹

If temporal differences result from movements endowed with different speeds, the very fact that they are endowed with different speeds must still be explained. The opponent therefore tries to avoid the implicit charge of infinite regress by

¹⁰⁸ NK, p. 171 (commenting upon the last words of the passage in PDhS, p. 170, quoted above, n. 98): *yathaikasya puruṣasya pacanādikriyāyogāt pācaka iti pāṭhaka iti vyapadeśas tathā kālasyāpi, na tu prārambhādikriyāiva kālo vilakṣaṇabuddhivedyatvād iti*. “Just as a single man may be called [both] ‘cook’ and ‘reader’ due to [his] association with the acts of cooking and [reading], similarly time too [may be called diversely due to its association with actions]; but [it is] not [true that] time is nothing but the action of undertaking, etc.; because [time and action] are the objects of distinct cognitions.”

¹⁰⁹ NM, vol. I, p. 365: *kriyamāṇasya paṭādeḥ kāryasya tadutpādakasya ca tantuturīvemaśalākākuvindādikāraṇavṛndasya sāmye 'pi kvacit tūrṇaṃ kṛtam, kvacit cireṇa kṛtam iti pratibhāsabhedadarśanān nimittāntaraṃ cintanīyam*. “Although an effect such as a cloth that is [in the process of] being done is the same, and although all [the causes] that bring it into existence, such as the threads, shuttle, loom, needle and weaver, are the same, in some cases [we say] that [this effect] was done quickly, and in others, that it was done slowly; so since [we] observe this difference in the way in which [these effects] appear [to us, we] must think of an additional cause.”

¹¹⁰ NM, vol. I, p. 366: *nanu parispanādikriyābheda evātra nimittam. kaścit parispandaś caturāḥ, kaścīn manthara iti kvacit kṣiprabuddhiḥ, kvacit cirabuddhir iti*. “[– Objection:] But the cause of this [temporal determination] is only the difference in actions such as movements: because a certain movement is quick, and another one slow, in some cases [we] have the cognition [that something] is quick, and in others, that it is slow.”

¹¹¹ Ibid.: *naitac cāru, parispandagatayor api cāturyamāntharyayor nimittāntarakāryatvāt. parispande 'pi cireṇa gacchati, śīghraṃ dhāvatīti cirakṣiprādipratītiḥ dṛśyate*.

arguing that the foundation of our awareness of time is not just *any* movement, but rather, the specific type of movement that pertains to astral bodies, and that the latter are the ultimate measure for all other actions:

[The opponent] replies: cognitions of such [temporal determinations] as succession and simultaneity are not based on the movement of [any ordinary entity] such as Devadatta, but rather, on that of planets, stars and so on; and what [we] call time is [nothing but] the movement of planets, stars and so on.¹¹²

It is the latter position that Jayanta explicitly ascribes to astronomers,¹¹³ and he refutes it thus:

In [experiences that we may describe as] “The sun has slowly set,” “The moon has quickly arisen,” “Mars and Venus seem to have arisen simultaneously,” [we] perceive a [temporally determined] appearance, and [this appearance] cannot be explained as having as its cause the movement of some other planet, because there would follow an infinite regress (*anavasthā*); therefore time is not the movement of planets, etc., but some other real entity that is responsible for [our conventional] usage (*vyavahāra*) [of words denoting] succession, simultaneity, etc.¹¹⁴

This line of argument was adopted by other authors, notably by the Śaiva Rāmakaṇṭha, who explicitly mentions Sāṃkhya *and* the astronomers as upholders of the idea that our awareness of time has actions as its sole cause, and who accuses them in passing of falling into an infinite regress.¹¹⁵ It is likely that the NM was one of Rāmakaṇṭha’s sources for his analysis of time, and that, whether this was Jayanta’s intention or not, Rāmakaṇṭha read the NM as targeting both

¹¹² Ibid.: *āha na devadattādiparispanandanibandhanāḥ kramākramādipratyayāḥ, kintu grahanakṣatrādiparispanandanibandhanāḥ. sa eva ca grahatārādiparispanandāḥ kāla ity ucyate.*

¹¹³ NM, vol. I, p. 367: *iti kālavidas ca jyotirgaṇakās ta evainaṃ budhyante.* “And it is the astrologers/astronomers (*jyotirgaṇaka*), these experts on time (*kālavid*), who understand it [i.e. time] thus.”

¹¹⁴ NM, vol. I, pp. 366–367: *cireṇāstaṃgato bhānuḥ śītāṃśuḥ śīghram udgataḥ | uditāv iva drśyate yugapad bhaumabhārgavau || iti drśyate pratibhāsaḥ, na ca grahāntarapari-spandakāraṇaka eṣa śakyate vaktum anavasthāprasaṅgāt; tasmān na grahādiparispanandāḥ kālaḥ, kintu vastvantaṃ yatkṛto ’yaṃ kramākramādivyavahāraḥ.*

¹¹⁵ Immediately after explaining that according to the Sāṃkhyas, time is not distinct from Nature (see above, n. 71), Rāmakaṇṭha adds (MatV, *Vidyāpāda* 12, p. 338): *iti tadāpy anavasthitaḥ kālaḥ, parīṇateḥ kriyātvenāvasthānāsambhāvād iti.* “In that case too, [as in the astronomers’ view that time is just a particular type of action], time is subjected to an infinite regress (*anavasthita*), because there is no possibility of a foundation (*avasthāna*) [where the regress would end], since the transformation [of Nature itself] consists in action.” Cf. MṛVD, p. 266.

the astronomers and the Sāṃkhyas (perhaps as those who claim that time is just any action, and not necessarily the movement of celestial bodies).

5. The JM and TK – a conflation with the Buddhist criticism of the Vaiśeṣika notion of time?

The JM¹¹⁶ and TK¹¹⁷ both deal with time far more cursorily than the YD, while discussing time under SK 33, which specifies that the external organs of perception and action are related to the present time whereas the internal organ is related to the past, present and future;¹¹⁸ yet the two commentaries have very different ways of tackling the issue.

Thus according to the JM,

It is the object (*viśaya*) [of the organs] itself, past, future and present, that [we] call “time,” [and we call it thus] because it is divided⁹ (*kalyate*); there is no time over and above the [organs’ object], because one cannot accept the consequence [that would follow otherwise – namely,] that there would be twenty-six principles.¹¹⁹

This brief remark, which apparently encapsulates everything that the JM has to say on time, highlights what is at stake in this debate for all the SK commentators: the SK’s teaching that the entire universe boils down to twenty-five principles. It brings to mind the identification of time with the *vyakta* category found in the first group of commentaries on the SK, but it makes no mention at all of the reduction of time to actions that appears in the YD, and it merely presents time as an aspect of the objects grasped by the organs of thought, perception and action.

As the JM, the TK emphasizes that time is no distinct *tattva*; contrary to the JM, however, it offers an argument to prove that it must be the case:

¹¹⁶ Its date and authorship are still debated (see e.g. Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 21 and 271 for further references). Chakravarti 1951: 164–168, has argued that the JM presupposes the YD and that one of its interpretations is criticized in the TK. At any rate there is a close relationship between the JM and TK (for instance they are the only two SK commentaries to discuss the nature of time under SK 33).

¹¹⁷ Vācaspatimiśra was active in the second half of the 10th century (see Acharya 2006: xviii–xxviii).

¹¹⁸ SK 33: *antaḥkaraṇaṃ trividhaṃ daśadhā bāhyaṃ trayasya viśayākhyam | sāmpratākālaṃ bāhyaṃ trikālaṃ abhyantaraṃ karaṇam ||* “The internal organ is threefold; the external [organ], which is said [to be] the object of the three[fold internal organ], is tenfold; the external organ is related to the present time, [whereas] the internal organ is related to the three times.”

¹¹⁹ JM, p. 40: *kalyata iti kālo viśaya evātīto ’nāgato vartamānaś cocyate. na tadvyatirekeṇa kālo ’sti, mā bhūt śaḍvīmśatitattvaprasaṅga iti.*

And [since] time [as it is] admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas is one, [it is] incapable of causing the diversity in [our] talking about [things as being past, present] and future; therefore let [us] admit that only the various extrinsic properties through which this [time allegedly] produces the variety [of temporal determinations] such as [“past,” “present”] and “future” are [in fact] the causes of our talking about [things as being past, present] and future: regarding this [variety of temporal determinations,] what could be the point of [the Vaiśeṣikas’] time, which is [as useless as] a humpback?¹²⁰ – This is what the masters of Sāṃkhya [declare]. Therefore [they] do not acknowledge an additional principle that would consist in time.¹²¹

The YD did not use the word *upādhi*, but argued that since the Vaiśeṣikas themselves acknowledge – as VS 2.2.10 does – that temporal determinations only occur in produced or impermanent entities, they cannot legitimately infer the existence of time as their imperceptible cause, because the fact that temporal determinations only (and always) occur in produced entities rather shows that actions must be the source of temporal determinations. The TK, for its part, points out that since the Vaiśeṣikas themselves acknowledge – as Praśastapāda does –¹²² that time is one and that the apparent diversity of time is due to actions defined as extrinsic properties that we superimpose onto time, they *ipso facto* admit that time, which they claim to infer as the cause of temporal determinations, plays no causal role in the production of these determinations; we can and should therefore dispense with such a useless speculative entity and consider that temporal determinations have no other cause besides the extrinsic properties themselves.¹²³

¹²⁰ On the compound *antargaḍu* (lit. an “internal growth”), see e.g. the commentaries on Utpaladeva’s ĪPK 1.2.5cd (*yady evam antargaḍunā ko ’rthaḥ syāt sthāyinātmanā* || “If it is the case, [then] what could be the point of a permanent self [as useless as] a humpback?”). Abhinavagupta comments (ĪPV, vol. I, p. 64): *evam tarhy antargaḍur yathāyāsāya param, tadvad ātmā sthiraḥ kalpanāyāsamātraphala iti kiṃ tena*. “If it is the case, just as a humpback only results in weariness, in the same way, a permanent self results in nothing but a weariness of the speculative faculty – so what is the point [of assuming its existence]?” The *Bhāskārī* further explains (vol. I, p. 98): *gaḍuḥ – kubja-prṣṭhastho māṃsapiṇḍaḥ, sa hi sphuṭam evāyāsakārī*. “*gaḍu* [designates] a mass of flesh on the back of [someone] whose back is humped; for obviously, this causes weariness!” See also below, n. 130.

¹²¹ TK, p. 140: *kālaś ca vaiśeṣikābhimata eko nānāgatādīvyavahārābhedaṃ vartayitum arhati. tasmād ayaṃ yair upādhibhedair anāgatādibhedam pratipadyate santu ta evopādhayo ’nāgatādīvyavahārāhetavaḥ, kṛtam atrāntargaḍunā kāleneti sām̐khyācāryāḥ. ta-smān na kālarūpatattvāntarābhyupagama iti*.

¹²² See above, n. 98.

¹²³ Cf. the similar objection in ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 4: *nanu ko ’sau kālo yo bhāvānām avacchedaucyate. yohi kaiścinnityadravyaviśeṣātmopagataḥ, sa ekatvāt saṃyogaviśeṣac citrākāracirakṣiprādīdhihetuḥ katham. upādhibalāt tathābhidhāne ta evopādhayaḥ santu,*

This might at first sight appear to be a summary of the YD's strategy, since as the latter, the TK argues that the Vaiśeṣikas do not manage to infer the existence of time and that only the extrinsic properties that Praśastapāda admits to cause temporal diversity are real. Yet it is striking that Vācaspatimiśra never uses the word "action" (*kriyā*), whereas the identification of time with actions indubitably constitutes the core of the YD's reasoning; and one could argue that the TK's formulation of the argument – often presented in secondary literature as Sāṃkhya's standard criticism of the Vaiśeṣika notion of time –¹²⁴ has a somewhat Buddhist ring to it. Thus the eighth-century Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita criticizes the Vaiśeṣika substance of time as follows:

The cognition [that something is] "distant," "close" and so on is based on a mental apprehension that arises from specific conventions – it is not due to time or space: because their nature is partless and one, [they] cannot produce [the cognition] that [something] is close, distant and so on. If [you reply that this cognition arises] due to the diversity [of the differentiated entities] that are in relation with [time and space], then surely the [latter] are useless!¹²⁵

Vācaspatimiśra's presentation of what the "Sāṃkhya masters" have to say about time sounds very close to this, in part because he does not describe as actions the "extrinsic properties" that are said to be enough to produce temporal determinations; for this is precisely where the Buddhist criticism of time diverges from the YD's, as the Buddhists refuse to ascribe reality to action (which they view as a mental construct)¹²⁶ and consider that the differences that produce

kim tena. "[– Objection]: But what is this time that is alleged to be what measures [objective] entities? For how could this [time], acknowledged by some to consist in a particular eternal substance, be the cause of cognitions such as 'slow' and 'quick,' with their diverse aspects, since it is one [and] has a particular conjunction [with all the substances endowed with a material shape]? If it is said to be thus [what measures things] because of extrinsic properties [and not because of its own nature], [then] let [us admit] that only these extrinsic properties exist, [and no distinct substance called time]; what is the point of this [time]?"

¹²⁴ See e.g. Jhaveri 1955: 1, or Balslev 1983: 44–48.

¹²⁵ TS_§ 628–629/TS_κ 629–630: *viśiṣṭasamayodbhūtanamanaskāranibandhanam | parā-parādivijñānam na kālān na dīśaś ca tat || niraṃśaikasvabhāvatvāt paurvāparyādyasambhavaḥ || tayoh sambandhibhedāc ced evaṃ tau niṣphalau nanu ||* The argument is not found in the earlier Buddhist criticisms of time (on which see May 1981; de Jong 1949: 37–42) by Āryadeva or Candrakīrti, who both target the MBh's *kālavāda* rather than the Vaiśeṣikas' view.

¹²⁶ See e.g. AKBh 9, pp. 134–136: *katham ca pradīpo gacchati. pradīpa ity arciṣāṃ santāna upacaryate. sa deśāntareṣūtpadyamānas taṃ taṃ deśaṃ gacchatiṭy ucyate*. "And how does a lamp[']s flame] move? [We] talk about 'the lamp[']s flame]' in a figurative way,

temporal differentiations are, rather than actions, the momentary entities themselves. This is obvious from Kamalaśīla's commentary on Śāntarakṣita's verses (which presents the source of temporal differences as the *entities*),¹²⁷ but also for instance from the demonstration that "what [we] call time is nothing"¹²⁸ by

[when we actually mean] the series of [different, momentary] flames; [and we] say of the [new flame] arising [at every moment] in different places that it 'moves' to this or that place." Cf. TS_ś 704–706/TS_k 705–707: *dr̥śyatvābhimataṃ karma na vastuvyatireki ca | dr̥śyate 'to 'pi* naivāsyā sattā yuktānupātini || asthire vā sthire vaivaṃ gatyādīnām asambhavaḥ | prāktanāparadeśābhyāṃ vibhāgaprāptyayogataḥ || deśāntaropalabdhes tu nairantaryeṇa janmanaḥ | samānāparavastūnām gatibhrāntiḥ pradīpavat || [*'to 'pi TS_ś; so 'pi TS_k.]* "Action, [inasmuch as we] regard [it] as [something] perceptible [and not as a mental construct], is nothing over and above the real thing [itself], and no existence of this [action] that would be compatible with reason is [ever] perceived [in addition] to this [real thing]. Thus [actions] such as going cannot occur in [anything,] whether impermanent or permanent, because no[thing] can be separated from the place [it] former[ly occupied] or reach another place. Rather, just as in the [case of] a lamp[']s flame], the illusion [that there is such a thing as an action] of going is due to the arising in a contiguous series of real things that are similar [yet] different, because [we] perceive [each of them] in different places."

¹²⁷ TSP_ś, vol. I, pp. 259–260/TSP_k, vol. I, p. 209: *atha matam – dikkālasambandhino bhā-vā bāhyādhyātmikāḥ pradīpaśarīrādayas teṣāṃ paurvāparyādi vidyate, tatas tayoṛ api dikkālayoḥ sambandhigatam etat paurvāparyādi nirdiśyate, tasmān na viruddhatā hetor iti bhāvaḥ. atrottaram āha evaṃ tau niṣphalau nanv iti. evaṃ hi kalpyamāne tau dikkālau niṣphalau syātām, tatsādhyābhimatasya kāryasya tair eva sambandhibhir niṣpāditatvāt. tathā hi kālāḥ pūrvāparakṣaṇalavanimeṣakāṣṭhākālāmuhūrtāhorātrārddhamāsādipratya-yaprasavahetuḥ. dik ca pūrvottarādivyavasthāhetur iṣyate. ayaṃ ca bhedaḥ sakalas tayoṛ na svātmani vidyate. bhedeṣu punar astīti vyārthaiva tatparikalpanā.* "But the [following] opinion [might be urged]: 'The entities (*bhāva*) that are in relation with space and time – whether [they are] external [to us], such as a lamp, or belonging to us, such as [our] body – have [properties] such as being anterior and posterior; therefore these [properties] such as being anterior and posterior, which reside within that which has a relation with space and time, are ascribed to these [space and time] as well, so the reason [in our inference] is not contradictory' – this is the implied gist [of the opponent's objection]. [Śāntarakṣita] states the response to this [when he says] 'Then surely the [latter] are useless!' For ['then,' i.e., if] one imagines that it is so, these space and time must be useless, because the effect supposedly brought about by them is accomplished solely by these [entities] that are in relation [with the so-called space and time]. To explain: [according to you,] time is the cause that produces the cognitions 'anterior,' 'posterior,' [or the cognitions of the time units called] *lava*, *nimeṣa*, *kāṣṭhā*, *kalā*, *muhūrta*, day and night, fortnight and so on; and [you] consider space to be the cause of states such as 'east,' 'north,' etc. Now, this whole diversity is not intrinsic to [space and time] (*tayoṛ na svātmani vidyate*): on the contrary, it exists in the differentiated [entities that are supposedly in relation with space and time] – so the assumption of [space and time's existence] is entirely vain."

¹²⁸ PVA, p. 112: *na kālo nāma kaścit*. For a summary of Prajñākaragupta's refutation of

Prajñākaragupta (active around 800). For according to the latter, those who claim that time is nothing but actions such as the sun's revolution are wrong:

If [our opponent says that] time is nothing but the movement of the sun and so on, [we reply:] no, because there is no movement [that would exist] over and above the nature of the sun or [any other entity that we consider to be moving].¹²⁹

Vācaspatimiśra may have avoided mentioning the reduction of time to actions for the sake of brevity; one could suspect, however, that he purposefully made the two criticisms sound identical by remaining silent about the YD's distinctive line of argument (i.e., since temporal determinations are only found in effects, they are produced by actions), by refraining from defining what the “extrinsic properties” in question are (i.e. actions), and perhaps also by using the compound *antargaḍu*, that the Buddhists often employ to mock the useless speculative inventions of their Brahmanical opponents.¹³⁰ As will be seen shortly, he himself seemed to dislike the Sāṃkhya position on time, and it is not impossible that in this particular instance he chose to present the Sāṃkhya position as boiling down to the Buddhist one in an attempt to disqualify it in Brahmanical eyes.

6. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika reactions to the TK's argument: Vācaspatimiśra's response

Thus, quite amusingly, it is Vācaspatimiśra himself who, in his commentary on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, offered a response to the TK argument that eventually became the standard form of the inference of time in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (so much so that Vācaspatimiśra is sometimes presented in secondary sources as having invented the inference of time).¹³¹ Since the NVTṬ is referred to at least three times in the TK,¹³² Vācaspatimiśra must have been perfectly aware, while explaining the Sāṃkhya argument in favour of the reduction of time to actions,

time as a substance see Franco 2011: 94–96.

¹²⁹ PVA, p. 112: *athādityādigatir eva kālaḥ. na, ādityādisvarūpavyatirekeṇa gatyabhāvāt.*

¹³⁰ Although it is occasionally encountered in Brahmanical texts as well, it seems to have been favoured by Buddhist authors; Dharmakīrti for instance uses it when emphasizing the Veda's uselessness as a means of knowledge (see Eltschinger, Krasser and Taber 2012: 39, n. 32), and the passages quoted above from Śaiva texts (n. 120) put the word in the mouth of a Buddhist opponent who points out the inability of a hypothetical unchanging self to account for the variety of our momentary cognitions.

¹³¹ See Prasad 1984b: 237: “it was Vācaspati (980 AD) who first suggested the method of inference of time.”

¹³² See Acharya 2006: xxxii.

that it laid itself open to a scathing criticism – his own –; and his silence in the TK is certainly an indication that he deemed the Sāṃkhya position weak.¹³³ For in the NVTṬ, Vācaspatimiśra points out as follows the defect inherent in the thesis that he ascribes to the “masters of Sāṃkhya” in the TK:

[Someone] may [object]: “[The properties of] being [temporally] close and distant can occur thanks to the sole body [of an individual] that is particularized by a smaller or greater amount of actions of the sun’s rising and setting; what could be the point in this respect of another substance that would be time?” [We answer:] This is not [acceptable,] because the action that inheres in the sun has no relation (*sambandha*) with the body [of that individual].¹³⁴

Actions can be compared with each other and measured by each other only if they can enter in some kind of *relation* with each other; but when we say that someone is X years old, and thus evaluate this person’s age relatively to the movement of the sun, what kind of relation can there be between the body of the individual, in which an action such as breathing, walking, etc., inheres, and that of the extremely distant sun, where the motion of the sun inheres? Movements inhere in substances, and only substances can be connected or conjoined (*saṃyukta*) with each other, but how could the two substances that are an individual’s body and the sun be in any way connected?

¹³³ According to Acharya 2006: lxvi–lxvii, Vācaspatimiśra “can be said to be trying to promote all of the orthodox Brahmanical philosophies independently, even if he is not aiming at harmonising them... Vācaspatimiśra authored his works on rival philosophies without taking sides...” In contrast, according to Phillips 2015: 7, he is to be compared to “the analytic philosopher who incorporates a broad inheritance while forging her own position,” such as “Rawls studying previous social-contract theorists, or Chisholm studying Descartes, Hume, and Russell.” Although it seems to me, perhaps wrongly, that the latter model is inadequate, Phillips 2015: 6 is certainly right in pointing out Vācaspatimiśra’s “deafening silence” regarding some aspects of instrumental causality in the TK: it seems that his discrete but efficient way of indicating when he thinks little of a thesis is to remain silent about possible objections to it while commenting on a treatise that defends it (instead of examining such objections so as to demonstrate that the thesis withstands all potential criticism), and to voice these objections in another treatise. This complex game of silences in Vācaspatimiśra’s works and the overall agenda that governs them still await a thorough study (cf. e.g. his attitude in the debate on the Sāṃkhya notion of *abhivyakti*: see Ratié 2014: 145 and 165–166).

¹³⁴ NVTṬ, p. 357: *sūryodayāstamayakriyāpracayālpavabahutvaviśiṣṭāt* piṇḍād eva paratvāparatve bhaviṣyataḥ kṛtam atra dravyāntareṇa kāleneti cet, na, savitr̥samavetāyāḥ kriyāyāḥ piṇḍenāsambandhāt. [*°kriyāpracayālpavabahutvaviśiṣṭāt corr.; °kriyā pracayālpavabahutvaviśiṣṭāt Ed.]*

On the other hand, [we can explain this by saying that] this relation is the inherence of the [sun's action in a substance, i.e. the sun,] which is conjoined with time, [the latter being] omnipresent; and ether, although omnipresent [as well], cannot produce the contrast between [the properties of being] distant and close, because there is no difference in its nature; besides, the ether and the self, [despite their omnipresence,] are not the cause of the contrast between [the properties of being] distant and close, because as the earth for instance, [which does not share the quality of smell with any other substance,] they have some uncommon properties.¹³⁵

In order to account for the relation between the sun's revolutions and the individual said to be X years old, we must assume that the substance in which the motion of the sun inheres, i.e. the sun, is connected with a second substance that is omnipresent, and therefore connected with anything of which we may say that it is X years old. Ether and the self could be this second substance since they are both omnipresent; but ether merely contains things without relating them with each other, so that it cannot be responsible for our awareness of spatial closeness or distance (which requires a distinct cause, namely space, *dis*),¹³⁶ let alone for our awareness of the contrast between spatial proximity and temporal distance in one and the same entity;¹³⁷ besides, both ether and the self have qualities that belong to no other substance (such as sound for ether, or cognition for the self), which disqualifies them as a neutral medium capable of relating all substances to the movement of the sun.¹³⁸ We therefore have no choice but to infer an eternal, all-pervading locus devoid of any specific qualities and capable of producing a relation between any given body and the sun's movement, and this is precisely what time is:

Therefore the sun's movement and the movement of, say, Devadatta, both have a relation with time, which is omnipresent; [this relation] consists in [their] inherence in [substances, i.e. the sun and Devadatta's body,] that are

¹³⁵ Ibid.: *saṃyuktasamavāyas tv asyāḥ sambandhaḥ kālena sarvagatenāsyāsti, na cākāśaṃ sarvagatam api parāparavyatikarāya kalpate tasya svarūpeṇābhedāt. api cākāśātmānau na parāparavyatikarakāraṇam asādhāraṇagūṇayogitvāt pṛthivyādivat.*

¹³⁶ See e.g. Bhaduri 1947: 214, on this fundamental difference between *ākāśa* and *dis*.

¹³⁷ Cf. NVTP, p. 371: *tasya svarūpeṇābhedād iti dikkālakṛtayoḥ parasparaviruddhayoḥ paratvāparatvayor abhinnenākāśena sampādayitum aśakyayor aparam api dravyāntaram kalpanīyam ity arthaḥ.* “‘Because there is no difference in its nature’ – this means that since the [properties of] being close and distant, which are mutually contradictory [and] result from space and time, cannot be produced by ether, which is undifferentiated, yet another distinct substance must be postulated.”

¹³⁸ This, at least, is how I understand the argument; cf. Bhaduri 1947: 228.

[respectively] conjoined [with time]; and through this intermediary (*dvār*), the two movements also have a relation [with each other].¹³⁹

Vācaspatimiśra's reasoning was adopted, in part or in totality, by many later authors, including Śrīdhara¹⁴⁰ and Udayana, whose reformulation of Vācaspatimiśra's thesis is often taken as the main source for the inference of time in secondary literature.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ NVTT, pp. 357–358: *tasmāt sūryaparispandasya devadattādiparispandasya cāsti kālena sarvagatena saṃyuktasamavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, etayā ca dvārā parispaṇdayor apy asti sambandha iti.*

¹⁴⁰ NK, p. 166: *ādityaparivartanālpīyastvanibandhano yuvasthavirapiṇḍābhyām* parā-paravyavahāra ity eke, tad ayuktam, ādityaparivartanasya yuvasthavirayoḥ sambandhābhāvād asambaddhasya nimittatve cātiprasaṅgāt.* [*yuvasthavirapiṇḍābhyām corr.; yuvasthavirapiṇḍābhyām Ed.] “Some [say] that our talking about something [temporally] close or distant has as its [sole] basis the fact that two bodies, one of which is young and the other old, have a smaller [or greater] number of revolutions of the sun. [But] this is not correct, because [then] there [can] be no relation between the revolution of the sun and the young and old [bodies], and because if [something] unrelated [to the temporally determined bodies] were a cause [of their temporal determinations], the [thesis would suffer from] an overextension.” On the fact that, contrary to what is assumed in Bhattacharyya 1945: 352–353, Śrīdhara certainly knew several works by Vācaspatimiśra, including the TK, see Acharya 2006: xxii–xxvi; on divergences in Śrīdhara's justification of the existence of time with Vācaspatimiśra's inference see Bhaduri 1947: 189–190, although I doubt whether these differences are to be explained as a result of the fact that “the postulation of indirect relation through the intervention of a *tertium quid*, and calling this intervening factor time, evidently, did not appeal to him” (ibid.: 189). Prasad 1984b: 238 even reads the passage quoted above as a denial of “any possibility of establishing a relation between the notions of temporal priority... and posteriority... and the movement of the sun.” It seems to me, however, that the sentence in question is a response to an opponent who wants to dispense with the very idea of time, and that Śrīdhara is simply alluding here to Vācaspatimiśra's strategy (namely: we cannot accept that temporal determinations have actions as their sole cause, *otherwise* there is no possible relation between the sun's movement and a temporally determined body). I also doubt whether Śrīdhara's other arguments (there must be a specific cause for our awareness of temporal determinations, and causality itself would be impossible without time) should be considered in any way incompatible with Vācaspatimiśra's reasoning.

¹⁴¹ See KĀ, pp. 76–77, and e.g. Bhaduri 1947: 185–189, or Prasad 1984b: 237–238. In particular, Udayana points out the absurd consequences that would ensue if ether or the self were capable of making a property that inheres in a given substance pass into a distant body by the sole virtue of their proximity with both (KĀ, p. 77): *tathātve caikatra bheryām abhihatāyām sarvabherīṣu śabdotpattiprasaṅgāt...*; “And because if it were the case, as a consequence any sound [occurring] when one drum is beaten would occur in all drums,” ibid.: *anyathā vārāṇasīsthitena nīlena pāṭaliputrasthitasya sphaṭikamaṇe rūparañjanaprasaṅgāt*, “Otherwise as a consequence a crystal in Pāṭaliputra would be tinted by the [colour] blue found in Vārāṇasī!” Cf. e.g. *Upaskāra* (on VS 2.2.6), p. 99,

7. The issue in the Pātañjalayoga tradition: the PYV's reduction of time to actions vs. Vijñānabhikṣu's interpretation of the moment's reality

Before turning to the SSū and their commentaries, a few words are in order regarding the Pātañjalayoga tradition; for in much of the secondary literature on time in Sāṃkhya, the identity of the two traditions is taken for granted, but depictions of time in “Sāṃkhya-Yoga” seem somewhat unconvincing because Sāṃkhya and Pātañjalayoga have strikingly different attitudes with respect to time, so that studies claiming to cover at once the two traditions usually end up juxtaposing their respective concepts without being able to show any unity in them.¹⁴² Thus contrary to Sāṃkhya works, the PYSū and PYBh show no interest at all in criticizing the *kālavāda* or the Vaiśeṣika substance of time, which is why they have not been examined here so far. Admittedly, the PYBh, commenting on an aphorism about the moment (*kṣaṇa*) and succession (*krama*),¹⁴³ argues that succession, rightly called time,¹⁴⁴ is a mere mental construct (*buddhinirmāṇa*), and this – which brings to mind the assertion in SK 33 that past and future are objects for the sole internal organ –¹⁴⁵ might have had a bearing on the YD's understanding of time:¹⁴⁶

which gives the same arguments, including those of the drums and crystal in Pāṭaliputra coloured by a safflower (*mahārajana*) residing in Vārāṇasī.

¹⁴² See e.g. Jhaveri 1955, Sen 1968, Kumar 1983 and Prasad 1984a. According to Sinha 1983: 173, “there are important differences between YSū and SK, and the PYBh only accentuates those points on which they tend to differ. But in the presentation of the classical Sāṃkhya-Yoga understanding of the time and temporality we do not find evidence of their fundamental difference” (see also *ibid.*: 16 and 175). This is a problematic assertion, both because it forces its author to declare that Vijñānabhikṣu's explicit distinction between the Sāṃkhya and Yoga views on time is simply wrong (*ibid.*: 174ff.) and because I have yet to come across a single clue that the acknowledgement in the PYBh of the reality of the moment (*kṣaṇa*) as opposed to that of sequence (*krama*) finds any correspondence in a Sāṃkhya work – yet Sinha 1983 constantly assumes that all Sāṃkhya and Yoga works are in full agreement in this crucial respect.

¹⁴³ PYSū 3.52: *kṣaṇatatkramayoḥ saṃyamād vivekajaṃ jñānam*. “A knowledge caused by discrimination [arises] from the concentration on moments and their succession.”

¹⁴⁴ PYBh, p. 171: *kramaś ca kṣaṇānantaryātmā taṃ kālavidaḥ kāla ity ācakṣate yoginaḥ*. “And succession consists in the contiguous series of moments; the yogins who are experts on time (*kālavida*) call this ‘time.’”

¹⁴⁵ See above, n. 54.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Oberhammer 1977: 196, which remarks about the following PYBh passage (before quoting in part the one from the YD given above, n. 50): “Dieser Auffassung entspricht die Definition der Zeit, wie sie sich in der YD findet.”

Succession, for its part, is the continuity of the [moments'] flow. There cannot be any real combination of moments and their succession, so [time units] such as *muhūrta* or night-and-day are [mere] mental combinations (*buddhisamāhāra*); indeed, this time, although devoid of reality, appears to have the nature of a real thing to ordinary [people] whose views keep going astray, [whereas in fact] it is a mental construct that conforms to a verbal cognition.¹⁴⁷

Yet the PYBh also defends the thesis that the moment, understood as an atom of time, is real:

The moment, on the other hand, belongs to reality and is the basis of succession.¹⁴⁸

As far as I know, neither the criticism of *krama* per se nor the assertion that *kṣaṇa* is real appears in any of the Sāṃkhya works examined here, and one wonders if and how they are compatible with the Sāṃkhya views presented so far. This is not to say that the Sāṃkhya and Yoga views on time are in fact irreconcilable, or that they were elaborated in isolation from each other; it is notable for instance, with respect to the YD's understanding of time, that the PYBh defines the moment as a kind of minimal or atomic *action*,¹⁴⁹ or that it specifies that the universe's *pariṇāma* must occur in a single moment,¹⁵⁰ and that this moment only exists in a present form;¹⁵¹ it is also of interest in this respect that the PYBh

¹⁴⁷ PYBh, pp. 170–171: *tatpravāhāvicchedas tu kramah. kṣaṇatatkramayor nāsti vastusamāhāra iti buddhisamāhāro muhūrtāhorātrādayaḥ. sa khalv ayaṃ kālo vastuśūnyo 'pi buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānupātī laukikānāṃ vyutthitadarśanānāṃ vastusvarūpa ivāabhāsate.*

¹⁴⁸ PYBh, p. 171: *kṣaṇas tu vastupatitaḥ kramāvalambī.* Cf. TV, p. 171: *vastupatitaḥ – vāstava ity arthaḥ*, and on *kramāvalambī*, *ibid.*: *krameṇāvalambyate vaikalpikenety arthaḥ.* See von Rospatt 1995: 97: “Whereas in Buddhism conditioned entities are atomized temporally, in the PYSBh time is atomized into moments which alone are considered to be real.” Cf. Vijñānabhikṣu's remark below (n. 157), according to which the main difference is that in the Pātañjalayoga tradition, only the moment is impermanent.

¹⁴⁹ PYBh, p. 170: *yathāpakarṣaparyantaṃ dravyaṃ paramāṇur evaṃ paramāpakarṣaparyantaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇo yāvatā vā samayena calitaḥ paramāṇuḥ pūrvadeśaṃ jahyād uttaradeśaṃ upasampadyeta sa kālaḥ kṣaṇaḥ.* “Just as the atom is the smallest possible substance, the moment is the smallest possible time, [i.e.] the ultimate [particle of time]; or a moment is the time taken by a moving atom to abandon one place and to reach a second one.” On the probable Buddhist influence on this definition, see below, n. 154.

¹⁵⁰ PYBh, p. 171: *tenaikena kṣaṇena kṛtsno lokaḥ pariṇāmam anubhavati.* “Therefore the entire world experiences transformation in a single moment.”

¹⁵¹ PYBh, p. 171: *tasmād vartamāna evaikah kṣaṇo na pūrvottarakṣaṇāḥ santīti.* “Therefore one moment is only present; there are no past or future moments.”

defines the present, past and future relatively to the performance of action.¹⁵² Yet it seems very difficult to say anything definite about a connection between the PYBh's and YD's statements on time (for instance the Naiyāyikas too define the future, past and present relatively to action,¹⁵³ which does not prevent them from postulating a substance called time beyond them); and the impact of some Buddhist conceptions of time on the PYBh is in fact much more conspicuous¹⁵⁴ than the relationship between the definitions of *kāla* in Pātañjalayoga and Sāṃkhya. It is striking in particular that Vācaspatimiśra does not mention at all in his TV the argument against the Vaiśeṣika definition of time that he himself presents in the TK as the core view of the "Sāṃkhya masters" on this topic. Nor does it appear in Bhoja's commentary on the PYSū. Vijñānabhikṣu, for his part, briefly mentions it in his PYVā, but he does so to point out that this is *not* what the PYBh means, as evidenced by the fact that it upholds the moment's reality:

[One could object the following:] "But if thus [succession is a mere mental construct], let [us] admit that the moment too is nothing but a concept, because [we] talk indifferently about [succession and the moment as being] time, and because [our] talking about the moment is possible on the mere basis of [something] such as the action of a [moving] atom." [The author] answers this [by saying] "The moment, on the other hand, [belongs to reality...]"¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² PYBh, p. 196: *bhaviṣyadyaktikam anāgatam anubhūtavyaktikam atītam svavyāpāro-pārūḍham vartamānam...* "Future is that whose manifestation is yet to come; past is that whose manifestation has been experienced; present is that which is engaged in its own activity." In the Sāṃkhya perspective, the cause's activity only brings about the effect's manifestation (*[abhi]vyakti*) rather than its existence, so that here the three times appear to be entirely defined in terms of action. This is the beginning of the commentary on PYSū 4.12: *atītānāgatam svarūpato 'sty adhvabhedād dharmāṇām*. "What is past and future exists by nature, because properties are divided along the [three temporal] paths." On the PYBh thereon see Bronkhorst 2011: 58–59.

¹⁵³ See e.g. NSūBh, p. 81: *nādhvavyaṅgyaḥ kālaḥ. kiṃ tarhi kriyāvyāṅgyaḥ patatīti yā patanakriyā sā yadoparatā bhavati sa kālaḥ patitaḥ kālaḥ, yadotpatsyate sa patitavyaḥ kālaḥ, yadā tu dravye vartamānā kriyā grhyate sa vartamānaḥ kālaḥ*. "Time may be revealed not by the distance [covered by something in movement], but rather, by action: the time when the action of falling [expressed as] 'X is falling' has ceased is the past time; the [time] when [this action] has yet to begin is the future time; whereas [the time] when the action is apprehended as taking place in a substance is the present time."

¹⁵⁴ See e.g. Keith [1918] 1924: 66; Stcherbatsky 1923: 43–47; Frauwallner 1953: 321–327; Shah 1968: 68; Sinha 1983; Halbfass 1992: 216; Bronkhorst 2011: 59; Maas 2014. The definition of *kṣaṇa* quoted above (n. 149) is also found in Buddhist sources; von Rospatt 1995: 102–104, while conjecturing that it might have originated in Jainism, notes (*ibid.*: 297, n. 215) that in this respect "the position of the PYBh bears the mark of the Buddhist theory of momentariness;" see also Eltschinger 2007: 279, n. 257.

¹⁵⁵ PYVā, p. 382: *nanv evaṃ kṣaṇo 'pi vikalpamātro bhavatu kālavyavahārāviśeṣāt kṣaṇa-*

Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that the PYBh's main point is the reality of *kṣaṇa*, defined as a particular transformation (*pariṇāma*) of Nature and as a substance (*dravya*).¹⁵⁶ He distinguishes this thesis from the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness by explaining that while the Buddhists hold all entities to be momentary, the followers of Yoga believe that nothing besides the moment itself is momentary;¹⁵⁷ yet ultimately, the moment is no distinct *padārtha* since it is in fact nothing but an aspect of Nature's infinite mutability.¹⁵⁸ Vijñānabhikṣu insists that as a consequence, the PYBh *cannot be denying the reality of time itself*, but only that of succession:

Therefore in this treatise, time is the moment itself – this is the thesis [held here]; whereas a certain [person]'s idle discourse to the effect that in this [tradition], time is not admitted [to exist at all], is based on a misunderstanding of the *Bhāṣya*'s meaning.¹⁵⁹

The PYVā thus highlights a divergence within the Pātañjalayoga tradition as to whether the PYBh admits that time is a mere word for actions (which could be supported, as Vijñānabhikṣu himself points out, by the definition of the moment as a minimal atomic movement), or whether it concedes the existence of time by proclaiming the moment's reality. Vijñānabhikṣu defends the latter interpretation (which he sees as one of the fundamental differences between the Yoga and Sāṃkhya traditions)¹⁶⁰ and scornfully alludes to another person who held

vyavahārasya ca paramāṇukriyādibhya eva sambhavād iti tatrāha kṣaṇās tv iti.

¹⁵⁶ PYVā, p. 382: *sa ca kṣaṇākhyāḥ kālāḥ sattvādīnāṃ dravyarūpaḥ pariṇāmaviśeṣa iti.* “And the time called ‘moment’ is a particular transformation (*pariṇāma*) – which consists in a substance – of [the constituents] *sattva*, [*rajas* and *tamas*].”

¹⁵⁷ PYVā, pp. 382–383: *bauddhamatāc cāsmākam ayaṃ viśeṣo yad asmābhir dharmi-grāhakapramāṇabalāt kṣaṇa evāsthira iṣyate, kṣaṇasthairyapratyabhiññādyabhāvāt, na kṣaṇātiriktaḥ kṣaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ kaścid iṣyate, taiḥ tu kṣaṇamāstrasthāyī eva padārthaḥ sarva iṣyata iti.* “And here is the difference between our [doctrine] and the Buddhists’: because means of knowledge grasp [lasting] property-bearers (*dharmīn*), we consider that only the moment is impermanent, since there is no [means of knowledge] such as recognition [that would establish] the moment's permanence, [and we] do not admit any entity (*padārtha*) that would be momentary while being something over and above the moment [itself]; whereas [the Buddhists] consider that every entity only exists for just a moment.”

¹⁵⁸ See PYSā, p. 71, quoted below, n. 241.

¹⁵⁹ PYVā, p. 383: *tad asmiṇ śāstre kṣaṇa eva kāla iti siddhāntaḥ. kālo 'tra nābhyupagamyata iti kasyacit pralāpas tu bhāṣyārthāvivēkamūla iti.*

¹⁶⁰ From his PYSā – which does not mention the reduction of time to actions but openly criticizes (see below, n. 241) the SSū's definition of time (on which see §8) –, it is clear that *asmiṇ śāstre* in PYVā, p. 383, designates Yoga as opposed to Sāṃkhya. Cf. the conclusion of the discussion on time in PYSā, p. 383: *evam anye 'py asmacchāstrasiddhāntāḥ*

the former. This unnamed exegete cannot be identified with Vācaspatimiśra, who does not discuss this issue in the TV's succinct gloss of this passage;¹⁶¹ nor, apparently, is he the author of the PYV, who also acknowledges, however tersely, the reality of *kṣaṇa*.¹⁶² In any case two points are noteworthy here: first, Patañjali's acceptance of the moment's reality was seen at least by some as an unacceptable departure from the blanket denial of time found in the Sāṃkhya commentarial tradition, and an attempt was made in consequence to read the PYBh passage as a complete negation of time's reality.¹⁶³ Second, while explaining why, according to the PYBh, succession is "devoid of reality" and is in fact a "mental construct," one Pātañjalayoga commentary, namely the PYV, explicitly links the YBh's reflections on time with Sāṃkhya's denial of time as an eternal substance; and while doing so, it elaborately defends the YD's thesis. Here is the passage in question, which has been entirely overlooked in the secondary literature on time in "Sāṃkhya-Yoga:"¹⁶⁴

sāṃkhyādipratīṣṭhāḥ subudhibhir upapādanīyāḥ. "Yet other theses of our tradition (*asmacchāstra*) that are contradictory with the Sāṃkhyas' and others are to be rationally justified in the same way by the intelligent." Kumar 1983: 131, according to which the PYVā "concludes that the Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory is that the moment itself is time," should therefore be considered with caution: Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that this conclusion is *not* a Sāṃkhya theory.

¹⁶¹ The TV merely confirms that according to the PYBh the moment is "real" (*vāstava*, see above, n. 148).

¹⁶² PYV, p. 310: *kṣaṇas tu vasturūpaḥ vāstavikas tad dravyānyathātvenānumīyamānaḥ kramāvalambī*. "'The moment, on the other hand, consists in a real entity' – [i.e.] it is real [inasmuch as it is] inferred as the transformation? (*anyathātva*) of that substance [which is itself real] – 'and is the basis of succession.'" Philipp Maas (personal written communication, 06/09/2019) has pointed out to me that *vasturūpaḥ* is a variant reading for the vulgate PYBh *vastupatitaḥ*, and suggested that *tad dravyānyathātvenānumīyamānaḥ* means that it is "inferred from the fact that it is different from its substance, i.e. the existing entity." I have no certainty at all as to the meaning of °*anyathātvena* here; it seems to me, perhaps wrongly, that it rather points to the notion of *pariṇāma* (Philipp Maas himself has suggested *ibid.* a link between this passage and PYSū 3.13, which discusses transformation); cf. Vijñānabhikṣu's definition of *kṣaṇa* as a *pariṇāmaviśeṣa* (see above, n. 156).

¹⁶³ Perhaps this was done by suggesting that the moment does not in fact belong to time; thus it might not be a coincidence that while Vijñānabhikṣu explicitly equates *kāla* and *kṣaṇa*, the PYV for instance does not, and it is not impossible that the PYBh's assertion that it is *krama* that the "experts on time" call time was taken by some as suggesting that in fact *kṣaṇa*, although admittedly real, is beyond time, so that time (exclusively defined as sequence in the last analysis) must be considered to have no reality at all.

¹⁶⁴ This has enabled such statements as the one in Prasad 1984a: 43: "Yoga, like Sāṃkhya, admits that time is not an independent reality. But whereas the latter identifies time with

But for him who [considers that] time is distinct from actions, eternal [and] all-pervasive, even such [properties as] being slow or quick cannot be an inferential mark for the existence of time as a distinct [entity], because [these properties] amount to nothing but action; for what defines (*lakṣaṇa*) an action the measure of which is not [yet] known is [simply] an action the measure of which is [already] determined,¹⁶⁵ as [when we say] that [someone] sleeps until the milking of cows [is done], or that he studies until the cooking of rice [is completed] – and time is nothing but this. For the eternal, all-pervasive, unchangeable (*kūṭastha*) [time postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas] cannot be that which measures (*paricchedaka*) something else – as for instance the [measure called] *prastha* [determines a weight or capacity] –,¹⁶⁶ because it can have no relation (*sambandha*) [with anything else]. If [our opponent replies] that time does [constitute] a measure, as for instance the [measure called] *prastha*, [but only inasmuch as it is] endowed with action, [then,] because it too is endowed with action, and because that which is endowed with action must [in turn] be measured, there must be another time endowed with action that measures [the first one], and a third [one measuring] the second [one] – and an infinite regress ensues! Besides, if [time] is endowed with action, its being impermanent must ensue as well. But if [the opponent responds] that [there is no such infinite regress because] a [given] time can be measured by its own activity, [then] since [he must accept that] the other [times] too can be measured by their respective activities, the supposition of time as a distinct entity is useless! And thus let [us] admit that time is nothing but action. If [the opponent] still [argues] that time measures [things] by its mere existence, [then] since it is not different as regards existence from all [other existing things], the same ensues. If [the opponent retorts] that this dilemma (*vikalpa*)¹⁶⁷ also

change or action, the former nowhere explicitly does so.”

¹⁶⁵ Cf. (as an example of divergence among many others) the translation of this sentence in Rukmani 2001, vol. II: 115: “Action has a fixed measure as there is no knowledge of action as something that does not take notice of the measure.”

¹⁶⁶ Cf. ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 4 (quoted below, n. 171), which also mentions a well-known measure. Leggett 1990: 357, leaves *prasthādivat* untranslated (twice); Rukmani 2001, vol. II: 115 understands “like a journey (*prasthā*).”

¹⁶⁷ Given the Sanskrit formulation, I do not think that Leggett 1990: 357, is right in understanding that the objection means “Your ‘action-time’ too is a mere logical construct,” although the answer provided could at first sight seem to confirm the latter interpretation. It seems to me that here the *vikalpa* said to ensue also in the case of the thesis that time is action is the dilemma just put forward by the author of the PYV against his Vaiśeṣika opponent, i.e.: either his time is not endowed with action, but then this unitary, immutable time cannot measure anything; or it is endowed with action and therefore must be measured by another time endowed with action, and so on *ad infinitum*. The opponent is arguing that the author of the PYV leaves himself open to the same criticism: either the action that measures another action is not itself limited (and therefore cannot help

ensues in [our] perspective according to which time is action, [we answer:] no; because the action [used to measure a given time] is well known by all, and because its being a measure is established in [ordinary experiences] such as “he stays until the milking of cows [is completed].” it is an action that [we] grasp [as] the measure [of time], and [we do] not [grasp] any other time that would be such a measure. And the cognition “slow” [or] “quick” results from the varying intensity of the effort [involved in the action]: it does not have as its cause a time that would be a distinct [entity].¹⁶⁸

The passage takes aim at a Vaiśeṣika opponent, showing that temporal determinations cannot be considered an inferential mark for an eternal, all-pervasive time because they are simply the result of our measuring a given action with another, well-known action; whereas the Vaiśeṣika’s substance is incapable of measuring anything because it is devoid of limits (so that it cannot assign limits to anything else) and because, being utterly immutable, it cannot enter into a relation with anything else and behave like a measure determining other entities. If the Vaiśeṣika replies that time can measure things inasmuch as it is “endowed with action” (i.e., in Praśastapāda’s terms, inasmuch as we superimpose onto it the extrinsic property that is a specific action), he falls into an infinite regress, because this time endowed with a limited action must itself be measured by another time endowed with action, etc, and because its possessing action entails its becoming impermanent.¹⁶⁹ The Vaiśeṣika cannot dodge the criticism by arguing that a given time may be measured by the sole action defining it,

measure another action), or it must be measured by another action, and so on *ad infinitum*.

¹⁶⁸ PYV, p. 310: *yasya tu kriyāvvyatiriktaḥ kālaḥ nityo vibhus tasya cirakṣipratvādy api kriyāmātre paryavasitatvāt prthakkālāstitve na liṅgaṃ ghaṭate, niyataparimāṇā hi kriyā-navaḡataparimāṇāyāḥ kriyāyā lakṣaṇam, yathā – āgodohanam svapiti, audanapākam adhīta iti. sa eva ca kālaḥ. na hi nityayasya vibhos tasya kūṭasthasyāsambandhatvād vastvantaraparicchedakatvaṃ prasthādivad upapadyate. kriyāvān kālaḥ paricchedakaḥ prasthādivad iti cet, tasyāpi kriyāvattvāt kriyāvataś ca paricchedanīyatvād anyena kriyāvātā paricchedakena kālena bhavitavyam, tasyāpy anyenety anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ, kriyāvattvāc cānīyatvaṃ api prasajyeta. atha svavyāpāreṇaiva kālaḥ paricchedanīyatvaṃ* yāyād iti cet, anye ’pi svavyāpāreṇaiva paricchedyā iti kālaprthaktvakalpanā nirarthikā. tathā ca kriyāvāstu kālaḥ. athāpi sadbhāvamātreṇa kālaḥ paricchedaka iti, sarveṣāṃ api sadbhāvaviśeṣād evaṃ prasaktam. kriyākālapakṣe ’py eṣa vikalpaḥ prāpta iti cet, na, kriyāyāḥ sarvaprasiddhatvāt paricchedakatvasya cā godoham āsta ityādiṣu siddhatvāt kriyāiva paricchedikā labhyate, nāparaḥ kālaḥ paricchedaka iti. ciraṃ kṣipram iti ca prayatnamandimapāṭavakṛtaḥ pratyayo na vyatiriktakālanibandhanaḥ...[*paricchedanīyatvaṃ conj.; paricchedanīyakaṃ Ed.]*

¹⁶⁹ A Vaiśeṣika would certainly object that time only *seems* to possess action, the latter being only an *upādhi* superimposed onto it; it is not impossible that the PYV’s author avoided using the word *upādhi*, however, precisely to emphasize that if it does not really possess action, it cannot be what really measures things temporally.

because this would mean that any time can be measured solely by its own action, and if thus only actions produce temporal determinations, there is no reason to infer time as their cause. Nor can time be measured by its own existence, otherwise one might as well consider that any existing entity has this power, and the assumption of time would again be useless. The Vaiśeṣika then replies that those who identify time with action are also doomed to the very infinite regress in which they accuse their opponents of falling, because any action A used to measure an action B is itself in need of an action C capable of measuring it, and so on *ad infinitum*; the PYV's author answers that there is no such infinite regress in his perspective. The reason for this latter answer is best explained with the help of a remark made in passing by the Śaiva Abhinavagupta as he sets out to explain the thesis, mentioned by Utpaladeva, that "Time is the movement of the sun, etc.:"¹⁷⁰

It is by a [particular] weight for instance, the measurement of which is [already] determined, that gold is measured; and there is no infinite regress or logical circle in that. In the same way, Caitra's movement [is measured] by an[other] action the measurement of which is [already] well known, [and] which consists in the rising and setting of the sun – so [we] say [such things as] "Caitra goes for the day." And if [we] want to measure the sun's action too, [we may] measure it with the flows [of water called] *nālikās* that are well known, [as when we say] "The sun is seen during thirty *nālikās*."¹⁷¹

Just as the PYV's author, Abhinavagupta explains that temporal determinations arise from our measuring a given action with another, well-known (*prasiddha*) action, so that, although any measuring action can in turn be measured, this entails no infinite regress, because, being already well known, the measuring action *need* not be measured. In saying so Abhinavagupta is following Utpaladeva's own explanation of the point in his *Vivṛti* on the Pratyabhijñā treatise, which also underscores that the action with which we measure another action is "well known;"¹⁷² and Abhinavagupta's commentary shares with the PYV, besides the

¹⁷⁰ ĪPK 2.1.3: *kālaḥ sūryādisaṃcāraḥ...*

¹⁷¹ ĪPVV, vol. III, p. 4: *niyataparimāṇaṃ yat prativartakādi tena kanakaṃ mīyate; na cātrānavasthānyonyāśrayo vā. tadvat prasiddhāparimāṇayā kriyayārkodayāstamayama-yyā caitragamanam. tad ucyate divasaṃ caitro gacchatīti. ādityakriyāpi yadā parimitsitā bhavati tadā prasiddhābhir nālikāsrutibhir mīyate – triṃśataṃ nālikāḥ sūryo drśyata iti...* Cf. *ibid.*, p. 8, where a *māṣaka* (a well-known measure of gold) is mentioned as a variety of *prativartaka*.

¹⁷² See the explanation of *sā sā prasiddhā kriyā kālaḥ* ("Time is this or that well-known action," ĪPVṛtti, p. 42) in Utpaladeva's hitherto unpublished ĪPVivṛti, Chapter 2.1 (as edited in Ratié 2021: 348–349): ... *bahutarapratipādyapratipādakaprasiddho nālikā-*

simile of a measure of capacity or weight, the specification that this action “has its measurement [already] determined” (*niyataparimāṇa*). The idea presented in all these texts is evidently the one that Bhartṛhari already knew as that of *kālavidyā*, and that he had formulated thus: “with respect to [any] action, the measurement of which is [already] known (*nirjñātapariṇāma*) and which is used to measure other actions, [we] use the word ‘time’;”¹⁷³ Helārāja, for his part, uses the compound *paricchinnaparimāṇa*.¹⁷⁴

Now, where should we place the PYV’s spirited defense of the YD’s thesis within the chronology of the other works examined here? This is a major difficulty, as the debate on the authorship of the PYV is not settled: it has been ascribed to Śaṅkara (the eighth-century proponent of Advaitavedānta) but it has also been suggested that it could be as late as the 14th century, if its author is to be identified with one of the members of the Payyur family.¹⁷⁵ In any case a few remarks are in order.

First, although it has been suggested that the PYV was composed by the author of the JM (also attributed to a Śaṅkarabhagavat and transmitted in Kerala), as noted by Wilhelm Halbfass, “readers of this work will hardly feel tempted to attribute it... to the author of the PYV,”¹⁷⁶ and the approaches of the two works regarding the topic of time indeed make this identification extremely unlikely: as seen above (§5), the JM ignores the identification of time with action.

divyapadeśyasūryādisaṃcāraviśeṣo nirdiṣṭaḥ prasiddhakriyopalakṣaṇārthaḥ, tad āha sā sū prasiddheti. viśiṣṭāpi kramanirvartyatayā prasiddhatvāt tasyaḥ saiva kālāḥ. tena godohādīnām api grahaṇam sūryādīti... “The thing referred to [by the word time] is taught to be [simply] a characterizing mark (*upalakṣaṇa*), [namely,] a well-known action (*prasiddhakriyā*): it is a particular movement of [something] such as the sun – [a movement] that [in turn] may be described in terms of *nālikās* and [other units of measure made of other actions; and this movement] is well known [insofar it] has [already] enabled [us] to obtain numerous [things] that [we] wanted to obtain [by measuring them with it] – this is what [the *Vṛtti*] means with ‘[Time is] this or that well-known [action].’ [And another action] too, which is particularized inasmuch as it is well known that it can be accomplished in a [specific] succession, is [in turn] nothing but the time of the [first action]. So there is an [implicit] mention [in ĪPK 2.1.3] of such [other well-known actions] as the milking of cows...”

¹⁷³ See above, n. 75.

¹⁷⁴ See above, n. 76.

¹⁷⁵ On this debate, and for more bibliographical references, see Halbfass 1991, Rukmani 1992, Maas 2013: 72–78 and Harimoto 2014: 225–252.

¹⁷⁶ Halbfass 1991: 220.

Second, the point made in the PYV regarding the fact that the thesis is not liable to an infinite regress could be seen as a response to Jayanta;¹⁷⁷ and even the initial remark that the eternal and immutable substance that the Vaiśeṣikas call time can have no “relation” with the actions that it is supposed to measure could be seen as an answer to Vācaspatimiśra’s argument that time is needed as an all-pervasive substance enabling the “relation” between distant moving bodies –¹⁷⁸ these elements might therefore be taken as clues in favour of a late date for the PYV, in any case one that would largely postdate Śaṅkara the Advaitin. These points, however, are hardly conclusive, since the PYV arguments do not necessarily presuppose Jayanta’s and Vācaspatimiśra’s criticisms; besides, not to mention that at least one passage in the NM could be read as mocking the dilemma in which the PYV claims to lock its opponents,¹⁷⁹ the very fact that the PYV thus upholds the YD’s view on time could be used as an argument in favour of a relatively early date, since this view, barely acknowledged and perhaps willfully distorted in the TK, entirely disappears in fourteenth-century Sāṃkhya works onwards (see §8). At any rate, the PYV clearly defends the very thesis ascribed by Bhartṛhari to “experts on time” – a thesis also supported by the YD, and presented by tenth- and eleventh-century authors in terms strikingly similar to those used in the PYBh. The brevity of the remark in the ĪPVV suggests that the Śaiva was summing up a point already made elsewhere; so Abhinavagupta, who had

¹⁷⁷ See above, §4.

¹⁷⁸ See above, §6.

¹⁷⁹ NM, vol. I, pp. 367–368: *nanu bhavatkalpito 'pi kālaḥ kiṃ svata eva kramākramasvabhāvaḥ, hetvantarād vā, svatas tasya tatsvabhāvatve kāryasyaiva paṭādeḥ paridrśyamānasya tatsvābhāvyam bhavatu, kiṃ kālena. hetvantarapakṣe tv anavasthā, tasyāpi hetvantarāpekṣatvād iti tad etad bālīśacodyam, śuklaguṇādāv apy evaṃ vaktuṃ śakyatvāt. guṇasya svataḥ śuklasvabhāvatve dravyasyaiva tad bhavatu, kiṃ guṇena guṇāntarakalpane tv anavastheti.* “[– Objection:] But does the time that you imagine [as a distinct entity] have the nature of succession and simultaneity all by itself, or due to some other cause? If it has this nature by itself, let [us] admit that the sole effect [of an action] that [we] see [being done], such as a cloth, has this nature [all by itself] – what is the point of time? But if [you choose] the option of the other cause, [you are doomed to] an infinite regress, because this [other cause] in turn requires another cause[, etc.]. [– Answer]: This is a simpleton’s objection; because [if we followed] such [a reasoning we] could say the same of the quality ‘white’ for instance: if this quality has the nature ‘white’ by itself, let [us] admit that only the substance [is white all by itself], what is the point of the quality? But if one postulates another quality [to account for the fact that a first quality is white, we fall into] an infinite regress!”

much interest in the Pātañjalayoga tradition,¹⁸⁰ either knew the PYV¹⁸¹ or shared with the PYV's author a source of which I am not aware; in any case, the idea alluded to by Bhartṛhari was defended both in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga traditions – although in both cases, judging from the works that have come down to us, it only seems to have been adopted by a minority.

8. The SSū and its commentaries: how time came to be identified with *ākāśa* – and how Vijñānabhikṣu the Yogin criticized Vijñānabhikṣu the Sāṃkhya commentator

In the last creative phase or “renaissance” of Sāṃkhya, to which the SSū (14th century?)¹⁸² and their commentaries belong,¹⁸³ the definition of time undergoes a spectacular change. In the SSū, the reduction of time to actions has vanished, replaced with the following claim:

Space and time are from ether, etc.¹⁸⁴

Space and time are still described as aspects of reality that do not constitute distinct *tattvas*;¹⁸⁵ but the explanation as to what the words “space” and “time” really denote is obviously different from the one found in the YD – although less transparent is the meaning of the SSū definition. Given that *ākāśa* is the first of the five great elements, one may assume that the “etc.” (*ādi*) refers to the four other *mahābhūtas*; but it has often been pointed out that the association of time with the great elements appears nowhere in the classical Sāṃkhya literature that has come down to us.¹⁸⁶ Not to mention, however, that it is not altogether absent

¹⁸⁰ See e.g. the ĪPVV's impressive number of quotations from the *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* recorded in Maas 2006: 111.

¹⁸¹ This would go against the assumption in Halbfass 1991: 220, that the PYV “did not have any significant impact outside Kerala.”

¹⁸² See Garbe 1894: 69–71.

¹⁸³ I could not find any discussion on the nature of time in the TSS or Vijñānabhikṣu's SSā.

¹⁸⁴ SSū 2.12: *dikkālāv ākāśādibhyaḥ*.

¹⁸⁵ Aniruddha, while introducing this *sūtra*, makes clear that this is still what is at stake (SSūV, p. 94): *nanu dikkālau sakalavyavahārasiddhau, kuto na gaṇitau, tatrāha...* “[– Objection:] But space and time are established in all [conventional] usages; [so] why are they not counted [among the principles]? This [is what the following aphorism] answers.”

¹⁸⁶ See e.g. Chakravarti 1951: 257: “It is strange to notice that in the SSū both ‘time’ and ‘space’ have been mentioned to be the products of ether. Such a view is not even hinted anywhere in the more authentic texts of Sāṃkhya.” Cf. Prasad 1984a: 39: “Here both time and space... have been said to be the products of ‘ether’..., though we do not encounter

from the MBh,¹⁸⁷ there is an intriguing description of the Sāṃkhya view of time in the commentary on the SuSaṃ by Ḍalhaṇa,¹⁸⁸ who must have lived in the second part of the 12th century.¹⁸⁹ The remark occurs as Ḍalhaṇa is explaining the SuSaṃ's statement that "the far-seeing ones consider that nature, God, time, chance, fate and transformation are Nature"¹⁹⁰ – i.e., in a context quite similar to the one encountered here in §1, where we saw Sāṃkhya authors preoccupied with showing that certain entities that include time have no distinct ontological status. In this respect, Ḍalhaṇa says:

As for time, it is defined as actions that are the movements of the moon, sun, etc.; but in it, [such properties as] "cold" or "hot" occur due to a particular transformation of the great elements. This has been said in: "Those who follow the path of reason call 'time' the particular [transformations of] the great elements on account of the difference between two [properties such as] cold and hot." Because of the transformation of the constituent *rajas* in the form of action, and because of the specific transformation of the great elements, time is not [an entity] other than Nature.¹⁹¹

Some elements of the above definition sound familiar: the YD does state that time is the movements of astral bodies and that actions are transformations of the constituent *rajas*. But Ḍalhaṇa adds that nonetheless, properties such as cold or hot arise due to a transformation of the great elements, and he quotes a verse according to which *the word time refers to the great elements* (or to particular transformations of the great elements?) owing to the difference between cold and hot. As far as can be guessed from this very short quotation (whose source is unknown to me), the gist of the reasoning is that time can be identified with

any such view in the rest of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga literature." (Both articles ignore the *ādi* and only mention ether, evidently under the influence of the SSū's commentaries: see below).

¹⁸⁷ According to Asita Devala, time creates beings "from the great elements" (*yebhyaḥ... mahābhūtāni... tāni*, see above, n. 31); see also e.g. MBh 12.244.2: *ākāśaṃ māruto jyotir āpaḥ pṛthvī ca pañcamī | bhāvābhāvau ca kālāś ca sarvabhūteṣu pañcasu* || "Ether, wind, fire, water and earth as the fifth [are the elements]; and existence and nonexistence, as well as time, are within these five universal elements."

¹⁸⁸ My attention was brought to it by Śāstrī 1963: 161, which quotes a part of it but does not notice its difference from previous Sāṃkhya definitions of time or its possible relationship with SSū 2.12.

¹⁸⁹ Meulenbeld 1999: 378–379.

¹⁹⁰ SuSaṃ, *Śārīrasthāna* 1.11: *svabhāvam īśvaraṃ kālaṃ yaddṛcchāṃ niyatim tathā | parināmaṃ ca manyante prakṛtiṃ pṛthudarśinaḥ* ||

¹⁹¹ NiSaṃ, p. 286: *kālo 'pi candrārkaḍigatikriyālakṣaṇaḥ, tatra tu mahābhūtānāṃ parināmaviśeṣaḥ chītoṣṇādayo bhavanti, tad uktaṃ: mahābhūtaviśeṣāṃ tu śītoṣṇadvaya-bhedataḥ | kāla ity adhyavasyanti nyāyamārgānusāriṇaḥ || iti, kriyātvena rajoguṇa-parināmatvān mahābhūtāparināmaviśeṣatvāc ca na kālasya prakṛter anyatvam.*

the great elements on the grounds that the appearance of new properties and the disappearance of former ones, which make us notice change, are due to the *mahābhūtas*' transformations. Ḍalhaṇa's testimony is of great interest, because the views that he reports are probably much older than his own work,¹⁹² and he is aware of the thesis defended by the YD and PYV, but he also records a second, somewhat conflicting view¹⁹³ (although he presents it as completing the former rather than cancelling it); and it is very tempting to see in SSū 2.12 an echo of the second doctrine (which, by the time of SSū's compilation, may have entirely superseded the YD's): SSū 2.12 may well have originally meant that although time is no distinct reality, our conventional understanding of time arises from the various transformations of the five great elements.

Be it as it may, the terse SSū was found problematic by its commentators, not because of the absence of any allusion to action (the commentaries never mention the reduction of time to actions found in the YD and PYV, although, as mentioned above, Vijñānabhikṣu at least seems to have been aware of it), but because the ablative in "from ether, etc." could be understood as implying an emanative process from the great elements, which would of course go against the dogma of the twenty-five *tattvas*. To avert such an interpretation, one could surmise that according to the SSū, time and space are mere words that we use *owing to* the five great elements' transformations. This is not, however, how Aniruddha (active in the second half of the 15th century)¹⁹⁴ explains the aphorism:

It is ether itself that is referred to with the words "space" and "time," because of the difference pertaining to the various extrinsic properties; therefore [space and time] are included (*antarbhūta*) within ether; the word

¹⁹² Philipp Maas has brought to my attention the fact that shortly before this passage Ḍalhaṇa refers to the (now almost entirely lost) commentary by Jejjhaṭa, who must have lived in the 6th or 7th century.

¹⁹³ As seen above (§2), the YD specifies that time is only movements (*parispanda/ praspanda*) and not transformations (*pariṇāma*), the latter being precisely defined as the loss of a former property and the acquisition of a new one by a property-bearer (see above, n. 60; cf. YD, p. 111 and PYSū 3.13, both examined in Bronkhorst 1994: 316–317; on PYSū 3.13 see also Maas 2014). Of course, the two views are nonetheless in agreement inasmuch as they both emphasize that time is no distinct entity and has no distinct causal power. As pointed out to me by Philipp Maas (personal communication, 06/09/2019), there was nonetheless a diversity of views on this issue in the SuSaṃ commentarial tradition, since Ḍalhaṇa further mentions (NiSaṃ, p. 286) the view of Gayadāsa (active around 1000), according to whom the five entities under discussion have a distinctive causal power insofar as they are additional causes (*nimittakāraṇa*) as opposed to Nature's transformation being the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*).

¹⁹⁴ See Garbe 1888: viii–ix; cf. Garbe 1892: xxiv.

“etc.” is an interpolation (*sampātāyāta*);¹⁹⁵ the ablative is [here] in the sense of a locative.¹⁹⁶

According to Aniruddha, both space and time *are* ether itself – and no other *mahābhūta*. His interpretation sounds forced, since in order to have the aphorism say this, he must claim that the ablative has the sense of a locative and that the word “etc.,” which indicates that ether is only the first element of a list, is to be discarded as a corruption of the original text. The fact that he uses the word “included” (*antarbhūta*) to highlight that space and time are subsumed under one of the *tattvas* acknowledged by the Sāṃkhya tradition is probably no coincidence: admittedly, the notion of *antarbhāva* is often used in Aniruddha’s time to reject a category by arguing that it is already “included” within a broader one;¹⁹⁷ still, the passage seems to echo a phrasing already found in a similar context in the *Suvarṇasaptati**, SV, SSV, GBh and MV –¹⁹⁸ with this significant difference, however, that the earlier texts merely argue that time is “included” in the category of the manifest, and they never mention *ākāśa* in this connection. Aniruddha, who, as noted long ago by Richard Garbe, was familiar with the TK,¹⁹⁹ also makes use of the concept of extrinsic property (*upādhi*) mentioned in the latter; but the idea summed up by Vācaspatimiśra has also undergone an important change. For the point is no longer to say that time is in fact the various actions that the Vaiśeṣikas wrongly see as extrinsic properties being superimposed onto a single substance: Aniruddha now explains that time, space and ether are one single reality, which is a *substance* apprehended as space, time or ether depending on the extrinsic properties that happen to be projected onto it (that is, presumably, actions as far as time is concerned, and bodies endowed with a fixed shape as regards space).²⁰⁰ From his use of the words *antarbhūta* and *upādhi*, we may surmise that Aniruddha knew, besides the TK, at least one work in the first group of commentaries on the SK examined above; but the YD’s conspicuous absence among Aniruddha’s sources, and the ambiguity pointed out above (§5) in the TK’s formulation, enable this strange shift of meaning in the use of the notion of “extrinsic property” as it was understood in earlier debates on time.

¹⁹⁵ Garbe 1892: 96, translates “is added to no perceptible purpose.”

¹⁹⁶ SSūV, p. 94: *tattadupādhibhedād ākāśam eva dikkālaśabdavācyaṃ. tasmād ākāśe ’ntarbhūtau. ādīśabdaḥ sampātāyātaḥ. saptamyaṃthe pañcamī.*

¹⁹⁷ See e.g. Ganeri 2011: 207, on the success of this strategy in the philosophical literature of the 15th century onwards.

¹⁹⁸ See above, nn. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 29.

¹⁹⁹ See Garbe 1888: vii.

²⁰⁰ On *mūrtas* as *digupādhis*, see e.g. Keith 1921: 236; Matilal 1968: 44.

As for Vijñānabhikṣu (active in the second half of the 16th century),²⁰¹ after specifying as an introduction that the aphorism “explains the creation of limited (*khaṇḍa*) space and time,”²⁰² he comments on it in the following way:

The space and time that are eternal (*nitya*), being [simply] the nature of ether, are just particular qualities (*guṇaviśeṣa*) of Nature. From this, the omnipresence of space and time is rationally established; so is that of ether, which is declared in the scriptural statement “And just as ether, it is omnipresent and eternal.” As for the space and time that are limited (*khaṇḍa*), they arise from ether due to [its] association with various extrinsic properties – this is the meaning [of the aphorism], since one must understand that extrinsic properties are part of [the definition] due to the [presence of the] word “etc.” Even though the limited space and time are nothing but ether [inasmuch as it is] particularized by various extrinsic properties, nonetheless, in this [aphorism they] are said to be the effect of [ether], just as, in the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, the auditory [organ] is [said to be] the effect [of ether], in accordance with a discourse that admits that [something] particularized is distinct [from that same thing when it is not particularized].²⁰³

Vijñānabhikṣu explicitly accepts the existence of eternal and unlimited or partless space and time (a statement patently at odds with the YD’s doctrine) but he argues that they are not distinct *tattvas* since they are nothing but ether, and as such, only a particular aspect of Nature itself. As for specific places and times, they are also ether, but ether inasmuch as it is associated with extrinsic properties that seemingly impose limits on it. He manages to explain away the presence of the word “etc.” in the *sūtra* without discarding it as an interpolation (i.e. by assuming that the “etc.” refers to the extrinsic properties that, once associated with ether, make space and time appear), and his explanation of the ablative (as indicating the source from which space and time emerge, which is not ultimately distinct from them but can be thought of as different inasmuch as it is not particularized) is certainly more ingenious than Aniruddha’s.²⁰⁴ In both commentaries,

²⁰¹ Garbe 1894: 74.

²⁰² SPraBh, p. 77: *khaṇḍadikkālayoḥ sṛṣṭim āha*.

²⁰³ SPraBh, p. 77: *nityau yau dikkālau tāv ākāśaprakṛtibhūtau prakṛter guṇaviśeṣāv eva. ato dikkālayor vibhutvopapattiḥ, ākāśavat sarvagataś ca nitya ityādiśrutyuktaṃ vibhutvaṃ cākāśasyopapannam. yau tu khaṇḍadikkālau tau tu tattadupādhisamyogād ākāśād utpadyeta ity arthaḥ, ādiśabdenopādhipgrahaṇād iti. yady api tattadupādhipviśiṣṭākāśam eva khaṇḍadikkālau, tathāpi viśiṣṭasyātirikatatābhyupagamavādena vaiśeṣikanaye śrotrasya kāryatāvat takāryatvam atroktam*.

²⁰⁴ The SVS by Mahādeva Vedāntin (active at the end of the 17th century, see Garbe 1892: xxiv–xxv) simply sums up this interpretation. See SVS, p. 94: *ādiśabdenopādhipgrahyante. tathā ca tattadupādhipbhyā ākāśāc ca dikkālāv utpadyeta ity arthaḥ. yady apy upādhipviśiṣṭākāśa eva dikkālau, tathāpi viśiṣṭasyātirekaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyobhayajanyatvaṃ*

however, space and time are identified with ether – a point that, to my knowledge, occurs nowhere in the commentaries on the SK, and has caused much puzzlement in the secondary literature on Sāṃkhya.²⁰⁵ It seems probable that Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu distorted the meaning of SSū 2.12, which may have originally referred to the doctrine of time's identity with the five *mahābhūtas* that, as seen above, is already attested in the 12th century; but why were they so keen on identifying time and space with the sole *ākāśa*, while disregarding the other great elements?

One could suspect that this was a result of the massive process of vedānticization undergone by the Sāṃkhya tradition in this last phase,²⁰⁶ all the more since Vijñānabhikṣu appeals to a well-known scriptural statement often discussed by Vedāntins,²⁰⁷ and Theodore Stcherbatsky saw the SSū's understanding of time as the expression of an ancient upaniṣadic doctrine²⁰⁸ stated e.g. in the BAU, which presents spatially and temporally determined things as “woven back and forth”

cābhyupetyāyaṃ janyatvavyavahārah. “The extrinsic properties are [to be] understood from [the use of] the word ‘etc.,’ and thus, the meaning [of the aphorism] is that space and time arise from these various extrinsic properties and ether. Even though space and time are nothing but ether [inasmuch as it is] particularized by these extrinsic properties, one thus talks about the fact that [a thing A] arises [from a thing B although A is only a particularized form of B] if one admits that [A] is something distinct [from B inasmuch as it is] particularized and that [A] arises from both the particularizing [properties] and that which is to be particularized [i.e. B].”

²⁰⁵ See above, n. 186, and Prasad 1984a: 39: “Vijñānabhikṣu... adds a quite different meaning to this *sūtra*, which definitely does not fit in with the traditional Sāṃkhya-Yoga doctrines.” Cf. e.g. Sen 1968: 415, which contrasts the YD definition of time with that of the commentators on the SSū by saying that the latter view “seems to give time some reality. When it is said that time is *ākāśa* itself or is a modification of *prakṛti*, at least this much seems to be granted that it is not nothing. The advocates of this view nowhere explicitly say that time is just a word signifying nothing positive. But then there is no explanation given why time should be regarded as being nondistinct from *ākāśa* and how *ākāśa* or *prakṛti* gives rise to our notions of time. This view, therefore, though less radical, is the more difficult to understand.”

²⁰⁶ A process already pointed out e.g. in Garbe 1895: xi ff.

²⁰⁷ I do not know its source; it is for instance quoted by Śaṅkara as he attempts to demonstrate that *ākāśa* too is ultimately a product, the sole ultimate reality being the Brahman. His opponent quotes *ākāśavat sarvagataś ca nityaḥ* (BSūBh, vol. 2, p. 580) to show that ether, just as the Brahman, possesses omnipresence and eternity; Śaṅkara, however, argues that the point of this statement is only to highlight the “absolute greatness” (*niratiśayamahattva*) of the Brahman in contrast with the “well-known greatness” (*prasiddhamahattva*) of ether (ibid., p. 586).

²⁰⁸ See Stcherbatsky 1926: 15–18.

on *ākāśa*.²⁰⁹ It is nevertheless striking that Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary on this passage is pervaded by doctrinal features that belong to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika rather than Vedānta: his use of the compound *khaṇḍadikkāla* ("limited space and time," or "partitioned space and time") is common in Navya-Nyāya,²¹⁰ and he explicitly mentions the "Vaiśeṣika doctrine" while justifying the use of the ablative, as he argues that space and time, although they are in fact ether, can be said to arise "from" ether, just as the Vaiśeṣikas sometimes talk about the auditory organ as an effect of *ākāśa* whereas they believe that this organ is just a particularized aspect of *ākāśa* itself.²¹¹ In fact, time as it is described in Vijñānabhikṣu's SPraBh is now in many ways similar to time as it is understood in Vaiśeṣika: as mentioned above, Vijñānabhikṣu acknowledges the distinction between an eternal substance called time and the temporal segments measured thanks to this substance's association with extrinsic properties. Besides, according to Aniruddha, the aphorism "[Bondage] is not due to the association with time, because, [being all-]pervading [and] permanent, it has a relation with all"²¹² means that bondage cannot be due to the association with time, because the *puruṣa*, eternal and all-pervading, is related with all times,²¹³ but according to

²⁰⁹ BAU 3.8.7: *yad ūrdhvaṃ gārgi divo yad avāk pṛthivyā yad antarā dyāvāpṛthivī ime yadbhūtaṃ ca bhavac ca bhaviṣyac cety ācakṣata ākāśa eva tad otaṃ ca protaṃ ceti*. "The things above the sky, the things below the earth, and the things between the earth and the sky, as well as all those things people here refer to as past, present, and future – on space (*ākāśa*), Gārgī, are all these woven back and forth." (Trans. Olivelle 1998: 91).

²¹⁰ See e.g. Ingalls 1951: 78–79, on "portions of time" that are nothing but *upādhis* (translated there as "imposed properties" or "calibrations"). See also Potter 1957: 22ff. (who translates *mahākāla* as "big-time" and *khaṇḍakāla* as "little-time").

²¹¹ On the homogeneity of the auditory organ with *ākāśa*, see e.g. PDhS, p. 162: *sarvaprāṇīnām ca śabdopalabdhaṃ nimittaṃ śrotrabhāvena. śrotraṃ punaḥ śravaṇavivaraṣaṃjñāko nabhodeśaḥ śabdanimittopabhogaprāpakadharmādharmopanibaddhaḥ*. "And as the auditory organ, [ether] is the cause of all living beings' perceptions of sound. As for the auditory organ, it is the area of ether that is called the 'aperture of the ear,' which is dependent on merit and demerit [inasmuch as the latter] bring about the experiences [of pleasure and pain] that have sound as their cause." Vijñānabhikṣu's point is that this does not prevent Vaiśeṣikas (or Naiyāyikas) from using the ablative and explaining that the auditory organ arises from *ākāśa* (see e.g. NSū 1.1.12: *ghrāṇarasanacakṣustvakśrotrāṇīndriyāṇi bhūtebhyaḥ*. "The organs of smell, taste, vision, touch and hearing [arise] from the elements.").

²¹² SSū 1.12: *na kālayogato vyāpino nityasya sarvasambandhāt*.

²¹³ SSūV, p. 10: *bhavatv ayaṃ yadi tasya kadāpi kālayogaḥ syān na syād vā, nityasya vyāpinaḥ sarvakālasambandhopādhitvāt...* "This [bondage of the person] could be [due to the association with time] if the [person] only had an association with time occasionally; [but 'it is not due to the association with time,'] because this eternal, all-pervading [person] has as its extrinsic property a relation with all times."

Vijñānabhikṣu, the reason why bondage cannot have as its cause the association with time is the fact that *time* itself is eternal (*nitya*), all-pervading (*vyāpin*) and in a relation with all (*sarvasambandha*).²¹⁴ In other words, Vijñānabhikṣu's conception of time – at least in his commentary on the SSū – has much to do with the Vaiśeṣika definition of *kāla* as an eternal, all-pervading substance that only appears to be limited owing to extrinsic properties and that enables all bodies to be in relation with the revolutions of the sun; and his main concern is to show that the Sāṃkhya view of time is not incompatible with that of Vaiśeṣika, despite the fact that Sāṃkhya denies its independent status as a distinct *tattva* – a strategy that he himself has clearly defined earlier in his commentary, while explaining the list of twenty-five principles enumerated in SSū 1.61: rather than criticizing the Vaiśeṣika categories, the SPraBh endeavours to show that they are all contained *in nuce* in the principles of Sāṃkhya –²¹⁵ a way of highlighting the superiority of Sāṃkhya while appropriating Vaiśeṣika concepts.²¹⁶ And at first glance, one might believe that Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu, when equating

²¹⁴ SPraBh, p. 11: *nāpi kālasambandhanimitakāḥ puruṣasya bandhaḥ. kutaḥ, vyāpino nityasya kālasya sarvāvacchedena sarvadā muktāmuktasakalapuruṣasambandhāt, sarvāvacchedena sadā sakalapuruṣāṇām bandhāpatter ity arthaḥ*. “Nor does the person's bondage have as its cause its relation with time; why? Because time, which is all-pervading [and] eternal, is always in relation with all persons, whether liberated or not, due to the fact that [time] determines everything; i.e., because [if the association with time were the cause of bondage,] as a consequence the bondage would occur eternally for all persons due to the fact that [time] determines everything – this is what [the aphorism] means.”

²¹⁵ SPraBh, p. 30: *ayaṃ ca pañcaviṃśatiko gaṇo dravyarūpa eva. dharmadharmyabhedāt tu guṇakarmasāmānyādīnām atraivāntarbhāvaḥ, etadatiriktapadārthasattve hi tato 'pi puruṣasya vivektavyatayā tadasaṅgrahe nyūnatāpadyeta. etena sāmānyānam aniyatapadārthābhyupagama iti mūḍhapralāpa upekṣaṇīyaḥ. dikkālau cākāśam eva, dikkālāvākāśādibhya ity āgamisūtrāt*. “And this group of twenty-five [principles] only consists in substances; but given that there is no difference between a property-bearer and its properties, [we should consider that] qualities, actions, universals and [the other Vaiśeṣika categories] are included (*antarbhāva*) within these [enumerated substances]; for if these [categories] existed as constitutive elements of reality (*padārtha*) distinct from the [enumerated substances], since [in order to reach liberation,] the person would need to be discriminated from them too, the fact that they are not enumerated [in the aphorism] would constitute a [defect of] incompleteness. This [shows that] the idle discourse of the deluded [who claim] that the Sāṃkhyas admit a fluctuating [number] of constitutive elements of reality must be disregarded; and space and time are nothing but ether, [as will be made clear] from the aphorism in the remainder [according to which] ‘Space and time are from ether, etc.’”

²¹⁶ On Vijñānabhikṣu's inclusivistic strategy with respect to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika see Nicholson 2010: 87.

space and time with ether, simply borrow from a Vaiśeṣika source, namely, a manual by Śivāditya (12th century?)²¹⁷ that says the following:

As for ether, which is differentiated by the differences between the ether [existing within the limits] of a pot and [that existing within the limits of other objects], it is in fact infinite; whereas time is threefold [inasmuch as it is] characterized by arising, continuous existence and destruction; [and] space is elevenfold [inasmuch as it is characterized as the directions called] Aindrī, Āgneyī, Yāmyā, Nairṛtī, Vāruṇī, Vāyavī, Kaiverī, Aiśānī, Nāgī, Brāhmī and Raudrī. But in reality, the three [substances] that are ether, [time and space] are only one; they become diverse owing to the difference in the extrinsic properties.²¹⁸

Many modern historians have read this passage as professing a radically new position in Vaiśeṣika, i.e., as upholding the thesis that ether, space and time are not in fact three distinct substances but a single one.²¹⁹ Wilhelm Halbfass, who also understood it in this way,²²⁰ even suggested a parallel with the definition of time in the last phase of Sāṃkhya.²²¹ Should we, then, surmise that fifteenth- and

²¹⁷ According to Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 642.

²¹⁸ SP 14–17, pp. 21–22: *ākāśas tu ghaṭākāśādibhedabhinno 'nanta eva. kālas tūtpattisthitivinaśalakṣaṇas trividhaḥ. dig aindry āgneyī yāmyā nairṛtī vāruṇī vāyavī kaiverī aiśānī nāgī brāhmī raudrī cety ekādaśavidhā. ākāśāditrayaṃ tu vastuta ekam evopādhibhedān nānābhūtam.*

²¹⁹ See e.g. Gurumurti 1932: 19: “Here we come upon one of the most profoundly meaningful remarks of Śivāditya. The identity of Time and Space and Ether when dissociated from their limiting conditions is one of the most debated questions of modern metaphysical, physical and mathematical speculation...,” Potter 1957: 25: “In the SP of Śivāditya we are told explicitly that these three individuals are actually one and are only distinguished by their limiting conditions;” Ramanujam 1979: 13–14: “Śivāditya identifies the three substances namely Ākāśa, Kāla and Dik as one and the same substance, their apparent difference being considered as due to the difference of conditions. This is a revolutionary idea put up boldly by Śivāditya;” Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 91: “The first writer who clearly identifies *ākāśa* with time and space is, surprisingly, Śivāditya in the SP – a rather unoriginal work in other respects.” See also e.g. Bhattacharya 1934: xxv.

²²⁰ Halbfass 1992: 217–218: “Even within the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya tradition, the status of *kāla* as a special substance was not universally accepted. It was questioned and re-interpreted not only by the radical innovator Raghunātha Śiromaṇi..., but also by the generally rather conservative Śivāditya. In his SP, Śivāditya suggests that ether, time, and space are in reality one and the same substance...” See also Halbfass 2001: 104–105.

²²¹ Ibid.: 226, n. 72: “This view is also found in later Sāṃkhya literature, for instance Aniruddha’s SSV and Vijñānabhikṣu’s SPraBh on SS 2.12.” Cf. Halbfass [1997] 2007: 484, where the parallel with the SSū commentaries is replaced with the suggestion of a Vedāntic or Śaiva nondualistic influence (the latter being seemingly understood as a sub-category of the former): “Also, the identification of the three unitary substances space

sixteenth-century Sāṃkhya authors simply imported Śivāditya's new definition of time into their own system?

In this respect, it should be noted that the interpretation adopted in the secondary literature on Śivāditya's work does not quite fit with Śivāditya's own assertion in the same work that there are *nine* substances, *including space and time*.²²² There is, however, another way of understanding the passage – one that is in accordance with both the Vaiśeṣika basic tenets and the rest of the SP: it can be read as simply stating that *each* of these three substances is one, although they each appear to be diverse owing to extrinsic conditions. This is in fact how the commentaries that seek to explain this particular passage seem to understand it;²²³ besides, one of the commentaries has been transmitted along with a *mūla*-text containing a reading that leaves no room for the first interpretation –²²⁴ and August Winter, whose 1898 German translation seems to have been overlooked by the subsequent secondary literature, also understood the passage as meaning that each of the substances is one.²²⁵ It is not absolutely impossible that Śivāditya did reduce time, space and ether to a single substance and that later Vaiśeṣika authors shied away from this bold move by reinterpreting his text; it seems far more probable, however, that in fact, the “rather conservative”²²⁶ Śivāditya did not introduce in this brief passage of his manual the “revolutionary” position within Vaiśeṣika with which he is often credited nowadays.²²⁷

(*diś*), time (*kāla*) and ether (*ākāśa*) in Śivāditya's SP poses some intriguing questions. What is the background of this unusual procedure, which finds no justification in the standard texts of classical Vaiśeṣika? Why did it occur in the work of Śivāditya, an otherwise rather conservative author? Are there connections with Vedāntic ideas or, more specifically, with Śaivite nondualist teachings?”

²²² SP 3, p. 15: *tatra dravyāṇi pṛthivyaptejovāyavākāśakāladiḡātmanāṃsi navaiva*.

²²³ *Padārthacandrikā*, p. 104 and *Balabhadrasandarbhā*, p. 148 have nothing to say on the matter, but *Mitabhāṣiṇī*, pp. 21–22 explains how each of the three substances must be inferred from *specific* inferential marks, which would make no sense if the commentator understood the three substances as being really one; as for Jinendravardhanasūri's SPV, p. 22, it explains that the three substances “each have a unity” (*ekaika*): see below, n. 224.

²²⁴ SPV, p. 22 comments on the following text: *ākāśādītrayaṃ vastutas tv ekaikam evopādhibhedān nānābhūtam*. “But in reality, the three [substances that are] ether, [time and space] each have a unity (*ekaika*); they become diverse owing to the difference in the extrinsic properties.”

²²⁵ Winter 1898: 334: “In Wirklichkeit gibt es nur eine Luft, eine Zeit und einen Raum; wir nehmen jedoch an, dass sie vielfach sind je nach den Bedingungen, unter denen sie vorkommen.”

²²⁶ Halbfass 1992: 217 (see also e.g. Larson and Bhattacharya 1987: 91, quoted above, n. 219).

²²⁷ That W. Halbfass did not envisage any other interpretation of the passage is all the

It has also been suggested that the insistence of the fifteenth-century Vaiśeṣika author Śaṅkaramiśra on distinguishing time and space shows that “some members of his school were proposing the reduction of time, spatial direction and *ākāśa* to a single substance;”²²⁸ and it is true that ether, space and time have much in common in the Vaiśeṣika tradition,²²⁹ so that it may have been tempting to reduce the three of them to a single substance. Śaṅkaramiśra’s endeavour is, however, a very common strategy in Vaiśeṣika, and one that largely predates his time: Praśastapāda for instance had already explicitly defined time and space in contradistinction from each other when specifying that we may consider an object temporally close when it is spatially remote (and conversely).²³⁰ Admittedly, the existence of space and time as distinct substances had already been questioned by the tenth-century Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña, who criticized Praśastapāda’s attempts to infer their existence and argued that their alleged causality is in fact God’s;²³¹ and the Navya-Nyāya philosopher Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (active in the first half of the 16th century)²³² followed in Bhāsarvajña’s footsteps,²³³ but also proposed to dispense with the substance ether by arguing that God is the inherence cause of sound.²³⁴ If we are to look for a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika influence on the definition

more surprising since Halbfass 1992: 226, n. 72, remarks that the claim in Ui 1917: 136f. to the effect “that Praśastapāda, too, regarded ether, time, and space as ultimately one and the same entity is based on his misunderstanding of the phrase *ākāśakāladiśām ekaikatvād*.”

²²⁸ Potter and Bhattacharyya 1993: 35.

²²⁹ As remarked e.g. in Potter 1957: 25.

²³⁰ See e.g. above, n. 91.

²³¹ See NBhūṣ, pp. 590–593 (too long to be quoted here) and Halbfass 1992: 218; cf. Aparārkaḍeva’s NMĀ, which simply paraphrases the NBhūṣ (third part, pp. 149–153).

²³² See Ingalls 1951: 17.

²³³ See PTN, p. 23: *tatra dikkālau neśvarād atiricyete mānābhāvāt tattannimittaviśeṣa-samavadhānavaśād īśvarād eva tattatkāryaviśeṣāṇām upapatteḥ*. “Among the [categories], space and time are nothing over and above God, since there is no means of knowledge [demonstrating their existence]; for it is thanks to God that the various particular effects become possible, thanks to the bringing together of various particular causes.” Cf. the translation in Potter 1957: 23. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi thus adopts a strategy very similar to Bhāsarvajña’s – a point that of course could not be made in Potter 1957 (the NBhūṣ was published in 1968); surprisingly, however, one still reads in Potter 1977: 91, that the forerunners of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi as regards space, time and ether are Aparārka[deva] (on whom see above, n. 231) and Śivāditya; cf. Potter and Bhattacharyya 1993: 35, which only says that in this respect Raghunātha Śiromaṇi “follows at least one earlier author, Aparārkaḍeva the commentator on Bhāsarvajña.”

²³⁴ PTN, p. 26: *śabdanimitakāraṇatvena kṛptasyeṣvarasyaiva śabdasaṃavāyikāraṇatvam*. “It is God – who is accepted as a [general] cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of sound – who [also]

of time in the last creative phase of Sāṃkhya, Raghunātha Śīromaṇi's way of reducing space, time and ether to aspects of God is certainly the one that comes closest; but not to mention the obvious differences between the two doctrines (notably the fact that late Sāṃkhya presents them as aspects of Nature, not of God), the identification of time, space and ether is already clearly stated in Aniruddha's commentary on the SSū, which predates Raghunātha Śīromaṇi's work, so that the PTN cannot have been the source of Sāṃkhya's new definition of time.

Finally, Karl Potter, while remarking that "Raghunātha's identification of space and time was not new in the history of the system," mentions, besides Śivāditya's SP, "at least one commentator" of the VS who supposed "that Kaṇāda himself identified these individuals with one another."²³⁵ The commentator in question, who remains unnamed in Potter's study, is Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra,²³⁶ and he did unambiguously defend the very idea put forward by Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu:

Indeed, although ether is one, it is called differently due to the variety of effects; but in reality, time and space are not something distinct from ether.²³⁷

Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra, however, cannot be suspected of having inspired either Raghunātha Śīromaṇi or Vijñānabhikṣu, since apparently this author (also known as Chandrakant Tarkalankar) was born in 1836 and died in 1910.²³⁸ So as far as I know, no surviving work belonging to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition and anterior to Aniruddha identifies space, time and ether, whereas a recent Vaiśeṣika work such as Candrakānta Tarkālaṃkāra's was evidently influenced by the later

constitutes its inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*).” See Potter 1957: 26–28.

²³⁵ Potter 1957: 25.

²³⁶ As can be gathered from the references to Faddegon [1918] 1969: 210 and Keith 1921: 237 in Potter 1957: 25, n. 6.

²³⁷ VSBh on VS 1.1.5, p. 19: *ākāśaḥ khalv eko 'pi kāryabhedād vyapadeśabhedam bhajate. na tv arthāntaram ākāsāt tattvataḥ kālo dik ceti...* Cf. VSBh on VS 2.2.13, p. 105: *ācāryapravṛttir jñāpayaty ākāśakāladigākhyam ekaṃ dravyam iti. yato 'sau mahatā praya-tenākāśe sparśavadātmamanasāṃ vyatirekam āha na kāladiśoḥ, tayos tu na kasyāpi.* “The master [Kaṇāda]’s endeavour makes [us] understand that there is a single substance called ‘ether,’ ‘time’ and ‘space;’ for he has gone to great lengths to explain how ether is distinct from tangible [entities,] the self and mind; but [he has said] no[thing of a possible distinction between ether] and time and space, or of [such a distinction] between [time and space] with anything else.”

²³⁸ The very late date of Candrakānta did not prevent e.g. Sinha 1923: 4 from asserting that “Time and Space are complementary to Ether. The three substances are in reality one only (Praśastapāda and Candrakānta).”

Sāṃkhya definition of time.²³⁹ Could earlier Sāṃkhya authors such as Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu themselves have initiated this way of reading into Śivāditya's popular Vaiśeṣika manual an idea that its author probably never upheld? I know of no evidence that could help answer this question. At any rate, in his commentary on the SPraBh, Vijñānabhikṣu keeps emphasizing how the metaphysical frame of Sāṃkhya leaves room for the Vaiśeṣika categories (or encompasses them from its superior viewpoint), instead of frontally opposing them as the author of the YD; and his explanation of time reflects this attitude. Admittedly, in his Yoga works, the perspective shifts: Vaiśeṣika is still described as an inferior point of view relatively to the Yoga tradition, but so is Sāṃkhya; and Vijñānabhikṣu makes a point of showing how Sāṃkhya and Yoga differ with respect to the issue of time, and how the Sāṃkhyas' definition of time expounded in the SPraBh is to be rejected on the same grounds as the Vaiśeṣikas'.²⁴⁰

With respect to this, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika consider that time is, as the Self, partless, eternal [and] one; [and] for the sake of economy [in reasoning] (*lāghava*), [they argue] that it is this same [time] that causes [our] talking about [such time units] as the moment, *muhūrta*, night-and-day, month, or year, inasmuch as it is delimited by the extrinsic properties [corresponding to] these [time units]; but [according to them], there is no distinct constitutive element of reality that would be called "moment." As for the Sāṃkhyas, in accordance with the aphorism "Time and space are from ether, etc.," they consider that [time] – whether the Great Time (*mahākāla*) or the moment and [other time units] – is not a distinct constitutive element of reality, but ether itself, which, [inasmuch as it is] particularized by extrinsic properties, causes [our] talking about [various segments of time,] from the moment to the Great Time. [Now,] both of these [opinions] are incorrect, because no extrinsic property – which, [being associated] with [either] the Great Time [or] ether, [would have to be] permanent [itself] – can cause [our] talking about the moment. To explain: [our] opponents [must] admit that the extrinsic property [allegedly causing] the fact that the Great Time or ether take the form of a moment [must be] the action of e.g. an atom – [an action] delimited by its conjunction with another place –, or something else of the same kind. With respect to this, if that [which causes

²³⁹ This is already noted in passing in Keith 1921: 237, n. 1, about Candrakānta on VS 2.2.12 ("This is the Sāṃkhya view, SSū 2.12.").

²⁴⁰ Sinha 1983: 174, claims to spot "contradictions" between the PYSā and SPraBh because "while in the later [*sic*] work he suggests that Sāṃkhya admits a distinction between eternal and empirical time, in the former he clearly maintains that Sāṃkhya expressly denies transcendental or eternal time." This is not the case: the PYSā never says that Sāṃkhya denies "transcendental time" – on the contrary, it criticizes it for admitting it, and it asserts that Yoga is superior to Sāṃkhya in that it denies the existence of time as an eternal substance.

the eternal substance to take the form of a moment] – such as an action particularized by a conjunction [with another place] as [just] stated – is [in fact] nothing but the [eternal substance] particularized [by this limitation], or the [limiting property] that particularizes [the eternal substance], or [even] the relation between them, since [our] opponents [must] admit that the three of them are eternal, [our] talking about the moment cannot occur thanks to them; and if that [which makes the Great Time or ether take the form of the moment] is [rather] distinct from these [three], then, this [so-called extrinsic property that does not particularize a substance] is only a name for a particularized [entity], and this [particularized entity] is precisely [what] we acknowledge as time, which is called “moment” [and] is distinct from all permanent things. But this [time] is neither the Great Time nor ether, because, given that this [impermanent entity] is sufficient to account for [our] talking about the moment, it is useless to postulate another [entity] distinct from it as the cause of [our] talking about the moment. And this moment, which is a particularized [entity] and [is neither the Great Time nor ether,] is impermanent; it is a particular transformation of Nature itself, which is extremely mutable (*atibhaṅgura*); therefore there does not ensue that it would be distinct from Nature and the person.²⁴¹

The passage underscores that according to both Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya, our awareness of temporal determinations results from the limitation of an eternal substance (whether we call it time or ether) by some extrinsic property. The PYSā argues that this cannot be the case because the said substance being eternal, the property particularizing it as well as their relation must be eternal too –²⁴² and as a consequence, whether the cause of temporal limitation is the substance, its property or their relation, the very fact that we are able at all to talk about the moment

²⁴¹ PYSā, pp. 70–71: *tatra nyāyavaiśeṣikābhyām manyata ātmavad akhaṇḍo nitya ekaḥ kālo 'sti, lāghavāt sa eva tadupādhyavacchinnāḥ san kṣaṇamuhūrtāhorātramāsasaṃvatsarādivyavahāraṃ kurute, na punaḥ kṣaṇanāmā pṛthakpadārtho 'stīti. sāmṃkhyais tu dikkālāv ākāśādibhya iti sūtrān mahākālo vā kṣaṇādir vā pṛthakpadārtho nāsti, kiṃ tv ākāśam evopādhibhir viśiṣṭaṃ kṣaṇādimahākālāntavyavahāraṃ kuruta iti manyate. tad etan matadvayam apy asamañjasam, sthiraṇa kenāpy upādhiṇā mahākālākāśābhyām kṣaṇavyavahārasyaśambhavāt. tathā hy uttaradeśasaṃyogāvacchinnā paramāṇvādikriyānyad vaitādṛṣaṃ kiṃcin mahākālākāśayoḥ kṣaṇarūpatāyām upādhiḥ parair iṣyate. tatroktasaṃyogaviśiṣṭakriyādikam ced viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇatatsambandhamātraṃ tarhi trayāṇām api paraiḥ sthiraṭvābhyupagamān na taiḥ kṣaṇavyavahāraḥ sambhavati. yadi ca tat tebhyo 'tiriktaṃ iṣyate, tarhi tasya viśiṣṭasaṃjñāmātraṃ tad eva cāsmābhiḥ sarvebhyāḥ sthiraṭvābhyo 'tiriktaṃ kṣaṇākhyāḥ kāla iṣyate. na tu tan mahākāla ākāśaṃ vā tenaiva kṣaṇavyavahāropapattau tadavacchinnasyānyasya kṣaṇavyavahārāhetutvakaḥ lpanāvaiyarthīyāt. sa ca viśiṣṭādir asthiraḥ kṣaṇaḥ prakṛter evātibhaṅgurāyāḥ pariṇāma-viśeṣa ity ato na prakṛtipuruṣātiriktaṭvāpattiḥ.*

²⁴² This, at any rate, is how I understand the passage; the translation in Jha 1894: 100–101, and the paraphrase in Sen 1968: 421, are obscure to me.

remains inexplicable. We must therefore accept that the cause of temporal determinations is essentially distinct from these three, but then it can be no property particularizing something else: it must be an entity of its own, i.e. a substance²⁴³ that, contrary to Vaiśeṣika's time or Sāṃkhya's ether, is particularized as being momentary *by its very nature* – and this is what time is. Vijñānabhikṣu thus presents the Yoga tradition as avoiding all the problems that inevitably arise if we try to understand the relation between an eternal, unitary time and its extrinsic delimitations; besides, all momentariness being thus confined within this single atom of time, everything *else* can be said to be permanent.²⁴⁴ One could argue that this solves very little in effect, since in order to avoid positing time as a fourth *padārtha*, Vijñānabhikṣu has no choice but to present the moment thus defined as a particular transformation... of the eternal Nature. Although Vijñānabhikṣu seems to have little to say in this regard, he does point out that the latter's eternal essence is precisely its absolute mutability, thus seemingly emphasizing that the paradoxal status of *kṣaṇa* is ultimately that of Nature itself.

9. By way of a conclusion: a tentative outline of the history of Sāṃkhya's denial of time

As seen above (§1), among the commentaries on the SK, the *Suvarṇasaptatī**, SV, SSV, GBh and MV all criticize an epic “doctrine of time” and refuse to acknowledge the existence of a distinct entity called time that would be endowed with a causal power. Their justification for this denial is doctrinal rather than philosophical: instead of discussing the nature of *kāla*, they merely emphasize that the Sāṃkhya tradition does not acknowledge it as a constitutive element of reality, since the SK only admits three *padārthas* and time is “included” within the *vyakta* category. This might be considered a clue that the authors of these works were fighting to establish a doctrine that had not always been unanimously shared in Sāṃkhya circles (Asita Devala in particular appears to have ascribed a distinct reality and causal power to time) and was perhaps still contested from within; it could also be seen as a reaction to Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva movements that were appropriating much of the Sāṃkhya conceptual frame while developing systems in which *kāla* featured as a fourth *padārtha* or a distinct *tattva*.

The way of dealing with time in preserved Sāṃkhya texts dramatically changes with the YD (§2–3). The target has shifted: it is now the Vaiśeṣika definition of time as an omnipresent, eternal and static substance causing our awareness of

²⁴³ Vijñānabhikṣu uses the word *dravya* in PYVā, p. 382 (see above, n. 156).

²⁴⁴ See above, n. 157.

temporal determinations that is under attack. What we call time is really nothing but actions being performed: our awareness of temporal determinations is simply the result of our comparing various limited actions relatively to each other, and does not have as its cause any distinct substance called time. This idea was certainly inspired in some measure by grammatical and astronomical treatises; and it is reminiscent of a passage in Bhartṛhari's VP that ascribes to "experts on time" the opinion that time is the measure of any action by another action (and that this entails no infinite regress because the duration of the action used as a time unit is already "well known"). Whether these *kālavids* were astronomers, as suggested by later sources, or certain *yogins* associated with Sāṃkhya (the PYBh describes as *kālavids* the *yogins* who call "time" the mentally constructed succession, and as pointed out in §7, in the Pātañjalayoga tradition, the same thesis happens to be vigorously defended by the PYV), the YD's relativistic conception of time sounds very close to that of the mathematician Bhāskara for instance.

The YD also says of actions that they are ultimately nothing but the constituent of Nature called *rajas*; nonetheless, contrary to later non-Sāṃkhya sources depicting the Sāṃkhya position, as far as I know, the YD never identifies time with Nature's transformation. It describes *prakṛti*'s activity as existing beyond temporal limitations inasmuch as it is ever present, but it does not attempt to equate it with time – probably because, according to the YD's author, time should not be thought of as the timeless, unitary source of all temporal determinations: it is nothing over and above our measuring various limited movements relatively to each other. This refusal to acknowledge time as a distinct substratum of change was certainly not a denial of change itself: the author of the YD probably felt that he could afford negating the existence of a substantive time precisely because Sāṃkhya acknowledges as one of its fundamental categories an active principle whose innumerable metamorphoses account for a material universe in constant evolution; and his staunch criticism of the Vaiśeṣika notion of time may have been driven at least in part by a will to avoid freezing the infinite dynamism of *prakṛti* into the static, universal receptacle that the Vaiśeṣikas call time. Against the Vaiśeṣika inference of *kāla*, the author of the YD therefore pointed out (§3) that, as acknowledged by the VS themselves, temporal determinations only occur in produced entities (which the Vaiśeṣikas take as evidence that temporal diversity is only due to the variety of actions, understood as extrinsic properties that we superimpose onto the fundamental unity of the substance that is time); but the invariable presence of temporal determinations in produced entities, and their invariable absence in eternal ones, rather show that these determinations must result from actions themselves.

Among Vaiśeṣika authors who may have responded to this argument (§4), Candrānanda appears to paraphrase it, and it seems that he forcefully read into the VS an anticipation of this objection and an answer to it. According to him (as well as Vyomaśiva and Śrīdhara), this reduction of time to actions is illegitimate because it ignores the specificity of our awareness of time as opposed to that of actions: it is not quite the same to be aware that something is *done* and to know that it is *done quickly*, or *before something else*, etc. (Sāṃkhya does not seem to have offered an explicit answer to it; anyway one wonders to what extent the objection actually undermines the YD's argument, since the YD does seem to acknowledge that the cognition of an action and the cognition of its temporal determinations differ inasmuch as in the latter case, we are in fact *comparing* the action with other actions.) On the Nyāya side, Jayanta accuses the thesis of involving an infinite regress, since every action used to measure another one must be temporally measured relatively to a third one, etc. (This reproach must in fact have been much older than the NM, as its answer by those who reduce time to actions, namely, that we only use an already well-known action to measure another one, can be traced back at least to Bhartṛhari.)²⁴⁵ On the whole, however, the YD's argument against time does not seem to have had much of an impact on later Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika literature;²⁴⁶ in the Pātañjalayoga corpus, only the PYV defends the same point of view;²⁴⁷ most of all, it seems to have rapidly vanished in Sāṃkhya itself.

It was first ignored or distorted in the two other commentaries on the SK that have come down to us, the JM and TK (§5). For all mention of the identification of time with actions is absent from the JM, and in the TK, Vācaspatimiśra, who knew the YD, ascribes to the "Sāṃkhya masters" an argument that is close to the YD's, but somewhat altered, perhaps to make it sound equivalent to the Buddhist criticism of the Vaiśeṣika notion of time; and Vācaspatimiśra, obviously averse to the YD's position, omits mentioning in the TK that in a previous work of his, he himself has already offered a lengthy rebuttal of the reduction of time to actions (§6).

²⁴⁵ See above, nn. 75, 76 and §7.

²⁴⁶ On the discrepancy between the YD's philosophical importance and its apparently limited influence, see e.g. Wezler and Motegi 1988: xxvi, and Granoff 1999: 580.

²⁴⁷ According to Maas 2013: 74–75, "the role of the PYV for the interpretation of *Pātañjalayogaśāstra* may be compared to that of the YD for understanding the philosophy of the SK," a comparison that seems particularly apt in that both texts, while being of a great philosophical interest, seem to have been rather isolated within their tradition and are still in many ways historical enigmas; and the relationship between these two fascinating works deserves a more thorough investigation.

The SSū's cryptic definition of time (§8) has nothing to do with the YD's. It presents time as arising "from ether, etc.," and it may have originally summed up a doctrine (already mentioned by Ḍalhaṇa alongside the reduction of time to actions) according to which the word "time" really designates the five *mahābhūtas*' transformations; but Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu, whose commentaries make no mention of the YD's thesis, read the SSū as asserting the identity of time and space with ether. In this last phase Sāṃkhya still ostentatiously denies the existence of time as a distinct principle; but the meaning of the denial has changed beyond recognition. Time is no longer, as in the YD, a word for the actions that the Vaiśeṣikas wrongly see as extrinsic properties superimposed onto a substance whose existence is denied: it has become the substance ether on which we superimpose the extrinsic properties that are actions. It is still no *tattva*; but ironically, it has become exactly what the author of the YD so fiercely refused to admit – an eternal, omnipresent and static substance. This spectacular transformation was certainly facilitated both by the virtual disappearance of the YD and Vācaspatimiśra's biased account of its position, but it is very unlikely that it resulted from the identification of *ākāśa*, *kāla* and *diś* in the twelfth-century Vaiśeṣika manual composed by Śivāditya: although the SP is often presented nowadays as having conflated the three substances, in fact Śivāditya probably did not mean to reduce space and time to ether; it is rather Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu's conflation of the three Vaiśeṣika substances that led recent Vaiśeṣika interpreters such as Candrakānta Tarkālāṅkāra or D. Gurumūrti to read Śivāditya in this way.

In any case tensions between the Yoga and Sāṃkhya traditions, and within the Yoga tradition itself, seem to have crystallized around the issue of time's nature (§7–8): contrary to the SK commentaries, the PYBh does not explicitly deny the reality of time itself, but only that of succession, and it asserts that the moment is real – a discrepancy that might result from a stronger Buddhist influence on the PYBh, and that is usually glossed over in the secondary literature on time in "Sāṃkhya-Yoga." Neither Vācaspatimiśra nor Bhoja attempts to compare the PYBh's attitude with the YD's, or even with the blanket denial of time found in the first group of commentaries on the SK; in contrast, the PYV explicitly links the YD's reduction of time to actions – which it expounds at length – with the PYBh's assertion that succession is a mental construct: it is the only surviving text in the Pātañjalayoga corpus that defends the YD's understanding of time, and that shows as a result a possible convergence between the Sāṃkhya and Yoga traditions on this issue. Vijñānabhikṣu, for his part, criticizes an interpretation of the PYBh according to which the latter in fact denies all reality to time (which might have been an attempt to conciliate the PYBh's approach with that of the

SK commentaries); he presents as a specificity of the Yoga tradition the equation of time with the moment understood as a real entity; and he underscores that what he thus sees as the thesis of Yoga – namely, that time is not an eternal substance limited by extrinsic properties, but a momentary substance limited by its own nature, i.e. the moment itself – should be deemed superior²⁴⁸ to that of Sāṃkhya.

There is a lot that could not be thoroughly examined here – in particular, the complex relationship between the Buddhists’ and Sāṃkhyas’ denial of time;²⁴⁹ but hopefully the present essay, despite its mistakes, oversights and outrageous length, has contributed to show that if Stanislaw Schayer was right in pointing out that Sāṃkhya authors were primarily driven by a dogmatic concern to deny time the status of an additional principle or category, they did not content themselves with “copying the view of the rejected *kālavāda*.”²⁵⁰ Sāṃkhya authors, at least from the SK onwards, had to accept on principle that time is nothing in and of itself; but this dogmatic denial left them much philosophical leeway to define *what it is that we confuse with an independent entity called time*: considering how far apart the definitions of time put forward from the first preserved commentaries on the SK to Vijñānabhikṣu’s works are, one cannot but marvel at the philosophical creativity that these authors showed (long after what is usually described as the end of the creative period of the tradition) in explaining what it is that this nonexistent time really is.

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²⁴⁸ That is, if we take at face value the “game of silences” mentioned above with respect to Vācaspatimiśra’s works (n. 134): Vijñānabhikṣu makes no allusion to the thesis of Yoga in the SPraBh, whereas he criticizes that of Sāṃkhya in his PYSā.

²⁴⁹ The influence of Buddhist ideas on the PYBh has often been noticed (see above, n. 154), but the exact relationship of the arguments adduced e.g. by Śāntarakṣita or Prajñākaragupta (see above, nn. 125, 128 and 129) with that found in the YD (the composition of which certainly predates these Buddhist authors) deserves a separate study.

²⁵⁰ See above, n. 3.

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Analyse einer Sammelhandschrift von Werken Dharmakīrtis

Ernst Steinkellner

Daß ich diesen Beitrag zur Feier eines bedeutenden historisch-philologischen Erforschers indischer philosophischer Höhepunkte und eines pointierten analytisch-kritischen Philosophen in deutscher Sprache vorlege, bedarf einer Begründung: Ich weiß, daß der Gefeierte des Deutschen mächtig ist, und ich mag ihm, über viele Jahre voll Hochachtung vor seinen Leistungen in Freundschaft verbunden, eine Gabe nicht in uneigener Sprache anbieten.

Das wird aber dem Beitrag in seiner Bedeutung für die weitere Erschließung der Werke eines der wichtigsten Denker des alten Indien, des buddhistischen Erkenntnistheoretikers, Logikers und Religionsphilosophen Dharmakīrti, keinen Abbruch tun. Was ich vorlege ist nur die bescheidene erste Analyse einer bisher in der gelehrten Welt noch gänzlich unbekannten Sammlung von Handschriften seiner Werke. Sie sind nämlich in ziemlich ungeordneter Form auf uns gekommen, und die für jeden Gebrauch dieser Handschriften notwendige Ordnung der Folios und Folio-Seiten wird allgemein von Nutzen sein.

Wie ich zu dieser Handschrift gekommen bin, mag wie ein Märchen anmuten, aber ich habe dieses Märchen selbst erlebt und möchte es daher zuerst für meinen Freund kurz zusammenfassen, obwohl er die Vorgeschichte weitgehend kennt.

Als ich vor fast sechs Jahrzehnten, noch im Auftrag meines Lehrers Erich Frauwallner, einen Überblick über die Philosophen der älteren Nyāya-Schule verfaßt hatte (Steinkellner 1961) und dann für eine Dissertation die überlieferten Fragmente ihrer großteils verlorenen Werke zu sammeln und zu interpretieren begann, stellte sich diese Aufgabe sehr bald als viel zu groß heraus. Ich beschränkte mich daher auf die Werke eines bestimmten Naiyāyika, des Śāṅkarasvāmin, und dann noch weiter auf die Fragmente von nur zweien seiner Werke: einer Polemik gegen den buddhistischen Beweis der Augenblicklichkeit alles Seien-den (*kṣaṇikatva*) und einem Gottesbeweis (*īśvarānumāna*) (Steinkellner 1963).

Während der Arbeit an diesen Fragmenten, die sich vor allem gegen Aussagen Dharmakīrtis richteten, begann ich die Ansätze dieses Denkers für interessanter zu halten als Śāṅkarasvāmins Widerlegungen. Ich nahm mir daher keine Zeit für die Ausarbeitung und Publikation der Dissertation, sondern stürzte mich gleich auf den *Hetubindu*. Der Sanskrittext des *Hetubindu* galt zu dieser Zeit aber noch als endgültig verloren; das Werk existierte nur in einer tibetischen Übersetzung (um 800 u. Z.) und einer oft problematischen Rekonstruktion in das Sanskrit.¹ Auf Grundlage der tibetischen Übersetzung, von Arcaṭas Kommentar in Sanskrit, von Durvekamiśras Subkommentar in Sanskrit und zahlreicher Zitate versuchte ich einen Sanskrittext des *Hetubindu* zu rekonstruieren, zu übersetzen und zu erklären (Steinkellner 1967). Diese Arbeit wurde dann viel genützt, aber sie war noch nicht das Ende der Geschichte.

Nach langer, oft hoffnungsloser Bemühung um einen Zugang zu den in Tibet noch vorhandenen Sanskrithandschriften, wie wir seit Rāhula Śāṅkṛtyāyanas und Giuseppe Tuccis Expeditionen in den 20er, 30er und 40er Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts wissen, ist es schließlich gelungen, zwischen dem nationalen Tibetforschungsinstitut in Beijing (China Tibetology Research Center = CTRC) und der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 2004 einen Kooperationsvertrag für die Bearbeitung dieser Schätze zu erwirken. Als eines der ersten Arbeitsprojekte konnte der *codex unicus* des *Hetubindu* gewählt werden. Daß er im Potala vorhanden war, wußten wir aus dem Katalog von Luo Zhao (1985: 90). Aber die Kopien der schwarz-weiß Fotos, die in der Bibliothek des CTRC vorlagen, waren dennoch eine freudige Überraschung.²

Zunächst bat ich aus verschiedenen Gründen Helmut Krasser die Edition des Werkes zu übernehmen. Er machte sich rasch daran, nutzte ein neues Wiener Editionsprogramm und konstituierte einen kritischen und einen diplomatischen Text. Das zog sich über einige Jahre hin, in denen sich, was wir alle, auch er selbst, nicht wußten, seine schwere Krankheit entwickelte. Als sie ihn schließlich am 30. März 2014 besiegte, mußte ich die Edition doch noch übernehmen und habe den *Hetubindu* nach Überarbeitung der Vorarbeiten 2016 publiziert.

Wegen der Bedeutung dieses Werkes als einer ausgereiften und präzisen Zusammenfassung der Logik Dharmakīrtis zusammen mit wichtigen ergänzenden Exkursen, vor allem zur Kausalität, habe ich mich 2017 noch dazu entschlossen,

¹ In Appendix 7 von Sukhlalji Sanghavi und Muni Jinavijayaji's Edition der *Hetubinduṭīkā* Arcaṭas (1949).

² CTRC, library: box 112/1, 25 Folios.

eine neue englische Übersetzung³ des *Hetubindu* zu versuchen, durch die das Werk nun vielleicht besser zugänglich gemacht werden könnte.

So weit habe ich ausgeholt, weil ich auch mir selbst erklären wollte, warum die Geschichte immer noch nicht zu Ende war. Warum nämlich ein weitgereister Storch – das vermute ich nur, weil ich als Kind gelernt habe, daß Kinder von Störchen gebracht werden – ein Stöcklein mit angehängten Fotos der erwähnten Handschrift ausgerechnet auf mich abgeworfen hat. Aufgrund meiner Arbeitsvorgeschichte ist mir natürlich klar, daß mich der Storch mit Absicht ausgewählt hat, und ich bin froh darüber.⁴

Ich habe versucht, den Storch und sein Nest ausfindig zu machen. Vergebens. So kann ich hier nur mitteilen, was sich mir aus dem Faktum der Fotos und der verschiedenen Handschriften selbst erschließt.⁵

Zunächst aber: Beim ersten Blick auf das erste Blatt sehe ich den Anfang des *Vādanyāya*, und dem zweiten Blick zeigt sich eine Seite aus dem Anfangsteil des *Hetubindu*. Für beide Texte, die wir bisher nur aus kostbaren *codices unici* kannten, stellt sich bald heraus, daß diese Fotos neue Manuskripte abbilden, vom *Hetubindu* sogar zwei neue. Besonders überrascht war ich aber, schließlich einen fast vollständigen Text des *Vādanyāya* vorzufinden. Erst vor kurzem konnte ich nämlich in den Fotokopien der Handschrift aus Ñor, die Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1934 transkribiert und für seine Edition des Textes 1935–36 benutzt hatte, diesen Codex in der Sammlung des CTRC wiedererkennen. Zwischen den Jahren

³ Die erste, von Pradeep P. Gokhale, ist 1997 erschienen und beruhte noch auf den vor der Entdeckung des *codex unicus* bekannten Veröffentlichungen.

⁴ Obwohl die Verwalter der Fotos die Handschrift mit dem Titel „*Pramāṇaviniścaya-kārikā*“ (unter der ersten Tafel mit der Dateinummer 034) versehen haben – offenbar angeregt durch den tibetischen, auf Seite 1A das Konvolut identifizierenden Titel *Tshad ma rnam nes dpal Chos kyi grags pas mdzad pa* –, muß der Storch gewußt haben, daß sich in ihr auch der *Hetubindu* verbirgt, und zwar sogar mit den Resten von zwei verschiedenen Handschriften.

⁵ Immerhin hatte ich eine Vermutung über die Herkunft dieser Fotos: In Anbetracht des professionellen Charakters der vorliegenden Reproduktion liegt die Vermutung nahe, daß es sich um einen kleinen Teil aus der bekannten, aber bisher leider immer noch unzugänglichen digitalen Publikation aller Handschriften handelt, die in der TAR aufgefunden werden konnten (zu diesem Projekt vgl. Steinkellner 2014: Anm. 6, Steinkellner 2020: 9f.). Weil die Handschriftensätze der meisten staatlichen und klösterlichen Sammlungen bisher schon weitgehend bekannt sind, nahm ich an, daß die vorliegende Handschrift aus einer jener Sammlungen stammt, in denen derartige Schätze traditionell aufbewahrt worden sind, von denen wir aber bisher noch kaum etwas wissen. Inzwischen hat sich diese Vermutung bestätigt. Diese Handschrift gehört zu einer Sammlung des Klosters Drepung.

1934 und 1984 war er leider stark beschädigt worden.⁶ Aber schon Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana und Gendün Chöphel haben die Existenz einer zweiten Handschrift des *Vādanyāya* erwähnt.⁷ Und bei der von ihnen erwähnten könnte es sich durchaus um die nun ebenfalls vorliegende handeln.

Weitere Texte Dharmakīrtis zeigten sich bei einem ersten Durchgang, aber auch, daß die Folios dieses Konvoluts teilweise stark vermischt waren. Somit ergab sich als vordringliche Aufgabe die Ordnung der Folios, und manchmal auch der Folioseiten. Diese Neuordnung lege ich im folgenden „survey“ vor. Sie wird künftigen Bearbeitern dieser Werke den Zugang zu den Fotos erleichtern.

Es sei auch gleich darauf hingewiesen, daß wir mit diesen Fotos nicht nur neue Manuskripte von schon bekannten und edierten Sanskrit-Texten von Dharmakīrtis Werken zur Verfügung haben, sondern auch wenigstens zwei Werke erstmals in Sanskrit, die *Sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti*, von der bisher nur die tibetische Übersetzung bekannt war,⁸ und als Überraschung auch die vollständige *Santānāntarasiddhi*.

Es handelt sich also um eine Sammlung von verschiedenen Handschriften von Werken Dharmakīrtis. Über das Entstehen dieser Sammlung kann ich nichts sagen.⁹ Ich kann nur vermuten, daß diese Reste verschiedener Handschriften wegen ihrer unschwer erkennbaren sprachlichen Charakteristik als der erkenntnistheoretisch-logischen Tradition zugehörig erkannt und zusammengestellt worden sind. Daß sie Dharmakīrti zugeordnet wurden, ist sowohl dessen kulturellem Rang in der tibetischen Tradition als auch der Nennung seines Namens in mehreren Kolophonon zu verdanken. Es ist aber mit einem Fragment seiner *Vādanyāyaṭīkā* immerhin auch ein Werk Śāntarākṣitas in das Konvolut aufgenommen worden. Ferner ist bemerkenswert, daß weder das *Pramāṇavārttika* noch die *Pramāṇavārttika(śva)vṛtti* in der Sammlung vorhanden ist, und daß die *Sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti* im Kolophon dem Devendrabuddhi zugeschrieben wurde.

Die Handschrift enthält somit, in größeren und kleineren Teilen, die folgenden Werke Dharmakīrtis: *Vādanyāya* (fast vollständig), *Hetubindu* (zwei große Fragmente), *Santānāntarasiddhi* (Anfang und Ende), *Sambandhaparīkṣākārikā*,

⁶ Cf. Steinkellner 2013–14: 183–185.

⁷ Cf. Steinkellner 2013–14: Anm. 2. Ich glaube nun aber, daß es sich bei dieser zweiten Handschrift um eine der *Vādanyāyaṭīkā* handelt.

⁸ Ediert und übersetzt in Frauwallner 1934.

⁹ Sie ist nicht erst für die Aufnahme zusammengestellt worden, sondern schon zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt durch einen interessierten Sammler. In jedem Fall war dies nur für jemanden möglich, der mit der Sprache und den verschiedenen Schriften vertraut war.

Sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti (vollständig, lt. Kolophon von Devendrabuddhi verfaßt), *Pramāṇaviniścaya* Kapitel 1 (fast vollständig), Kapitel 2 (große Teile), Kapitel 3 (fast vollständig), *Pramāṇaviniścayakārikā* (Stücke aus Kapitel 2 und 3). Ferner die *Santānāntarasiddhi* und den Anfang aus *Śāntarakṣitas Vādanyāya-ṭīkā*. Der vollständige *Vādanyāya*, der hier erstmals in Sanskrit vorliegende Text der *Sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti* und der *Santānāntarasiddhi* werden wohl von größtem Interesse sein.

Alle Manuskripte sind auf Palmblatt zu sechs oder sieben Zeilen mit zwischen 60 und 70 *akṣaras* geschrieben. Ein unbeschriebener quadratischer Platz ist bei Siebenzeilern in der dritten bis fünften Zeile, bei Sechszeilern in der zweiten bis fünften links vor der Mitte des Blattes für die Schnürlöcher vorgesehen. Marginalien sind eher selten, meist mit kleineren Ergänzungen von einzelnen *akṣaras*, selten auch mit längeren von ganzen ausgefallenen Zeilen. Dazu gibt es auch einige wenige Marginalien in tibetischer Schrift.¹⁰

Ein Teil der Folioseiten ist vermutlich durch Feuchtigkeit und Verklebungen mehr oder weniger stark beschädigt, gelegentlich sogar bis zur völligen Unleserlichkeit zerstört. Bei wenigen Folios ist auch der Anfang abgebrochen.

Natürlich haben die meisten der Handschriften verschiedene Schreiber, und die Schriften können grob dem späten zwölften bis vierzehnten Jahrhundert zugeordnet werden.¹¹ Im Wesentlichen sticht nur die zweite Handschrift des *Hetubindu* dadurch hervor, daß ihre Schrift nach rechts geneigt ist und daß die Paginierung am rechten Rand steht, während sie sonst links angebracht ist. Keine dieser Handschriften weist Merkmale des nepalesischen „hooked style“ auf.

Die Paginierung ist nicht überall erhalten oder erkennbar, aber doch regelmäßig, und sie setzt sich auch nach Lücken erwartungsgemäß fort. Einige der Texte sind in Fortsetzung kopiert worden, wobei sich auch die Paginierung fortsetzt, wie im Fall von *Hetubindu 1* und *Nyāyabindu*, oder bei den drei Kapiteln des *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, sowie der *Sambandhaparīkṣākārikā*, an die die *Vṛtti* dazu anschließt. Es sind also Texte schon in Handschriften verbunden gewesen, bevor sie in die vorliegende Sammlung aufgenommen worden sind.

Die Fotos der Sammelhandschrift sind in Tafeln mit je vier Folio-Seiten abgebildet, die mit den Datei-Nummern 035–109 identifiziert sind. Diesen Tafeln sind links vor den Fotos Sigel beigegeben, die sich auf die Vorder- und Rückseiten der Folios beziehen, z. B., 1A, 1B, etc. Diesen Datei- und Folioseiten-Nummern gelten die entsprechend benannten Spalten im folgenden „survey“.

¹⁰ Auf fol. 1A, 65A, 74A, 76A, 81A, 93B.

¹¹ Für Näheres darf ich auf zukünftige Bearbeitungen verweisen.

Die erste Spalte identifiziert den auf den Seiten enthaltenen Text in den jeweiligen aktuellen Editionen. Schließlich werden auch die Folionummern von den Rückseiten der Folios angegeben. Die letzte Spalte, benannt „additional points“, vermerkt vorhandene Kolophone und enthält Bemerkungen verschiedener Art.

Gleichzeitig mit dem Erscheinen der Festschrift für John Taber werde ich die Fotos dieser Handschriftensammlung über Academia.edu im Internet zugänglich machen.¹²

Survey

Hetubindu Ms.1

pp. in ed. Steinkellner 2016	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
2,6–3,10	046	26A		
3,10–4,13	047	26B	2b	
4,13–5,15	062	58A		
5,15–7,1 [?]	063	58B	3b	
7,1–8,1	034	4A		
8,1–9,7	035	4B	4b	
9,7–10,10	048	29A		
10,10–12,5	049	29B	5b	
12,5–13,8	036	6A		
13,8–14,15	037	6B	6b	
14,15–16,2	048	31A		
16,2–17,5	049	31B	7b	

¹² Die Manuskripte der beiden *Hetubindu*-Fragmente habe ich schon für eine englische Übersetzung in Arbeit und sie für eine weitere Liste von Corrigenda und Addenda zur Edition von 2016 kollationiert (Steinkellner 2016). Diese Liste werde ich nach Abschluß der Übersetzung online publizieren. Die Kapitel 1 und 2 des *Pramāṇaviniścaya* habe ich kollationiert und eine weitere Liste von Corrigenda und Addenda bereits online publiziert (Steinkellner 2018). Für das Kapitel 3 wird das Pascale Hugon übernehmen, und die *Vādanyāya*- und *Vādanyāyaṭikā*-Manuskripte werden von Muroya Yasutaka bearbeitet.

pp. in ed. Steinkellner 2016	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
17,5–18,11	036	8A		
18,11–19,15	037	8B	8b	
one folio page missing				
20,16–21,15	056	48A		
21,15–22,1	057	48b	–	ll.2–7:destroyed
two folio pages missing				
24,8–25,8	056	46A		
two folio pages missing				
~28,8–~29,9	057	46B	–	
29,9–30,10	052	37A		
30,10–31,12	053	37B	13b	
31,12–32,14	052	38A		
32,14–33,18	053	38B	14b	
33,18–35,2	038	10A		
35,2–36,2	039	10B	15b	
36,2–37,1	052	39A		
37,1–19	053	39B	16b	
37,19–39,1	038	12A		
39,1–40,4	039	12B	17 ^b	
40,4–41,2	040	13A		l.4: colophon

Hetubindu Ms.2

pp. in ed. Steinkellner 2016	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
2,6–3,8	058	49A		
3,8–4,10	059	49B	2b	all folio nos on the right side

pp. in ed. Steinkellner 2016	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
4,10–5,13	058	50A		
5,13–6,14	059	50B	3b	
6,14–7,13	058	51A		
7,13–9,1	059	51B	4b	
9,1–10,3	058	52A		
19,3–11,11	059	52B	5b	
11,11–12,13	060	53A		
12,13–14,3	061	53B	6b	
14,3–15,6	060	54A		
15,6–16,7	061	54B	7b	
16,8–17,9	060	55A		
17,10–18,13	061	55B	8b	
18,13–19,15	060	56A		
19,15–20,16	061	56B	9b	

Nyāyabindu

text	pp. in ed. Malvania 1955	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
Ch. 1	1–14 ¹³	040	13A, 14–7		1.4: beginning; folio nos continue from HB 1
Ch. 2	'14–21 1–23'	041	13B	18b	
Ch. 3	'24–40'	057	47B		B>A
	'40–48	056	47A		A>B
	1–9				

¹³ An apostrophe after a *sūtra* number indicates that the text stops right in the middle of this *sūtra*, whereas an apostrophe before a *sūtra* number indicates that the text begins right in the middle of this *sūtra*.

two folio pages missing					
	'40–54'	054	41A		
	'54–70'	055	41B	21b	
	'70–91'	042	17A		
	'91–110'	043	17B	22b	
	'110–122'	054	43A		
	'122–130'	055	43B	23b	
	'130–135	054	44A		
	136–140	055	44B	24b	1.3: colophon

Pramāṇaviniścaya Chapter 1

pp. in ed. Steinkellner 2007	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
	086	128A?		empty front page with <i>akṣara</i> - stains from another page not identifiable
1,1–2,11	097	128B	1b	1.1: beginning
2,12–3,13	098	131A		
3,13–5,1	099	131B	2b	
5,1–6,5	098	132A		
6,5–7,?	099	132B	3b	
7,11–9,4	064	61A		
9,4–10,9	065	61B	4 [?] b	
10,9–11,13	100	134A		
11,13–13,5	101	134B	5b	
13,5–14,9	100	135A		
14,9–15,10	101	135B	6b	
15,10–16,15	100	136A		

pp. in ed. Steinkellner 2007	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
16,15–18,3	101	136B	7b	
18,3–19,8	102	137A		
19,8–20,11	103	137B	8b	
20,11–21,15	066	66A		
21,15–23,2	067	66B	9b	
23,3–24,4	066	67A		
24,4–25,8	067	67B	10b	
25,8–26,12	066	68A		
26,13–28,7	067	68B	11b	
28,7–29,12	068	69A		
29,12–31,4	069	69B	12b	
two folio pages missing				
33,8–34,10	068	71A		
34,10–35,12	069	71B	14b	
two folio pages missing				
38,6–40,1	070	73A		
40,1–41,4	071	73B	16b	
41,4–42,7	070	74A		
42,7–43,13	071	74B	17b	
? –44,7,1.1–4	071	75B	–	l.4: chapter colophon; folio pages BA reversed against correct AB

Pramāṇavinīścaya Chapter 2

pp. in ed. Steinkellner 2007	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
45,1–8	071	75B	–	l.4: beginning; B>A
45,8–47,5	070	75A		A>B
47,5–48,13	070	76A		
48,13–50,2	071	76B	19b	
50,2–51,7	072	77A		
51,7–52,11	073	77B	20b	
52,11–54,1	072	78A		
54,1–55,6	073	78B	21b	
55,6–56,9	072	79A		
56,9–57,14	073	79B	22b	
58,1–59,2	072	80A		
59,2–60,5	073	80B	23b	
60,5–61,7	074	81A		
61,8–62,9	075	81B	24b	
62,9–63,14	074	82A		
63,14–64,4	075	82B	25b	
63,11–64,13	086	108A		!! another ms?
64,13–65,13	087	108B	?	!!
fourteen folio pages missing				
81,13–82,15	076	85A		
82,25–84,4	077	85B	34b	
84,4–85,10	076	86A		
85,10–86,13	077	86B	35b	
86,13–87,14	076	87A		
87,14–88,14	077	87B	36b	
two folio pages missing				

pp. in ed. Steinkellner 2007	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
91,8–92,12	076	88A		
92,12–94,1	077	88B	38b	
94,1–95,4	078	89A		
95,4–96,6	081	89B	39b	
96,6–97,6	078	90A		
97,6–98,7	081	90B	40b	
98,7–99,8	078	91A		
99,8–100,11	081	91B	41b	
100,11–101,12	078	92A		1.6: chapter colophon

Pramāṇaviniścaya Chapter 3

pp. in ed. Hugon and Tomabechi 2011	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
1,1–2,9	081	92B	42b	1.1: beginning; follows PVin 2
3,1–4,7	080	93A		
4,7–5,10	079	93B	43b	
5,10–6,12	080	94A		
6,12–8,4	079	94B	44b	
four folio pages missing				
15,5–16,7	080	95A		
16,8–17,9	079	95B	47b [?]	
17,9–19,3	080	96A		
19,3–20,8	079	96B	48b	
20,8–22,5	082	97A		
22,5–23,9	083	97B	49b	
? –25,2	082	98A		

pp. in ed. Hugon and Tomabeche 2011	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
25,2–26,6	083	98B	50b	
26,6–27,11	082	99A		
27,11–29,4	083	99B	51b	
two folio pages missing				
32,2–33,6	082	100 A		
33,6–34,8	083	100B	53b	
34,8–35,9	084	101A		
35,9–36,11	085	101B	54b	
36,11–38,3	084	102A		
38,3–39,9	085	102B	55b	
two folio pages missing				
42,6–44,2	084	103A		
44,2–45,8	085	103B	57b	
45,10 ¹ –47,3	084	104A		overlapping
47,3–48,7	085	104B	58b	
48,7–50,1	086	105A		
50,1–51,3	087	105B	5 ⁹ b	
51,3–52,8	086	106A		
52,8–53,11	087	106B	60b	
53,11–55,4	086	107A		
55,4–57,4	087	107B	61b	
60,6–61,11	088	109A		
61,11–63,5	089	109B	62b	
63,5–64,11	088	110A		
64,11–66,6	089	110B	64b	
66,6–67,10	088	111A		
67,10–69,1	089	111B	65b	
69,1–70,6	088	112A		

pp. in ed. Hugon and Tomabechi 2011	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
70,6–72,2	089	112B	66b	
72,2–73,6	090	113A		
73,6–74,10	091	113B	67b	
74,10–76,4	090	114A		
76,4–77,7	091	114B	68b	
77,7–79,4	090	115A		
79,4–80,10	091	115B	69b	
80,10–82,3	062	59A		
83,8–85,2	090	116A		
85,2–86,10	091	116B	71b	
86,10–88,3	092	117A		
88,3–89,7	093	117B	72b	
89,7–92,1	092	118A		
92,1–93,5	093	118B	73b	
93,5–94,7	092	119A		
94,7–96,1	093	119B	74b	
96,1–97,8	092	120A		
97,8–99,2	093	120B	75b	
99,2–100,12	094	121A		
100,12–102,3	095	121B	76b	
102,3–103,4	094	122A		
103,4–104,8	095	122B	77b	
104,8–106,2	094	123A		
106,2–107,9	095	123B	78b	
107,10–108,13	094	124A		
108,13–110,3	095	124B	79b	
two folio pages missing				
115,3–116,6	096	125A		
116,6–117,8	097	125B	82b	

pp. in ed. Hugon and Tomabechei 2011	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
image of one folio page missing				
120,1–121,5	096	126A		
121,5–122,10	097	126B	84b	
122,10–124,6	096	127A		
124,6–125,11	097	127B	85b	
two folio pages missing				
130,13–132,10	102	139A		
132,10–134,3	103	139B	–	
134,3–136,3	074	83A		
136,3–137,6	075	83B	8 ³⁹ b	

Pramāṇaviniścayakārikā

text	pp. in ed. Steinkellner 2007 (ch. 2), Hugon and Tomabechei 2011 (ch. 3)	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
Chapter 2	'68,69,72	069	72B, 1.1–2	–	l.2: chapter colophon
Chapter 3	1–34'	069	72B, 1.2–6	–	B>A
	'34, 40–57	068	72A		A>B
	58–67d'	064	62A		
	'67–85	065	62B	5b	

Sambandhaparīkṣākārikā

pp. in ed. Śāstri 1972	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
1–10d'	099	130B	1b	
one folio page missing				
'20–22 and new: 23–25	063	59B	2b	1.4: colophon;

Sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti

pp. in Tib. ed. Frauwallner 1934	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
269,2–11	063	59B	2b	1.4: beginning
269,11–270,3	062	60A		
270,3–24	063	60B	3b	
270,24–271,15	074	84A		
271,15–272,7	075	84B	–	
272,5–27	068	70A		
272,27–273,22	069	70B	–	
273,22–274,17	064	63A		
274,17–275,12	065	63B	6b	
275,12–276,8	064	64A		
276,8–277,1	065	64B	7b	
277,1–22	066	65A		
277,22–278,20	067	65B	8b	
278,20–279,15	103	138B		B>A
279,15–20	102	138A	9b	1.2: colophon. Attributed to Devendra- buddhi!! A>B

Santānāntarasiddhi

pp. in the edition (Tib. ed. Stcherbatsky 1916)	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
one folio page missing				
<i>maṅgala</i> + 1–14	047	25B	1b	beginning
15–33'	034	2A		
'33–51'	035	2B	2b	
'51–62'	034	3A		
'62–74'	035	3B	3b	
'74–87'	046	28A		
'87–94	047	28B	4b	l.6: colophon

Unidentified

data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
108	151A		
109	151B	6 ^b	

Vādanyāya

pp. in ed. Much 1991	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
	034	1A		Tibetan title of the collective manuscript
1,2–2,7	035	1B	1b	l.1: beginning
2,7–3,11	062	57A		
3,12–4,18	063	57B	2b	
4,18–5,22	046	27A		
5,22–6,23	047	27B	3b	
two folio pages missing				
8,17–9,15	036	5A		
9,15–10,11	037	5B	5b	
10,11–11,11	048	30A		
11,12–12,10	049	30B	6b	
12,10–13,9	036	7A		
13,9–14,12	037	7B	7b	
14,12–15,14	048	32A		
15,14–16,17	049	32B	8b	
16,17–17,15	050	33A		
17,15–18,14	051	33B	9b	
18,14–19,20	050	34A		
19,20–20,22	051	34B	10b	
20,22–21,22	050	35A		
21,22–22,22	051	35B	11b	
22,22–23,21	050	36A		
23,21–25,15	051	36B	12b	
two folio pages missing				
28,4–29,8	038	9A		
29,8–30,12	039	9B	14b	
30,12–31,16	038	11A		

pp. in ed. Much 1991	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
31,16–32,19	039	11B	15b	
32,19–33,18	056	45A		
33,19–34,21	057	45B	16 ^a b	
34,21–36,2	052	40A		
36,2–37,6	053	40B	17b	
37,7–38,9	040	14A		
38,9–40,4	041	14B	19b	
40,4–41,11	040	15A		
41,11–43,4	041	15B	20b	
43,4–44,15	040	16A		
44,15–46,5	041	16B	21b	
46,5–47,10	054	42A		
47,10–48,20	055	42B	22b	
48,20–50,7	042	18A		
50,7–51,11	043	18B	23b	
51,11–53,1	042	19A		
53,1–54,6	043	19B	24b	
54,6–55,7	042	20A		
55,7–57,2	043	20B	25b	
57,2–58,9	044	21A		
58,9–60,1	045	21B	26b	
60,1–61,7	044	22A		
61,7–62,13	045	22B	27b	
62,13–64,7	044	23A		
64,7–66,1	045	23B	28b	
66,1–67,8	044	24A		
67,8–68,12	045	24B	29b	
68,12–14	098	129A		l.1: colophon

Vādanyāyaṭīkā (Śāntarakṣita)

pp. in ed. R. S. 1935–36	data no.	folio no. on plate	folio no. on folio	additional points
one folio missing				
1,22–2,12	102	140A		
2,12–25	103	140B	2b	
2,25–3,12	104	141A		
3,12–32	105	141B	3b	
3,32–4,14	100	133A		
4,14–28	101	133B	4b	
4,28–5,12	104	142A		
5,13–26	105	142B	?	folio no. invisible
6,26–6,18	104	143A		
6,17 ¹ –7,3	105	143B	6b	
7,3–17	104	144A		
7,17–8,9	105	144B	7b	
8,9–26	106	145A		
8,26–27 + 11,28–12,12	107	145B	8b	
12,12–25	106	146A		
12,25–13,11 + 10,18–21	107	146B	9b	
10,21–11,7	106	147A		
11,7–21 [?]	107	147B	10b	
11,21–28 + 8,27–9,15	106	148A		
9,15–10,2	107	148B	11b	
10,2–15	108	149A		
10,15–18 + 13,5–18	109	149B	12b	
13,18–21	108	150A	13a ¹⁴	Four more unreadable ll.

¹⁴ Folio no. 13 added by another hand; 13b assumed to be empty.

Abbreviations

HB – *Hetubindu*.

PVin – *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.

R. S. – Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. See Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935–36.

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Reversing Śāntarakṣita's Argument. Or Do Mādhyamikas Derive Part-Whole Contradictions in All Things?

Tom J. F. Tillemans

John Taber significantly showed us how arguments of Indian Buddhists take on needed depth when we better understand their Brahmanical critics. Mīmāṃsaka arguments against Buddhist philosophy of language and metaphysics, for example, provide the indispensable backdrop to understanding Buddhist logicians' ideas on scripture, meaning, universals, and abstract entities and, indeed, may ultimately remain unanswerable in some of those debates. I have long maintained that Indian Buddhist arguments are also profitably understood via Tibetan critical analyses, although the context is more complicated as Tibetan Buddhist authors very rarely present themselves as openly opposing major Indian coreligionists but instead as showing their true intentions. Here is one such thinly disguised Tibetan critique (henceforth called the "quoted passage") of an important Indian argument about parts and wholes:

If it were to be contradictory (*'gal ba = viruddha*) for any phenomenon (*chos de*) to have multiple parts and to be a single thing, then singleness would be impossible, and if it [i.e., singleness] were to be nonexistent, multiplicity would be nonexistent too. Then, those two being nonexistent, and given that there is no third alternative (*phung = rāśi*) apart from those two, there could not be anything at all. Therefore, those two [i.e., having multiple parts and being a single thing] are not contradictory, and thus it was *not* taught [by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla] that if one believes that God has multiple temporal stages, He would have to be non-single. And [Kamalaśīla] did not mean [that having parts entailed not being single] when he said that [the non-Buddhist opponents] have accepted an antecedent term (*khyab bya = vyāpya*) implying non-singleness. (Tsong kha pa, *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*; see Appendix I, §11.)

This is surprising stuff from anyone who is a professed Buddhist Philosopher of the Middle (*mādhyamika*), as were Śāntarakṣita (circa 725–788 CE) and his disciple Kamalaśīla (circa 740–795), and as was the subtle Tibetan dGa' ldan pa (or dGe lugs pa) thinker Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357–1419). Although there are many cases where Tibetans have reformulated Indian thinkers' own positions in new and perspicacious ways, what we see here is not just a re-formulation or fine tuning of an Indian position: it is an important philosophical critique and, as we shall try to show below, presents a rival view on parts and wholes and thus on the Philosophy of the Middle (*madhyamaka*) in general, even if it is presented as a proof of Indian authorial intent.

The context is Tsong kha pa's discussion of Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka*, and notably the famous “neither one nor many” argument (*gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs = ekānekaviyogahetu*). In the words of Śāntarakṣita, this argument shows that

All things, whether promoted by Buddhists or non-Buddhists, are without any intrinsic natures (*niḥsvabhāva*), like a reflection, because they have in fact/really (*tattvatas*) neither the intrinsic nature of single things nor that of multiplicities.¹

Madhyamakālaṃkāra, in keeping with that programmatic opening verse, is indeed naturally read as a long and elaborate derivation of latent contradictions in all versions of things, be they Buddhist or non-Buddhist, for Śāntarakṣita sought to show that each such putative thing would have to be in fact single or many, and yet they were always neither. There are also several other contradictions that seem to be derived from versions of things at key stages of the “neither one nor many” argument, such as the contradiction between being partite and being one single thing. However, while that is a natural reading of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, if we follow Tsong kha pa then such a formulation of Madhyamaka mereology would *not* be what Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla had in mind at all. In what follows, we will do a close reading of the passage quoted above from Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, his “Synopsis of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*,” in which he turns the tables on, or reverses, the very argument that Śāntarakṣita and his disciple

¹ The Sanskrit text of *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* verse 1 is found in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā* of Prajñākaramatī, p. 173, 17–18: *niḥsvabhāva amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat //* On the Indian use and the Tibetan elaboration of the *ekānekaviyogahetu*, see Tillemans 1984.

likely had in mind. To ensure context for the passage quoted above, a translation of the whole discussion in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* is given in an appendix. Relevant paragraphs in the appended translation are indicated as supporting textual references for our reading.

The argumentation in which the quoted passage is situated is somewhat technical and needs a bit of explanation from the outset. The passage figures within a discussion about how a Mādhyamika can derive propositions and attribute them to opponents when those same opponents do not themselves accept them explicitly (*ngos su = sākṣāt*). Śāntarakṣita had warned against taking the opponent's recalcitrance as decisive in *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* to verse 1: "Do not think that this [neither one nor many] reason is unestablished."² He fully recognized that opponents would vociferously contest his proof that entities are not single things but discounted that opposition as not insurmountable. It fell on Kamalaśīla to explain how.

Initially in his *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* and then later in more detail in his *Madhyamakāloka* (see §1), Kamalaśīla argued that the Mādhyamikas' arguments bring out what their opponents "have [already] implicitly accepted" (*shugs kyis khas blangs pa = sāmāthyād abhyupagata*) or "have in fact (*kho na = eva*) accepted by implication" (*shugs kyis khas blangs pa kho na*). The Madhyamaka method, then, is to cite an antecedent term Φ (or "pervaded term" (*khyab bya = vyāpya*)) that the opponent accepts and then argue that the opponent has at least *implicitly* accepted the consequent term Ψ (or "the pervader" (*khyab byed = vyāpaka*)). In particular, the opponent explicitly accepts that God and other permanent entities act to produce different effects at different times; thus, according to Kamalaśīla, the opponent has also *ipso facto* implicitly accepted that God is not a single entity because He is divisible into temporal stages correlated with His different actions.

Note that "implicitly" or "by implication" (*shugs kyis*) is most probably to be understood as the Sanskrit term *sāmāthyāt*, which plays an important role in Dharmakīrti's logic.³ It is clear, in both Dharmakīrti (6th–7th century CE) and Kamalaśīla, that this "implication" is not just a purely formal variety; the implied propositions that one accepts if one accepts a set Γ of propositions will not just be the set of logical consequences formally derivable from Γ , but also at least some of those that follow from the meaning of the propositions composing Γ .⁴

² *gtan tshigs 'di ma grub po snyam du ma sems shig*; Ichigō 1985: 26.

³ See Keira 2004: 181; Tillemans 2000: 36.

⁴ One naturally thinks of some form of strict implication here to explain *sāmāthyāt* (i.e., Γ strictly implies a proposition Φ if it is impossible that all the members of Γ are true and that Φ is false) or perhaps some stronger form of entailment as in relevance

Tsong kha pa shows that Kamalaśīla's idea here potentially leads to the problem that one's acceptance by implication will become absurdly wide-ranging – a Materialist Cārvāka, who only explicitly accepts existence of this life, would also implicitly accept that there are past lives, because (following Buddhist Dharma-kīrtian reasonings) their existence is implied by the existence of the present one (see §2).

Ultimately, however, Tsong kha pa does not take up the problem of what “by implication” precisely means. His own solution to the difficulties he sees on this logical issue is the same as his solution to the difficulties he sees in the part-whole arguments of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*: in both cases the solution is that we need to appropriately qualify terms. Instead of speaking of singleness, multiplicity, parts, wholes, etc. *simpliciter*, or as Tsong kha pa puts it, instead of speaking of them “in a general [unqualified] fashion” (*spyir 'chad*) (see §§5–6), we need to speak of “qualified terms” (*khyad par ba*) such as “real singleness” (*bden pa'i gcig*). He concludes the quoted passage: “[Kamalaśīla] did not mean [that having parts entailed not being single] when he said that [the non-Buddhist opponents] have accepted an antecedent term (*khyab bya = vyāpya*) [viz., having multiple temporal stages] implying non-singleness.” What Mādhyamikas supposedly actually meant was that the terms in the “neither one nor many” reasoning should all be prefixed by *bden pa* (real) and that real singleness (*bden pa'i gcig*), as opposed to singleness *simpliciter* (*gcig*), implied being partless (*cha med*).⁵ Tsong kha pa goes further and even sees Kamalaśīla talk of implicit acceptance as needless: “Then when one has accepted that [God and the like] deploy effects having temporal stages, one has explicitly (*dngos su*) accepted that those things lack real singleness: it is not implicitly (*shugs kyis*) [accepted]”

logic. Kamalaśīla's talk of “pervasion,” *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* might suggest that we could unpack his use of “implication” unproblematically as a material implication in classical logic – because other uses of the term “pervasion” (*vyāpti*) are generally analysable in such terms. This, however, seems implausible. Given the truth conditions for a material implication of the form *if Φ then Ψ* (viz., either Φ is false or Ψ is true), then if one explicitly accepted some proposition and implicitly accepted all statements that are materially implied by it, one will implicitly accept all true statements whatsoever. In short, explicitly accepting just one statement would mean that one also implicitly accepted everything else that is true – that is uncomfortably close to a type of omniscience.

⁵ Cf. *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, p. 51: *cha med kyi rtags pa'i gcig dang 'bras bu rim can du bskyed pa gnyis la 'gal ba ston pa yin gyi / 'bras bu rim can skye na du ma yin dgos zhes ston pa gtan min pa'i phyir* “The reason is: We teach that something having [a property of] singleness marked with the absence of parts is in contradiction with it producing effects successively, but we don't at all teach that if effects arise successively [from something], then it must [itself] be many different things.”

(see §§11–12). Clearly, he is a very powerful critic of Kamalaśīla here and not just a reformulator or fine-tuner.

The context being given, let's now backtrack a bit to the quoted passage and seek a better understanding as to why Tsong kha pa's statement that there is no contradiction in single things themselves (or single things *simpliciter*) having many parts *should* seem so surprising. First of all, it is so that many of the finest and philologically grounded twentieth century writers on Madhyamaka philosophy, like Louis de La Vallée Poussin and Jacques May, *did* think that logically deriving latent contradictions in non-Buddhist opponents' would-be entities or in the world's customary truths (*saṃvṛtisatya*) themselves, typically by *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*) from the opponent's premises, was what, in essence, Mādhyamika thinkers like Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti and others did. *Reductio ad absurdum* showed internal inconsistencies in putative things, and so the Madhyamaka method to counter all versions of things was to relentlessly show them to be flawed, i.e., riddled with inconsistencies, or latent internal contradictions.⁶

⁶ Thus, e.g., Louis de La Vallée Poussin 1933: 56: "Le Madhyamaka ... ne construit pas un système: sa vérité vraie n'est que la négation de tous les systèmes." (The Madhyamaka ... does not construct a system: his real truth is only the negation of all systems.) And further *ibid.* 57: "Le Mādhyamika s'interdit de rien connaître soit par perception directe, soit par le raisonnement. Il reste étranger à sa propre critique: sa critique, qui n'est qu'une démonstration par l'absurde (*prasaṅga*, *aniṣṭāpatti*), repose sur les arguments reçus dans le monde et qu'il ne fait pas siens. Ces arguments, à son avis, minent toutes les idées admises dans le monde et même la foi bouddhique en la 'production en raison des causes,' la foi bouddhique en un Nirvāṇa." (The Mādhyamika forbids himself from knowing anything, be it by direct perception or by reasoning. He remains outside his own critique: his critique, which is only a proof by absurdities (*prasaṅga*, *aniṣṭāpatti*), relies on arguments that are accepted in the world, but which he does not make his own. These arguments, in his opinion, undermine all the ideas admitted in the world, and even Buddhist faith in the "production through causality," [or] Buddhist faith in Nirvāṇa.) La Vallée Poussin moves tentatively from proofs by absurdities toward fictionalism or a global error theory (*ibid.* 58): "Si on lui attribue un sens philosophique quelconque, en dépit des déclarations que nous venons de signaler, la critique de Nāgārjuna aboutit purement et simplement à mettre en lumière l'inexistence métaphysique des choses et l'irréalité de l'expérience." (If one attributes to him any philosophical sense whatsoever, despite his various declarations that we have just mentioned, then Nāgārjuna's critique comes down purely and simply to a bringing to light the metaphysical nonexistence of things and the unreality of experience.) In the final analysis, he did not, however, grant the Madhyamaka's systematic negations much philosophical interest. *Ibid.* 58: "Admettons plutôt que le nāgārjunisme est sans portée philosophique. ... [S]a Sapience ou Prajñā – car tel est bien le titre de sa collection d'aphorismes – ne contient qu'une méthode de purification de l'esprit." (We should rather admit that Nāgārjunism is without philosophical import. His wisdom or Prajñā – for that is indeed the title of his collection

Part-whole arguments played a very significant role in showing precisely *that*.⁷

Secondly, the common thread in most (but not all) Madhyamaka philosophies, be they traditional or modern, Indian or Tibetan, is usually a Buddhist variant upon global irrealism; it is a fictionalism about everything, or at least everything customary, coupled with an error theory to account for the genesis of the mistaken minds that think and experience some of these fictions to be real.⁸ Latent inconsistency of all that is customary is taken to imply that the customary is only appearances (*ābhāsa*) that are, to use the frequent phrase of Candrakīrti, Kamalaśīla and others, *mṛṣāmoṣadharma*, false and deceptive, with no entities underlying them – although it is invariably claimed that these appearances are not simply dispensable and are needed in worldly transactions (*vyavahāra*). A large number of the Indo-Tibetan commentators interpret the Madhyamaka idea of emptiness and no intrinsic natures anywhere as implying that a customary thing like a cart is empty of any carts, or in other words a putative cart is not in fact a cart, and hence is only a mistaken appearance of one, or is one only “customarily.” Customary entities are thus said by them to be “empty of themselves” (*rang stong*), with the corollary also not infrequently being drawn that there simply are no right accounts of the customary, no sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that

of aphorisms [i.e., the *Prajñānāmamūlamadhyamakakārikā*] – bears only a method for purifying the mind.) Others, like J. May, while agreeing with much of La Vallée Poussin’s 1933 article, would see Madhyamaka writings as having philosophical import precisely in virtue of their duly circumscribed acceptance of the inconsistency of all and that acceptance’s consequent thesislessness; see May 1979; Tillemans 1992.

⁷ There are numerous versions as to *why* Mādhyamikas show inconsistency across the board. Prominent Brahmanical critics held the view that Mādhyamikas were purely *vaiṭāṇḍikas*, or “cavillers.” For many traditional and modern thinkers, showing the inconsistency of all ideas of entities themselves was to enable one to realize a transcendent and positive absolute – e.g., an innate fully developed buddha-nature (*tathāgata-garbha*), pure consciousness (*amalavijñāna*), the nature of mind itself (*sems nyid*) in Mahāmudrā or the Great Perfection (*rdzogs chen*), a Tantric absolute of luminous clarity (*prabhāsvaratā*), a perfect nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*) in Yogācāra-influenced and gZhan stong Madhyamaka schools – that is beyond all such purely customary ideas. Śāntarakṣita’s *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* is also interpreted in this positive fashion by Tibetans such as the Great Perfection thinker Mi pham rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846–1912). See ’Ju Mi pham 2004: 85, 657. Many others did not profess, or emphasize, such transcendence and positively described absolutes, but rather emptiness of all that is customary or negation of its reality: Tsong kha pa is one of such thinkers.

⁸ Elsewhere (see Tillemans 2016: chapter 2) I have called this panfictionalism and global error theory “typical Prāsaṅgika.” It’s typical for Svāntarikas too, even though they have a bigger place for *pramāṇas* (“sources of knowledge”).

grasp customary truths, but only more or less widespread mistaken opinions and beliefs. To use a related Tibetan catchphrase, the would-be cart in which we supposedly ride does not really, or in fact, exist, but only “exists for mistaken minds” (*blo 'khrul ba'i ngor yod pa*).⁹

So much, for the moment, about Mādhyamikas' bringing out the latent inconsistencies in all; we'll come back to this and to the Buddhist global irrationalism that readily results. The extraordinary feature of Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālamkāra* is that it not only shows inconsistencies in various current Buddhist

⁹ The latter phrase is typically associated with the Jo nang pa but is widespread (see also n. 27). A good example of the interrelation of these various themes is found in the rNying ma pa Mi Pham's *gZhan stong khas len seng ge'i nga ro*, p. 167: *de lta na gnas snang mi mthun pa 'khrul ba'i snang ba rnams ni / 'khrul ngor snang du zin kyang / don la de ltar ma grub pa'i phyir kun rdzob ces bya la / cig shos ni ma 'khrul ba'i gzigs ngor snang ba ltar grub pa la tshad mas gnod pa med pa'i phyir don dam du yod pa dang bden par grub pa zhes bya'o* // “So mistaken appearances, i.e., those where being and appearance do not concord, do appear to the mistaken (*'khrul ngor*), but are said to be customary (*kun rdzob* = *saṃvṛti*) because they are not established like that in fact (*don la*). As for the other [truth, viz., the ultimate], it is established just as it appears to unmistaken perception and is not invalidated by any source of knowledge (*tshad ma* = *pramāṇa*). Thus, it is said to be ultimately existent (*don dam par yod pa*) and really established (*bden par grub pa*).” The frequent criticism of the dGe lugs pa/dGa' ldan pa by thinkers such as Mi pham, is that they are not genuine Rang stong pas (and a fortiori not gZhan stong pas), because their ultimate truth is purely a negation of the reality of things – i.e., *bden par grub pa*, which they term “the object of negation” (*dgag bya*) – and not of the putative thing itself, thus leaving intact the customary thing as existent and established by *pramāṇas*. They are then accused of falling into the nihilist extreme concerning the ultimate and the eternalist extreme concerning the customary. Ibid, p. 172: *khyed cag gis bum pa bum pas mi stong bum pa bden grub kyis stong ngo zhes ma smras sam ...* p. 175: *bum pa rang ngos mi stong zhes smras na / chos kun mi stong rtag par lta ba dang / nyi tshe'i stong pa'i stong pa dngos med po / cha gnyis 'dzin pa'i rtag chad lta gzhi sgrubs* / “You are saying that vases are not empty of vases, but are empty of really established vases, aren't you? ... If you are saying that vases are not empty of themselves, then [you'll have] a view that all dharmas, being non-empty, are eternal, and an emptiness that is a limited emptiness (*nyi tshe'i stong pa*), an absence. Go ahead and prove (*sgrubs*) the grounds for a view having both aspects, eternalist and nihilistic!” Cf. Pad ma dkar po (1527–1592) *Phyag chen rgyal ba'i gan mdzod*, p. 105: *'di ni rtag chad gnyis ka'i phyogs su lung ste / don dam chad pa dang / kun rdzob rtag ltar song zhing phyogs gnyis su gzung rung bshad pas gzhi gcig gi steng du phyogs lung sel ma shes so* // “This [dGa' ldan pa] falls into both the eternalist and the nihilistic positions. Because he explains the ultimate nihilistically and the customary eternalistically and the acceptability of the two positions, he has no idea how to eliminate falling into positions about one single ground.” On varieties of Tibetan Rang stong and gZhan stong (“emptiness of something other”) thought, see Higgins and Draszcyk 2016.

and non-Buddhist putative entities – as do most other Indian Madhyamaka texts – but shows the very *same* inconsistency as running through all Buddhist and non-Buddhist versions of things, now or to come. Indeed, while Nāgārjuna (2nd–3rd century CE), in the chapters of his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* seems to show how going second century versions of things have their respective and different inconsistencies, Śāntarakṣita shows that there is one recurring inconsistency that all putative things have and will have, namely, that *x*'s having multiple parts and *x*'s being itself a single thing are contradictory.¹⁰ This along with other premises leads to the further omnipresent contradiction that anything existent would have to be a single thing or a multiplicity and yet can be neither.

Here is what I take to be the most plausible and natural way that the argument from Śāntarakṣita could be fleshed out, a way that Tsong kha pa nevertheless pointedly said could *not* have been what Śāntarakṣita had in mind. For the moment, we'll remain uncommitted as to exactly *what* Śāntarakṣita, his philosophical mentors and disciples themselves had in mind – a more detailed discussion will come later – and give this argument as a clear starting point for analysis.

- (a) Suppose that there are things.
- (b) All things are either single things or multiplicities.
- (c) All things are wholes.
- (d) All wholes have multiple parts.
- (e) Nothing has multiple parts and is itself single.
- (f) Nothing is a single thing.
- (g) There are no multiplicities (as multiplicities are aggregates of singles).
- (h) Nothing is either a single thing or a multiplicity.

¹⁰ Note that Śāntarakṣita, unlike Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, also relies on various proofs of impermanence (*kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*) from the logicians. See *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, verse 2. In Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamaka, Dharmakīrtian reasonings become arguments against singleness rather than for impermanence; spatially unextended entities, such as God and the like, could not be single entities because they have temporal parts. To summarize centuries of history with a few logical distinctions, the difference between early Madhyamaka's and later Madhyamaka's use of latent contradictions turns on the order of quantifiers: mainstream early Mādhyamikas would readily say that for all putative entities *x*, there is some latent contradiction *y* such that *x* has *y*; Śāntarakṣita is saying something considerably stronger, viz., there is some latent contradiction *y* such that for all putative entities *x*, *x* has *y*.

- (i) If there was something, it would be both either a single thing or a multiplicity and also neither a single thing nor a multiplicity.
- (j) There isn't anything – only at most mistaken appearances of things.

What is surprising in Tsong kha pa is that he turns the tables on this seemingly plausible version of the “neither one nor many” argument and says that wholes having multiple parts does *not* embody a latent contradiction, precisely because, if it did, an argument like (a)–(j) would be unanswerable: we would prove the absurd conclusion that there would just be nothing at all. Indeed, for Tsong kha pa, (j) is an unacceptable absurdity; as he puts it, “There could not be anything at all” (*gang yang mi srid par 'gyur*). He therefore denies the truth of (j), turns the tables on the entire argument and says that one of the earlier steps is thus a false statement. The culprit is (e), for it is not true, for Tsong kha pa at least, that nothing can have multiple parts and be single – the two properties, as the quoted passage makes clear, are instead compatible.

The move is astute. Indeed, turning the tables, or reversing an argument, is a familiar move in East-West argumentation. One may acknowledge that a set of premises entails a conclusion by a seemingly valid argument,¹¹ refuse to accept that the conclusion is true, and so infer that at least one of those premises is false, or alternatively infer that the argument from true premises to false conclusion is not valid after all. Reversing the argument is, for example, what convinced atheists usually do when faced with mind-numbingly complex theological arguments, or what working scientists do when presented with a theory and observations that together entail very unlikely conclusions. It is what skeptical people routinely do. In Tsong kha pa's case, he accepted Śāntarakṣita's argument as validly leading to the unacceptable conclusion that nothing would in fact exist at all and then denied the truth of (e). Another way to put it is that Tsong kha pa's argument is a typical type of *reductio* from a counterfactual conditional, one with the protasis “if-clause” needing the English subjunctive. Indeed, when Tsong kha pa says *chos de cha du ma dang bcas pa dang gcig yin pa 'gal na ...* “If it were to be contradictory (*'gal ba = viruddha*) for any phenomenon to have multiple parts and to be a single thing” (see §11), the statement is best *not* translated in the simple indicative, for his point, as we see in the rest of the passage, is that it is *not* in fact contradictory at all for wholes to be single things and yet have multiple parts.¹²

¹¹ “Valid” is used here in the technical western sense, where an argument is valid when the premises, if true, would imply the truth of the conclusion.

¹² Note too that his use of *chos de* should be taken as a type of free variable *x*, i.e., any phenomenon, and certainly not as a demonstrative for a specifically delimited case, i.e.,

What then are we to make of Tsong kha pa's own conclusion in the quoted passage, viz., "Therefore, those two [i.e., having multiple parts and being a single thing] are not contradictory, and thus it was *not* taught [by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla] that if one believes that God has multiple temporal stages, He would have to be non-single"? So, granted that Tsong kha pa is *himself* convinced that being partite and single are not contradictory, were they so also for Śāntarakṣita and his disciple Kamalaśīla? Were they contradictory for mainstream Madhyamaka? It is, finally, high time to get clearer on what Śāntarakṣita himself probably had in mind. The issues are exegetically and philosophically tangled. Before we try to show that Tsong kha pa, in a philosophically interesting, subtle, and important way, imposed an alien thought on Śāntarakṣita, let's first adopt a slightly backhanded approach asking, "Why would one ever think that Tsong kha pa's own exegesis of the Indian 'neither one nor many' argument was actually *right* and accounted for what Śāntarakṣita thought?"

There are some considerations that might, *prima facie* at least, seem to be in favor of his exegesis of the *mens auctoris*. For Tsong kha pa, as we mentioned earlier, the "neither one nor many" argument turns on an appropriately strongly circumscribed, or qualified (*khyad par ba*) reason that things are not truly/ really single (*bden pa'i gcig*) nor really multiple (*bden pa'i du ma*) rather than a reason which is just stated in a general, unqualified manner (*spyir 'chad*) (see §6) – having multiple parts is thus contradictory with being *really* single, but not with singleness *simpliciter*. This introduction of various qualifiers, like *bden par* (*satyatas*, "truly"), *don dam par* (*paramārthatas* "in fact," "ultimately," "really"), *rang bzhin gyis* (*svabhāvena* "by its intrinsic nature"), *rdzas su* (*dravyatas* "substantially") and some others, is a well-known feature of Tsong kha pa's Philosophy of the Middle;¹³ he sees it as the way to make sense both of Śāntarakṣita's one-many argument and Kamalaśīla's account of implicit acceptance. Significantly too, Śāntarakṣita's programmatic verse in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* clearly has the word *tattvatas* (*yang dag tu*), which is a qualifier in the same semantic circle as *satyatas*, *paramārthatas*, *svabhāvena*, *dravyatas*, etc.

that particular phenomenon. This use of *chos de* as a variable is nothing unusual; it is, for example, how *chos de* is regularly used in the technical language of Tibetan logical discussions in *bsDus grwa* literature. See Tillemans 1999: 121.

¹³ In dGe lugs Madhyamaka literature we also have very important and suggestive terms that are in the same circle of qualifiers but do not, to my knowledge, come from Sanskrit: "from its own side" (*rang ngos nas*), "in terms of its own specific mode of being" (*rang gi thun mon ma yin pa'i sdod lugs gyi ngos nas*). To be precise, Tsong kha pa and his school make a significant and subtle difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika acceptances of some of these largely equivalent terms, but fortunately that need not concern us here – see Tillemans 2003 for the details and implications.

So, such qualifiers are not only important to Tsong kha pa, but also prominent in Indian Madhyamaka, in one way or another. Moreover, whether we are dealing with Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Jñānagarbha, or Tsong kha pa there is a consensus that Mādhyamika refutations target “superimpositions” (*samāropa*, *adhyāropa*) of truth or reality, but not ordinary, customary things, or appearances.¹⁴ It is sometimes thought that the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika Candrakīrti is somehow different on this score. That is not easily supported. The methodology of leaving customary entities, or appearances, untouched while refuting projections of reality, or “superimpositions,” is best seen as just mainstream Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka.¹⁵

Do these points of convergence show that Tsong kha pa, with his qualified “neither one nor many” argument targeting superimpositions, simply had Śāntarakṣita dead *right* and that the argument we laid out in (a)–(j) is indeed both not the actual “neither one nor many” argument and not Śāntarakṣita's thought? I don't think so. The key term that remains to unpack is *tattvatas* and its equivalents, which we had translated as “in fact” or (equivalently) “really.” The mere fact of targeting superimpositions while leaving the customary somehow unscathed is itself common and uncontroversial, but precisely *how* that superimposition is to be interpreted, what role the qualifier plays, and the status of the customary that remains *is* where significant divergences may be found. So, let's look in a bit of detail at what Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla meant by the qualifier. Śāntarakṣita had a heavy debt to the epistemological school of Dharmakīrti et al. – indeed in

¹⁴ See, for example, Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka* Degé f. 180a: *des na dngos po rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kun rdzob pa la yang gnod pa ni mi byed kyi / 'on kyang de la bden pa'i rnam pa nyid du sgro btags pa sel ba'i phyir rab tu sgrub par byed pa kho na yin no //* “So, we do not invalidate the customary natures of entities but instead just prove [the absence of real intrinsic nature] in order to exclude what is superimposed (*sgro btags pa* = *samāropita*, *adhyāropita*) upon the [customary entities] as their aspect of being true/real (*bden pa'i rnam pa*).” For discussion of this as well as passages from Jñānagarbha, see Tillemans 2016: 33–35.

¹⁵ For Candrakīrti's clear adherence to the same methodology of refuting superimpositions, see *Prasannapadā* 58.10–11: *tasmād anutpannā bhāvā ity evaṃ tāvad viparītasvarūpādhyāropapratipakṣeṇa prathamaprakaraṇārambhaḥ / idānīm kvacid yaḥ kaścīd viśeṣo 'dhyāropitas tadviśeṣāpākaraṇārthaṃ śeṣaprakaraṇārambhaḥ / ganṭh-gantavyagamanādiko 'pi niravaśeṣo viśeṣo nāsti pratītyasamutpādasyeti pratipādanārtham //* “Thus, when [Nāgārjuna] says ‘entities do not arise’ in this way, first of all [it is pointed out that] the initial chapter [of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*] was written as a counter to superimpositions (*adhyāropa*) of false intrinsic natures (*viparītasvarūpa*) and then that the remaining chapters were written in order to eliminate whatever distinctions (*viśeṣa*) are superimposed anywhere, the [passage] is designed to show that dependent arising has absolutely no distinctions at all like goes, places to be gone over, and going, and so on.”

his major work, the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, he was certainly a full-fledged member – so that the epistemologists' use of *tattvatas*, *paramārthatas*, etc. is most likely also his. We'll look at some examples and then try to generalize.

In his *Tattvasaṃgraha* verse 200, Śāntarakṣita argues against the non-Buddhist Nyāya school's example of the "furrowed brow of a dancing girl" (*narttakī-bhrūlatābhaṅga*), that they use to illustrate their idea of self – the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara had said that just as several people each think they have seen the same girl's beckoning brow because the cause of their perceptions is a single entity, so too a given person's various apprehensions of colours, shape, etc., are all recalled as perceptions belonging to one and the same person, because the self that is an underlying condition of these perceptions is a single entity. Śāntarakṣita replies:

The furrowed brow of a dancing girl is not really (*paramārthatas*) a single [thing] at all, as it is an aggregate of many atoms. Its singleness is [just] imagined (*kalpita*).¹⁶

Further on, in his chapter on semantic theories (*Śabdārthaparīkṣā*), Śāntarakṣita takes up the requirement of the grammarians that meanings to univocal words (*śabdārtha*) be single entities; the universal denoted by a word must be one and the same permanent thing present in a multitude. He accepts this requirement in his own *apoha* (exclusion) theory of meaning but maintains that the opponent cannot ridicule him as holding the same view as a non-Buddhist: what sets the Buddhist apart from the non-Buddhist is that word meanings and universals (taken as *apoha*) are not real, but only commonly imagined (*kalpita*). *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1200:

Singleness, permanence and the like are imagined (*kalpita*), but not real (*tāttvika*).¹⁷

To this Kamalaśīla comments in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*:

If we had said that singleness and so forth were real (*pāramārthika*), then there would have been a reason for you to ridicule us. Since indeed our teacher has said they are fictitious (*kālpanika*) in keeping with mistaken [common] conceptions (*bhrāntipratipatti*), how could there result any reason for [your] scholarly ridicule?¹⁸

¹⁶ *narttakībhrūlatābhaṅgo naivaikaḥ paramārthataḥ / anekāṇusamūhatvād ekatvaṃ tasya kalpitam //*

¹⁷ *ekatvanityatādiś ca kalpito na tu tāttvikaḥ /*

¹⁸ *yadi hi pāramārthikam ekatvādyupavarṇanam kṛtaṃ syāt tadā hāsyakāraṇam eva syād bhavataḥ, yadā hi bhrāntipratipattyanurodhena kālpanikam etad ācāryeṇopavarṇitam tadā katham iva hāsyakāraṇam avatarati viduṣaḥ //*

Finally, let's look at Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's characterization of customary truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) in *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* 63 and *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-pañjikā* thereupon:

Thus, such entities bear only *saṃvṛti* characters.¹⁹

Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*:

Because minds that are mistaken veil the real status (*de kho na nyid*) of entities, all these mistaken minds are called *saṃvṛti* (*kun rdzob*). Something that exists for that [type of mind], because it exists with a nature that is imagined (*brtags pa = kalpita*) due to the thought of a mistaken mind, is customary/obscured (*kun rdzob pa = sāmṃvṛta*).²⁰

The recurring contrast in Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's works, whether it is with regard to notions of the self, universals, or customary entities, is the contrast between reality and appearance (*snang ba = ābhāsa*), or in other words, what is in fact/really so, and what is only mistakenly imagined (*kalpita*) or thought to be so but is not so. In the case of imagined things, they may be in keeping with commonly held conceptions – in which case, they may be treated as customary truths –, but those conceptions are nonetheless *bhrāntipratipatti* “mistaken conceptions.” What is more, this reality-appearance, or real-imaginary contrast is not just idiosyncratic to Śāntarakṣita: it is a common way of using *pāramā-rthika*, *tattvatas*, etc. amongst other members of the Dharmakīrtian school. Thus, for example, when someone like the eleventh century Kashmiri commentator Manorathanandin characterizes the reason (*hetu*) in a *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*) as “not a real reason” (*pāramā-rthiko hetu*), he is saying no more, no less, than that it isn't one because it does not satisfy the criteria – *na tv ayaṃ pāramā-rthiko hetus trairūpyābhāvāt* “This, however, is not a real reason, because it lacks the triple characterization.” It is at most thought to be one. When Dharmakīrti's early commentator Devendrabuddhi (6th–7th century CE) grants that scriptural passages are *don dam par rtog pa de'i rten ma yin pa* “not bases for really (*don dam par*) understanding,” he means something similar: they are certainly accepted as such by Buddhists and others, but fail to lead to understanding because

¹⁹ *de phyir dngos po 'di dag ni // kun rdzob kho na'i mtshan nyid 'dzin // Ichigō 1985: 196.*

²⁰ *'khrul ba'i blos dngos po'i de kho na nyid bsgrigs pas blo 'khrul ba thams cad ni kun rdzob yin no / 'khrul ba'i blo'i bsam pa'i dbang gis brtags pa'i bdag nyid du gnas pa'i phyir de la yod pa ni kun rdzob pa yin no // Ichigō 1985: 197.*

they don't in fact lead to inferences (*anumāna*) – scripturally based inferences for Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi are not inferences in fact, or *stricto sensu*, because words lack the requisite certainty (*niścaya*) of a connection with their objects.²¹

I think that the textual data shows that whether we take Śāntarakṣita, most other Indian Mādhyamikas, or Buddhist epistemologists like Dharmakīrti or Devendrabuddhi, “*x* is in fact Φ ” or “*x* is really Φ ,” “*x* is intrinsically Φ ” and other such equivalently qualified formulations can best be taken as expressing a commitment to the truth of “*x* is Φ .” “Really Φ ” or “in fact, Φ ,” etc. thus emphasize the speaker's truth-claim that *x* having Φ -ness is so, and not just a fiction accepted in a certain context of ignorance, other peoples' ideas, a going story, error-ridden common opinions, or convenient make-believe and white lies.²² (A literal versus metaphorical contrast seems also relevant here and indeed is something we find explicit in thinkers like Vasubandhu and Sthiramati.)²³

²¹ See, e.g., *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* on I.217 (ed. Gnoli 1960: 109): *na khalv evaṃ anumānam anapāyāṃ anāntarīyakatvād artheṣu śabdānām iti niveditam etat* // “But such [scripturally based understanding] is not at all a flawless inference, for words have no necessary connections with objects – this has [already] been explained.”

²² Cf. the classic Indian Buddhist argument against real universals: the all-important contrast is between fictional appearance, on the one hand, and what is so, or equivalently in fact so, on the other. Universals, which people customarily accept, are said to be only fictions (*asadartha*) and appearances (*pratibhāsa*) due to error – they are pseudo-existents that fail to meet the criteria for existence but only seem to exist. Dharmakīrti writes in *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* on verse 64 (ed. Gnoli 1960: 34–35): *katham idānīm ekasya vyāvṛttasyānyānanugamād anyavyāvṛttiḥ sāmānyam / tadbuddhau tathāpratibhāsanāt / na vai kiñcit sāmānyam nāmāsti / śabdāśrayā buddhir anādivāsanāsāmarthyād asaṃsrṣṭān api dharmān saṃsrjantī jāyate / tasyāḥ pratibhāsaśena sāmānyam sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ca vyavasthāpyate / asadārtho 'pi / arthānām saṃsargabhedābhāvāt* // “[Objection:] Now, how is it that the exclusion of what is other (*anyavyāvṛtti*) could be a universal (*sāmānya*), since one excluded thing cannot be present in any others? [Reply:] It is [a universal] because it appears to be that way to the cognition [we have] of it (*tadbuddhau tathāpratibhāsanāt*). But indeed, there is no so-called universal whatsoever (*na vai kiñcit sāmānyam nāmāsti*). A cognition based on words ends up combining elements, even though they are not combined, because of the power of beginningless tendencies [to make cognition do so] (*anādivāsanāsāmarthyād*). It is on account of how things appear to be (*pratibhāsaśena*) to that [word-based cognition] that universals and co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) are established, though they are fictions (*asadartha*), for [actual particular] things are neither combined [to be a universal] nor differentiated [into the various qualities we think they have].” See also the translation and remarks in Eltschinger, Taber, Much, and Ratié 2018: 63–64.

²³ Cf. Ganeri 2011: 185: “Our Buddhists think that the evolution of the concept EGO brings with it all manner of defilements, and one form of justification for that claim is

Equally, to say that “ x is not in fact/really Φ ” usually means that x *fails* to pass muster to have Φ -ness, that it only seems to have Φ -ness, or is commonly or metaphorically said to have it in keeping with worldly epistemic practices and opinions, but doesn't. To put things another way, x has Φ -ness and x in fact/really has Φ -ness have the same truth conditions; we have a simple equivalence: x has Φ -ness if and only if x in fact/really has Φ -ness. If x only customarily has Φ -ness, or is imagined having it, or only appears to have it, then x *doesn't* have it. We shall call a use of the qualifier that obeys the above equivalence, a “weak use.”

The direct consequence of using qualifiers in this weak way – a way close to how “in fact” or “really” are used in ordinary English discourse – is that it would make no difference whether we formulated the “neither one nor many” reasoning in unqualified terms like (a)–(j) or with the qualifier “in fact/really” figuring on each line; the equivalence enables us to go from one way to the other. (In fact, this weak use of qualifiers is so weak that it collapses, for all intents and purposes, into what I called in Tillemans 2018 an “unqualified Madhyamaka.”) The key mainstream Madhyamaka contrast is then not between “ x is a single thing” and “ x is in fact/really a single thing” – they are equivalent –, but between “ x is a single thing” and “ x (only) appears mistakenly to be a single thing.” Louis de La Vallée Poussin's depiction of Madhyamaka philosophy as showing *l'inexistence métaphysique des choses et l'irréalité de l'expérience* (see n. 6 above) would not be far off the mark. Equally, the Tibetan *rang stong pa*, and even those Tibetan Mādhyamikas who saw customary entities as being only “existent for mistaken minds” (*blo 'khrul ba'i ngor yod pa*), were also pursuing a quite convincing and similar type of exegesis of India in saying that carts are empty of carts, and hence are not carts, only wrongly appearing to be so. Finally, targeting superimpositions and leaving the customary unscathed means that one refutes commitment to something being so, but does not challenge the fact that it appears to be so to mistaken individuals. All these Madhyamaka philosophies turn on the contrast between what is, or is in fact/really, and what only erroneously appears to be. Mainstream Madhyamaka generally uses qualifiers in the weak way described above, which results in that contrast.

Tsong kha pa, by contrast, has a strong use of qualifiers, which is not the same as the weak and is part of a very different Madhyamaka philosophy, as

that the concept rests in this way on an error. Sthiramati's comment on the first of the *30 Verses* [of Vasubandhu] bears the point out: he says that the concept of self presents only an apparent (*nirbhāsa*) referent, just as the perception of someone with an eye-disease presents only apparent hairs and circles. It is ‘metaphorically designated’ (*upacaryate*) because it is said to be there when it is not, as if one were to use the word ‘cow’ when there is an ox.”

the equivalence between “ x has Φ -ness” and “ x really has Φ -ness” does not hold. In particular, the key contrast in Madhyamaka thought for Tsong kha pa is not between commonly accepted mistaken appearances of Φ -ness, on the one hand, and Φ -ness, or equivalently in fact/really Φ -ness, on the other. Rather, it is between Φ -ness (i.e., customary truths), on the one hand, and in fact/really Φ -ness, on the other. As we have done in some earlier publications (Tillemans 2016: chapter 2; 2018), we could highlight Tsong kha pa’s strong use of the qualifier by putting “really” in capitals, i.e., “REALLY.” The point would be that while using “really,” “in fact” and the like in the weak way would collapse into the assertion that such and such a state of affairs is the case, and doesn’t just appear to be so, “REALLY” would be a much stronger assertion, one that does not collapse in that fashion but means that things would have to be what they are independently of all other factors. Mādhyamikas, in short, supposedly know that customary things are so (in a way that does not unpack as just “appearing-to-be-so-to-the-mistaken”), but not REALLY so because they are thoroughly dependent phenomena.²⁴

What then is badly wrong, for Tsong kha pa, in saying that customary entities are just commonly accepted mistaken appearances? Although many Tibetan thinkers, like the Jo nang pa and others, held that customary things are all just fictions, or mistaken appearances, that seem to exist to the ignorant, but don’t,

²⁴ Here’s a possible objection to splitting the use of “really/REALLY” into two that might come to mind for a careful reader of Indian and Tibetan texts. As we mentioned earlier, Tsong kha pa subscribes to the principle that if something were to be *bden pa’i gcig*, REALLY single, it couldn’t have parts – what we see emphasized in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* and in later dGe lugs pa texts is that while single things (*gcig*) do have parts (*cha bcas*) unproblematically, REALLY single things would have to be partless (*cha med*) (see §12). Significantly, Śāntarakṣita’s commentator Kamalaśīla might seem to agree with much of this mereological maxim: in his *Pañjikā* on the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, Kamalaśīla glosses the term “single” (*gcig pa = eka*) in the programmatic verse’s line “because they are in fact/really neither single things nor multiplicities,” as *cha med pa nyid* (= *niravayavatā*) “partlessness” (*gcig pa zhes bya ba ni cha med pa nyid do*; Ichigō 1985: 23). This, however, doesn’t show that the qualifier is used in the same way. Mainstream Mādhyamikas, as well as Tsong kha pa, all recognize, in one way or another, that real or REAL existence of x would imply that x would, *per impossible*, have to exist completely independently of any other factors, be they causes, conditions, cognizing minds, or spatio-temporal parts. (See Tillemans 2016: 22–26, 29.) The difference that sets Tsong kha pa apart, therefore, is that whereas the Indian Madhyamaka tends to use the qualifier to contrast how things are or are not (i.e., the being of things) with how they mistakenly appear to be, Tsong kha pa contrasts different ways of being of things, i.e., REAL and customary. In the former case, for x to *be* single, and not just wrongly *seem* to be single, it would have to be partless. In the latter case, x can *be* single and have parts; for x to be REALLY single it would have to be partless.

for Tsong kha pa global error and a resultant all-encompassing fictionalism are anathema: there are *pramāṇas* (*tshad ma*, sources of knowledge) that establish customary existence; it has properties that can be argued about and have a significant objective status, as they are not just seeming-properties only so because people ignorantly think they are. We find the following in his polemic, in *Drang nges legs bshad snying po*, against the Jo nang pa and other thinkers' idea of customary truth being only *blo 'khrul ba'i ngor yod pa* "existent for mistaken minds:"

You can't say, "There is no problem in establishing customary existents as being just what exists for the mistakes (*'khrul ngor yod pa tsam*) that have come down to us unanalysed from beginningless [time]." Suppose that were so. Then the objects as determined (*zhen yul = adhyavaseya*) when one apprehends things to be permanent, i.e., as being the same previously and subsequently, as well as those apprehended by the innate self-grasping that holds persons and phenomena to be intrinsically established (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*), would [all absurdly] end up existing customarily (*tha snyad du yod par 'gyur*).²⁵

And a few lines further he states the linchpin of his own position:

It is because things that customarily exist have to be established by *pramāṇas*.²⁶

In short, customary existence of *x*, or more generally, *x* having Φ -ness, do not unpack as simply that *x* mistakenly seems to exist (to all or most of us?) or that *x* mistakenly seems to have Φ -ness. If they did unpack in this way, there would be no correctives to widespread ideas of customary existence and properties, no possibility of reform, and, indeed, no normativity to truth at all. This critique of no-*pramāṇa* views is a recurrent theme in the philosophy of Tsong kha pa and his dGe lugs pa followers and is subtle, notwithstanding the fact that certain prominent dGe lugs pa thinkers like 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648–1721) go into some rather predictable hyperbole against those who get the point wrong. It is polemically argued that misguided individuals who see the customary as being false conceptual discriminations and thus best transcended would sabotage the Buddhist path and be comparable to the Chinese Heshang (Hvashang) Mohoyen who, in his debate at bSam yas with Kamalaśīla at the end of the eighth century,

²⁵ Tsong kha pa, *Drang nges legs bshad snying po*, S., p. 234: *ma dpyad pa thog med nas brgyud de 'ongs pa'i 'khrul ngor yod pa tsam la kun rdzob tu yod par 'jog pas skyon med do zhes kyang smra mi nus te / de lta snga phyi gcig 'dzin gyi rtag 'dzin dang gang zag dang chos rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub par 'dzin pa'i bdag 'dzin lhan skyes kyi zhen yul yang tha snyad du yod par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro /*

²⁶ Ibid., p. 234: *tha snyad du yod pa la tshad mas grub pa dgos pa'i phyir ro //*

advocated a Buddhist path consisting in transcendence of discriminations by the abandonment of all conceptual thinking.²⁷

Buddhist fire and brimstone polemics aside, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's composite picture of no-*pramāṇa* Madhyamaka, customary truth as mistaken appearances, and the Heshang-like abandonment of conceptual thinking is not just pure calumny. There are serious philosophical problems if one tries to eliminate reasoned deliberation about normative matters such as what people *should* think there is in favor of just acquiescing in what they *do* mistakenly think. A viable stance on truth requires more than just talk about what people, *de facto*, wrongly think is true; and an active pursuit of such truth demands refined conceptual thinking about how customary things are and should be, not just how they seem to be to the benighted. Interestingly enough, Kamalaśīla, to his credit, did recognize the need for *pramāṇas* concerning the customary and was not satisfied with simply substituting widespread current opinion for truth; Śāntarakṣita probably thought the same. As I have discussed elsewhere (Tillemans 2016: chapter 2), in texts like the *Sarvadharmāṇiḥsvabhāvatāsiddhi* Kamalaśīla did argue for the need for *pramāṇas* and normativity, and he did so for reasons that were, in the end, not much different from those of *Drang nges legs bshad snying po*. His problem, however, is essentially the following: if he is indeed the Buddhist global irrealist that I have been making him out to be, it is doubtful that he will be able

²⁷ See, for example, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's *Grub mtha'*, p. 576: ...gzhi kun rdzob thams cad ri bong gi rwa dang rab rib kyi nam mkha'i skra shad ltar gzhi cir yang ma grub kyang blo 'khrul ba'i ngor yod pa kun rdzob tu yod pa'i don du 'dod la / lam sgom tshe yid la gang byas thams cad mtshan 'dzin bdud las su bsams nas shes rab kyi cha kun 'gog cing spyod pa'i tshe chos spyod bcu dang phar phyin lnga sogs thams cad blun po mas 'dzeg gi ched yin pas 'gog par byed pa... "With regard to the [ontological] bases, they maintain that no customary things whatsoever are established, just as if things were like rabbits' horns or like the hairs falling in space for those who have myodesopsia (*rab rib* = *timira*); and they also maintain that 'existence for a mistaken mind' (*blo 'khrul ba'i ngor yod pa*) is what [Buddhists] mean by 'customary existence.' When they cultivate the path, they think that whatever is produced in the mind is all [just] the work of the demon of grasping at characteristics [of things], and so they put a stop to all facets of insight (*shes rab* = *prajñā*). When they practise, they make people stop the ten [virtuous] practices and five perfections (*phar phyin* = *pāramitā*), since those all would [just] be for fools who were climbing upwards from the bottom. ..." He makes the parallel with Heshang and Tibetan crypto-followers of Heshang in some detail, tarring them together with the same broad brush (in keeping with a famous verse from Sa skya Paṇḍita's *sDom gsum rab dbye*) as "contemporary Mahāmudrā and the Chinese-style Great Perfection" (*da lta'i phyag rgya chen po dang / rgya nag lugs kyi rdzogs chen*, *ibid.*, p. 575). On Heshang and his debate with Kamalaśīla, see Demiéville 1987, Tillemans 2016: chapter 10.

to meet his own needs.²⁸ Tsong kha pa was not an advocate of panfictionalism and global error theories and that gives him a better chance at a meaningful pursuit of customary existence and truth.²⁹

It is time to draw some corollaries. Given Śāntarakṣita's weak use of qualifiers that collapse "x is in fact/really Φ " and "x is Φ ," it is therefore clear that (a)–(j) is indeed Śāntarakṣita's "neither one nor many" reasoning. Moreover, we also have a response to the question as to whether mainstream Mādhyamikas show latent contradictions in the putative entities themselves. They *do*. (For a semi-serious illustrative parable of what it is like for there to be latent contradictions in everything, see Appendix II.) For Tsong kha pa, on the other hand, Madhyamaka does *not* show latent contradictions in the putative entities themselves: it only shows contradictions in the ideas of REAL entities or REAL properties. His Madhyamaka thought is thus quite significantly different from that of most of its Indian forerunners and sources. Finally, it should be said that his own position that there is no contradiction between something having many parts and being nonetheless single makes good philosophical sense – after all, why *would* one say that there was such a contradiction if one accepted ordinary views as capturing *truths* and not just errors, white lies or useful make-believe? But such a position is not Śāntarakṣita's nor probably that of other major Indian Mādhyamikas. It is a position that, I would maintain, is not only subtle but may provide a simple, convincing alternative to Indian Madhyamaka's tortuous mereology.³⁰

²⁸ Cf. Tillemans 2018: 95: "The price to be paid for a cocktail of quietism and panfictionalism is potentially very high. It's hard to see how the panfictionalist could account for the complex and evolving rational discriminations between truths and falsities that we do make, if all were just completely false and deceptive. Of course, at some point the global fictionalist or error theorist may well say that the world's thinking some propositions to be true and others false is based on the brute fact of some erroneous beliefs turning out to be useful to us as white lies and others remaining relatively useless. But while we might perhaps (like an ethical irrealist) be able to take as 'true' certain sorts of shared white lies, like beliefs in there being good or bad actions because such erroneous beliefs make people more respectful, gentle, and so on, it would be hard to see why many beliefs and statements – in ethics, physics, geography, car mechanics, or what have you – would be so useful on a wide and complex scale if one stripped them all of any truth."

²⁹ See Tillemans 2016: 6, 57–58.

³⁰ There is still a regrettably strong tendency, amongst modern writers and Tibetans alike, to see Tsong kha pa and the dGe lugs pa as somehow simply *transmitting* the mainstream, a kind of duplicating or channelling of Nāgārjuna's, Candrakīrti's, and Śāntarakṣita's thought processes. Part of that phenomenon is, no doubt, due to Tsong kha pa's and his school's devoted profession of conformity with, and grounding in, Indian Buddhist texts, an understandable scholastic worry about *khungs*, or legitimizing sources. In many

More generally, Tsong kha pa has significantly changed the rules of the game: we now have a Madhyamaka philosophy turning on a contrast between two different sets of propositions that each could have genuine truth and justification. The point of Madhyamaka is now to separate out an ordinary type of realism (with its minimally adequate account of truth) from a metaphysics of REALISM, the latter being a seductive and needless trap. Arguably, if one's Madhyamaka is primarily a means to non-conceptuality and transcendence, Tsong kha pa's new game, which *does* stress and legitimize conceptual thought, would not be attractive; one would probably want to stick with the old as it would dismiss reasoned discriminations and indeed all concepts of ordinary things as concerned with false appearances. For a philosopher who needs the tools to make reasoned discriminations about the ordinary as best she can, however, the new game is much more promising than the old.

Appendix I. An extract from Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*³¹

§1. Now, in [Kamalaśīla's] *Madhyamakāloka* it was explained that it is fine whether one takes [the neither one nor many argument] as an absurd consequence (*thal 'gyur = prasaṅga*) or as an autonomous [reasoning] (*rang rgyud = svatantra*). So, let's explain the faultless way to prove it as an absurd consequence. In that case, the *Madhyamakāloka* says that although the opponent has not explicitly (*dngos su*) accepted the logical reason [viz., that the entities in question are not single things], implicitly he has accepted it, and hence we present an explicitly accepted antecedent term (*khyab bya = vyāpya*, lit. "what is pervaded") for that reason, for when he has explicitly accepted the antecedent term [e.g., producing various effects successively], then he has implicitly (*shugs kyis = sāmāthyāt*) accepted the consequent term (*khyab byed = vyāpaka*, "the pervader") [viz., not being a single thing].³²

respects, including especially the present matter, however, Tsong kha pa showed major, but hardly acknowledged, originality.

³¹ Another extract from *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* on logical issues was translated in Tillemans 1984. This publication also has a translation of Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's work on the *ekānekaviyogahetu*.

³² See *Madhyamakāloka*, ed. Keira 2004: 253, §§2–3: *de la 'dir thal bar sgrub na gtan tshigs ma grub pa yang ma yin te / 'di ltar ji ste pha rol po dag gis dngos po rnams gcig dang du ma dang bral bar khas ma blangs su zin kyang / 'on kyang des khyab pa'i chos khas blangs pa'i phyir shugs kyis ni de yang khas blangs pa kho na yin te / de la re zhig dang gis dbang phyug la sogs pa rtag pa dang gcig pu'i ngo bo nyid du kun brtags pa de dag gis ni de dag 'bras bu rim gyis 'byung ba la nye bar shyor ba nyid kyi chos su khas blangs pa'i phyir shugs kyis na gcig gi ngo bo nyid dang bral ba yang khas blangs pa nyid de / ngo bo gcig la skyed par mi byed pa'i gnas skabs dang khyad par med pa nyid*

§2. If that were so [we would reply that] a Cārvāka [Materialist], too, would have [implicitly] accepted past and future lives and omniscience, for given that he has accepted consciousness in this life, that [consciousness's existence] would imply that it was preceded by a consciousness in a previous life and given that he has accepted that the four elements exist, such existence implies that it is seen by an omniscient being. There are a lot of other sorts [of cases] like those too [where it could be shown absurdly that the opponent would implicitly accept propositions that run directly counter to his professed views].³³

§3. Suppose it is objected that we do not say the opponents *have* accepted [the lack of singleness], but it just has *been* accepted (*khas blangs pa tsam mo*).

§4. [We reply:] That version of things would not be right, for if one referred to one phenomenon, then those words would implicitly refer to all the phenomena that are consequent terms (*khyab byed* = *vyāpaka*) implied by it and the mind would implicitly ascertain [those consequent terms].

kyis dus snga ma bzhin du dus phyis kyang skyed par byed pa nyid du mi rung ba'i phyir ro // 'on te skyed par byed pa nyid yin na ni sngon gyi gnas skabs dang mtshan nyid mi mthun pa'i no bo nyid yin pa'i phyir gcig pa nyid nyams pa yin no // Translation Keira 2004: 180–182: “In this case, if this [reason] proves an absurd consequence, the reason is still not unestablished. That is, although it is not accepted by others that entities are neither one nor many, they do acknowledge properties that are pervaded (*vyāpta*) by [being neither one nor many]. Therefore, the latter [i.e., being neither one nor many] is also in fact acknowledged by implication (*shugs kyis, sāmāthyāt*). In this vein, first of all, those who imagine *Īśvara* (i.e., ‘God’) and so forth as having permanence and oneness acknowledge that [*Īśvara* and so forth] have the property of influencing results produced successively, and therefore they also in fact acknowledge the absence of oneness by implication. This is because given that something which is one in nature is no different [later] from what it was [earlier] when it did not produce [results], then it could not produce [results] later, just as [it did not produce results] earlier. If, on the other hand, it did in fact produce [results], then because of the difference of character from its former state, its oneness would be undermined.”

³³ The first absurdity is that a Materialist of the Cārvāka school, who vociferously rejects past lives, would implicitly accept reincarnation by simply accepting that people are conscious in this life. Tsong kha pa and other *paralokavādins* (“advocates of other lives”) follow Dharmakīrti in arguing that the existence of past consciousnesses is entailed by the existence of the present consciousness, because past consciousness must be the substratum (*upādāna*) of the present, just as clay is the substratum of a pot. In Tillemans 1993: 73–75 I have translated the elaborate presentation of this argument as found in mKhas grub rje's *sDe bdun rgyan yid kyi mun sel*. Much of that argumentation goes back to *Pramāṇavārttika* II, 84–118. Secondly, the same Materialist, who rejects omniscience, would implicitly accept it, because it is also supposedly proven (by Buddhist logicians) that all existent atomic matter is apprehended by the omniscient Buddha.

§5. It might be said that he therefore explicitly accepts a duly qualified (*khyad par ba*) antecedent term. Let us accordingly present the antecedent term for what he has implicitly accepted, namely, not being really a single thing (*bden pa'i gcig min pa*).

§6. If we state the antecedent and consequent terms in a general [unqualified] fashion (*spyir 'chad*), then the faults would ensue as before [i.e., the opponent would end up accepting all sorts of propositions that he explicitly disavows]. Thus, we do have to accept qualified terms.

§7. Now, if we take as an illustration the [non-Buddhist] conceptions of God (*dbang phyug* = *īśvara*), then here is the way in which [non-Buddhist philosophical thinkers] accept that He is of the nature of a single (*gcig* = *eka*) [entity]. They believe that the very God who existed in the morning exists in full in the afternoon, too. So, they do not believe that while certain parts of the God that exists in the morning may exist in the afternoon, other parts are however non-existent. Rather, they believe that the entirety of parts existing earlier exists later and that there are no parts nonexistent earlier that are parts of the God that exists later. Therefore, they do not believe that the parts of God are different beings (*ngo bo tha dad*) from each other. This is the way in which they hold God to be a single [entity].

§8. This [point] is not the same as [the fact] that, according to our [Buddhist] tradition, we maintain that a vase *is* a case of a single [entity] and believe that it exists in both the morning and the afternoon, but nonetheless do not believe that the two vases [respectively] of the morning and afternoon are one single [entity] and maintain [instead] that they are cases of multiple [entities].³⁴

§9. So much for [Kamalaśīla] saying that it is not explicitly (*ngos su*) accepted that God lacks the nature of being a single [entity].

³⁴ The key point in §§7–10 is that the opponent conceives of God and other such permanent entities as partlessly single (*cha med kyi gcig*), and that partless singleness is in contradiction with having temporal divisions. The Buddhist, on the other hand, can still hold that a customary entity, like a vase, is a single thing but has multiple temporal parts, just as he too holds that it is single but has multiple spatially extended parts. He can also maintain that the temporal slices of the vase are multiple without saying that the vase itself is a multiplicity. On a conception of partless singleness, the God of the morning and the God of the evening would have to be numerically one and the same unchanged thing and could not produce different effects at different times. But this is not analogous to the perfectly uncontradictory case where a customary single object, like blue, produces several perceptions over time. Customarily single entities are not *bden pa'i gcig* or *cha med kyi gcig* “partlessly one.”

§10. The antecedent term (*khyab bya* = *vyāpya*) by the acceptance of which [the non-Buddhists] have implicitly (*shugs kyis*) accepted that God is not such a single entity, is that this God would have multiple temporal stages that produce [various] effects such as creating happiness in the morning and misery in the afternoon. Once [those temporal stages] have been accepted, then by implication from that [proposition] they would have accepted that God was not a single [entity]. When [Śāntarakṣita] says this, the singleness at stake is a singleness where all (*thams cad*) the Gods that exist at multiple earlier and late times would not be different beings (*ngo bo tha dad*), but rather would exist as one being (*ngo bo gcig*). However, [Śāntarakṣita] is not talking about anything like the fact that [people correctly] accept blue to be a single [thing] while it [i.e., blue] produces a blue perception having multiple earlier and later temporal stages.

§11. If it were to be contradictory (*'gal ba* = *viruddha*) for a phenomenon to have multiple parts and to be a single thing, then singleness would be impossible, and if it [i.e., singleness] were to be nonexistent, multiplicity would be nonexistent too. Then, those two being nonexistent, and given that there is no third alternative (*phung* = *rāśi*) apart from those two, there could not be anything at all. Therefore, those two [i.e., having multiple parts and being a single thing] are not contradictory, and thus it was not taught [by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla] that if one believes that God has multiple temporal stages, He would have to be non-single. And [Kamalaśīla] did not mean [that having parts entailed not being single] when he said that [the non-Buddhist opponents] have accepted an antecedent term (*khyab bya* = *vyāpya*) implying non-singleness.

§12. So, suppose that [instead] one construes the point of things lacking real singleness (*bden pa'i gcig*) in terms of a singleness of something partless (*cha med kyi gcig*), i.e., that does not have multiple parts. Then when one has accepted that [things] deploy effects having temporal stages, one has explicitly (*dngos su*) accepted that those things lack real singleness: it is not implicitly (*shugs kyis* = *sāmarthyāt*) [accepted]. Via this position, one should also understand just how [opponents] have accepted the other four antecedent terms implying that things are not really one.

Tibetan text of the extract

A note on the editions consulted. I have looked at the text in the various editions of Tsong kha pa's *Collected Works* (*gsung 'bum*) on <https://www.tbrc.org>. There are no significant differences from the Tashilhunpo edition ("T") and thus these editions have not been referenced here. On the other hand, in the Sarnath edition of *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* destined for classes of Tibetan students, the editor

has made two important amendments. They are listed below in notes. I think this perspicacious editor was right in making those corrections.

§1. [37. f. 7b] yang *dBu ma snang bar* thal 'gyur dang rang rgyud gang du byed kyang byas pas chog par bshad pas thal bar bsgrub pa la skyon med tshul bshad na / *dBu ma snang ba* las pha rol pos rtags dngos su khas ma blangs kyang / shugs kyis khas blangs pa dang / de'i rgyu mtshan du rtags de'i khyab bya dngos su khas blangs pa bkod de / khyab bya dngos su khas blangs na khyab byed shugs kyis khas blangs pas so //

§2. de lta na **rGyang pan** gyis kyang skye ba snga phyi dang / thams cad mkhyen pa khas blangs par gyur te / 'di ltar des tshe 'di'i rig pa khas blangs la de la ni skye ba snga ma'i rig pa sngon du 'gro bas khyab pa'i phyir dang / 'byung ba bzhi yod par khas blangs la / de yod pa la thams cad mkhyen pas gzigs pas khyab pa'i phyir ro // de 'dra ba'i rigs gzhan yang mang ngo //

§3. gal te rgol ba de dag gi khas blangs zhes mi smra'i shugs kyis [38] khas blangs pa tsam mo zhe na /

§4. de lta na mi 'thad de / chos gcig brjod pa na de la khyab byed du yod pa'i chos thams cad sgra des shugs la brjod pa dang / blo des shugs la nges par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //

§5. des na khyab bya khyad par ba ji 'dra ba zhig dngos su khas blangs pas bden pa'i gcig min pa shugs kyis khas [f. 8a] blangs pa'i khyab bya ston cig ce na /

§6. 'dir khyab bya dang khyab byed spyir 'chad na skyon snga ma ltar 'ong bas khyad par ba la 'dod dgos so //

§7. de yang dbang phyug rtog pa la mtshon na / de gcig gi rang bzhin du khas len tshul ni / snga dro'i dus na gang yod pa'i dbang phyug de nyid ma lus pa phyi dro'i dus na'ang yod par 'dod pas / snga dro'i dus na yod pa'i dbang phyug gi cha 'ga' zhig phyi dro'i dus na yod kyang / cha gzhan 'ga' med par yang 'dod pa min gyi / snga dus na yod pa'i cha hril po phyi dus na yod cing / phyi dus na yod pa'i dbang [39] phyug gi cha yin pa'i cha snga dus na med pa med par 'dod do ³⁵ des na dbang phyug yin pa'i cha ngo bo phan tshun du tha dad pa mi 'dod pa ni / dbang phyug gcig tu 'dod lugs so //

§8. 'di ni rang lugs kyis bum pa ni gcig gi mtshan gzhir 'jog la / snga dro dang phyi dro'i dus gnyis su'ang yod par 'dod kyang / snga dro'i dus kyi bum pa dang

³⁵ *S. med pa med par 'dod do*: T. *med pas / med par 'dod do*. The instrumental ...*med pas* / makes little sense, although all editions of Tsong kha pa's works have that reading. The editor of *S.* has it right.

phyi dro'i dus kyi bum pa gnyis gcig tu mi 'dod la / de gnyis du ma'i mtshan gzhir yang 'jog pa dang mi 'dra'o //

§9. dbang phyug gcig gi rang bzhin dang bral bar dngos su khas ma blangs zhes pa de'o //

§10. gang khas blangs pas dbang phyug de de 'dra ba'i gcig ma yin par shugs kyis khas blangs pa'i khyab bya / dbang phyug des snga dro bde ba bskyed pa dang / phyi dro sdug bsngal skyed par byed pa sogs kyi 'bras bu bskyed pa'i rim pa du ma khas [f. 8b] blangs na / de'i shugs kyis dbang phyug gcig min par khas blangs zhes pa gcig ni / [40] dus snga phyi du ma na yod pa'i dbang phyug thams cad ngo bo tha dad min par ngo bo gcig na yod pa'i gcig yin gyi / sngon po gcig tu khas len pa dang / des sngo 'dzin snga phyi du ma rim pa can du bskyed pa lta bu la de ltar ston pa min no //

§11. chos de cha du ma dang bcas pa dang / gcig yin pa 'gal na gcig mi srid la de med na du ma yang med cing / de gnyis med na de gnyis las gzhan pa'i phung gsum med pas gang yang mi srid par 'gyur bas / de gnyis ni mi 'gal bas dbang phyug la rim pa du ma yod par 'dod pa la gcig ma yin par 'gyur zhes bstan pa yang min³⁶ la / gcig min pa'i khyab bya khas blangs zhes pa yang min no //

§12. des na bden pa'i gcig yin pa dang bral ba'i don cha du ma dang bcas pa min pa'i cha med kyi gcig la byed na / 'bras bu rim can la nye bar sbyor bar khas blangs pa ni / bden pa'i gcig bral du dngos su khas blangs pa yin gyi [41] shugs kyis min no // phyogs 'dis ni bden pa'i gcig min pa'i khyab bya bzhi gzhan la khas blangs tshul yang shes par bya'o //

Appendix II. Latent contradictions in all things: a Borgesian parable

There is an interesting rumour – thoroughly unsubstantiated, alas – that Jorge Luis Borges told a labyrinthine tale showing how all things would be internally contradictory and thus false appearances. Here is a fragment of what he supposedly said to the assembled literati of Buenos Aires:

“For a reason that I can not explain here, we all – or perhaps, only most of us – imagine there is a mysterious village barber: he shaves all and only the men in his village that do not shave themselves. Perhaps we learned that in school; perhaps we have been reading too much Bertrand Russell; or perhaps, as Buddhists say, we have had innate tendencies to think so since

³⁶ *S. min*: T. *yin*. The editor of *S.* has made the right correction, as the logic of the passage is that non-contradictoriness of being partite and single is used as a reason to show that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla could *not* have taught that God was not single because of being partite.

beginningless time. No matter. The point is that while people imagine, or even see that such barbers are good or bad, cheap or expensive, identical with or different from their bodies, even momentary or enduring, still there aren't any, or aren't any in fact, and they don't have the properties in question, because if there were to be such a barber, he would shave himself if and only if he didn't."³⁷

"Indeed, fortunately perhaps, the village barber is an impossible barber and so doesn't exist. Likewise for all the other customary things whose metaphysical status so troubles us, because they are riddled with their own various contradictory features, like part-whole contradictions, and are thus empty of themselves. No need to be troubled: they too are just appearances, fictions, errors, things that are *mṛṣāmoṣadharma* (false and deceptive), as they say in Sanskrit. Worldlings, unfortunately, don't understand such non-obvious contradictions. *Somos todos el barbero*."

The erudite Argentine apparently returned to the Café Tortoni and said no more on the subject. He was more obsessed with tortoises and their avatars than barbers. He was, though, arguably right in saying that everything from ideas of God to those of carts, atoms, minds, and people, if latently contradictory, would be deeply barber-like.

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³⁷ Borges was, no doubt, referring to the barber that Russell, in his 1918 "Philosophy of Logical Atomism" (see Russell 1968: 261), defined as: "one who shaves all those, and those only, who do not shave themselves. The question is, does the barber shave himself?" It was an analogy for his notoriously paradoxical set of all sets that are not members of themselves. That set leads to a paradox (Is it a member of itself? It is if and only if it isn't.), because its existence is a consequence of basic and intuitively plausible axioms of set theory, notably the axiom of set construction, and thus cannot easily be dismissed. The impossible barber is not interesting in that way; as Raymond Smullyan and others have pointed out, it is just a (slightly non-obvious) case of contradictory properties (not far from a man supposedly being five feet tall and also six feet tall), but is not intractable like the Russellian set theoretical paradox.

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Jayanta on the Question of God's Existence*

Alex Watson

Introduction

The history of the various classical Indian discussions of the existence of God remains yet to be written. Indeed, a thorough history could not yet be written, for the writings of many authors who elaborated on the subject have not yet been sufficiently studied. Philosophers who contributed substantially include Vasubandhu (c. 350–430), Praśastapāda (c. 560–610), Uddyotakara (c. 550–600), Kumārila (c. 550–650), Dharmakīrti (c. 550–660), Śāntarakṣita (725–788), Kamalaśīla (740–795), Vācaspatimiśra (c. 950–1000), Jñānaśrīmitra (c. 990–1040), Udayana (c. 1050–1100), and Gaṅgeśa (c. 1300–1350) – but this is merely a small sample that does not even include any of the various Jaina, Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, Sāṅkhya or Yoga writers who also need to be considered. Three recent books allow us a good picture of three specific episodes that were previously not much known about: Helmut Krasser's (2002) on Śāṅkara-nandana (9th or 10th century), Parimal Patil's (2009) on Ratnakīrti (c. 1000–1050), and Shinya Moriyama's (2014) on Prajñākaragupta (c. 750–810).¹ This article

* I would like to thank Kei Kataoka: it was collaborating with him on an English translation of this section of the *Nyāyamañjarī* (Watson and Kataoka forthcoming) that enabled me to write this article. I am also very grateful to Arindam Chakrabarti for inviting me to two conferences, organized by him and sponsored by the Templeton Foundation, at which I presented parts of the present article: “God, No-God, and the Argumentative Indian,” IIAS, Shimla, July 2015; and “Realism/Anti-Realism, Omniscience and God/No-God,” University of Hawai'i, Manoa, March, 2017. I also gave, in 2016, two keynote speeches on this topic (University of Leiden, symposium on “Problems in Indian Philosophy;” University of Tel Aviv, conference in honour of Shlomo Biderman) and one more conference paper (NYU Abu Dhabi, “Normativity Conference”). I thank the members of those five audiences who gave me the benefit of their questions and comments.

I was also very fortunate to receive insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article from a number of colleagues: Amit Chaturvedi, Nilanjan Das, Matthew Dasti, Birgit Kellner, Roy Perrett, Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, Mark Siderits and John Taber.

¹ The last focusses on the subject of omniscience, but treats the existence of God as

adds an account of Jayanta's discussion in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (c. 890). For readers of Japanese, Jayanta's discussion is already accessible by means of Kataoka's (2009 and 2010) translation, and partially accessible by means of Kano's (2000). For readers of English there is a translation by Bhattacharyya (1978), which however, as is well known, does not provide an accurate rendering of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, and three summaries/studies: Nagin Shah (1995: 135–145), Taber (1986: 112–114) and Clooney (1999: 528–533).² This article adds a more detailed account than any of those three. The features I have highlighted may be of interest not only to those wanting a window into Indian debates about God, but also to those wanting an introduction to Indian inferential logic.

When one comes to the *Nyāyamañjarī* from another *śāstra*, or from another area within Nyāya, four things may strike one. First, the beauty of its Sanskrit, which switches between verse and prose. Jayanta was a poet as well as a philosopher, writing *kāvya* (in particular the play *Āgamaḍambara*) as well as *śāstra*. Secondly the clarity he brings to his treatment of philosophical topics. He had a keen sense of precisely what the issue was: what separated the two sides of a debate. A good way to understand a philosophical problem that captured the attention of disputants in Classical India is to read its treatment in the *Nyāyamañjarī*. Indeed Jayanta often begins his treatment of a topic by giving an account of the most salient chapters in the prior history of the debate. Thus, for example, when dealing with *apoha*, Buddhist philosophy of language, he first gives Dignāga's theory, then Kumārila's arguments against that, then Dharmakīrti's modified version, which takes account of Kumārila's critique, then Dharmottara's further modified version, before giving his own position.

Thirdly, his sense of humour. He peppers his dialogue with witty or sarcastic put-downs directed from the speaker to his interlocutor. It is striking that these are sometimes directed from the opponent (the *pūrvapakṣin*) to Jayanta himself (the *siddhāntin*). This leads on to the fourth point, the strength of Jayanta's *pūrvapakṣas*. He puts the strongest possible arguments into the mouth of his opponent; to learn Buddhist or Mīmāṃsā philosophy one could do a lot worse than study Jayanta's Buddhist and Mīmāṃsaka *pūrvapakṣas*. In fact it even occasionally happens that the opponent's arguments appear more interesting and sophisticated than Jayanta's response.

a related problem.

² Ratié (2015: 274–277) also touches on it.

The section of the *Nyāyamañjarī* concerned with the existence of God is, like many of its sections, divided into two parts: *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*. That is not to say there is no back and forth within both sections. Both contain dialogue, with objections and responses. It is just that in the *pūrvapakṣa* section the opponent is the main speaker. When an objection is raised and dialogue starts, it is he that has the final say on the matter, before moving on to his next point. In the *siddhānta* section, this is reversed. This article is divided into two main parts: “The Atheistic *pūrvapakṣa*” and “The Theistic *siddhānta*.”

1 The Atheistic *pūrvapakṣa*

1.1 The inference of God's existence

The first problem that the atheist points to with the inference of God's existence is that one can usually only infer the existence of something that one has perceived elsewhere previously.³ The only reason we can infer the existence of fire on the mountain is that we have perceived fire previously, for example in the kitchen. Part of the reason for the necessity of this prior perception is that without it we could not come to know the “concomitance” (*avinābhāva*, *anvayavyatireka*) between smoke and fire – or, as it is sometimes expressed, the fact that smoke is “pervaded” (*vyāpta*) by fire – i.e. that wherever smoke occurs, fire occurs. That pervasion is the basis for inferring fire. So if we cannot perceive God, as the Naiyāyikas generally conceded, and hence cannot establish that wherever X occurs, God occurs, what basis do we have for inferring him?

The theist here replies that his inference of the existence of God is not *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭa* but *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*;⁴ that is to say it is not one whose pervasion is observed through perception, but rather through “similarity.” In order to understand what this means, let us first look at the form of the theist's inference; we will then be better equipped to address the question of in what sense it is *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. The theist's inference is:

³ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.1. Here, and throughout this article, §-numbers refer both to Kataoka's (2005) edition and to Watson and Kataoka's (forthcoming) translation.

⁴ The term probably first occurs in Sāṅkhya, where it is contrasted with *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*; see Frauwallner 1982: 213ff., 267, and *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* Vol. I p. 518.9–10. See also Torella 2011: 43–46.

Earth etc. (*kṣityādi*) are effects (*kārya*).
 Whatever is an effect has a maker (*karṭr*).
 Therefore earth etc. have a maker.

By “earth” the theist here probably means the soil beneath our feet, and by “etc.” he means other naturally occurring phenomena such as trees and mountains.⁵ “Earth etc.” is the *pakṣa* (the “site” of the dispute); “being an effect” (*kāryatva*) is the reason-property (*hetu*); “having a maker” (*karṭṛvattva*/*karṭṛpūrvakatva*) is the property-to-be-proved (*sādhya*). Thus the inference is based on the idea that “being an effect” is pervaded by “having a maker.”

Note that no pervasion between God and something else is established by direct perception. Rather what can be established by direct perception is pervasion between being an effect and having a maker (effects such as pots are seen to be made by a potter, effects such as buildings by a builder etc.). When it is then considered that earth etc. are effects, we are forced to conclude that they have a maker, the only suitable maker in their case being God.

A standard example of a *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference that is helpfully parallel to the present inference of God is the inference of the self from desire.⁶ This contains parallels to the three features of the God-inference just mentioned. (1) No pervasion between the self and something else is established by direct perception, since the self, like God, is imperceptible (according to most proponents of this self-inference). (2) Rather what can be established by direct perception is pervasion between being a quality and residing in a substance. (3) When it is then considered that desire is a quality, we are forced to conclude that it resides in a substance, the only suitable substance in its case being the self.

Naiyāyikas give a general characterization of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference that alludes to three features.⁷ Each of these three can readily be seen to apply to both the self-inference and the God-inference: (1) It infers something imperceptible (self/God); (2) no pervasion between what it infers and anything

⁵ For a defence of these claims, see Watson and Kataoka forthcoming.

⁶ This is given as an example of a *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference by Vātsyāyana on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5: *yatheccādibhir ātmā: icchādayo guṇāḥ, guṇāś ca dravyasaṁsthānāḥ, tad yad eṣāṁ sthānaṁ sa ātmeti*.

⁷ Vātsyāyana on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5: *sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ nāma yatrāpratyakṣe līṅgaliṅginoh sambandhe kenacidarīthena līṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo līṅgī gamyate*. “A *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference is one where, even though the relation between inferential mark and inferred thing is imperceptible, an imperceptible inferred thing can be known as a result of the similarity of the inferential mark to some [other] thing.”

else is perceptible; (3) what enables the inference to take place is the similarity of the inferential mark (*liṅga*) to something else. So with this third point we have finally reached an explanation of what the word *sāmānya* (similarity) refers to in the compound *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.

In the self-inference, the relevant similarity is that of desire to other qualities. We know that these other qualities inhere in a substance. The similarity of desire to other qualities enables us to know that desire inheres in a substance. In the God-inference, the relevant similarity is that of earth etc. to other effects. We know that these other effects, such as pots and houses, have a maker. The similarity of earth etc. to other effects enables us to know that earth etc. have a maker.

Note that it is not the case that *no* pervasion can be established in advance; without pervasion there can be no inference. It is just that no pervasion involving the final target of the inference – self or God – can be established in advance. What is the pervasion that can be established in advance? In the inference involving desire, it is between two general properties that co-exist in all of the things to which desire is similar (“being a quality” and “inherence in a substance”); in the inference involving earth etc. it is between two general properties that co-exist in all things to which earth etc. are similar (“being an effect” and “possession of a maker”).

To conclude: We can now identify the following ways in which the God-inference differs from a standard inference such as that of fire from smoke. The inference of fire from smoke, unlike a *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference such as that of God or the self, (1) infers something perceptible (i.e. fire); (2) is based on a perceptible pervasion involving that thing; (3) does not require the similarity of smoke to some other group of entities for its validity. To clarify the third point: If the God-inference were not *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, but were exactly parallel to the fire-inference, then we would be able to observe God making some earth. Then, on seeing some other bit of earth, we could infer that it had been made by God. In fact we never observe anyone making some earth, but the inference can get off the ground since it is based on the similarity of earth to other effects whose possession of a maker is uncontroversial.

The response of the atheist is not to reject *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inferences in general, but to point to problems with this particular one.

1.2 The reason-property is unestablished (*asiddha*)

The first charge of the atheist against the inference is that it is unestablished (*asiddha*), i.e. that its *hetu* does not exist in its *pakṣa*, i.e. that earth etc. are not actually effects.⁸ What does he mean by this? Earth, trees and mountains are all conglomerations of atoms and in that sense they are all the *effects* of the coming together of those atoms. Perhaps the atheist could assert that the earth and mountains have always been here – that the atoms that constitute them have always been joined together – so that they are not effects. The atheist opponent here is predominantly a Mīmāṃsaka (see appendix), and Mīmāṃsakas did not believe in cycles of cosmic creation and destruction, but rather that “the world has never not been thus.” But the atheist opponent could certainly not claim that today’s trees have always been here; we can observe their coming into being out of seeds. So in order to appreciate what the atheist means by rejecting that earth etc. are effects, we probably have to understand “effect” (*kārya*) here as meaning (not just something that has come into being, but) something that has been made.⁹ If that is its meaning, then to describe earth etc. as effects is to prematurely and unjustifiably smuggle in the conclusion that they have a maker; it is difficult to see how something can be “made” without possessing a maker. So if “effect” here means something that has been made, the atheist’s denial of earth etc. being effects is perfectly understandable. For the atheist’s position is that such phenomena as earth, mountains and trees can come into existence naturally, without any maker: the atoms that comprise them come together as a result of various causes (such as karma); but those causes do not include the promptings of an agent or maker (*karṭṛ*).

At this point the theist tries a different *hetu*, namely “having a configuration” (*sanniveśavattva*).¹⁰ The implication is: if you atheists regard it as controversial that earth etc. are effects, that is not a problem for us because we can fall back on the claim that earth etc. possess a configuration. Possessing a configuration means simply having parts, since everything that has parts, i.e. consists of more than one atom, will have those parts arranged in a certain configuration. Thus this *hetu* looks to be well-established. That is not to say that the inference is necessarily valid. For validity will additionally require that whatever has a configuration has

⁸ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.1.1.

⁹ Indeed this is how Jayanta defines the word “effect” in exactly this context in the *Āga-maḍambara*: *kriyata iti kāryam* (p. 170).

¹⁰ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.1.2 and § 3.1.2.

a maker, i.e. that “having a configuration” is pervaded by “having a maker.”¹¹ But at least it looks as though this *hetu* is not vulnerable to the charge of being unestablished in earth, mountains and such like.

The atheist's response is to draw on a distinction that was introduced into the God-debate by Dharmakīrti.¹² Dharmakīrti distinguished between two different kinds of configurations: the kind from which one can validly infer a maker, found for example in pots, tables, chairs and houses, and the kind from which one cannot validly infer a maker, found for example in mountains. Obviously only the first kind will serve as the *hetu* in an inference of a maker. Yet this first kind of configuration is not found in earth, mountains and such like. So this *hetu* “having a configuration” too, just like “being an effect,” is unestablished.

The atheist's next charge is that even if the *hetu* were established, the inference would still be invalid because the *hetu* is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). To clarify the difference between a *hetu* that is inconclusive and one that is unestablished, let us introduce the *trairūpya* theory, the theory that a valid *hetu* must fulfill three conditions. These three conditions are that the *hetu* must exist in the *pakṣa*, must exist in the *sapakṣa*, and must be absent from the *vipakṣa*. The *sapakṣa* is defined as the set of all instances (apart from the *pakṣa*) where the *sādhya* is present. So if we are inferring fire on the mountain from the fact that smoke is present there, the *sapakṣa* will be all places (apart from the mountain) where fire occurs. The *vipakṣa* is defined as the set of all instances (apart from the *pakṣa*) where the *sādhya* is absent. So in the fire-inference, the *vipakṣa* will be all places (apart from the mountain) where fire is absent. The *sapakṣa* will include such locations as a kitchen, with its fire for cooking; the *vipakṣa* will include such locations as lakes, where fire never occurs. For the fire-inference to be valid, then, smoke must exist on the mountain, must exist in such places as the kitchen and must be absent from such places as lakes. It must be completely absent from the *vipakṣa*, but it can be only partially present in the *sapakṣa*: there may be instances of fire without smoke, for example when the wood is completely dry or in the case of red-hot metal, but there must be *some* instances of fire with smoke.

¹¹ There is no distinction in Indian inference theory between validity and soundness, i.e. validity requires that the premises be true.

¹² *Pramāṇavārttika* 2:11–12.

This is illustrated in the following diagram:

<i>Pakṣa:</i> Mountain ✓	<i>Sapakṣa:</i> Fiery places ✓
	<i>Vipakṣa:</i> Non-fiery places ×

✓ = Smoke is present × = Smoke is absent

Figure 1: A valid inference

The ticks and crosses show where a *hetu* must and must not exist for the inference to be valid.

The next diagram shows what it is for a *hetu* to be unestablished:

<i>Pakṣa:</i> Mountain ×	<i>Sapakṣa:</i> Fiery places ✓
	<i>Vipakṣa:</i> Non-fiery places ×

✓ = Smoke is present × = Smoke is absent

Figure 2: An unestablished (*asiddha*) inference

In this case, although the ticks and crosses are in the correct places on the right (in the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*), we have smoke absent from the mountain, so the inference cannot even get started. This would be the case if what I take to be smoke on the mountain is actually mist.

That the God-inference is unestablished was the first charge of the atheist as we saw above and as illustrated in the next diagram.

<i>Pakṣa:</i> Earth etc. ×	<i>Sapakṣa:</i> Those things that have a maker ✓
	<i>Vipakṣa:</i> Those things that lack a maker ×

✓ = Being an effect is present × = Being an effect is absent

Figure 3: The God-inference is unestablished

The charge was that earth etc. are not effects, i.e. that the property of “being an effect” is not present in the class of things such as earth, mountains and such like.

1.3 The reason-property is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*)

We are now ready to turn to the second potential fault of a *hetu*, namely that it is inconclusive. An inconclusive *hetu* is one that is established in the *pakṣa*, present in the *sapakṣa*, but also present in the *vipakṣa*. So it violates the third of the three necessary conditions for validity. This is the case if we are inferring not fire from smoke, but smoke from fire. In that case the *sapakṣa* becomes all of those places where smoke is present, and the *vipakṣa* becomes all of those places where smoke is absent.

<i>Pakṣa:</i> Mountain ✓	<i>Sapakṣa:</i> Smoky places ✓
	<i>Vipakṣa:</i> Non-smoky places ✓

✓ = Fire is present ✕ = Fire is absent

Figure 4: An inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) inference

The fact that the *hetu* (fire) is present both in the *sapakṣa* (for example in the smoky kitchen) and in the *vipakṣa* (for example some burning dry wood or some red-hot metal) means that it is compatible both with what is trying to be proved (smoke) *and* its opposite (absence of smoke). The fact that fire occurs sometimes with smoke and sometimes without smoke means, obviously, that it is inconclusive for proving the presence of smoke. Another example of an inconclusive inference would be: “He must be a brahmin because he is a man.” The *hetu* here, “being a man,” co-exists in some places with brahminhood, but in other places with non-brahminhood. This fault, unlike being unestablished, indicates a problem with the pervasion; it shows that it is not the case that wherever the *hetu* is present, the *sādhya* is present.

How does the atheist argue that the God-inference is inconclusive? He points to the example of wild grass.¹³ This uncultivated grass is an example of an effect that lacks a maker. It is thus an example in which the *hetu* is present, but the *sādhya* is absent. The pervasion on which the validity of the argument depends has thus been shattered: “being an effect” is no longer pervaded by “having a maker.” Since some effects have been shown to lack makers, we can no longer conclude that effects such as earth etc. have makers. The situation is as illustrated in the following diagram.

¹³ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.2.

<i>Pakṣa:</i> Earth etc. ✓	<i>Sapakṣa:</i> Those things that have a maker ✓
	<i>Vipakṣa:</i> Those things that lack a maker ✓

✓ = Being an effect is present ✕ = Being an effect is absent

Figure 5: The God-inference is inconclusive

Since wild grass lacks a maker, it falls in the *vipakṣa*, and since it is an effect, we have the presence of the *hetu* in the *vipakṣa*.

Note that this fault involves taking wild grass to be an effect, whereas the charge that the argument was unestablished involved denying that things like earth, trees, and hence also presumably wild grass, are effects. So the atheist is not arguing that both of these faults apply to the argument, but rather that the theist is in a dilemma. He will have to decide whether grass and trees are effects or not. If they are not, the argument is unestablished; if they are, the argument is inconclusive.

How do we know that grass lacks a maker? The theist, after all, will claim that grass does have a maker, namely God. The atheist answer is that we do not perceive such a maker. But arguments from non-perception to non-existence are not always valid. I have never perceived the maker of the table in front of me, but that does not mean that it does not have a maker, as my presence at the table is separated in time from that of the creation of the table. Could the case of grass be analogous? No, replies the atheist, for if and when we are present at the moment of coming into being of a piece of grass, we perceive no maker. If it had a maker, he or she should be present then, and hence perceived then.¹⁴

The theist replies that God is imperceptible, thus we cannot conclude his non-existence from his non-perception.¹⁵ Obviously we can only conclude something's non-existence from its non-perception if it is perceptible – in the strong sense that

¹⁴ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.2 and § 3.2.1.

¹⁵ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 3.2.1.

if it is present it is necessarily perceived. To state the principle using Sanskrit terminology *dr̥śya-anupalabdhi* entails *abhāva*; *adr̥śya-anupalabdhi* does not.

The atheist response is to point out that observable causes of grass exist, namely seeds, earth, moisture. So if the theist is going to claim that in addition to these observable causes we have to postulate a further imperceptible one, namely God, then he will violate a widely shared principle – the principle that when there are observable causes of a certain phenomenon, we are not justified in postulating further unseen causes. If violation of this principle becomes acceptable, then we lose any control over the postulation of causes; we lose any criterion for saying that it is reasonable to postulate X as a cause of something, but unreasonable to postulate Y.¹⁶

1.4 The reason-property is contradictory (*viruddha*)

We now reach the third kind of fault that the atheist attributes to the God-inference, namely that it is contradictory.¹⁷ A contradictory *hetu* is one that is present in the *pakṣa*, absent in the *sapakṣa*, and present in the *vipakṣa*, i.e. it fails to fulfill both the second and the third conditions of validity.

<i>Pakṣa</i> ✓	<i>Sapakṣa</i> ×
	<i>Vipakṣa</i> ✓

✓ = The *hetu* is present × = The *hetu* is absent

Figure 6: A contradictory (*viruddha*) inference

Like the last fault but unlike the first one, this one undermines the pervasion. It shows that it is not the case that wherever the *hetu* is present, the *sādhya* is present. But it undermines the pervasion in a more thoroughgoing way than the fault of inconclusiveness. Since this *hetu* is absent in all of the places where the

¹⁶ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.2.

¹⁷ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.3.

sādhya is present, and present where the *sādhya* is absent, it proves the opposite of what it is attempting to prove. That is the sense in which it is contradictory.

How does the atheist portray the God-inference as contradictory? Consider the form of the inference: “Earth etc. are effects. Therefore they have a maker.” A problem is that even if the inference is successful, it has still not proved the existence of God. It has proved that earth and mountains and the like have a maker, but it has not proved that that maker is omniscient, disembodied, unaffected by karma, permanently blissful and unstained by the “defilements” (*kleśa*) such as attachment, aversion, and egoism. One potential way around this problem is to add some qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) to the *sādhya*, so that it becomes not just “possession of a maker,” but “possession of a maker who is qualified by omniscience, bliss etc.” Then if the inference is successful it will have proved not just any maker, but God. Once the *sādhya* is modified in this way, then the *sapakṣa* becomes all those things that have a maker who is omniscient etc., and the *vipakṣa* becomes all those things that lack a maker who is omniscient etc. Now pots and houses will fall not in the *sapakṣa* but in the *vipakṣa*, for we all know that potters and builders are not omniscient and permanently blissful! But pots and houses are effects, so we have the presence of the *hetu* in the *vipakṣa*. What now exists in the *sapakṣa*? Unless one is an already committed theist one will not accept the existence of anything created by someone omniscient. So the *sapakṣa* is an empty set. So the *hetu* does not exist in it.

<i>Pakṣa</i> : Earth etc. ✓	<i>Sapakṣa</i> : Those things that have an omniscient maker ×
	<i>Vipakṣa</i> : Those things that lack an omniscient maker ✓

✓ = Being an effect is present × = Being an effect is absent

Figure 7: The God-inference is contradictory

The reason why the God-inference is potentially vulnerable to this fault of being contradictory is that the theist is caught in a dilemma. To clarify this dilemma I will now present the God-inference not through the lens of the *trairūpya* theory, but as an argument from analogy – i.e. as an argument that starts from examples

and proceeds by extrapolating features of those examples to a similar object. Seen in this way, the argument starts with examples such as pots and houses. We can all agree that these are effects, and that their being effects results from their possession of a maker. Thus when we move to other effects such as earth etc., we can conclude that they too have makers.

We saw earlier that it is a defining feature of *sāmānyatodrṣṭa* inferences that they proceed by analogy. As the God-inference starts with a group of effects that are known to have makers, and moves to a new effect such as earth whose maker is not perceived, so the self-inference discussed earlier starts with a group of qualities that are known to reside in substances, and moves to a new quality whose substance is not perceived. But in fact *pratyakṣatodrṣṭa* inferences too can be represented in this way. Thus the fire-inference can be seen as starting from examples such as the kitchen fire. We can observe that in those examples smoke co-exists with fire. Thus when we move to the mountain, which resembles the kitchen in having smoke, we can conclude that it also resembles the kitchen in having fire.

Now the problem with the God-argument seen as one that proceeds by analogy is that if one postulates strictly in accord with the examples, then one will postulate a maker of earth etc. who is non-omniscient, embodied, and subject to suffering, karma and the like. Since the properties that can be proved in arguments from analogy are only ones that are present in the examples, these properties that are present in the potters and builders (non-omniscience etc.) will be the ones that can transfer to the maker of earth etc., certainly not their opposites (omniscience etc.).

So the dilemma to which I referred above is that the theist has to do one of two things. There are only two options open to him. He can include the qualifiers in the *sādhya* or exclude them. If he excludes them, then there is at least accord between his example and his conclusion, so the conclusion can validly follow. But the conclusion that follows is not that earth etc. are made by God, but rather that they are made by someone non-omniscient, embodied etc. So there is some pressure on him to take the other option and include them. If he does this, and if the argument is successful, it will have proved God. But this form of the argument cannot be successful, because its *sādhya* (possession of an omniscient maker) is not present in its example, a fatal flaw for an inference. Neither can the flaw be easily removed by the substitution of a different example, since there are no uncontroversial examples of things that have been made by someone omniscient.

And as we noted above, if the *sādhya* is modified to “possession of an omniscient maker,” then the corresponding modifications of the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* mean that the *hetu* becomes not merely inconclusive, but actually contradictory.

1.5 The nature of God

As well as pointing to problems with the inference of God's *existence*, the atheist also claims that there are various impossibilities concerning the *nature* of God. We will finish this account of the *pūrvapakṣa* section by looking at these.

1. God must either have a body or lack a body; but neither is possible, for the following reasoning. (A) He cannot lack a body, for without one he would not be able to do anything. As a potter's agency in the creation of a pot depends on his bodily movements, so God's agency in combining atoms in certain ways to create the universe would be impossible if he were disembodied. (B) Given that he has a body, this must be either eternal or have a beginning. Of these two options we have to accept that it has a beginning, for every body we have ever observed has a beginning; part of what it is to be a body is to have a beginning. (C) Given that it has a beginning, it must have been created by himself or by another God. How could he have created it himself when the act of creation requires a body? So it must have been created by a second God. Now we can run this whole sequence of argumentation again with regard to the second God's creation of the first God's body. We now know that the second God must have a body, that it must have a beginning, and that it must have been created by a third God. Hence we have an infinite regress. If the theist at this point says: “Okay we can live with that; we will postulate a chain of Gods running back into infinity each one creating the body of the next one,” the atheist's response is: “Given how hard it is for you to establish the existence of just one God, what makes you think you are justified in postulating an infinity?”¹⁸

2. What is the manner of God's creation? It must take place either through physical activity or through his will alone. Given the enormity of the universe, even hundreds of aeons (*yugas*) would not be sufficient to create it through physical activity. But the alternative is also impossible; for the atoms that God supposedly works on are insentient, so how could they conform to – or even know – the will of God?¹⁹

¹⁸ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.4.

¹⁹ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.5.

3. What is God's motive for creating the universe? No satisfactory answer can be given.

(A) "Compassion" (*karuṇā*, *kṛpā*), the theists might say. But there are two problems with this. First, prior to creation, i.e. during a period of cosmic withdrawal (*pralaya*), souls are not suffering. Like liberated souls, they are not experiencing anything at all, so they would not move anyone to compassion. Secondly, how could compassion be the motive for the creation of a world that involves so much suffering? If the theist argues that God is not *able* to create a world that contains only pleasure, then the claim that God is omnipotent is undermined.²⁰

(B) The theist may say that God creates the world in dependence on karma. This provides both a motive for creation, and an answer to why suffering exists in a world created by God. Again, there are two problems. First, if it is the karma in souls that determines what kind of universe is created, then God becomes redundant; the agency in the creation of the universe can be attributed to karma alone. Indeed this was the Buddhist and Jain view – that karma alone constitutes an adequate explanation of the creation of the universe and thus does away with the need to postulate a creator God. Secondly, if God is dependent on souls' karma, his sovereignty (*aiśvarya*) – his supreme and ultimate power – is compromised.²¹

(C) The theist may say that God creates the universe merely for his own amusement (*krīḍā*). The atheist points to three problems with this. If, as the theist claims, God is supremely blissful always – including prior to creation –, why would he desire the amusement that will result from creating and overseeing the universe? If he is motivated to act by the prospect of such amusement, this implies a prior lack in him of total contentment. Secondly, an elevated soul would not derive amusement from creating something that involves so much pain for the sentient beings that then live in it. Thirdly, no one derives amusement from something that requires ceaseless toil.²²

4. The theists claim not only that God creates the universe, but also that he withdraws it – at the end of each cosmic cycle. The atheist points out that the theist has to choose between two equally undesirable horns of a dilemma. He has to claim either that karma is preserved at this time, or that God overrides karma. If karma is preserved, i.e. if God has to act in accordance with it, then he will not be able to withdraw the universe. For the karma of the non-liberated souls

²⁰ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.7.

²¹ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.8.

²² *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.9.

would dictate that they remain in *saṃsāra* to experience the remaining fruits of their past actions. But if God has the power and inclination to override karma, then karma becomes redundant; God can at any time decide to do whatever he wants. This horn of the dilemma involves several unwanted consequences: (A) The suffering that we see souls undergoing can no longer be blamed on karma; God becomes a cruel God. (B) Conforming to Vedic injunctions and prohibitions becomes pointless; one can get the fruits of those by God's will alone. (C) Liberation would no longer be a stable achievement. Liberated souls could be hurled back into *saṃsāra* at any moment as a result of God's will.²³

2 The Theistic *siddhānta*

How does Jayanta reply to the charges that the God-inference is unestablished, inconclusive and contradictory? His response is that if these three atheistic criticisms are successful, then all inference is undermined. He neutralizes the atheistic criticisms by showing how the God-inference is exactly parallel to inferences that the atheists take to be valid, such as that of fire from smoke. The present article will focus on his responses to the first two charges. His replies to the charge that the inference is contradictory, and to the conundrums regarding the nature of God, will have to be left for now.

2.1 The reason-property is not unestablished

We will begin with the claim that the argument is unestablished (*asiddha*). Let us leave aside the atheist's claim that "being an effect" is unestablished because earth etc. are not effects. That is easier for Jayanta to refute than the more sophisticated argument for why "having a configuration" is unestablished. Here the (Dharmakīrtian) point was that there are two different kinds of configuration, that found in artifacts such as pots, jugs and dishes, and that found in naturally occurring phenomena like earth, mountains, oceans and grass. Let us call the configurations of artifacts "A-configurations," and the configurations of such naturally occurring phenomena as earth and mountains "N-configurations." The atheist claim is that despite the use of the one word "configuration" to refer to both, we are really dealing with two different types. Instances of the first type are indeed the product of a maker; instances of the second type are not. Thus it is only "having an A-configuration" that will serve as a potential reason-property (*hetu*) in a maker-proving inference. But earth etc. do not have an A-configuration. Thus this reason-property is unestablished.²⁴

²³ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.10.

²⁴ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 2.2.2.1.2 and § 3.1.2.1.

Note that this point can easily be extended to the other reason-property “being an effect.” The atheist will just have to state that there are two kinds of *effect*, those such as pots, which can be known to require a maker, and those such as mountains, which cannot be known to require a maker.

Whichever of these two *hetus* is chosen, we have an extension problem. Pervasion by makerhood is established by appeal to a certain sample: pots, buildings, cloths etc., i.e. artifacts. When the argument extends makerhood to earth and oceans, it is (illegitimately according to the Buddhist) going beyond the sample set. The charge is thus that there is a problematic gap between artifacts and naturally occurring phenomena. That all of the former have makers lends no credence to any of the latter having makers.

Two examples are given in this context to illustrate the Buddhist’s point. (1) We observe a huge number of cases of white smoke to co-exist with fire. We thus take it that whiteness is pervaded by fire. On encountering a pile of white chalk-dust, we infer fire.²⁵ (2) We observe a huge number of clay jars and dishes to be produced by a potter. On encountering a clay termite hill, we infer that it was produced by a potter.²⁶ Both of these clearly fallacious inferences are, for the Buddhist, exactly parallel to our case of observing a huge number of artifacts to be produced by a maker, and then inferring that mountains and oceans are produced by a maker. As we were there dealing with unwarranted extension from smoke to all white objects, and clay jars and dishes to clay termite hills, so we are here dealing with unwarranted extension from artifacts to naturally occurring phenomena.

How does the theist bring about this extension? By having a reason-property with a very wide scope. Both “being an effect” and “having a configuration” are reason-properties that are instantiated in a very large group of *heterogeneous* things. It is the widely encompassing reach of these reason-properties that facilitates the in fact illegitimate extension of makerhood from one subgroup to another subgroup.

Jayanta’s response is that all of this is exactly parallel to the smoke-fire inference. There is a similar kind of gap, and a similar kind of extension across that gap, even in the case of the inference of fire from smoke. Smoke on the mountain is a different size, shape and density from the previous smokes we have encountered in the kitchen. In a colourful sentence, Jayanta contrasts the kitchen smoke, with its small size, thin shape, and production from a weak fire

²⁵ See *Pramāṇavārttika* 2:12 and § 3.1.2.1 of the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

²⁶ See *Pramāṇavārttika* 2:13 and Krasser 1999: 217.

enflamed by gentle blowing, with the dense smoke on the mountain arising from fire in a thick forest, enflamed by a powerful wind, pervading the whole sky.²⁷

So the reason-property “being smoky” is also one with a wide scope and one that is instantiated in a heterogeneous group of things (kitchens and mountains). If the kind of configuration in an artifact is different from the kind of configuration in a naturally occurring phenomenon, well so too the kind of smoke in the kitchen is different from the kind of smoke on the mountain. If what is true of a certain kind of configuration (i.e. that it has a maker) cannot be inferred to be true of another kind of configuration, then what is true of a certain kind of smoke (i.e. that it has been caused by fire) should not be inferred to be true of another kind of smoke. So if we have never seen a mass of dense and copious smoke before, and hence never observed the association of *that* kind of smoke with fire, we would not be able to infer that some dense and copious smoke on the mountain is caused by fire – however many smoky kitchen fires we have observed. Thus all inference would be undermined.

What to make of this? Jayanta has laid down a challenge. How could we distinguish the two inferences?

The Buddhist will say: In the smoke-fire inference there is no gap, and no extension over a gap. Smoke's pervasion by fire has been established through the observation of repeated fires in the kitchen. The established pervasion is not between smoke of a certain kind and fire, it is between smoke in general and fire in general.

Jayanta will reply: The established pervasion in the God-inference is between “being an effect” in general and “having a maker” in general. It is not between a certain kind of effect and a certain kind of maker. So there is no gap here either.

The Buddhist will say: But in the God-inference, the pervasion has only been established between artifacts and makers, not between naturally occurring phenomena and makers.

Jayanta will reply: Some extension is involved in all inferences. Yes, these supposedly naturally occurring phenomena like earth and oceans were not included in the original sample set, but neither was the mountain with its huge dense smoke included in the original sample set.

The Buddhist may say: If we compare the set of all smokes to the set of all effects/configurations, there is more heterogeneity in the latter class. So it is

²⁷ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 3.1.2.2.

much less of a jump to go from small kitchen-smoke to large mountain-smoke than it is to go from a pot to earth or the ocean.

Jayanta will reply: Heterogeneity is always inevitable. It is there even in inferences that the Buddhist takes to be valid. The Buddhist distinguished two kinds of configuration, A-configurations and N-configurations, it being valid to infer a maker only of and from A-configurations. But Jayanta points out that even A-configurations are radically heterogeneous.²⁸ The configurations of a piece of cloth, a pot and a palace are all very different. To that we could add a camera, a television and an iPod. Knowing that cameras and televisions etc. have a maker, we may, on seeing an iPod for the first time, infer that it has a maker. The Buddhist can allow that.²⁹ But if he does, then he accepts that we can have a valid inference despite a gap between the sample set and the proof-subject, and despite a wide reason-property that is instantiated in a diverse, heterogeneous group of things.

What to do? We seem to have reached a stalemate. How could we decide between the two disputants?

The issue that divides them can be stated in one sentence: How similar do naturally-occurring phenomena and artifacts need to be for us to infer that they have the same kind of cause? This was exactly the issue that David Hume identified as at the heart of the argument from design. His verdict was that the matter is undecidable. I end this section with some perceptive contrasts that John Taber has identified between Hume's treatment of the argument from design and the Indian treatment of the argument from "having a configuration."

Hume spotted several of the same defects as Jayanta's atheist opponent did in the *pūrvapakṣa* section. For Hume there is too little similarity between artifacts and naturally-occurring phenomena – or as he puts it, between a watch and the universe – to infer a cause of the latter that has significant resemblance to the cause of the former (Taber 1986: 117). To state this in the Indian terminology: the reason-property "having a configuration" is too broad; it covers a heterogeneity. The configuration of artifacts is something different from the configuration of

²⁸ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 3.1.2.5.

²⁹ Evidence that Jayanta's Buddhist, at least, would allow this is his remark (§ 3.1.2.1) that having observed dishes and such like (*śarāvādi*) to require a maker, when we then encounter waterjugs and such like (*kalaśādi*), we can know that they too require a maker. The Buddhist concedes this point in order to contrast with the case of observing dishes and such like to require a maker, followed by encountering mountains and such like; in that case we are not able to infer anything about the latter.

naturally-occurring phenomena, so we cannot infer that the latter have a maker like that of the former.

But although Hume was a stern critic of the argument from design, his position was not that it is fallacious, but rather that it is “merely probable” (Taber 1986: 117). He took the strongest conclusion implied by it to be that “the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence” (Hume 1947: 227).

Taber identifies respective advantages of the Indian and Humean treatments of the argument. The more technical, logical framework of the Indian analysis of the argument enables “a more efficient and precise formulation of its strengths and weaknesses.” It also allows us to see that the criticisms of the argument potentially affect all inference (Taber 1986: 117–118).

Hume's informal approach, on the other hand, is more suited to revealing that the debate is irresolvable. The issue is whether watches, pots, mountains and earth belong to the same class with respect to the kind of configuration they exhibit. But as Hume shows, this is not a formal, technical matter: it is a question of judgment. Jayanta can endlessly point out the similarities between pots and earth etc. – and the necessity of there always being some heterogeneity and some extension, otherwise all inference becomes impossible. The atheist can stress the differences: earth and mountains are only vaguely similar to pots – not similar enough to imply that they too have a maker (Taber 1986: 118). But how similar do things have to be for them to be counted as members of same class? How different do they have to be to fall into separate classes? There is no objective answer. Taber's claim is that the Indian preoccupation with the identification of technical fallacies and ways of avoiding them, along with a certain pressure to take sides and align oneself with this or that tradition, blocked realization of this fact (1986: 118–119).

I return to these thought-provoking remarks of Taber at the end of this article.

2.2 The reason-property is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*)

The second logical problem that the atheist identified with the argument is that it is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). Recall the example of wild grass. This is an effect – and it has a configuration – so the reason-property exists in it. But it lacks a maker: the property-to-be-proved is absent in it. It is thus a counterexample to the pervasion claim that whatever is an effect – or has a configuration – has a maker. Since it shows the reason-property to exist in the *vipakṣa* (something that lacks a maker), it reveals the argument to be inconclusive.

The theist's response is to place grass etc. into the *pakṣa* of the inference.³⁰ We may not perceive a maker of grass, but that does not mean that such a maker does not exist, for he could be imperceptible. If there are no grounds for certainty about the non-existence of a maker of grass, then the existence of such a maker is not impossible. And if it is thus possible that grass has a maker, we can place grass in the *pakṣa* of the argument. Once the inference has been carried out, we will know that grass does have a maker.

We can see now why from the beginning of the God section of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta always names the *pakṣa* as "earth etc." The "etc." signals that the *pakṣa* consists of an open-ended list. Everything in the universe is divided into three collectively exhaustive classes: (1) things we know to lack a maker – i.e. eternal things such as atoms and souls; (2) things we know to have a maker, i.e. artifacts; and (3) things about which there is legitimate doubt concerning whether they have a maker or not. The "etc." indicates that everything in the third of these three categories will be placed in the *pakṣa*.

How does that secure, for the theist, the truth of the pervasion claim? The answer is that investigations of the truth of pervasion claims typically do not need to take account of what falls into the *pakṣa* of an inference. This will seem natural if we consider the smoke-fire inference – that there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke on the mountain. Here the *pakṣa* is the mountain, and the pervasion claim on which the inference depends is: whatever possesses smoke possesses fire. It would be strange indeed if someone were to dispute this inference on the grounds that the pervasion claim can be seen to be false because the mountain possesses smoke but does not possess fire. Whether the mountain possesses fire is exactly what is in question and exactly what the inference is intended to reveal. One cannot assume at the outset that the mountain lacks fire and use that to dispute the pervasion. It seems legitimate, then, to leave out the *pakṣa* when investigating the truth of pervasion claims. So if all naturally-occurring phenomena (grass, trees etc.) can indeed be placed in the *pakṣa*, then they cannot be put forward as counterexamples to the pervasion claim by the atheist. They cannot serve as instances of effects that lack a maker, because whether they have a maker or not is what the inference is intended to establish.

In the previous section, when considering whether the inference is unestablished, we were able to reduce the debate to one question (How similar do naturally-occurring phenomena and artifacts need to be, for us to infer that they have the same kind of cause?). Here too, in considering whether the inference is inconclusive, we can reduce the debate to one simple question: Is the theist's

³⁰ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 3.2.

placement of all naturally-occurring effects in the *pakṣa* defensible? The rest of this closing section will consist of a few reflections on that. These reflections will be organized around four questions. (1) Is the theist arguing in a circle? (2) Is it possible that grass has a maker? (3) Can the *pakṣa* be ignored when the pervasion is being established? (4) Are GAIE and NFI sound principles (the acronyms will be explained below)?

2.2.1 Is the theist arguing in a circle?

No, the theist's placement of grass etc. in the *pakṣa* cannot be dismissed as a case of circular reasoning. The theist is not assuming that grass has a maker in order to prove that all effects have a maker. Rather he is first maintaining that grass *may* have a maker (instead of assuming that it does not); and then coming to know that all effects – including grass – have a maker as a result of the inference.

2.2.2 Is it possible that grass has a maker?

The theist's placement of grass etc. in the *pakṣa* will only be legitimate if it is possible that grass has a maker. If we can be certain that grass lacks a maker, then it will be a valid counterexample and the inference will be invalidated. The question, then, is which is more appropriate: doubt concerning whether grass has a maker or certainty that it does not. I will first give a line of thought favouring the first.

A. Jayanta is just asking the atheist to accept that there is room for doubt and to not pre-judge the issue. His request is that both sides remain neutral at the outset. The point of the inference is to find out whether God exists. If God does exist, then grass has a maker. So we should not assume at the outset that grass does not have a maker; that would be to assume at the outset that God does not exist. It seems then that if the atheist disallows grass etc. from being placed in the *pakṣa*, they are being more dogmatic than the theist. They have to say, even before a consideration of the inference gets underway, that there can be absolutely no doubt over the question of whether grass etc. have a maker. If they admit that there is any possibility of doubt, then grass etc. can go in the *pakṣa* so the pervasion can be established.

So it seems that the theist has successfully shifted the burden of proof away from himself and onto the atheist. Atheists will not be able to avoid this charge of dogmatism unless they have a firm proof to hand that grass etc. do not have a maker. Without such a proof, grass etc. should be allowed to be placed in the *pakṣa*, in which case the inference avoids inconclusivity, in which case it can

successfully prove that grass etc. do have a maker. So this line of thought favours the legitimacy of placing grass etc. in the *pakṣa*.

Now a consideration that weighs in favour of the opposite: that grass etc. should not be allowed to be placed in the *pakṣa*.

B. What more could the atheists do to prove that grass etc. lack a maker? They in good faith attempt to perceive such a maker, but without success. When the Naiyāyika insists that God is imperceptible, how is this different from insisting that there might be an imperceptible species of elephant currently in this room? It is not that the atheist is dogmatically assuming that God does not exist, and thereby dismissing out of hand that grass could have a maker. They are relying on, on the one hand, the non-perception of a sentient maker of grass, and on the other the perception of other causes of grass.

That they are not simply dogmatically assuming that grass does not have a maker is illustrated by their willingness³¹ to admit that it *is* possible that mountains, oceans and earth have a maker. There *is* legitimate doubt in their case, admits the atheist, because we were not around at the time of their origin. But we can be around at the time of origin of some grass or some trees. If and when we are, we observe no maker in the proximity of the place of their origin, however hard we look.

The Naiyāyika, in order to justify that there *is* legitimate doubt, has to appeal to the imperceptibility of God even though God has not been proved yet. So there *is* a sense in which the Naiyāyika is helping themselves to God's existence prior to the inference, i.e. there is a sense in which they are being the dogmatic one, not the atheist.

2.2.3 Can the *pakṣa* be ignored when the pervasion is being established?

Here too I will give two considerations, one implying no, and the other implying yes. In this case both considerations are simply taken from Jayanta.

A. To the question of whether the *pakṣa* can be ignored when the pervasion is being established, Jayanta's atheist opponent replies:³² No, for that would enable all sorts of dubious inferences such as the following:

³¹ This willingness is found not only in Jayanta's atheist (§ 3.2.1), but also, for example, in Ratnakīrti: see Patil 2009: 144.

³² *Nyāyamañjarī* § 3.2.4.1.

Fire is produced
 Whatever is produced is cold
 Therefore fire is cold

This inference is clearly fallacious; we all know that fire is hot. But Naiyāyikas will be forced to count it as sound if the *pakṣa*, fire, is to be ignored when considering whether everything that is produced is cold. For according to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika ontology, the only thing in the universe that is hot is fire. When water feels hot, that is not because the water atoms have warmed up, but rather because some fire atoms have entered the water and are present alongside the water atoms. So if fire is the *pakṣa*, and is on those grounds to be removed from consideration, then it will appear that everything in the universe, let alone everything that is produced, is not hot, i.e. is cold. "Being produced" will indeed be pervaded by "being cold." If Naiyāyika theists maintain that grass is not eligible as a counter-example in the God-inference, as it is part of the *pakṣa*, they will be forced to conclude that fire is cold!

B. But whereas the atheist's reply to the question under consideration is "No, for ignoring the *pakṣa* enables clearly fallacious inferences," the theist's reply is the converse: "Yes, for *not* ignoring the *pakṣa* disqualifies clearly correct inferences." The example the theist gives is:

The perception of sound is an action
 All actions require an instrument
 Therefore the perception of sound requires an instrument (i.e. the faculty of hearing)

Both the theist and the atheist accept the validity of this inference of the existence of a faculty of hearing, but Jayanta thinks it would be invalidated if the *pakṣa* were taken into account when judging the truth of the second premise. He claims that before the inference has been carried out the perception of sound (the *pakṣa*) will appear as an action that lacks an instrument. So if we cannot exclude the *pakṣa* from a consideration of the second premise, the inference will not go through.³³

As with the previous section, I end this one with things evenly balanced between the theist and the atheist. But I said that both of the arguments in this section came from Jayanta. Readers may be wondering: surely he did not leave things evenly balanced and would have seen his treatment of this question as

³³ Nyāyamañjarī § 3.2.4.1.

coming down firmly on the side of the theist, i.e. as affirming the need to exclude the *pakṣa* when considering pervasion claims. Yes, Jayanta's treatment does come down firmly on the side of the theist, but it does not convince me. Jayanta thinks he can remove the problem pointed out under "A" above, because the inference of the coldness of fire can be invalidated by perception. He admits that the inference cannot be invalidated by disputing its second premise – the pervasion claim that whatever is produced is cold. But he claims that its conclusion can be contradicted by direct perception, whereas the conclusion of the God-inference cannot.³⁴ But to admit that the pervasion claim cannot be invalidated (because the only counterexample exists in the *pakṣa*) seems to be too much of an admission. Surely we do want to uphold the ability of fire to invalidate the claim that whatever is produced is not hot. It appears that Jayanta, in order to justify the exclusion of grass and such like from considerations of pervasion on the grounds that they are in the *pakṣa*, has been forced to concede that fire can be excluded from a consideration of the pervasion of "being produced" by "being cold." In order to preserve the pervasion of "being an effect" by "having a maker," Jayanta has been constrained to admit the seemingly parallel but surely false pervasion of "being produced" by "being cold." This appears as too heavy a price to pay.

2.2.4 Are GAIE and NFI sound principles?

GAIE – the "General Acceptability of Inductive Examples" – is an acronym and a concept that was much used in K. K. Chakrabarti's (1999) *Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind; The Nyāya Dualist Tradition*, and has since been discussed in secondary literature on Nyāya and Indian inference theory.³⁵ Chakrabarti identifies it as a norm that is followed by Nyāya in its treatment of pervasion claims. It stipulates that, for an example or counterexample to carry any weight in establishing or disrupting a pervasion claim, it must be acceptable to both sides. If it is disputed by one of the two sides, it can be dismissed from consideration. To remove from consideration what is to the opponent a counterexample by placing it in the *pakṣa* is thus a particular application of the GAIE principle.

NFI – the "Norm for Induction" – was paired with GAIE in Charles Goodman's (2008) treatment of, as he puts it, some "very strange arguments" of Bhāvaviveka, which "may appear so weak that we may be hard pressed to understand how anyone could endorse them" (2008: 167). Goodman's thesis is that these problematic

³⁴ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 3.2.4.1.

³⁵ See Perrett 2002: 148–149, Chakrabarti 2003: 596–597, Phillips 2012: 73 and Goodman 2008: 169–175. I thank Roy Perrett for pointing me to these references.

arguments do indeed come out as valid by the application of GAIE and NFI, so that we should regard these two principles with suspicion. The relevance to the present article is that it is these very principles that allow the Naiyāyika to establish that “all effects have a maker,” and thus to avoid the charge of inconclusivity. NFI holds that if we have not yet observed any counterexamples to a pervasion claim, then we can take the pervasion as established. In other words we can move from such perceptually validated claims as “some effects have a maker” to the universal claim “all effects have a maker.” Once grass and all the other counterexamples that the atheist comes up with have been dismissed by GAIE (and placed in the *pakṣa*), then NFI will enable the scaling up from “some effects have a maker” to “all effects have a maker.”

That the combination of GAIE and NFI can lead to suspect inferences is, I think, beyond question. I refer the reader to the examples in Goodman's (2008) article. And thus their role in the God-inference throws suspicion on it too.³⁶

³⁶ One of the indications that GAIE should be regarded with suspicion is that it enables many contradictory inferences (inferences with contradictory conclusions). The atheist could in fact easily use GAIE to generate disproofs of God such as:

Earth etc. are effects.

Whatever is an effect, such as a pot, is not produced by a bodiless soul.

Therefore earth etc. are not produced by a bodiless soul.

The theist will try to disrupt the pervasion claim that no effect is produced by a bodiless soul by giving counterexamples in the form of effects produced by God. GAIE enables these counterexamples to be dismissed, as they are not acceptable to the atheist. Almost any inference put forward by a proponent taking advantage of GAIE can be matched by an inference leading to the contrary conclusion put forward by the opponent making use of GAIE.

GAIE was defended by K. K. Chakrabarti (1999: xii–xv, 8–12). In support of it he points to the fact that it is impartial, that it can be used to the advantage of not only the theist but also the atheist, not only the dualist but also the physicalist. But he draws the wrong conclusion from that. He thinks that because it is not biased we should accept inferences that benefit from it. But when it can so easily be used to formulate contradictory inferences, why should we accept one of those to the exclusion of the other? The correct conclusion is surely that we should be hesitant about accepting both. If that is right, then we should be hesitant about accepting the God-inference that depends so heavily on it.

What have others made of GAIE? Perrett (2002: 148–149), in a review of Chakrabarti 1999, sees no pressing positive argument for the principle, and points out that if it is self-referential, it may be self-refuting (since GAIE applied to itself would imply that as long as there is any disagreement about it, it can be dismissed). Chakrabarti (2003: 596–597) responds that it is not self-referential. Goodman (2008: 169ff.) is the most sustained criticism of GAIE that I am aware of. I have drawn on him for the point that GAIE's enabling of contradictory inferences is a point not in its favour, as for Chakrabarti, but against it.

Goodman's position seems to be that inferences based on the two principles should be disqualified altogether – and only inferences whose pervasions are established by the Dharmakīrtian criteria of causality or identity should be allowed. But another response would be to adopt a Taberian stance.

Taking as our starting point Taber's remark, cited towards the end of the previous section, that all that can be arrived at by the God-inference is (a certain level of) probability, not certainty, we can then generalize that to all inferences whose pervasion claim is arrived at through induction. Classical Indian inferences have the appearance of certainty, because they have the form of deductions: they are formulated in such a way that if the premises are true, the conclusion is certainly true. They were treated as either yielding certainty or as fallacies. But in the majority of them the premise that states the pervasion has been arrived at by an inductive inference, one that is incapable of yielding certainty. Consider the claim "All effects have a maker." This should not be regarded as certain, for two reasons. (1) We have not observed all of the effects in the world, and (2) some of those we have observed do not appear to have a maker. The Naiyāyika uses GAIE to remove the uncertainty arising from 2, and NFI to remove the uncertainty arising from 1. On Goodman's view the claim, and the inference based on it, should be dismissed as fallacious. On the Taberian view I am suggesting, both 1 and 2 should lessen the probability value that is assigned to the claim and to the conclusion of the inference. That is not to say that the inference is established to be fallacious. The point is that this binary between fallacious and certain is artificial and misrepresents all of the grey areas in between as being one or the other.

A premise's reliance on the application of GAIE and NFI, then, should not on this view invalidate it, but should have an impact on the level of confidence we have in its truth. If GAIE is being used to dismiss a large number of counterexamples that on the opponent's view should disrupt the pervasion, that should lessen the probability of the premise and hence conclusion. If NFI is being used to scale up from a small homogeneous sample to a large heterogeneous sample, i.e. to assume throughout the latter a feature that occurs throughout the former,

Nilanjan Das helpfully suggested to me that GAIE could be criticized on the grounds that it involves bias in the selection of evidence: "If my way of selecting the evidence for an inductive generalization is guaranteed to exclude any counterexample to the inductive generalization, and I know that this is the way I select my evidence, the evidence I have cannot boost the evidential support for that generalization. Suppose I want to know whether all swans are white. If I select my evidence in a way that is guaranteed to prevent me from seeing or hearing about black swans and I know this, then seeing white swans shouldn't provide me any evidence for that hypothesis" (email, April 28, 2019).

the probability of premise and conclusion should be lessened. This idea of the varying probability of conclusions of inferences – as opposed to the idea that inferences are either correct or incorrect – is not, as far as I am aware, found in the classical Indian philosophical literature itself. But to introduce it would be a way of moving beyond the stalemates that arose between, for example, theists unjustifiably claiming certainty for their inferences, and atheists rejecting any level of probability at all for those inferences. The introduction of the idea would in the present context lead to a rejection of Nyāya's claim to have successfully inferred the existence of God. In that sense it may be more devastating for the theist than the atheist.

Appendix: The identity of the atheistic opponent

Who is the opponent? Or to put it another way, where is Jayanta taking the arguments from that he puts into the mouth of his opponent? Varadacarya, the editor of the best complete edition of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, says (1969: 484) that the speaker is no particular *pūrvapakṣin*, but mixes Mīmāṃsaka views with those of “atheistic Cārvākas, Buddhists, Jains, Naiyāyikas and such like” (*īśvaranirākṛṇām cārvākabauddhajainanaiyāyikādīnām*). I think Kataoka is correct when he points out (2005: 58–59 and 2009: 66, note 24) that the opponent is primarily a (Kumārila) Mīmāṃsaka.

Prabal Sen (2015) mentions two Mīmāṃsaka features of the *Nyāyamañjarī*'s *pūrvapakṣa*: its denial of the validity of yogic perception and its rejection of cosmic cycles of creation (*srṣṭi*) and destruction (*saṃhāra*). Buddhist epistemologists of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrtian tradition, incidentally, accepted both yogic perception and cosmic cycles of creation and destruction – the latter brought about not by God's will of course, but by karma. Several other Mīmāṃsaka features can be pointed to.

The very last line of the whole *pūrvapakṣa* section reads: *nā kadācid anīdrśaṃ jagat kathitaṃ nītirahasyavedibhiḥ*. The first part of the sentence is a quotation meaning “The world has never not been thus.” It is often quoted and is almost certainly from the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, a lost text by Kumārila. Thus the rest of the sentence probably means: “this has been stated by [Kumārila], the one who knows the secrets of the [Mīmāṃsā] doctrine.”³⁷ Not only does the whole section end with an attribution to Kumārila, but Jayanta throughout is paraphrasing Kumārila's arguments against the existence of God found in the *sambandhākṣepaparihāra* section of the *Ślokavārttika*. Kataoka's (2005) edition of this section of the text, which contains many improvements on all previous editions, identifies

³⁷ Kei Kataoka, personal communication, June 26, 2015.

twenty-eight of Kumāṛila's verses that Jayanta is clearly drawing on. Furthermore, the whole of this *pūrvapakṣa* section is structured according to the six means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) accepted by the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas: perception, inference, comparison, scripture, presumption and absence. This can be seen through the following outline of the section.

1 Perception (*pratyakṣa*)

1.1 Sense perception (*akṣavijñāna*)

1.2 Mental perception (*mānasavijñāna*)

1.3 Yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*)

2 Inference (*anumāna*)

2.1 The existence of God

2.1.1 Inference based on perception (*pratyakṣatodrṣṭam anumānam*)

2.1.2 Inference based on similarity (*sāmānyatodrṣṭam anumānam*)

2.1.2.1 Unestablished (*asiddha*)

2.1.2.1.1 Being an effect (*kāryatva*)

2.1.2.1.2 Having a configuration (*sanniveśavattva*)

2.1.2.2 Inconclusive (*anaikāntika*)

2.1.2.3 Contradictory (*viruddha*)

2.2 The nature of God

2.2.1 God's body

2.2.2 Manner of creation

2.2.3 Motive for creation

2.2.4 God's destruction of the universe

3 Comparison (*upamāna*)

4 Scripture (*āgama*)

5 Presumption (*arthāpatti*)

6 Absence (*abhāva*)

We thus have abundant evidence that the opponent is *primarily* a Mīmāṃsaka.³⁸ But he is not exclusively so. For there is at least one occasion, as we have seen, where Jayanta inserts into his basically Mīmāṃsaka account a Buddhist distinction – one taken from Dharmakīrti. When Jayanta in the *siddhānta* section addresses himself to this particular point, he addresses his opponent as a Buddhist.³⁹

Furthermore there is one occasion in Jayanta's *siddhānta* section where he takes up for discussion a point that has been made by the opponent and he asks who it is that makes this claim: “Cārvākas, Buddhists or Mīmāṃsakas?”⁴⁰ This confirms that he is seeing the opponent not exclusively as a Mīmāṃsaka but to some extent as a Mīmāṃsaka-Cārvāka-Buddhist composite.

Some may be surprised that the Mīmāṃsakas were rejecters of the existence of God.⁴¹ Surely they at least believed in gods? Who were their Vedic rituals offered to, if not gods? And what is the *svarga* (usually translated as “heaven”) that they name as the fruit of Vedic sacrifice, if not a place where one joins the gods after death? In fact they defined *svarga* simply as *prīti*, happiness; they denied that it referred to a particular place.⁴² Gods, furthermore, were considered to exist only as names, sounds that if uttered correctly as part of a correctly performed ritual will help to bring about its result. Thus gods neither have bodies nor eat offerings, but are believed in merely as instrumental elements of Vedic ritual.⁴³ Hence we can see that, in classical India, orthodoxy in no sense entailed belief in God; these most orthodox of Vaidikas were atheists.

Abbreviations

GAIE – General Acceptability of Inductive Examples

NFI – Norm for Induction

³⁸ One more indication is that in arguing against scripture having been composed by God, the opponent gives the reason that scripture is eternal (§ 2.4). This is of course a Mīmāṃsaka view, and certainly not that of other atheistic traditions such as the Buddhists, Jains, Cārvākas and Sāṅkhyas.

³⁹ See § 3.1.2.4 *bhikṣo, dhūme 'pi bhavad darśane kiṃ vastumātram asti*. “Oh monk, in your [Buddhist] system is there a thing in general in the case of smoke either?”

⁴⁰ *Nyāyamañjarī* § 3.1.1: *ka evam ācaṣṭe – cārvākaḥ śākyo mīmāṃsako vā?*

⁴¹ I sometimes encounter not just surprise, but disbelief. I read the first few pages of the *pūrvapakṣa* section with two pandits at the Lal Bahadur Shastri Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha; their view was that the *pūrvapakṣin* could not be a Mīmāṃsaka, but must be either a Buddhist or a Cārvāka.

⁴² See *Jaiminisūtras* 6.1.1–3, *Ślokaṇvārttika codanāsūtra* 190, D'Sa 1980: 20–26 and Kataoka 2011: 440–441, n. 559.

⁴³ *Jaiminisūtras* 9.1.6 and 9.1.10 and *Śābarabhāṣya ad loc.*; Yoshimizu 2014.

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Jaimini, Bādari, and Bādarāyaṇa in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* and the *Brahmasūtra*

Kiyotaka Yoshimizu

Introduction

In all Vedānta schools that have recourse to the *Brahmasūtra* (BS), scholars are well acquainted with the rules of exegesis systematized in *Mīmāṃsā*. Śaṅkara acknowledges *Mīmāṃsā* as a prerequisite for the study of Vedānta, calling the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (MmS)¹ “former section” (*pūrvakāṇḍa*), the “first section” (*prathamakāṇḍa*), and the “first instruction” (*prathama tantra*) in his commentary (BSBhŚ) on BS 3.3.² In the BS itself, several sections refer to the MmS with the phrase “it has been stated” (*tad uktam*) in order to apply the exegetic rules formulated in the MmS, indicating that the BS was compiled later than the MmS.³ Despite their close relationship, *Mīmāṃsā* and Vedānta have methodological

¹ I abbreviate the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* as MmS rather than MS because I will use the latter for the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*, not as JS because Jaimini is not the true compiler of the MmS, and not as PMS paired with the UMS, which assumes the existence of an entire text composed of the MmS and the BS (Parpola 1981), because the MmS does not refer to the BS, and because the pair of appellations, *pūrvamīmāṃsā* and *uttaramīmāṃsā*, came into use later (since Yāmuna, cf. Bronkhorst 2007: 64), and because of the methodological difference between the MmS and the BS argued in Yoshimizu forthcoming.

² See Nakamura 1983: 411, nn. 14–16. Among the sixteen chapters of the BS, BS 3.3, which belongs to the oldest layer of the BS, is the most closely related to the *Mīmāṃsā* exegesis.

³ Among the eight *sūtras* that contain “*tad uktam*,” that is, BS 1.3.21, 2.1.31, 3.3.8, 3.3.26, 3.3.33, 3.3.43, 3.3.50, and 3.4.42, Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja unanimously remark that BS 3.3.26 refers to MmS 10.8.4, and BS 3.3.33 to MmS 3.3.9. Regarding BS 3.3.50, Śaṅkara holds that it refers to MmS 11.4.11–12, Bhāskara to MmS 2.3.3, and Rāmānuja to MmS 10.4.22. Regarding BS 3.4.42, Śaṅkara holds that it refers to MmS 1.3.8–9 and Bhāskara to MmS 1.3.9, whereas Rāmānuja holds that it refers to *Gautamadharmasūtra* (GDhS) 3.10 (*Śrībhāṣya* [ŚrBh] pt. 1, 705,4). Cf. Modi 1937; Kane 1960: 136–137; Parpola 1981: 152–153; Aklujkar 2011: 840. In contrast, no *sūtra* referring to the BS has been found in the MmS (see Kane 1960: 137).

differences in their framing of an exegetic system, as well as different objects of investigation (*jijñāsā*), *dharma* and *brahman* respectively. In Yoshimizu (forthcoming), a study of BS 3.3, I examined the “integration” (*upasaṃhāra*) adopted in the meditative veneration (*upāsana*) of the teachings of Upaniṣads, and made it clear that in the *upāsana* of an object addressed in an Upaniṣad, the BS gives the meditator full discretion to integrate descriptions of the object given in the Upaniṣads of other Vedic branches (*śākhās*). Despite its origin in the Mīmāṃsā argument for adopting the “textual evidence in all Vedic branches (corpuses)” (*sarvasākhāpratyaṃ*), this *upasaṃhāra* as a synthesizing attitude to scriptures is unique to Vedānta because the BS treats the Upaniṣad as a manual for *upāsana*, differentiating between ritual action and *upāsana* on the grounds that the former is to be carried out for the sake of a sacrifice (*kratvartha*) whereas the latter is for the sake of a human being (*puruṣārtha*).

In light of preceding studies, this paper will further elucidate the synthesizing attitude unique to the early Vedānta by examining the Vedic affiliations of three scholars, Jaimini, Bādari, and Bādarāyaṇa, and how their thoughts are arranged in the MmS and the BS.

1. Jaimini and the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*

1.1. Jaimini, a Sāmavedin

According to legend, the sage Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, “Kṛṣṇa, born in a sandbar (*dvīpa*) [of the river Yamunā],”⁴ the author of the *Mahābhārata* (MBh), was called Vyāsa because he divided (*viśvas*) the primordial Veda into four divisions,⁵ and imparted each division to one of his four disciples.⁶ The Sāmaveda, the Veda of chanting, was imparted to Jaimini.⁷ In the Mīmāṃsā school, Jaimini, a historical figure, was also recognized as a scholar of the Sāmaveda.

⁴ MBh 1.57.71.

⁵ MBh 1.57.73. Kane (1960: 129–130) notes that the identification of Vedavyāsa and Bādarāyaṇa was not known to Śāṅkara, but taken for granted by Vācaspatimiśra in *Bhāmātī* (Bhm) 1,20 (v. 5). Cf. also Sankaranarayan 2005.

⁶ MBh 1.57.74–75; 12.314.23–24.

⁷ *Vāyupurāṇa* (VāyuP) 1.60.13–15; *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* (BrahmāṇḍaP) 1.2.34.13–15; *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (ViṣṇuP) 3.4.8–9.

As noted by Parpola (1968: 137; 2012: 376–379), Kumārila explicitly states that Jaimini is the author of an auxiliary text of the Sāmaveda. In MmS 1.3.3, it is declared that a *smṛti*, a recollected scripture, should be rejected if it is incompatible with a *śruti*, a statement in the Veda. As an example of such a *smṛti*, Śabarāsvāmin refers to a ritual prescription that the pillar of *udumbara* wood (*audumbarī*)⁸ erected on the ground of the assembly-hall (*sadas*) of a Soma sacrifice should be entirely wrapped with cloth. He claims that this whole-wrapping (*sarvaveṣṭana*) contradicts the *śruti* prescription that the Udgāṭṛ, the head of chanter-priests, should sing his part of *sāman* after touching the pillar, because he cannot directly touch the pillar if it is entirely covered with cloth.⁹ Kumārila, however, is not satisfied with this explanation; to promote tolerance in the Brahmanical society, Kumārila stresses that one should not despise those who follow unfamiliar practices, because it can transpire that these are based on the Veda of their own *śākhā*.¹⁰ Thus, Kumārila does not criticize the wrapping of the whole *audumbarī* pillar with cloth as Śabarāsvāmin does, owing to the fact that a certain Brāhmaṇa contains a *śruti* that validates this practice.

In the *Tantravārttika* (TV),¹¹ Kumārila quotes a phrase from the text *Chāndogyanuvāda*, in which Jaimini himself (*jaimininaiva*) explains that the *smṛti* prescription of the wrapping of the *audumbarī* pillar with cloth (*sarvaveṣṭana-smaraṇa*) is based on a Brāhmaṇa of Śāṭyāyanins which states that there are two cloths, respectively one in two different contexts (*ubhayatra vāsasī darśayati*). In the context of the *audumbarī* pillar (*audumbarīprakaraṇe*), the Brāhmaṇa gives the injunction “[He wraps] it (i.e., the *audumbarī* pillar) with [a cloth] that has its fringe upwards (*tām ūrdhvadaśena [vāsasā veṣṭayati]*),” and in the context of *kuśā*, the stick used for counting *viṣṭuti* (the method of repetition in chanting), the same Brāhmaṇa refers to a cloth in which *kuśās* (*viṣṭuti* sticks) are placed,¹² with the explanatory passage (*arthavāda*) “The cloth is, indeed, for *viṣṭutis*; the cloth is, indeed, prosperity; *sāman* is prosperity” (*vaiṣṭutaṃ vai vāsaḥ*,

⁸ Cf. Staal 2001: 583, plate 93.

⁹ ŚBh 168,3–4: *yathaudumbaryāḥ sarvaveṣṭanam*, “*audumbarīm sprṣṭvōdgāyed*” *iti śrutyā viruddham*. For the *śruti* sources of the wrapping of the *audumbarī* pillar with cloth, see Parpola 2012: 377, n. 9.

¹⁰ Cf. TV 188,5–7; Yoshimizu 2016: 315, n. 50.

¹¹ TV 188,9–12: *yac caitat sarvaveṣṭanasmarāṇaṃ sparśanaśrutiviruddhatvenodāhriyate. etaj jaimininaiva cchāndogyanuvāde śāṭyāyanibrāhmaṇagataśrutimūlatvena audumbarīprakaraṇe ca śāṭyāyanināṃ tām ūrdhvadaśenobhayatra vāsasī darśayati vaiṣṭutaṃ vai vāsaḥ śrīṛ vai vāsaḥ śrīṛ sāma iti darśite tatprasaṅgena audumbarīveṣṭanavāsaso 'pi prakāśaśrutimūlatvaṃ evānvākhyātam*. To make sense this passage, see Parpola (2012: 377–378) who uses Paritoṣamīśra's commentary, *Ajitā*, edited by Harikai (1986).

¹² For the *vaiṣṭuta* cloth, see Staal 2001: 629, plate 103.

śrīr vai vāsaḥ, śrīḥ sāma). Therefore, Jaimini explains (*anvākhyāta*) that in association with the cloth for *kuśās* (*tatprasaṅgena*), the Brāhmaṇa of Śāṭyāyanins gives a *śruti* testimony that illustrates (*prakāśaśrutimūlatva*) the wrapping of the *audumbarī* pillar with cloth.

Parpola has been editing the unpublished *Anupadasūtra*, an exegetic treatise on the *Pañcaviṃśabrāhmaṇa*, the Brāhmaṇa of the Kauthuma and Rāṇāyanīya schools of the Sāmaveda. In the section *viṣṭuti* (5.12), Parpola identified a phrase in which a series of words quoted by Kumārila can be traced.¹³ Therefore, it is reasonable to say that Kumārila calls the *Anupadasūtra* “*Chāndogyānuvāda*,”¹⁴ and identifies the author of this text of the Sāmaveda as Jaimini, the purported author of the MmS.¹⁵

In the MmS, there are five *sūtras* that record Jaimini’s exegetic views with his name: MmS 3.1.4, 6.3.4, 8.3.7, 9.2.39, and 12.1.7.¹⁶ Among these *sūtras*, MmS 6.3.4 deserves special attention. The first *sūtra* of MmS 6.3.1–7 presents the view that the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) should hold a fixed (*nitya*) sacrifice, such as the everyday Agnihotra and the new and full moon sacrifices, only when all acts of the sacrifice are ready to be performed by priests (*sarvaśakti*).¹⁷ The second *sūtra* refutes this, presenting the view that as far as subsidiary acts (*guṇas*) are concerned, the performance of some and not all parts suffices (*apy ekadeśe syāt*) for a fixed sacrifice because only the primary act (*pradhāna*), the offering of an

¹³ Parpola (1968: 136; 2012: 379): *dravyānām aniyogaḥ. śāṭyāyanināṃ tv audumbarā viṣṭutayo bhavanty, ūrg udumbara, ūrjam evāsmiṃ dadhātīti. ... kuśāprakarāṇe ca śrīr vai sāmānāṃ stomah, śrīr vāsaḥ, śrīyam eva tac chriyāṃ pratiṣṭhāpayatīti vāsasaḥ parāmarśaḥ śāṭyāyaninām. audumbarīprakarāṇe ca tām ūrdhvadaśenety ubhayatra vāsasī darśayati*. Kumārila may have quoted “*audumbarīprakarāṇe ca tām ūrdhvadaśenety ubhayatra vāsasī darśayati*” inserting “*śāṭyāyanināṃ*” between “*ca*” and “*tām*” because this “*ca*” would otherwise become difficult to interpret in Kumārila’s text.

¹⁴ According to Harikai (2008), two manuscripts preserved in the Bodleian Library (M2 and M5) read *chāndogyānupade* instead of *chāndogyānuvāde*.

¹⁵ Parpola (2012: 384) announces that in a forthcoming paper he will discuss how Jaimini, who belonged to the Chāndogya (Kauthuma-Rāṇāyanīya) school of the Sāmaveda, came to be regarded as the eponymic scholar of the Jaiminīya school.

¹⁶ Cf. Nilakantha Sastri 1921: 174; Kane 1960: 122; Mishra 1964: 10–11; Parpola 1981: 156.

¹⁷ MmS 6.3.1: *sarvaśaktau pravṛttiḥ syāt tathābhūtopadeśāt*.

oblation to a deity, can bring about the result (*arthanirvṛtti*) of the sacrifice.¹⁸ The next *sūtra* names another reason why the lack of preparation for subsidiary acts does not excuse neglecting a fixed sacrifice, which is that one commits a fault (*doṣa*) if one fails to perform the primary act (*tadakarmaṇi*) at the time fixed for the sacrifice, and concludes that there is a difference (*viśeṣa*) between the performance of the primary act and the subsidiary acts because the fault of negligence pertains to the primary act (*pradhānenābhisambandha*).¹⁹ Following this, MmS 6.3.4 presents Jaimini's view that one is taught to perform all acts (*sarveṣāṃ upadeśaḥ*) because there is no difference (*karmābheda*) between primary and subsidiary acts as they are prescribed by the same Vedic injunction (*prayogavacanaikatva*).²⁰

Aklujkar (2011: 865) quotes Kane (1960) in support of his opinion that MmS 6.3.4 is not an opponent-*sūtra* in opposition to Nilakantha Sastri (1921).²¹ However, it cannot be denied that MmS 6.3.4 is rejected by 6.3.5,²² which names the offering

¹⁸ MmS 6.3.2: *api vāpy ekadeśe syāt pradhāne hy arthanirvṛttir guṇamātram itarat tadarthatvāt*.

¹⁹ MmS 6.3.3: *tadakarmaṇi ca doṣaḥ, tasmāt tato viśeṣaḥ syāt pradhānenābhisambandhāt*.

²⁰ MmS 6.3.4: *karmābhedaṃ tu jaiminiḥ prayogavacanaikatvāt sarveṣāṃ upadeśaḥ syād iti*.

²¹ To defend his view that Jaimini does not oppose the proponent's view of this section, Kane (1960: 123–124, quoted by Aklujkar 2011: 865) construes MmS 6.3.4 as stating, “whether one performs the principal rite carrying out all subsidiary acts or only a few such acts, there is no difference in the rite (it is the Agnihotra or Darśapūrṇamāsa all the same) ... whether a few subsidiary acts are performed or all of them are performed there is no difference in the principal rite (*karmābheda*).” Kane insists that with “*karmābheda*,” Jaimini states the non-difference of a sacrifice in its primary parts regardless of whether all subsidiary acts are performed. However, commenting on MmS 6.3.4, Śabarasvāmin explicitly remarks that Jaimini states the non-difference between the primary act and the subsidiary acts of a sacrifice in ŚBh 1411,10: *nāsti bheda imāny aṅgāni, imāni pradhānānīti*. Considering the peculiarity of MmS 6.3.4 as an opponent-*sūtra*, Nilakantha Sastri (1921: 172) claims that the Jaimini referred to in MmS 6.3.4 is “a less known predecessor of the same name as the Sūtrakāra,” whom he also distinguishes from the Jaimini that appears in the BS. However, this assumption of a different Jaimini is unnecessary if the MmS was not codified by Jaimini himself.

²² MmS 6.3.5: *arthasya vyapavargitvād ekasyāpi prayoge syād yathā kratvantareṣu**. “Even if one performs only a part [of subsidiary acts, the result] will follow (*syāt*) because the object (*artha*) is separated [from subsidiary acts]; it is just as in different sacrifices [i.e., a basic sacrifice (*prakṛti*) and its modified sacrifices (*vikṛti*), where the prescriptions of the latter are not the same as those of the former.]” * Cf. ŚBh 1412,13–14: *yathā kratvantareṣu prakṛtīvikṛtiṣu parasya dharmāḥ parasya na bhavanti*.

of an oblation to a deity as the “object” (*artha*)²³ of a sacrifice distinguished from subsidiary acts, approving the partial performance of subsidiary acts. Jaimini, as a Sāmavedin, may not have been concerned about the practical difficulties that would result from the compulsory performance of a full set of subsidiaries in every periodical session of fixed sacrifices. However, these difficulties were a serious matter of concern to the majority of Mīmāṃsakas who were Yajurvedins, because Yajurvedins take charge of most of the subsidiary rituals; therefore, Jaimini’s view in MmS 6.3.4 was rejected. Accordingly, although in most cases Jaimini’s views are accepted in the MmS, we cannot consider him as the person who compiled the MmS.

1.2. The *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* and the Black Yajurveda

In a detailed list of the scholars who appear in the MmS, the *Śaṅkarāṣakāṇḍa* (SK) and the BS, Parpola (1981: 156–157) identifies the school (*carana*) of the Veda that each scholar belongs to. From this, we have drawn up a table of controversy that arranges the names of the Yajurveda scholars by school (using the abbreviation of a Śrautasūtra) in the left-end column and in the top row, and shows the *sūtra* numbers that record the scholars’ competing views in the relevant cells. Cases of scholars’ confrontation with Jaimini, a Sāmavedin, are omitted.²⁴

²³ ŚBh 1412,1–7: *arthasya vyapavargitvāt. vyapavṛktam aṅgebhyaḥ pradhānam ... tasmād agnaye puroḍāśo ’gnīṣomābhyāṃ ca, ājyaṃ cāgnīṣomādibhyaḥ paurṇamāsyām. āgneya-sāmnāyyādīnām amāvāsyāyām.* “[MmS 6.3.5 states] ‘because the object is separated.’ The primary act is separated from the subsidiaries. ... Therefore, on the full moon day, [the oblations of primary acts are] a cake for Agni, a cake for Agni-Soma, and clarified butter for Agni-Soma and so on (i.e., *upāṃśuyāja*). On the new moon day, [they are] a cake for Agni, a mixture of milk and yogurt (*sāmnāyya*), and so on.”

²⁴ Controversies are also recorded between Kārṣṇājini and Lābukāyana (MmS 6.7.35–37, n. 31), and between Aitiśāyana and Bādarāyaṇa (MmS 6.1.6–8, cf. nn. 88–89). In MmS 11.1.54–67, the proponent agrees with both Kāmukāyana (58 and 63) and Bādarāyaṇa (65). The affiliations of Lābukāyana, Aitiśāyana, and Kāmukāyana are uncertain.

controversy between	BhŚS & ĀpŚS		HŚS			KŚS
	Ālekhana ²⁵	Auḍulomi ²⁶	Ātreya ²⁷	Kāśakṛtsna ²⁸	Bādarāyaṇa ²⁹	Bādari ³⁰
BhŚS & ĀpŚS Āśmarathya	MmS 6.5.16– 17 SK 2.4.41–42 SK 4.2.1–2	BS 1.4.20– 22		BS 1.4.20– 22		BS 1.2. 29–30
HŚS Ātreya		BS 3.4.44– 45			MmS 5.2.18– 19	MmS 6. 1.26–27
Kārṣṇājini			MmS 4.3.17–18			BS 3.1. 9–11

Table 1. Controversies between Yajurveda scholars in the MmS, the SK, and the BS, and their affiliation.

This table shows that six cases of controversy occur between two or three scholars of the Black Yajurveda, namely, scholars of the Bhāradvāja (BhŚS) and the Āpastamba (ĀpŚS), and those of the Hiranyakeśin (HŚS) schools. Kārṣṇājini is quoted in the *Kātyāyanaśrautasūtra* (KŚS), the Śrautasūtra of the White Yajurveda, but it is not certain whether he was a scholar of the White Yajurveda.³¹ If he was a scholar of the Black Yajurveda, the cases of controversy within the schools of the Black Yajurveda amount to seven, and the cases in which a White Yajurvedin takes part amount only to three.

²⁵ Āśmarathya and Ālekhana frequently appear together in the Kalpasūtras of Bharadvāja and the ĀpŚS. See Kashikar 1964: lxvii–lxxv; Parpola 1981: 166.

²⁶ See n. 127.

²⁷ See nn. 55 and 86.

²⁸ Parpola (1981: 174) finds Kāśakṛtsna quoted in HŚS 21.2.34 (pt. 8, p. 700), but also notes that this is inconclusive as evidence for his belonging to the Hiranyakeśin school because HŚS 21.2.34 addresses the pronunciation of the *hautra*, the recitation of a Ṛgveda-*mantra*. In his commentary on KŚS 4.3.17 (KŚSV, 319,5–7), Yājñikadeva remarks that Kāśakṛtsna(-ni) refers to *Kāṭhakaśaṃhitā* (KS) 8.1 (84,3–5) with modifications (cf. n. 36). Cf. n. 55.

²⁹ See n. 86.

³⁰ See n. 36.

³¹ KŚS 1.6.23: *kulasatṭram iti kārṣṇājiniḥ*. As noted by Parpola (1994: 296–297), this *sūtra* corresponds to MmS 6.7.35. MmS 6.7.31–40 as well as KŚS 1.6.17–27 forms a closely paralleled section that deals with the question of who is eligible for the sacrificial session (*sattra*) of a thousand years. It is possible that the KŚS rewrote this section of the MmS. For the controversy between Kārṣṇājini and Ātreya in MmS 4.3.17–18, see n. 55.

As noted by Garge (1952: 56–64) and Parpola (1994: 302), the KŚS is the Śrautasūtra that shows the most prominent parallelism with the MmS. According to Garge (1952: 53), the KŚS has 89 sections that have a corresponding section in the MmS, and as many as 29 of these are arranged in continuity and close verbal correspondence with the *sūtras* of the MmS. Nevertheless, in the MmS, the passages for discussion (*viṣayavākya*s) are generally quoted from the Black Yajurveda, most frequently from the Taittirīya *śākhā*.³² As for the White Yajurveda, the quotations from the *Vājasaneyisaṃhitā* amount only to 4, and those from the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* (ŚB) to 23 (Garge 1952: 110 and 118–121). This conspicuous difference in quotation frequency may indicate that the MmS was compiled predominantly by the scholars of the Black Yajurveda,³³ and that the scholars of the White Yajurveda, that is, the Vājasaneyin *śākhā*, took the MmS into account when they compiled the KŚS, making its first chapter their own basic manual of exegesis (*paribhāṣā*).

1.3. Bādari vs. Jaimini, and Ātreya vs. Bādari in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*

Except for MmS 6.3.4, which is later rejected, Jaimini's view consistently appears as an accepted authority in the MmS. In particular, in MmS 3.1.4 and 8.3.7³⁴ Jaimini plays the role of the proponent who refutes Bādari's view recorded in the immediately preceding *sūtra*. Bādari, who appears in MmS 3.1.3, 6.1.27, 8.3.6, and 9.2.33,³⁵ is a scholar of the White Yajurveda, the rival *śākhā* of the Black Yajurveda. As evidence for this affiliation, Parpola (1994: 296) points out that in KŚS 4.3.18, Bādari is coupled with Vātsyā.³⁶

³² According to Garge (1952: 73–118), the ŚBh quotes 216 passages from the *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* (TS), 72 from the *Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa* (TB), 69 from the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā*, and 7 from the *Kāṭhakaśaṃhitā*.

³³ Garge (1952: 53–54) and Parpola (1994: 303–304) made it clear that the KŚS was compiled after the MmS, paying particular attention to the following two cases: KŚS 4.3.16 shows a condensation of three *sūtras* of the MmS (8.2.16, 17 and 23), and the three *siddhānta-sūtras* of the MmS (3.5.37–39) are condensed into KŚS 9.1.14, which is then rejected as a *pūrvapakṣa* by KŚS 9.1.15–17.

³⁴ MmS 8.3.6–7 debates whether the thirty-six-day rite is to be performed with the details of the twelve-day rite (Bādari), or with those of the six-day rite (Jaimini). Cf. Mishra 1964: 7. Each of the remaining two *sūtras* of Jaimini forms a section: MmS 9.2.39 defines *stobha*, the interjections involved in chanting; MmS 12.1.7 gives the rule of ritual omission for a complex sacrifice that the subsidiary rituals to be performed only once for all (*tantra*) in a sacrifice can be omitted only when the corresponding rituals of an external sacrifice take their place (*paratantrāpatteḥ svatantrapratīṣedhaḥ syāt*).

³⁵ Cf. Nilakantha Sastri 1921: 174; Mishra 1964: 7; Parpola 1981: 156.

³⁶ KŚS 4.3.18: *anuvādaḥ pūrvasyeti vātsyabādari*. This refutes the preceding view of

In MmS 3.1.3, Bādari ascribes the status of “subsidiary element” (*śeṣa*), the topic of the third volume, to substances (*dravyas*), their qualities (*guṇas*), and preparatory acts (*saṃskāras*).³⁷ According to Śābarasvāmin, Bādari does not only enumerate three subsidiary categories, but restricts the subsidiary status to these three, and claims that a Vedic sacrifice (*yāga*) is not subsidiary to its result because it should be held for its own sake.³⁸ He asserts that once a fixed sacrifice is held, it is destined to bring its result (*phala*) to the sacrificer, and claims that the sacrifice does so by itself (*svayam*) and cannot be considered as a means to exclusively serve the sacrificer’s profit.³⁹ His reasoning for this is because

Kāśakṛtsna that modified sacrifices (*vikṛtis*) are to be performed within one day on the authority of KS 8.1 (84,3–5) (KŚS 4.3.17: *sadyastvaṃ kāśakṛtsnaḥ*). For Vātsyā’s affiliation with the White Yajurveda, see Parpola 1994: 294. Parpola (1981: 173) notes that regarding the question of whether *darvīhoma*, the offering of clarified butter (*ājya*) by a *darvī* ladle without *mantra*-recitations, has its prototype (*prakṛti*) among Śrauta sacrifices, the views of Bādari, Ātreya, and Kāśakṛtsna are summarized in *Baudhāyanagr̥hyasūtra* (BaudhGS) 1.4.44: *āghāraṃ prakṛtiṃ prāha darvīhomasya bādariḥ / āgnihotrikaṃ tathātreyāḥ kāśakṛtsnas tv apūrvatām* // Parpola’s opinion (1981: 174) that this may not prove these three scholars’ affiliation to Baudhāyana’s school can be reinforced. Conforming with Kāśakṛtsna’s view, MmS 8.4.10–28 argues that *darvīhoma* is an original rite (ŚBh 1629,12–13: *tasmād apūrvāḥ*). In contrast, KŚS 6.10.17–29 states that *darvīhomas* are to be offered in accordance with the full moon sacrifice with some modifications (17: *darvīhomāḥ paurṇamāsadharmāḥ*). *Āghāra*, the pouring of *ājya* by a ladle into the Āhavanīya fire, is a subsidiary ritual in the new and full moon sacrifices (see Rustagi 1981: 209–219). In both *āghāra* and *darvīhoma*, the *yājyā*-formula composed of a Ṛgveda-verse is not recited (cf. Sen 1982: 72; 101). It is possible that in BaudhGS 1.4.44, Bādari represents the position of the White Yajurveda by taking *āghāra* for the *prakṛti* of *darvīhoma*, which is different from the position of the Black Yajurveda. See ĀpŚS 24.3.2–10 (2: *apūrvo darvīhomāḥ*); BhŚS 5.11.3–4, HŚS 3.8 (pt. 1, pp. 361–364), and VārŚS 1.1.1.24–29 describe *darvīhoma* (see Chakrabarti 1980: 100–101) without referring to its *prakṛti*.

³⁷ MmS 3.1.3: *dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣu bādariḥ*.

³⁸ ŚBh 660,3–4: *bādarir ācāryo ’tra dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣv eva śeṣaśabda iti mene, na yāgaphalapuruṣeṣu*; ŚBh 661,4–5: *tasmād yāgo na śeṣabhūtaḥ kasyacid arthasya*; ŚBh 661,1–3: *sa hi puruṣārthaḥ, yad anyad dravyādi, tat tadarthaṃ tasya śeṣabhūtam. sa tu na kiṃcid abhinirvartayitum kriyate*. “Because it (i.e., the sacrifice) is [directly] aimed at human beings. The other elements, substance and so on, are subsidiary to the sacrifice because they are aimed at it. That (sacrifice), however, is never held for the sake of producing anything else.”

³⁹ ŚBh 661,3–4: *tasmimś tu kṛte svayam eva tad bhavati. tasmin kṛte phalam asya bhavatīty etāvad gamyate. nāsti śabdo yāgena kriyate phalam iti*. “If it is held, that (result) occurs by itself. What is understood [from *codanā*] is that the result occurs for one who has held the sacrifice, but there are no words [in the Veda that state] that the result is brought about by means of the sacrifice.”

the fundamental injunction (*codanā*) “One who desires heaven should hold a sacrifice (*svargakāmo yajeta*)” makes one who has the desire to reach heaven eligible to hold the sacrifice, and does not guarantee one’s exclusive ownership of heaven.⁴⁰

In opposition to Bādari, Jaimini declares that a sacrifice is subsidiary to its result, and the latter to the person who has held the former;⁴¹ this stems from his conviction that holding sacrifice is a tool (*upāya*) that serves for the sacrificer’s own profit.⁴² According to Śabarāsvāmin, Jaimini is said to have held that the fundamental injunction assures one who has held the sacrifice ownership of its result, because the verb in the injunction “he should hold a sacrifice” (*yajeta*) ends in the middle voice (*ātmanepada*) which expresses the agent as the enjoyer of the result of action.⁴³

MmS 6.1.25–38 records another serious debate provoked by Bādari: over the eligibility (*adhikāra*) for the Vedic sacrifice, he disagrees with Ātreya, a scholar who is affiliated with the Hiranyakeśin school of the Taittirīya *śākhā*, the most comprehensive corpus of the Black Yajurveda.⁴⁴ In opposition to the orthodox view of Ātreya that eligibility should be restricted to the upper three classes,⁴⁵ Bādari boldly declares that people of all four classes, including Śūdras, are eligible (*sarvādhikāra*).⁴⁶ Quoting an injunction for the establishment of the

⁴⁰ ŚBh 661,6–7: *yah svargaṃ kāmāyate sa yāgaṃ kuryād ity etāvac chabdenopadiśyate, nātmanaḥ parasya veti. svargaṃ pratīchhāmātreṇa svargakāma iti bhavati.* “What is taught by the words [of *codanā*] is that one who desires heaven should hold a sacrifice, and not whether [heaven] belongs to oneself or someone else. One becomes ‘one who desires heaven’ only by virtue of the desire for heaven.”

⁴¹ MmS 3.1.4: *karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt*; 3.1.5: *phalaṃ ca puruṣārthatvāt.*

⁴² ŚBh 661,14–15: *na yāgaḥ kartavyatayā codyate, phalakāmasya tu tatsāadhanopāyatveneti.* “A sacrifice is laid down not as what is to be done [for itself], but as the means by which one who desires the result attains it.”

⁴³ ŚBh 662,1–3: *yah svargo me bhaved ity evaṃ kāmāyate, tasya yāgaḥ. na yah svargaḥ, sa ātmānaṃ labheteti. kutaḥ. ātmanepadaprayogāt.* “The person who is eligible for the sacrifice is one who desires to possess heaven, but not [one who desires] heaven to [simply] come about. Why? Because the middle voice is used [in the verb *yajeta*].”

⁴⁴ See n. 86.

⁴⁵ MmS 6.1.26: *nirdeśād vā trayāṇāṃ syād agnyādheya hy asaṃbandhaḥ kratuṣu, brāhmaṇaśrutir ity ātreyaḥ.* “However, only the [upper] three classes have [the eligibility for the Vedic sacrifice] because of the instruction on the establishment of the fires. Because the Veda assigns it to Brahmins, [Kṣatriyas, and Vaiśyas, Śūdras] have no relation to sacrifices.”

⁴⁶ MmS 6.1.25: *cāturvarṇyam aviśeṣāt*; 27: *nimitārthena bādariḥ, tasmāt sarvādhikāraṃ syāt.*

sacrificial fires (*agnyādheya*), “In spring, a Brahmin should establish the fires; in summer, a royal member; in autumn, a Vaiśya” (*vasante brāhmaṇo ’gnīn ādadhūta, grīṣme rājanyah, śaradi vaiśyah*),⁴⁷ Ātreya asserts that there is no injunction permitting Śūdras to set up the sacrificial fires.⁴⁸ Bādari, however, contends that Śūdras are not excluded from the Vedic sacrifice because the injunction of a sacrifice makes all those who desire the result eligible to hold the sacrifice; furthermore, he argues that there is no injunction explicitly prohibiting Śūdras to hold a sacrifice.⁴⁹ Regarding the injunction for the establishment of the sacrificial fires, Bādari counters that it merely specifies the occasion (*nimitta*) for the upper three classes to establish the fires, and does not exclude Śūdras.⁵⁰ After further debate, the proponent concludes in favor of Ātreya, declaring that the lack of words determining the occasion for Śūdras to establish the fires is to be considered as the exclusion of Śūdras (*apaśūdra*).⁵¹ The restriction of the holding of a sacrifice to the upper three classes is common to the Śrautasūtras of

⁴⁷ Cf. TB 1.1.2.6–7; Krick 1982: 43–44.

⁴⁸ ŚBh 1376,12–13: *śūdrasyādadhāne śrutir nāstīty anagniḥ śūdro ’samartho ’gnihotrādi nirvartayitum*. “Because there is no Vedic statement on the establishment [of the fires] by Śūdras, Śūdras have no fires. Therefore, they are unable to carry out such [sacrifices] as the Agnihotra.”

⁴⁹ ŚBh 1377,3–5: *tan na, sarve hy arthinam adhikṛtya yajetety ucyate. so ’sati pratiṣedhavadhāne śūdrān na vyāvarteta. yat tv asamartho ’gnyabhāvād iti, syād evāsyāgnir arthaprāptaḥ, kāmāśrutipariṅhātāt*. “That (i.e., Ātreya’s view) is not correct, because [the fundamental injunction (*codanā*)] ‘one should hold a sacrifice’ is issued to all those who desire [its result]. Because there is no prohibition, that (i.e., the sacrifice) is not to be disjoined from Śūdras. Regarding the [Ātreya’s] view that Śūdras are not able [to hold a sacrifice] because they do not have the sacrificial fires, their possession of the sacrificial fires is necessarily postulated because they are included in what the word ‘one who desires’ denotes.”

⁵⁰ ŚBh 1377,7–11: *nimittasvabhāvā ete śabdāḥ, brāhmaṇa ādadhāno vasante, rājanyo grīṣme, vaiśyah śaradīti brāhmaṇādīnāṃ vasantādibhiḥ saṃbandho gamyate, tena vasantādisaṃbandhārthā brāhmaṇādāya ity eva gamyate, tathā cādadhātir na vākyena śūdrān vyāvartito bhaviṣyati*. “These words, by nature, designate the occasion in the manner that a Brahmin is [a person] who establishes the fires in spring, a royal member in summer, and a Vaiśya in autumn. What is understood from this (injunction) is simply that Brahmin, [royal member, and Vaiśya] have their relation with spring, [summer, and autumn,] respectively; [this injunction] does not syntactically exclude Śūdras from the establishment [of the fires].”

⁵¹ MmS 6.1.33: *api vā vedanirdeśād apaśūdrāṇāṃ pratīyeta*; ŚBh 1379,16–17: *vedābhāvād asamarthaḥ śūdro yaṣṭum. tasmān nādhikriyeta*. “Because of the lack of [corroborating] Vedic words, a Śūdra is unable to hold a sacrifice; therefore, he is not to be made eligible [for sacrifice].”

the Yajurveda, including the KŚS.⁵² Nevertheless, the easing of this restriction is mentioned even in a Śrautasūtra of the Taittirīya *śākhā*.⁵³

In the MmS, Bādari's view is consistently rejected, except in MmS 9.2.33 which addresses the method of how to sing a *sāman* in a particular instance.⁵⁴ Considering the competition for the priesthood between the schools of the Black Yajurveda and the White Yajurveda, it is possible to conjecture the reason why the MmS was named after Jaimini. Concerning the relation between the act of Vedic sacrifice and its result, the central topic of the theory of action for ritualists, Jaimini refutes the view of Bādari, a White Yajurvedin who advocated a radical egalitarianism that was capable of disturbing the hierarchical order of Indian society. Jaimini's rejection of Bādari's view may have been welcomed among the majority of Mīmāṃsakas who, belonging to the schools of the Black Yajurveda as Ātreya did, wanted to keep the Brahmanical social order. This, along with his fame as the author of the *Anupadasūtra*, contributed to their decision to attribute the MmS to him, despite his being a Sāmavedin.⁵⁵

⁵² BaudhŚS 24.13 (198,1); ĀpŚS 24.1.2; HŚS 3.1 (pt. 1, p. 275); VārŚS 1.1.1.4; KŚS 1.1.5: *aṅgahīna-aśrotriya-ṣaṇḍha-śūdra-varjam* "[All human beings (KŚS 1.1.3–4)] except for the maimed, those who have not studied the Veda, eunuchs, and Śūdras;" 6: *brāhmaṇarājanyavaiśyāṇāṃ śruteḥ*. Cf. Chakrabarti 1980: 143.

⁵³ BhŚS 5.2.9: *vidyate caturthasya varṇasyāgnyādheyam ity ekam. na vidyate ity aparam*. "Some insist that people of the fourth class (i.e., Śūdra) have [the eligibility for] the establishment of the fires. Others insist that they do not." Cf. Gopal 1959: 119, n. 32. In addition to the upper three classes, a chariot-maker (*rathakāra*) is allowed to set up the sacrificial fires in rainy season. Cf. MmS 6.1.44–50; Krick 1982: 44; TB 1.1.4.8.

⁵⁴ See Mishra 1964: 7.

⁵⁵ MmS 4.3.17–19 records Ātreya's controversy with Kārṣṇājini: Regarding the Rātrisattra, Kārṣṇājini (17) maintains that this sacrifice has no injunction that mentions a particular result, whereas Ātreya (18) asserts that the stability (*pratiṣṭhā*) mentioned in its explanatory passage (*arthavāda*) is to be considered as its result. Ātreya's view is accepted by the proponent and generally called *rātrisattranyāya*. In addition, Kāśakṛtsna (see n. 28) is said to have promulgated his own treatise of Mīmāṃsā in *Mahābhāṣya* (VMBh) vol. 2, 206,8–9; 249,17; 325,13–14: *kāśakṛtsninā proktā mīmāṃsā kāśakṛtsnī*; cf. Parpola 1981: 174. However, the MmS was not ascribed to him. Because the MmS collects the views of early scholars together, its purported author may have been chosen from the scholars of generations close to its compilers. Compared with Jaimini, Ātreya and Kāśakṛtsna may belong to older generations. In BS 3.4.44–45, Ātreya's view on *upāsana* is rejected by Auḍulomi, who contends with Āśmarathya and Kāśakṛtsna over the nature of *ātman* in BS 1.4.20–22. For the reason why Bādarāyaṇa, who was probably younger than Jaimini, was not chosen as the author of the MmS, see section 3.1 of the present paper.

2. Bādari, a radical theologian of the White Yajurveda

2.1. Background of Bādari's egalitarianism

Considering Ātreya's affiliation with the Hiranyakeśin school of the Taittirīya śākhā, the confrontation between conservative Ātreya and radical Bādari regarding Śūdras' eligibility for the Vedic sacrifice conforms to Nishimura's (2006: 149–151; 2016: 237–238) findings on the difference between the Taittirīya and the Vājasaneyin strategies for securing and enlarging their “market.” In dispute over the new and full moon sacrifices (*darśapūrṇamāsau*), the Taittirīya appealed to wealthy people by restricting the offering of *sāmnāyya* (a mixture of milk and sour milk) to Indra or Mahendra at the new-moon sacrifice to those who had already held a *soma* sacrifice, which is a large-scale expensive sacrifice,⁵⁶ whereas the Vājasaneyin abolished this restriction⁵⁷ in order to spread their style of Vedic sacrifice to wider social strata.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ TS 2.5.5.1: *nāsomayājī sām nayed ānāgataṃ vā etāsya pāyo yó 'somayājī. yád āsomayājī saṃnāyēt parimōṣā evā só 'nṛtaṃ karoty. ātho páraivá sicyate. somayājy evā sām nayet. pāyo vái sómah páyah sāmnāyyám. páyasaivá páya ātmán dhatte.* “No one who is not a Soma sacrificer should offer the Sāmnāyya. For the milk of him who is not a Soma sacrificer is imperfect, and if one who is not a Soma sacrifice offers the Sāmnāyya he is a thief and does wrong, and (his milk) is poured forth in vain. A Soma sacrificer only should offer the Sāmnāyya. Soma is milk, the Sāmnāyya is milk; verily with milk he places milk in himself” (trans. Keith 1914: 193). For the offering of *sāmnāyya*, see Rustagi 1981: 244–246.

⁵⁷ ŚB 1.6.4.10; *tád āhuḥ. nāsomayājī sām nayet. somāhutír vā eṣā, sánavaruddhāsomayā-jinas tásmān nāsomayājī sām nayed iti; 11: tád ú sām evā nayet. nanv átrántareṇa śuśrūma sómena nú mā yājayatātha ma etád āpyāyanam sām bhariṣyathéty abravíd iti ná vái medám dhinoti yán mā dhinavát tán me kuruteti. tásmā etád āpyāyanam sāmabharams tásmād āpy āsomayājī sām evā nayet.* “In reference to this point they say, ‘One who has not performed the Soma-sacrifice must not offer the Sāmnāyya; for, indeed, the Sāmnāyya is (of the same significance as) a Soma libation, and the latter is not permitted to one who is not a Soma-sacrificer: hence he who has not performed the Soma-sacrifice must not offer the Sāmnāyya.’ He may nevertheless offer the Sāmnāyya; for have we not heard within this place* that he (Indra) said, ‘Do ye now offer Soma to me, and then ye will prepare for me that invigorating draught (*āpyāyana*, viz. the Sāmnāyya)!’ ‘This does not satiate me, prepare for me what will satiate me!’ That invigorating draught they indeed prepared for him, and therefore even one who has not performed the Soma-sacrifice, may offer the Sāmnāyya” (trans. Eggeling 1882: 179). * Nishimura (2006: n. 409) interprets this as referring to ŚB 1.6.4.4–5. In KŚS, as a rule, one who has held a *soma* sacrifice is requested to offer *sāmnāyya*, but those who have not held a *soma* sacrifice are also allowed to do so if they wish. See KŚS 4.2.45: *somayājī saṃnāyēt; 46: kāmād itaraḥ.*

⁵⁸ The White Yajurveda, which originated in Kosala-Videha, expanded across northern India, and the Kāva school expanded southward to Tamilnadu. See Witzel 2016: 38–47.

Although, as stated in the KŚS,⁵⁹ the White Yajurveda school officially proclaims Śūdras as being excluded from the Vedic sacrifice, Bādari's egalitarianism recorded in MmS 6.1.27 may be considered a radical conclusion of the social expansion policy of the White Yajurveda. The position Bādari approved to Śūdras is not that of the priest (*ṛtvij*), the specialist of rituals, but that of the sacrificer (*yajamāna*), the sponsor who hosts a session of the sacrifice paying honorarium (*dakṣiṇā*) to priests. Among those who have grown wealthy despite their lower status in the social hierarchy, there may have been a demand to celebrate their prosperity by holding a Vedic sacrifice.

2.2. Prospect after “the path of the gods” (*devayāna*): how to attain the supreme *brahman*

In the BS,⁶⁰ Bādari also offers his views concerning transmigration (*saṃsāra*) and the way to liberation (*mokṣa*) in accordance with the White Yajurveda, in this case the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (BĀU), particularly the teachings of Yājñavalkya. In BS 4.3.7, Bādari states that the final destination to which the deceased are led through “the path of the gods” (*devayāna*) is the effected (*kārya*) lower *brahman*. Jaimini counters this with the statement that the *brahman* attained at the end of the *devayāna* is the supreme (*para*) *brahman*, the literal meaning (*mukhya*) of the word “*brahman*” (BS 4.3.12).⁶¹ The origin of this confrontation between Jaimini and Bādari can be traced back to the Upaniṣads they each basically rely on: in the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* (ChU), the major Upaniṣad of the Sāmaveda, the goal of the *devayāna* is expressed as “*brahman*” in neutral singular, indicating the cosmic principle without concrete appearance. In the BĀU, it is expressed as “the worlds of *brahman*” in masculine plural.⁶² Bādari evaluates this goal as lower because of its variability for the reason that it is attainable by movement (*gati*) and is described in various ways.⁶³ In his commentary on this section of the BĀU, Śaṅkara remarks that the world of *brahman* consists of different spheres, and one attains a lower or higher sphere (*adharottarabhūmi*) according to one's own

The White Yajurveda appealed also to rich people, especially, kings, by elaborately systematizing large-scale sacrifices and royal ceremonies.

⁵⁹ See n. 52.

⁶⁰ Bādari's views are recorded in BS 1.2.30, 3.1.11, 4.3.7, and 4.4.10.

⁶¹ BS 4.3.7: *kāryaṃ bādarir asya gatyupapatteḥ*; 12: *paraṃ jaiminir mukhyatvāt*. For the significance of this section within the system of the BS, see Uskokov 2018: chapter 4.

⁶² ChU 5.10.2: *tat puruṣo 'mānavaḥ. sa enān brahma gamayati*; BĀU(K) 6.2.15=BĀU(M) 6.1.18: *puruṣo mānasa etya brahmalokān gamayati*. The word “*brahmaloka*,” however, repeatedly appears in the eighth chapter of the ChU.

⁶³ BS 4.3.7: *kāryaṃ bādarir asya gatyupapatteḥ*; 8: *viśeṣitatvāc ca*.

progress in meditation (*upāśanatāratamyā*).⁶⁴ Moreover, Bādari suggests that the goal of *devayāna* is called “*brahman*” only figuratively, by virtue of its nearness (*sāmīpya*) to the supreme *brahman*,⁶⁵ which one is said to enter following one’s stay in the worlds of *brahman* after they have vanished (*atyaya*).⁶⁶ Considering Bādari’s view that one cannot attain the supreme *brahman* by movement (*gati*), which refers to gradual practices including the meditation on *devayāna*,⁶⁷ we may say that Bādari is influenced by Yājñavalkya, who asserts the limit of the efficacy of action in soteriology. According to Yājñavalkya, all activities are necessarily motivated by desire, and one who has completely annihilated desire for anything other than one’s own self (*ātman*) has already become *brahman* when finally liberated.⁶⁸

The confrontation between Jaimini and Bādari concerning the goal of *devayāna* results from their difference of opinion over whether one can gradually approach the supreme *brahman* through religious practices including meditation, or whether one is abruptly merged with the supreme *brahman* through a particular insight unrelated to any kind of action. As noted by Nakamura (1983: 388), Bādari’s view in this section is very close to the Śaṅkara’s view (Advaita), which

⁶⁴ BĀUBh 995,15–16: *brahmalokān iti adharottarabhūmibhedena bhinnā iti gamyante. bahuvacanaprayogāt. upāśanatāratamyopapatteś ca.*

⁶⁵ BS 4.3.9: *sāmīpyāt tu tadvyapadeśaḥ.*

⁶⁶ BS 4.3.10: *kāryātyaye tadadhyakṣeṇa sahātāḥ param abhidhānāt.* “When the effected [world of Brahman] has vanished, [one goes] to the (*brahman*) which is higher than this (world of *brahman*) together with its controller [called Hiraṇyagarbha]. This is based on the scriptural statement.”

⁶⁷ *Devayāna* and *pitryāna* are, respectively, regarded as the way after death led by knowledge and led by action in BS 3.1.17: *vidyākarmaṇor iti tu prakṛtatvāt.* According to Vedānta scholars including Jaimini and Bādari, this “knowledge” of *devayāna* is a kind of knowledge to be gradually gained through meditation.

⁶⁸ BĀU(K) 4.4.6=BĀU(M) 4.4.8: *athākāmayamāno yo ’kāmo niṣkāma āptakāma ātmakāmo* [BĀU(M): *bhavati.*] *na tasya* (BĀU(M): *tasmāt*)* *prāṇā utkrānti.* [BĀU(M): *atraiva samavanīyante*] *brahmaiva san brahmāpy eti.* “Now, a man who does not desire – who is without desires, who is freed from desires, whose desires are fulfilled, whose only desire is his self – his vital functions do not depart. *Brahman* he is, and to *brahman* he goes” (trans. Olivelle 1998: 121). *BĀU(M): “... ziehen [seine] Lebenskräfte nicht aus ihm aus. Nur hier [in ihm selbst] versammeln sie sich. [Als jemand], der [selbst] der Urgrund ist, geht er in den Urgrund ein” (trans. Slaje 2009: 181). In BS 4.2.12–14, the proponent prefers “*tasmāt*” of the BĀU(M) to “*tasya*” of the BĀU(K). What this preference indicates is aptly explained by Uskov (2018: 228–229): “What the text says is not that the subtle body enveloping the Self of the knower of Brahman does not depart through the course of the gods, but that it does not depart from the Self: it sticks to the Self all the way until liberation is reached.”

is strongly influenced by Yājñavalkya. In Śaṅkara's commentary on the BS, Bādari (4.3.7–11) is made the proponent and Jaimini (4.3.12–14) the opponent, despite Bādari appearing first and Jaimini second.⁶⁹

2.3. Prospect for the final destination of “the path of the fathers” (*pitṛyāna*): from sacrifice to ethics

BS 3.1.8–11 records a controversy between Bādari and Kārṣṇājini. In this controversy, they dispute over the mechanism of transmigration. Of the two versions of “the path of the fathers” (*pitṛyāna*), one in the BĀU(K) 6.2.16 (=BĀU(M) 6.1.9) and another in the ChU 5.10.3–10, the BĀU version explains the path of descent from the world of the moon, which is considered as heaven, by simply enumerating the transit points: the space (*ākāśa*); the wind; the rain; the earth; food (that is, edible plant); man; and woman. In contrast, the ChU adds more detailed information, including the types of edible plant on the earth, the difficulty of the transit from edible plant to male animal, and the various wombs in which one is finally born. According to ChU 5.10.3–4, one who has accumulated the merits of Vedic sacrifice and gift (*iṣṭāpūrta*) is led to the world of the moon after being transformed into *soma* through the funeral fire (ChU 5.4.2). In the world of the moon, the gods eat one's *soma*, and one stays there as long as its residue (*sampāta*) remains, beginning descent when it has vanished (ChU 5.10.5). ChU 5.10.7 adds that one whose behavior (*caraṇa*) in former life was pleasant (*ramaṇīya*) enters into a pleasant womb, namely the womb of a woman of an upper caste. On the contrary, one whose behavior was abhorrent (*kapūya*) enters into an abhorrent womb, namely the womb of a woman of a lower caste or of a female animal. Because the ChU describes the exhaustion of the merits of Vedic sacrifice and gift in heaven as well as the karmic retribution of the next mundane life, there must be a direct cause of one's rebirth. The BS names this cause “attachments” (*anuśaya*) because it adheres to the person who has begun to descend to the earth.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ BSBhŚ 496,12–13. Bhāskara, however, calls Bādari “opponent” in his *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* (BSBhBh) 237,11: *iti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ*. After comparing it with Jaimini's view, Bhāskara asserts Bādarāyaṇa's view as the determined view (*nirṇaya*) in BSBhBh 240,7: *atra dvau pakṣau darśayitvā nirṇayārtham āha*. Cf. Nakamura 1951: 360.

⁷⁰ BS 3.1.8: *kṛtātyaye 'nuśayavān dṛṣṭasmṛtibhyāṃ yathetam anevaṃ ca*. “According to the Veda and recollected scriptures, when [one's *iṣṭāpūrta*] is exhausted, [one begins to descend] with attachments in the same way as one ascended, but in reverse order.” Kanakura (1984: 164, n. 1) considers this word “*anuśaya*” to be borrowed from Buddhism. As a synonym of “*kleśa*” (affliction), the Buddhist term “*anuśaya*” expresses a variety of the defiled states of one's mind that tenaciously remain until one is liberated. For “*anuśaya*” in Buddhist Abhidharma, see Mitomo 1973. It is possible that Kumārila

Concerning what is this *anuśaya*, Kārṣṇājini distinguishes “attachments” from the effects of one’s behavior in everyday life, stating that the word “behavior” (*caraṇa*) in ChU 5.10.7 alludes (*upalakṣaṇa*) to the existence of the “attachments.”⁷¹ *Upalakṣaṇa* is the ability of a word to secondarily indicate something relevant to its own meaning.⁷² The word “behavior” (*caraṇa*) is synonymous with other words that refer to one’s everyday conduct and habit such as *cāritra*, *ācāra*, and *śīla*.⁷³ “Attachments” (*anuśaya*) are the enduring (*avaśiṣṭa*) merits of religious activities such as murmuring prayers (*japa*), domestic offerings (*homa*), gifts (*dāna*) etc. which, according to Kārṣṇājini, unlike the merits of the Vedic sacrifice, are destined to bear fruit for the next life in this world (*aihi-kaphala*).⁷⁴ Kārṣṇājini does not state that good behavior in everyday life is of no use, but rather regards it as a prerequisite (*apekṣa*) for accumulating merits by religious activities.⁷⁵

In contrast, Bādari does not distinguish the “attachments” from the lasting effects of one’s everyday behavior,⁷⁶ arguing that the “behavior” (*caraṇa*) which determines one’s next birth in this world refers to nothing other than one’s good deeds and bad deeds (*sukṛtaduṣkṛte eva*) in the present life without alluding (*upalakṣaṇa*) to religious activities.⁷⁷ He accepts that only one’s Vedic *iṣṭāpūrta*

applied the idea of the Vedāntic *anuśaya*, which is positively imagined in contrast to the Buddhist *anuśaya*, into his theory of the temporal *apūrva*.

⁷¹ BS 3.1.9: *caraṇād iti cen nopalakṣaṇārtheti kārṣṇājiniḥ*. “If it is objected that [one does not descend on account of attachments, but descends] on account of behavior, Kārṣṇājini disagrees, asserting that [with the word ‘behavior’ (*caraṇa*)] this (*śruti* in ChU 5.10.7)* alludes to [attachments (*anuśaya*)].” *Śaṅkara regards *caraṇād-yony-āpatti-śruti* (BSBhŚ 334,26), shortly, *caraṇaśruti* (BSBhŚ 335,1), to be the subject of this *iti*-sentence.

⁷² Cf. Abhyankar 1977: 87.

⁷³ BSBhŚ 334,21–22: *anyac caraṇam anyo ’nuśayaḥ. caraṇaṃ cāritram ācāraḥ śīlam ity anarthāntaram*; BSBhBh 155,18: *nanu “ramaṇīyacaraṇa” iti caraṇaṃ śīlam ācāra ity anarthāntaram*.

⁷⁴ BSBhBh 155,6–7: *avaśiṣṭenaihi-kaphalena japahomadānādināvarohantīti*.

⁷⁵ BS 3.1.10: *ānarthakyam iti cen na tadapekṣatvāt*. “If it is objected that [the word ‘behavior’ (*caraṇa*) in ChU 5.10.7] would be of no use [if the attachments are distinguished from behavior], we disagree, because [the attachments] depend on it (i.e., pleasant behavior).”

⁷⁶ Cf. *Nyāyanirṇaya* (NN), Ānandagiri’s commentary on the BSBhŚ, 610,28: *lakṣaṇāyām nimittābhāvāc caraṇaśabdo ’nuśaye mukhya iti*. “Because there is no need to apply secondary indication, the word ‘behavior’ [in ChU 5.10.7] refers to the attachments as its main meaning.”

⁷⁷ BS 3.1.11: *sukṛtaduṣkṛte eveti tu bādariḥ*. “Bādari, however, is of the opinion that [the behavior that brings about attachments is] nothing other than good deeds and bad deeds;” BSBhŚ 335,18: *caraṇam anuṣṭhānaṃ karmety anarthāntaram*; BSBhBh 155,28: *caryata iti caraṇaṃ karma. ... tuśabda upalakṣaṇārthanivṛttyarthatḥ*.

can make one remain in heaven for a limited period, but does not differentiate between the Vedic sacrifice and one's good deeds in everyday life in terms of bearing a pleasant fruit sooner or later. On the contrary, one who has indulged in bad behavior in one's previous life will surely be born to an abhorrent womb in one's next mundane life, even if one could enjoy a limited stay in heaven owing to the merits of the Vedic sacrifices one hosted with honorarium (*dakṣiṇā*). Bādari may have inherited this emphasis on ethics from Yājñavalkya's teaching of *karman* to Ārtabhāga, a teaching that was, in his time, thought to be so radically underestimating the Vedic sacrifice that he had to teach it privately outside the assembly hall of king Janaka, which was filled with many specialists of the Vedic sacrifice.⁷⁸

2.4. The need for reappraisal of Bādari's view of practice

Although the *sūtras* that record Bādari's views in the MmS and the BS have been collected in the works of several modern scholars,⁷⁹ none has appraised Bādari in the history of Mīmāṃsā except for K.S. Ramaswami Sastri, whose judgment, it must be noted, is inappropriate and biased. He focuses on the controversy between Bādari and Jaimini in MmS 3.1.3–6, which addresses the subsidiarity of sacrificial elements. On the basis of MmS 3.1.3 and Śabaravāmin's corresponding commentary, Ramaswami Sastri insists that Bādari regards human beings as the “functionaries” of the Veda who are supposed to enact the Vedic injunction without any idea of the reward.⁸⁰ Furthermore, resulting from his interpretation that Bādari holds that human beings perform actions solely under the external compulsion of the Veda, Ramaswami Sastri insists that Bādari denies karmic retribution in BS 3.1.11.⁸¹

⁷⁸ BĀU(K) 3.2.13=BĀU(M) 3.2.14: *tau hotkramya mantrayāmcakrāte* (BĀU(M): -*ca-kratuḥ*). *tau ha yad ūcatuḥ karma haiva tad ūcatuḥ. atha yat praśaśamsatuḥ karma haiva tat praśaśamsatuḥ. puṇyo vai puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati pāpaḥ pāpeneti*. “So they left and talked about it. And what did they talk about? – they talked about nothing but action. And what did they praise? – they praised nothing but action. Yājñavalkya told him: ‘A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action’” (trans. Olivelle 1998: 81).

⁷⁹ Nilakantha Sastri 1921: 174; Chintamani 1938: 9–10; Mishra 1964: 7; Kane 1960: 133; Nakamura 1951: 27–32; 1983: 386–390; Parpola 1981: 156.

⁸⁰ Ramaswami Sastri 1956: xxi, xxiii, xxv, xlii; 1964: 97.

⁸¹ “Bādari does not consider that those who do good or bad actions come to get good or evil births in future, for the actions are not stated as the direct cause to those births. Perhaps he means that there is some other agent who produces the future results. Bādari does not also believe in the theory that the momentary actions performed long before the result obtained either in this or the next birth under the different circumstances can be taken

This assessment of Bādari as a rigorous theocrat who is convinced that human beings are the slaves of the Veda must be reconsidered. According to Śābarasvāmin, Bādari does not deny that fixed (*nitya*) sacrifices bring heaven to the sacrificer, but states that the Vedic injunction does not determine whether heaven is exclusively possessed by the sacrificer or by someone else (*nātmanaḥ parasya veti*).⁸² Śābarasvāmin's explanation allows the interpretation that Bādari warns us not to confuse the fixed sacrifices with facultative (*kāmya*) sacrifices, because the latter are held for the purpose of pursuing one's own worldly profits. Bādari may have viewed the holding of a fixed sacrifice as a way of contributing to public welfare in the same way that ethically good behavior is altruistic; this parallel gives a rationale for Bādari's view that good deeds in everyday life enable one to be born in a pleasant womb in the next mundane life. There is no evidence that favors Ramaswami Sastri's claim that Bādari, conforming with materialists, denies karmic retribution in BS 3.1.11.

Ramaswami Sastri assesses Bādari as a rigorous theocrat in order to undermine the Prābhākara school in favor of the Bhāṭṭa school.⁸³ He asserts that Śābarasvāmin and Kumārila follow Jaimini whereas Prabhākara opposes Jaimini and follows Bādari.⁸⁴ However, this is nothing other than an anachronistic projection of the factional conflict between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara from medieval times into ancient times, because Prabhākara never criticizes Śābarasvāmin, but instead repeatedly criticizes Bādari in his *Bṛhatī*, appealing to readers not to confuse his theory of *niyoga* with Bādari's view of practice.⁸⁵

to be the cause of those results" (Ramaswami Sastri 1964: 100). Moreover, Ramaswami Sastri (1956: xvi; 1964: 98) assesses Bādari's affirmation of Sūdras' eligibility for the Vedic sacrifice recorded in MmS 6.1.27 merely as "extra-ordinary" without considering its background.

⁸² See nn. 39 and 40.

⁸³ "Prabhākara, later on, has established the same old view (i.e., Bādari's view, KY) against the school of Jaimini, in his two commentaries on the Bhāṣya of Śābara. A great confusion has thus been created by Prabhākara in the minds of the readers of the Bhāṣya on each topic of the *Tarkapāda*" (Ramaswami Sastri 1956: xxv).

⁸⁴ Ramaswami Sastri 1956: xvi–xxv; 1964: 99. Kataoka (2011: 19–20) "basically" agrees with Ramaswami Sastri's anachronistic demarcation of Mīmāṃsā scholars into two lineages, the followers of Bādari (Prābhākara School) and the followers of Jaimini (Bhāṭṭa School), reproducing the table of this pair of lineages (Ramaswami Sastri 1956: xxv) with his own chronological dates of scholars. Kataoka (2011: 17–19) accepts that Ramaswami Sastri simplistically labels the former "conservative" and the latter "re-formative." In fact, Bādari was radically reformatory in Indian hierarchical society.

⁸⁵ Cf. Yoshimizu 1994; Yoshimizu 1997: "Bādari" in Index; Yoshimizu 2015: n. 6. A. Subrahmanya Sastri (1961: 8–10) rejects the explanations Ramaswami Sastri uses in support of his claim that Prabhākara follows Bādari. In addition, Prabhākara joins

3. Bādarāyaṇa and the *Brahmasūtra*

3.1. Rejection of Bādarāyaṇa's view in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* due to his affinity to the White Yajurveda

In all probability, Bādarāyaṇa belongs to the Hiranyakeśin school of the Taittirīya śākhā.⁸⁶ Regarding the MmS, Kane (1960: 128–129) identifies five sections recording Bādarāyaṇa's views on Mīmāṃsā topics. The *sūtras* that refer to his views are MmS 1.1.5, 5.2.19, 6.1.8, 10.8.44, and 11.1.65. Briefly summarizing the discussions of these sections, Kane points out that in most of them the proponent agrees with Bādarāyaṇa. For example, MmS 1.1.5 agrees with Bādarāyaṇa's view (*bādarāyaṇasya*) that a word is related to its meaning by its intrinsic nature (*autpattika*); the *sūtra* also agrees that the Vedic statement (*upadeśa*) on an imperceptible (*anupalabdha*) object is a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) to invariably (*avyatireka*) understand the said object by virtue of semantic relation without external dependence (*anapekṣatva*).⁸⁷ Furthermore, MmS 6.1.6–15 addresses women's right to take part in the Vedic sacrifice. Aitiśāyana insists that only men are eligible to hold a sacrifice because the words that designate the sacrificer in Vedic injunctions, such as “one who desires heaven” (*svargakāmaḥ*), have a specific gender (*liṅgaviśeṣa*), that is, the masculine gender.⁸⁸ Bādarāyaṇa disagrees, asserting that women are eligible to partake in the Vedic sacrifice

Śabarāsvāmin in excluding Śūdras from the Vedic sacrifice. See *Bṛhatī* (Bṛh) 73.6–7: *tathā ca darśayati yady api nimittārthāny ādhānaśravaṇāni tathāpy anadhikārah śūdrasyeti*. “And in this way, [the proponent] shows that even if the Vedic statement of the establishment [of the fires] aims at prescribing the occasion [for the upper three classes], a Śūdra does not have the eligibility [for the establishment of the fires].”

⁸⁶ Parpola (1981: 168–170) notes that Bādarāyaṇa and Ātreya are quoted side by side in HŚS 16.7.23 (pt. 6, p. 389), 22.4.20 (pt. 9, p. 780), *Hiranyakeśigr̥hyasūtra* (HGS) 1.25.3–4, and that in all of these references Bādarāyaṇa appears as the proponent. According to the genealogy given in *Sāmavidhānabrāhmaṇa* (SVidhB) 3.9.8, Jaimini is a disciple of Vyāsa Pārāśarya, Pauspiṇḍya Pārāśaryaṇa is a disciple of Jaimini, and Bādarāyaṇa is a disciple of Pārāśaryaṇa (cf. Weber 1892: 240, n. 254; Nilakantha Sastri 1921: 173). However, it is unreliable that Bādarāyaṇa is a disciple of Jaimini's disciple and therefore a Sāmavedin, because this genealogy gives the chronologically implausible statement that Bādarāyaṇa is the teacher of Tāṇḍin and Śāṭyāyanin (cf. Weber 1892: 243, n. 259), the compilers of the *Pañcaviṃśabrāhmaṇa* (alias *Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa*) and the *Śāṭyāyaṇabrāhmaṇa* (cf. Gonda 1975: 349) respectively. For the intricate formation of the SVidhB, see Caland 1907: 35.

⁸⁷ MmS 1.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya jñānam upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe 'nupalabdhe, tat pramāṇam bādarāyaṇasya, anapekṣatvāt*. Cf. n. 106.

⁸⁸ MmS 6.1.6: *liṅgaviśeṣanirdeśāt puṇyuktam aitiśāyanaḥ*.

because words such as “*svargakāma*” refer to the generic property (*jāti*) of human beings, and the grammatical gender of the word “*svargakāma*” is irrelevant to whether the eligibility (*adhikāra*) pertains to a man or a woman.⁸⁹ After further discussion, the proponent of this section adopts Bādarāyaṇa’s view. In MmS 5.2.19 (on the temporal order between two offerings, opposing to Ātreya’s view in 5.2.18) and in MmS 11.1.65 (on the subsidiary rituals to be performed only once for all [*tantra*]), Bādarāyaṇa’s views are also supported by the proponent of each section.

In MmS 10.8.35–46 (section 14), however, Bādarāyaṇa’s position (10.8.44) appears at the end of the views of several opponents, and is immediately refuted by the proponent of this section (10.8.45–46). This section addresses how to interpret the following statement about the oblations to be offered at the new moon sacrifice: *puroḍaśābhyām evāsomayājinaṃ yājayet, yāv etāv āgneyaś caindrāgnaś ca*, “One should let [the sacrificer] who has not held a *soma* sacrifice offer only these two (*yāv etau*) cakes (*puroḍaśas*) [at the new moon sacrifice], one to Agni and the other to Indra-Agni.”⁹⁰ The offering of *sāmnāyya* is not included in this statement.

At the beginning of his commentary, Śābarasvāmin lists six alternative views. The statement in question is either: (A) a supplementation (*vākyaśeṣa*) of the eligibility (*adhikāra*) for the new moon sacrifice; (B) an injunction of two offerings to be added to the new moon sacrifice; (C) an injunction of a subsidiary detail that a priest (*ṛtvij*) should have these two oblations offered; (D) an injunction that lays down the time (*kāla*) for these two offerings, namely, before holding a *soma* sacrifice; (E) a reiteration (*anuvāda*) of the offering of a cake to Agni and an injunction (*vidhi*) of the offering of another cake to Indra-Agni; or (F) a reiteration of the offering of a cake to Agni and the other cake to Indra-Agni.⁹¹

Of these six views, the first four (A to D) are each rejected by the advocate of the following view (B to E) in MmS 10.8.35–43.⁹² (E) is rejected by MmS

⁸⁹ MmS 6.1.8: *jātim tu bādarāyaṇo ’viśeṣāt, tasmāt stry api pratīyeta jāt्यarthasyāviśiṣṭatvāt*.

⁹⁰ This *viśayavākya* may have been assumed to be a *śruti* among Mīmāṃsakas, in accordance with the following Śrautasūtras of the Black Yajurveda. ĀpŚS 24.2.32: *āgneyo ’ṣṭākāpāla aindrāgna ekādaśakapālo dvādaśakapālo vāmāvāsyāyām asomayājinaḥ*; 32: *sāmnāyyaṃ dvitīyaṃ somayājinaḥ*; HŚS 1.1.3 (pt. 1, pp. 59–60): *āgneyo ’ṣṭākāpāla aindrāgna ekādaśakapālo dvādaśakapālo vāmāvāsyāyām asaṃnayata, āgneyaḥ sāmnāyyaṃ ca saṃnayataḥ*; Vārāhaśrautasūtra (VārŚS) 1.1.1.57: *ubhayatrāgneyaḥ puroḍaśaḥ. agnīṣomīyo dvitīyaḥ paurṇamāsyām aindrāgno ’māvāsyāyām asaṃnayataḥ*; 58: *sāmnāyyena samānadevataḥ*; 59: *saṃnayata aindraṃ sāmnāyyaṃ mātendram vā*.

⁹¹ ŚBh 2082.6–12.

⁹² (A) is rejected because the new and full moon sacrifices are fixed (*nitya*) sacrifices

10.8.44,⁹³ which records Bādarāyaṇa's view that the statement in question prescribes the time for these two offerings. According to Śabarasaṁvāmin, in contrast to (D), which makes it compulsory to offer another cake to Indra-Agni after having offered a cake to Agni when the sacrificer has not held a *soma* sacrifice yet,⁹⁴ Bādarāyaṇa permits such a person to offer *sāmnāyya* instead of another cake for Indra-Agni on the basis of a certain *śruti* “*tad u saṁnayet*.”⁹⁵ Accordingly, Bādarāyaṇa is thought to have maintained that after having offered a cake to Agni at the new moon sacrifice, one can choose (*vikalpa*) the offering of another cake to Indra-Agni or the offering of *sāmnāyya* before holding a *soma* sacrifice, whereas thereafter one should make the offering of *sāmnāyya*.⁹⁶ However,

to be held throughout one's life (*yāvajjīvam*), and therefore eligibility cannot be subject to change according to whether the sacrificer has already held a *soma* sacrifice (ŚBh 2083,7–13 on 10.8.36). (B) is rejected because the expression “these two” (*yāv etau*) indicates (*lakṣaṇā*) the existence of a related Vedic statement (*vyapekṣāvacana*) that prescribes the offering of a cake to Agni as well as another cake to Indra-Agni (ŚBh 2084,13–14 on 10.8.39). (C) is rejected because a priest's action is implied (*upagraha*) by the instruction of the sacrificer's action, because the former does not have its own result and is therefore a subsidiary of the latter. (ŚBh 2084,20–23 on 10.8.40). (D) is rejected because there is no uncertainty (*anāśaṅkita*) about the time for these offerings, considering that the prohibition “one who has not held a *soma* sacrifice should not make the offering of *sāmnāyya*” (*nāsomayājī saṁnayet*) has already clarified the difference in time (*vibhaktakāla*) between the offering of a cake to Indra-Agni and that of *sāmnāyya* (ŚBh 2085,14–22 on 10.8.42).

⁹³ MmS 10.8.44: *vidhiṁ tu bādarāyaṇaḥ*. “Bādarāyaṇa, however, [interprets the statement] as an injunction [of time].” (E) is rejected because it does not stand to reason that the same statement has two different functions, namely reiteration and injunction (ŚBh 2086,9–10 on 10.8.44).

⁹⁴ ŚBh 2085,9–11 (on 10.8.41): *śakyate cāsomayāgena viśeṣaliṅgena kālo lakṣayitum. tasmīn kāle puroḍāśābhyām eva yajeta, na sāmnāyyeneti*. “The time [for the offering of a cake to Indra-Agni] can be specified by [the word in this statement] ‘one who has not held a *soma* sacrifice’ (*asomayājinaṁ*), which works as a distinguishing mark indicating that at this time one should hold the [new moon] sacrifice by two cakes, not by *sāmnāyya*.”

⁹⁵ ŚBh 2086,10–14: *bādarāyaṇa ācāryo manyate sma, prāg api somayāgāt sāmnāyyaavidhir iti. asomayājino 'pi sāmnāyyaṁ śrūyate, tad u saṁnayed iti. tathā, tatheha smāhur gopāyaṇaḥ sāmnāyyaṁ evāsomayājinaḥ. tasmāt kālārthaḥ saṁyoga iti*. “The teacher Bādarāyaṇa is said to hold the opinion that there is an injunction instructing one to offer *sāmnāyya* even before one holds a *soma* sacrifice. In the *śruti* ‘*tad u saṁnayet*,’ it is stated that [the offering of] *sāmnāyya* is permitted even to one who has not held a *soma* sacrifice. Similarly, here (i.e., in the Black Yajurveda schools), Gopāyaṇas stated that one who has not held a *soma* sacrifice offers only *sāmnāyya*. Therefore, [the phrase ‘two cakes’] is connected [with ‘one who has not held a *soma* sacrifice’] for the sake of [indicating] time.”

⁹⁶ *Śāstradīpikā* (ŚD) 484,16–485,1: *tanniyamāc ca prāk somād aindrāgnasān(sic)nāyye*

this view is immediately refuted by MmS 10.8.45,⁹⁷ in which the proponent declares that the statement at issue informs those who have not held a *soma* sacrifice that they are prohibited (*pratiṣiddha*) to offer *sāmnāyya* at the new moon sacrifice. The proponent advocates view (F) analyzing this statement: in addition to this prohibition, the statement at issue merely reiterates the two cake-offerings that have already been laid down, one for Agni and the other for Indra-Agni, because this statement is subordinate to the injunction that follows it: “[one should let the sacrificer] who has held a *soma* sacrifice offer *sāmnāyya*” (*sāmnāyyena somayājinaṃ*).⁹⁸

The debates in this section may have arisen among the scholars of the Taittirīya *śākhā*; despite various interpretations of the statement from (A) to (F), it is commonly believed that only those who have held a *soma* sacrifice are permitted to offer *sāmnāyya* at the new moon sacrifice. The prohibition quoted by the advocate of (E) to refute (D), “one who has not held a *soma* sacrifice should not make the offering of *sāmnāyya*” (*nāsomayājī saṃnāyeta*), corresponds to a part of TS 2.5.5.1 “*nāsomayājī saṃnāyeta*,”⁹⁹ and the injunction quoted by the proponent “*sāmnāyyena somayājinaṃ*” corresponds to another part of the same “*somayāgy evā saṃnāyeta*.”¹⁰⁰ However, as previously argued, the Vājasaneyin school permits those who have not held a *soma* sacrifice for economic reasons to offer *sāmnāyya* at the new moon sacrifice. Thus, it is likely that Bādarāyaṇa’s view is influenced by the Vājasaneyin because the injunction he quotes, “*tad u*

vikalpyate. paścāt tu sām(sic)nāyyam eva bhavātīti yuktaḥ kālavidhiḥ. “Furthermore, because of the restriction of that (i.e., the time for the offering of a cake to Indra-Agni), whether the cake for Indra-Agni or *sāmnāyya* is offered [at the new moon sacrifice] is facultative; but after [one has held a *soma* sacrifice], only *sāmnāyya* is offered. Therefore, it is reasonable [to consider this statement] as an injunction of time.”

⁹⁷ MmS 10.8.45: *pratiṣiddhavijñānād vā.*

⁹⁸ ŚBh 2086,18–19: *ubhayor anuvādaḥ. katham. somayājinaḥ sāmnāyyavidhānārtham etad vākyam. ato naindrāgnasyāpi vidhiḥ. bhidyate hi tadā vākyam* “[The statement in question] reiterates both [the offering of a cake to Agni and that of the other cake to Indra-Agni*]. Why? Because this statement is given for the sake of another statement that enjoins one who has held a *soma* sacrifice to offer *sāmnāyya*. Therefore, [this statement] does not prescribe even the offering of a cake to Indra-Agni, because if this were the case the statement would become split;” ŚBh 2086,21–23: “*puroḍāśābhyām evāsomayājinaṃ yājayet, yāv etāv āgneyaś caindrāgnaś ca, sāmnāyyena somayājinaṃ*” *iti, evam ekena vākyena somayājinaḥ sāmnāyyam vidhīyate.* * For the *śruti*-sources of the cake for Agni and the cake for Indra-Agni, see Nishimura 2016: 239–240, Table 5.

⁹⁹ See nn. 92 and 56.

¹⁰⁰ See nn. 98 and 56.

saṃnāyeta,” corresponds to a part of ŚB 1.6.4.10: “*tād ú sām evā nayeta*.”¹⁰¹ However, Bādarāyaṇa’s view was not accepted by other Mīmāṃsakas of the Taittirīya śākhā. This may be because the Taittirīya school officially made the offering of *sāmnāyā* at the new moon sacrifice a monthly discernible symbol of a higher social status achieved by a sacrificer who has already held a *soma* sacrifice.

3.2. Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa in the *Brahmasūtra*

In the BS, Bādarāyaṇa is the second most frequently mentioned scholar after Jaimini: Bādarāyaṇa is mentioned nine times and Jaimini eleven.¹⁰² The following table shows the names of the sections that record the views of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, given in the *adhikaraṇānukrama* of the BSBhŚ (Works of Śaṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit). The numbers of the sections are in parentheses.

name of sections	Jaimini	Bādarāyaṇa	others
BS 1.2.(7) <i>vaiśvānarādhikaraṇa</i>	1.2.28 & 31		29 Āśmarathya, 30 Bādari
BS 1.3.(8) <i>devatādhikaraṇa</i>	1.3.31	1.3.26 & 33	
BS 1.4.(5) <i>bālākyadhikaraṇa</i>	1.4.18		
BS 3.2.(7) <i>phalādhikaraṇa</i>	3.2.40	3.2.41	
BS 3.4.(1) <i>puruṣārthādhikaraṇa</i>	3.4.2	3.4.1 & 8	
BS 3.4.(2) <i>parāmarṣādhikaraṇa</i>	3.4.18	3.4.19	
BS 3.4.(10) <i>tadbhūtādhikaraṇa</i>	3.4.40		
BS 4.3.(5) <i>kāryādhikaraṇa</i>	4.3.12	4.3.15	7 Bādari
BS 4.4.(3) <i>brāhmādhikaraṇa</i>	4.4.5	4.4.7	6 Auḍulomi
BS 4.4.(5) <i>abhāvādhikaraṇa</i>	4.4.11	4.4.12	10 Bādari

Table 2. Sections that record the views of Jaimini, Bādarāyaṇa, and others in the BS.

Aside from BS 1.3.26 and 3.4.1, which are both beginnings of sections, Bādarāyaṇa consistently appears following a *sūtra* which presents the view of Jaimini. Considering this general order of appearance, it is clear that the BS gives priority to Bādarāyaṇa’s views over Jaimini’s.¹⁰³ For example, BS 1.3.26–33 debates whether

¹⁰¹ See nn. 95 and 57.

¹⁰² Cf. Nilakantha Sastri 1921: 174; Kane 1960: 126–127; Parpola 1981: 156.

¹⁰³ In BS 1.2.24–32, however, among the views of Āśmarathya, Bādari, and Jaimini on the relation of the *vaiśvānara-ātman* within one’s body (ChU 5.18) to the supreme *brahman*, priority is given to Jaimini, who identifies both (BS 1.2.28) on the grounds of the correspondence (*saṃpatti*) between the microcosm and the macrocosm (BS 1.2.31). Moreover, Jaimini’s views in BS 1.4.18 and 3.4.40 are accepted by the proponent of each section.

deities (*devatās*) are eligible to perform Upaniṣadic meditation. Referring to ChU 1.3 on *madhvidyā*, the meditative reverence (*upāsana*) towards the sun as a mass of honey (*madhu*), Jaimini maintains that it is impossible for the Sun as a deity to perform *madhvidyā* because it cannot revere itself.¹⁰⁴ Bādarāyaṇa counters that deities have the eligibility for Upaniṣadic meditation, and that it is possible even for the Sun as a deity to meditate on *brahman* alone, regardless of the fact that it cannot revere itself.¹⁰⁵ Bādarāyaṇa's flexible view on the eligibility for Upaniṣadic meditation is adopted and declared as the proponent's view at the beginning of this section.¹⁰⁶

Moreover, BS 3.2.38–41 discusses the question of who or what determines karmic retribution. Jaimini states that it is *dharma*, the Vedic norms to be observed by qualified persons, whereas Bādarāyaṇa asserts that it is God (*īśvara*) who rewards or punishes one for one's own *karman*.¹⁰⁷ Again, Bādarāyaṇa's theistic view is adopted and declared at the beginning of this section with the “*ataḥ*” that refers to God.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ BS 1.3.31: *madhvādiṣv asaṃbhavād anadhikāraṃ jaiminiḥ*; BSBhŚ 131,13–15: “*asau vā ādityo devamadhu*” (ChU 3.1.1) *ity atra manuṣyā ādityaṃ madhvadyāsenopāsīran. devādiṣu hy upāsakeṣv abhyupagamyamāneṣv ādityaḥ kam anyam ādityam upāsīta*. “With regard to the passage ‘the sun is indeed the honey of gods,’ it is human beings who are to revere the sun by projecting honey on it; if deities are seen as reverent meditators, which other sun would the Sun revere?”

¹⁰⁵ BS 1.3.33: *bhāvaṃ tu bādarāyaṇo 'sti hi* “Bādarāyaṇa, however, [maintains that even deities] have [the eligibility for the knowledge of *brahman*] because there is [a corroborating passage in the Upaniṣad];” BSBhŚ 133,3–4: *yady api madhvādividyāsu devatādivyāmīśrāsv asaṃbhavo 'dhikārasya tathāpy asti hi śuddhāyām brahmavidyāyām saṃbhavaḥ* “Even if [deities] cannot have the eligibility for meditations such as *madhvidyā* in which the deities themselves are integrated, they are eligible for the pure knowledge of *brahman*.”

¹⁰⁶ BS 1.3.26: *tadupary api bādarāyaṇaḥ saṃbhavāt*. “According to Bādarāyaṇa, even super-human beings [i.e., deities, have the eligibility for the knowledge of *brahman*] because it is possible [for them].” Kane (1960: 129) maintains that MmS 1.1.5, which asserts the invariable relation of a word with its meaning as the opinion of Bādarāyaṇa (see n. 87), corresponds to BS 1.3.28–29, which asserts the invariable relation of gods with their names in spite of their possession of bodies (*vigrahas*). Kane takes this as a reason to identify the Bādarāyaṇa in the BS as the Bādarāyaṇa in the MmS.

¹⁰⁷ BS 3.2.40: *dharmaṃ jaiminir ata* eva*; 41: *pūrvam** tu bādarāyaṇo hetuvyapadeśāt*. * This “*ataḥ*” refers to *upapatti* and *śruti* (cf. BS 3.2.38–39). ** “*pūrvam*” refers to the *īśvara* indicated in 3.2.38 by “*ataḥ*.”

¹⁰⁸ BS 3.2.38: *phalam ata upapatteḥ*; 39: *śrutatvāc* ca*.

* Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja unanimously allude to BĀU(K) 4.4.24, which qualifies *ātman* as “giver of wealth” (*vasudānaḥ*).

However, there is a noteworthy exception; regarding the main topic of BS 3.4, the way of life for liberation, the author of the BS takes a stance closer to Jaimini's. As a forerunner of the theory of practice "the combination of knowledge and action" (*jñānakarmasamuccaya*), Jaimini is supported in this instance rather than Bādarāyaṇa, who explicitly approves of the life of ascetic (*ūrdhvaretas*).

Nakamura (1983: 423) notes that in BS 3.4 Bādarāyaṇa highly regards the ascetic life, whereas the Sūtra-author recommends that one who is meditating on *brahman* should keep holding sacrifices as a householder. The difference of opinion between Bādarāyaṇa and the Sūtra-author is most distinct in BS 3.4.25–26.

The first section (BS 3.4.1–17) begins with Bādarāyaṇa's statement that the words (*śabda*) of the Upaniṣad affirm that liberation, referred to here as "the purpose of a human being" (*puruṣārtha*), is attained through the knowledge of self (*ātman*).¹⁰⁹ This is followed by Jaimini's statement that the knowledge of an individual person (*puruṣa*) who works as the agent of action¹¹⁰ is no more than a subordinate (*śeṣa*) to action.¹¹¹ In BS 3.4.3–7, Jaimini's statement is reinforced by the exegetical arguments that liberation is brought about predominantly by action whereas knowledge merely aids action. Next, in BS 3.4.8, Bādarāyaṇa

¹⁰⁹ BS 3.4.1: *puruṣārtho 'taḥ śabdād iti bādarāyaṇaḥ*.

Olivelle (2019) discusses that within the context of *trivarga*, the term "*puruṣārtha*" was originally, like the Mīmāṃsā term "*puruṣārtha*" contrasted with "*kratvartha*," used as a Bahuvrīhi compound that means the human activity beneficial for a human being, not a Tatpuruṣa that would mean the aim or goal of a human being. In BS 3.4.1, however, "*puruṣārtha*" is used as a substantive noun ending in the masculine. Śaṅkara takes it as a substantive saying "*puruṣārthaḥ sidhyati*" (BSBhŚ 433,8). He also predicates "*aupanīṣadam ātmajñānam*" to be the "means (*sādhana*) of *puruṣārtha*" (BSBhŚ 433,6), and "*kevalā vidyā*" to be the "cause (*hetu*) of *puruṣārtha*" (BSBhŚ 433,17). Bhāskara also takes this "*puruṣārtha*" as the purpose of a human being by paraphrasing it as "*puruṣasya prayojanaṁ brahmaprāptiḥ*" (BSBhBh 2014). BS 3.4.1 alludes to the human activity that brings about this *puruṣārtha* by "*ataḥ*," which Śaṅkara construes as referring to *ātmajñāna*, and Bhāskara as *brahmaprāptiḥ* (BSBhŚ 433,7; BSBhBh 2014).

¹¹⁰ BSBhŚ 433,20: *kartṛtvenātmanaḥ*; BSBhBh 201,21: *kartur ātmanaḥ*.

¹¹¹ BS 3.4.2: *śeṣatvāt puruṣārthavādo yathānyeṣv* iti jaiminiḥ*. "Jaimini opines that [the said Upaniṣadic words] are explanatory passages (*arthavāda*) about an individual person (*puruṣa*) because [the knowledge of *ātman* as an individual person] is subordinate [to action], as in other cases." *According to Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja, "*anyeṣu*" refers to the Mīmāṃsā way of interpreting a statement as an *arthavāda* if it explains the result of applying a subsidiary element (i.e., material, its quality, and preparatory action, cf. MmS 4.3.1–3).

rejects Jaimini's view because of existing Upaniṣadic statements about the self that is surpassing (*adhika*) the self in a body (*śārīra*), namely God (*īśvara*).¹¹² He argues that the knowledge of this surpassing self is not related to the actions of human beings.¹¹³ Thereafter, the arguments in BS 3.4.3–7 are each refuted in BS 3.4.9–17 in accordance with the views of Bādarāyaṇa.

In the second section (BS 3.4.18–19), as noted by Nakamura (1983: 423), BS 3.4.18 presents Jaimini's view that descriptions of ascetic life in scriptures are not injunction and therefore not to be followed; BS 3.4.19 refutes 3.4.18, presenting Bādarāyaṇa's view that ascetic and householder are equally evaluated in the Upaniṣad.¹¹⁴ Later, BS 3.4.25 exempts an ascetic from the householder's duties such as the holding of Vedic sacrifices for "this very reason" (*ata eva*),¹¹⁵ which refers to Bādarāyaṇa's view supported in preceding sections 1 and 2. However, this exemption is nullified by the next *sūtra* 3.4.26.

BS 3.4.26: "Nevertheless, one needs all activities [of all life-stages, including the householder's duties, in order to attain liberation securely,] on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifice, etc. [in BĀU(K) 4.4.22: 'by sacrifice, donation, austerity, and fasting' (*yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena*)].¹¹⁶ This is similar to the case in which [one needs] a horse [in order to arrive at a village swiftly and comfortably, granted that one could also arrive there without a horse.]"¹¹⁷ (*sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādiśruter aśvavat*).

¹¹² BSBhŚ 435,18–20: *adhikas tāvac chārīrād ātmano 'saṃsārīśvaraḥ ... paramātmā*.

¹¹³ BSBhBh 202,24–26: *tajjñānasya karmānupayogāt prakaraṇādyabhāvāc ca karmāṅga-tvaṃ kalpayitum aśakyam*. "Because the knowledge of this (self as God) is not contributing to action, and because there is no context [for such a contribution], it is impossible to postulate that [this knowledge] is subsidiary to an action."

¹¹⁴ BS 3.4.18: *parāmarśaṃ jaiminir acodanā cāpavadati hi* "Jaimini [maintains that the statements about ascetic life such as '*tapa eva dvitīyaḥ*' in ChU 2.23.1 are purely for] reference because [these statements have] no words of injunction, and because of the condemnation [of ascetic life in scriptures];" 19: *anuṣṭheyaṃ bādarāyaṇaḥ sāmāśruteḥ* "Bādarāyaṇa maintains that one should lead an ascetic life because of a [corroborating] Upaniṣadic statement of equivalent authority.*"

* Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja unanimously refer to ChU 2.23.1 which concludes "*sarva ete puṇyalokā bhavanti*."

¹¹⁵ BS 3.4.25: *ata eva cāgnīndhanādyanapekṣā*. "For this very reason, [an ascetic] does not need to kindle the [sacrificial] fire, and so on."

¹¹⁶ Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja unanimously allude to BĀU(K) 4.4.22.

¹¹⁷ Instead of Śaṅkara's, Bhāskara's, and Rāmānuja's interpretations, I follow Maṇḍana-miśra's interpretation of *aśvavat* given in *Brahmasiddhi* (BSi) 37,2–3, which is noted by Kuppuswami Sastri (1937: xxxiv, n. 61).

According to BS 3.4.26, if those who wish for liberation periodically hold fixed (*nitya*) sacrifices, they can attain liberation more assuredly than can ascetics, although it must be noted that holding sacrifices requires expenditure. Sacrifices cooperate (*sahakārin*) with the soteriological knowledge (BS 3.4.33), and make one's resolve invincible (*anabhibhava*) (BS 3.4.35). Furthermore, the fixed sacrifices, if periodically held, contribute towards attaining final liberation even for one who has realized *brahman* (BS 4.1.16). Accordingly, despite his agreement with Bādarāyaṇa that liberation results from the knowledge of one's self (*ātman*) as *brahman*, the Sūtra-author's opinion regarding the way of life is closer to Jaimini's than Bādarāyaṇa's, because the lifestyle of an ascetic without sacrificial fires is incompatible with that of a householder who keeps his sacrificial fires. Although the proponent does not reject Bādarāyaṇa's view, he gives clear priority to Jaimini's.¹¹⁸

Therefore, as in the case of the MmS, it is clear that the compilation of the BS was not carried out by its purported author, Bādarāyaṇa, but by his posterior generation. Why, then, was the BS attributed to Bādarāyaṇa after its compilation?

3.3. Bādarāyaṇa, the conciliator of controversies in the *Brahmasūtra*

In the BS, Bādarāyaṇa shows his unique character: among the scholars who appear in the BS, only he attempts to make the competing views of scholars compatible.¹¹⁹ In the BS, Bādari and Jaimini repeatedly confront each other regarding metaphysics and soteriology, whereas Bādarāyaṇa mediates between them without choosing a side. As argued in section 2.2, BS 4.3.7–16 contemplates the final destination of the “path of the gods” (*devayāna*). According to Bādari (4.3.7), one is led only to the effected (*kārya*) lower *brahman*; according to Jaimini (4.3.12), one is led to the supreme (*para*) *brahman*. In BS 4.3.15,¹²⁰ Bādarāyaṇa concedes that both destinations are possible and neither incorrect (*ubhayathā-adoṣa*), based on the authority of ChU 3.14 in which Śaṇḍilya asserts

¹¹⁸ In BS 3.4.27, the proponent adds a proviso that one who pursues liberation performing the householder's duties should cultivate one's virtues such as calmness (*śama*) and the control (*dama*) over sense-organs on the authority of BĀU(K) 4.4.23=BĀU(M) 4.4.28 (cf. BSBhŚ 446,7–8; BSBhBh 210,29; ŚrBh, pt. 1, 697,14–15).

¹¹⁹ The following three issues are mentioned by Nakamura (1951: 74–76; 1983: 421–423).

¹²⁰ BS 4.3.15: *apratīkālambanān nayatīti bādarāyaṇa ubhayathādoṣāt tatkratuś ca*. “Bādarāyaṇa is of the opinion that [a special *puruṣa* (see n. 62)] leads those who do not resort to symbols (*pratīkas*) [either to the effected *brahman* or to the supreme *brahman*]; there is no fault in either case, and [whether the effected *brahman* or the supreme *brahman* is attained depends on] which (*brahman*) one resolves [to attain].”

that one can attain one's posthumous existence in accordance with the resolve (*kratu*) made in one's present life.¹²¹

In BS 4.4.10,¹²² Bādari asserts that a liberated person has no body and no sense-organs on the authority of ChU 8.12,¹²³ in which Prajāpati teaches Indra that, after having left one's worldly body, one who rejoices in the world of *brahman* (*brahmaloka*) sees objects only by mind. In BS 4.4.11¹²⁴ Jaimini affirms that one has an alternative (*vikalpa*) body and sense organs in liberation on the basis of ChU 7.26.2,¹²⁵ in which Sanatkumāra teaches Nārada that it has been handed down (*smṛta*) that the liberated person takes one of various appearances as single (*ekadā*), threefold (*tridhā*), fivefold (*pañcadhā*), etc. Subsequently, in BS 4.4.12,¹²⁶ Bādarāyaṇa approves of both views on the grounds that they are based on their own Upaniṣadic sources.

Bādarāyaṇa also mediates between Jaimini and Auḍulomi on one issue (4.4.5–7); BS 4.4.5–6 debates how one's *ātman* manifests in liberation. In Jaimini's view, what appears in liberation is *ātman*'s nature that is described in ChU 8.7.1 as many good features of *brahman* (*brāhma*) such as “free from evils” (*apahatapāpman*) and “whose intentions are real” (*satyasankalpa*). According to Auḍulomi,¹²⁷ only the nature of *ātman* itself (*tanmātra*), namely, intelligence (*citi*), appears in liberation as described in BĀU(K) 4.5.13 by Yājñavalkya in such a manner as “the entirety made of wisdom without inside and outside”

¹²¹ ChU 3.14.1: *atha khalu kratumayaḥ puruṣo yathākratur asmiṃ loka puruṣo bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati. sa kratum kurvīta*. “Now, then, man is undoubtedly made of resolve. What a man becomes on departing from here after death is in accordance with his resolve in this world. So he should make this resolve” (trans. Olivelle 1998: 209). However, it is to be noted that in the following Śāṇḍilya calls for one's resolve to become merged with the supreme *brahman*, but says nothing of the lower *brahman*.

¹²² BS 4.4.10: *abhāvaṃ bādariḥ, āha hy evam*.

¹²³ Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja unanimously allude to ChU 8.12. In addition to his view in BS 4.3.7, this point also suggests Bādari's affinity to Yājñavalkya's apophatic theology.

¹²⁴ BS 4.4.11: *bhāvaṃ jaiminir vikalpāmananāt*.

¹²⁵ Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja unanimously allude to ChU 7.26.2.

¹²⁶ BS 4.4.12: *dvādaśāhavad ubhayavidhaṃ bādarāyaṇo 'taḥ* “For this reason [i.e., as there are words of the Upaniṣad that corroborate each view], Bādarāyaṇa is of the opinion that [the liberated person exists] in both ways in the same manner that the Dvādaśāha (twelve-day rite) [can be regarded as an *ahīna*-sacrifice as well as a *sattra*-sacrifice (cf. MmS 8.2.25–29)].”

¹²⁷ Auḍulomi appears in *Bhāradvājapariśiṣṭasūtra* (BhPS) 185 along with Āśmarathya and Ālekhaṇa. See Parpola 1981: 168.

(*anantaro 'bāhyaḥ kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghanaḥ*) without affirmative properties.¹²⁸ Bādarāyaṇa accepts both views in BS 4.4.7.¹²⁹

In each of these three issues, even by making a compromise or a questionable explanation, Bādarāyaṇa accepts two competing opinions on the same topic claiming that they are, in fact, not incongruous. This conciliatory character may have resulted in Bādarāyaṇa's good reputation among the codifying scholars who consented to name the BS after him. The eclectic attitude that resulted in his tendency to conciliate controversies not only reflected his personal character, but also conformed with the keynote view of Vedānta that *brahman* itself transcends all verbal expression.

Concerning the relation of Bādarāyaṇa to Bādari, Kane (1960: 132) notes: “the word Bādarāyaṇa is formed from Badara, which is one of about 76 words in the *Naḍādigāṇa*¹³⁰ according to Pāṇini. The son of Badara may be called Bādari,¹³¹ and Bādarāyaṇa may be Badara's grandson or a remoter male descendant.”¹³² Despite their differences in Vedic affiliation, it is possible that Bādarāyaṇa is

¹²⁸ BS 4.4.5: *brāhmaṇena jaiminir upanyāsādibhyaḥ*; 6: *cititanmātreṇa tadātmakatvād ity auḍulomiḥ*. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja quote Jaimini's source from ChU 8.7.1 and ChU 8.12.3 (*jakṣat krīdan ramamānaḥ*), and Auḍulomi's source from BĀU(K) 4.5.13. Additionally, Śaṅkara alludes to “*tasya sarveṣu lokeṣu kāmācāro bhavati*” (ChU 7.25.2) for Jaimini, and Rāmānuja “*viññānaghana eva*” (BĀU(K) 2.4.12) for Auḍulomi.

¹²⁹ BS 4.4.7: *evam apy upanyāsāt pūrvabhāvād avirodhaṃ bādarāyaṇaḥ* “Even admitting thus (i.e., Auḍulomi's view that intelligence alone is the nature of *ātman*), Bādarāyaṇa is of the opinion that there is no incompatibility [between Auḍulomi's and Jaimini's views] because the mode of existence [of a liberated person] mentioned above [in BS 4.4.5] is based on a reference [to the Upaniṣad].”

¹³⁰ Cf. Katre 1989: p. 1295, 125.62.

¹³¹ Badara → Badarasya apatyam (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* [A] 4.1.92 *tasya apatyam*; 1 [Nī-āP-] *prātipadikāt*; 76 *taddhitāḥ*) → Badara (A 4.1.82 *samarthānām prathamād vā*) → Badara-iÑ (A 4.1.95 *aTaḥ^iÑ*; 1.1.72: *yena vidhis tadantasya*) → Badar-iÑ (A 6.4.1 *aṅgasya*; 129: *BHAsya*; 134 [aT-] *lopaḥ [anaḥ]*; 144 [nas] *taddhite*; 148 *i-a-sya [iTi ca]*) → Bādar-i (A 6.4.1 *aṅgasya*; 7.2.114 [mr̥jer] *vṛddhiḥ*; 115 *aCo Ñ[-N]-ITi*; 117 *taddhiteṣv aCām ādeḥ*).

¹³² Badara → Badarasya gotrāpatyam (A 4.1.92 *tasya apatyam*; 1 [Nī-āP-] *prātipadikāt*; 76 *taddhitāḥ*; 93 *eko gotre*; 162 *apatyam pautraprabhṛti gotram*) → Badara (A 4.1.82 *samarthānām prathamād vā*) → Badara-phaK (A 4.1.95 *aTaḥ^iÑ*); 98 *gotre [kuñja-ādibhyas CphaÑ]*; 99 *naḍa-ādibhyaḥ phaK*; 1.1.72: *yena vidhis tadantasya*) → Badar-phaK (A 6.4.1 *aṅgasya*; 129: *BHAsya*; 134 [aT-] *lopaḥ [anaḥ]*; 144 [nas] *taddhite*; 148 *i-a-sya [iTi ca]*) → Badar-āyan-a (A 6.4.1 *aṅgasya*; 7.1.2 *āyan[ey-īn-īy-iy]aḥ pha[-dha-kha-cha-gḥ]ām pratyayādinām*) → Bādar-āyan-a (A 6.4.1 *aṅgasya*; 7.2.114 [mr̥jer] *vṛddhiḥ*; 115 *aCo [ÑN-ITi]*; 117 *taddhiteṣv aCām ādeḥ*; 118 *K-ITi ca*) → Bādar-āyan-a (A 8.2.108 [tayor yvau aCi] *saṃhitāyām*; 4.1 *rA[-ṣA]bhyām n-aḥ ṇAḥ samānapade*; 2 *aT-[kU-pU-āN-nUM-]vyavāye 'pi*).

a descendant of Bādari, and it is also possible to identify a common feature of thought between them. BS 1.3.34–38 debates whether Śūdras are eligible to partake in the knowledge of *brahman*, and concludes that they do not have the right.¹³³ Bādarāyaṇa's view is not recorded in this section, and he may not have been as radical as Bādari who asserted Śūdras' right to hold the Vedic sacrifice (MmS 6.1.27). Nevertheless, in MmS 6.1.8, Bādarāyaṇa asserts women's right to partake in the Vedic sacrifice.¹³⁴ The Vedic sacrificer (*yajamāna*) must be a married householder, and he must hold a session of the sacrifice together with his wife.¹³⁵ Although the Vedic rituals to be performed by the wife are restricted to subsidiary parts, Bādarāyaṇa does not regard a wife as a servant controlled by her husband. Agreeing with Bādarāyaṇa, the proponent of this section asserts that women are no different (*aviśeṣa*) from men in their resolve to gain the result of the sacrifice (*phalotsāha*).¹³⁶ According to Śabarasvāmin, Bādari is said to oppose Ātreya in his upholding of Śūdras' right to hold a sacrifice, on the grounds that the fundamental injunction "one who has desire for heaven should hold a sacrifice" (*svargakāmo yajeta*) makes all people who have the desire for heaven equally eligible to hold the sacrifice.¹³⁷ Accordingly, Bādarāyaṇa can be said to have inherited the spirit of egalitarianism from Bādari to a moderate extent, emphasizing the equality between men and women.¹³⁸

Conclusion

As examined, the MmS contains a section in which Jaimini's view is rejected and the BS a section in which Bādarāyaṇa's view is overruled; this shows that Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa cannot be the compilers of the MmS and the BS respectively, despite their purported authorship. Both left behind fragmented materials on

¹³³ In contrast, the opponent in Bhāṣiveka's *Vedāntatattvaviniścaya* (VTV), a Vedāntin who does not rely on the Mīmāṃsā exegesis (Bronkhorst 2007: 28), maintains that one who sees all beings in the same *ātman* realizes the equality between ignorant and learned, and between outcaste and Brahmin (VTV, v. 9cd: *bālapaṇḍitacaṇḍālaviṇṇāṇāṃ ca tulyatā*).

¹³⁴ See n. 89.

¹³⁵ In MmS 6.1.17–21, it is argued that a married couple (*damṣpatī*) should hold a sacrifice together.

¹³⁶ MmS 6.1.13: *phalotsāhāviśeṣāt tu*. In addition, MmS 6.1.14–16 argues that a wife legitimately possesses her own properties.

¹³⁷ See n. 49.

¹³⁸ In addition, it might be due to Bādari's influence that Bādarāyaṇa permits one who has not held a *soma* sacrifice to make the offering of *sāmnāyā*. See section 3.1 of the present paper.

many topics of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta; these materials were later incorporated and codified, along with those of other early scholars, first by the compilers of the MmS and then by those of the BS.¹³⁹

To reflect on the reasons why the MmS and the BS were ascribed to Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa respectively, one can examine their relationship to Bādari, a unique theologian of the White Yajurveda. Jaimini rejects Bādari's views both in the MmS and in the BS, whereas Bādarāyaṇa conciliates their disagreements in the BS. Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa's contrasting attitudes towards Bādari, which can be described as intolerance and tolerance, respectively, characterize the difference in the principles of dialectics between the MmS and the BS. The tense relationship between the schools of the Black Yajurveda and the White Yajurveda exerted great influence on the formation of the MmS. The fact that Bādarāyaṇa was appointed as the author of the BS with his conciliatory attitude indicates an inceptive stage of inclusivism that was not shared by Mīmāṃsā, but was fully developed in medieval Vedānta.¹⁴⁰

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A – *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. See Katre 1989.

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ĀpŚS – *Āpastambaśrautasūtra*, ed. R. Garbe. 3 vols. Calcutta 1882–1902.

BĀU(K) – *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (Kāṇvīya recension). See Olivelle 1998.

¹³⁹ As remarked by Kane (1960: 136), Sureśvara's testimony in *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (NkS) 52,2–6, that Jaimini wrote a Vedānta treatise (*śārīraka*) including BS 1.1.1 “*athāto brahmaṁjijñāsā*” and 1.1.2 “*janmādy asya yataḥ*,” cannot be taken at face value because Śaṅkara (BSBhŚ 9,1–2), Bhāskara (BSBhBh 9,15), and Rāmānuja (ŚrBh, pt.1, 132,15–17) unanimously quote the source of BS 1.1.2 from *Taittirīyopaniṣad* (TU) 3.1.1, not from the ChU, unlike in the cases of all BS-*sūtras* that record Jaimini's views.

¹⁴⁰ Andrianić (2019: section 5) explains the methods of conciliation applied by Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja in their commentaries on BS 1.4.20–22 in which Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi, and Kāśakṛtsna debate on the relationship between an individual self and the supreme self in interpreting BĀU(K) 2.4.5 and 4.5.6.

- BĀU(M) – *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (Mādhyandina recension), ed. O. Böhtlingk. St. Petersburg 1889.
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- Bhm – *Bhāmatī*. In: *Brahmasūtraśāṅkarabhāṣyam*, ed. J. L. Shastri. Delhi 1980.
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- BhŚS – *Bhāradvājaśrautasūtra*. See Kashikar 1964.
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