

WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE 104.1

## To the Heart of Truth

Felicitation Volume for Eli Franco on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday



Part I



ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

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GEGRÜNDET VON  
ERNST STEINKELLNER

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON  
BIRGIT KELLNER, KLAUS-DIETER MATHES  
und MARKUS VIEHBECK

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ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

# **TO THE HEART OF TRUTH**

FELICITATION VOLUME FOR ELI FRANCO  
ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY

EDITED BY

HIROKO MATSUOKA, SHINYA MORIYAMA,  
and TYLER NEILL

PART I

WIEN 2023

ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN



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Eli Franco  
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## एलिफ्राङ्कोऽभिनन्दन- पद्यपुष्पाञ्जलिः

शान्तः कान्तः सरलहृदयः सर्वमान्यो वदान्यः  
विद्यान्वेषी जनहितकरः शिष्यवृन्दैर्वरेण्यः ।  
सर्वाराध्यः प्रियतमगुरुः पण्डितः कर्मनिष्ठः  
एलिफ्राङ्को सकलहृदये राजतां नो वरिष्ठः ॥ १ ॥

यूरोपाख्ये भुवनविदिते भूमिखण्डे सुरम्ये  
शर्मण्याख्यो गिरिवननदीशोभितश्चारुदेशः ।  
साक्सेनाख्यं प्रकृतिरुचिरं राजते तत्र राज्यं  
लैप्त्सीगाख्या भवति हि पुरी तत्र राज्ये सुरम्या ॥ २ ॥

तस्यां पुर्यामतिपरिचितो विश्वविद्यालयोऽस्ति  
ख्यातो लोके सकलजगतां ज्ञानदानप्रसङ्गे ।  
संस्थानं वै जगति प्रथितं भारतीये हि शास्त्रे  
पूर्वाध्यक्षः सहृदयवरो बौद्धशास्त्रस्य वेत्ता ॥ ३ ॥

अनेकविद्याध्ययनैर्विमण्डितः  
स बौद्धशास्त्रे नितरां हि पण्डितः ।  
नाट्ये कलायां सततं च मोदते  
स पण्डितोऽयं गुरुरत्र वन्द्यते ॥ ४ ॥

निसर्गसारस्वतसाधनायां  
सदा प्रवृत्तः प्रतिभायुतः सः ।  
गवेषणाकर्मनिविष्टचित्तः  
विराजतां मान्यवरः प्रशान्तः ॥ ५ ॥

बौद्धेषु शास्त्रेषु सदा लसन्तं  
तद्दर्शनं चैव विकासयन्तम् ।  
विद्वत्सु गोष्ठीषु च तुष्टिमन्तं  
प्रणौमि तं दर्शनशास्त्रसन्तम् ॥ ६ ॥

नैकासु संस्थासु विधाय कार्यं  
प्रशंसितो बुद्धिमतां सभासु ।  
नैकेषु शास्त्रेष्वपि पुस्तकानि  
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जीवेस्त्वं शरदः शतं वर्धितो यशसा गुणैः ।  
आयुःसत्त्वबलारोग्यैः श्रीमान् धीमान् च शान्तिमान् ॥ १२ ॥

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## Introduction

*Ce qu'on n'a jamais mis en question n'a point été prouvé. Ce qu'on n'a point examiné sans prévention n'a jamais été bien examiné. Le scepticisme est donc le premier pas vers la vérité.*

What has never been questioned has not been proven. What has not been examined without prejudice has never been well examined. Skepticism is therefore the first step towards truth.

Denis Diderot, *Pensées philosophiques*, XXXI

The title *To the Heart of Truth* was inspired by our colleague, friend, and teacher, Eli Franco, who has a “heart of truth” himself, is interested in the essence of truth in his study of skepticism in premodern South Asia, and has contributed to the understanding of how “heart” in the sense of “compassion” relates to truth through his study of Buddhist epistemology and logic in relation to Buddhist religion and spirituality. This felicitation volume is also itself a collection of various truths pursued and newly revealed by each of the contributors. With it, we aim to celebrate Eli (as we all call him) by way of these heartfelt gifts, and hopefully to inspire readers to seek further truths themselves.

Eli has pioneered and led for half a century the study of the Lokāyata school of materialism and skepticism, as represented by Jayarāśi, and the Buddhist logical–epistemological tradition, with an emphasis on its religious school represented by Prajñākaragupta and Yamāri. He has published extensively not only on various aspects of these fields, but also on other areas such as Brahminical philosophical traditions, early Buddhist scholastics, and the history of Indological studies in Europe. He has furthermore directed several important third-party funded research projects successfully, and continues to do so.

As a professor at the University of Leipzig, Eli devoted himself to general higher education as well inasmuch as he gave broad-ranging lectures without language requirements on Indian philosophy and Buddhism, open to all

students of the University. On the other hand, he guided graduate students in their highly specialized studies on the basis of original texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan. We three former students of his have benefited greatly from our *Doktorvater*. At the same time, he was our mentor, always present with cheerful words of encouragement. He exemplified for us a virtuous harmony of bold skepticism and optimistic materialism, and indeed he can often be heard quoting the Lokāyata aphorism, *yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīvet!*<sup>1</sup>

### *From Jayarāsi to Yamāri—Eli's academic journey*<sup>2</sup>

Eli's academic career coincides with his geographical journey. An adventurer by nature, he dared to travel the world to further his scholarship. He based his academic formation and research activities in Israel, France, Australia, Germany, and Austria, and also spent considerable time as a visiting scholar

<sup>1</sup> Cited in Franco 1987 (=A2): 53 n.70. *Bārhaspatyasūtra* B2–B3 (cf. Namai 1996: 10):

*etāvān eva puruṣo yāvān indriyagocarah |*  
*bhadre vṛkapadaṃ hy etad yad vadanti ahuśrutāḥ || \*<sup>1</sup>*  
*yāvaj jīvet sukhaṃ jīved ṛṇaṃ kṛtvā ghr̥taṃ pibet |*  
*bhasmībhūtasya dehasya punarāgamaṇaṃ kutaḥ || \*<sup>2</sup>*

A person extends only as far as the realm of the senses. O dear lady, indeed, what the educated speak of is [like] the footprint of a wolf [artificially manipulated; therefore it should be questioned].

For as long as one lives, one should live joyfully! One should take out loans and drink ghee! How could the body, which has already been turned to ashes, come back [to life]?

\*<sup>1</sup> Cited in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (Ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin, St.-Petersbourg 1903) 360.6–7. \*<sup>2</sup> Cited in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (Ed. V. S. Abhyankar, Poona [1924] 1951) 14.5–6. For more citations with variant readings, see Namai, C. M. Rinne no Ronshō: *Bukkyō ronrigakuha ni yoru yuibutsuron hihan* [The Proof of Transmigration: A Critique of Materialism from the Buddhist Epistemological–Logical Tradition], Osaka 1996, 9 n.21; Bhattacharya, R. "Cārvāka Fragments: A New Collection." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 30 (2002): 597–640 (esp. 610).

<sup>2</sup> This section is based on a series of interviews with Eli. Note that his selected publications and studies referenced below are not necessarily in chronological order. The capital letters with numbers in **bold** follow the numbering of publications listed in the "List of Publications by Eli Franco" in this volume.

in India, Japan, and Norway. Let us trace his life milestones to date, along with his major academic achievements.

**Tel Aviv 1953–1977** Eli Franco was born on June 19, 1953 in Tel Aviv, Israel, the eldest of two sons and one daughter to his parents Nissim and Regina Franco, who were both Sephardic immigrants from Bulgaria after the founding of the state of Israel. He grew up in this beautiful Mediterranean coastal city, also known as the “White City.” Meanwhile, the second, third and fourth Arab–Israeli wars broke out (1956–1957; 1967; 1973). His strong opposition to militarism and his inclination toward atheism and skepticism could not have been unaffected by these historical events, and in fact led to his early political involvement, at times on the radical left. He was one of the earliest conscientious objectors to military service after the Six-Day War. In 1971, he enrolled in Philosophy and Jewish Philosophy at Tel Aviv University and in 1976 received his B.A. for a thesis on a comparative study of skepticism in Ancient Greek philosophy, Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy and Chinese Taoism. Already as a B.A. student, he discovered the writings of the modern philosopher R. G. Collingwood (1889–1943) and the historian of skepticism Richard H. Popkin (1923–2005), whose influence is clearly evident in his subsequent work.

**Paris 1977–1980** In 1977, Eli was awarded a three-year French Government Grant and moved to Paris. He first enrolled at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), obtained his Diplôme in 1978, and then enrolled as a doctoral student under the supervision of Professor Charles Malamoud in the joint program of the École Pratique des Hautes Études (v<sup>ème</sup> section) and the Université de Paris X (now Paris Nanterre University). In 1980 he received his Ph.D. for his dissertation entitled *Lokāyata, la philosophie dite matérialiste de l’Inde classique* (*Lokāyata, the so-called materialist philosophy of classical India*), which became, in a thoroughly revised and enlarged form, his first monograph *Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief: A Study of Jayarāṣi’s Skepticism* (A2).<sup>3</sup> During his studies in Paris, and later on as a postdoc at the University of Vienna and as a Humboldt Fellow at Hamburg University, Eli slowly moved

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<sup>3</sup> For reviews on A2, see, among others, Werner, K. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* 2 (1988): 432–433; Pollock, S. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 47

away from the comparative approach of his earlier mentor Professor Ben-Ami Scharfstein (1919–2019) that had dominated the Philosophy Department at Tel Aviv University and toward a more philologically oriented study of Indian philosophy. As he told us in a discussion leading to this essay, “I knew that something was wrong with the comparative approach, but could not put my finger on it. Only some years later, when I read Wilhelm Halbfass’s article,<sup>4</sup> the penny dropped: Comparative philosophy has to be philosophy; it cannot just be the juxtaposition of philosophies.”

In his Ph.D. thesis, Eli struck gold. Due to his wide reading and strong interest in skepticism, he was able to truly discover the work of Jayarāśi, a major philosopher of the ninth century who, for some inexplicable reason, had remained under the radar of scholars of Indian thought—it is impossible to count the number of scholars who claimed that no original work of Lokāyata had survived. Eli’s work was the very first monograph on Jayarāśi and established him as one of the most important philosophers in the second half of the first millennium. Although this study is strongly philological in providing the first-ever translation of a substantial part of the difficult Sanskrit text of the *Tattvopaplavasīṃha*, we clearly see Collingwood’s influence, in the form of his “Logic of Question and Answer,”<sup>5</sup> in the extensive annotation, where Eli attempts to reconstruct the dialogue between Jayarāśi and his opponents: Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, Sāṃkhya, and Buddhist followers of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy. And although he had been moving away from the comparative approach, he still believed that Popkin’s vision of the history of modern philosophy as a series of *crises pyrrhoniennes* and attempts to resolve them<sup>6</sup> could be applied to Indian philosophy as well. Although the monograph on Jayarāśi has now been published almost forty years ago, it has not been surpassed and is regularly quoted or referred to in studies of Indian materialism and skepticism. Many years later (2017), Eli supplemented this

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(1988): 917–919; Potter, K. H. *Philosophy East and West* 39 (1989): 216–217; de Jong, J. W. *Indo-Iranian Journal* 32 (1989): 209–212; Matilal, B. K. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 110 (1990): 537–539.

<sup>4</sup> Halbfass, W. “India and the Comparative Method.” *Philosophy East and West* 35 (1985): 3–15.

<sup>5</sup> Collingwood, R. G. *An Autobiography*. Oxford [1939] 2002, 29–43.

<sup>6</sup> Popkin, R. H. *The History of Scepticism: From Savonarola to Bayle*. Oxford [1960] 2003.

study with an important paper on Jayarāśi's critique of inference (C68). He also contributed a comprehensive study of Lokāyata to the *Encyclopedia of Hinduism* (D5).

**Vienna 1980–1981, Hamburg 1982–1983** After completing his doctorate in Paris, Eli received a postdoctoral scholarship from the Austrian government and spent about eight months at the University of Vienna studying with Professors Gerhard Oberhammer and Ernst Steinkellner. He used the time primarily to master German, to begin to study Classical Tibetan, and to familiarize himself with the Austro-German scholarly tradition of philological-historical research on Indian philosophy founded by Erich Frauwallner. At the same time, he also worked at the UN Center in Vienna and could have stayed for a career in the UN administration, but chose to remain in academia. With the support of Professors Steinkellner and Albrecht Wezler (1938–2023), he obtained a prestigious Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship and studied for twenty months at the University of Hamburg with Professors Wezler, Lambert Schmithausen, and Claus Oetke (1947–2019), and with Karin Preisendanz (then a Ph.D. student) who became not only his partner and then wife but also a close collaborator who took part in almost all of his studies.

**Tel Aviv 1983–1988** In 1983, together with Preisendanz, Eli returned to his hometown of Tel Aviv, where he spent five years teaching and researching, first as a lecturer in the Philosophy Department at Tel Aviv University, and then as a research fellow at the University's Institute for the History and Philosophy of Sciences and Ideas and at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. As part of his teaching duties in Western philosophy at the University, he inter alia taught a course on the philosophy of the Enlightenment and in this connection published an annotated Hebrew translation of the French philosopher Denis Diderot's (1713–1784) *Lettre sur les aveugles à l'usage de ceux qui voient* (*Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those Who See*) (A1). The opening quotation is from another work by the same author, *Pensées philosophiques* (*Philosophical Thoughts*).

**Melbourne 1989–1996** As it happened, there was no prospect of Eli obtaining a permanent position in Israel, and when he was offered a lectureship in the Department of Religious Studies at La Trobe University in Bundoora,



Melbourne, in 1989, he decided to leave his home country. Unfortunately, the entire department at La Trobe was soon disbanded, and although he was able to move to the Philosophy Department at the same university, this was without the prospect of tenure.

Soon after joining La Trobe, Eli was invited by Professor Wilhelm Halbfass (1940–2000) to spend a year at the prestigious Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Institute for Advanced Study in Berlin). He used the time there mainly to continue his study of Classical Tibetan and to translate large portions from Prajñākaragupta's (ca. 8<sup>th</sup>–9<sup>th</sup> century)<sup>7</sup> *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*. By this time his research focus had shifted from Lokāyata to the Buddhist logical–epistemological tradition, on which he subsequently wrote dozens of original articles as well as two monographs. One of these monographs, *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth* (A3),<sup>8</sup> was accepted as his Habilitation thesis, first in Hamburg in 1997 for the field of Indology, and then again in 2000 at the University of Vienna, where he had moved in 1999 following the appointment of Preisendanz to the Chair of Indology, for the fields of Indology and Buddhist Studies.

In his studies on the Buddhist logical–epistemological tradition, Eli was able to break new ground by being the first to produce an extensive work on Prajñākaragupta, a towering figure in post-Dharmakīrtian Buddhist philosophy who has been largely neglected until very recently. This monograph was one of the earliest studies of the close relationship between Buddhist epistemology and logic and the Buddhist religion. In a second edition of *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, Eli enlarged the monograph with “A Study of Backward Causation in Buddhism,” depicting one of the most original and fascinating theories advanced by Prajñākaragupta.

In connection with this work, Eli also prepared a free but precise translation of the entire *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. This had

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<sup>7</sup> For this new date of Prajñākaragupta, see D9, which is based on the recent revision of Vidyānandin's date. Cf. Ono's dating to ca. 750 to 810. Ono, M. *Prajñākaraguptas Erklärung der Definition gültiger Erkenntnis (Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra zu Pramāṇavārttika II 1–7)*. Teil I. Vienna 2000, i.

<sup>8</sup> For reviews on A3, see Werner, K. *Buddhist Studies Review* 15 (1998): 240–242; Günther, H. V. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 120 (2000): 154; Namai, C. M. *Indo-Iranian Journal* 44 (2001): 84–90; and especially, Taber, J. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 31 (2003): 479–502.

been written in the 1990s and was shared and mentioned by many scholars, but was published only in 2017 (D8).<sup>9</sup> In the same volume, he also wrote an extensive introduction to Dharmakīrti's philosophy (D7), in which he summarized many of his own specific studies and showed how they could be integrated to form a systematic interpretation of Dharmakīrti's thought. Eli's work on Prajñākaragupta was continued by Shinya Moriyama—his first Ph.D. student and now a professor at Shinshu University, and also one of the editors of the present volume—which culminated in the publication of his monograph, *Omniscience and Religious Authority*.<sup>10</sup>

**Hamburg 1997–2002** After his monograph on Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta had been published, Eli's research took an unexpected turn. A chance encounter in Jerusalem with the son of the Indologist Moritz Spitzer (1900–1982), who was forced to emigrate from Germany to Palestine in 1939, led him into the field of Turfan Studies. His most important work in this field is *The Spitzer Manuscript—The Oldest Philosophical Manuscript in Sanskrit* (A4).<sup>11</sup> In this work, funded by the German Research Council (DFG) at the University of Hamburg, he edited about a thousand fragments of this unique Abhidharmic manuscript and was also able to offer a partial reconstruction of its text. Once again, he had accomplished truly groundbreaking work and brought a previously neglected and little-known treasure to the attention of scholars. As a result of his work, the Spitzer manuscript is now regularly taken into account in studies of early Indian dialectics. Eli's work on the Spitzer manuscript also led him to important studies of aspects of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical traditions, such as "Lost Fragments from

<sup>9</sup> Also important in this connection is C7, a review on T. Vetter's *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika: Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Pramāṇasiddhi-Kapitel. Eingeleitet, editiert und übersetzt* (Vienna 1984), which critically discussed Vetter's partial German translation of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter. This motivated Eli to translate this chapter of Dharmakīrti's work in full (D8) and also to write A3. From that time until Vetter's death in 2012, Vetter and Eli maintained a cordial relationship, sending each other their publications.

<sup>10</sup> Moriyama, S. *Omniscience and Religious Authority. A Study on Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārahāṣya ad Pramāṇavārttika II 8–10 and 29–33*. Zürich/Berlin 2014.

<sup>11</sup> For a review on A4, see Kudo, N. *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saṃbhāṣā* 26 (2007): 169–173.

the ‘Spitzer Manuscript’ (C30), “A Note on Nāgārjuna and the Naiyāyikas” (C38) and “The Earliest Extant Vaiśeṣika Theory of *guṇas*” (C28), respectively.

**Vienna 2002–2004** After completing the project on the Spitzer manuscript, Eli joined Steinkellner’s long-term Austrian Science Fund (FWF) Project “Erkenntnistheoretische Tradition des Buddhismus” (Logical–epistemological tradition of Buddhism) on the topic “Buddhist theories of yogic perception,” at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA), Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna. Among the results of this work one should mention the interdisciplinary volume, *Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness* (in collaboration with Dagmar Eigner) (B3), and Eli’s own paper in it (C53), where he critically examines Schmithausen’s theory of the emergence of philosophical theories from spiritual practice. This topic led to a further exchange published in Schmithausen’s *The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda*<sup>12</sup> and Eli’s “On the Arising of Philosophical Theories from Spiritual Practice” (C72), respectively.

It was not only in this debate with Schmithausen that Eli believed he could get to the heart of Indian and Buddhist philosophy through repeated discussions with various scholars. We recall that he usually sat in one of the front rows at conferences, symposia and guest lectures, and asked sharp questions to speakers. For example, at the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference in Hiroshima in 1997, there was a heated exchange with Clause Oetke over the interpretation of the conjunction particle *vā* regarding Dharmakīrti’s two definitions of *pramāṇa* in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, which was also echoed in the proceedings<sup>13</sup> (C24). Since the 1990s, Eli has been a central figure in the academic debate on Dharmakīrti’s philosophy, taking for his partners in dialogue Tilmann Vetter (1937–2012) (see n.9 above), Ernst Steinkellner<sup>14</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Schmithausen, L. *The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses and Reflections*. Tokyo 2014.

<sup>13</sup> Oetke, C. “The Disjunction in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*.” In: Katsura 1997: 243–252; Oetke, C. “Clarifications.” In: Katsura 1997: 261–266; Katsura, S. “Preface.” In: Katsura 1997: xi–xiv (esp. xi–xii); Katsura, S. (ed.), *Dharmakīrti’s Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy: Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference Hiroshima, November 4–6, 1997*. Vienna 1999. See Inami and Ono in the present volume for the most recent studies relevant to this topic.

<sup>14</sup> Steinkellner, E. *Dharmakīrtis frühe Logik. Annotierte Übersetzung der logischen Teile*

(C77), John Taber<sup>15</sup> (C39, C57), John D. Dunne<sup>16</sup> (C55), Helmut Krasser (1956–2014)<sup>17</sup> (C74) and other leading scholars in the field.

**Leipzig 2004–2021** In 2004, Eli was appointed a full professor and director of the Institute of Indology and Central Asian Studies at the University of Leipzig. He reorganized the Department's curricula, equipping it with unique features that were not present in comparable departments at other German universities. In addition to bringing his own specialization in Indian philosophy and Buddhism into the curricula, he appointed Sadananda Das to teach spoken Sanskrit and Monika Zin, and subsequently her students, to teach Indian, especially Buddhist art history. He also further developed modern South Asian Studies at the Department. The results of this restructuring were quite successful and the Department had more than a hundred students majoring in Indology and Central Asian Studies. Eli also gave general lectures open to students of all subjects, which attracted large crowds. In some years the enrollment had to be stopped at two hundred. It was undoubtedly this strong record in terms of student numbers, as well as his numerous research projects with third-party funding, that persuaded the University to re-advertise the Chair of Indology on the occasion of Eli's retirement, and the chair is now filled by his successor, Jowita Kramer.

In addition to his strong interest in the religious aspects of Buddhist logic and epistemology, as reflected in his above-mentioned work on the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and Prajñākaragupta's commentary thereon, it was clear to Eli from the outset of his encounter with Dharmakīrti's work that the fundamental chapter on perception (*pratyakṣa*) in the *Pramāṇavārttika* deserved to be translated and studied much more extensively than what had been done so far in Western languages.<sup>18</sup> In a

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von *Pramāṇavārttika* 1 mit der *Vṛtti*. Tokyo 2013.

<sup>15</sup> Taber, J. "Did Dharmakīrti think the Buddha had desires?" In: Eds. H. Krasser et al., *Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis: Proceedings of the 4<sup>th</sup> International Dharmakīrti Conference Vienna, August 23–27, 2005*. Vienna 2011, 437–448.

<sup>16</sup> Dunne, J. D. *Foundations of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy*. Sommerville 2004.

<sup>17</sup> Krasser, H. "Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti and Kumāṛila." In: Eds. F. Voegeli et al., *Devadattīyam: Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume*. Bern, etc., 2012, 535–594.

<sup>18</sup> By contrast, Hiromasa Tosaki had treated the entire chapter in Japanese already

third-party funded project, he was able to make a beginning with Miyako Notake, resulting in the jointly written *Dharmakīrti on the Duality of the Object* (with a preface by his friend, the renowned German philosopher and Hegel specialist Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer) (A5).<sup>19</sup> Other obligations prevented him from continuing this work himself, but he encouraged his students to do so. We may mention two Ph.D. theses that he supervised closely: the first by King Chung Lo, containing an edition, translation and studies of the Pratyakṣa chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, in particular vv. 425–484 which deal with self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*)<sup>20</sup>; the second by Yuki Kyogoku, which will be submitted soon, deals with vv. 123–193, where Dharmakīrti discusses the defining characteristic of perception, namely its being “free from conceptual construction” (*kalpanāpoḍha*). Another dissertation by Youngsan Sohn on Dharmakīrti’s *Hetubindu* is currently under preparation and promises a significant update of our view of the relationship between Dharmakīrti and his teacher Īśvarasena. Yet another dissertation related to the Dharmakīrtian tradition was written by Hiroko Matsuoka, one of the editors of this volume.<sup>21</sup>

Eli’s work on the Spitzer manuscript and thus the Turfan finds, as well as his election as a full member (Ordentliches Mitglied) to the Saxon Academy

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in the 1970–80s. See Tosaki, H. *Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū: Hosshō cho “Pramāṇavārttika” no genryōron* [Studies in Buddhist epistemology: The theory of perception in Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika*]. Vols. 1–2. Tokyo 1979/85.

Undoubtedly, the notion regarding the significance of further basic research on the Pratyakṣa chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* was not limited to Eli, but rather shared by other diligent scholars. Among others, for insights into the methodological considerations involved in editing Dharmakīrti’s verses, see Kellner, B., “Towards a Critical Edition of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika*,” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasien* 52/53 (2009/10): 161–211. In conjunction with this methodology, Birgit Kellner is currently preparing the new critical edition of the *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.425–539, along with its English translation.

<sup>19</sup> For reviews on A5, see Moriyama, S. *Rivista Degli Studi Orientali* 89 (2016): 109–12; Miyo, M. *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saṃbhāṣā* 33 (2016): 75–78; Steinkellner, E. *Journal of South Asian Studies* 40 (2017), 428–430; Pecchia, C. *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 138 (2018): 662–665.

<sup>20</sup> Lo, K. C. “The Establishment of Self-Awareness: An Annotated Translation of *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.425–484” (Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 2018).

<sup>21</sup> Matsuoka, H. “Introducing Introductions: A Study of Kamalaśīla’s *Tattvasaṅgraha-*

of Sciences and Humanities in 2012, positioned him well to establish and foster a massive long-term research project (2016–2030) on the wonderful Kucha murals in collaboration with Zin. The project is funded by the Union of the Union of German Academies of Sciences and Humanities, and is hosted by the Saxon Academy.<sup>22</sup> On the whole, Eli has been very successful in attracting third-party funding and promoting young scholars. With six DFG projects, he was able to employ eager young scholars, some of them right at the beginning of their careers, such as Miyako Notake, Isabelle Ratié, King Chung Lo, Junjie Chu, Xuezhu Li, Yasutaka Muroya, Philipp Maas, Hiroko Matsuoka, and Tyler Neill, as well as a large number of student assistants. As a result of his collaboration with Ratié, we should mention their co-edited volume *Around Abhinavagupta: Aspects of the Intellectual History of Kashmir from the Ninth to the Eleventh Century* (B7). Of particular importance is the long-term DFG project (2017–2025) on a digital critical edition of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, with Maas as research associate and Preisendanz as senior cooperation partner, conducted in its initial phase with substantial support from Neill in Digital Humanities. Furthermore, as probably the most important of Eli's projects in the area of Buddhist Studies, the "Yamāri Project" has to be mentioned (see further on this below, p. xxvii).

Eli's interest in Buddhist logic was not confined to South Asia. He was able to make an important contribution to Chinese (and consequently also to Korean and Japanese) Buddhist logic. Although he does not himself read Chinese, his background in Indian Buddhist logic enabled him to gain a key insight into the logic of Xuanzang 玄奘 (600/602–664), which had eluded specialists in Chinese and Japanese Buddhism. His paper "Xuanzang's proof of idealism (*vijñaptimātratā*)" (C43) had a major impact and was translated

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*pañjikā* on the *Tattvasaṅgraha* vv. 1–6" (Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 2019).

<sup>22</sup> Some of the results of this project can be seen in the series *Leipzig Kucha Studies*, edited by Eli Franco and Monika Zin, of which four impressive volumes have already been published, with four more in the pipeline. Altogether seventeen volumes are planned. See Konczak-Nagel, I., and M. Zin. *Essays and Studies in the Art of Kucha* (Leipzig Kucha Studies 1). New Delhi 2020; Zin, M. *Representations of the Parinirvāṇa Story Cycle in Kucha* (Leipzig Kucha Studies 2). New Delhi 2020; Vignato, G., and S. Hiyama. *Traces of the Sarvāstivādins in the Buddhist Monasteries of Kucha* (Leipzig Kucha Studies 3). New Delhi 2022; Zin, M. *Gods, Deities, and Demons in the Paintings of Kucha* (Leipzig Kucha Studies 4). New Delhi 2023.

into Chinese and Japanese; it also led to the organization of a panel, together with Jeson Woo, at the 17<sup>th</sup> Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Vienna in 2014 and the subsequent publication of the proceedings, with Preisendanz, as *Hetuvīdyā and the Science of Pramāṇa: The South Asian Scene and East Asian Developments* (B8).

Although most of Eli's publications relate to Buddhist philosophy, he has read widely in all other philosophical traditions, and alongside his substantial studies on Lokāyata and Abhidharma, he has published several papers not only on Buddhist traditions other than the logical–epistemological tradition, such as Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, but also on non-Buddhist traditions, notably, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā. Of particular interest are his two papers on Bhāsarvajña, one of the most important, yet understudied Nyāya philosophers (C6, C67). Moreover, he supervised the Ph.D. thesis on Bhāsarvajña by Tyler Neill, another editor of the present volume.<sup>23</sup> Also noteworthy is Eli's work, during a stay at the Norwegian Institute for Advanced Studies, Oslo, on the manuscripts of the Schøyen Collection, of which he edited and studied three Mīmāṃsā fragments and tentatively identified their common author as Bhavadāsa (C36).

Furthermore, Eli had a continuous interest in the history of Indology in Europe and published several papers on this subject. He wrote inter alia on Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), Antoine-Léonard de Chézy (1773–1832), Paul Deussen (1845–1919), Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935), Erich Frauwallner (1898–1974), Walter Ruben (1899–1982) and Madeleine Biardeau (1922–2010), and contributed a detailed historical overview in “A Survey of Buddhist Studies in Germany and Austria 1972–1997” (C26). His interest in the history of Indology, specifically the study of Indian philosophy, also led him to organize a large conference panel on the periodization and historiography of Indian philosophy, the proceedings of which were published under the same title in the Publications of the De Nobili Research Library (B6,<sup>24</sup> C62, C70). Being of Jewish heritage, Eli took this opportunity to strongly rebuke attempts

<sup>23</sup> Neill, T. “Intertextual Readings of the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* on Buddhist Anti-Realism” (Ph.D. diss., University of Leipzig, 2022).

<sup>24</sup> For reviews on B6, see among others Gokhale, P. P. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 94 (2013): 176–185; Yoshimizu, K. *Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism: Saṃbhāṣā* 32 (2015): 60–71.

at diminishing Frauwallner's involvement with National Socialism (also, C85).<sup>25</sup>

Some of Eli's editorial work has already been mentioned above. Eli has been on the editorial board of the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* for decades, founded and edited the monograph series *Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Süd- und Zentralasiens*, and co-edits with Zin the series *Leipzig Kucha Studies* (see n.22 above). Among the edited volumes not yet referred to above, the one closest to his heart and considered by him to be of lasting value is *Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies*, which he edited with Preisendanz (B1).<sup>26</sup>

**Back to Vienna, 2021–present** Even after having retired from the University of Leipzig in 2021 and moved back to Vienna, Eli has not ceased to be active in teaching his Ph.D. students and doing research. He is still highly enthusiastic about the ongoing “Yamāri Project,”<sup>27</sup> in which several of the contributors to this volume and two of its editors are involved. Eli routinely says, “The ‘Yamāri Project’ will be my last project” (we don’t believe it), and so we shall make special mention of its progress since 2014.

Yamāri is an eleventh-century lay Buddhist scholar, the second and last known commentator of Prajñākara Gupta's magnum opus *Pramāṇavārttikā-lāṅkāra*.<sup>28</sup> Although this commentary is one of the major works in the Buddhist logical–epistemological tradition, it has been largely neglected in modern scholarship, or used only occasionally as a tool for the literal under-

<sup>25</sup> C85 is an abridged version of his paper; the full version can be downloaded from: [https://www.academia.edu/105122726/\\_There\\_is\\_No\\_Reliable\\_Evidence\\_to\\_Pass\\_Moral\\_Judgment\\_on\\_Frauwallner\\_Erich\\_Frauwallner\\_Jakob\\_Stuchlik\\_Walter\\_Slajc\\_and\\_the\\_Whitewashing\\_of\\_Austrian\\_Indology\\_During\\_the\\_Time\\_of\\_National\\_Socialism](https://www.academia.edu/105122726/_There_is_No_Reliable_Evidence_to_Pass_Moral_Judgment_on_Frauwallner_Erich_Frauwallner_Jakob_Stuchlik_Walter_Slajc_and_the_Whitewashing_of_Austrian_Indology_During_the_Time_of_National_Socialism) (last accessed 30 June 2023).

<sup>26</sup> For a review on B1, see de Jong, J. *Indo-Iranian Journal* 42 (1999): 184–186.

<sup>27</sup> “Yamāri's *Pramāṇavārttikā-lāṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā* (Diplomatic and Critical Editions, Partial Translation and Studies)” (DFG 253118915, 2014–23, University of Leipzig). Eli's team members in this project were X. Li (2014–17), J. Chu (2014–21), and H. Matsuoka (2018–22).

<sup>28</sup> For Yamāri's biography, see Matsuoka, H. “Biographical and Bibliographical Data on Yamāri and the *Pramāṇavārttikā-lāṅkāranibandha*.” Forthcoming in: Eds. H. Lasic et al., *Sanskrit Manuscripts in China IV*. Beijing.



standing of *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*. Since its inception, the “Yamāri Project,” which aims at a critical edition of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha*<sup>29</sup> on the basis of a *codex unicus* and the Tibetan translation, has transformed the landscape of research on the religious dimensions of the Buddhist logical–epistemological tradition, in conjunction with the remarkable increase in studies on Prajñākaragupta’s thought in Japan.<sup>30</sup> A considerable number of papers written to date by Eli (some of them with Preisendanz) (C71, C73, C76, C78, C81, C82, C84, D9) and by project collaborators, including the papers by Junjie Chu, Masahiro Inami, Mai Miyo, Motoi Ono, and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu in this very volume, are based on extensive use of the preliminary critical edition of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* made available to them.

One of the most interesting parts of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* is its introduction, where Yamāri discusses the order of chapters and scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, as well as the relationship between Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Devendrabuddhi, Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta and Jayanta (to name only the main protagonists). Yamāri provides insights that challenge and call for the modification of perceptions widely spread in modern scholarship, which still relies on the hypothesis set up by Frauwallner about seventy years ago. Yamāri’s work opens a window onto a multitude of hitherto unknown voices within the Buddhist logical–epistemological tradition and thus provides a fresh perspective on its intellectual history (esp. C73, C84).

<sup>29</sup> The generic title *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* (“a literary composition on the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*”) has now been adopted as the title of Yamāri’s commentary by the editorial team, instead of the more specific title as provided in Tibetan transliteration, namely *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Suparīśuddhā*, which was used earlier, e.g., in the name of the Project. See Matsuoka forthcoming (n.28 above).

<sup>30</sup> This is represented by the launch of a peer-reviewed online journal, *Prajñākaragupta Studies*, edited by the Prajñākaragupta Research Group headed by M. Inami in 2021 (vols. 1–3 published in 2021; 2022; 2023), and the initiation of two projects dedicated to the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, M. Miyo’s JSPS Grant-in-Aid project for JSPS Fellows “A Study of Prajñākaragupta’s Perception of Buddhist Doctrine” (2021–25, Tokyo Gakugei University, Grant Number JP21J40169) and S. Moriyama’s JSPS Grant-in-Aid project for Scientific Research (B) “Philosophy and Religion in Late Indian Buddhist Epistemology: A Comprehensive Study of Prajñākaragupta’s *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, Chapter II” (2022–27, Shinshu University, Grant Number JP22H00605). These research groups and projects are operating in close collaboration with the “Yamāri Project.”

We editors, together with the scholars participating in this project, strongly believe that Eli's "last project" could become the beginning of laying a new foundation for the history of Buddhist logical–epistemological thought beyond Frauwallner's paradigmatic ingenious speculations.

### **Eli's wide circle of friends and their contributions to the present volume**

Critical and skeptical as a scholar, remarkably bright and open-minded as a person, and the generous owner of a wonderfully affable smile—Eli has attracted and forged friendships with people all over the world and scholars across many disciplines. Due to the limited capacity of the present editors, the papers in this felicitation volume had to be limited to those in the field of premodern South Asian Studies and Buddhist Studies, but the volume is still quite rich: Part I contains a wide variety of articles on Abhidharma and Madhyamaka, Sanskrit grammar and literature, Śaivism, Buddhist hermeneutics and Buddhist Art history; and Part II contains articles on the Buddhist logical–epistemological tradition. We hereby would like to express our deepest and most sincere gratitude to each and every one of our colleagues who graciously agreed to contribute to the volume. We greatly regret that Prof. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, a renowned authority in Lokāyata Studies who had hoped to contribute, passed away on October 2, 2022, and offer our deepest condolences to his family.

### **Acknowledgements**

Furthermore, we would like to thank Dr. Sadananda Das and Ms. Linda Gaenzle for providing unique Sanskrit congratulatory verses and the beautiful cover art of two traditional South Asian *raṅgolīs*, respectively, which make this celebratory volume even more festive and auspicious. We are also honored and grateful to have the commentary on *raṅgolī* art jointly written by Linda Gaenzle and her husband Prof. Martin Gaenzle. We furthermore thank Mr. Kazuki Kimura for unifying the format of the bibliographies, Dr. Miyuki Nakasuka and Dr. Junjie Chu for their technical support, and Mr. Youngsan Sohn for his all-round volunteer help. We would also like to extend our gratitude to the editors of the Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde (WSTB), Prof. Birgit Kellner, Prof. Klaus-Dieter Mathes and Dr. Markus Viehbeck, for the inclusion of this volume in the WSTB

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When we asked Karin Preisendanz for a one-sentence description of Eli, she had this to say: "Prickly with his sharp mind, frank criticisms, and unconventional creativity—sweet with his winning humor, radiant smile and natural informality: a true *sabra* in the field of Indian and Buddhist Studies."

June 2023

Hiroko Matsuoka – Shinya Moriyama – Tyler Neill

Vienna – Matsumoto – New York

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<sup>31</sup> The *Bhāṣāpariccheda (Kārikāvalī)* by Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya, together with his commentary *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, printed and published by Kṣemrāj Śrī-kṛṣṇadās at his own Śrīveṅkaṭeśvar Steam Press, Mumbai Caitra Saṃvat 1964 / Śaka 1829 (1907/1908 CE).

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\* Most publications are available for download from: <https://independent.academia.edu/EliFranco> (last accessed 30 June 2023).

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- E1. With Dan Daor, Kālidāsa's Śakuntalā. Introduction and translation of act II into Hebrew. *Prosa* 100, 1988, pp. 158–163.
- E2. Interview with Wilhelm Halbfass and translation of his paper "India, Europe and the Europeanization of the Earth" into Hebrew. *Prosa* 101–102, 1988, pp. 80–88.
- E3. Das *Nirvāṇa* als Vollendung jedes Lebewesens. *Religionen unterwegs* 3, 2002, pp. 4–10.
- E4. With Karin Preisendanz, Die indischen Schriften. In: Wilfried Seipel (ed.), *Der Turmbau zu Babel. Ursprung und Vielfalt von Sprache und Schrift*, Milano 2003, Vol. IIIa: pp. 291–296, Vol. IIIb: pp. 295–314.
- E5. Preface. In: Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons. Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien 2007, pp. ix–xii.
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- E7. With Karin Preisendanz, Preface. In: Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz (eds.), *Hetuvidyā and the Science of Pramāṇa. The South Asian Scene and East Asian Developments = Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens / Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies* 56–57, 2015–2018 (2019), pp. 5–18.

## F Book Reviews in

- F1. *Asian and African Studies*
- F2. *Asian Studies*
- F3. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*
- F4. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
- F5. *Entangled Religions*
- F6. *Indo-Iranian Journal*

- F7. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*
- F8. *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung*
- F9. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*
- F10. *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*





## On the Cover Illustration: *raṅgolī*

Religious designs drawn by hand with some kind of powder, usually rice flour, are a common form of folk art throughout South Asia. In Nepal, in much of North India and the Deccan they are known as *raṅgolī* (< *raṅgāvalī*), in Tamil Nadu they are called *kōlam*, in Bengal *ālpanā*, or in Madhya Pradesh *maṇḍana*.

These symmetrical designs similar to a *maṇḍala* are usually placed at the front door of the house; therefore they are also called threshold designs. This is done on certain special ritual occasions, in particular harvest or new year rituals in spring (Baisākhī) or autumn (Dīvālī). The underlying idea is generally that the designs protect the house from danger or bad influences and at the same time invite and welcome auspicious goddesses (Durgā, Pārvatī, Sarasvatī, Lakṣmī). The task of drawing the designs is almost exclusively carried out by women who take great pleasure in creating their own compositions.

The two *raṅgolīs* serving as the cover illustrations for this felicitation volume are part of a collection of *raṅgolīs* documented by Linda Gaenzle in November 2018 during the festival of Tihāḍ (Dīpāvalī) in Swotha, a ward in the Newar city of Patan in the Kathmandu Valley. This is the Festival of Lights, and so at night every house or temple is adorned with rows of lamps—the traditional oil lamps in small clay bowls (*diyo*)—or garlands of colorful electric bulbs. During the five-day celebration crows, dogs, cows, and the Goddess of Wealth are worshipped and the bond between brothers and sisters is renewed. On every morning, new *raṅgolīs* are displayed in front of the entrances of the houses, i.e. on the street in open public space. The responsibility for the drawings is with the women of the house; preferably they are done by the eldest daughter of the household. The explicit purpose of the *raṅgolīs* is to invite the goddess Lakṣmī—who is at the center of the Tihāḍ festival. She is requested to enter the house and give her blessings to all its residents. Lakṣmī is known to provide wealth, health, and good luck.

The designs are drawn in an act of devotion with colored flour or powder, and much care is taken that the auspicious *raṅgolīs* are well-formed and embellished with fresh flowers and small gifts of fruit, such as bananas and

apples. In order to attract the goddess, a little oil lamp is often placed and lighted at the center of the *raṅgolī*. Occasionally foot prints or little arrows made of red color or clay (*rāto māto*) are added, showing Lakṣmī the way from the *raṅgolī* to the kitchen of the house. No chances are taken that she might get lost.

On the next day, the weathered *raṅgolī* is swept away, and a new, fresh one takes its place. Again its creation is carried out artfully and with love and devotion. This procedure of creation and destruction, appearance and disappearance, life and death, is continued until the end of the festival. The art of *raṅgolī* is thus a truly ephemeral kind of art.

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Vienna

## **Part I**

**Abhidharma and Madhyamaka,  
Sanskrit Grammar and Literature,  
Śaivism, Buddhist Hermeneutics  
and Buddhist Art History**



# *Akliṣṭājñāna, vāsanā, jñeyāvaraṇa, and Origins of Mahāyāna\**

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## 0. Preliminaries

In 1998, I published a paper on “The Defects in the *Arhat*’s Enlightenment: His *akliṣṭājñāna* and *vāsanā*.” Subsequently, I wrote two partially related articles: “From Abhidharma to Mahāyāna: Remarks on the Early Abhidharma Doctrine of the Three *yāna*-s” (2011), and “*Prajñā-vimukta, ubhayatobhāga-vimukta* and *vimokṣāvaraṇa*: The Sarvāstivāda Perspective” (2015).

This present paper, while recapitulating the major points in those earlier discussions, offers supplementary discussion relating particularly to the early Mahāyāna conceptions of a Buddha’s Perfect Enlightenment. It is intended to suggest that these conceptions, in the diverse Mahāyāna traditions, largely owed their inspiration to the Abhidharma doctrines of the *akliṣṭājñāna* and *vāsanā*.

## 1. Introduction

Shortly before the Common Era, there developed diverse doctrinal convictions and traditions of praxis, in diverse Buddhist communities, mutually impacting on one another, to eventually result in a distinct movement known as the Mahāyāna. Accordingly, it may not be meaningful to determine an exact “original source” in respect of location, community involved, and so on. These diverse, interacting traditions of doctrines and praxis must have had a common source of inspiration—inasmuch as all Mahāyāna traditions commit to the shared ideal of attainment of Supreme Enlightenment/Buddhahood (*anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi*). This common source, I believe, is the admiration

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\* This is a revised version based on my lecture entitled “*Akliṣṭājñāna, vāsanā* and perfect Buddhahood” delivered under the auspices of the University of Oxford on February 28, 2022, as part of the Lingyin Lecture Series in Buddhist Studies Hilary Term 2022.

for the Buddha's Perfect Wisdom, surpassing that of all his disciples. From this, further consideration of the Buddha's perfections—Great Compassion, Purity, etc.—led to the development of new and distinctively Mahāyāna doctrines.

Already in the early discourses (e.g., SN, *Nālandā-sutta*), we find Sāriputta, the foremost *arahant*, representing Wisdom par excellence in early Buddhism, acknowledging his inability to directly discern the full profundity of a Buddha's Wisdom—he knows it only through inferential knowledge (*anvaye ñāṇa*).

The stress on the superiority of the Buddha's perfection is also seen in the development of the Mahāsāṃghikas.

Mahādeva's "five points" is a clear case in point: *arhats* still have doubts (猶豫) and nescience (無知) explained as ignorance of mundane things like location of a place, etc., and can still have semblance of defilements, etc.

In the Jātaka of the various schools, this superiority is recognized in respect of the Buddha's cultivation of virtues. This is expressed through a summation of the ideal of moral practice and the yearning for the utmost spiritual perfection in the collective psyche of the ancient culture.

At the emergence of the Mahāyāna movement, the new message of "Wisdom-perfection" distinctively signifies that the Mahāyāna spiritual goal is no more just *prajñā*, as was emphasized by the early Buddhist tradition, but its very perfection (*prajñāpāramitā*) in Supreme Enlightenment or Buddhahood.

In this connection, the Sarvāstivāda tradition articulated the doctrine of non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭajñāna*) and the related notion of the defilement-trace (*vāsanā*). Before long, the two notions came to be intermingled: The Buddha alone is perfect in wisdom, because he alone has absolutely abandoned the non-defiled nescience; or, in him alone, all *vāsanā* has been absolutely eradicated. In one form or another, this doctrine came to impact significantly on the Buddhological doctrines of all subsequent schools—Prajñāpāramitā, Yogācāra (including the Tathāgatagarbha School) and even the Pāli commentarial tradition.

## 2. Superiority of the Buddha's wisdom discernible in the Pāli suttas and commentaries

In the *Nālandā-sutta*,<sup>1</sup> Sāriputta expresses his profound conviction in the Buddha's Wisdom (Enlightenment):

I am deeply convinced thus about the Fortunate One: There is not another recluse or brahmin whose supramundane knowledge is superior to the Fortunate One—namely in respect of perfect Enlightenment.

Questioned by the Buddha as to whether he has directly discerned all the minds of the past, present and future Buddhas, or even the mind of the Buddha in front of him, Sāriputta admits that he does not have such a capability. But he has understood thus through *Dhamma*-consequence (*dhhammanvayo vidito*).<sup>2</sup>

The commentary explains:

“*Dhamma*-consequence”: The inferential knowledge arisen following after the application to the knowledge from direct perception of the *Dhamma*; guiding inference has been understood. He says: “Basing on just the knowledge of a disciple's perfection, I understand in this manner.”<sup>3</sup> ...

Their doubts will be abandoned when they see “even a quick-witted disciple like Sāriputta is unable to know the buddhas' mind-states (*cittācāra*).”<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> SN. *Nālandā-sutta*, 159–161: *evaṃ-pasanno ahaṃ, bhante, bhagavati: na ... añño samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā bhagavatā bhiyyobhiññātaro, yad idaṃ sambodhiyaṃ* | ...; Cf. DN. ii, *Samapasādanīya-sutta*, 81–83; SĀ, T2, 130c–131a. All references to the Pāli canon and commentaries refer to the editions of the Pāli Text Society (PTS) and do not appear in the bibliography.

<sup>2</sup> SN. *Nālandā-sutta*: *na kho me, bhante, atītānāgatapaccuppannesu arahantesu sammāsambuddhesu cetopariya-ñāṇaṃ atthi* | *api ca me dhammanvayo vidito* |

<sup>3</sup> *Sāratthappakāsinī* (Burmese edn, vol. 2, 243), *Nālandā-sutta-vañṇanā: dhammanvayoti dhammassa paccakkhato ñāṇassa anuyogaṃ anugantvā uppannaṃ anumānaññāṇaṃ nayaggāho vidito* | *sāvakaaparāmīñāṇe* | *ṭhatvāva iminā ākārena jānāmi bhagavāti vadati* |

<sup>4</sup> *Sāratthappakāsinī* (Burmese edn, vol. 2, 245): “*sāriputtasadiso pi nāma ñāṇajavanasampanno sāvako buddhānaṃ cittācāraṃ jānitum na sakkoti* | *evaṃ appameyyā tathagatāti cintentānaṃ yā tathāgate kaṇkhā vā vimati vā, sā pahīyissatīti* |



This commentary thus suggests that the *sāvaka*'s knowledge, even at its very peak (perfection; *sāvakaṭṭhāna*)—as in the case of Sāriputta—cannot directly discern the Buddha's mind; it can at best infer from his direct experience (*paccakkha*) of the *Dhamma*.

Another early discourse with a similar suggestion is the *Mūlapariyāya-sutta*. It states that the Tathāgata knows Earth, Water, Fire, Air, etc., truly as they are, without conceptualization. Likewise do the *arahants*. However, whereas the latter are described as “having fully known (*pariññātaṃ*),” the Tathāgata is said to “have fully known to the end” (*pariññātantaṃ*)—clearly indicating the superiority and perfection of the Buddha's wisdom over that of the *arahants*.<sup>5</sup>

The commentary explains:

“Known fully to the end”—That is to say: fully known to the utmost, known fully to the final end, fully known without remainder. There is not any difference between the Buddhas and the disciples in respect of abandonment of defilements by the specific paths. However, there is [a difference] in respect of full knowledge (*pariññā*).”<sup>6</sup>

The doctrine that the *arahants* and the Buddha are equally liberated, but differ in respect of knowledge (wisdom), is seen to be systematically emphasized and developed in the Abhidharma tradition (particularly the Indian continental Abhidharma schools), and in the Mahāyāna. In the Pāli commentarial tradition, Ācariya Dhammapāla is also seen to contrast the Buddha's perfect wisdom with the wisdom (/knowledge) of the *sāvakas* and the *paccekabuddhas* in terms of the *vāsanā* doctrine. In fact, it appears that the buddhological doctrines in the *Aṭṭhakathā* and *Ṭīkā* have been considerably influenced by the continental development in this direction.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> MN, *Mūlapariyāya-vagga, sutta* no. 1, 4–6.

<sup>6</sup> *Papañcasūdanī*, 52: *pariññātantaṃ nāma pariññātapāraṃ pariññātāvasānaṃ anavasesato pariññātanti vuttaṃ hoti | buddhānaṃ hi sāvakehi saddhiṃ kiñcāpi tena tena maggena kilesappahāne viseso natthi | pariññāya pana atthi |*

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *infra*, §4.

### 3. The Sarvāstivāda doctrine of the non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*)

Kātyāyanīputra's *Jñānaprasthāna* (=JPŚ, c. 150 BCE) mentions, probably for the first time, a group of five false views, famously ascribed in the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā* (=MVŚ) to Mahādeva and said to result in the first split of the Saṅgha into the Mahāsāṃghika and the Sthaviravāda. But JPŚ does not link them up with Mahādeva nor with first Saṅghabheda. That with regard to their liberation "*arhats* can have nescience," and "doubt" are both judged to be false views abandonable through vision (*darśanaheya*).<sup>8</sup> MVŚ explains:

With regard to his own liberation, the *arhat* has seen it by means of his outflow-free knowledge and is free from nescience. Yet, this [false view] claims that he still has nescience [in this regard]. It then amounts to a denial of the outflow-free knowledge-vision (*jñānadarśana*). It is therefore a false view in its intrinsic nature (*mithyādrṣṭisvabhāva*). It is [said to be] "abandonable through vision"—this indicates that such untrue speculation is abandonable at the time when its antidote (*pratipakṣa*), the knowledge of the path (*mārgajñāna* in the *satyābhisamaya*, i.e., *darśanamārga*), is generated.<sup>9</sup>

This stands clearly in contrast with the developed Sarvāstivāda doctrine of the non-defiled nescience which came to be articulated to be abandonable through cultivation (*bhāvanāheya*. See §3.2).

Likewise, the Pāli *Kathāvatthu* discusses the view that *arahants* still have *aññāṇa* and *kaṇkhā*, and its *Aṭṭhakathā* ascribes them to the Pubbaseliyas; but again, with no ascription to Mahādeva. Although there a notion of "*akiliṭṭhāññāṇa*" is not attested, the Theravādins conclude that *aññāṇa* of worldly things does not affect the *arahants*' liberation.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> T26, 956b1–15.

<sup>9</sup> MVŚ, 510b23–27.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Aung and Rhys Davids 1960: 114–119.

### 3.1. The Buddha's wisdom alone knows the *sāmānya*- as well as *sva-lakṣaṇa*s of all existents

The *Dharmaskandha*, one of the earliest canonical Abhidharma texts, speaks of the Buddha being so called because he is “endowed with all knowledge-  
vision with regard to all object-domains.”<sup>11</sup>

Another early canonical text, the *Prajñapti*, states that the *Pratyekabuddhas* are incapable of teaching the Dharma. Only the Buddha, fully endowed with both *sarvajñatā* / *sarvajñāna* and *sarvākārajñāna*, is truly capable of doing so:<sup>12</sup>

The Buddha always abides in equipoise on account of his freedom of thought (*cittavaiśitva*). He is unhindered in entering and exiting [the equipoises], at no time relinquishing the cognitive object. This is not the case with the Śrāvakas. They are unlike the Bhagavat who is fully omniscient (*thams cad mkhyen pa*; *sarvajña*; 具一切智); his knowledge and mental mastery of thought have reached perfection.<sup>13</sup>

With regard to the twelve abodes (*āyatana*), MVŚ contrasts Śāriputra's knowledge with the Buddha's perfect knowledge. The Buddha excels in having both omniscience (*sarvajñāna*, *sarvajñatā*) as well as the all-mode knowledge (*sarvākārajñāna*)—he knows by himself both the common characteristics (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) as well as the specific characteristics (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) of each of the twelve abodes:

Q: With regard to the twelve *āyatanas* (=all knowables), does Śāriputra have only knowledge derived from teachings (教智; *āgamajñāna*) and not realization-knowledge (證智; *adhigamajñāna*)?

A: He also has realization-knowledge—he also directly knows (證知; *adhi-√gam*) each of the twelve *āyatanas* non-erroneously.

Q: Both the Buddha and Śāriputra directly know each of them non-erroneously—what difference is there between the Buddha and Śāriputra?

<sup>11</sup> T vol. 26, 461c5–8.

<sup>12</sup> MVŚ, 906a14–15

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Toh 4087, *bstan 'gyur*, *mnyon pa*, vol. ai: 51a: *nyan thos ni de lta ma yin pa'i phyir ro // gzhan yang sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das ni thams cad mkhyen pa yin te / ye shes dang / dbang gi pha rol tu phyin pa yin la* /; 《施設論》 T26, 526a14–16: 世尊具一切智；智、

A: With regard to each of the twelve *āyatana*s, [i] the Buddha directly knows their specific characteristics and common characteristics. Venerable Śāriputra directly knows their common characteristics, not so their intrinsic characteristics: There are immeasurable particularities (差別; *viśeṣa*) subsumed within the twelve-*āyatana dharma*s. Śāriputra can only know them through others' unraveling. [ii] Moreover, it is through others' instruction that Śāriputra comes to directly know each of the twelve *āyatana*s. In the Buddha's case, he does so through his own awakening, not through others' instruction. [iii] Moreover, with regard to the twelve *āyatana*s, the Buddha possesses both omniscience and the all-mode knowledge; Śāriputra has only omniscience, not the all-mode knowledge.<sup>14</sup>

For the Sarvāstivādas, as for the Sautrāntikas, knowledge of the twelve *āyatana*s is knowledge of all existents.<sup>15</sup> On Vasubandhu's description of the Buddha's perfect knowledge as resulting from the absolute destruction of all defiled and non-defiled nescience with regard to all knowables (*jñeya*), Yaśomitra comments:

With regard to all knowables—with regard to that having the characteristics of the twelve *āyatana*s. This follows from the [*Sarva*]-*sūtra* statement: "O brahmins, 'all,' 'all'—it is no more than just the twelve *āyatana*s."<sup>16</sup>

### 3.2. The non-defiled nescience is not *avidyā*; it is *bhāvanāheya*. A Buddha alone fully abandons and renders it incapable of manifestation, and is thus unhindered in his discernment of all knowables

In the context of discussing false views in the MVŚ, we get a clearer description of the non-defiled nescience. This corresponds to the second of two types of false knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) that are spoken of: defiled (*kliṣṭa*) and non-defiled (*akliṣṭa*). The Buddha alone is said to be totally free from both, as well as having rendered them absolutely incapable of manifesting:

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心得自在，已到彼岸。

<sup>14</sup> MVŚ, 382c19–383a4.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Sar Abhi, §2.4.1.2.

<sup>16</sup> Vy, 4: *sarvasmin jñeye dvādaśāyatanalakṣaṇe | sarvaṃ sarvaṃ iti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva*

Q: What is this false knowledge [which sees a non-existent as existent (無有智)]?

A: This is the non-veiled-non-defined (*anivṛtāvyaṅkṛta*) knowledge, to be abandoned by cultivation (*bhāvanāheya*) and pertaining to the sensuality-sphere, which operates erroneously. E.g., it generates such thoughts as a man with regard to a post, and a post with regard to a man, ...

There are two kinds of false knowledge: 1. defiled, 2. non-defiled. The defiled one is associated with ignorance (*avidyā*), the non-defiled one, such as that which generates the thought of a man with regard to a bare tree, is not.

As for the defiled one, both the disciples (*śrāvaka*) and the solitary buddhas (*pratyekabuddha*) can completely abandon it, as well as render it incapable of manifesting (現行; *saṃmukhī-√bhū*, *saṃudā-√car*). As for the non-defiled one, though it can be completely abandoned by the *śrāvakas* and the *pratyekabuddhas*, it can still manifest in them. It is only in the case of the Tathāgata that it absolutely (*atyantam*) does not manifest any more, as he has permanently abandoned the defilements (*kleśa*) as well as the perfuming/traces (*vāsanā*). It is for this reason that he alone is called a 'Perfectly Enlightened One' (*samyaksambuddha*).

... The non-defiled false knowledge is a false knowledge from the conventional standpoint, not from the absolute standpoint, not being associated with the false *dharma*s of defilement.<sup>17</sup>

A practitioner comes to be called a “*bodhisattva*” on account of the Supreme Perfect Enlightenment (*anuttarā samyaksambodhiḥ*). Why is it that before this attainment, he continues to be called a “*bodhisattva*,” but comes to be renamed as a “*buddha*” upon its attainment? The following are among the several reasons given by MVŚ:

- [i] All defiled and non-defiled delusions are absolutely abandoned.
- [ii] He discerns all knowables (*jñeya*) pertaining to both the absolute (*paramārtha*) and conventional [levels].

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*dvādaśāyatanānīti sūtre vacanāt |*

<sup>17</sup> MVŚ, 42b16–42c4.

- [iii] He is capable of enlightening immeasurable sentient beings, benefitting them accordingly as their [diverse] capacities (*indriya*) and dispositions.<sup>18</sup>

There are several important points to be noted in the above two passages. Firstly, the reasons stated in the second passage as being among the unique excellences in the signification of being “enlightened,” highlight a Buddha’s absolute abandonment of the “non-defiled delusion” in addition to the defiled one—and hence his ability to discern all knowables (*jñeya*). This can be seen to echo the doctrine that Buddhahood is attained when the hindrance to the knowables is absolutely removed along with the absolute removal of the non-defiled nescience.

Secondly, the specification in the first passage that the non-defiled nescience/delusion is “abandonable through cultivation” is noteworthy. This distinguishes it from any defiled false view—such as that mentioned by JPŚ (§3 above)—which is necessarily “abandonable through vision.”<sup>19</sup> As a matter of fact, it is a specific Sarvāstivāda doctrine that “neither the non-defiled nor matter is abandonable through vision.”<sup>20</sup> We shall return to this point after examining the doctrine of the *vimokṣāvaraṇa* in §3.4.

Thirdly, in this first passage, a Buddha’s absolute abandonment of the non-defiled nescience—such that it can never manifest in him—is further stated to be on account of his permanent abandonment of both the defilements as well as their traces/perfuming (*vāsanā*). We thus see here the Buddhological development in which perfect Buddhahood/Enlightenment is conceived in terms of both notions: *akliṣṭājñāna* and *vāsanā*.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> MVŚ, 887a24-b12.

<sup>19</sup> MVŚ, 328c20–27, explains the different manners in which a *prthagjana* on the one hand, and an *ārya* on the other, abandon the *darśanaheya* and *bhāvanāheya* defilements. See also Dhammajoti (2021: n. 89).

<sup>20</sup> AKB, 29: *nāsti kiṃcid akliṣṭaṃ darśanaprahātavyaṃ nāpi rūpaṃ* |. See also Dhammajoti (2021: n. 93).

<sup>21</sup> For this, see further, §3.

### 3.3. Non-defiled nescience in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and its sub-commentaries

At the commencement of his *Abhidharmakośa* and the auto-commentary, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (=AKB), Vasubandhu expounds on the *akliṣṭājñāna* doctrine in essentially the same manner as what we have seen in the MVŚ above. Noticeably in this context, the Buddha is distinguished from the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas entirely in respect of his absolute abandonment of the *akliṣṭājñāna*.<sup>22</sup>

Vasubandhu describes the Buddha's absolute abandonment of the *akliṣṭājñāna* and attainment thereby of perfect unhindered knowledge as constituting his "accomplishment in respect of the practice of self-benefaction" (*ātmahitapratipattisaṃpat*). His "accomplishment in respect of the practice of other-benefaction" (*parahitapratipattisaṃpat*) is described as his compassionate uplifting of sentient beings from the mire of *saṃsāra*, which qualifies him as "the teacher who accords with truth (*yathārthaśāstā*)."<sup>23</sup> Saṃghabhadra here correlates this twofold accomplishment with the Buddha's threefold virtues (德; *guṇa*), providing us with a clearer picture of the buddhological doctrines relating to these notions hitherto developed:

<sup>22</sup> AKB, 1: "'Who has in all ways destroyed darkness of all' (*sarvathāsarvavatāndhakāraḥ*)—who has destroyed darkness in all manners, with regard to all. Nescience (*ajñāna*) is darkness because it obstructs the seeing of things in their true nature (*bhūtārthadarśana*). And that is absolutely destroyed because the Fortunate One, the Buddha, on account of acquiring its antidote, has [realized] the state of its non-re-arising (*punaranutpattidharmatva*) with regard to all the knowables (*jñeya*) in all ways. Hence, he is 'one who has destroyed in all ways darkness of all.' Granted that the solitary buddhas and disciples too are those who have destroyed darkness with regard to all, being absolutely free from the defiled delusion (*kliṣṭasaṃmoha*); but no in every way. This is because they definitely have the non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*) with regard to the [unique] qualities of the Buddha (*[āveṇika-]buddhadharma*), extremely remote space and time, and things of infinite complexities."

法寶 Fabao's sub-commentary of AKB too states explicitly that the Śrāvakas' and Pratyekabuddhas' "not having abandoned the *akliṣṭājñāna*" means that they have not acquired its non-arising (T41, 461b21–23). See Dhammajoti (1998), §6.2. For mention in AKB of the Buddha's abandonment of *vāsanā*, see Dhammajoti (1998), §5.2.

<sup>23</sup> AKB, 1.

On account of his endowment of both the virtues of knowledge and abandonment, he accomplishes self-benefaction.<sup>24</sup> On account of his endowment of the virtue of service (*upakāra*), he accomplishes self-benefaction. Why? On account of the destruction of darkness in all ways, his knowledge-virtue is accomplished. On account of the absolute destruction of darkness with regard to all object-domains, his abandonment-virtue is accomplished. On account of uplifting sentient beings from the mire of *saṃsāra* by giving his hand of the True-dharma teaching (*saddharmadeśanāhastapradāna*), his service-virtue is accomplished.

The Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have destroyed all darkness; but not yet in every way. They have therefore not achieved the all-mode knowledge. Because they have not acquired the knowledge in which all specific nesciences do not manifest, and because they lack the knowledge of the dispositions and propensities (意樂隨眠; *āśāyānuśaya*) [of all sentient beings], they cannot uplift all sentient beings accordingly as appropriate. On account of [thus] not having accomplished self-benefaction and other-benefaction, they are not called teachers despite being possessed of noble virtues. ...<sup>25</sup>

In the context of the MVŚ discussion cited above on the erroneous understanding the non-existent as existent, different views on its nature are discussed: Some opine that it is a view (*drṣṭi*); others, a knowledge (*jñāna*); yet others, a *prajñā*. The MVŚ compilers conclude that: it is “the non-veiled-non-defined knowledge, abandonable by cultivation, and pertaining to the sensuality-sphere, which operates erroneously.” (§3.2 above) It appears that even in Saṃghabhadra’s time (c. 5<sup>th</sup> century CE), various views of the *akliṣṭājñāna* still persist: Some assert that it is a merely the absence of knowledge;<sup>26</sup> some, a *citta*; some, a specific thought-concomitant (*caitta-viśeṣa*), etc. The Dārṣṭāntika master, Rāma, asserts that it is a perfuming (*vāsanā*).<sup>27</sup> Saṃghabhadra, however, distinguishes in detail the non-defiled

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Vy, 5: *ātmahitapratipattisampat phalanīṣpattir ity arthaḥ | sā ceyam sampat jñāna-prahāṇasampatsvabhāvā veditavyā |*

<sup>25</sup> Ny, 329a13–25.

<sup>26</sup> Ny, 501c24–25: 不染無知唯智非有。

<sup>27</sup> Ny, 502b13–14: 大德邏摩作如是說：有不染法名為習氣；如不善因所招異熟。 See also below, §4.1



nescience from the defiled one, and articulately argues to establish that it is a real entity (not a mere concept), a distinct *dharma* (*dharmāntara*)—the universal thought-concomitant (*caitta*) *prajñā*, operating as a non-defiled inferior or weak knowledge.<sup>28</sup> His specification of the *akliṣṭājñāna* is very much in keeping with the Sarvāstivāda doctrinal system: (1) Being a universal thought-concomitant, it arises in every thought moment—until the practitioner becomes a Buddha. (2) Being *prajñā* in its intrinsic nature, it functions as an understanding. (3) Being undefiled-undefined—non-veiled-non-defined (*anivṛtāvyaḥṛta*)<sup>29</sup>—it is itself not of the nature of a defilement, and in fact can continuously coexist with a mental *dharma* of any moral species.

Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (=Vy) offers little elucidation on the doctrine, but does provide some more exemplifications of the *akliṣṭājñāna*—the cases of Maudgalyāyana not knowing the very distant location of his suffering mother; Śāriputra unable to discern the distant temporal point when a seeker formerly had planted his skillful seeds; etc.<sup>30</sup>

### 3.4. *vimokṣāvaraṇa* and non-retrogressibility<sup>31</sup>

MVŚ links the non-defiled nescience to the “liberation-hindrane” (*vimokṣāvaraṇa*), a notion already attested in the Sarvāstivādin *Śaṅgīti-paryāya* and other canonical Abhidharma treatises, and is therein linked to the highest of the set of Eight Noble Persons—the one “liberated in both parts” (*ubhayatobhāgavimukta*). In the *Śaṅgītparyāya* discussion, we see that the hindrance in respect of liberation is distinct from that in respect of defilement. The person “liberated in both parts” is one whose thought is completely liberated from both aspects of hindrance:

Who is he called an “*ubhayatobhāgavimukta-pudgala*”?

<sup>28</sup> For details, see Dhammajoti (1998), §7.2.

<sup>29</sup> E.g., in the discussion on the *vimokṣāvaraṇa* (Ny, 724b15–17; see also §3.4 below), Saṃghabhadra speaks of it as being “a weak nescience, non-veiled-non-defiled (i.e., the *akliṣṭājñāna*) . . .”

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Vy, 5. See Dhammajoti (1998), §6.2.

<sup>31</sup> Dhammajoti (2015), §4, §5.

Hindrance is of two parts (分; *bhāga*)—defilement-part (*kleśabhāga*) and liberation-part (*vimokṣabhāga*). This is called “*ubhayatobhāga*.” With regard to both these parts (/aspects) of hindrance, such a person’s thought (*citta*) is liberated, utterly liberated, absolutely liberated.<sup>32</sup>

MVŚ records, without making judgement, several opinions on the nature of the liberation-hindrane.<sup>33</sup> The first opinion mentioned in that context asserts that it is a weak/inferior nescience (下無智; *mṛdvajñāna*).<sup>34</sup>

Describing the seven types of Noble Person, AKB distinguishes the last two, *prajñāvimukta* (“liberated through wisdom”) and *ubhayatobhāgavimukta*, thus:

[An *arhat*] who obtains the cessation-attainment (*nirodhasamāpatti*) is called an *ubhayatobhāgavimukta*, because of being liberated from [both] the defilement-hindrane and the liberation-hindrane by the power of ‘wisdom’ (*prajñā*) and equipoise (*samādhi*) [respectively]. The other [type of *arhat*] is a *prajñāvimukta*, because of being liberated merely from the defilement-hindrane through the power of wisdom.<sup>35</sup>

In Ny, Saṃghabhadra repeats Vasubandhu’s explanation above. We may understand the Vaibhāṣika view here as follows: The highest attainment of spiritual liberation consists in the absolute eradication of both the hindrance *qua* defilement and the hindrance to the mastery of the meditative attainment. The latter hindrance, referred to as the “attainment hindrance” (*samāpatty-āvaraṇa*), is in fact the hindrance to the perfect state of the *citta*—since, in the context of the threefold training (*śikṣā*) of *śīla–samādhi–prajñā* and *adhiśīla–adhicitta–adhiprajñā*, “*samādhi*” and “*citta*” are equivalent in signification.

<sup>32</sup> T26, 436a4–10; for full description of all seven *ārya-puḍgalas*, see *ibid*, 435b15–436a10.

<sup>33</sup> Yaśomitra (Vy, 597) too claims that “it is the inaptitude or non-pliability of the mind and body due to which one is unable to generate the *vimokṣas*.” (*tat punaḥ kāyacittayor akarmaṇyatā, yayā vimokṣān utpādayituṃ na śaknoti*) This of course is quite unlike Saṃghabhadra’s view that the liberation-hindrane must be a distinct real entity, the *akliṣṭājñāna*.

<sup>34</sup> See Dhammajoti (2015), §4.1.

<sup>35</sup> AKB, 381: *yo nirodhasamāpattilābhī sa ubhayatobhāgavimuktaḥ | prajñāsamādhibalābhyāṃ kleśavimokṣāvaraṇavimuktatvāt | itaraḥ prajñāvimuktaḥ | prajñābalena kevalaṃ kleśāvaraṇavimuktatvāt |*

Samghabhadra, immediately after repeating Vasubandhu's explanation above, inquires into the nature of this liberation-hindrane:

What is it that is called the nature of the liberation-hindrane? An *arhat*, having liberated the *citta*, seeks further liberation, in order to be liberated from the hindrance [of liberation] (cf. end of §3): In the liberations that are hindered, there exists an inferior nescience (*ajñāna*) which is non-veiled-non-defined (*anivṛtāvyaṅkṛta*), and which is of the nature of hindering liberation. This is the intrinsic nature (體) of the liberation-hindrane. When one acquires detachment (*vairāgya*) from a particular sphere (*dhātu*), one has abandoned it without any remainder and liberation is arisen. However, it is only when it no longer becomes active (*samudā-√car*) that one is said to have been liberated from it.<sup>36</sup>

As MVŚ proclaims, all Buddhas are in fact *ubhayatobhāgavimukta*,<sup>37</sup> while *arhats* may be either *prajñāvimukta* or *ubhayatobhāgavimukta*.<sup>38</sup> The highest or absolute spiritual liberation is achieved only when the non-defiled nescience—in the form of a force hindering the perfect state of the *citta* and the perfect mastery of *samāpatti/samādhi*—is not only abandoned but also rendered absolutely incapable of manifestation. This is in keeping with Vasubandhu's statement above, of the unique perfection of the Buddha's wisdom.

### 3.4.1. *Akliṣṭājñāna* and the retrogressible and non-retrogressible *arhats*

For the Sarvāstivādas, the possibility of an *arhat*'s retrogression is on account of the possibility of his retrogressing from the abandonment of defilements. The latter fact, in turn, is necessarily linked with the doctrine of tritemporal existence of *dharmas*—in this case, of the defilements. MVŚ explains:

When an *arhat* abandons defilements, it is not that he renders them totally non-existent (全無); for, the characteristics of their [temporal] modes (性相; *bhāvalakṣaṇa*) as past and future defilements still exist truly (實有; *dravyato 'sti*). At the time when the path counteracting the defilement has not manifested in his serial continuity, the defilement is

<sup>36</sup> Ny, 724b14–18.

<sup>37</sup> E.g. MVŚ, 279a3.

<sup>38</sup> MVŚ, 553c7–8.

said to be not yet abandoned. At the time when the path counteracting the defilement has manifested in his serial continuity, he abandons the acquisition of connection (*saṃyogaprāpti*) [with the defilement] and attains the acquisition of its disconnection (*visaṃyoga*), he is not endowed (*samanvāgata*) with the defilement (i.e., he no more continues to be linked with the defilement *via* the acquisition-series), he is said to have abandoned the defilement.

It should be stated thus: The cultivation of the noble path is a marvellous thing—it results in an *arhat*'s abandonment of defilements, and yet not in their non-existence. For this reason, the Venerable Ghosaka asserts: “When a defilement is not active (𑖀𑖦; *samudā-√car*) in the personal being, it is said to be abandoned. It is not made totally non-existent. Just as, when one says that Devadatta is not present in the house, it does not mean that Devadatta is also not present anywhere else. The same should be understood in the case of a defilement being abandoned, since what is past is [still] existent. When the conditions for retrogression obtain, it serves as the cause inducing a future defilement to arise.<sup>39</sup> Hence, there must be the possibility of retrogression [of an *arhat*].<sup>40</sup>

The Sarvāstivādas speak of six types of *arhats*: (1) Those susceptible to retrogression or ‘falling away’ (*parihāṇadharman*); (2) those who can end their lives at will (*cetanādharman*); (3) those who guard themselves (*anurakṣaṇadharman*); (4) those who are abiding firmly (*sthitākampya*); (5) those capable of penetration (*prativedhanādharman*); (6) those not susceptible to being shaken (*akopyadharman*). Of these, the first five, said to be “circumstantially liberated” (*samayavimukta*) or those “whose liberation of mind is circumstantial and dear” (*sāmayikī kāntā cetovimuktiḥ*) are susceptible to retrogression. The sixth, said to be “non-circumstantially liberated” (*asamayavimukta*), are non-retrogressible.<sup>41</sup> In contrast, the Sautrāntikas maintain that no *arhat* is retrogressible.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>39</sup> A past *dharma* continues to be existent; while no more capable of exercising its activity (*kāritra*), it can still exercise causal efficacy for the arising of other *dharma*s. Cf. Sar Abhi, §3.

<sup>40</sup> MVŚ, 312c10–21.

<sup>41</sup> See AKB, 372 f.

<sup>42</sup> AKB, 375: *arhattvād api nāsti parihāṇir iti sautrāntikāḥ* | See also Vasubandhu; cf. Ny, 711c2–43.

The Vaibhāṣika doctrine is that an *arhat* does not retrogress from the abandonment of the *darśanaheya* defilements. On the other hand, in the *bhāvanāmārga* subsequent to the *darśanamārga*, retrogression is possible with respect to a *bhāvanāheya* defilement if the *arhat*'s *jñāna* is weak. On account of the weak nature of the *jñāna*, a defilement, though already abandoned, can still manifest—hence, retrogression. Saṃghabhadra states:

Our school concedes that [an *arhat*] who has been a retrogressible type, has not realized the non-arising of the *kleśa*, even though he has already abandoned them, due to the feeble strength of his *jñāna*. . . .

“Abandoning” is from the point of view of the arising of the antidote-path which uproots the seed-like *prāpti* of the *kleśa*. It is not a requirement that the *kleśa* must absolutely be incapable of arising; for they will arise again for those whose *jñāna* is feeble.<sup>43</sup>

“Those whose *jñāna* is feeble” are those in whom the non-defiled nescience is present. This spells out the role of the non-defiled nescience, the presence of which prevents the perfection of both equipoise and wisdom, and renders possible the retrogression from the abandonment of a *bhāvanāheya* defilement. This aligns with the doctrine that the non-defiled nescience is *bhāvanāheya* (above, §3.2). In the final analysis, it amounts to that: Although the non-defiled nescience seems to have been originated, or at least explicitly stressed, as a doctrine relating the cognitive deficiency, it had later also come to be related to the issues of meditative hindrance and of the absolute abandonment of defilements. Even though the *arhats* are said to be those “whose outflows are exhausted” (*kṣīṇāsraṇa*), the absolute abandonment of defilements is truly effectuated only when the non-defiled nescience is rendered absolutely incapable of further manifestation: At the culmination of the *bhāvanāmārga* and the threshold of *arhat*-hood, he abandons the remaining *bhāvanāheya* defilements when the “knowledge of exhaustion” (*kṣayaajñāna*) is acquired along with the acquisition (*prāpti*) of the *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*. But it is only in the case of an *arhat* capable of generating the “knowledge of non-arising” (*anutpādaajñāna*) in the immediately following moment—the case of the unshakable (*akopya*) *arhat*—that the abandoned defilements are rendered incapable of future re-manifestation by virtue of the acquisition of their *aprasaṃkhyānirodha*.

<sup>43</sup> Ny, 716a4–10.

The “knowledge of exhaustion” is immediately preceded by the *vajra*-like equipoise (*vajropamasamādhi*), so called because it is so powerful that whatever defilements remaining in the practitioners all come to be abandoned.<sup>44</sup> This is the last non-resistible or uninterrupted (/unhindered) path (*ānantaryamārga*) in the *bhāvanāmārga*.<sup>45</sup> The last liberation-path (*vimuktimārga*) that arises immediately after is the knowledge of exhaustion. Following this, the weak-faculty *arhats*, the retrogressive ones, cannot generate the knowledge of non-arising. In the case of the unshakable ones, its generation ensures non-retrogression. As to the non-defiled nescience, it can be absolutely abandoned and rendered incapable of manifestation only in the case of a Buddha through the acquisition of its *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* at the time of the *Vajra*-like equipoise. Puguang describes the process as follows:

In the case of the Bodhisattva, this *akliṣṭājñāna* is abandoned gradually in different stages during the three *asaṃkhyeyakalpas* (preceding his Enlightenment). It is at the stage of the *Vajra*-like equipoise that it is completely abandoned. In the case of the two *yānas* (*śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*), there can be partial, but no complete abandonment. “Abandonment” here refers to its non-arising as a result of the acquisition of its *apratisaṃkhyānirodha*. It is not in terms of its *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*—in terms of the *pratisaṃkhyānirodha*, the abandonment is not different among the three *yānas*.

... It is when [the Bodhisattva] attains the *vajropamasamādhi* that he abandons it in toto, and acquires its *apratisaṃkhyānirodha*. ... [This is because:] it is when he attains the *Vajra*-like equipoise that the specific conditions for the *akliṣṭājñāna* come to be deficient. Thus, it is at this stage that its *apratisaṃkhyānirodha* is acquired.<sup>46</sup>

According to the Abhidharma doctrine of “sublimation (/refining) of faculties” (*indriyottāpana*, *indriyottāpanā*) or “progressive transformation” (*indriya-saṃcāra*), the practitioners—other than the unshakable *arhats* who retrogress

<sup>44</sup> MVŚ, 142c2–4: In fact, if a sentient who has never abandoned any bondage is capable of generating this *samādhi*, at that very moment all his defilements—whether *darśanaheya* or *bhāvanāheya*—are at once abandoned. AKB, 452: *yaś caturthadhyāne vajropamaḥ samādhīḥ sa āsravakṣayāya samādhībhāvanā* | See Sar Abhi, §12.9.3.1 f, §12.10.6, §16.1.2, etc.

<sup>45</sup> See also discussion on *vāsanā*, §4

<sup>46</sup> 《俱舍論記》 T41, 6b20–c3. Dhammajoti (2021), §4.3.

neither in respect of family (*gotra*) nor of fruit—can practice to transform an acquired inferior spiritual family (*gotra*) to one that is superior. E.g., from the *parihāṇadharman* family to the *cetanādharmā* family, from a circumstantially liberated *arhat* to one who is unshakable, etc. Saṃghabhadra underscores its sole purpose as the ultimate achievement of the non-manifestation of the non-defiled nescience:

The great Abhidharma masters under whom I have learned unani-  
mously assert that all sublimation of faculties is for the purpose of elim-  
inating the manifestation of the non-veiled-non-defined (*anivṛtāvyaṅkṛta*)  
nescience brought about by virtue of the *darśanaheya* and *bhāvanāheya*  
defilements. Thus, for one practicing the sublimation of faculties at the  
trainee stage, it is precisely for eliminating that brought about by the  
*darśanaheya* defilements; for one practicing the sublimation of faculties  
at the non-trainee stage, it is precisely for eliminating that brought  
about by the *bhāvanāheya* defilements. Accordingly, as the number of  
irresistible- and liberation-paths generated when he is abandoning those  
defilements that bring about it, correspondingly is the number of paths  
which abandon the manifestation of the nescience brought about by  
them. For this reason, when a non-trainee is practicing the sublimation  
of faculties, he uses nine irresistible paths and nine liberation-paths. For  
a trainee practicing sublimation of faculties, he uses one [irresistible and  
one liberation] path. ...<sup>47</sup>

#### 4. *Akliṣṭājñāna*, *vāsanā* and the Buddha's perfect wisdom

As we saw above (§3.2), already in the MVŚ, the Buddha alone is said to be Perfectly Enlightened because in him alone the *akliṣṭājñāna* absolutely does not manifest anymore; and this is accounted for in terms of his absolute abandonment of all defilements along with their traces (*vāsanā*).<sup>48</sup> No definition of *vāsanā* is found therein. But several examples are provided which suggest the notion that *vāsanā* is not defilement in nature. One is in the context of explaining why the Buddha sometimes scolds his disciples, calling them “deluded person” (*moha-puruṣa*). MVŚ states that this is for the sake of protecting them where appropriate, and spiritually benefitting them.

<sup>47</sup> Ny, 723a15–24.

<sup>48</sup> For a recent full-scale discussion on the doctrinal development of the *vāsanā* notion, see Gao (2020).

The Buddha has absolutely abandoned greed and hatred, ... destroyed the root of conceit. He is completely illumined with regard to all *dharma*s. He is free from semblances (*sādrśya*) of greed, hatred, conceit, etc, since he has absolutely abandoned defilements and *vāsanā*. This is unlike the case of the *pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas* who, though having abandoned defilements still possess their traces (餘習; *vāsanā*).<sup>49</sup> The case of greed-perfuming/trace (*rāgavāsanā*) is like Venerable Ānanda who has a certain weakness (sympathetic) towards the Śākya<sup>50</sup>s. The case of hatred-perfuming (*dveṣavāsanā*) is like Pilinda Vatsa who says to the Gangā goddess: “You Vṛṣala! Stop the flow! I want to cross over now.” The case of conceit-perfuming (*mānavāsanā*) is like Venerable Śāriputra who throws away medicines. The case of delusion-perfuming is that like Gavāṃpati who spits out [the cud like a cow] before eating; he knows the food has not been digested; but not being aware of the suffering that follows, he continues to eat (chew).<sup>49</sup> Such examples are numerous.

Although the Bhagavat is free from *vāsanā*, he nevertheless occasionally utters words that resemble greed ...; ... that resemble hatred ...; ... that resemble conceit ...; ... that resemble delusion. ...

Q: Why does the Buddha utter words that resemble greed etc.?

A: In order to protect, [in an appropriate manner], those who are fit to be guided (所化田; *vineya-kṣetra*), and spiritually benefitting them. ...

Q: Why is it that the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, though having abandoned defilements, still possess their traces; but not so the Buddha?

A: The wisdom fire of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* is not fierce. [With it], though the *kleśa* is abandoned, the *vāsanā* remains. It is like the case of ordinary fire in the world: Though it can consume a thing, it leaves behind ashes. The Buddha’s wisdom is fierce; it consumes the *kleśa* without leaving behind any *vāsanā*, like the fire at the end of a *kalpa* which consumes everything in its way leaving no ash behind.<sup>50</sup>

The notion that the two *yānas*, while free from all defilements, still possess *vāsanās* which cause semblances of defilements, manifested in certain be-

<sup>49</sup> His story of having the *vāsanā* (餘習) derived from having been a cow for hundreds of lives found in several sources; e.g., 《佛說處處經》T17, 527a2–5; DZDL, 252b1–2, 260c22–23; etc.

<sup>50</sup> MVŚ, 77a22–c8. For the simile of the fire at the end of a *kalpa*, see DZDL, cited in



havioural contortion, came to be shared by masters of other traditions, including the Theravāda commentaries (§2) and the Mahāyāna *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras* (see §5.1.2). It also reminds us of the so-called “Mahādeva’s five points” which collaterally allege that an *arhat* still possesses non-defiled type of nescience and that he can have nocturnal emissions, etc.<sup>51</sup>

The origin of the doctrine that *vāsanā*, though perfumed by defilements, are nonetheless distinct from them, is yet to be fully determined. In MVŚ, as we have seen, this doctrine is used by the Sarvāstivāda masters along with that of the non-defiled nescience. But these masters are also seen to use the term *vāsanā* in the more generic sense, as either an impregnation outside the context of defilements, or as perfuming without the said specialized sense. For instance, MVŚ speaks of the *vāsanās* (習氣) of the *mahābhūtas* as being weak and non-enduring, unlike *vāsanās* that are *kuśala* or *akuśala* which are firm.<sup>52</sup> It asserts that *āhrīkyā* and *anapatrāpyā*, though exclusively *akuśala*, are not designated as among the proclivities (*anuśaya*) because their *vāsanās* are feeble and easily perishable—as the fire of grasses and leaves, generating heat that subsides easily—whereas the proclivities are characterized as having strong *vāsanās*.<sup>53</sup> In this latter case, *vāsanā* would seem to be the subtler counterpart of the associated defilement, rather than being totally different in nature from defilement—non-veiled and non-defined—as is the non-defiled nescience. In this connection, we may also notice that Saṃghabhadra also speaks of *vāsanā* as a form of *bīja* doctrine of the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas.<sup>54</sup> Nevertheless, the doctrine in the above-quoted passage is clear: (1) Defilement on the one hand, and *vāsanā* and non-defiled nescience on the other, are two distinct things. (2) The persistent presence of *vāsanā* in the two *yānas* even when their defilements are totally abandoned is on account of their wisdom being of insufficient strength—on account of the operation of the non-defiled nescience. We shall see that this MVŚ understanding is essentially echoed by the 5th century Saṃghabhadra (§4.1).

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## §5.2.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Dhammajoti (1998), 69f.

<sup>52</sup> MVŚ, 685a25–b1.

<sup>53</sup> MVŚ, 180a6–17.

<sup>54</sup> Ny, 398b2–29.

When we examine the early *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, we find that the Buddha's perfection in Wisdom is almost explained exclusively in terms of his absolute eradication of the defilements along with their *vāsanās* (see below, §5.1.2). If we consider the close connection of the Mahāsāṃghikas with the *Prajñāpāramitā* development,<sup>55</sup> then it seems probable that the articulated *vāsanā* doctrine under discussion could have been first developed by the Mahāsāṃghikas. In any case, this Mahāsāṃghika (and Vibhajjavāda) doctrine is certainly known by the MVŚ compilers, as is evident in the discussion below on the Buddha's physical body: Is it with-outflow, or outflow-free?

The Vibhajjavādins and the Mahāsāṃghika masters maintain that the Buddha's physical body comprises outflow-free *dharma*s. ... Moreover, they assert that since the Buddha has absolutely abandoned all defilements together with their *vāsanās* (一切煩惱并習氣皆永斷), how can his physical body be with-outflow? The [JPŚ] discussion here is for the sake of refuting their claim and make known one's own tenets.<sup>56</sup>

However, it should be noted that the MVŚ compilers themselves too, utilize this notion of *vāsanā* to distinguish the Buddha from the *arhats*. In the above-cited discussion, MVŚ proceeds to argue that when the Sūtra speaks of the Tathāgata not being defiled by the "eight worldly *dharma*s" (*aṣṭalokadharmas*), it is not intended that his body is outflow-free. The Buddha is said to be non-conforming to them and undefiled by them; the Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas are to the contrary. The major reason for this difference is that the latter still possess their semblances:

The *arhats*, though having abandoned craving and hatred, still possess the residual traces (餘習; *vāsanatā/vāsanā*) resembling craving and hatred ... they are therefore not regarded as being undefiled by the worldly *dharma*s. The Buddha alone has absolutely eradicated the *vāsanās* of craving and hatred. ... Moreover, when the Buddha acquires gains, he does not feel elated, because he has abandoned the *vāsanā* of

<sup>55</sup> Consider, for instance, the tradition that the Prakritic version of the *Aṣṭasāhaśrikā Prajñāpāramitā* was said to have been possessed by the Pūrva- and Aparā-śailya subsects of the Mahāsāṃghikas (cf. e.g., Warder 2000: 347).

<sup>56</sup> MVŚ, 871c2–8.

conceit. ... When he is praised, he does not feel delighted, because he has abandoned the *vāsanā* of arrogance. ...<sup>57</sup>

MVŚ explains that the ten powers (*daśabala*)<sup>58</sup> unique to the Buddha are knowledge in their intrinsic nature (以智為自性; *jñānasvabhāva*). In this discussion, the connection of complete abandonment of defilements together with their *vāsanās* with his perfect Wisdom is again underscored:

Q: The two *yānas* also possess the knowledge of recollection of former lives (*pūrvanivāsānusr̥tījñāna*) and the knowledge of the perishing and arising [of beings in *samsāra*] (*cyutyupapattijñāna*). Why is the Buddha's knowledge (Wisdom) alone called "power"?

A: It has been explained previously that "power" signifies non-crushability (*anavamar̥dyatā*). Although the two *yānas* possess this [knowledge], it does not have this signification. For instance, Śāriputra, in spite of his entry into the fourth *dhyāna*, fails to discern the future destiny of rebirth and his background.<sup>59</sup>

Q: The two *yānas* too possess the knowledge of the absolute exhaustion of the outflows. Why is that not a power?

A: The Buddha's knowledge is strong; it swiftly abandons defilements and their residual *vāsanās*; not so in the case of the two *yānas*.<sup>60</sup>

AKB also discusses the Buddha's power, and likewise underscores the two *yānas'* knowledge as being hindered by the *vāsanās* of defilements:

This tenfold knowledge is not called power in the case of others. Only in the case of the Buddha is it called "power" because his knowledge proceeds unobstructed with regard to all knowables (*sarvatra jñeye*). [It is only the Buddha that has eradicated the *vāsanās* of the defilements,

<sup>57</sup> MVŚ, 871c19–872c19.

<sup>58</sup> 1. *sthānāsthānajñānabala*; 2. *karmavipākajñānabala*; 3. *nānādhimuktijñānabala*; 4. *nānādhātuññānabala*; 5. *indriyaparāparajñānabala*; 6. *sarvatra gāmanīpratipajñānabala*; 7. *sarvadhyanavimokṣasamādhisamāpattisaṃkleśavyavadānavyutthānajñānabala*; 8. *pūrvanivāsānusr̥tījñānabala*; 9. *cyutyupattijñānabala*; 10. *āsravakṣayajñānabala*. Cf. MVŚ, 156c16–25; AKB, 411–413.

<sup>59</sup> See also the AKB passage quoted below.

<sup>60</sup> MVŚ, 157c29–158a7.

and is able to know all object-domains as he wishes].<sup>61</sup> On the other hand, they are obstructed in the case of others. ... This is like the case of the Elder Śāriputra's rejection of a man seeking ordination [—because the time period in which this man planted seeds of skilfulness and aspired for liberation is beyond Śāriputra's knowledge],<sup>62</sup> and his incapability to know the number of previous and subsequent births of a bird being chased by a hawk.<sup>63</sup>

In Vy, the above story of Śāriputra, together with that of Maudgalyāyana's inability to locate his mother suffering in the extremely far away Mārīcī world-sphere (*ativiprakṣṭadeśamārīcīlokadhātu*), are cited precisely as illustration of the imperfection of the Śrāvakas' knowledge due to the very reason of the presence of the non-defiled nescience in them.<sup>64</sup> Here then, is another instance where the two notions—non-defiled nescience and *vāsanā*—are used interchangeably to account for the imperfection of the two *yānas*' knowledge. The Buddhological development outlined so far above in the Abhidharma tradition leads clearly to the understanding that the non-defiled nescience or *vāsanā* indeed constitutes a cognitive hindrance, the absolute eradication of which results in the Buddha's uniquely perfected Wisdom.

In MVŚ, the term “knowable hindrance” (所知障; *jñeyāvaraṇa*) does occur, albeit attested only once, juxtaposed with “defilement-hindrance” (煩惱障; *kleśāvaraṇa*):

All the four [proper abandonment (*samyakprahāṇa*)] have the meaning of abandoning (*prahāṇa*): The former two abandon the defilement-hindrance. The latter two abandon the knowable-hindrance; for when

<sup>61</sup> This bracketed sentence is only in Xuanzang's translation, 《阿毘達磨俱舍論》T29, 140b25–26: 唯佛已除諸惑習氣，於一切境隨欲能知。

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Vy, 5; Puguang, 404b28–405a24 (with a much more elaborate narration).

<sup>63</sup> AKB, 412.

<sup>64</sup> Vy, 5: ... *teṣv api teṣāṃ ajñānam anekalokadhātu-antarīta-deśatvāt | śrūyate hi sthavira-maudgalyāyanasya ativiprakṣṭadeśamārīcīlokadhātu-jāta-svāmātrdeśāparijñānam | ativiprakṣṭakāleṣv apy atīteṣu anāgateṣu vā teṣv artheṣv atibahukalpāntarāntarītavināśa-prādurbhavatvāt teṣāṃ bhavaty evājñānam | śrūyate hi sthaviraśāriputreṇa mokṣa-bhāgīyakuśalamūlādarśanāt pravrajyā'pekṣa-puruṣapratyākhyānam | ...* Similar stories of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana are also given in Sthiramati's sub-commentary 《俱舍論實義疏》(*Tattvārtha*) on AKB, T29, 325b1–13.

the skillful *dharma*s are cultivated, nescience (無知; *ajñāna*) is abandoned.<sup>65</sup>

That the knowable-hindrane must be gradually abandoned through cultivation is doctrinally consistent with what we saw above: it is *bhāvanāheya*.

The ultimate aim of Buddhist cultivation is not merely for the abandonment of defilements—for moral perfection *per se*—but for the perfection of wisdom through absolutely eradicating the non-defiled nescience *qua* knowable-hindrane. As we shall see below, the early Mahāyāna scriptures subsequently derived much inspiration from this Abhidharma doctrine, in which they found an adequate and satisfactory doctrinal basis for the formulation of their Bodhisattva ideal culminating in the attainment of Perfect Buddhahood—perfect wisdom in contrast to the inferior wisdom/knowledge of the two *yānas*.

#### 4.1. Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika view on the relation between the non-defiled nescience and *vāsanā*

The above-cited MVŚ discussion (§4) on the Buddha's sometimes scolding his disciples is followed by a discussion on the meaning of "*moha-puruṣa*." In this context, we see that the *arhats*' behaviour exhibiting semblances of defilements is also understood to be due to the *akliṣṭājñāna*.

Q: What is the meaning of a "deluded person"?

A: ... Some other masters assert: One is a deluded person if delusion (*moha*) manifests in him.

Q: If so, the Sūtra should not speak of the *arhats* as "deluded persons."

A: ... Some other masters assert: The *arhats*, etc, too have manifestation of delusion, since their non-defiled nescience has not been abandoned.

...<sup>66</sup>

The explanation in terms of the *akliṣṭājñāna* is a Sarvāstivāda view, not being contended by the MVŚ compilers. The simultaneous acceptance here, of these two notions—*akliṣṭājñāna* and *vāsanā*—as the reason for the incompleteness

<sup>65</sup> MVŚ, 724b25–29.

<sup>66</sup> MVŚ, 78a11–b8.

of an *arhat*'s perfection, compared to the Buddha's, is similar to what we saw above in §3.2, where it is claimed that the non-defiled *jñāna* (=akliṣṭājñāna) is both abandoned and rendered non-manifesting by the Buddha alone because he alone has permanently abandoned all defilements as well as their *vāsanā*.

We saw that in the context of Saṃghabhadra's discussion on the nature of the non-defiled nescience, Rāma speaks of the non-defiled nescience as being *vāsanā* (§3.3). According to him, whereas the non-defiled *vāsanā* comes to be gradually eradicated in the course of spiritual cultivation, the "white-dharma *vāsanā*" persists in the Buddha after his Perfect Enlightenment:

The Venerable Rāma claims thus: "There exists a non-defiled *dharma* called perfuming (*vāsanā*), which is like the retribution (*vipāka*) incurred by a skilful cause. Formerly, at the Bodhisattva-stage, when the Bhagavat was cultivating the various preparatory practices (*prayoga*) during the three incalculable *kalpas*, while still possessing defilements, he was able to gradually eradicate the non-defiled *vāsanā* induced by the defilements, and gradually develop the white-dharma *vāsanā*. Later, when he absolutely abandoned the acquisition (*prāpti*) of the outflows, some of his previous *vāsanās* were ceased and some were not ceased."

As a result of cultivating the preparatory practices for a long time, he attained the Supreme [Enlightenment], and the outflows were absolutely exhausted. However, the Buddha still possessed the white-dharma *vāsanās*—since he speaks of some *vāsanās* being ceased and some not being ceased. Such a claim may be considered reasonable. But he fails [therein] to clarify its nature: What constitutes the nature of this non-defiled *vāsanā*?<sup>67</sup>

Saṃghabhadra's own explanation of the nature of the non-defiled nescience and its relation to the *vāsanā* is as follows:

Thus, it is this inferior knowledge (*jñāna*)[—a mode of *prajñā*—]induced [through a succession] by previous knowledge which repeatedly gets

<sup>67</sup> Ny, 502b13–21. Yinshun (1968), 572–573, suggests that Rāma's explanation on the white-dharma *vāsanā* represents a doctrine accounting for the generation of the outflow (pure) seeds (within one who has been practicing as an ordinary worldling), and may be seen as being very close to the \*Mahāyānasamgraha doctrine of the new outflow-free seeds being gradually formed from the perfuming in the with-outflow process of the listening to the True *Dharma* which is the emanation

used to being incapable of understanding the objects' taste, etc—that is called *akliṣṭāññāna*. Those very *cittacaittas* co-nascent with it are known collectively as *vāsanā*.<sup>68</sup>

Thus, according to him, on the one hand, there seems to be no objection to the non-defiled nescience being considered as the *vāsanā*. On the other hand, the two notions are not identical: the former is a real entity, *prajñā* in its intrinsic nature; the latter is a concept for the thought and thought-concomitants conjoined with the non-defiled nescience. This understanding of the distinction and relationship between the two is essentially in agreement with the MVŚ doctrine we saw above (§4).

In this very same context, and immediately following the above explanation, Saṃghabhadra also offers a somewhat differently worded explanation on the formation of the *vāsanā*:

When sentient beings are at the stage of possessing defilements, all their non-defiled *cittas* together with their series, are perfumed by defilements that comingle (間雜; *\*vy-ava-√kṛ*) with them, giving rise to traces (氣分; *\*vāsa*?) that accord with the arising of defilements. Accordingly, specific non-defiled *cittas* and their retinue (*\*parivāra*) arise, operating in a manner similar to the [defilements]. They arise successively by virtue of the force of repeated conditioning, for which reason those without faults [i.e. the *ārya-pudgala*] are still said to be in possession of *vāsanā*. In the case of an Omniscient One, it is absolutely abandoned and does not manifest (*\*samudā-√car*) any more. ...

As the Bhagavat has acquired mastery over the *dharma*s, such [*vāsanā*s] which appear like defilements absolutely never manifest. Therefore, the Buddha alone is called the “well purified serial continuity” (*\*suviśuddha-santati*);<sup>69</sup> and for this very reason, his behaviour is never amiss” (無誤失; *\*asaṃpramoṣa*).<sup>70</sup>

This second explanation entails that *vāsanā* refers to the non-defiled nescience together with the co-existent serial continuity—i.e., the co-nascent psycho-

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(*niṣyanda*) of the Truth realized in the Buddha's Perfect Enlightenment.

<sup>68</sup> Ny, 502a24–26.

<sup>69</sup> Or, “Wholesome Series” (*\*kuśala-santati*) 善淨相續.

<sup>70</sup> Ny, 502a27–b13. For the full translation of his two explanations, see also, Akli, §7.2.

physical complex.<sup>71</sup> The Buddha, totally devoid of the non-defiled nescience, is said to be the “well purified serial continuity,” without behavioral plunder. This reminds us of the MVŚ discussion on the “deluded person.” The Buddha is free from semblances of greed, etc, “he has absolutely abandoned defilements and *vāsanā*.” The *pratyekabuddhas* and *śrāvakas* display such semblances in behaviour because they “still possess the *vāsanā* [as defilement-traces].” (§4).

## 5. *Akliṣṭājñāna, vāsanā, jñeyāvaraṇa* in the early Mahāyāna texts

### 5.1. The Wisdom-perfection *sūtras*

The very first chapter of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (=Aṣṭa)—most likely its earliest core, on which the various expanded versions of the *Prajñāpāramitā sūtra* developed—is entitled “the practice of the all-mode-knowledge” (*sarvākārajñatā-caryā*). This suggests that in fact the Mahāyāna ideal, at least as discernible in the *Prajñāpāramitā* tradition, upheld the ideal of Perfect Enlightenment through the practice of the *prajñāpāramitā* —the perfection of Wisdom. Indeed, the title of the earliest Chinese translation (179 CE) by 支婁迦讖 Lokakṣema, 《道行般若經》 *Daoxing bore jing* (=DX), could well be seen as a support of this surmise.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>71</sup> Puguang (5b21–24) clarifies the difference in Saṃghabhadra’s two explanations: “According to one explanation: the *cittacaitta dharmas* co-nascent with the weak *prajñā* are collectively called *vāsanā*. According to the other explanation: *vāsanā* refers not only to the *cittacaittadharma*s, but also the serial body.”

<sup>72</sup> While *dao* (道)—commonly known to translate “*mārga*,” “*patha*,” “*pratipad*,” “*caryā*,” “*dharma*,” etc—is pregnant in Chinese religious and philosophical connotations, judging by Lokakṣema’s translation style in the *sūtra*, it likely corresponds here to “Wisdom” or “Ultimate Spiritual Attainment”; and in this textual context, probably “*sarvajñatā*,” “*sarvākārajñatā*” (as in the Aṣṭa) or “Perfect Enlightenment” / “Buddhahood” / “*saṃbodhi*.” Lokakṣema’s renderings are quite inconsistent. In DX, we find *dao* used to render *jñāna* (e.g., Aṣṭa, 5: *prādeśikena jñānena* ≈ 小道); *sarvajñatā* (often transliterated in the same context as 薩芸若. E.g., Aṣṭa 6: *niryāsyati sarvajñatāyām* ≈ 致薩芸若, but *sarvajñatā āsannibhavati* ≈ 疾近作佛; Aṣṭa 20: *samyaksambuddhatva* ≈ 佛道; Aṣṭa 27: *samyaksambodhim abhisambhotsyate sarvajñānam ca pratilapsyate* ≈ 疾成佛道; Aṣṭa 114: *saṃbodhaye pratiṣṭāpayiṣyanti* ≈ 令 ... 學佛道; Aṣṭa 232: *sthāsyati sarvajñatāyām* ≈ 正住佛道. We also see *sarvajñatā* and *dao* forming a compound corresponding to *sarvajñatā*[phala]—Aṣṭa 140:



It has already been suggested by several scholars, including Professor Lambert Schmithausen<sup>73</sup> and Venerable Yinshun,<sup>74</sup> that this first chapter constitutes the urtext of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*. This is quite likely the case, especially as regards its earlier portion. For one thing, we find this text, almost at the beginning, urgently answering the question—very much to be expected by the emerging Mahāyānists proposing the new message of *prajñāpāramitā*—how is this new doctrine, expounded through Subhūti, to be accepted as genuine *Buddhavaṇṇa*? The answer is:

Whatever... the Bhagavat's Disciples teach..., all that is to be known as the Tathāgata's direct effectuation (*puruṣakāra*)... It is just an emanation (/flowing-out *niṣyanda*) of the tathāgata's *Dharma*-teaching.<sup>75</sup>

The course of this practice culminates in the attainment of the all-mode knowledge (perfect wisdom), to be contrasted with the Wisdom of the Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas. In the extant *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras*, this attainment is not accounted for in terms of his absolute eradication of the non-defiled nescience, but of all defilements together with their traces (*vāsanā*). The description in the MVŚ (see §4) suggests that this is the view of the Mahā-sāṃghikas and the Vibhajyavādins.

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*sarvajñatāyā aparigrahāyā* ≈ 薩芸若道不受. The correspondence of *dao* to “spiritual fruit”/“attainment” is sometimes quite explicit; e.g., Aṣṭa 18f: *srotaāpattiphala*, *sakṛdāgāmiphala*, *anāgāmiphala*, *arhatva* correspond to: 須陀洹道, 斯陀含道, 阿那含道 and 羅漢道; Aṣṭa 93f: *phalaviśuddhi* ≈ 道...清淨. One must, however, also concede the possibility that both *dao* and *xing* equally connote “practice,” and become compounded as a correspondence to “*caryā*”; cf. Aṣṭa 199: *caryā* ≈ 所行道. This may explain why in X1 (T7, 763b6: 妙行品第一), the first chapter is entitled “妙行” (“Wonderful Practice”). Seishi Karashima, however, considers X2 to be older than X1 (see Karashima 2011: xiii.). But still, it is possible that the early *Prajñāpāramitā* tradition could have understood the “wonderful practice” as the practice leading to *sarvākārajñatā*, as indicated in the Aṣṭa's “*sarvākārajñatā-caryā*.”

<sup>73</sup> Cf. Schmithausen 1977.

<sup>74</sup> Yinshun 1981: 632 f.

<sup>75</sup> Aṣṭa, 2 f.

### 5.1.1. The *sarvākārajñāna* and the *sarvajñajñāna*

Besides the title of the first chapter, the term *sarvākārajñatā* also occurs in the Aṣṭa as follows :

- (1) This perfection of wisdom is a perfection of the knowledge of the omniscient (*sarvajñajñāna*) on account of its all-mode full understanding (*sarvākāra-parijñānatā*) of the intrinsic natures of all *dharma*s.<sup>76</sup>
- (2) Bodhisattvas ... training in [this Wisdom-perfection] swiftly come to attain all *buddha*-qualities accompanied with the perfection of all virtues, as well as the all-mode-knowledge (*sarvākārajñatā*).<sup>77</sup>

For (1), the Tib version corroborates “*sarvākāra-parijñāna*” (*rnam pa thams cad yongs su mkhyen pa*).<sup>78</sup> However, noticeably, corresponding to (1) above: X1 has simply: “on account of this all-knowing knowledge *pāramitā*’s understanding (apparently without *sarvākārajñatā*) that all *dharma*s are devoid of intrinsic nature.”<sup>79</sup> Both X2 and Kumārajīva’s version too, is even simpler: “... on account of all *dharma*s being devoid of intrinsic nature.” Likewise DX, simply: “because all *dharma* has no intrinsic nature.”<sup>80</sup>

As for (2) above: the Tib version likewise has *rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid*. There is, however, no correspondence in X1 or X2, but only in the First Assembly (第一會) of 玄奘 Xuanzang’s 《大般若波羅蜜多經》 *Da bore boluomiduo jing* (=X) which has 一切智智 (*sarvajñajñāna*) instead of *sarvākārajñatā*.<sup>81</sup> The corresponding place in K<sub>j</sub> has “swiftly come to attain 薩婆若 (*sarvajñatā*;

<sup>76</sup> Aṣṭa, 103: *sarvajñajñānapāramiteyaṃ ... yad uta prajñāpāramitā sarvadharmasvabhāva-sarvākāraparijñānatām upādāya* |

<sup>77</sup> Aṣṭa 250 *na tvam kulaputra jānīṣe? eṣā hi sā prajñāpāramitā bodhisattvānām ... mātā ... , yatra śikṣamāṇā bodhisattvā mahāsattvāḥ sarvagunaṣṭāpāramitānugatān sarvabuddha-dharmān sarvākārajñatām ca kṣipram anuprāpnuvantīti* | ; Toh 12, bka’ ‘gyur, shes phyin, vol. ka: 217b: ‘di la bsabs pas byang chub sems dpa’ sems dpa’ chen po dag yon tan thams cad kyi pha rol tu phyin par rjes su ‘gro ba dang / sangs rgyas kyi chos thams cad dang rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid kyang myur du thob par ‘gyur ba yin na khyod mi shes sam /

<sup>78</sup> Toh 12, bka’ ‘gyur, shes phyin, vol. ka: 116a: *rnam pa thams cad yongs su mkhyen pa’i slad du ‘di lta ste shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ‘di ni thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’o* //

<sup>79</sup> T7, 805b25–26.

<sup>80</sup> T8, 444b23: 於諸法亦無自然故。

<sup>81</sup> T6, 1066a20–22.

not *sarvākārajñatā*<sup>82</sup>).<sup>83</sup> Accordingly, we cannot be sufficiently confident of the occurrence in the early Prajñāpāramitā texts, of the term “all-mode knowledge”—so much stressed in the Abhidharma since the MVŚ—except in the Aṣṭa and its corresponding Tib version.

Another term in the Prajñāpāramitā for a Buddha’s unique Wisdom is “all-knowing knowledge,” *sarvajñajñāna*, usually rendered by Xuanzang as 一切智智. “*sarvajñajñāna*” is also attested in DX as 薩芸若智慧. But in the Aṣṭa, it seems to connote the same as *sarvajñatā*; and judging by X1, even *sarvākārajñatā*. For instance, in the Aṣṭa XII, we see *buddhajñāna* (Tib: *sangs rgyas kyi ye shes*)<sup>84</sup> used synonymously as *sarvajñajñāna*; in X1, also as *sarvākārajñatā*:

It is impossible that [a Bodhisattva], thus coursing, thus intensely striving, thus vigorously engaged, will not attain the supreme Buddha-knowledge, the all-knowing knowledge, the Great-Caravan-Leader knowledge.<sup>85</sup>

X1: It is impossible that [a Bodhisattva], thus vigorously practicing, will not attain the *anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi*, the *sarvākārajñāna* (一切相智), the great knowledge, the wonderful knowledge, the *sarvajñajñāna* (一切智智), the *mahāsārvasthāvāhajñāna*.<sup>86</sup>

At times, one gets the impression that the notion of *sarvākārajñatā* was still being worked out. In some places, it seems to be suggested that it leads to the accomplishment of the *sarvajñajñāna*,<sup>87</sup> the very name conferred to the final, perfect Wisdom of a Buddha.

<sup>82</sup> However, A. Hirakawa’s *Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary* gives *sarvākārajñatā* as one of the correspondence for 薩婆若.

<sup>83</sup> KJ, 583c1–2: 菩薩於是中學，當得盡諸功德一切佛法，疾得薩婆若。

<sup>84</sup> Toh 12, *bka’ ’gyur, shes phyin*, vol. ka: 222b: *de ltar spyod cing de ltar brtson te de ltar ’bad na sangs rgyas kyi ye shes bla na med pa dang ye shes chen po dang thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes dang ded dpon chen po’i ye shes thob par mi ’gyur ba ’di ni gnas med do //*

<sup>85</sup> Aṣṭa, 202: *evaṃ caran, evaṃ ghaṭamānaḥ, evaṃ vyāyacchamāno ’nuttaraṃ buddhajñānaṃ sarvajñajñānaṃ mahāsārvasthāvāhajñānaṃ nānuprāpsyatīti naitat sthānaṃ vidyate //*

<sup>86</sup> X1, 842b13–15. X2 (T7, 911c20–22): 若諸菩薩勤行此道，不得無上正等覺智、大智、妙智、自然智、一切智智及如來智，無有是處。

<sup>87</sup> See discussion on *sarvākārajñatā* below.

Regrettably, Xuanzang's rendering is not always consistent. In the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, his “一切智智” is seen to correspond to *sarvajñajñāna*; but sometimes, also to *sarvajñatā*. E.g., Aṣṭa, 4f: *na nirvāsyati sarvajñatāyām* = 不能成辦一切智智 (*sarvajñatā*); but: *sacen nimittato grahītavyā abhaviṣyat, na ceha śreṇikaḥ parivrājakaḥ śraddhām alapsyata | tatra hi śreṇikaḥ parivrājakaḥ sarvajñajñāne adhimucya śraddhānusārī ...* = X1: 若取相修, 得一切智智 (*sarvajñajñāna*) 者, 則勝軍梵志於一切智智不應信解。Such Examples abound in Xuanzang's 《大般若波羅蜜多經》. However, this state of affairs seems also to indicate that in contrast to Aṣṭa, in the subsequent *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, the “all-knowing knowledge” qua a Buddha's supreme Wisdom was increasingly understood to connote more than “all-knowledge” or “omniscience” (*sarvajñatā*), which is doctrinally said to be shared by the two *yānas*.

Aṣṭa teaches that this unique omniscience, also called “all-knowing knowledge,” can only be achieved by practicing Wisdom-perfection without grasping at anything, including Wisdom-perfection itself. This meditative state of non-grasping is the equipoise known as “*sarvadharmāparigṛhīta*” (Aṣṭa, 4; 於一切法無攝受定), or “*sarvadharmānupādāna*” (Aṣṭa, 7; 無所攝受三摩地)—“equipoise of non-grasping of (/non-clinging to) any *dharma*.” It is this equipoise, apparently proclaimed for the first time in the *Prajñāpāramitā*, that distinctively marks off the Bodhisattva Path, which leads to Perfected Wisdom, from the Śrāvaka-pratyeka Path. For it is here declared to be “unshared by all Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas” (*asādhāraṇaḥ sarvaśrāvaka-pratyekabuddhaiḥ*). In chapter XVIII, Aṣṭa states that the knowledge (*jñāna*) obtained by an irreversible Bodhisattva is “endless, boundless, insuperable by the Śrāvaka-pratyekabuddhas.”<sup>88</sup> The *Pañcaviṃśatikā* speaks of the Bodhisattva's equipoise of non-grasping at any *dharma* likewise as being “insuperable by the two *yānas*,” and in that connection significantly relates it to the all-mode knowledge:

This *samādhi-maṇḍala* of the Bodhisattva, Great Being, named “the non-grasping of any *dharma*” ... is insuperable (/incapable of being

<sup>88</sup> Aṣṭa, 170: *avinivartanīyena hi subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena anantam aparyantaṃ jñānaṃ pratilabdham asaṃhāryaṃ sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhaiḥ ||*

eclipsed) by all Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. The all-mode knowledge (*sarvākārajñatā*) too is not grasped. . . .<sup>89</sup>

In brief, the doctrine that came to be formulated in the *Prajñāpāramitā* is that the Buddha's perfect Wisdom, called *sarvajñatā*/*sarvajñajñāna* and *sarvākārajñāna*, is unshared by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, and is insuperable by them. This is to be achieved through the practice of *prajñāpāramitā* in the equipoise state of not grasping at any *dharma* at all, and this is the new Bodhisattva praxis.

Subsequent to the Aṣṭa, *Prajñāpāramitā* came to further articulate and distinguish among the three types of knowledge (Wisdom): (I) all-knowledge (*sarvajñatā*), (II) path-mode knowledge (*mārgākārajñāna*) and (III) all-mode knowledge (*sarvākārajñāna*). (I) is shared by the Buddha, Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas; but the latter two, while knowing all internal and external *dharma*s, do not know them in all-modes. (II) is possessed by the Bodhisattvas. They must fully possess knowledge of all the paths of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas, and use them to cross over sentient beings—without realizing the Reality-limit (*bhūta-koṭi*).<sup>90</sup> (III) is unique to the Buddha: it knows all the modes (*ākāra*), distinguishing characteristics (*liṅga*) and signs (*nimitta*) of all *dharma*s; or rather, it knows all *dharma*s through a single mode, the mode of tranquillity (*śāntākāra*).<sup>91</sup> In such articulation, it seems clear enough that *sarvākārajñatā* is the culminating Wisdom of Perfect Enlightenment. The Bodhisattva is to apply his mind (*manasi*-√*kr*) to *sarvākārajñatā* from the first moment of resolving for Perfect Enlightenment.<sup>92</sup> Indeed, in the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā* texts, *sarvākārajñatā* stands out as the key term for expressing the unique, perfect, Wisdom of a Buddha. When

<sup>89</sup> PSP 1:171: *idaṃ bodhisatto vasya mahāsattvo vasya sarvadharmāpariṅhītaṃ nāma samādhiṃ maṇḍalaṃ vipulaṃ puraskṛtaṃ apramāṇaṃ niyataṃ asaṃhāryaṃ sarvaśrāvaka-pratyekabuddhaiḥ | sāpi sarvākārajñatā aparīṅhītā | . . .*

<sup>90</sup> PSP 5, 125; AdPP I, 146; T8, 375b23–c5.

<sup>91</sup> AdPP I, 147. Also cf. PSP 5, 124. Also cf. explanations of the three types of knowledge in T7, 337b8–26.

<sup>92</sup> PSP 5, 134: *bhagavān āha: prathamacittotpādikena subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena sarvākārajñatā manasikartavyā |*; Also cf. PSP 5, 145: *bodhisattvo mahāsattvo vīryapāramitāyāṃ caran prathamacittotpādam upādāya sarvākārajñatāpratisaṃyuktair manasikārair vīryam ārabhate |*

the Bodhisattva, having transcended the Śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha stage, achieves this, he becomes a Perfectly Enlightened Buddha, whose absolute abandonment of defilements is one in which all the serial connexion of *vāsanā* is eradicated:

... a Bodhisattva, Great Being, coursing in Wisdom-perfection, transcends the Śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha stage and enters into the Bodhisattva-certainty (*bodhisattvaniyāma*). He fulfils the *buddha*-qualities and will come to attain the all-mode knowledge. Having attained the all-mode knowledge, he will become a Tathāgata, Arhat, Samyak-saṃbuddha, characterized by the abandonment of defilements along with all the serial connexion of *vāsanā*.<sup>93</sup>

In another similar context, the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā* likewise states:

... abiding in the *vajropamasamādhi*, he directly realises the Supreme Perfect Full Enlightenment by means of the *prajñā* conjoined with a single thought-moment. Thereupon, he is described as a “Tathāgata.” He is the knower of all *dharma*s, and hence said to be “all-seeing” (*sarvadarśin*), “all-knowing” (*sarvajña*).<sup>94</sup>

Thus, essentially agreeing with the Abhidharma path trajectory, the absolute abandonment of all defilements—in this case including also the *vāsanā*—can only take place in the moment of the *Vajropamasamādhi*, abiding wherein all the *vāsanā* comes to be eradicated.

From §5.1.1. (1), the *sarvajñajñāna* has the capacity of knowing fully in all modes; i.e., of the all-mode knowledge. For this reason, it is mentioned, as seen above, on a par with *buddhajñāna* and *sarvākārajñatā*. However, in some places, we see the suggestion that the *sarvākārajñatā* leads to the *sarvajñajñāna* which can be rendered as “knowledge of the omniscient (/ the all-knowing),” i.e., of a Buddha.

<sup>93</sup> PSP 5:68: *atra hi kauśika prajñāpāramitāyāñ caran bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ śrāvaka-pratyekabuddhabhūmim atikrāmati, bodhisattvaniyāmam avakrāmati | buddhadharmān paripūrayati, sarvākārajñatām anuprāpsyati | sarvākārajñatām anuprāpya tathāgato 'rhan samyaksambuddhaḥ sarvavāsanānūsaṃdhi-kleśaprahāno bhaviṣyati |*

<sup>94</sup> PSP 6-8:124: *iha subhūte yadā bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ śatpāramitāḥ paripūrya ... aṣṭādaśa-veṇikān buddhadharmān paripūrya vajropame samādhau sthitva ikacittakṣaṇa-samāyuktayā prajñāyānuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambudhyate | tadā tathāgata iti*

In Aṣṭa, *prajñāpāramitā* is said to be the full accomplishment (perfection) of the all-mode knowledge, omniscience (*sarvajñatva*, *sarvajñatā*).<sup>95</sup> “Because of having abandoned all the serial connexion or succession with the *vāsanā* of the defilement- and knowable-hindrane (*sarvakleśajñeyāvaraṇa-vāsanānūsandhiprahīnatām upādāya*), the *prajñāpāramitā* is non-generative of all *dharma*s.”<sup>96</sup> The last sentence links up the notion of the twofold hindrance with the notion of *vāsanā*, and is therefore doctrinally significant in the context of our investigation of the impact of the *vāsanā* (and *akliṣṭājñāna*) doctrine. However, this linkage is attested only in Xuanzang’s version of the third assembly (第三會):<sup>97</sup> “because of the absolute abandonment of all defilement serial continuity together with the *vāsanās* ....” It is not in the other Chinese versions, including the oldest *Daxing Bore* and Kumārajīva’s version.<sup>98</sup> Accordingly, the allusion to *vāsanā* here maybe a later interpolation. Elsewhere in the Aṣṭa, it is said that the *prajñāpāramitā* is said to be the *pāramitā* of *sarvajñajñāna* “because of the fact of full understanding in all modes of the intrinsic nature of all *dharma*s.”<sup>99</sup> Training in the *prajñāpāramitā*, the Bodhisattva swiftly attains all the *buddha*-qualities and the all-mode knowledge.<sup>100</sup> Accordingly, in such contexts, the all-mode knowledge and the all-knowing are still not properly differentiated, although we might

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*nirdiśyate sarvadharmān jānīta ity atah sarvadarsin sarvajña iti |*

<sup>95</sup> Aṣṭa, 170: *sarvajñajñānapariniṣpattir bhagavan prajñāpāramitā, sarvajñatvaṃ bhagavan prajñāpāramitā |*

<sup>96</sup> Aṣṭa, 86: *sarvakleśajñeyāvaraṇavāsanānūsandhi-prahīnatām upādāya anutpādikā bhagavan sarvadharmānām prajñāpāramitā |* For *vāsanā-anūsandhi*, cf. 諸習之緒 “the continuity/succession of the *vāsanās*,” in 《放光般若經》 (Mo, T8, 116a10–11), the older translation of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*.

<sup>97</sup> X, T7, 576b25–26: 永斷一切煩惱相續并習氣故; 是諸菩薩摩訶薩母。However, it is the fourth and the fifth assemblies (第四會, 第五會) that properly correspond to the Aṣṭa.

<sup>98</sup> 《道行般若經》 T8, 440b23: 無所生無所滅, 即般若波羅蜜是。; 《小品般若波羅蜜經》 T8, 550a8: 般若波羅蜜, 非生法者, 非滅法者。; X, T7, 798c16–25: ... 示一切法無滅無生, 是諸菩薩摩訶薩母。

<sup>99</sup> Aṣṭa, 103.

<sup>100</sup> Aṣṭa, 250.

also infer that the “knowledge of the omniscient” is in fact the “all-mode knowledge.”

### 5.1.2. *Vāsanā*, its absolute eradication and Perfect Buddhahood

In the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā* texts evolved from the Aṣṭa, such as *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, frequent allusion to *vāsanā* and *vāsanānusandhi* (“serial connexion or succession of *vāsanā*”) is attested. Thus, like MVŚ (§3.2 and §3.4) and the Pāli commentaries (§2), they teach that *vāsanā* serial connexion (*sarvavāsanānusandhi*) is not defilement, but exists in the two *yānas*, resulting their bodily perturbation, and is absent only in the Tathāgata.<sup>101</sup> The *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (=AdPP):

Subhūti! The *vāsanā* serial connexion is not defilement.<sup>102</sup> But even though the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have abandoned greed, hatred and ignorance, certain bodily perturbances occur. These [perturbances] lead to harm in the case of the foolish worldlings; not in the case of the Śrāvakas. They are [completely] absent in the tathāgata.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Cf. PSP 5, 126: *bhagavān āha: na subhūte kleśaprahāṇasya nānātvam asti, asti punas tathāgatasya sarvavāsanānusandhikleśaprahāṇam, na punaḥ śrāvakasya sarvavāsanānusandhikleśaprahāṇam* |

<sup>102</sup> I have emended *vāsanānusandhikleśo 'sti* to *vāsanānusandhiḥ kleśo 'sti*, which reads more meaningfully, and probably agrees better with Xuanzang's version. See following note.

<sup>103</sup> AdPP, I, 149: *bhāgavān āha, na subhūte vāsanānusandhiḥ kleśo 'sti | api tv asti teṣāṃ śrāvākapratyekabuddhānāṃ rāgadoṣamohaprahāṇam; kaścit tu kāyavikārās pravartante | te bālaprthagjanānāṃ anarthāya saṃvartante | na tu śrāvakānāṃ, te tathāgatasya nāsti |*; PSP 5:126 states almost identically: *bhagavān āha, na subhūte vāsanānusandhikleśaprahāṇam; api nu teṣāṃ rāgadoṣamohaprahāṇam asti, kāyavāgvikārās tu pravartante | te tu bālaprthagjanānāṃ anarthāya pravartante, na tu śrāvakānāṃ, te tathāgatasya na santi* | But on the basis of the AdPP passage above, Xuanzang's 《大般若波羅蜜多經》(X, T6, 872a1–19, T7, 338a4–9, and T7, 695c7–11: 佛言:「善現! 習氣相續實非煩惱。然諸聲聞及諸獨覺煩惱已斷, 猶有少分似貪瞋癡動發身、語。即說此為習氣相續。此在愚夫異生相續能引無義; 非在聲聞、獨覺相續能引無義。如是一切習氣相續, 諸佛世尊究竟無有」) as well as Kumārajīva's 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》(Kj, T8, 376a3–621: 佛告須菩提:「習非煩惱。是聲聞、辟支佛身口有似婬欲、瞋恚、愚癡相。凡夫愚人為之得罪。是三毒習, 諸佛無有」), *vāsanānusandhikleśaprahāṇami* should be amended to *vāsanānusandhiḥ kleśo* (like AdPP).



The complete destruction (*samudghāta*) of *vāsanā* is defined in PSP as the non-manifestation (*asamudācāra*), in each and every way, of any improper behaviour resembling defilements.<sup>104</sup>

In most instances, the eradication of the *vāsanānūsandhi* is explicitly stated to be through the attainment of the all-mode knowledge, and sometimes indicated as the consummation or culmination of the Mahāyāna path of cultivation. Thus, a list of practices enumerating the spiritual friends and teachers of the Bodhisattvas begins with the six *pāramitās* and culminates in the all-mode knowledge and the abandonment of the serial connexion of *vāsanā*:

The six *pāramitās*, Subhūti, should be known as the spiritual friends of the Bodhisattvas, Mahāsattvas. [So are] the four abidings of mindfulness (*smṛty-upasthāna*) ... the eighteen unique *buddha*-qualities. ... The six *pāramitās* are to be known as the teachers, ... the mothers, the fathers. The four abidings of mindfulness, proper exertion (*samyakprahāṇa*) [etc. up to] the eighteen unique *buddha*-qualities are conducive to the all-mode knowledge up to the abandonment of all defilements together with their *vāsanā* serial connexion (*sarvavāsanānūsandhiklēśaprahāṇa*).<sup>105</sup>

In Xuanzang's translation of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*, we see "the absolute abandonment of all defilement-*vāsanās*"—alongside with *sarvajñāna*, *sarvākārajñāna*, *anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi*—stated to be "the teachers and the path/guide (為師為導; *śāstarah, mārga*) for the Bodhisattvas, great beings."<sup>106</sup> The older translation, 《放光般若經》 *Fangguang Bore Jing* (=Mo), states: "the

<sup>104</sup> Cf. PSP 6-8:61: *katamaś ca subhūte vāsanāsamudghātaḥ? sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā sarvaṃ kleśasaṃgāḥ asadrśaceṣṭo 'samudācāro 'yam ucyate vāsanāsamudghātaḥ |* Similar definition in the *Yogācārabhūmi*; cf. T30, 574a18–22.

<sup>105</sup> PSP 5:10f: *ṣaṭ pāramitāḥ subhūte bodhisattvānāṃ mahāsattvānāṃ kalyāṇamitrāṇi veditavyāni; catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni ... | catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni ... 'ṣṭādaśā-venikā buddhadharmāḥ sarvākārajñatāyāi yāvāt sarvavāsanānūsandhiklēśaprahāṇāyā saṃvartante |*

It seems proper to interpret *vāsanānūsandhiklēśaprahāṇa* as *saha vāsanānūsandhyā kleśaprahāṇaṃ*. Cf. BoBh, 63: *savāsanasarvākleśaprahāṇa*; *nyon mongs pa bag chags dang bcas pa thams cad spangs ba*; 一切煩惱習氣永斷; and *savāsanappahāṇaṃ* (Pāli), understood as *saha vāsanāyā kilesappahāṇaṃ* (see Akli, §1, and ns. 9 & 10.)

<sup>106</sup> Cf. T6, 709a18–29; T7, 288a1–15; T7, 652c27–653a5.

six *pāramitās* are the *sarvajñā*. The six *pāramitās* are that which eradicate the *vāsanās* of men.”<sup>107</sup>

In Aṣṭa, Subhūti, a prominent direct disciple of the Buddha, is presented as the disciple who properly understands and expounds the new Mahāyāna message of *prajñāpāramitā*, praised as being foremost among those dwelling in non-dispute (*araṇāvihāriṇām agrah*). When we come to the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā*, he is also described as one who dwells/abides in isolated-ness, emptiness etc., and who does not apperceive (*nopalabhate*) the six *pāramitās*. Yet, compared to the Bodhisattvas’ coursing in the *prajñāpāramitā*, Subhūti’s dwelling is said to be infinitely less significant. Because, except for the Tathāgata’s dwelling, this Bodhisattva dwelling is supreme:

Therefore, Kausika, the Bodhisattva, Great Being, wishing to get to the highest state (*agratā*) should dwell in this dwelling, viz, the *prajñāpāramitā*-dwelling. Why? For, herein, Kauśika, a Bodhisattva, Great Being, coursing in the *prajñāpāramitā*, transcends the stage of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, enters into the Bodhisattva-certainty (*bodhisattvaniyāma*), perfects the Buddha-qualities, and will attain the all-mode knowledge. Having attained the all-mode knowledge, he will become a Tathāgata, Worthy One, Perfectly Fully Enlightened One, who has achieved the abandonment of all defilements together with their *vāsanā*-succession (*sarvavāsanānusaṃdhi-prahāṇo bhaviṣyati*).<sup>108</sup>

<sup>107</sup> Mo, T8, 97b23–24: 六波羅蜜者，是薩云然。六波羅蜜者，除人諸習緒。

<sup>108</sup> PSP 5:67f: *tathā hi tathāgatavihāraṃ sthāpayitvā bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya prajñāpāramitāyāṇ carato yo vihāraḥ sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhānām ca ye vihārās teṣāṃ vihārāṇām ayaṃ bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya prajñāpāramitāyāṇ carato yo vihāraḥ so 'gra ākhyāyate, ... tasmāt tarhi kauśika bodhisattvena mahāsattvenāgratāṃ gantukāmenānena vihāreṇa vihartavyaṃ yad uta prajñāpāramitāvihāreṇa. tat kasya hetoh? atra hi kauśika prajñāpāramitāyāṇ caran bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ śrāvaka-pratyekabuddhabhūmim atikrāmati, bodhisattvaniyāmam avakrāmati, buddhadharmān paripūrayati, sarvākārajñātām anuprāpsyati, sarvākārajñātām anuprāpya tathāgato 'rhan samyaksaṃbuddhaḥ sarvavāsanānusaṃdhikleśaprahāṇo bhaviṣyati.*; Cf. Kj, T8, 362a16–b15: 佛告釋提桓因：「須菩提比丘行空時，檀那波羅蜜不可得，... 四念處不可得... 何以故？憍尸迦！須菩提比丘一切法離行，一切法無所得行，一切法空行，一切法無相行，一切法無作行。憍尸迦！是為須菩提比丘所行。欲比菩薩摩訶薩般若波羅蜜行者，百分不及一，千分千萬億分乃至算數、譬喻所不能及。何以故？除佛行，是菩薩摩訶薩行般若波羅蜜，於聲聞、辟支佛諸行中最尊最妙最上。以是故，菩薩摩訶薩欲得於一切眾生中最上，當行是般若波羅蜜行。何以故？憍尸迦！諸菩薩摩訶薩行般若

Thus, in the newly emerged Mahāyāna Bodhisattva-path—conceived as transcending the “older” path of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas—Perfect Full Enlightenment is the final goal, to be achieved by the Bodhisattva through the coursing in *prajñāpāramitā*. The passage suggests that it is after the all-mode knowledge has been attained (*anuprāpya*) that the *vāsanā* serial connexion comes to be abandoned. And it is only with its absolute abandonment that this Perfect Buddhahood can finally be attained. Elsewhere it states further that they are abandoned in the manner of not being susceptible to re-arising (*sarvavāsanānusaṃdhiklēśāḥ prahāsyante, anutpattikaprahāṇāḥ*).<sup>109</sup> This tallies with the Abhidharma doctrine that the Buddha’s non-defiled nescience is not only fully abandoned, but also rendered incapable of re-arising. The role of the all-mode knowledge is sometimes stated more explicitly:

The Bodhisattva, Great Being, ... having entered into the Bodhisattva-certainty (*bodhisattvaniyāma*), further abandons all defilements along with their *vāsanā* serial connexion by means of the knowledge of the all-mode knowledge.<sup>110</sup>

The two corresponding places in Xuanzang’s version add: “it is only then that the *sarvajñajñāna* (一切智智)” is achieved. The suggestion is: when all *vāsanās* are eradicated through the all-mode knowledge, the Bodhisattva enters into the Tathāgata-stage; only then does he arrive at the culmination of the *sarvajñajñāna*.<sup>111</sup> Similar statements are found in several other places of his version. The following is an example:

PSP 6–8:132f states that for the sake of Perfect Enlightenment, the Bodhisattva should train in all skilful *dharma*s; “training wherein, he will attain the

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波羅蜜時，過聲聞、辟支佛地，入菩薩位，能具足佛法，得一切種智，斷一切煩惱習作佛」

<sup>109</sup> See n. 120 below.

<sup>110</sup> PSP 5:155: *bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ ... bodhisattvaniyāmam avakramya sarvākārājñā-tājñānena ca sarvavāsanānusaṃdhiklēśān prajahāti* |; Cf. Toh 9, bka’ ‘gyur, shes phyin, vol. ga: 158b–159a: *byang chub sems dpa’i skyon med par zhugs nas / rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid kyis / bag chags kyī mtshams sbyor ba’i nyon mongs pa thams cad rab tu spong ngo //*; Tib has no equivalent to *-jñānena*; *rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid kyis*.

<sup>111</sup> But also bear in mind our remark above on Xuanzang’s rendering of this term.

all-mode knowledge, and will abandon all the *vāsaṇā* serial connexion."<sup>112</sup> To this, Xuanzang's version immediately adds: "It is only then that he will realize the *sarvajñajñāna*."<sup>113</sup>

As regards the particular stage of the absolute eradication of the *vāsanā*, the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā* is in fact quite articulate: It is abandoned by the perfected *prajñā* conjoined with the single moment of the *vajropama-samadhi*:

[Buddha to Subhūti:] Just these [*bodhisattvadharmas*] are the *buddha-dharmas*. That is to say: by means of these *dharmas* he directly realizes the all-mode knowledge (*sarvākāra-jñatā*). When he has acquired the all-mode knowledge, succession of all the *vāsanās* is abandoned. The Bodhisattva, Great Being directly realizes it (the all-mode knowledge); [but] by means of the understanding/wisdom conjoined with one single moment, all *dharmas* are directly realized by the Tathāgata, the Perfectly Fully Enlightened one (Xuanzang: "The Tathāgata, ... having directly realized all *dharmas* by means of the excellent *prajñā* conjoined with a single moment, attains the Supreme Perfect Full Enlightenment."<sup>114</sup>). This is the difference between the Bodhisattva, Great Being, and the tathāgata, Arhat, Samyakṣambuddha.

This, Subhūti, is just like the case that the candidate (*pratipannaka*) is quite another than the one abiding in the fruition (*phalastha*); and yet it is not that both are not foremost persons (*agrapudgala=āryapudgala*). Likewise, the Bodhisattva, Great Being, is the candidate in the non-hindered path (*ānantaryamārgapratipannaka*); but the tathāgata, Arhat, Samyakṣambuddha is one who has acquired the hindrance-free knowl-

<sup>112</sup> PSP 6–8:132f: ... *bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prathamacittotpādam upādāya sarva-kuśaladharmaparipūryai śikṣitavayaṃ yatra śikṣitvā sarvākārājñatām anuprāpsyati sarvavāsanānusaṃdhiṃ prahāsyati* |; likewise, Tib Toh 9, *bka'* 'gyur, *shes phyin*, vol. kha: 306a–306b: *dge ba'i chos thams cad yongs su rdzogs par bya ba la bslab par bya ste de la bslabs na rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid rjes su 'thob bo // bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba thams cad kyang yongs su spong ngo* // However, this passage lacks last sentence of Xuanzang's version.

<sup>113</sup> X, T7, 415b8–12 (=T7, 415b9–12): ... 常學圓滿一切善法，學已當得一切相智，永斷一切習氣相續，乃能證得一切智智。

<sup>114</sup> X, T7, 418a28–b2: 謂：諸菩薩於一切法覺一切相，由此當得一切相智，永斷一切習氣相續。若諸如來、應、正等覺，於一切法以一剎那相應妙慧現等覺已，證得無上正等菩提。善現，是名菩薩與佛二法差別。; X, T7, 755a9–13: 謂：諸菩薩於一切法覺一切相，由此當得一切相智，永斷一切習氣相續。若諸如來、應、正等覺，於一切法以一剎那相應般若現等覺已，證得無上正等菩提。是名菩薩與佛有異。

edge (*anāvaraṇajñānaprāpta*). This, Subhūti, is the difference between the Bodhisattva, Great Being, on the one hand, and the Tathāgata, Arhat, Samyaksambuddha, on the other.<sup>115</sup>

We shall see below (§6) that in Yogācāra, the “hindrance-free knowledge” is directly related to the notion of overcoming the non-defiled nescience (called therein the non-defiled ignorance *akliṣṭāvidyā*—BoBh, 62). In Xuanzang’s version of the PSP (T7, 749c16–18, cited below in n.118 ) too, the absolute abandonment in the final *ānantaryamārga* is that of all *kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa*; the latter being the cognitive hindrance attributable to the non-defiled nescience. As regards the last description of the difference, the several versions of Xuanzang and that of Kumārajīva, while essentially agreeing with the PSP, are more explicitly in terms of the Abhidharmic differentiation of the *ānantaryamārga* and the *vimuktimārga*. Thus, Xuanzang:

when [the practitioner] is coursing in all *dharma*s in the *ānantaryamārga*, and has not been freed from the hindrance of darkness, has not acquired mastery, has not acquired the fruit—he is known as a Bodhisattva, Great Being. When he is coursing in all *dharma*s in the *vimuktimārga*, and has been freed from the hindrance of darkness, has acquired mastery, has acquired the fruit—he is then known as the a Buddha. This is how the Bodhisattva and the Buddha differ. Because there is a difference in stage, the *dharma*s are not identical (“not without a difference”); but one cannot say that the *dharma*-nature is different.<sup>116</sup>

Kumārajīva’s version is similar; but more concise:

<sup>115</sup> PSP 6-8:141f: ... *eta eva subhūte buddhadharmā yad ebhir dharmaiḥ sarvākārajñātām abhisambudhyate tasya sarvākārajñatāprāptasya sarvavāsanānusaṃdhiḥ prahīyate | tām bodhisattvo mahāsattvo 'bhisambudhyate; tathāgatenārhatā samyaksambuddhena sarvadharmā ekakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā abhisambuddhā ayaṃ viśeṣo bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya ca tathāgatasyārhatāḥ samyaksambuddhasya | tad yathāpi nāma subhūte anya eva pratipannako 'nyaḥ phalasthaḥ | na ca tāv ubhāv api nāgrapudgalau | evam eva subhūte bodhisattvā mahāsattva ānantaryamārga-pratipannakas tathāgataḥ punar arhan samyaksambuddhaḥ sarvadharmeṣv anāvaraṇajñānaprāptaḥ, ayaṃ subhūte viśeṣo bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya ca Tathāgatasyārhatāḥ samyaksambuddhasya | Cf. X, T7, 418a25–b11; X, T7, 755a7–19; X, T6, 1044a6–21; Mo, T8, 138b1–10; Kj, T8, 411b15–27.*

<sup>116</sup> X, T7, 418b5–10.

When the Bodhisattva, Great Being, courses in the *ānantaryamārga*, he is known as a Bodhisattva. In the *vimuktimārga*, being free from all coverings (/hindrance) of darkness, he is known as a Buddha.<sup>117</sup>

The above-mentioned “one single moment (*ekakṣaṇa*)” undoubtedly refers to the moment of the *vajropamasamādhi* with which the *prajñā* is conjoined. This is unmistakable in the PSP, as the following passage shows:

Here, Subhūti, when the Bodhisattva, Great Being—having fulfilled the six *pāramitās*, ... the eighteen unique *buddha*-qualities, abiding in the *vajropamasamādhi*—directly realises the Supreme, Perfect Full Enlightenment by means of the *prajñā* conjoined with a single thought-moment,<sup>118</sup> he is then described as a Tathāgata.<sup>119</sup>

More specifically, it is after the Bodhisattva has finally achieved the all-mode knowledge that all the *vāsanā*-succession are absolutely abandoned, in the manner of their not further re-arising:

And, Subhūti, that Bodhisattva, Great Being, fully mastering (/intensely practising; *parijayan kurvan*) the six *pāramitās* in the Enlightenment-paths, until he comes to be endowed with the eighteen unique *buddha*-qualities[, etc., up to,] endowed with the all-mode knowledge. These, Subhūti, are the paths to Enlightenment. By means of these Enlightenment-paths, he fulfils the *pāramitās*. Having fulfilled the *pāramitās*, by means of the wisdom (/understanding; *prajñā*) conjoined with a single moment, he will achieve the all-mode knowledge. In that state (*tatrāvasthāyām*), all the defilements together with their *vāsanā*-succession will be abandoned by him, as abandonment not susceptible

<sup>117</sup> Kj, T8, 411b25–27.

<sup>118</sup> X, T7, 749c16–18: 從此無間，用一剎那金剛喻定相應般若，永斷一切煩惱、所知二障麤重習氣相續，證得無上正等菩提，乃名如來... “When, immediately after this, by means of the single moment of *prajñā* conjoined with the *vajropamasamādhi*, he absolutely abandons all *vāsanā*-succession of the *dausṭhulya* of the twofold hindrance of *kleśa* and *jñeya*, and realises the *anuttarā samyaksambodhi*.”

<sup>119</sup> PSP 6-8:124: *iha subhūte yadā bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ ṣaṭpāramitāḥ paripūrya- ... aṣṭādaśāveṇikān buddhadharmān paripūrya vajropame samādhau sthitvaikacittakṣaṇa-samāyuktayā prajñāyānuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambudhyate tadā tathāgata iti nirdiśyate sarvadharmān jānīta ity atah sarvadarśiṃ sarvajña ity abhidhiyate* |; Cf. X, T7, 749c13–19. Also, Kj, T8, 408b13–20.

to arising (無所從生故 “...abandoned in the manner of being incapable of further arising”; 以不生故 “because of their non-arising”).<sup>120</sup>

That is: the paths leading to Enlightenment (*bodhaye mārgāḥ*) are intensely cultivated by the Bodhisattva and are fully mastered (*parijayaṃ-√kr*) only when he comes to be endowed with the eighteen unique *buddha*-qualities ... up to the knowledge that is the all-mode knowledge (*sarvākārajñatājñāna*). It is with these paths leading to Enlightenment that he fulfils the *pāramitās* and will attain the all-mode knowledge. And as Xuanzang’s version here clarifies: all *vāsanās* are not only fully eradicated, but also rendered absolutely incapable of re-arising—and this is the attainment of Buddhahood.<sup>121</sup>

To summarise: the Abhidharma teaches that a defilement is abandoned, in the *ānantaryamārga*, by the simultaneously arising *prajñā qua* counteragent. This *prajñā* is called a receptivity (*kṣānti*). In the next moment called the *vimuktimārga*, the practitioner is totally liberated from the defilement, and the corresponding *jñāna* arises. Both *kṣānti* and *jñāna* are modalities of the universal thought-concomitant *prajñā*. The *vajropamasamādhi* is the *ānantaryamārga* that cuts off the very last (ninth) division of defilement, as a

<sup>120</sup> PSP 5:137: *sa khalu punaḥ subhūte bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ ṣaṣṣu pāramitāsu caran bodhimārgaḥ parijayaṃ kurvan, yāvad daśabhis tathāgatabalāiḥ samanvāgato bhavati, ... sarvākārajñatājñānena ca samanvāgato bhavati | ime subhūte bodhaye mārgāḥ | sa ebhir bodhimārgaiḥ pāramitāḥ paripūrayati | pāramitāḥ paripūrya sarvaṇ tad ekalakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā sarvākārajñatām anuprāpsyati | tasya tatrāvasthāyāṃ sarvavāsanānusaṃdhikleśāḥ prahāsyante, anutpattikaprahāṇāḥ |*; Mo, T8, 116a7–11: 菩薩行六波羅蜜與道場作因緣，至佛十力、... 一時一意，以智慧一時合，應便逮薩云若。爾時所作諸習之緒悉滅已，無所從生故。...; Kj, T8, 378b17–22: 是菩薩摩訶薩行六波羅蜜修學佛道，乃至未成就佛十力、... 一切種智，是為修學佛道。能具足是佛道因緣已，以一念相應慧得一切種智，爾時一切煩惱習永盡，以不生故。

<sup>121</sup> 一切微細煩惱習氣相續皆永不生名無餘斷，得名為佛。 Cf. Toh 9, *bka'* 'gyur, *shes phyin*, vol. *kha*: 222b. 142b–143a: *de'i tshes de'i bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba'i nyon mongs pa thams cad kyang mi skye bar spang bas yongs su spong bar 'gyur te /*

See X, T7, 342b26–c26: 若未成就如來十力、四無所畏、四無礙解、大慈、大悲、大喜、大捨、十八不共法、無忘失法、恒住捨性、一切智、道相智、一切相智及餘無量無邊佛法，皆名學菩提道未得圓滿。若學此道已得圓滿，由一剎那相應般若，便能證得一切智 (相?) 智。爾時，一切微細煩惱習氣相續皆永不生名無餘斷，得名為佛。 Also cf. X, T7, 699a27–b7: ... 波羅蜜多已圓滿故，由一剎那相應般若，便能證得一切相智。爾時，一切微細煩惱習氣相續永不生故名無餘斷，則名如來、應、正等覺。

result of which the practitioner is absolutely freed from all defilements.<sup>122</sup> In attaining Buddhahood, the non-defiled nescience is completely eradicated in the last *ānantaryamārga*. Immediately after, the “knowledge of the exhaustion of outflows” (*kṣayajñāna*), following by the next moment of the “knowledge of non-arising” which ensures that all defilements along with their *vāsanās*, and the non-defiled nescience, can no more arise. This final knowledge is in nature the unique all-mode knowledge (cf. §3.4.1).

All these Abhidharmic doctrines can be seen to have impacted the Prajñā-pāramitā doctrinal system. However, the apparent further articulation of the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā* tenet is that it now speaks of the attainment of Perfect Buddhahood, or rather his perfect Wisdom, as being subsequent to this. The suggestion seems to be that: now, the all-mode knowledge previously intended as the Buddha’s unique final Wisdom—both in Abhidharma and a probably somewhat earlier stage of the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā*—is now, though still considered as unique to the candidate (the [*buddha*]-*pratipannaka*) destined to be a Tathāgata in the immediately following moment, is made comparable to the Abhidharma notion of receptivity (*kṣānti*) which absolutely abandons a defilement, in this case all defilements along with their *vāsanās* in the final *ānantaryamārga*. The PSP claims that all the preceding knowledge and abandonments (*jñānaṃ ca prahāṇaṃ ca*)—i.e. *jñānas* and *kṣāntis*—upto and including those of the Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas, are in fact

the *kṣānti* of the Bodhisattva, Great Being. In this way, ... having fulfilled all the paths of all the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, he enters the Bodhisattva-certainty. Having entered the Bodhisattva-certainty, he abandons all defilements along with their *vāsanās* by means of the knowledge of the all-mode knowledge (*sarvākārajñātājñāna*).<sup>123</sup>

That is: differing from the Abhidharma doctrine, the *prajñā* that cuts all defilements and *vāsanās* are now not considered as *kṣāntis*, but a *jñāna*. The final Wisdom that issues in the very next moment now apparently receives the name “knowledge of the omniscient” (*sarvajñajñāna*; i.e., of the Buddha). As seen a few paragraphs above, the Bodhisattva in the penultimate stage is the candidate (for perfect Buddhahood) in the *ānantaryamārga*. In the final, ultimate tathāgata-stage, he acquires the “hindrance-free knowledge”

<sup>122</sup> Cf. MVŚ, 264c21–23.

<sup>123</sup> PSP 5:155.



(*anāvaraṇajñāna*), which now seems—especially according to Xuanzang’s version—to be also known as the *sarvajñajñāna*. In terms of the *daśabhūmi* doctrine of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, the Bodhisattva now arrives at the tenth stage, the *buddha*-stage (= *dharmameghabhūmi*), at which he becomes no different from a Tathāgata:

In this connection, how is it that a Bodhisattva, Great Being, abiding/dwelling in the tenth stage, is to be said to be indeed a “full tathāgata” (*tathāgata eveti vaktavyaḥ*)?<sup>124</sup> When a Bodhisattva, Great Being, has fulfilled the ten *pāramitās*, up to the eighteen unique *buddha*-qualities, and there occurs the all-mode knowledge and the abandonment of all defilements together with their *vāsanā* serial connexion, and great compassion and all *buddha*-qualities have been fulfilled—in this way, Subhūti, a Bodhisattva, Great Being, after the tenth *bodhisattva*-stage, is to be known indeed as a “Tathāgata.”<sup>125</sup>

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Xuanzang: “he should be said to be no different from a Tathāgata”; Kumārajīva: “should be understood as being like a Buddha.”

<sup>125</sup> PSP 1-2:102: *tatra katham bodhisattvo mahāsattvo daśamyāṃ bhūmau sthitaḥ saṃstathāgata eveti vaktavyaḥ? yadā bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya daśapāramitāḥ paripūrṇā bhavanti, yāvad aṣṭādaśāveṇikā buddhadharmāḥ paripūrṇā bhavanti, sarvā-kārajñātājñānam ca sarvavāsanānusamdhikleśaprahāṇam* (cf. *savāsanam kilesapahāṇam, savāsanasarvokleśaprahāṇa*; 一切煩惱習氣永斷) *bhavati, mahākaruṇā ca sarvabuddhadharmāḥ paripūrṇā bhavanti | evaṃ hi subhūte bodhisattvo mahāsattvo daśamyāḥ punar bodhisattvabhūmeḥ param tathāgata eveti vaktavyaḥ* | ; X2, T7, 88c11–17 : 云何菩薩摩訶薩住第十地已，與諸如來應言無別？善現！是菩薩摩訶薩已圓滿六波羅蜜多，乃至已圓滿十八佛不共法，具一切智、一切相智，若復永斷一切煩惱習氣相續便住佛地。由此故說：若菩薩摩訶薩住第十地已，與諸如來應言無別。(This version seems closest to the Sanskrit version.); Kj, T8, 259c6–15 : 云何菩薩住十地中當知如佛？若菩薩摩訶薩具足六波羅蜜、… 一切種智具足滿，斷一切煩惱及習，是名菩薩摩訶薩住十地中當知如佛。… ; X T5, 309b5–16 : 「世尊！云何當知已圓滿第十法雲地菩薩摩訶薩與諸如來應言無異？」「善現！是菩薩摩訶薩已圓滿六波羅蜜多，… 十八佛不共法、一切智、道相智、一切相智，已圓滿一切佛法故；若復永斷一切煩惱習氣相續，便住佛地。是故當知：已圓滿第十法雲地菩薩摩訶薩，與諸如來應言無異」；X, T7, 497a24–b9: 「世尊！云何菩薩摩訶薩住第十地已，於前所修諸地勝法皆得圓滿，與諸如來應言無異？」「善現！是菩薩摩訶薩已圓滿布施波羅蜜多乃至般若波羅蜜多，… 已圓滿如來十力乃至十八佛不共法，具一切智、一切相智，若復永斷一切煩惱習氣相續便住佛地。由此故說，若菩薩摩訶薩住第十地已，於前所修諸地勝法皆得圓滿，與諸如來應言無異」

## 5.2. Discussion on *vāsanā* in 《大智度論》

《大智度論》 *Dazhidu lun* (=DZDL), purporting to a commentary on the *Mahā-prajñāpāramitā*, contains extensive discussion on *vāsanā*. Like in the *Prajñāpāramitā*, it explains the imperfection of the two *yānas*' wisdom in terms of *vāsanā*, rather than the non-defiled nescience. The Buddha alone abandons the defilement-traces (煩惱習; *kleśavāsanā*); this results in his perfect Wisdom surpassing the two *yānas*. He does so by means of his all-mode-knowledge. The nature of *vāsanā* is explained thus:

The defilement-traces are the residual impregnation/perfume (殘氣) of the defilements. They are bodily or vocal karma not conforming to wisdom (*prajñā*), and appear to arise from defilements. Those incapable of knowing others' minds, on seeing their actions generate impure thoughts. They are not truly defilements; but are actions (*karma*) arising on account of having for long habitually practiced (/been accustomed with 久習) defilements. Just as one having his feet chained up for a long time comes to be suddenly released. Even when walking without the chain, he still retains the habitual manner as when he was chained. Just as the garment of a nursing mother that has become tainted. After cleaning it with pure ashes, even though the taint has been removed, its residual trace still remains. The garment is like a Noble One's thought; the taint is like the defilements. Although it has been cleansed with the water of Wisdom, the residual trace of the taint still remains. Thus, even though the other Noble Persons [other than a Buddha] can abandon defilements, they cannot abandon their *vāsanā*.<sup>126</sup>

Similar cases of *vāsanā* are given, as in the *Abhidharma*: those of Nanda's sensual craving, Śāriputra's anger, etc.<sup>127</sup> Also like in the *MVŚ*, it compares the traces of the other Noble Persons to the ashes that left behind after a fuel has been burnt, owing to the relative feebleness of the fire. A Buddha's *sarvajñatā* fire consumes all defilements without any residual traces; just as the powerful fire at the end of a *kalpa*, which consumes everything without leaving anything behind.<sup>128</sup> Some further explanations are given: The virtues of the two *yānas* are accumulated for one or two or three

<sup>126</sup> DZDL, 260c2–10.

<sup>127</sup> Cf. DZDL, 260c10–24.

<sup>128</sup> DZDL, 260c23–27.

lifetimes; but a Buddha has been impregnated/perfumed by skilful *dharmas* for immeasurable *asaṃkhyeyakalpas* and thus for him there is no residual traces of the defilements. Further, in the case of a Buddha, all virtues have been exhaustively taken up, owing to which all *kleśavāsanās* are absolutely exhausted without any residues. This is because the skilful virtues counteract the defilements. The Arhats are incapable of acquiring all these virtues; they only abandon worldly attachments and enter into Nirvāṇa straight after.<sup>129</sup> A Bodhisattva abandons [all] defilements when he attains the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* [at the eighth Bodhisattva-stage]; he abandons the *kleśavāsanās* when he attains Buddhahood.”<sup>130</sup>

An important doctrine here, not visible in the Prajñāpāramitā in general, concerns the notion of transformational births of the advanced Bodhisattvas on account of their residual *vāsanā*:

When the Bodhisattva attains the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*, he has exhausted all defilements. But since he has not eradicated the *vāsanās*, he is capable of being transformationally reborn at will—qua retribution of the *vāsanās* and as a body born of the *Dharmadhātu*. This is on account of his great compassion for sentient beings. It is also for the sake of completing his original vows, and in order to return to the world again for accomplishing the remaining *buddha*-qualities (*buddhadharma*). When the tenth stage is completed, he will be seated upon the seat of Enlightenment (*bodhimanda*). By virtue of the nonhindrance-liberation (無礙解脫; *anāvaraṇa-vimokṣa*), he will acquire the all-knowledge and the all-mode knowledge and abandon the *kleśavāsanās*.

According to the Mahāyāna people: “the Bodhisattva that acquires that *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* has exhausted all defilements and *vāsanās*.” This is also wrong! If all has been exhausted, he would be no difference from a Buddha. Hence, when the Bodhisattva acquires the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*, he relinquishes the physical body and acquires the body born of the *Dharmadhātu*.<sup>131</sup>

According to the above doctrine. A Bodhisattva, having destroyed all defilements—as also in the case of an Arhat—has transcended saṃsāric rebirth. But he still has *vāsanā* on account of which, in Mahāyāna, he is still

<sup>129</sup> DZDL, 261a29–b6.

<sup>130</sup> DZDL, 262a14–16.

<sup>131</sup> DZDL, 261c22–262a2.

susceptible to another type of subtle, transformational (*pāriṇāmikī*) rebirth. In fact, he needs this in order to complete his Bodhisattva vows and accomplish all the *buddha*-qualities to attain perfect Buddhahood. DZDL explicitly claims that “for the Bodhisattvas, the *vāsanās* of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas are defilements.” This notion, that outflow-free *dharma*s can be “defilements” and can also constitute *karma*, is of course a far cry from the Śrāvakayāna tenets and also Early Buddhism for whom only defilements and with-outflow *karma* can lead to rebirth. But the implication here is that such form of rebirth is not within the triple sphere of saṃsāric existence. DZDL expounds as follows:

Q: An Arhat’s body retributed by the causal conditions in his preceding existence will necessarily come to be extinguished. Where will he complete his path to buddha-hood?

A: When he attains Arhat-hood, all his outflows constituting the causal conditions [for existence] in the triple are exhausted, and he will no more be born in the triple sphere. There is, [however], a *buddha*-land beyond the triple spheres, which does not have even the name “defilements.” In this field, he will hear the *Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtra* from a buddha and complete the path to Buddha-hood.<sup>132</sup>

It is interesting to see the author of DZDL here essentially agreeing to a doctrine which is usually ascribed to the Tathāgata-garbha school of thought. This school claims thus: Even the non-defiled nescience of perfuming are of the nature of defilements, albeit in a very subtle form. These *vāsanās* that still remain in the two *yānas* serve as supporting conditions for the outflow-free (*anāsrava*) *karmas* to generate a subtle, inconceivable type of birth-and-death. The birth-and-death that comes to an end as a result of the exhaustion of with-outflow (*sāsrava*) *karma* is “sectional (birth-and-)death” (*pariccheda-cyuti*). The two *yānas*, as well as the advanced *bodhisattvas*, are still subject to the “transformational birth-and-death” (*acintya-pāriṇāmikī-cyuti*), generated by the outflow-free *karma* as cause and the “ignorance-perfuming ground” (*avidyāvāśabhūmi*; *ma rig pa’i gnas kyi sa*; 無明習地/無明住地) as supporting condition.

<sup>132</sup> DZDL, 714a9–15. The text here, as in many other places, quotes the *Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtra* as scriptural support.

This “ignorance-perfuming ground”—existing from beginningless time—is the most subtle and fundamental source of all defilements. “All arising of defilements has the ignorance-perfuming ground as its cause, has ignorance-perfuming ground as its condition.”<sup>133</sup> It is not conjoined with thought, and is abandonable by the Buddha alone. We thus discern here a Mahāyāna doctrinal development proposing that the ultimate obstacle—ultimate source or seed of imperfection and the biggest Evil per se, existing from beginningless time—to the attainment of the perfect Wisdom of Buddhahood is in fact this fundamental, subtlest, nescience.

Just as, the arising, establishment and growth of all seeds have the ground as support-basis. Likewise, the arising, establishment and growth of all the [defilement] dharmas, surpassing the amount of sands in the Gangā, to be abandoned by the Wisdom of the Tathāgata’s Enlightenment (菩提智), all have this ignorance-perfuming ground as their support-basis. ... If the latter is abandoned (eradicated), the former will come to be abandoned accordingly.<sup>134</sup>

Thus, similar to the Abhidharma doctrine that a Buddha alone can absolutely abandon the *akliṣṭājñāna* and become perfectly enlightened, the Mahāyāna doctrine here claims that the *avidyāvāsabhūmi* “cannot be abandoned by the Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas; it is abandonable only by the Enlightenment-knowledge (菩提智; *bodhiññāna*) of the Tathāgata.”<sup>135</sup> Accordingly, only a Buddha truly transcends all births and deaths. This most subtle and fundamental ignorance-perfuming ground, which is more fundamental than all the other defilements, constitutes the knowable-hindrance. The defilement-hindrance, which is *ātma-grāha*, has the knowable-hindrance, which is *dharma-grāha*, as its support-basis. We can discern here an impact from the Abhidharma doctrine of the non-defiled nescience—constituting the inspirational source for the *avidyāvāsabhūmi* doctrine—even if it is differently interpreted by the Mahāyānists—and also an exemplification of the fusion of the latter with that of the *vāsanā*.

<sup>133</sup> Cf. SSH, T12, 220b11–24. Also see Yinshun 1951: 154a6–155a13.

<sup>134</sup> SSH, 220b24–c1.

<sup>135</sup> SSH, 220a13–15.

## 6. Akliṣṭājñāna, vāsanā, kleśāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa in Early Yogācāra

For the Mahāyāna theory of Perfect Buddhahood and the soteriological prescription of the path leading thereto, the early Indian Yogācāra found an important doctrinal device and inspiration in the Abhidharma doctrine of the *akliṣṭājñāna* and *vāsanā*.

### 6.1. Basic Section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*: Enlightenment is attained when all *vāsanās* and non-defiled ignorance are destroyed

The *Bodhi-paṭala* in the Basic Section (本地分), among the earliest Yogācāra doctrinal strata of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, explains Supreme Perfect Enlightenment in terms of the complete destruction of all defilements together with the *vāsanā*, and the absolute abandonment of the non-defiled ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*):

Herein, what is Enlightenment (*bodhi*)?

Briefly, it is the twofold abandonment and twofold knowledge.

Twofold abandonment: of defilement-hindrane (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and knowable-hindrane (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).

Twofold knowledge: [1] the taintless knowledge free from all bondages, resulting from the abandonment of *kleśāvaraṇa*; and [2] the knowledge which is unobstructed and unhindered with regard to all knowables, resulting from the abandonment of *jñeyāvaraṇa*.

Its synonyms: “pure knowledge” (*śuddhajñāna*), “omniscience” (*sarvajñāna*), and “obstacle-free knowledge” (*asaṅgajñāna*). The complete destruction of all defilements together with the *vāsanā*, and the remainderless abandonment of the non-defiled ignorance (*akliṣṭāyāś cāvidyā*) is called the “Supreme Proper Perfect Enlightenment” (*anuttarā samyak-sambodhi*).<sup>136</sup>

Thus, we see here a more explicit development in which the attainment of Perfect Enlightenment is taught to require the eradication of the twofold-hindrane: Removal of all defilements—even that along with their *vāsanā*—is not enough; the cognitive hindrance preventing the complete, all-mode knowledge of all knowables must also be removed.

<sup>136</sup> BoBh 62. Cf. T30, 498c20–499a15; T30, 975c11–17.

In the very first chapter, on “families” (*gotrapaṭala*), of the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, the Śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha-family is contrasted with the Bodhi-sattva-family in terms of this twofold hindrance: The former are purified only in respect of the defilement-hindrance; the latter is purified in respect of both hindrances.<sup>137</sup>

Another example of early Yogācāra notion of the knowable-hindrance obstructing supreme perfect Wisdom is the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. This text enumerates the highest level of Reality (*tattvārtha*) as that accessible exclusively for those whose knowledge (Wisdom) has been purified of, and thus liberated from, the knowable-hindrance, in addition to being freed from the defilement-hindrance. This cognitive domain is the supreme, highest Suchness (*tathatā*) “at the very limit of the knowables (i.e., of knowability itself), from which proper investigations of all *dharma*s cease and proceed no further.”<sup>138</sup>

The term “*akliṣṭāvidyā*” in the above *Bodhipaṭala* passage, rather than *akliṣṭājñāna*, is noticeable. It signifies a development in which the earlier, Abhidharma conception of the non-defiled and non-defined *akliṣṭājñāna* being now considered an *avidyā*—a Buddhist notion generally considered the fundamental source of defilement.<sup>139</sup> In this connection, we may also note that, in a relatively later Yogācāra text, the *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*, Sthiramati (c. 6<sup>th</sup> century CE) in fact directly identifies the knowable hindrance with the *akliṣṭājñāna*:

The abandonment of the defilement and knowable hindrances is for realization of liberation and omniscience [respectively].

For, defilements are the hindrance to the attainment of liberation; thus, when they have been abandoned, liberation is realized.

The knowable-hindrance is the non-defiled nescience, obstructive to the operation of knowledge with regard to all knowables. When it has been abandoned, the unobstructed and unhindered knowledge arises

<sup>137</sup> BoBh 2. Cf. T30, 478c22–26.

<sup>138</sup> Takahashi 2005: 87f: ... *yo gocara viṣayaḥ | sāsau paramā tathatā niruttarā jñeyaparyanta gatā yasyāḥ saṃyaksarvadharmapracicayā nivartante nātivartante ||*

<sup>139</sup> Cf. also the notion of the *avidyāvāsabhūmi*. However, also see §6.2 on usage of this “*avidyā*.”

with regard to the knowable in all its modes; and thus the state of omniscience is realized.<sup>140</sup>

## 6.2. *Akliṣṭāvidyā* (不染無明) and *akliṣṭājñāna* (不染無知) in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* and its commentary

The *Madhyāntavibhāga* states that the nondefiled ignorance concerning the *dharmadhātu* constitutes the tenfold hindrance qua opposition to the ten stages (*bhūmi*) of the Bodhisattva Path. The stages serve as their counteraction.<sup>141</sup>

However, the *Bhāṣya* that follows uses here the term non-defiled nescience:

Concerning the *dharmadhātu* ... that which is the nondefiled nescience is the hindrance to the ten bodhisattva-stages respectively, on account of being their opposition.<sup>142</sup>

This suggests that indeed “*avidyā*” here may not be used by Sthiramati (the commentator) not in the strict sense of ignorance that is intrinsically defiled.

It is noteworthy that the ten Bodhisattva-stages—concretely constituting as they do the path of progress toward Perfect Buddhahood (*tathāgatahood*)—are expounded as being counteraction, stage by stage, to the non-defiled ignorance/nescience. This obviously underscores the Mahāyāna doctrinal concerns on the latter as the fundamental obstacle to be overcome for the attainment of perfect Wisdom or complete Enlightenment.

## 6.3. \**Mahāyānasamgraha*: the *akliṣṭāvidyā* is non-defiled for the *śrāvakas*, but defiled for the *bodhisattvas*

Asaṅga’s \**Mahāyānasamgraha* cites the above-discussed stanza (*chos kyi dby-ings la ma rig pa / nyon mongs can min sgrib pa bcu / sa bcu’i mi mthun phyogs rnams kyi / gnyen po dag ni sa yin no //*), and explains thus:

<sup>140</sup> Buescher 2007: 38: *kleśā hi mokṣaprāpter āvaraṇam ity atas teṣu prahīṇeṣu mokṣo ’dhigamyate | jñeyāvaraṇam api sarvasmiṁ jñeye jñānapravṛttipratibandhabhūtam akliṣṭam ajñānam | tasmīn prahīṇe sarvākāre jñeye asaktam apratihatam ca jñānam pravartata ity atah sarvajñatvam adhigamyate |*

<sup>141</sup> Nagao 1964: 35: *dharmadhātāv avidyeyaṁ akliṣṭā daśadhāvṛtīḥ | daśabhūmivipakṣeṇa pratipakṣās tu bhūmayah || II.16*

<sup>142</sup> Nagao 1964: 35.



This ignorance is non-defiled for the *śrāvakas* etc. But, for the *bodhisattvas*, it should be understood as being defiled.<sup>143</sup>

The reason is not far to seek: According to the Mahāyāna, unlike the *bodhisattvas*, the *śrāvakas* do not seek the perfect all-mode knowledge (and that is why they do not attain Buddhahood). They do not embark on the bodhisattva stages wherein the non-defiled “ignorance” or “nescience” constitutes a hindrance to be counteracted. This is explained in Asvabhāva’s commentary:

“This *avidyā* is non-defiled in the case of the Śrāvakas”—This is because it is not to be abandoned [by them]. It is not to be abandoned by them because it is not their intention to enter into these [Bodhisattva]-stages which serve as its counteraction, and it does not hinder their Nirvāṇa.

“It is defiled in the case of the Bodhisattvas”—This is because it is to be abandoned [by them]. It is to be abandoned because it is their very intention to enter into these [Bodhisattva]-stages which serve as its counteraction, and because the all-mode knowledge [sought after by the Bodhisattvas] is hindered by this ignorance.<sup>144</sup>

## 7. Conclusion

Since the Buddha’s own time, the disciples, including the foremost Arahants, had been overwhelmed by the superiority of the Buddha’s Wisdom. The continuous pondering over and search for an answer on his incomparable perfect Wisdom and the path leading thereto led to important Buddhological doctrines in the various Buddhist schools or textual traditions. In a significant

<sup>143</sup> Toh 4048, *bstan ’gyur, sems tsam*, vol. ri, 30a: *ma rig pa ’di yang nyan thos rnam kyī ni nyon mongs pa can ma yin gyi / byang chub sems dpa’ rnam kyī ni nyon mongs pa can du rig par bya’o //*

<sup>144</sup> Toh 4051, *bstan ’gyur, sems tsam*, vol. ri, 257b: *ma rig pa ’di yang nyan thos rnam kyī ni nyon mongs pa can ma yin gyi zhes bya ba ni spang bar bya ba ma yin pa’i phyir ro // de mi spong ba ni de’i gnyen po’i sa la ’jug pa’i skabs ma yin pa dang / mya ngan las ’das pa la bgegs mi byed pa’i phyir ro // byang chub sems dpa’ rnam kyī ni nyon mongs pa can te zhes bya ba ni spang bar bya ba’i phyir ro // spong ba ni de’i gnyen po’i sa la ’jug pa’i skabs yin pa dang / rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid kyī bgegs byed pa’i phyir ro //*; 《攝大乘論釋》T31, 423c23–28.

way, this search may be considered one of the major threads inspiring the origin of the Mahāyāna for which Perfect Buddhahood is the common ideal.

In this connection, the Sarvāstivāda formulated the *akliṣṭājñāna* doctrine. This *ajñāna* is not *avidyā*, and in fact not of the nature of defilement. It is a non-veiled-non-defined (*anivṛtāvvyākṛta*) *prajñā*, one of the universal thought-concomitants (*caitta*), to be abandoned by the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāheya*) upon the attainment of the *Vajropamasamādhi*. The Buddha alone is capable of absolutely eradicating it, as a result of which he uniquely and permanently achieves the all-mode knowledge. More or less contemporaneous with this doctrine, was the doctrine of *vāsanā*. Before long, as attested in the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā*, the two doctrines came to be often fused: the two *yānas* are inferior in Wisdom because their *akliṣṭājñāna* have not been absolutely eradicated; the inferiority is also said to be on account of their *vāsanās* not having been destroyed. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas (e.g., Saṃghabhadra) emphasize the ontological reality of the *akliṣṭājñāna*.

The Prajñāpāramitā tradition continued to be inspired in their investigation in the Buddha's Perfect Wisdom in a similar manner, and proposed that the Wisdom-perfection (*prajñāpāramitā*) is the perfect Wisdom to be sought after. It constituted both the means and the end with regard to Supreme Perfect Enlightenment. However, in contrast to the Sarvāstivāda, their texts explain the hindrance to Buddhahood in terms of *vāsanā*. This implies that the cognitive imperfection of the two *yānas* essentially results from their incomplete abandonment of defilements—having their *vāsanās* still remaining behind. In the early Prajñāpāramitā texts, such as the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*, the “all-mode knowledge” stands out as the main term characterizing a Buddha's perfect Wisdom. But eventually we see the clear distinction among three relevant terms: all-knowledge (*sarvajñatā*), path-knowledge (*mārgajñatā*) and all-mode knowledge. Another important term in this context is the “knowledge of the omniscient” or “all-knowing knowledge” (*sarvajñajñāna*). It appears that this term was initially used in a more or less generic sense, sometimes seen to be synonymous with the other terms, and with *buddhajñāna* etc. But in the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā*, it is asserted—especially judging by Xuanzang's version—that the *vāsanās* are absolutely abandoned by the all-mode knowledge in the *Vajropamasamādhi* (basically echoing the Abhidharma path-structure), and this leads at the Tathāgata-stage to the “knowledge of the omniscient,” the

content and function of which must of course be the same as those of the all-mode knowledge.

Starting from the earliest Yogācāra textual stratum, Perfect Buddhahood is said to be attained only when thought is absolutely purified (*śuddha*)—fully integrated—by permanently abandoning both the defilement-hindrane and the knowable-hindrane. This came to be the standard Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrinal doctrine. Sthiramati, for one, explicitly identifies the *jñeyāvaraṇa* with the *akliṣṭājñāna*. The significant impact of the *akliṣṭājñāna* notion on the Yogācāra becomes conspicuous in texts like the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* and the \**Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*, which teach that the ten *bodhisattva-bhūmis* are practiced as its counteraction. It is further taught that this non-defiled nescience/ignorance is non-defiled for the two *yānas*, but defiled for the Bodhisattvas.

In the Mahāyāna textual tradition represented by the SSH, another important impact of the Sarvāstivāda *akliṣṭājñāna* doctrine is discernible in the formulation of the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*, which constitutes the most fundamental ground and subtlest source for the obstruction to the Wisdom of Perfect Enlightenment. Related to this notion is the teaching of the subtle “transformational (birth-and-)death (*pāriṇāmikī cyuti*) of the advanced Bodhisattvas (after the eighth Bodhisattva-stage) and the Arhats after they have transcended the physical births as a result of having abandoned all defilements—since their *vāsanās* still remain. Thus, the *vāsanās*, originally conceived of, in both Abhidharma and Prajñāpāramitā, as having nothing to do with defilements, are now considered—analogously to the with-outflow defilements generating impure *karma*—as capable of generating outflow-free (pure) *karma* resulting in transformational births in which the advanced Bodhisattvas can continue to accomplish their vows and the *buddha*-qualities. The same doctrine of the two types of birth-and-death is also seen in DZDL which explains that the Arhats are reborn outside the triple spheres, in some Buddha-land where they will receive the profound teachings of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra*, and continue their journey toward Buddhahood.

## Abbreviations

- AdPP *Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. Ed. E. Conze. Rome 1962–1974.
- AKB *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Ed. P. Pradhan. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Patna 1975.
- Akli Dhammajoti 1998.
- Aṣṭa *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. Ed. P. L. Vaidya. Darbhanga 1960.
- BoBh *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Ed. N. Dutt. Patna 1966.
- DX 支婁迦讖 Lokakṣema (trans.), 《道行般若經》 *Daoxing bore jing* [“Practice of the Way”]. T vol. 8, no. 224.
- DZDL 《大智度論》 *Dazhidu lun* [\*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa; Commentary on the Great Perfection of Wisdom]. T vol. 25, no.1509.
- JPŚ 迦多衍尼子 Kātyāyanīputra’s 《阿毗達磨發智論》 *Apidamo fazhi lun* [\*Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra]. T vol. 26, no. 1544.
- Kj 鳩摩羅什 Kumārajīva (trans.), 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》 *Mohe ban ruo bo luo mi jing*. T vol. 8, no. 223.
- Mo 無羅叉 Mokṣala (trans.), 《放光般若經》 *Fanguang bore jing*. T vol. 8, no. 221.
- MVŚ 《大毗婆沙論》 *Dapiposha lun* [\*Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā]. T vol. 27, no.1545.
- Ny 《順正理論》 *Shun zhengli lun* [\*Nyāyānusāra]. T vol. 29, no.1562.
- PSP *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. Ed. T. Kimura. Tokyo 1986–2009.
- Puguang 《俱舍論記》 *Jushe lun ji* [Commentary on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya]. T vol. 41, no. 1821.
- SSH 求那跋陀羅 Guṇabhadra (trans.), 《勝鬘師子吼一乘大方便方廣經》 *Shengman shizi hou yisheng da fangbian fanguang jing*, T12, no. 353.
- SĀ 《雜阿含經》 *Za ahan jing* (\*Saṃyuktāgāma). T vol. 2, no. 99.
- Sāratthappakāsinī* Burmese edition.
- Sar Abhi *Sarvāstivāda Abidharma*. See Dhammajoti 2015.
- T 《大正新修大藏經》 *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*. Eds. J. Takakusu, et al, Tokyo 1924–1932.
- Toh Eds. H. Ui, et al., *A complete catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons. (Bkaḥ-ḥgyur and Bstan-ḥgyur)*. Sendai 1934.
- Tib Tibetan translation.
- Vy *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*. Ed. U. Wogihara. Tokyo 1971.
- X 玄奘 Xuanzang (trans.), 《大般若波羅蜜多經》 *Da bore boluomiduo jing*. T vols. 5–8, no. 220.
- X1 The 4<sup>th</sup> division (第四分) of X.
- X2 The 5<sup>th</sup> division (第五分) of X.

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# Bhāviveka, Atiśa, and the Transmission of the *Tarkajvālā*

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By now, it is well known that the composition and transmission of the *Tarkajvālā* (“Flame of Reason”)<sup>1</sup> is of central concern for the study of Bhāviveka and, through him, for the study of Buddhist philosophy more generally. V.V. Gokhale discussed some of the issues in his earliest work on the *Tarkajvālā*, and they have been discussed further by a long and distinguished series of scholars, including Lindtner, Ejima, Ruegg, Krasser, He, van der Kuijp, and others.<sup>2</sup> I sketched out my own approach to the composition of the *Tarkajvālā* in the introduction to my *Bhāviveka and His Buddhist Opponents* (Eckel 2008). I take my lead from Ruegg’s citation of the principle of parsimony, that “entities should not be multiplied beyond need” (Ruegg 1990: 65). Unless it is necessary to assume that the author of the *Tarkajvālā* differed from the author of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (“Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way”), the verses that are the subject of the *Tarkajvālā*’s commentary, one is justified in treating the two texts as coming from the same source.

In support of this position, I argue that the commentarial style and level of sophistication in the *Tarkajvālā* show obvious similarities to the style in the *Prajñāpradīpa* (“Lamp of Wisdom”), the text that is the gold standard for determining the authorship of the original Bhāviveka. The *Tarkajvālā* also shows no signs of the most distinctive feature that was developed by the Madhyamaka texts of the eighth century and thereafter: the three-part definition of correct relative truth. This three-part formula, in which correct relative truth is defined as arising dependently, capable of effective action, and satisfying when not analyzed, seems to have begun with Śrīgupta in his *Tattvāvatāra* (“Introduction to Reality”):

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<sup>1</sup> In this paper I will use the name *Tarkajvālā* as Atiśa does, to refer to both the commentary and the verses in the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (“Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way”).

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Gokhale 1985, Ejima 1980, Lindtner 1986, Ruegg 1981 and 1990, Krasser 2011, He and van der Kuijp 2014.

They satisfy only when not analyzed, and from them other things seem to arise. These things produce effective action that is like themselves.<sup>3</sup>

It was then picked up and elaborated by Jñānagarbha in the *Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga* ("Distinction between the Two Truths." Eckel 1987), by Śāntarakṣita in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* ("Ornament of the Middle Way." Ichigō 1985), and, notably, by Atiśa in the *Satyadvayāvatāra* ("Introduction to the Two Truths." Lindtner 1981, Apple 2018a):

A *dharma* that arises and is destroyed, only satisfies when it not analyzed (*avicāraikaramaṇīya*), and is capable of effective action (*arthakriyā-samartha*) is considered correct relative [truth].<sup>4</sup>

The concept of "effective action" (*arthakriyā*) shows the decisive influence of Dharmakīrti. As far as I know, this combination of terms is not present in the text of the *Tarkajvālā*, and its appearance in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* ("Jewel Lamp of the Middle Way") is simply one more piece of evidence that the attribution of that text to Bhavya (or Bhāviveka) must be considered spurious.<sup>5</sup>

But to say that one is justified in treating the *Tarkajvālā* and *Madhyamakahrdaya* as coming from the same source is not to say that the text of the *Tarkajvālā* has not evolved or expanded over the course of its transmission in India and Tibet. Professor Saito's impressive work on the Dunhuang manuscript of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* ("Introduction the Practice of Awakening." Saito 2000) shows that, with the right sources, it is possible to discern additions and expansions in a text that for many years had been treated as a unitary whole. Scholars as early as Gokhale (1985) have noted similar possibilities in the

<sup>3</sup> TA: *ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' ste // de 'dra las byung de bzhin no // dngos po de dag de lta bu'i // don bya de dang de byed do //* (D 3892, Ha 41b1).

<sup>4</sup> SDA: *ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' ba'i // skye ba dang ni 'jig pa'i chos // don byed nus dang ldan pa ni // yang dag kun rdzob yin par 'dod //* (Lindtner 1981: 193).

<sup>5</sup> "For those with inferior vision, conventional [reality] is like the pith of a plantain, it satisfies when it is not analyzed, it arises from causes, and it is capable of effective action" (*chu shing gi ni phung po bzhin // ma brtags nyams dga'i mtshan nyid can // rgyu las skyed dang don byed nus // tshu rol mthong ba'i kun rdzob yin //* D 3854, Tsha 269a). Translated in Lindtner 1981: 170. For a thoughtful account of the current scholarship on this problematic text, see Del Toso 2014.

text of the *Tarkajvālā*. (Among these he includes “a few anachronisms” like the oft-remarked references to the author as “*ācārya*.”) Many parts of the *Tarkajvālā* give the impression of having grown through a process of addition, interpolation, and expansion. But without another version of the text for comparison, how can these vague impressions be turned into something more definitive? Are there any reliable criteria to distinguish additions or interpolations in the text?

To answer these questions, I would like to begin with Ritsu Akahane’s study of the Chinese and Tibetan versions of the *Prajñāpradīpa* to suggest ways of identifying possible additions to the *Tarkajvālā*. I would then like to comment on other features of the text that suggest a composite character. I will then discuss the role Atiśa and his Tibetan students may have played in transmitting the text of the *Tarkajvālā*. Finally, I will offer some observations about one of the most puzzling chapters in the textual history of the *Tarkajvālā*: Atiśa’s translation of a text known as the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* (“Destruction of Errors about the Middle Way”). This work is an extract from the climactic argument about emptiness in the *Tarkajvālā* and is attributed to the ancient Madhyamaka master Āryadeva.<sup>6</sup>

## 1. Digressions in the *Tarkajvālā*

Max Müller is famous for the dictum that “He who knows one knows none.” This simple statement has become the watchword for the comparative study of religion. It means that one can only know the significance of a religious phenomenon by comparing it to something else that is similar but differs in significant respects. Only then can its distinctive features come to light. Ritsu Akahane’s study of the *Prajñāpradīpa* (Akahane 2013 and 2014) is a classic example of this principle. Considering the Tibetan text of the *Prajñāpradīpa* by itself, it is difficult to know how the text might have changed over the course of its transmission. But when it is read side by side with the Chinese translation, omissions and variations tell a more complex story. Akahane

<sup>6</sup> The translation concludes with this statement: “Here ends the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta*, written by the great Ācārya Āryadeva” (*dbu ma ‘khrul pa ‘joms pa zhes bya ba / slob dpon chen po ārya de bas mādzaḍ pa rdzogs so*) (D 3850, Tsha 26). This statement is followed by the colophon attributing the translation to Atiśa and his assistant “monk, translator Tshul khrims rgyal ba.”



(following Krasser) was able to identify a series of digressions present in the Tibetan translation but absent in the Chinese. The most extensive of these is the long digression that appears at the end of chapter 25 (Eckel 1985). This digression summarizes issues that are dealt with more extensively in the critique of Yogācāra in chapter 5 of the *Tarkajvālā* and provides a useful point of comparison for other versions of this argument. The digression concludes with these words:

A more extensive analysis is made with the Yogācāras in the chapter on “The Introduction to Reality” (*tattvāvatāra*) in the [verses on] “The Heart of the Middle Way” (*Madhyamakahrdaya*). So much for the digression. This is a partial account of the investigations with our fellow Buddhists concerning what is correct and incorrect.<sup>7</sup>

The key phrase here is “so much for the digression” (*zhar la bshad pas chog ste / alaṃ prasaṅgena*). Akahane points out that this or a similar phrase appears six times in the *Prajñāpradīpa* in passages that are present in the Tibetan translation but missing in the Chinese.

The question is what to make of these omissions. Akahane points out that the evidence is ambiguous. It is not as if all digressions are found only in Tibetan and not in Chinese. Digressions also occur in passages that are present in both translations. Should we conclude from this that the Chinese translator was working with an earlier version of the text? Or is it possible that the Chinese translator simply omitted some of the digressions in the original text, thinking perhaps that they were unnecessary interruptions? These questions are difficult to answer. It also is difficult to determine when these digressions may have entered the text. Did Bhāviveka introduce them himself? Were they introduced by students after the text was originally dictated or transcribed? Or did they enter at a later stage of transmission? We do not know enough about the circumstances that surrounded the production or transmission of this text to determine the answers to these questions. But they give important hints about its possible evolution.

<sup>7</sup> PP: *dpyad pa rgyas par ni dbu ma'i snying po'i de kho na la 'jug pa'i skabs snal sbyor spyod pa pa dag dang lhan cig byed par 'gyur ro // zhar la bshad pas chog ste / 'di ni mngon par brtson pa rnam rang gi sde pa dag dang lhan cig rigs pa dang rigs pa ma yin pa rtog pa'i phyogs tsam zhig bstan pa yin no //* (D 3853, Tsha 248a6–7).

When we look at the text of the *Tarkajvālā*, we find a similar situation. One of the most striking features of the fourth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā* on “The Analysis of Reality According to the Śrāvakas” is a long digression written in response to a series of what I call “Miscellaneous Objections” in the Śrāvakas’ *pūrvapakṣa* (Eckel 2008: 126-128). These objections appear right after Bhāviveka’s account of the eighteen schools (*nikāya*). These objections range from an attack on a concept as central as the idea of the eternal Buddha to a complaint that the Mahāyāna is not included in the dream of King Kṛkin. The arguments give a fascinating glimpse of controversies that might have separated the Mahāyāna from its more traditional Buddhist opponents. Some of the points are obvious, like the claim that Śākyamuni is an illusory manifestation (*nirmāṇa*), while some are more obscure, like the argument that the vows of the bodhisattva Gaganagañja are nothing but words. (I take this to be a general objection against the concept of the bodhisattva vow, but the reason for choosing Gaganagañja as the example is obscure.)<sup>8</sup> Bhāviveka’s response to these objections takes up almost twenty full folios in the Derge edition of the canon. It concludes with the formula that Akahane identified in his study of the *Prajñāpradīpa*:

If one is capable of analysis, one should rationally (lit. with argument after argument) investigate this. So much for this lengthy digression. Let us return to the point at hand.<sup>9</sup>

Here the phrase *shin tu spros pa chog go* represents the Sanskrit *alam atiprasaṅgena* (s.v. Negi 1993) like the *zhar la bshad pas chog ste* that Akahane discussed in the *Prajñāpradīpa*, with the added note that this is a “lengthy” (*shin tu / ati*) digression. The “point at hand” (*skabs su bab pa / prakṛta* or *prastuta*) is intended to pick up where Bhāviveka left off in the Śrāvakas’ *pūrvapakṣa*.

<sup>8</sup> Although it is worth noting that a paper manuscript of the *Ārya-gaganagañja-paripṛcchā-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra* is one of a handful of sūtras that have been identified in a box of manuscripts associated with Atiśa. According to a catalog by Luo Zhao (compiled in 1985), this box is located in the Potala. On the significance of this collection, see Kano 2016: 104–107.

<sup>9</sup> TJ: *blos spyod par nus pa yod na rigs pa dang rigs pas de brtag par gyis shig / shin tu spros pa chog go // skabs su bab pa nyid kyi dbang du byas te* / (Eckel 2008: 367).

Even here, however, there is a significant incongruity. Verses 4.7–8 of the *pūrvapakṣa* read as follows:

MHK 4.7: The Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching, because it is not included in the Sūtrāntas and so forth, or because it teaches a different path, like the Vedānta view.

MHK 4.8: Or the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha's teaching because it improperly denies cause and effect, like a nihilistic view. The point is clinched because it is not included in the eighteen schools.<sup>10</sup>

Verse 4.8 is followed by Bhāviveka's long prose account of the eighteen schools. Right after the eighteen schools come the "Miscellaneous Objections." But in Bhāviveka's response to these objections, the sequence of the argument is disturbed. Bhāviveka responds to verse 4.7ab in verse 4.35cd: "[The Mahāyāna is the Buddha's teaching] because the teachings of the Mahāyāna, beginning with the [four] truths, are included in the Tripiṭaka." The *Tarkajvālā* then follows this verse with a long prose passage arguing that various canonical collections are incomplete and cannot dispute the authority of the Mahāyāna. (It is not insignificant that this passage is also found in Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*.) Then, when the text has finished responding to the argument in 4.7ab, it takes up the "Miscellaneous Objections."

At the end of the response to the "Miscellaneous Objections," the text returns to "the point at hand" in 4.7cd.

MHK 4.36: The reason ["because it teaches a different path"] is not accepted, because the eightfold path to omniscience is taught in the Mahāyāna.

In other words, the text doubles back on itself. It does not pick up the objection in verse 4.8, the objection that preceded the first mention of the "Miscellaneous Objections," and it does not move forward to verse 4.9. It goes back to verse 4.7. This means that the response to the "Miscellaneous Objections" not only constitutes a digression; it interrupts the logical sequence of the text.

As always, it is difficult to know how much significance to attribute to such incongruities. Perhaps Bhāviveka himself looked back at the text and

<sup>10</sup> The Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of chapters 1–3 of the *Madhyamakahr̥dayakārikāḥ* are

felt that this was the right place to add a discussion of issues not mentioned in the verses. But Bhāviveka gives the impression of being an organized and systematic thinker. It is hard to imagine that he would have inserted this digression in a place that breaks the flow of the text. It is more likely that someone else found a need to expand the text to include additional arguments. That person might have thought: What would be a better place to locate these objections than right after the long prose digression on the origin of the eighteen schools, and what would be a better place to respond than after another long prose digression on the authority of different canonical collections? If this seems slightly confusing, well, that's a problem for others to sort out.

The structural incongruities connected with the “Miscellaneous Objection” seem to suggest the intervention of someone other than the original author of the verses, but there also are places where “digressions” seem to play an integral part in the original text. One notable example occurs in chapter 1, on “Not Relinquishing the Awakening Mind.” Bhāviveka uses this chapter as Śāntideva uses the early chapters of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, to praise the awakening mind (*bodhicitta*) and advocate the practice of the bodhisattva path. But in verse 1.21, he introduces the concept of a bodhisattva's “nirvāṇa-without-foundation” (*apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa*):

MHK 1.21: The wise [bodhisattvas] do not apprehend saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as either different or the same, so they stay nowhere and yet everywhere in the realm of rebirth.

This verse then initiates a digression on the topic of “nirvāṇa as perfection for the sake of self and other,” in other words a discussion of Buddhahood. Bhāviveka explicitly identifies this passage as a digression (*zhar la 'ongs pa brjod par bya ste*):

MHK 1.22: They have attained the status of one who turns the wheel of true Dharma. This [status] is rich with the seven jewels of the limbs of awakening; it is a storehouse of immeasurable virtues; and it is respected by gods and demigods.

MHK 1.23: They have filled the ten directions with their splendor and their words, like the pure rays of a pearl or the full moon in autumn.

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found in Heitmann 1998. The translations are mine.

MHK 1.24: To continue the lineage of the three jewels, they have established their true sons, who are storehouses of virtues and whose teachings are worshipped by gods, serpent deities, and others.

MHK 1.25: Those who have attained nirvāṇa by doing what needs to be done for themselves and others have truly attained nirvāṇa; others who have been cut off by the destruction of the aggregates also have attained nirvāṇa.

At the end of this passage, the author marks the return to the main topic with the familiar formula: “Now that this digression has been concluded (*zhar la 'ongs pa yongs su rdzogs par byas nas*), we take up the third kind of compassion, developing the mind to raise others from lower vehicles.” It is possible, of course, that these four verses were inserted by someone other than the original author, but they are so closely connected to the thought of this chapter and so similar in style, involving both verse and prose, that they seem to function as an integral part of the text.

There is more to the question of insertions and additions in the *Tarkajvālā*, however, than passages marked explicitly as “digressions.” I mentioned earlier that the chapter on the Śrāvakas shares a passage with Vasubandhu’s *Vyākhyāyukti*, with no explicit mention of its source.<sup>11</sup> Whether Bhāviveka is quoting Vasubandhu or both are quoting a common source is difficult to tell. But a comparison of the two passages shows that, if Bhāviveka borrowed the passage, he made distinctive stylistic adjustments to incorporate it into his text. In the *Vyākhyāyukti*, Vasubandhu (if he was indeed the author) uses the distinction between “definitive” meaning (*nītārtha*) and “interpretable” meaning (*neyārtha*) to explain differences between the Mahāyāna and canonical collections of the Śrāvakas. Bhāviveka omits this distinction, not because he is unaware of it, but because it does not fit his approach to scriptural authority. His own approach is expressed most succinctly in his initial response to the Yogācāra objection in verse 5.8: “In response, we say: All the Tathāgatas’ teachings are authoritative for us” (*atrocyate pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvaṃ tathāgataṃ vacaḥ*).<sup>12</sup> For Bhāviveka, the problem is not that the scriptural

<sup>11</sup> Peter Skilling wrote the first important study of this passage in Skilling 1997. The passage is translated and discussed in Eckel 2008: 148–153.

<sup>12</sup> Eckel 2008: 225.

sources of the Yogācāra are wrong and need to be superseded. The sources are fine; it is just that the Yogācāras fail to understand them correctly.

This small doctrinal fingerprint suggests that the borrower was Bhāviveka himself, or at least someone who was familiar with Bhāviveka's approach. But Bhāviveka's fingerprints are not always so evident in the long and rambling discussion of the "Miscellaneous Objections." Some, like the explanation of the concept of the eternal Buddha, are concise and focused on removing contradictions between the Mahāyāna and the traditions of the Śrāvakas. Others, like the discussion of the status of bodhisattvas ("The Mahāyāna Pays Homage to Householders and Exalts Bodhisattvas")<sup>13</sup> seem to be more random collections of loosely connected points. Without a clear external source, like the *Vyākhyāyukti*, it is difficult to say with any certainty that other materials have been inserted, but the text gives the impression of having grown over a period of time. Whether this took place in the lifetime of Bhāviveka or later is unclear. Helmut Krasser has suggested that developments in the text could have come from Bhāviveka's students (Krasser 2011). This is certainly possible. Steven Collins is reported to have said, after long study of the Pali tradition, that the figure known as "Buddhaghosa" looks less like a single author and more like a committee designated by the conventional term "Buddhaghosa." Something similar might be true of Bhāviveka. The more we look at the components of the *Tarkajvālā*, the more it seems to be the product of a cumulative tradition, if not by a single author, then by a complex literary process to be designated by the conventional term "Bhāviveka."

## 2. Atiśa's Use of the *Tarkajvālā*

If we think of the *Tarkajvālā*, in some sense, as the product of a cumulative tradition, it opens up many new possibilities for investigation. Even if it is difficult to determine who was responsible for particular parts, who would be a likely candidate to contribute to the development of the text? Who quoted from it and why? Who played a role in its transmission, and who was involved in the translation that gave us the text we have today? These questions all lead to the eleventh-century Bengali scholar Atiśa (Dīpaṃkara

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<sup>13</sup> Special thanks to James B. Apple for sharing his wisdom and expertise about the study of Atiśa.

Śrījñāna) who, with his assistant Nag-tsho Lo-tsā-ba Tshul-khrims rGyal-ba, was responsible for the Tibetan translation.<sup>14</sup> According to traditions about Atiśa's life, the translation was completed when Atiśa and Nag-tsho were teaching in the gTsug-lag-khang (or Jo-khang) in Lhasa. This would have been sometime between Atiśa's arrival in central Tibet in 1043 and the years 1047-48, when he moved his activities to Nye-thang. His life came to an end in Nye-thang in 1054.

Early biographies of Atiśa indicate that he began his training as a scholar and practitioner with several different Indian masters, including a lay disciple, Jitāri, a scholar-monk Bodhibhadra and a number of practitioners and Tantric yogis. Tantra was a major part of his intellectual training and his scholarly work. But it was woven, to borrow the Tantras' own metaphor, on the warp of Madhyamaka tradition and on the lineage of Nāgārjuna. The key figure in shaping Atiśa's Madhyamaka identity seems to have been Bodhibhadra. Atiśa received his vows as a novice from Bodhibhadra in 994 at the monastic university of Nālandā, and he refers to Bodhibhadra frequently as an authority in his writings about Madhyamaka. A particularly good example is found in his *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* ("Commentary on the Lamp for the Path to Awakening"), a text that Atiśa composed at the request of king Byang-chub-'od shortly after arriving in Western Tibet in the year 1040:

Bodhibhadra attained accomplishments by means of the special instructions of Ārya Nāgārjuna and acquired the approval of Ārya Mañju-ghoṣa. He obtained supersensory knowledge and perceived reality, manifesting in his mind the intention of all the tantras, all the sūtras, and the tradition of vinaya at the same time. Therefore, since the spiritual teacher of the successively transmitted lineage is the glorious Bodhibhadra, one should follow him.<sup>15</sup>

These words of praise introduce a series of 33 verses in which Atiśa summarizes his understanding of the key ideas of Madhyamaka.

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<sup>14</sup> For an analysis of traditions about the life of Atiśa, see Eimer 1982. The major events of Atiśa's life are summarized by Apple (2018a) and Roesler (2019). See also Apple (2019).

<sup>15</sup> Translation quoted from Apple (2018a: 4). The Tibetan text is found in Sherburne (2000: 246).

Atiśa's scholarly travels led him to study the Mahāyāna with Dharmakīrti of Suvarṇadvīpa (known in Tibetan as gSer-gling-pa) and back to eastern India to take a position at the monastic university of Vikramaśīla.<sup>16</sup> There are suggestions in some of the early biographical literature that Atiśa came into conflict with gSer-gling-pa over differences between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra approaches to the nature of consciousness.<sup>17</sup> But his clash with the Yogācāra was more clearly articulated when Atiśa encountered the formidable figure of Ratnākaraśānti at Vikramaśīla. Although Ratnākaraśānti's position is complex and difficult to summarize, his basic Yogācāra orientation put him at odds with Atiśa on several key points. As summarized by Apple, "Ratnākaraśānti severely criticized the position that buddhahood was 'inconceivable' and exhausted of all mind and mental functions. Instead, Ratnākaraśānti advocated that a Buddha's realization has mental qualities. Atiśa, on the other hand, strongly advocated an understanding of buddhahood as bereft of all mental qualities, being without conceptuality and inconceivable" (Apple 2018b: 17). Behind this disagreement lay the Madhyamaka view that consciousness is just as insubstantial as the objects of consciousness. And the same is true of the ultimate reality that is the object of a Buddha's awareness. Both the awareness and its object are equally empty.

Atiśa saw this point as stemming from Nāgārjuna, but he would also have found it in the text of the *Tarkajvālā* that he taught to students at Somapurī during his time at Vikramaśīla. For example, in the final section of Bhāviveka's refutation of the Yogācāra in the fifth chapter of the *Tarkajvālā*, Bhāviveka says: "[Reality (*dharmatā*)] is grasped by the noble one's non-conceptual awareness, because it does not arise, since its arising can be refuted as before, and because it is not substantially real. It also is completely inexpressible" (Eckel 2008: 289). With this comes the idea that Buddhas, who perfectly realize this no-arising, have no thoughts and no actions. This stark view of Buddhahood was expressed in a passage from the *Tathāgataguhyā Sūtra*:

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<sup>16</sup> One can get a sense of some of the hazards Atiśa encountered on his journey from a biographical passage translated by Decleer (1995). The story tells of Atiśa being saved by the intervention of Tārā when his ship was becalmed on the journey.

<sup>17</sup> Apple 2018a: 30–33.



O Śāntamati, between the night in which he attained perfect Buddhahood and the night in which he attained parinirvāṇa without remainder, the Tathāgata did not utter a sound. He did not speak, he does not speak, and he will not speak. But all sentient beings, with different dispositions and interests, and in accordance with their aspirations, perceive the Tathāgata's diverse teaching as if it were coming forth [from the Tathāgata himself].<sup>18</sup>

This idea that a Buddha has no thought and does not act was challenging enough in the earlier period of the Mahāyāna, but it is likely to have become particularly problematic in the tenth century when the Tantras made it possible to imagine that one could attain Buddhahood in this life.<sup>19</sup> It is not surprising that it elicited a strong reaction from figures like Ratnākaraśānti, who had a more affirmative view of a Buddha's awareness.

Colophons and biographical accounts of Atiśa's life indicate that he used the *Tarkajvālā* in his teaching at Somapurī around the year 1034.<sup>20</sup> If so, what seems to have appealed to him in this text, and how did it fit into his presentation of Madhyamaka? It is possible to form an initial answer to these questions by scrutinizing two different texts: The *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭamadhyamakopadeśa* ("The Teaching of the Madhyamaka: Opening a Basket of Jewels"), written at Vikramaśīla before Atiśa left for Tibet around 1040, and the *Bodhipathapradīpa* ("Lamp for the Path to Awakening") with its *Pañjikā* ("Commentary"), written after Atiśa's arrival in Western Tibet.<sup>21</sup> The colophon of the "Basket" indicates that it was written at the request of Atiśa's two Tibetan disciples: Tshul-khrims rGyal-ba and rGya brTson-'grus Seng-ge.<sup>22</sup> As mentioned earlier, the "Lamp" was composed

<sup>18</sup> Quoted by Candrakīrti in the *Prasannapadā* (1903–1913: 539) For additional references, see Eckel 1992: 207, n. 48.

<sup>19</sup> I discussed the implications of this view in Eckel 1992. For a recent discussion of these and related issues see Almogi 2009.

<sup>20</sup> Apple 2018a: 8.

<sup>21</sup> The first of these texts was edited with Japanese translation by Miyazaki (2007). English translation by Apple (2010 and 2018a). The second text was edited with a German translation by Eimer (1978) and edited with an English translation by Sherburne (2000).

<sup>22</sup> Apple 2018a: 113.

at the request of king Byang-chub-'od. Both texts were meant to introduce the texts, traditions, and practices of Madhyamaka.

A brief examination of the "Basket" turns up several quotations from the *Tarkajvālā*, all related to the practice of the bodhisattva path, in keeping with the practical orientation of the "Basket" as a whole. The first appears in a section on maintaining the awakening mind (*bodhicitta*) by not letting go of suffering beings: "When [a bodhisattva] looks with compassion on those who suffer and are tormented by grief, pity arises deep in his bones, and he helps them."<sup>23</sup> This quotation brings together two lines from Bhāviveka's description of an "accomplished" (*kṛtīn*) bodhisattva who has achieved the sixth stage of the bodhisattva path. The full passage gives a picture of the bodhisattva's active gaze, looking down with compassion from the mountain peak of wisdom on those who suffer below. It might be compared to the compassionate gaze of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara, the "Lord who Looks Down."

[This bodhisattva] has climbed the mountain peak of wisdom and is free from grief, but he gazes with compassion on ordinary people who suffer and are burned by grief.

With eyes moist with compassion, he sees ordinary people trapped in an imaginary net created by the craft of conceptual thought. . .

This accomplished one is tormented by pity and dedicated to helping them; his mind is as hard as a diamond, and he is the greatest of beings.<sup>24</sup>

Atiśa's second quotation reaches back to the second chapter of the *Tarkajvālā* on "Taking the Vow of an Ascetic" (*munivratasamāśraya*). For Bhāviveka this chapter functioned as part of the aspiration to awakening:

<sup>23</sup> RKUMU: *sdug bsngal drag pos gdungs pa yi // sdug bsngal can dag mthong ba'i tshe // snying rje rus pa'i gting nas // skye zhing de la phan par byed //* (Miyazaki 2007: 21). Here I translate *snying rje* as "pity" in keeping with the Sanskrit *kṛpā* of the corresponding verse in the *Madhyamakahrdaya*.

<sup>24</sup> MHK 3.296–297, 301: *sa prajñāmeruśekharam ārūḍhaḥ karuṇāvaśāt / aśokaḥ śoka-samtaptam prekṣate duḥkhitam jagat // sa tadā karuṇārdreṇa lokam ālokya cakṣuṣā / vikalpaśilpasambhūtakaḥ pañjālasamvṛtam // ... // yaḥ pīḍyamānaḥ kṛpayā taddhitā-dhānadikṣitaḥ / vajraśailamahāśāraccittāḥ sattvottamaḥ kṛtī //*. These and related passages are discussed in Eckel 1992.

Those who are bound by the noose of hope for a result choose to whom to give their gift, and they search for them. Others, who think only of relieving suffering such as sickness or hunger, do not think of the recipient. They give equally to all and understand the equality of *dharmas*. As it is said in another sūtra: “O Kumāra, with one Dharma a bodhisattva quickly attains perfect awakening. That is, with an equal mind toward all sentient beings.” Likewise, “If a bodhisattva thinks that the Tathāgata is the one to whom offerings should be given, rather than animals, that would not be the *dharma* of a bodhisattva.”<sup>25</sup>

In the same section, Atiśa quotes a somewhat earlier verse from the same chapter of the *Tarkajvālā* about the attitude a bodhisattva should take toward others’ faults. The original verse reads like this: “His mind is honest, it has overcome pride, and it sees reality; it is blind to the faults of others, and it is afraid of falling into faults of its own.”<sup>26</sup> Atiśa’s version of the verse differs enough to be a paraphrase: “It is as if his eyes are sharp to perceive his own faults and blind to the faults of other; he is honest, has no pride, and always meditates on emptiness.”<sup>27</sup> The divergence between these two versions shows that there is some fluidity in the transmission of these texts. The same can be said about Atiśa’s attribution of the verses, not to Bhāviveka, but to his guru Avadhūtipa. What is significant, however, is that Atiśa uses the *Tarkajvālā* to support his views about the practice of a bodhisattva. Atiśa includes this text along with Śāntideva’s *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and Śikṣāsamuccaya,

<sup>25</sup> The Derge version of the passage reads as follows: ‘bras bu la re ba’i zhags pas bcings pa rnam ni sbyin pa’i zhing ‘dam par byed cing tshol te / gzhan dag bkres dang skom pa la sogs sdug bsgal zhi bar bya ba’i phyir snod ma brtsis par byin na chos mnyam pa nyid rtogs ‘gyur te / ji skad du / gzhon nu chos gcig gis byang chub sems dpa’ myur du mngon par rdzogs par ‘tshang rgya ste / ‘di la ste sems can thams cad la sems mnyam zhing snyoms la bye brag mi phyed pa nyid do zhes bya ba dang / de bzhin du gal te byang chub sems dpa’ ‘di snyam du de bzhin gshegs pa ni bdag gi yon gnas yin gyi dud ‘gro ni ma yin no snyam du sems na / byang chub sems dpa’i chos su mi ‘gyur ro zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa lta bu’o // (D 3856, Dza 51a7–b3). I have translated this passage from the *Tarkajvālā*. The passage quoted in the “Basket” differs in some small details. Compare the text in Miyazaki 2007: 42 and the translation in Apple 2018a: 94.

<sup>26</sup> MHK 2.3: *rjunāhatamānena manasā tattvadarśinā / paradoṣekṣaṇāndhena svadoṣāpatti-bhīruṇā* //.

<sup>27</sup> RKUMU: rang skyon rtog la mig rnon bzhin // gzhan skyon rtog la long ba bzhin // drang dang nga rgyal med pa dang // rtag tu stong nyid bsgom par bya // (Miyazaki 2007: 44).

Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* and a host of sūtras and hymns as a way of extolling the virtues of the bodhisattva path. What is missing in these quotations is the feature that we are most accustomed to seeing in the *Tarkajvālā*: its extensive analysis of different Indian philosophical views (both Buddhist and non-Buddhist) and the argument for emptiness. To understand how this analytical dimension of the *Tarkajvālā* fits into Atiśa's view of Madhyamaka, it is necessary to look beyond the "Basket" to the more systematic account of the bodhisattva path in his *Bodhipathapradīpa* and commentary.

In this text, Atiśa divides the path into three conventional categories: moral conduct (*śīla*), concentration (*samādhi*), and wisdom (*prajñā*). The chapters on moral conduct include a discussion of the three refuges, the awakening mind, the regulations of the monastic life, and the bodhisattva vow. Atiśa might have used the *Tarkajvālā* once again as a source. Instead, he chose a two-pronged approach, tacking back and forth between Asaṅga and Śāntideva, holding their divergent positions together with references to the views of his own guru, Bodhibhadra.<sup>28</sup> The *Tarkajvālā* makes a cameo appearance in the section on concentration, where Atiśa explains the importance of concentration as a preparation for wisdom. In the *Tarkajvālā*, Bhāviveka makes this point with admirable simplicity, focusing, as he often does, on the act of seeing: "You cannot see your face in muddy or turbulent water, and you cannot see reality in a mind that lacks concentration and is covered by obstructions."<sup>29</sup> Atiśa quotes the next verse, in which Bhāviveka compares the mind to an unruly elephant: "When the mind strays from the right path like an elephant, it should be bound to the post of the object with the rope of mindfulness and brought gradually under control with the hook of wisdom."<sup>30</sup> Atiśa does not make much of the rope and the hook, but he

<sup>28</sup> See, for example, the "Explanation of the Vow" (Sherburne 2000: 153–159).

<sup>29</sup> MHK 3.15: *na paśyati yathā vaktraṃ kaluṣapracale jale / tathāsamāhite citte tattvaṃ nivarāṇāvṛte //*.

<sup>30</sup> MHK 3.16: *nibadhyālabhanastambhe smṛtirajjvā manogajam / unmārgacāriṇaṃ kuryāt prajñāṅkuśavaśaṃ śanaiḥ //*. Prajñāmukti also quotes this verse in his commentary on Atiśa's short *Madhyamakopadeśa* ("Special Instructions on the Middle Way"). See Apple 2018a: 286 and note 768.

has a great deal to say about the “post of the object (*ālambana*).”<sup>31</sup> In his commentary on this verse, Bhāviveka explains the “objects” as being “whole-some qualities (*kuśala-dharmas*) such as the four immeasurables (*apramāṇa*)”: kindness (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), joy (*muditā*), and detachment (*upekṣā*). Atiśa takes a different tack and greatly expands the list of possible objects. He notes that calming meditation (*zhi gnas* / *śamatha*) is twofold: with signs (*sanimitta*) and without. “With signs” is divided in two: with signs that are internal and with those that are external. Internal signs also are twofold: those on the body and those that support the body. The list stops only when Atiśa concedes that he does not have the space to teach someone how to concentrate. For that one would have to seek instruction from an experienced guru.

Atiśa’s approach to the analytical portion of the *Tarkajvālā* comes into focus more clearly in the next stage of the path, the cultivation of wisdom (*shes rab* / *prajñā*). Atiśa begins this section with a statement about the need to integrate wisdom and “means” (*thabs* / *upāya*): “Now, with the wisdom that understands the combination of means and wisdom, the prerequisite of merit (*punya-saṃbhāra* / *bsod nams kyi tshogs*) and the prerequisite of knowledge (*jñāna-saṃbhāra* / *ye shes kyi tshogs*) should be completed.”<sup>32</sup> At first, the emphasis on the means might seem incongruous, since wisdom alone is the key to liberation, as Atiśa acknowledges in his opening verse: “Without the application of wisdom, one does not remove obstructions (*shes rab pha rol phyin sbyor dang // bral bas sgrib pa zad mi ’gyur //*).” But he does not want to minimize the significance of moral and meditative preparation. Atiśa was known as a person of great moral seriousness, and, for him, wisdom required serious preparation. It is characteristic of him that he spends several pages explaining the importance of combining wisdom and means. Then he gets to the heart of the chapter: the cognitive discipline of wisdom.

In verse 47, Atiśa defines wisdom: “Someone who understands that aggregates, elements, and sense media do not arise knows the emptiness

<sup>31</sup> Sherburne translates “object” (*ālambana*) as “topic” of meditation (Sherburne 2000: 203). “Focus” might also be a good translation.

<sup>32</sup> BPP: *da ni thabs dang shes rab zung du ’brel par shes pa’i shes rab kyi bsod nams kyi tshogs dang ye shes kyi tshogs gnyis zung du ’brel bar rdzogs par bya’o* (Sherburne 2000: 218).

of intrinsic nature. This is called wisdom.”<sup>33</sup> If wisdom is understanding of emptiness, how does one acquire it, or, in Atiśa’s words, “by what approach (*tshul*) would one realize (*mngon sum du byed*) this?” Atiśa answers that wisdom comes from “the four great reasons” (*gtan tshigs chen po*) for emptiness, and he proceeds to enumerate them, with quotations from their Indian sources. For someone who is not familiar with the analytical focus of the Indian Madhyamaka, this might seem to be a strange response. Isn’t it obvious that wisdom is a form of non-discursive awareness? How could it be equated with rational analysis? In a final sense, this might be true. But Atiśa and his Madhyamaka predecessors thought that the pathway to non-discursive awareness had a decidedly rational character. That view was embedded in Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (“Root Verses on the Middle Way”), and it was made explicit by his various commentators. To underline this point, Atiśa traces the succession of Madhyamaka commentaries by Buddhapaṇita, Bhāviveka, and Candrakīrti, among others, as well as a succession of independent treatises by figures like Āryadeva and Śāntideva. He acknowledges that it would be impossible to work out all the implications of the four great reasons<sup>34</sup> without making his own text impossibly large:

In each of these [texts] the emptiness of all *dharmas* has been extensively established. If I were to use the four great reasons to remove all the misconceptions of others, this text would become too large. So I have said just a little and do not elaborate. I have said only that the tenets (*grub mtha’ / siddhānta*) of the Madhyamaka are like this, but I have not written extensively about these tenets. For practitioners (*rnal ’byor / yogin*) who want to understand them, I summarize them as follows: (Verse 52) Since my text would become too large, I do not elaborate. I will explain only established tenets for the sake of practice (*bsgom / bhāvanā*).<sup>35</sup>

<sup>33</sup> BPP: *phung po khams dang skye mched rnams // skye ba med par rtogs gyur pa’i // rang bzhin stong nyid shes pa ni // shes rab ces ni yongs su bshad //* (Sherburne 2000: 14).

<sup>34</sup> On the role of the four great reasons in Atiśa’s thought, see also “A General Explanation of and Framework for Understanding the Two Truths” (*bden gnyis spyi bshad dang bden gnyis ’jog tshul*), the record of an oral teaching on the two truths attributed to Atiśa (Apple 2018a: 203–206).

<sup>35</sup> BPP: *de dang der chos thams cad stong pa nyid du rgyas par bsgrubs zin la / gal te bdag gi gtan tshigs chen po bzhis gzhan dag gi log par rtogs pa bsal bar gyur na ni gshung shin*

What, then, is the “practice” of wisdom? For anyone who is interested in the practical function of Madhyamaka argumentation, the answer to this question should be of great interest.

Atiśa’s answer to this question is brief, but it tells a great deal about his view of reality (and what it means to have a “view” of reality), as well as the sources from which his view is derived. I will quote the passage in its entirety and then comment on its relevant points:

I have not written here about the means to understand [the tenets] by practicing the ultimate mind of awakening. One should please a teacher (*bla ma / guru*) and request it from him.

(53) One practices no-self by not apprehending the intrinsic natures of all *dharma*s. This is the practice of wisdom. These<sup>36</sup> are commonly known.

(54) The wisdom that does not see intrinsic nature in any *dharma*s is expressed rationally.<sup>37</sup> It should be practiced without concepts.

“Does not see intrinsic nature” means does not see any *dharma*. This is called “the supreme vision of reality” in many sūtras.

For the meaning of this, one should consult the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* by Ācārya Āryadeva. One should also consult the *Tarkajvālā*, *Madhyamakāvātāra*, and Avalokitavratā.

If the vision of all other *dharma*s is not established, does the mind itself exist?

It says, “This wisdom is expressed rationally.” When wisdom is carefully considered (*so sor rtog pa / pratisaṃkhyāna*),<sup>38</sup> it does not exist

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*tu mangs par 'gyur bas na / de'i phyir bdag gis 'dir nyung ngun du byas shing ma spros pa yin no / 'dir bdag cag dbu ma chen po'i grub pa'i mtha' ni 'di ltar yin no zhes smos pa tsam du zad kyi / grub pa'i mtha' rgyas par ni ma bris te / rnal 'byor pa nyams su len pa 'dod pa dag la nyung ngun du bsdus nas bstan pa yin pas (Verse 52) gang phyir gzhung ni mangs 'gyur pas // de phyir 'dir ni ma spros la // grub pa'i mtha' tsam zhig tu // bsgom pa'i phyir ni rab to bshad // (Sherburne 2000: 240).*

<sup>36</sup> Presumably “all *dharma*s.”

<sup>37</sup> Read *rigs bshad* (with the Derge) rather than *rig bshad* (Sherburne). A better reading, but one without textual support, would be *rigs shes* (“rational cognition”). Davidson (1995: 217) interprets *rigs bshad* to mean “explained as analysis.”

<sup>38</sup> Another possible translation might be: “wisdom that consists of careful consider-

at all. Why does it not exist? It says: “expressed rationally.” It too is not established when it is expressed (*bshad*) or examined (*gzhigs*) by the four great reasons.

As it is said, “Ultimately, when wisdom about all *dharma*s is sought by analysis, it does not exist and is not apprehended. When [one understands that] this wisdom ultimately does not exist and is not apprehended, one is called wise conventionally. This wisdom ultimately does not arise and does not exist.”<sup>39</sup>

Ārya Nāgārjuna also considers this point: “No Buddhas see this mind; it is not seen. Its nature is to have no nature; what is there to see?”<sup>40</sup>

And Ācārya Āryadeva said this in the *Jñānasārasamuccaya* (“Compendium of the Heart of Knowledge”): “The wise do not think that there ultimately is consciousness; since it lacks one and many, like a lotus in the sky.”<sup>41</sup>

Therefore, when one removes the concepts of self and so forth that outsiders imagine, concepts of the aggregates and so forth that Buddhists imagine, and concepts of the mind and illusion, and always stays with this point, it is possible to remove concepts.

This is why Ārya Nāgārjuna said: “When one is not confused (lit. covered) by concepts of self, aggregates, and so forth, as well as of consciousness, one thinks that the awakening mind of the Buddhas has the characteristic of emptiness.”<sup>42</sup>

To remove concepts in this way is called supreme nirvāṇa.

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ation.”

<sup>39</sup> Sherburne identifies this as a quotation from the *Ārya-saṃvṛti-paramārthasatyā-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*.

<sup>40</sup> This verse corresponds, with variants, to *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 43: *mdor na sangs rgyas rnams kyis ni / gzigs par ma gyur gzigs mi 'gyur // rang bzhin med pa'i rang bzhin can // ji lta bur na gzigs par 'gyur //* (Lindtner 1982: 198–99).

<sup>41</sup> This verse corresponds, with variants, to *Jñānasārasamuccaya* 27: *neṣṭaṃ tad api dhīrāṇaṃ vijñānaṃ pāramārthikaṃ / ekānekavicāreṇa viyogād gaganābjavat //* (Mimaki 2000: 240).

<sup>42</sup> This verse corresponds, with variants, to *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 2: *sangs rgyas rnams kyi byang chub sems / bdag dang phung sogs rnam rig gi // rtog pa rnams kyi ma bsgrigs pa / rtag tu stong nyid mtshan nyid bzhed //* (Lindtner 1982: 186) See also Apple 2018a: 73 and note 215.



(55) Saṃsāra comes from concepts; it has the nature of concepts; therefore, the removal of all concepts is the supreme nirvāṇa.<sup>43</sup>

The first point to note about this passage is that Atiśa makes a practical distinction between the “ultimate mind of awakening,” for which one needs the instruction of a teacher, and the rational cultivation (or practice) of wisdom. He suggests that this rational process is pursued by the analysis of intrinsic nature (*ngo bo nyid / svabhāva*) in a series of exemplary texts. While Atiśa elsewhere rejects the distinction between two kinds of ultimate awareness that is found in the works of Bhāviveka and Jñānagarbha,<sup>44</sup> his approach to wisdom is consistent, for example, with Jñānagarbha’s definition of the expressible ultimate as “consistent with a rational cognition” (*rigs pa’i rjes su ’gro ba*).<sup>45</sup> But this rational cognition also has to be subjected to rational analysis, and when it is, it too is unestablished. Atiśa makes this point with a cryptic phrase in verse 54: “This wisdom ... is expressed rationally (*rigs bshad*).” He makes the point more explicit in the commentary by equating “expressed” with “examined” (*gzhigs*) and explaining that this examination is carried out with the four great reasons for emptiness. The point of this examination is made clear in the quotations that follow. The wisdom that understands emptiness is just as empty as the things themselves. It does not exist, and it is not apprehended. In this way, he directly addresses the point that separated Atiśa from Ratnākaraśānti on the reality of consciousness.

Another point to note has to do with the imagery of vision. As Atiśa says in his commentary on verse 53, the goal of wisdom is to cultivate what he calls “the supreme vision of reality.” This is consistent with other accounts of Madhyamaka thought as a “vision” of reality (*tattva-darśana*), but in the context of emptiness, it takes on the paradoxical character of a vision that is no-vision: the supreme vision of reality is not to see intrinsic nature in any *dharma*, including the mind. The force of Atiśa’s point is easy to grasp if one follows his advice and consults (or “sees,” *blta bar bya’o*) the short text named the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* (“Destruction of Errors about the Middle

<sup>43</sup> The Tibetan text of this passage is found in Appendix 1.

<sup>44</sup> In SDA 4: “The ultimate is only one; others think that it is two-fold” (*dam pa’i don ni gcig nyid de // gzhan dag rnam pa gnyis su ’dod //*) (Lindtner 1981: 190–191).

<sup>45</sup> Eckel 1987: 71.

Way"). This text pictures the act of no-vision with two common Madhyamaka comparisons: waking from a dream and curing a disease of the eyes:<sup>46</sup>

When someone gets rid of an eye disease and has eyes that are pure and clear, he does not see hairs, flies, a double moon, or the eyes in a peacock's feathers.

So also, when a wise person removes the eye disease of defilements and cognitive objects and has the pure eye of correct knowledge, he does not see anything at all.

Someone who feels drowsy and falls asleep might see young men, young women, a palace, and other dwellings, but he does not see them when he wakes up.

So also, someone who has opened the eye of wisdom, stopped the sleep of ignorance, and woken up does not see things as they are perceived conventionally.

On a dark night, someone may see ghosts that are unreal, but he does not see them when the sun has risen and his eyes are opened.

So also, when a wise person has destroyed all the traces of ignorance with the sun of correct knowledge, he does not see mind and mental phenomena as real.<sup>47</sup>

For a waking person, the right way to "see" the phantoms of a dream is not to see them, just as the right way to see the strange visual artifacts associated with certain kinds of ophthalmia is not to see them. No-seeing is the goal of the analytical process that Atiśa associates with the practice of wisdom.

### 3. The Authorship of the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta*

Where does this short but vivid text come from? Apparently Atiśa would have us believe that this is the work of Āryadeva, one of the two authoritative founders of Madhyamaka tradition. He indicates as much in his commentary on "The Lamp for the Path to Awakening" (quoted above). This attribution is reiterated in the colophon to the Tibetan translation: "The *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* by the great Ācārya Āryadeva is now completed. It was translated and revised by the Indian upādhyāya Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna

<sup>46</sup> See also Apple 2018a: 329–330.

<sup>47</sup> The Tibetan and Sanskrit of these verses is found in Appendix 2.

and lotsāba Bhikṣu Jayaśīla (Tshul-'khrims rGyal-ba) on the request of King Sukhācārya of Jambudvīpa at Nālandā. So have I heard."<sup>48</sup> It has been known for some time, however, that these six verses, together with their commentary, constitute verses 251–256 of the third chapter in the *Tarkajvālā*.<sup>49</sup> This is the chapter that develops Bhāviveka's own analysis of emptiness by criticizing the categories of reality associated with Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. It finishes with the claim that there is nothing left to see, even in the knowledge of emptiness itself. Bhāviveka goes on for several verses to elaborate this point, then he moves on to the discussion of Buddhahood and the bodhisattva path that complete his account of the path.<sup>50</sup>

If the source of these verses is so well known, why would Atiśa attribute them to Āryadeva, rather than to Bhāviveka himself? One possible answer might be to think of the authorship of the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* as Christian K. Wedemeyer approaches the authorship of the Tantric work *Caryāmelāpakapradīpa* ("Lamp that Integrates the Practices"), a text that also is attributed to Āryadeva.<sup>51</sup> Wedemeyer finds in Tāranātha's historical writings two possible models for the attribution of texts like this to ancient masters. One is the model of "sequestered revelation," by analogy with the "treasure teachings" (*gter ma*) in the rNying-ma tradition, in which texts from an early period are understood to have been hidden at some time in the past and then discovered at a later time. A second model involves "mystical visions" in which a scholar or practitioner has a vision of receiving teaching directly from an ancient master. Wedemeyer sees an example of the second model at work in the teaching of the Tantric saint Mātāṅgīpā: "How is it possible that Mātāṅgīpā could nonetheless be considered the disciple of these saints? Simply stated, 'he could have had their vision later (*phyis zhal mthong*

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<sup>48</sup> *dbu ma 'khrul pa 'dzom pa zhes bya ba / slob dpon chen po ā rya de bas mdzad pa rdzogs so // rgya gar gyi mkhan po dī paṃ ka ra shrī dzā na dang / lo tsā ba dge slong tshul 'khrims rgyal bas bsgyur cing zhus pa //* (D 3850, Tsha 26b1–2).

<sup>49</sup> See Lindtner 1982: 173, n. 21; and Del Toso 2010.

<sup>50</sup> The account of Buddhahood and the bodhisattva path at the end of this chapter were the focus of my book *To See the Buddha* (Eckel 1992).

<sup>51</sup> Wedemeyer 2007. The relevant passage is found in the section on "History of the Noble Tradition" (pp. 7–43).

*ba'o*), i.e. he qualifies due to having received their teachings in a miraculous vision."<sup>52</sup> The saints in question are Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

It is not inconceivable that Atiśa also thought that he too received these verses, directly or indirectly, by a process of miraculous vision. In the "Basket of Jewels," Atiśa recounts an experience of being taught directly by Avalokiteśvara. He says: "Previously, when sitting in the forest of Somapurī, I was taught directly by Lokeśvara: 'Kulaputra, if desiring the goals of others, to be quickly awakened you must make effort in expanding and training the mind of awakening.' Having said [this, he] disappeared."<sup>53</sup> He describes a similar communication from Tārā, received while he was circumambulating the shrine at Vajrāsana (Bodhgayā). In the same text, he describes a tradition passed on by his teacher Avadhūtipa reporting that Nāropa, Avadhūtipa's own teacher, had a vision of Nāgārjuna dwelling on Śrī-Parvata and received his teaching.<sup>54</sup> He makes the same point about revelations to the Venerable Nāgabodhi.

Atiśa clearly lived in a milieu where revelations such as these were accepted features of the religious landscape, but this model does not really fit the circumstances of the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta*. The mention of Jayaśīla (Tshul 'khrims rGyal ba) as collaborator in the colophon of the translation indicates that the text was translated after Atiśa had returned to India from Sumatra and before he accepted the invitation to travel to Tibet. We know from various biographical and historical sources that Atiśa was teaching the *Tarkajvālā* in India at this time.<sup>55</sup> He must have had a clear understanding of the source of these verses. Why, then, would he have attributed them to Āryadeva? Of course, it is impossible to answer this question with certainty, but we know that Atiśa was involved in controversy with Ratnākaraśānti and perhaps also gSer-ling-pa about the reality of a Buddha's awareness. Apple speculates that tensions with the Yogācāra teachers at Vikramaśīla might even have contributed to Atiśa's decision to leave India, at the advanced age of sixty, to make the hazardous journey to Tibet.<sup>56</sup> Atiśa's attribution

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<sup>52</sup> Wedemeyer 2007: 21.

<sup>53</sup> Apple 2018a: 92–93.

<sup>54</sup> Apple 2018a: 111.

<sup>55</sup> Apple 2018a: 8.

<sup>56</sup> Apple 2018a: 8.

of the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* to Āryadeva might have been a convenient way to score a polemical point in this difficult controversy by taking a pithy expression of his own position and investing it with the authority of an ancient sage.

This model of pseudonymous attribution is quite different from the modes of attribution in Wedemeyer's account of the Tantric Āryadeva. Here the text is not being attributed to a second "Āryadeva," to the recovery of a hidden text, or to some kind of visionary experience; the text is being repurposed for another goal. If this is the case, this text raises a question about how many other important texts from this period had similar origins, not necessarily by borrowing texts wholesale, but by creating a pastiche of quotations or ideas to be attributed to an ancient source. The *Jñānasārasamuccaya* ("Compendium of the Heart of Knowledge"), also attributed to Āryadeva, might be a good example, or even the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* ("Jewel Lamp of the Middle Way"), which Atiśa translated and used to teach Madhyamaka to his Indian and Tibetan students. (Ironically, this is attributed to the ancient master Bhavya or Bhāviveka.) But these questions are better left for another day.

### **Appendix 1: The Tibetan text of the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* on *Bodhipathapradīpa* 53–55**

'dir ni don dam pa'i byang chub kyi sems bsgom pas / nyams su blang ba'i  
thabs ni bdag gis ma bris / bla ma yongs su mnyes par byas nas bla ma las  
zhu bar bya'o /

Verse 53: de bas chos rnams ma lus pa'i // rang bzhin dag ni mi  
dmigs pas //  
bdag med par ni bsgom pa yin // de nyid shes rab bsgom pa yin //

zhes bya ba la sogs pa la / de dag ni dkyus ji lta ba bzhin no //

Verse 54: shes rab kyis ni chos rnams kun // gang gi rang bzhin  
ma mthong zhing //  
shes rab de nyid rigs bshad pas // rnam rtog med par de bsgom  
bya /

gang gi rang bzhin ma mthong zhing zhes pa ni chos gang yang mthong  
ba med pa nyid de kho na nyid mchog mthong ba'o zhes mdo sde du mar  
gsungs pa yin no //

'di'i don la slob dpon ārya de bas mdzad pa'i dbu ma 'khrul pa 'joms par  
blta bar bya'o // rtog ge 'bar ba dang / dbu ma la 'jug pa dang / spyen ras  
gzigs brtul zhugs dag tu yang blta bar bya'o //

chos gzhan thams cad lta yongs su grub pa med na rang gi sems 'di yod  
dam zhe na / shes rab de nyid rigs bshad pa zhes smras te / so sor rtogs pa'i  
shes rab de nyid ga la yod de med do // ji ltar med pa yin zhe na / rigs bshad  
pa zhes te / de nyid kyang gtan tshigs chen po bzhis bshad cing gzhigs na  
grub par mi gyur te // don 'di ni bcom ldan 'das kyis 'phags pa bden na gnyis  
bstan pa'i mdo las gsal bar gsungs te /

ji skad du don dam par ni chos thams cad kyi shes rab rnam par dpyad  
nas btsal yang shin tu med cing mi dmigs pa'o // shes rab de yang don dam  
par ni shin tu med cing mi dmigs pas na kun rdzob tu shes rab can zhes bya  
ba ste / shes rab de yang don dam par na shin tu ma skyes shing med pa yin  
no //

'phags pa klu sgrub kyi zhal nas kyang don 'di la dgongs nas // sems ni  
sangs rgyas thams cad kyis // ma gzigs gzigs pa ma yin te // rang bzhin med  
pa'i ngo bo la // ji lta bu zhig gzigs par 'gyur / zhes gsungs so //

slob dpon 'phags pa lha'i zhal nas kyang // rnam shes de yang don dam  
par // de ni mkhas rnams mi bzhed de // gcig dang du ma bral ba'i phyir //  
nam mkha'i padma nyid dang mtshungs // zhes ye shes snying po kun las  
btus na las gsungs so //

de bas na 'phags pa klu grub kyi zhal nas // bdag dang phung po la sogs  
dang // rnam shes rtog pas ma bsgrigs pa // sangs rgyas rnams kyi byang  
chub sems // stong pa'i mtshan nyid dag tu bzhed // ces gsungs pa yin no //

...

de bas na phyi rol pas brtags pa'i bdag la sogs pa dang / rang gi sde pas  
brtags pa'i phung po la sogs pa dang / sems dang sgyu ma la sogs pa'i rtog  
pa bsal bar byas nas de lta bu'i don la dus rtag tu gnas nas rnam par rtog pa  
spang bar bya'o //

de lta bu'i rnam par rtog pa spangs pa ni mya ngan las 'das pa'i mchog  
yin no zhes smras so //

Verse 55: rnam rtog las byung srid pa 'di // rnam par rtog [D:  
rtogs] pa'i bdag nyid de //  
de phyir ma lus rtogs spangs pa // mya ngan las 'das pa mchog  
yin no //

**Appendix 2: The Sanskrit and Tibetan verses of the *Madhyamakabhrama-ghāta*, corresponding to *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* / *Tarkajvālā* 3.251–256**

rab rib bral bar gyur pa'i mig // rnam dag dri ma med pa la //  
skra dang sbrang bu zla gnyis dang // rma bya'i mdongs dag mi  
snang ltar //

timirāpagame yadvad viśuddhāmālocanaḥ /  
neṣṣate keśamaśakadvicandraśikhicandrakān //

mkhas pa nyon mongs shes bya yi // sgrib mun rab rib bral gyur  
cing //  
yañ dag mkhyen spyen dri med la'ang // de bzhin ci yang snang  
ba med //

kleśajñeyāvṛtitamastimirāpagame tathā /  
na paśyati budhaḥ kiṃcit samyagjñānāmalekṣaṇaḥ //

dper na gnyid log gnyid dbang gis // bu dang bud med gzhal  
med khang //  
gnas la sogs pa mthong gyur pa // sad na de la mi mthong ltar //

yathā prasuptaḥ putrastrīvimānabhavanādikam /  
paśyed middhavaśāt tatra pratibuddho na  
paśyati //

de bzhin kun rdzob shes pa dag / blo gros mig ni bye gyur cing //  
mi shes gnyid dang bral gyur nas // sad pa'i tshe na mi mthong  
ngo [gzigs so MBG] //

saṃvṛtyādhigatāṃs tadvad unmīlitamatīkṣaṇaḥ /  
ajñānanidroparamāt pratibuddho na paśyati //

dper na mtshan mo mun khrod na // 'byung po yang dag min  
 mthong ba //  
 nyi ma shar zhing mig bye'i tshe // snang bar 'gyur ba ma yin  
 ltar //

niśi bhūtāny abhūtāni yathā tamasi paśyati /  
 pronmīlitākṣo yady arka udeti ca na paśyati //

de bzhin mkhas pa yang dag gi // shes pa'i nyi mas mi shes pa'i //  
 bag chags ma lus bcom pa'i tshe // sems dang sems byung yul mi  
 mthong [gzigs MBG] //

na paśyati tathā vidvāṃś cittacaitasagocaram /  
 samyagjñānaravidhvastasamastājñānavāsanah //



## Abbreviations

- BPP *Bodhipathapradīpa* (Atiśa): see Sherburne 2000.  
 D *sDe-dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan hgyur preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*. Tokyo 1977.  
 MBG *Madhyamakabhramaghāta*: see Del Toso 2010.  
 MHK *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (Bhāviveka): see Lindtner 2001.  
 PP *Prajñāpradīpa* (Bhāviveka): D 3853.  
 RKUMU *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭamadhyamakopadeśa* (Atiśa): Miyazaki 2007.  
 SDA *Satyadvayāvātāra* (Atiśa): see Lindtner 1981.  
 TA *Tattvāvātāra* (Śrīgupta): D 3892.  
 TJ *Tarkajvālā* (Bhāviveka): see Eckel 2008.

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# The Chinese Mādhyamika Commentator Jizang's Reference to Orthodox Philosophical Schools in India, with Special Attention to “Mīmāṃsaka”

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## 1. Introduction

Currently, we are familiar with the appellation of the “six philosophical schools (of Brahmanism)” (*ṣaḍ darśana*), viz., Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, but it is not used in the primary sources through the first millennium of the Common Era. Marui (2014) indicates that the earliest extant text in which we are able to attest a prototype of the term is the Buddhist epic entitled *Mañimēkalai* (ca. sixth cent.) in Tamil, and that its twenty-seventh chapter enumerates the six kinds of *camaya* in Tamil (equivalent of *samaya* in Sanskrit): Lokāyata, Bauddha, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā schools.<sup>1</sup> This list is worthy of attention because it refers to Lokāyata (i.e., Indian Materialists who do not believe in transmigration/*saṃsāra*) instead of the Vedānta school, which is included,

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Marui (2014: 120 n. 6). His informant of this Tamil text is Prof. em. TAKAHASHI Takanobu who was in charge of Tamil studies at the University of Tokyo. The Jaina author Haribhadrāsūri (active around the turn of the ninth cent. CE) composed the text entitled *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (“Collection of the Six Views”), in which the contents of the six are not the same as those of the modern notion. For this Jaina text, see Marui (2014: 118). Likewise, the Vedānta author Mādhava composed the text *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (“Integration of all the Views”) in the fourteenth cent. and the contents of “all the views” are also different from the six views in the modern sense.

without fail, in all modern versions of the six views. In my opinion, the reasons for this difference are twofold. First is the actual popularity of Lokāyata at the time of the *Maṇimēkalai*'s composition. Second is the fact that Śaṅkara (ca. mid-8th cent.), the most significant figure of the Vedānta, had not yet appeared explicitly in Brahmanical history. In short, in order to understand these varying concepts of the "six philosophical school (of Brahmanism)," we should know precisely what kind of groups of non-Buddhists actually existed and to what extent they prevailed in the Indian subcontinent.

The specifics of three of these schools still remain unclear: the Nyāya, Yoga and Mīmāṃsā. The present article attempts to confirm earlier—and possibly the earliest—references to them in Chinese Buddhist texts. I center this discussion on the Mīmāṃsā school, focusing especially on phonetic transcriptions of "Mīmāṃsā" (referring to the name of the school) and "Mīmāṃsaka" (referring to authors belonging to the school) before the time of the most influential Chinese Buddhist translator, Xuanzang, who was active in the mid-seventh century.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. Enumerations of Non-Buddhist Groups by Xuanzang and His Followers

Let me first confirm the biographical record of Xuanzang. The *Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] of the Great Cī'en Monastery*, fascicle 4, lists the four kinds of non-Buddhist practitioners, or heretics, in India in the following way:

The four kinds of non-Buddhist [ascetics] such as (1) Bhūtas, (2) the Undressed (\*Nirgrantha), (3) Skull bone wearers (\*Kāpālika), and (4) Jyotikas differ in terms of appearance and clothes.... (1) Bhūta people put ashes on their bodies as ascetic practice, making the whole body

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<sup>2</sup> Xuanzang 玄奘 (600/602–664) is among the most well-known Chinese Buddhist translators. After studying Buddhism in India for about seventeen years, particularly at the Great Nālandā monastery (present-day Nālandā, Bihar State), Xuanzang came back to Chang'an 長安 (present-day Xi'an, the capital of Shaanxi Province) in the first month of the Zhenguan 貞觀 era (i.e., 645 CE) and set forth with the work of translating Buddhist works into Chinese. He continued this work for twenty years until 664, when he passed away.

dusty as if they were cats dusted with the ash from a kitchen range. (2) Undressed people intentionally show their naked bodies and take removing all hair to be meritorious; their foot skin is damaged as if it were deadwood at the riverside. (3) Skull bone wearers adorn themselves with cranial bones. They put them on their head or hang them on their neck, their bodies being emaciated and distorted, as if they were ghostlike *yakṣas* close by the grave. (4) And Jyotika people wear robes with excrement, and they are willing to eat feces and drink urine, its odor as evil as that of a mad pig in dirt.<sup>3</sup>

The biography further mentions yet two other philosophical schools:

[There are two schools:] (I) the non-Buddhist school [called] Sāṃkhya <an older transcription of it is Sengqu> and (II) the non-Buddhist school [called] Vaiśeṣika <an older transcription of it is Weishishi>.... (I) The non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya propounds the twenty-five principles.... (II) [On the other hand,] Vaiśeṣika advocates the six principles (\**padārtha*).<sup>4</sup>

Along with the six *samayas* in the above-stated *Mañimēkalai* in Tamil, the Chinese Buddhist sources prior to Xuanzang also deserve special notice. After the import of Indian Buddhism in the mid-second century, Chinese Buddhists launched fully into preparation for massive translations of treatises (*śāstras*, one of the three jewels/*tripitaka*). Such a project was achieved for the first time by the Kuchean scholar-monk Kumārajīva (ca. 350–409),<sup>5</sup> who founded the Chinese Madhyamaka school through numerous translations of Nāgārjuna's and Deva's/Āryadeva's Mahāyāna treatises on Emptiness. Later, Chinese Buddhist translations of treatises were carried out by Bodhiruci (ca. the first half of the sixth cent.) in North China and Paramārtha (499–569) in the South, respectively, both of whom topicalized

<sup>3</sup> BTMC, fascicle 4 (T50,245a–b): 如 (1) 鋪多外道、(2) 離繫外道、(3) 體鬘外道、(4) 殊微伽外道，四種形服不同。... (1) 鋪多之輩，以灰塗體用爲修道，遍身艾白猶寢竈之猫狸。(2) 離繫之徒，則露質標奇，拔髮爲德。皮裂足皴，狀臨河之朽樹。(3) 體鬘之類，以體骨爲鬘，裝頭桂 (read 挂) 頸，陷枯碗磊，若塚側之藥叉。(4) 微伽之流，披服糞衣，飲噉便穢，腥臊臭惡，譬溷中之狂豕。

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid* (T50,245a–b): (I) 數論外道<舊曰僧佉>、(II) 勝論外道<舊曰衛世師也>。... 至如 (I) 數論外道立二十五諦義。... (II) 勝論師立六句義。

<sup>5</sup> *Skt.* Kumārajīva, *Ch.* Jiumoluoshi 鳩摩羅什 (ca. 350–409).

the Yogācāra philosophy of Mahāyāna.<sup>6</sup> In the mid-seventh century, the Chinese scholar-monk Xuanzang, who was at the fore of the heyday of Chinese Buddhist translations, renovated Chinese Yogācāra philosophy on the basis of the tradition of Nālandā Monastery.

### 3. Akṣapāda, the Founder of the Nyāya School in Xuanzang's Translations

As stated in the second section, Xuanzang, the first and foremost scholar-monk in Chinese Buddhist doctrines, mentions only two of the six views (*ṣaḍ darśana*): Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika. The same is true of his disciples. In addition to the two schools, however, they were aware of the personal name Akṣapāda, who is usually known as the founder of the Nyāya school. These Chinese monks, however, attribute the foundation of Nyāya to Kapila, the founder of the Sāṃkhya school, or to Ulūka (a.k.a. Kaṇāda), the author of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. In other words, Chinese sources seldom attribute the foundation of the Nyāya school to Akṣapāda.<sup>7</sup> In short, we may be able to say that none of Xuanzang's disciples fully understood the history of the Nyāya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā or Vedānta schools.

### 4. Formerly Known Chinese Transcriptions of "Mīmāṃsā" and/or "Mīmāṃsaka"

The Mīmāṃsā school is rarely mentioned in Chinese Buddhist texts. A major reason would be the lack of a famed author or commentator on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* at an early date. There is modern consensus that the most famed Mīmāṃsā author is Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (active around the turn of the seventh cent.), but his biography places him as a near-contemporary of

<sup>6</sup> *Skt.* Bodhiruci, *Ch.* Putiliuzhi 菩提流支 alias 菩提留支. *Skt.* Paramārtha (also called Kulanātha), *Ch.* Zhendi 真諦 (also called *Skt.* Kulanātha, *Ch.* Juluonata 拘羅那他和 Qin'yi 親依).

<sup>7</sup> Zhanran 湛然 (712–82), a commentator of the Tiantai 天台 school, explains that Ulūka, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school and also called \*Akṣapāda (Yanzu 眼足, = Zumu 足目), had three eyes on the soles of his feet. Zhanran here confuses Ulūka and Akṣapāda. See the *Zhiguan fuxing zhuan hongjue* 止觀輔行傳弘決, fascicle 10a (T46, 434c–435a).

Xuanzang. As a result, neither earlier Chinese authors nor Xuanzang make reference to Kumāṛila.

Only two Buddhist translations that mention the phonetic transcription of “Mīmāṃsā” are known thus far. The earlier of these is the Mādhyamika Prabhākaramitra's<sup>8</sup> Chinese translation of the *Prajñāpradīpa*,<sup>9</sup> which is Bhāviveka's<sup>10</sup> commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, or the *Middle Treatise* (*Zhong lun*). The Prabhākaramitra translation uses “Mixiga” twice as a phonetic transcription for “Mīmāṃsā.”<sup>11</sup>

The other reference is found in a later Chinese Buddhist translation entitled *Diamond Needle Treatise*<sup>12</sup> by Fatian from the Northern Song dynasty. It is a translation of the *Vajrasūcī*. The phonetic transcription employed in this text in the second carving of the Korean Canon<sup>13</sup> is “Mimanpo,”<sup>14</sup> which is undoubtedly incorrect; it is a corruption of the variant “Mimansuo”<sup>15</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *Skt. Prabhākaramitra* (565–633 CE), *Ch. Poluopo jialuo miduoluo* 波羅頗迦羅蜜多羅.

<sup>9</sup> *Skt. Prajñāpradīpa*, *Ch. Bore deng lun* 般若燈論; the translation was made during 630 and 633 CE.

<sup>10</sup> *Skt. Bhāviveka* (active in the sixth cent.), *Ch. Fenbie ming* 分別明.

<sup>11</sup> *Skt. Mīmāṃsaka*, *Ch. Mixiga* 彌息伽 (namely “Mī[mām]saka”), *Tib. dPyod pa can*. See T30, 119b and 119c. TANG Yongtong (1945/88: 144). One of the original Chinese translations is as follows: 復有彌息伽外道言，佛家所說十二部經者，非一切智人所說，有作者故，譬如韓世師等論。“Further, the non-Buddhist Mīmāṃsakas say that the twelvefold scriptures told by the Buddhists are [in fact] not the speech of the omniscient one (i.e., the Buddha) because the author exists, as in the case of the treatises of Vaiśeṣika school and so on.” (T30, 119b; the other reference is found in 119c). Here the transcription “Mixiga” literally corresponds to “Mī-sa-ka” or other similar forms, omitting “-mām-.”

<sup>12</sup> *Diamond Needle Treatise*, *Ch. Jingang zhen lun* 金剛針論 (T vol. 32, no. 1642; *Skt. Vajrasūcī*) in one fascicle, composed by Facheng 法稱 and translated by Fatian 法天 (d. 1001 CE). See also TANG Yongtong (1945/88: 144).

<sup>13</sup> *Korean Goryeo jang jaejobon*, *Ch. Gaoli zang zaidiao ben* 高麗藏再雕本.

<sup>14</sup> *Ch. Mimanpo* 彌輪婆.

<sup>15</sup> *Ch. Mimansuo* 彌輪婆. This form is used in the *Sixi Canon* 思溪藏 of the Southern Song dynasty, the *Puning si Canon* 普寧寺藏 of the Yuan dynasty, and the *Jiaxing Canon* 嘉興藏 of the Ming dynasty. This form shows the original transcription.



as indicated in the collation of the Taishō; “*po*” and “*suo*” are quite often confused due to the similarity of each character’s shape.<sup>16</sup>

## 5. Jizang’s Phonetic Transcription of “Mīmāṃsā”

### 5.1 Biography of Jizang

As we all know, even before Xuanzang’s time, there were a number of Chinese Buddhist translations and Chinese commentaries that recorded the non-Buddhist intellectual history of India. Among these, the following three genres are worth noticing: first, Chinese texts belonging to the earliest adoption of Yogācāra Buddhism in China, popularly known as the “Dilun school,” in the Northern dynasties in the sixth century<sup>17</sup>; second, Chinese texts belonging to the second adoption of Yogācāra Buddhism, often called the “Shelun school,” in the Chen dynasty in the South<sup>18</sup>; and third, Chinese texts belonging to a new wave of the “Sanlun school,” the Chinese Madhyamaka school, developed by Jizang’s numerous commentaries and independent texts on the Middle-Way philosophy.<sup>19</sup> The third group in particular, Jizang’s

<sup>16</sup> 又彼妄執，解四『圍陀』及彌鞞婆 (read 彌鞞婆) 并僧佉論、尾世史迦，乃至諸論，皆悉了達，名婆羅門。“In addition, the [brāhmaṇa] persist in the wrong view that the person who understands the four Vedas, as well as the treatises of Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika schools and up to numerous treatises completely, is called brāhmaṇa.” (T32,170a) Wogihara (1986: 1044a) registers this transcription “弥鞞婆 [婆(?)] *Vajr.-s.*” under s.v. “mīmāṃsā,” but does not include Prabhākaramitra’s transcription “Mixiga.”

<sup>17</sup> Ch. Dilun 地論 is a short name of *Shi di jing lun* 十地經論 (Vasubandhu’s *Commentary on the Scripture on the Ten Stages*), one of the most fundamental texts for Chinese Yogācāras in the Northern dynasties such as Northern Wei 北魏 (386–534), the Eastern Wei 東魏 (534–550), and the Northern Qi 北齊 (550–577). During this period, northern Buddhists formed the Yogācāra school with the name “Dilun school.”

<sup>18</sup> Ch. Shelun is a short name of *She dasheng lun* 攝大乘論 (Asaṅga’s *Integration of Mahāyāna Thoughts*, Skt. *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*), which was translated by Indian scholar-monk Paramārtha (Zhendi 真諦, 499–569). Centering on this text as well as Vasubandhu’s commentary thereon, Paramārtha and his Chinese disciples formed the “Shelun school” in the Chen (陳 557–589) dynasty in the South.

<sup>19</sup> Ch. Jizang 吉藏 (549–623), active in the Sui (隋 581–618) and early Tang (唐 618–907) dynasties, integrated the new development of “Sanlun school” (school of the

exegetical works, are rich in information on non-Buddhist philosophical thought in India, as this was a primary target of Sanlun criticism.

As is commonly known, Jizang was not Chinese (in the sense of “*hanren* 漢人”) by race. As Jizang's biography records, Jizang's family lineage originally came from Parthia.<sup>20</sup> However, in terms of personal life and education, Jizang was born in Jingling (present-day Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu Province) and was brought up in China. From a cultural point of view, he is not a foreigner but a pure Chinese. His biography even says, “[His] appearance looks like western foreigner, but his language is certainly Chinese.”<sup>21</sup>

Thus, Jizang was a Chinese of a foreign origin. Interestingly enough, however, Jizang's biography does not mention anything about his learning of Sanskrit, though he often refers to Sanskrit information. In such instances, his Sanskrit informant was often Paramārtha, who came from Ujjayinī, India, via Cambodia, and arrived at the port of Guangdong, China, in 546 CE and thereafter started translating Buddhist works with his Chinese disciples until he passed away in 569. Jizang frequently refers to a “Master of the Three Storehouses (*Skt. tripiṭaka*),”<sup>22</sup> whom we know to be Paramārtha. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that Jizang's information of Sanskrit primary sources is overall based on Paramārtha's works in Chinese. However, it is also true that none of the passages I quoted from *CHT* in the present article evidently mentions a “Master of the Three Storehouses” as Jizang's informant.

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three treatises, viz., Nāgārjuna's *Middle Way Treatise* (*Skt. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*) and *Twelve-Gate Treatise*, and Deva's/Āryadeva's *Hundred Treatise*). On the basis of these three texts that Kumārajīva translated, Jizang radically developed the Chinese tenets of the school.

<sup>20</sup> Parthia (Arsacid Empire), *Ch. Anxi guo* 安息國.

<sup>21</sup> Jizang's biography in the *Continued Biography of Eminent Monks* (*Xu gaoseng zhuan* 續高僧傳 compiled by Daoxuan 道宣 of the Tang dynasty), fascicle 11 (T50, 514c): 貌象西梵, 言寔東華.

<sup>22</sup> “Master of the Three Storehouses,” *Ch. sanzang shi* 三藏師.

## 5.2 Jizang's Phonetic Transcription of "Mīmāṃsā"

Jizang's works are revelatory in multiple senses. First of all, it was Jizang who employed "Mīmāṃsā" for the first time in Chinese Buddhism. In terms of source materials that refer to the Indian orthodox (i.e., non-Buddhist) schools, the following passage from the *CHT*<sup>23</sup> is undoubtedly one of the most significant statements in Chinese Buddhist translation:

Outer [non-Buddhist heretics] say as follows:

In primeval time, King Brahmā was active in the mundane world and taught the secular people the seventy-two Indic letters in what is called Kharoṣṭhī script. [However,] as secular people's respect to him became less and less, King Brahmā, due to his stingy mind, swallowed the letters, but two letters, "a" and "u," came off and fell to the ground. The secular people accused him and treated these as the two kings of letters. This is why they put "u" at the front of the four Vedas and "a" at the beginning of the *\*Bārhaspatya Scripture*.<sup>24</sup>

The four Vedas<sup>25</sup> [are included in] the eighteen major scriptures of non-Buddhists (i.e., the orthodox brahmins), which are also called the eighteen branches of knowledge (*\*vidyāsthāna*).<sup>26</sup> [Namely, ] (i) four is the [fundamental] four Vedas; (ii) further six treatises exist [as limbs (*\*vedāṅga*)], therefore [the number becomes] ten all together. Moreover, (iii) yet another eight treatises exist. Thus, in total, there are eighteen [disciplines] in number.

(i) The following are the four Vedas: 1. *Ṛgveda*,<sup>27</sup> which clarifies the way to liberation (*\*mokṣa*); 2. *Yajurveda*, which clarifies religious reverence

<sup>23</sup> Jizang composed the *CHT* (*Commentary on the Hundred Treatise*) in the fourth year of the Daye 大業 era, i.e., 608 CE (see T42,232a).

<sup>24</sup> *Skt. Bārhaspatya* (derived from Bṛhaspati), *Ch. Guangzhu jing* 廣主經. HT (T30,168b-c): 諸師作『經』法, 初說吉故, 義味易解, 法音流布。若智人讀誦念知, 便得增壽, 威德尊重, 如有『經』名婆羅呵波帝<秦言『廣主經』>。如是『經』等, 初皆言吉, 以初吉故, 中、後亦吉。

<sup>25</sup> For the four Vedas, see the next paragraph of the present translation.

<sup>26</sup> *Skt. aṣṭādaśa-vidyāsthāna*, *Ch. Shiba mingchu* 十八明處。

<sup>27</sup> *Skt. Ṛg-veda*. *Ch. transcription Héli* 荷力; the first character "hé" is intentionally added in order to differentiate the r-phoneme from the l-phoneme. Likewise, see *yìlì* 億力 for *Ṛg-* in Saṃghavarman's 僧伽跋摩 translation entitled *Za apitan xin lun*

(\**yajus*); 3. *Sāmaveda*, which clarifies how to realize worldly issues, that is, mundane events such as marriage (\**āvāha-vivāha*) and fulfilling desire (\**kāma*); and 4. *Atharvaveda*, which clarifies techniques such as bewitchment and calculation (\**gaṇanā*).<sup>28</sup> Originally, [Veda should be expressed as] “Pituo” in Chinese phonetic transcription, which is [eventually wrongly written] as “Weituo” due to corruption.

(ii) The following are the six [auxiliary] treatises<sup>29</sup>: 1. *Śikṣā* (or *Phonetics*) *Treatise*, which clarifies the sixty-four items of learning; 2. *Vyākaraṇa* (or *Grammar*) *Treatise*, which explains phonetic [and grammatical issues]; 3. *Kalpa* (or *Ritual Practice*) *Treatise*, which explains the customs and names of heavenly gods (\**deva*) and ascetics (\**ṛṣi*) ever since the dawn of time; 4. *Jyotiṣa* (or *Astronomy*) *Treatise*, which explains techniques such as astronomy, geography and calculation; 5. *Chandas* (or *Metrics*) *Treatise*, which explains how to make *śloka*s, that is, the metric stanzas told by the Buddha's disciples as well as the ascetics with five kinds of supernormal powers; and 6. *Nirukta* (or *Etymology*) *Treatise*, which explains the etymology of names given to things.

Further, (iii) the eight treatises exist: 1. *Mīmāṃsā* (or *Deep Investigation*) *Treatise*, which discerns the right and wrong of all things; 2. *Nyāyavistara* (or *Details of Logic*) *Treatise*, which clarifies the reasonableness of all things; 3. *Itihāsa* (or *Legend*) *Treatise*, which clarifies history and events in previous lives; 4. *Sāṃkhya* (or *Numeric*) *Treatise*, which elucidates the twenty-five principles (\**padārtha*); 5. *Yoga* (or *Contemplation*) *Treatise*, which clarifies how to control one's mind—both of the two treatises (4 & 5) explain the way to liberation; 6. *Dhanur[veda]* (or [*Science of*] *Archery*) *Treatise*, which explains military discipline; 7. *Gandharva* (or *Celestial*

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雜阿毘曇心論, fascicle 7 (T28,924b), and *yīlì* 一力 for *Rg-*, too, in Prabhākaramitra's *Ch. translation Bore deng lun* 般若燈論 (*Skt. Prajñāpradīpa*), fascicle 13, T30,119b). For the distinction between the r-phoneme and the l-phoneme in Chinese phonetic transcription, see Funayama (2013: 188–189) and (2020: 409–407).

<sup>28</sup> Prabhākaramitra's *Ch. translation Bore deng lun*, fascicle 13 (T30, 119b): 又汝『韋陀』中言一力山中造『一力毘陀』, 三摩山中造『三摩毘陀』, 迦逋處<唐言白領(Read 鴿)\*地>造『阿闍毘陀』。\*GTWR, fascicle 9 (T51, 925b): 因陀羅勢羅囊訶山東北行百五六十里。至迦布德迦<唐言鴿>。僧徒二百餘人。學說一切有部, in which *jiabudejia* 迦布德迦 is a phonetic transcription of *Skt. \*kapoṭaka*.

<sup>29</sup> *Skt. vedāṅga*, *Ch. liu lun* 六論 (lit. “six treatises”).

*Musician) Treatise*, which explains music; and 8. *Āyur[veda]* (or *[Science of] Long Life) Treatise*, which explains medical science.<sup>30</sup>

In this long passage, the final fifth paragraph deals with the eight auxiliary disciplines, the first of which, *Mīmāṃsā*, is critically important because it is historically the first phonetic transcription of “*Mīmāṃsā*”/“*Mīmāṃsaka*” in Chinese. Moreover, we should also pay attention to the fact that the original text is corrupt; that is, the text should be emended from “**Jianwangpo** 肩亡婆” to “**Meiwangsuo** 眉亡娑.”<sup>31</sup> This textual emendation is supported by the medieval Japanese commentator Chinkai’s quotation, “**Mei wang po** 眉亡婆” (which correctly shows *mei*, and not *jian*, yet *po* remains wrong).<sup>32</sup> To the best of my knowledge, among previous scholars, only UI Hakuju was aware of the significance of this transcription.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>30</sup> CHT (T42,251a–b): 外云，昔有梵王，在世說七十二字以教世間，名佉樓書。世間之敬情漸薄，梵王貧憫心，起收取吞之。唯「阿」、「漚」兩字，從口兩邊墮地。世人責之，以爲字王。故取「漚」字置四『韋陀』首，以「阿」字置『廣主經』初。

四『韋陀』者，外道十八大經，亦云十八明處。四『皮陀』爲四，復有六論，合四『皮陀』爲十。復有八論，足爲十八。

四『皮陀』者，一『荷力皮陀』明解脫法，二『治受皮陀』明善道法，三『三摩皮陀』明欲塵法，謂一切婚嫁欲樂之事，四『阿闍皮陀』明呪術算數等法。本云「皮陀」，此間語訛，故云「韋陀」。

六論者，一『式叉論』釋六十四能法，二『毘伽羅論』釋諸音聲法，三『柯刺波論』釋諸天仙上古以來因緣名字，四『豎底<張理反>沙論』釋天文、地理、算數等法，五『闍陀論』釋作首盧迦法，佛弟子五通仙第（Read 等）說偈名「首盧迦<強河反>」，六『尼鹿多論』釋立一切物名因緣。

復有八論。一『肩亡婆（Read 眉亡娑）論』簡擇諸法是非，二『那邪毘薩多論』明諸法道理，三『伊底呵婆（Read 娑）論』明傳記宿世事，四『僧佉論』解二十五諦，五『課（Read 踰）伽論』明攝心法。此兩論同釋解脫法。六『陀菟論』釋用兵杖法，七『捷（Read either 捷 or 捷）闍（Read 闍）婆論』釋音樂法，八『阿輪論』釋醫方。

<sup>31</sup> The three synographs **Jianwangpo** 肩亡婆 are incorrect due to scribal error. It should be **Meiwangsuo** 眉亡娑, viz., *Mīmāṃsā*.

<sup>32</sup> See the *Myōkyōshō* 名教抄, fascicle 15 (T70,831a), composed by the medieval Japanese scholar-monk Chinkai 珍海 (1091–1152 CE): 一眉亡娑論，簡擇諸法是非。

<sup>33</sup> Taking up the eighteen disciplines of knowledge in the CHT in question, UI points out, “The first of the eighth treatises [i.e., 肩亡婆論—FT] is probably a scribal error of 眉亡娑論. Since this is a reference to the *Mīmāṃsā* theory, we easily notice that 娑 is an error of 婆. Chinese letter 肩 cannot show the phoneme *mi*, therefore it

The second discipline, *Nyāyavistara*, is a scripture of logic.<sup>34</sup> The fifth, *Yoga Treatise*, signifies Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*.<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that the *Sāṃkhya Treatise* (i.e., Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhyasūtra*) and the *Yoga Treatise* are a pair of systems used to pursue liberation.

To put it briefly, Jizang explain the following three groups of Vedic texts:

I	Four fundamental scriptures ( <i>veda</i> )	<i>Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda, Atharvaveda</i>
II	Six auxiliary treatises (* <i>vedāṅga</i> )	<i>Śikṣā, Vyākaraṇa, Kalpa, Jyotiṣa, Chandas, Nirukta</i>
III	Eight supplementary texts	<i>Mīmāṃsā, Nyāyavistara, Itihāsa, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Dharmurveda, Gandharvaveda, Āyurveda</i>

### 5.3 An Evaluation of Jizang's Mention of Mīmāṃsā

The most decisive value of the above-mentioned text lies in the fact that Jizang's explanation is indirectly based on the extant Sanskrit texts. If we were to disregard the chronology of Sanskrit texts provisionally, we are able

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should be an error of 眉.... Chinese letter 亡 is a phonetic transcription of *mām*" (Ui 1924/44: 466).

<sup>34</sup> *Na-ye-pi-sa-duo* 那邪毘薩多, which is a synonym of *Na-ye-pi-sa-duo-luo* 那邪毘薩多羅 (see the *Myōkyō shō* 名教抄, fascicle 15, composed by the twelfth-cent. Japanese scholar-monk Chinkai in T70,831a), is a phonetic transcription of *Skt. Nyāyavistara*.

<sup>35</sup> The original *Ch.* form *Kejie lun* 課伽論 is most probably a corruption of *Youqie lun* 踰伽論 (or other Chinese letters) due to the similarity of forms between *ke* 課 and *you* 踰. This is also argued in Ui (1924/44: 466).

to find parallel passages, if only partially, in the *AP* 1,<sup>36</sup> 219,<sup>37</sup> and 382,<sup>38</sup> as well as others. Both texts, however, differ from the details as Jizang outlines them. The date of the *AP* in particular is considered to be rather late by a number of scholars, and we can therefore conclude it was not Jizang's source.

Furthermore, as indicated by the thick line in the quotations in the relevant footnotes, both of the texts above employ the word “the fourteen kinds” (*caturdaśa*) to enumerate all relevant texts. This classification is certainly different from the eighteen-fold classification Jizang uses. According to YOSHIMIZU Kiyotaka's examination, the fourteen-fold classification signifies the four *vedas*, the six *vedāṅga*, and four other texts (i.e., *purāṇa*, *nyāya*, *mīmāṃsā*, *dharmaśāstra*) and this classification is found in the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.3 and the *ViṣṇuP* 3.6.27.<sup>39</sup> The eighteen-fold classification, on the other hand, signifies the above-stated fourteen kinds and four other texts (i.e., *Āyurveda*, *Dhanurveda*, *Gāndharvaveda*, and either *Arthaveda* or

<sup>36</sup> *AP* 1.16–17: śikṣā kalpo vyākaraṇaṃ niruktaṃ jyotiṣāṅgatiḥ / chando 'bhidhānaṃ mīmāṃsā dharmaśāstraṃ purāṇakam //16// nyāyavaidyakagāndharvaṃ dhanurvedo 'rthaśāstrakam / apareyaṃ parā vidyā yayā brahmābhigamyate //17//.

<sup>37</sup> *AP* 219.58–61: vindhyaś ca pāripātraś ca girayaḥ śāntidāstu te / ṛgvedādyāḥ śad-aṅgāni itihāsapurāṇakam //58// āyurvedaś ca gandharvadhanurvedopavedakāḥ / śikṣā kalpo vyākaraṇaṃ niruktaṃ jyotiṣāṅgatiḥ //59// chandogāni ca vedāś ca mīmāṃsā nyāyavistarāḥ / dharmaśāstraṃ purāṇaṇca vidyā hy etāś caturdaśa //60// sāmṅkhyam yogāḥ pāśupatam vedā vai pañcarātrakam / kṛtāntapañcakam hy etad gāyatrī ca śivā tathā //61//.

<sup>38</sup> *AP* 382.2–3: ṛg-yajuh-sāmātharvākhyā vidyā viṣṇur jagajjanīḥ / chandaḥ śikṣā vyākaraṇaṃ nighaṇṭu-jyotiḥ ākhyakāḥ //2// nirukta-dharmaśāstrādi mīmāṃsā nyāyavistarāḥ / āyurveda-purāṇākhyā dhanur-gandharva-vistarāḥ //3//. Op. cit. 382.59–60: vyavahārāḥ śāntayaś ca ṛgvedādividhānakam / sūryavaṃśaḥ somavaṃśo dhanurvedaś ca vaidyakam //59// gāndharvavedo 'rthaśāstraṃ mīmāṃsā nyāyavistarāḥ / purāṇasaṃkhyāmāhātmyam chando vyākaraṇaṃ smṛtam //60//.

<sup>39</sup> *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.3: purāṇa-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-dharmaśāstrāṅgamīritāḥ / vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṃ dharmasya ca caturdaśa //. According to IKARI Yasuke, the final formation of this text would be around the sixth century (Ikari/Watase 2002: 360). *ViṣṇuP* 3.6.7: aṅgāni caturo vedā mīmāṃsā nyāyavistarāḥ / purāṇam dharmaśāstraṃ ca vidyā etāś caturdaśa //. The *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* and the *ViṣṇuP* were compiled nearly at the same period (I owe this reference to YOSHIMIZU Kiyotaka via personal communication).

*Arthaśāstra*).<sup>40</sup> YOSHIMIZU further points out that the historically earlier classification of eighteen kinds is found in the *ViṣṇuP* 3.6.28 and the parallel passages of the *ViṣṇuP* 1.61.78–79 and the *BrahmāṇḍaP* 1.2.35.87cd–89ab.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, YOSHIMIZU indicates that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (ca. 560–620) of the Mīmāṃsā school gives the appellations “*veda*, *vedāṅga*, *upaveda*, and *upāṅga*” to the four groups of the eighteen kinds, respectively.<sup>42</sup>

Unfortunately, it is still unclear exactly which text was the source material for Jizang's explication. However, it is doubtless that Jizang had a Sanskrit source or oral instruction on a Sanskrit source from an Indian informant.

#### 5.4 The Identity and the Chronology of “Mīmāṃsā” and “Nyāyavistara”

Jizang's reference to “Mīmāṃsā” and “Nyāyavistara” as two among the eighteen texts reveal that the “Mīmāṃsā” and “Nyāyavistara” had been recognized a pair of the two disciplines prior to Jizang's composition of the *CHT* in 608 CE. However, due to the chronological problems of the *ViṣṇuP* and the *BrahmāṇḍaP*, the origin and the identity of “Mīmāṃsā” and “Nyāyavistara” remain unclear. As one of the crucial points, it is not fully evident whether “Mīmāṃsā” and “Nyāyavistara” signify or suggest the

<sup>40</sup> Yoshimizu (2022: 360–364).

<sup>41</sup> *ViṣṇuP* 3.6.28: *āyurvedo dhanurvedo gāndharvaś caiva te trayah / arthaśāstraṃ caturthaṃ tu vidyā hy aṣṭādaśaiva tāḥ //*, quoted by Yoshimizu (2022: 364). *ViṣṇuP* 1.61.78–79: *aṅgāni vedāś catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāyavistarāḥ / dharmaśāstraṃ purāṇāṇi ca vidyās tv etāś caturdaśa //* *āyurvedo dhanurvedo gāndharvaś caiva te trayah / arthaśāstraṃ caturthaṃ tu vidyās tv aṣṭādaśaiva tu / ≈* *BrahmāṇḍaP* 1.2.35.87cd–89ab: *aṅgāni vedāś catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāyavistarāḥ / dharmaśāstraṃ purāṇāṇi ca vidyās cemāś caturdaśa //* *āyurvedo dhanurvedo gāndharvaś ceti te trayah / arthaśāstraṃ caturthaṃ tu vidyā hy aṣṭādaśaiva hi //*. See Yoshimizu (2022: 365–366). Furthermore, Ui (1924/44: 462) argues that Kumārajīva's translation entitled *Da zhidu lun* 大智度論 (fascicle 25) mentions the eighteen texts using the expression “the eighteen kinds of non-Buddhist great scriptures such as Vyākaraṇa, Sāṃkhya and Veda” (T25,243b: 外諸經書弊迦蘭那、僧佉、韋陀等十八種大經書), claiming that the notion of “eighteen kinds of texts” had existed in India prior to Kumārajīva (ca. 350–409).

<sup>42</sup> Yoshimizu (2022: 402 n. 21).



already established school names or refer merely to their prototypes in an earlier period.<sup>43</sup>

## 6. Jizang on Nāgārjuna

### 6.1 CHT as a Source to Emend the Error of an Earlier Buddhist Source

In his *CHT*, Jizang provides us with at least two useful pieces of information about Nāgārjuna. First, Jizang explains Nāgārjuna's period of activity in the following way:

The master Rui composed the *Preface to the Treatise on the Establishment of Realities* after his Master Kumārajīva's passing away. Explaining the Master [Kumāra-]Jīva's words, [Rui] states, "Aśvaghoṣa appeared in the world three hundred fifty years after the [Śākyamuni] Buddha's extinction. And Nāgārjuna appeared in the world five hundred and thirty years after [the Buddha's extinction]." [Rui] also states, "Aśvaghoṣa was active at the end of the Correct Teaching, and Nāgārjuna showed up at the beginning of the Semblance Teaching."<sup>44</sup>

Jizang here places Nāgārjuna's period of activity some five hundred and thirty years after the Buddha's extinction (*parinirvāṇa*) based on the theory that the time of Correct Teaching continued only five hundred years after the Buddha taught. This is why Jizang claims Nāgārjuna's time was at the beginning of the Semblance Teaching, which started five hundred years after the Buddha's extinction. Jizang's comments are consistent. In this respect,

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Ui (1924/44: 466): "The *Nyāyavistara Treatise* amounts to the Nyāya theory, hence calls it especially *Nyāyavistara*" (那邪毘薩多論は正理説に當るものであつて、之を特にニヤーヤギスタラ (*Nyāyavistara*) と呼むたのである). I do not fully understand Ui's intention here. On the other hand, in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, the Nyāya author Jayanta (active around the latter half of the ninth-cent.) interprets the "Nyāyavistara" as the text of Akṣapāda, in other words, as identical with the *Nyāyasūtra*. For this argument and problems, as well as Japanese translations of primary sources, see Marui (2014: 127–130).

<sup>44</sup> *CHT* (T42,42,233a): 叡師「成實論序」は什師去世後作之、述什師語云、「佛滅後三百五十年、馬鳴出世。五百三十年、龍樹出世」。又云、「馬鳴興正法之末、龍樹起像法之初」。Cf. A similar explanation is found in Jizang's *Commentary on the Middle Treatise* (*Zhongguan lun shu* 中觀論疏), fascicle 1b: 睿師『成實論序』述羅什語云、「馬鳴是三百五十年出。龍樹是五百三十年出」。(T42,18b)

Jizang simply provides a normal explanation. However, his words become significant when we compare them with what is considered the original source of this means of calculating these dates. This text, the *Records of Issuing the Three Storehouses*, was compiled by the scholar-monk Sengyou (445–518) of the early Liang dynasty.<sup>45</sup> The *Records of Issuing the Three Storehouses* is extant (T vol. 55, no. 2145) and consulted quite often as one of the most reliable historiographies and Chinese catalogues of Buddhist scriptures.

Let me get straight to the point. Jizang's words are useful to emend the *Records of Issuing the Three Storehouses*, which was itself Jizang's source text. Sengyou does not have exactly the same sentences as Jizang's commentary. However, instead of "Rui's Preface to the Treatise on the Establishment of Realities," Sengyou literally quotes "Sengrui's Preface to the Commentarial Treatise on the Great Wisdom," in which we find the following sentence:

In this way, Āśvaghōṣa showed up in the end of the Correct Teaching and Nāgārjuna was born **at the end** of the Semblance Teaching.<sup>46</sup>

The above phrase "**at the end** of the Semblance Teaching" is erroneous; it should be "**at the beginning** of the Semblance Teaching" in accordance with Jizang's consistent explanation.

## 6.2 Kumārajīva's Son

In the opening section of the *CHT*, which deals with general explanations of the author Nāgārjuna and the text the *Hundred Treatise*, Jizang gives us yet another short, but surprising note. It tells a more or less a shocking fact. After speaking about Kumārajīva's parents (father Kumārayāna and mother Jīvā) and his birthplace (Kucha in Central Asia), Jizang adds a short note in passing, "His (Kumārajīva's) grandson is in Chang'an now."<sup>47</sup> This is

<sup>45</sup> *Records of Issuing the Three Storehouses* (Skt. *Tripiṭaka*), Ch. *Chu sanzang ji ji* 出三藏記集, compiled by Sengyou 僧祐.

<sup>46</sup> Sengrui's 僧叡 *Preface to the Commentarial Treatise on the Great Wisdom* (*Da zhi shi lun xu* 大智釋論序) in the *Records of Issuing the Three Storehouses*, fascicle 10 (T55,74c): "是以馬鳴起於正法之餘，龍樹生於像法之末。" The final character *mo* 末 ("end") should be *chu* 初 ("beginning"). For this emendation, see Funayama (2021: 361–360).

<sup>47</sup> *CHT* (T42,235c): 即長安猶有其孫也。

surprising enough to throw up our eyes. It is a historical fact that Kumārajīva was compelled to commit the monastic offense of sexual intercourse at least twice in his life. Even King Yao Xing 姚興 (366–416) of the Later Qin (Houqin 後秦) was familiar with this fact and even offered Kumārajīva yet another opportunity to have children in order to keep his genetic gift alive.<sup>48</sup> Jizang's note here goes well with these affairs.

Incidentally, later, in 840 CE, during the Tang dynasty, the Japanese pilgrim Ennin 圓仁 (794–864) met a South Indian monk named Fada 法達 at Taiyuan fu 太原府 (present-day Taiyuan City, the capital of Shanxi Province). Fada is identified as “the third descendant of the Tripiṭaka Master Kumārajīva.”<sup>49</sup>

## 7. Jizang on the Jaina Nirgrantha

Among the two subdivisions of the Jaina school, “Undressed” or “Naked” (Nirgrantha) was known to the Chinese Buddhists prior to Kumārajīva.<sup>50</sup> The earliest reference seems to be found in a translation by Zhu Fahu (239–326).<sup>51</sup> Kumārajīva's translation of the *Hundred Treatise* says,

Disciples of Ṛṣabha (*Ch. Leshapo*)<sup>52</sup> [the first founder (*tīrthaṃkara*) of the Jaina tradition,] recite the *Nirgrantha Scripture*, teaching that [actions such as] burning one's own body with five kinds of heats and accepting painful practices such as hair-pulling are called beneficial actions.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>48</sup> For this account, see the “Record of Buddhism and Daoism” (*Shi Lao zhi* 釋老志) of the *Book of Wei* (*Weishu* 魏書).

<sup>49</sup> For these series of episodes, see Funayama (2019: 312–316).

<sup>50</sup> The other group of Jainism is called Śvetāmbara (“those who wear white robes”), which appeared historically later than the Nirgrantha. As a result, Śvetāmbara is, by and large, not mentioned in Chinese sources.

<sup>51</sup> Zhu Fahu's 竺法護 translation of the Buddha Śākyamuni's biography entitled *Chu yao jing* 出曜經 which mentions *Skt.* Nirgrantha as *Ch. Niganzi* 尼乾子 and Niganzi 尼犍子 six times in total.

<sup>52</sup> *Skt.* Ṛṣabha, *Ch. Leshapo* 勒沙婆.

<sup>53</sup> *HT* (T30,168b): 勒沙婆弟子誦『尼乾子經』言,「五熱炙身、拔髮等受苦法,是名善法」.

Commenting on this passage, Jizang explains that *Skt.* “Rṣabha” is the name of an ancient ascetic and that the fundamental tenets of Jainism are summarized in the book on logic entitled *Fangbian xin lun*.<sup>54</sup>

Further, Jizang associates the doctrine of the disciples of Rṣabha with a person named *Ch. Naye xiumo*, who propounds the sixteen principles of this world.<sup>55</sup> Moreover, quite a similar phonetic transcription (“Ruoye xumo”)<sup>56</sup> appears in the *Shunzhong lun*<sup>57</sup>, a Chinese translation of a commentary on the opening section of the *MT*. Summarizing the previous scholars' ideas on Ruoye xumo, Kajiyama (1984: 83–93) suggests the possibility that Ruoye xumo (a.k.a. Naye xiumo) is a logician of a system similar to the Nyāya school, if not exactly identical with the Nyāya school.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>54</sup> CHT (T42,244b): 「勒沙婆」者，此云苦行仙。其人計身有苦、樂二分。若現世併受苦盡，而樂法自出。所說之經名『尼健（健）子』，有十萬偈。如『方便心論』云，「有五智、六障、四濁，以為經宗。五智者，謂聞智、思智、自覺智、慧智、義智。六障者，一不見障，二苦受障，三愚癡障，四命障，五姓障，六名障。四濁者，一瞋，二慢，三貪，四諂也」(\*)。而明因中亦有，果亦無果。亦一亦異，以為經宗。(\*) Kumārajīva's translation *Fangbian xin lun* 方便心論 (*Skt.* \**Upādahṛdaya*?; T32,24a): 如六諦等衛世師有。冥初一義，多我異解，是僧伽。有八微。所謂四大、空、意、明、無明八自在，一能小、二為大、三輕舉、四遠到、五隨所欲、六分身、七尊勝、八隱沒，是名踰伽外道。有命無命罪福漏無漏差戒具足縛解。五智聞智思智自覺智慧智義智。六障不見障苦受障愚癡障命盡障性障名障。四濁瞋慢貪諂。是皆名為尼乾陀法。For an English translation, see Gillon/Katsura (2016: 208–209). The *Fangbian xin lun* was translated by Jijiaye (吉迦夜, *Skt.* unknown) in 472 CE in the Northern Wei dynasty, as well as other relevant issues. For the year of this translation, see Sengyou's *Records of Issuing the Three Storehouses* (*Skt.* *Tripiṭaka*), fascicle 2 (T55,13b).

<sup>55</sup> *Ch. Naye xiumo* 那耶修摩, *Skt.* unknown. CHT, fascicle 1b (T42,247b): 亦名那耶修摩... 說有十六諦。

<sup>56</sup> *Ch. Ruoyexumo* 若耶須摩 (T30,42a). For this phonetic transcription, Kajiyama (1984: 90) points out that there are six possibilities for the *Skt.* equivalent; viz., 1. Nyāya-soma, 2. Nyāya-sauma, 3. Nyāya-saumya, 3. Naya-soma, 5. Naya-sauma and 6. Naya-saumya.

<sup>57</sup> *Shunzhong lun* 順中論 (lit. “Treatise in Accordance with the Middle”); the full title is *Shunzhong lun yi ru Da bore poluomi jing chu pin famen* 順中論義入大般若波羅蜜經初品法門 (T vol. 30, no. 1565) in two fascicles, originally composed by Nāgārjuna and commented on by Asaṅga (Wuzhuo 無著).

<sup>58</sup> Kanakura (1944: 298), on the other hand, assumes the idea “those who admire Naya”; viz., Jaina people.

Jaina Nirgranthas are prominent in quite a strict precept of non-killing, which is applicable even to plants, because Jains believe that every plant has a spirit. Wengui,<sup>59</sup> one of Xuanzang's most eminent disciples, says, "Nirgrantha people propagate the thesis that each and every plant has a spirit, because it sleeps, as in the case of a human and so on."<sup>60</sup> However, I have not found an equivalent passage in Jizang's works.

## 8. The Sixteen Principles Held by the God Maheśvara

As separate from the immediately mentioned sixteen principles of Naye xiu-mo, Jizang continues to enumerate yet another sixteen principles taught by the God Maheśvara.<sup>61</sup> The contents of the sixteen principles are identical to the list of the sixteen principles (*Skt. padārtha*) as follows:

<sup>59</sup> Wengui 文軌 was active in the second half of the seventh century. He is sometimes criticized by Kuiji 窺基 (632–682) and Huizhao 慧沼 (650–714).

<sup>60</sup> Wengui's *Commentary on the Fourteen Fallacies* (*Shisi guolei shu* 十四過類疏): 尼乾子立一切草木皆有神識，以有眠故，猶如人等 (Shen Jianying 2008: 241). The two other Chinese Buddhist translations contain nearly the same contents, if not exactly the same, without specifying the upholder's name. That is, Zhendi's 真諦 (*Skt. Paramārtha*, a.k.a. *Kulanātha*) translation *Rushi lun* 如實論 (*Skt.* unknown; T32,32a): 有人立義一切樹有神識。何以故。樹能眠故，譬如尸利沙樹，and Xuanzang's translation *Yinming zhengli men lun* 因明正理門論 (*Skt. Dignāga's Nyāyamukha*; T32,4b): 叢林皆有思慮，有睡眠故 (See Katsura 1984: 59–60). Cf. *TBh* (25,1): *digambaraprayogaḥ—cetanās taravaḥ svāpāt*.

<sup>61</sup> *CHT*, fascicle 1b (T42,247c): 又摩醯首羅天說十六諦義。一量諦，二所量，三疑，四用，五譬喻，六悉檀，七語言分別，八思擇，九決，十論議，十一修諸義，十二壞義，十三自證，十四難難，十五諍論，十六墮負。1. 量 (*pramāṇa*) 諦者有四種。一現知，如眼見色，耳聞聲等。二比知。如見一分，即知餘分，見烟知有火等。三不能知，信聖人語。四譬喻知，如見日去等。2. 所量 (*prameya*) 者，如身有我，乃至解脫也。3. 疑 (*saṃśaya*) 者，如見机似人等。4. 用 (*prayojana*) 者，如依此物作事也。5. 譬喻 (*dṛṣṭānta*) 者，如見牛，知有水牛也。6. 悉檀 (*siddhānta*) 者，自對義由異他義。如數人根是實法，論明根是假名等也。7. 語言分別 (*avayava*) 者，分別自他義也。8. 思擇 (*tarka*) 者，思擇道理如此也。9. 決 (*nirṇaya*) 者，義理可決定也。10. 論議 (*vāda*) 者，由語言顯真實道理。11. 諸義 (*jalpa*) 以立真實義。12. 壞義 (*vitandā*) 者，由立難，難他立義。13. 證 (*hetvābhāsa*) 者，五種。一不定，二相違，三相生疑，四未成，五即時也。14. 難難 (*chala*) 者，聞山林有白象，難草頭亦有白象。15. 諍論 (*jāti*) 者，有二十四種。16. 墮負 (*nigrahaṇasthāna*) 者，如墮負論說。此十六諦異勒沙婆十六諦也。

Jizang's Ch. Terms (T42,247c)		Skt. Terms in the <i>Nyāyasūtra</i> 1.1.1 <sup>62</sup>
(1) 量 "means of valid cognition"	= #1	#1. <i>pramāṇa</i> <sup>63</sup>
(2) 所量 "object of valid cognition"	= #2	#2. <i>prameya</i>
(3) 疑 "doubt"	= #3	#3. <i>saṃśaya</i>
(4) 用 "purpose"	= #4	#4. <i>prayojana</i> <sup>64</sup>
(5) 譬喻 "example"	= #5	#5. <i>drṣṭānta</i>
(6) 悉檀 "fixed thesis"	= #6	#6. <i>siddhānta</i>
(7) 語言分別 "verbal distinction"	≠ #7	#7. <i>avayava</i> <sup>65</sup> "syllogistic parts"
(8) 思擇 "conjecture"	= #8	#8. <i>tarka</i>
(9) 決 "ascertainment"	= #9	#9. <i>nirṇaya</i>
(10) 論義 "argumentation"	= #10	#10. <i>vāda</i>
(11) (修) 諸義 "(sum-up of) objects"	≠ #11	#11. <i>jalpa</i> <sup>66</sup>
(12) 壞義 "captious objection"	= #12	#12. <i>vitandā</i>
(13) (自) 證 "(self-)proof/awareness"	≠ #13	#13. <i>hetvābhāsa</i> <sup>67</sup>
(14) 難難 "deceitful rejoinder"		#14. <i>chala</i>
(15) 諍論 "frank criticism"	≠ #15	#15. <i>jāti</i> <sup>68</sup>

<sup>62</sup> NS 1.1.1: *pramāṇaprameyasamśayaprayojanadrṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkanirṇayavāda-jalpavitandāhetvābhāsacchalajātiniagrahasthānānām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*.

<sup>63</sup> NS 1.1.3: *pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni*.

<sup>64</sup> NS 1.1.24: *yam artham adhikṛtya pravartate tat prayojanam*.

<sup>65</sup> NS 1.1.32: *pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ*. On the other hand, Jizang comments, "Verbal distinction [means] the distinction between one's own and other's doctrines. CHT (T42,247c): 語言分別者, 分別自他義也。This gloss deviates from the definition of *avayava* as "syllogistic parts" in NS 1.1.32.

<sup>66</sup> NS 1.2.2: *yathoktopapannaḥ chala-jātiniagrahasthānasādhyanopālambhaḥ jalpaḥ*. On the other hand, Jizang comments, "The objects are those by which one consolidates the real objects." CHT (T42,247c): 諸義以立真實義。

<sup>67</sup> NS 1.2.4: *savyabhicāraviruddhaprakaraṇasamasādhyaśamakālātītā hetvābhāsāḥ*. On the other hand, Jizang comments, "Directness/Proof is of five kinds: 1. uncertainty; 2. contradictory; 3. doubtful; 4. yet not-established; and 5. immediate." CHT (42,247c): 證者五種。一不定, 二相違, 三相生疑, 四未成, 五即時也。The relation between *hetvābhāsa* "fallacious reason" and *zheng* 證 "directness or proof" is unclear. Further, the fifth factor, *Skt. kālātīta* "past in time" and *Ch. jishi* 即時 "immediate" looks antonymous.

<sup>68</sup> NS 1.2.18: *sādharmyavaidharmyābhyām pratyavasthānam jātiḥ*. Jizang's explanation, "Frank criticism is of twenty-four kinds. 諍論者, 有二十四種。" The kinds of *jāti* are not mentioned in NS 1.2.18.

(16) 墮負 “fall into defeat”

= #16 #16. *nigrahasthāna* “point of defeat”

## 9. The Significance of Jizang’s Notes

In this article, I have dealt with the significance of Chinese Buddhist translations and translators’ instructions to their Chinese disciples. I made a special focus on Jizang’s commentary as source material prior to Xuanzang. In conclusion, we are able to draw the following five points from this paper:

1. When compared with the modern consensus of the “six philosophical schools” of orthodox Brahmanism, the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika schools are repeatedly mentioned in medieval Chinese Buddhist texts, but the Vedānta school is not mentioned at all from a chronological point of view (see Section 1). Reference to the Yoga school is rare.
2. Medieval Chinese Buddhist texts do not refer to the Nyāya school by name, but the contents of the *Nyāyasūtra* are, if not literally identical, at least mentioned as the “Sixteen Principles” held by God Maheśvara (see Section 8). Akṣapāda, who is the founder of the Nyāya school, is indeed known to Chinese Buddhists, but he was confused with Ulūka, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school, hence the correct understanding of who Akṣapāda actually was was not established in China (see Section 3).
3. In addition to the six schools, the four ascetic groups—Bhūta, Nirgrantha, \*Kāpālika, and Jyotika—are mentioned and explained in Xuanzang’s tradition (see Section 2).
4. Among the six orthodox schools, the position of the Mīmāṃsā school was ambivalent. It was certainly recognized as a school name in two Chinese Buddhist translations, one immediately before Xuanzang and the other quite late; otherwise, Chinese Buddhists were aware of Mīmāṃsā as a school name, but, with only two references, we should consider it quite rare (see Section 4).
5. It was Jizang who provided rich and numerous expositions on non-Buddhist thought in India. One of the most noteworthy cases was Jizang’s reference to the phonetic transcription of “Mīmāṃsā,” probably for the first time in the history of Chinese Buddhism. Doubtlessly, Jizang based this on his own personal information of the Sanskrit

tradition. Be that as it may, it is highly probable that Jizang's informant was the Indian scholar-monk and translator Paramārtha, who was frequently mentioned as "the Master of the Three Storehouses" elsewhere in Jizang's exegetical works (see Section 5). As for Jizang's explication, this article is mainly based on his *Commentary on the Hundred Treatise*. The same text also elucidates Jaina Nirgrantha school, as well as other minor issues (see Sections 6 and 7).

### Abbreviations and Previous Studies Consulted

- AP *Agnipurāṇa*. Ed. R. Mitra, *Agni Purāṇa*. 3 vols. Calcutta 1870–1879.
- Brahmāṇḍa *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa*. Ed. K. V. Śarma, *Brahmāṇḍa-Mahāpurāṇa*. Varanasi 2000. Reprint.
- BTMC *Biography of the Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] of the Great Cí'en Monastery* (in Chinese: *Da Cí'en si sanzang fashi zhuan* 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳) in ten fascicles. Compiled by Huili 慧立 and Yancong 彦棕. T vol. 50, no. 2053.
- Ch. Chinese.
- CHT *Commentary on the Hundred Treatise* (in Chinese: *Bai lun shu* 百論疏) in three fascicles. Composed by Jizang 吉藏. T vol. 42, no. 1827.
- Funayama, T. 2013. *Making Sutras into 'Classics' (jingdian): How Buddhist Scriptures Were Translated into Chinese* (in Japanese: *Butten wa dō hon'yaku sareta no ka: sūtoro ga kyōten ni naru toki*). Tokyo.
- . 2019. *The Evolution of Chinese Buddhism during the Six Dynasties, Sui, and Tang Periods* (in Japanese: *Rikuchō Zui Tō bukyō tenkai shi*). Kyoto.
- . 2020. "Chinese Buddhist Phonetic Transcriptions during the Liang Dynasty Depicted in the Fragmentary Quotations of the *Chu yao lü yi* (in Japanese: *Shutsu yō ritsugi itsubun ni miru Ryō dai bukyō no onshago*)." *Tōhō Gakuhō* 95: 522–402.
- . 2021. "The Significance of the Anonymous *Cibei daochang chan fa* in Ten Fascicles (in Japanese: *Mishō senja Jihi dōjō senpō jikkan no shiryō kachi*)." *Tōhō Gakuhō* 96: 408–346.
- Gillon, B., and S. Katsura. 2016. "The English Translation of the \**Upāyahrdaya* (pt. 1)." *Indogaku Chibettogaku kenkyū* 20: 195–232.
- GTWR *The Great Tang Record of the Western Regions* (in Chinese: *Da Tang xiyuji* 大唐西域記) in twelve fascicles. Compiled by Bianji 辯機 in 646 CE according to Xuanzang's oral testimony. T vol. 51, no. 2087.



- HT *Hundred Treatise* (Ch. *Bai lun* 百論). Composed by Deva (Ch. Tipo 提婆, a.k.a. Āryadeva) and translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva. T vol. 30, no. 1569.
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- MT *Middle Treatise* / *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* (Nāgārjuna).
- NS *Nyāyasūtra* (Gautama / Akṣapāda).
- Shen J. 2008. *Studies in Texts of Logic from Dunhuang* (in Chinese: *Dunhuang yinming wenxian yanjiu* 敦煌因明文獻研究). Shanghai.
- Skt. Sanskrit.
- T *Taishō shinshū daizō kyō* or *Taisho Canon*.
- Tang Y. 1945/88. *A Brief History of Indian Philosophy* (in Chinese: *Indu zhexue shi lüe* 印度哲學史略). Beijing 1988. Originally published in 1945.
- TBh *Tarkabhāṣā* (Mokṣākaragupta). Ed. H. R. R. Iyengar, *Tarkabhāṣā and Vādashāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*. Mysore 1952.
- Tib. Tibetan.
- Ui, H. 1924/44. "Notes on Various Paths (in Japanese: [Shuju naru michi] Chūki)." In: H. Ui, *Studies in Indian Philosophy vol. 4* (in Japanese: *Indo tetsugaku kenkyū, dai shi*). Tokyo 1924. Reprint 1944/1965: 453–575.
- ViṣṇuP *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. Ed. M. M. Pathak, *Viṣṇupurāṇam*. Vol. 1. Vadodara 1997.
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- Yoshimizu, K. 2022. "Baramon no gakumon bunrui: Jūshi matawa jūhachi no 'chi no kyosho' " In: Eds. M. Fujii and H. Teshima, *Burahumanizumu to hinduizumu: kodai, chūsei Indo no shakai to shisō* (1) Kyoto. 355–413.
- < > Interlinear notes in Chinese texts and English translations thereof.
- \* Assumed Skt.: asterisk (\*) before a Skt. word signifies that the word form in the context in question has not been attested in extant primary sources.

# Possible Fragments of Aśvaghoṣa's Lost *Sūtrālaṃkāra* from the "Manuscript Cave" in Šorčuq\*

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The first volume of the series *Sanskrihandschriften aus den Turfanfunden* (SHT), which appeared in 1965, under the catalogue number 378 contains a folio of a manuscript that the editor Ernst Waldschmidt classified as "Kāvya-Anthologie."<sup>1</sup> With this classification, Waldschmidt followed Else Lüders who, as is so often the case, had been the first to transliterate the manuscript. Only one year later, Dieter Schlingloff published an extensive review of the volume, which also included a significant number of corrections to the edition of SHT 378.<sup>2</sup> Altogether, the catalogue number consisted of three folios listed a–c. All three folios were damaged, a and c only slightly, and b to a greater degree. In 1980, Lore Sander and Ernst Waldschmidt re-edited the previously published folio a, including Dieter Schlingloff's corrections and adding an edition of the two still unpublished folios b and c.<sup>3</sup>

The manuscript was discovered in the "Handschriften-Höhle," the "Manuscript Cave," in Šorčuq at the northern route of the ancient Silk Road, by the third of the so-called Prussian Turfan Expeditions that visited the Tarim basin between December 1905 and May 1907. According to the description of the Sanskrit manuscripts from the German Turfan finds, it is written in a script called type III, which is roughly ascribed to the fifth and sixth centuries.<sup>4</sup>

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\* It is our pleasant duty to thank Mitsuyo Demoto (Marburg) and Klaus Wille (Leer) for their comments and corrections, and Sophie Florence (Munich) for correcting our English.

<sup>1</sup> SHT I: 169–170 including a photograph of folio 61 as plate 12.

<sup>2</sup> Schlingloff 1966: 421–422.

<sup>3</sup> SHT IV: 310–314.

<sup>4</sup> Sander 1968: 46–47.

Only one of the three pieces preserves the complete folio number, 61 on a. On fragment c only the character for 50 remains, and the number of fragment b is completely lost.<sup>5</sup> When Else Lüders employed the term *kāvya* anthology, she was correct in the sense that the text consisted of verses that fulfilled the requirements of ornate poetry. However, she disregarded a characteristic feature of the manuscript, a mistake that Waldschmidt and Sander would later repeat. The text contains a kind of subtitles written in prose, which structure the work and clearly organize the verses around certain topics. At a minimum, these headings consist of a Buddhist concept in the locative, e.g., *saṃpraharsake* “about the exhilarator” or *śīlaviśuddhau* “about purity of morality,” or of a short sentence as *atha bhadraghaṭam upākhyāyāha* “then relating to the vase of fortune, it is said.”

Among the German Turfan manuscripts, there is at least one similarly structured text. In 2007, Adelheid Mette edited selected verses from the manuscript SHT 25, which also consists of verses and preserves about forty headings or topics. She discussed the classification of the manuscript in detail, and we draw from her exemplary study here.<sup>6</sup> SHT 25 is a palm-leaf manuscript that is slightly older than SHT 378, its script is type II, and radiocarbon dating gives 238–343 CE as the most probable range.<sup>7</sup> Both texts were unidentified and nothing more specific could be said about genre, author, or purpose. This situation has recently changed, however.

As it turned out, the *Tridaṇḍamālā* (TDM), a highly remarkable text containing about 1500 *kāvya* verses, preserves an immediate parallel to folios a and b of SHT 378. The TDM appears to be a collection of texts used for recitation on specific occasions. It consists of forty chapters, all of which follow the same division into three sections: first, a section with *kāvya* verses, second, a section with a full *sūtra* quotation, and third, another section containing *kāvya* verses. The discovery of verses common to both the TDM and SHT 378 entailed further findings: Some of these verses also

<sup>5</sup> The editors of SHT IV argue that the folio number of fragment c should be understood as 57 or 58, see p. 310, note 2.

<sup>6</sup> Mette 2007. See especially 353–354 on the contents of the text, and 367 for a list of the topics.

<sup>7</sup> Allon et al. 2006; 280; cf. Mette 2007: 352, note 4.

occur in other Central Asian manuscripts, namely SHT 303,<sup>8</sup> 1621,<sup>9</sup> and 1775a<sup>10</sup> of the German collection in Berlin, and a folio belonging to the Pelliot Collection in Paris.<sup>11</sup> Amazingly, the *Subhāṣitaratnakaraṇḍakakathā* (SRKK), a late compilation ascribed to Āryaśūra,<sup>12</sup> also shares six verses with sections 1 and 3 in chapter 17 of the TDM, and they occur in the same order. Taking the order of the TDM as the starting point, the following table illustrates the complex relations between the various sources. It should be added that in all the fragments from Central Asia, the verses related to the TDM are embedded between other verses that have no equivalent in the TDM. On first sight, it would appear that the texts draw from a common pool, but to very different degrees and in various combinations.

TDM	SHT 378	SHT 1621	SHT 1775a	SHT 303	Pelliot	SRKK
17.1.22	X					160
17.1.23–28	X					
17.1.29	X		X			
17.3.1	X	X				
17.3.2		X			X	161
17.3.3		X				
17.3.4		X				162
17.3.5						163
17.3.7						164
17.3.10						165
22.1.20		X	X			

<sup>8</sup> SHT 303 with remains of various verses written by different scribes on the previously empty recto side of the folio; recto a–b = TDM 27.1.10; see SHT XII: 454–455 (Ergänzungen und Korrekturen zu Teil 1–11).

<sup>9</sup> SHT 1621 contains verses with continuous counting, some of which are also found in the Pelliot fragment; r2–5 = TDM 17.3.1–4, v2–3 = TDM 27.1.10, v4 = TDM 22.1.20; see SHT VII: 23–25.

<sup>10</sup> SHT 1775a: its recto side contains nine lines with remains of verses, while the verso side ends in line 3; r2–3 = TDM 27.1.10, r3–4 = TDM 22.1.20, r7–8 = TDM 17.1.29; see SHT VII: 205–207.

<sup>11</sup> Pell. Skt. stotra III.6 r3–5, see Pauly 1960: 526–527; cf. also Tripathi 1964.

<sup>12</sup> Hahn 1982.

TDM	SHT 378	SHT 1621	SHT 1775a	SHT 303	Pelliot	SRKK
26.1.7–14	X					
27.1.10		X	X	X		

Evidently, all these texts are somehow related, but their mutual relations are difficult, if not impossible, to assess.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, this is another case where the *Tridaṇḍamālā* opens new vistas for our understanding of Sanskrit fragments from Central Asia.<sup>14</sup> We therefore hope that our small contribution will be a fitting tribute to Eli Franco, who made accessible one of the most fascinating—and most difficult—Sanskrit texts from the Silk Road in his wonderful edition and study of the so-called Spitzer Manuscript.<sup>15</sup>

According to our present knowledge, the TDM is a collection of verses and canonical *sūtras*, which followed a fixed structure and served for ritual purposes.<sup>16</sup> Some of the parallels introduced here appear to confirm this understanding. Regarding the *Subhāṣitaratnakaraṇḍakakathā*, however, Péter-Dániel Szántó is inclined to consider it “as a collection of pericope verses, which were elaborated upon according to the occasion.”<sup>17</sup> The same most likely holds for SHT 378. The headings inserted between the verses seem to indicate that the purpose of the text must have been didactic and/or doctrinal. How then are the overlaps between SHT 378 and the TDM to be explained? In two folios, fragments a and b, the order of stanzas fully corresponds with that in the TDM. The headings in SHT 378 are not found in the TDM, and, following the usual style of Central Asian Sanskrit manuscripts, SHT 378 has verse numbers and a new count begins after each heading.

<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that those Central Asian fragments share other verses that are not included in the TDM. The combination seems to vary from manuscript to manuscript. It is impossible to say if the specific selection in a manuscript reflects an individual choice or a monastic/ritual tradition.

<sup>14</sup> For other examples see Hartmann 2022, Hartmann in print b, Hartmann et al. 2022.

<sup>15</sup> Franco 2004.

<sup>16</sup> Its purpose is discussed elsewhere, cf. Hartmann in print a.

<sup>17</sup> Szántó 2021: 306, note 31.

So far, about a quarter of the 1500 stanzas contained in the TDM could be connected to sources, and, in an overwhelming number of cases, these sources are linked in one way or another to Aśvaghoṣa. As is well known, the colophon of the TDM names Aśvaghoṣa as its author.<sup>18</sup> Although Edward Hamilton Johnston vehemently rejected this attribution,<sup>19</sup> there is much more to it than a simple attempt to associate a work with the name of a famous author. Given the evidence now available, one should at least reckon with the possibility that some or even the majority of the unidentified verses originally stem from works of Aśvaghoṣa that are not otherwise preserved. Kazunobu Matsuda suggests that many of those unidentified verses in the TDM are cited from Aśvaghoṣa's lost *\*Sūtrālaṃkāra*. If this text ever existed, it must have been a commentary on canonical *sūtras*, interspersed with a large number of poetical verses. Here is not the place to discuss the hotly debated existence of the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, but suffice it to say that, in connection with our work on the TDM, new and complex evidence has turned up in favor of the existence of such a work. This evidence includes quotations of many anonymous verses in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa*,<sup>20</sup> it also includes Subhūticandra's *Kavikāmadhenu*, a commentary on the *Amarakośa* composed in the 11th–12th centuries, which cites a stanza from the (or a) *Sūtropadeśālaṃkāra*,<sup>21</sup> and it includes the *Jātakamālā-ṭīkā* of a Dharmakīrti, preserved only in Tibetan translation, which cites three stanzas as coming from the *mDo sde rgyan* (= *Sūtrālaṃkāra*).<sup>22</sup> Remarkably, these stanzas are also found in the *Tridaṇḍamālā*. There are several more arguments that we will not get into here. Taken all together, these arguments lend an increasing plausibility to the existence of the lost *Sūtrālaṃkāra*, and that encouraged us to adopt such a provocative title for our contribution. In our eyes, the moment has come to reopen the discussion that has long been considered closed, and we do so with the expectation that our celebrant will find some pleasure in the debate.

<sup>18</sup> See Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938: 160; cf. Hartmann in print a.

<sup>19</sup> Johnston 1939.

<sup>20</sup> Matsuda 2020.

<sup>21</sup> *tad uktaṃ sūtropadeśālaṃkāre*, Deokar 2014: 121; see also Matsuda 2020, esp. pp. 432 (= 57) and 430 (= 59).

<sup>22</sup> Hanisch 2007: 194–195, and Matsuda 2021.

If our idea proves viable, a text like SHT 378 appears to be another derivative or, even a prominent candidate for, the *Sūtrālaṃkāra*. At this moment, there is no proof whatsoever, but such a possibility should be kept in mind. Regrettably, SHT 378 is a *codex unicus* among the Central Asian manuscripts. The related manuscript SHT 25, mentioned above, is of no great help since it displays only a single overlap with the TDM: Stanza 11.3.13 of the TDM is partly preserved in lines r1–2 of fragment 21 of SHT 25.<sup>23</sup> None of the other verses in this manuscript show any connection with the TDM.

In the following, we will present a re-edition of SHT 378,<sup>24</sup> which for the folios a and b is based on the complete version found in the TDM. Remarkably, the original Sanskrit text is much better preserved in the TDM manuscript, although it is at least five hundred years younger than the manuscript from Šorčuq. The wording of the version contained in the Central Asian manuscript is deteriorated to such a degree that several verses have become incomprehensible. A striking example, noted already by Schlingloff in his review of 1966, is the seeming omission of water from the enumeration of the four elements in line recto 2 of folio a, where, instead of the expected *jala*, a meaningless *vihaṃ* is found. Comparison between the two manuscripts confirms once more the outstanding quality of the text preserved in the TDM manuscript and the notable accuracy of its transmission. Although our initial hope to also find a parallel for fragment c has not been fulfilled, we add it here for the sake of completeness.

In our presentation of the text, square brackets [ ] denoting damaged *akṣaras* and doubtful readings are omitted whenever the reading is confirmed by the TDM. Restored portions are indicated by round brackets ( ) and additionally marked by italics if the restoration is supported by the TDM. The asterisk \* denotes the *virāmā*; two dots .. denote an illegible *akṣara*; one dot . denotes an illegible part of an *akṣara*; pointed brackets < > denote an

<sup>23</sup> This is a beautiful Śālinī verse whose imagery is closely connected with *Buddha-carita* 6.46 (itself quoted in chapter 30.3 of the TDM) and *Saundarananda* 15.33 (quoted in chapter 22.1 of the TDM); for a comparison of the three verses see Hartmann and Matsuda in print, section 6, example 4.

<sup>24</sup> Photographs of fragments a and b are available from IDP Berlin (<http://idp.bbaw.de/idp.a4d>, last access September 17, 2022); fragment c is kept at the Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, and we are very grateful to Lilla Russell-Smith and Caren Dreyer for providing us with copies.

omission without gap. Variants and mistakes are noted after each verse. For the sake of brevity, in the text-critical notes, SHT is replaced by S and TDM by T.

**SHT 378a** (fol. 61): lines r1–v6 = TDM 26.1, verses 7–14 (fol. 66r3–v2);<sup>25</sup> Vasantatilakā

(*anyonyavigra*)(r1)haparā(ṃ)ś caturo yathogrān  
 āśīviṣān satatam ekakaraṃḍasaṃsthān <|>  
 bhītaḥ parityajati dehagatān tath(ai)va  
 dhāt(ū)(r2)n jalajvalanabhūmyanilān vijahyāt\* 1 <||>

- a: °parā(ṃ)ś S : °karāṃs T;
- b: °karaṇḍya- S; °saṃsthāt S;
- c: °gatas S : °gatān T;
- d: *vihaṃ* S<sup>26</sup> : *jala*° T; °anilaṃ S; *nijahyāt* S.

Like a frightened person abandons four violent venomous snakes engrossed in quarrelling with each other<sup>27</sup> and always staying together in the same basket, exactly so he should give up the elements water, fire, earth and wind which form the body.

kruddho yathā hy ativiṣo 'nyatamaś caturṇām  
 āśīviṣo 'parihṛto niyat(am) (r3) vadhā(..) <|>  
 (dhā)tus tathā puruṣam anyatamaś caturṇām  
 kopam ya eva samupaiti sa eva hanti 2 <||>

- a: *nyatamaś* S; *catūrṇāṃ* S;
- b: *āśīviṣa* S;

<sup>25</sup> The complete Sanskrit text and a Japanese translation of TDM 26 (*Āśīviṣa*) is published in Matsuda et al. 2022.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. SHT IV: 313, note 28, which mentions Schlingloff's recognition of the four elements as topic of the verses and the fact that water is missing here.

<sup>27</sup> Pāda a occurs also in the Anuṣṭubh verse 22 of SHT 837cR3, confirming the variant *-para*. This manuscript is classified as a "Lehrgedicht" (doctrinal poem); the rather fragmentary passage seems to deal with the same topic, since the compound *dhātupannagāḥ* is preserved at the end of Pāda b and related words like *mahābhūta*, *kopa*, *dhātu*, *kruddha* etc. appear in the following stanzas (all Anuṣṭubh).



- c: *puruṣam* S : *niyatam* T;<sup>28</sup> *ananyatamaś* S; *catūrṇāṃ* S :  
*caturṇāṃ* T;  
d: *haṃti* S.

Like any of the four highly venomous snakes, when provoked and not abandoned, surely will ...,<sup>29</sup> exactly so the one of the four elements which goes into disorder will kill a man.<sup>30</sup>

āśī(vi)ṣā(d a)(r4)pi ca ghoraviṣāt kadācit  
syāt svasti mantravidhibhir mahatām ṛṣṇāṃ < | >  
dhātūrageṇa tu śarīragatena (*daṣṭe*)  
(r5) kāle prakṛṣṭamanaso munayo 'pi daṣṭāḥ <3 || >

- b: *syat* S; °*mantra*° S; *mahatām* S : *mmahatām* T;  
c: *dhātūvorageṇa* S : *dhātūrageṇa* T;  
d: the pāda is missing in T.

Sometimes there may be safety from a venomous snake and its terrible poison through the magic formulas of the great seers; however, when they are bitten by the snake “element” inside the body, even the high-minded seers are bitten.<sup>31</sup>

āśīviṣā jagati sarvagatā na santi  
sarva(*tra yena na bhayaṃ*) (r6) puruṣasya tebhyaḥ < | >  
dhātūn ṛte tu khalu nāsti śarīrabandhas  
te yatra tatra ca vadho niyataḥ prajān(ā)m\* (4) < || >

- a: *nāśīviṣā* S; *sarvvaga[tā]ś ca[la]ṃ[ti]* S : *sarvvagatā na santi* T;  
b: *sarvve* /// S : *sarvvatra* T;  
c: *tu khalu* S : *khalu ca* T; °*baddhas* S : °*bandhaḥ* T.

Venomous snakes do not appear everywhere on earth, and therefore men are not everywhere in fear of them. Without the

<sup>28</sup> The parallelism between the two half verses speaks for *niyatam*.

<sup>29</sup> A word for “kill” is expected, but the photograph is nearly illegible.

<sup>30</sup> Or, with the reading of T, “will kill surely.”

<sup>31</sup> The repetition of *daṣṭa* seems strange; should we read *daṣṭāḥ* in Pāda c and something like *naṣṭāḥ* in d? TDM is of no help, since the pāda d is missing. The verses

elements there is indeed no joining into a body; and where they are, destruction is definite for living beings.

*s(arpebhya) (v1) (e)va ca na mṛtyubhayam prajānām  
tebhy(aḥ kvacid) bh(avati kasyacid eva mṛtyuḥ |  
dhātuvāśraye sati bhavanti bahū)(v2)(ni) loke  
dvārāṇi jīvitavilopakarasya mṛtyoḥ || <5><sup>32</sup>*

d: °vilopa° S : °vighāta° T.

From the snakes alone there is no danger of death for the living beings; from them sometimes death occurs just for one. (But) when there is the seat of the elements, there are many doors in the world for death which causes the interruption<sup>33</sup> of life.

*pañcāsūpādānaskandheṣv<sup>34</sup> amitrād eva sāhasam (up)ākhy(āyā)(v3)ha ||*

*pañcastupādānaskandheṣv S; amitrad S; sahasam S.*

About the five groups of clinging referring to rashness from the enemy only, he says:

*apy eva śāntim upayānti arayaḥ saśāstrāḥ  
kaṃcid guṇam samupalabhya kṛtajñabhāvāt\* <|>  
skandhāḥ śram(eṇa) (v4) mahatāpy upacāryam(ā)ṇā  
na tv eva śakyam akṛtajñatayā grahītuṃ 1 <||>*

a: *upayānti S; saśāstrāḥ S;*

c: *skandhā S; upacāryyam(ā)ṇā S.*

Even armed enemies find peace through the state of acknowledging something, after having met with some virtue; the groups, however, even when approached with great effort, are impossible to get hold of because they do not acknowledge anything.

26–27 in SHT 837 d r1–2 show close similarities (*mantra*, *dhātūraga*), but due to their state of preservation they do not contribute to the understanding of our verse.

<sup>32</sup> The last verse before a new heading usually has no number.

<sup>33</sup> Or “destruction” (*vighāta*) according to the TDM.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. SHT IV: 314, note 30, with a reference to the correction suggested by Schlingloff.

pratyarthinaś ca vadhakāḥ pragṛhītaśastr(āḥ)  
 (v5) śakyam (guṇai)r api śarair api vā vihanṭum <|>  
 dharme sthitair api balair api labdhaśabd(ai)ḥ  
 skandhā na śakyam apavartayi(tuṃ) (v6) svabhāvāt 2 <||>

- a: *pratyarthi[m]lāra vadhaka pragṛhīta[ś]as[t]r(aṃ) S;*  
 b: *vā vihanṭu[m] S : nābhihantum\* T;*  
 c: *dharme sthitair S : dharmmasthitair T; ga[le] 'pi ca S :*  
*balair api T;*  
 d: *apavarttayituṃ T.*

Moreover, hostile murderers with a weapon in their hand can be warded off with virtues or arrows; but neither those standing firm in the dharma nor fools with the right words are able to turn the groups away from their own nature.

dr̥ṣṭvetaram param anarthakaram kadācit  
 praty(a)r(thi(naḥ) prati(n)uda(n)ti na cātmapakṣam <|>  
 svām yonim agnaya (ivonmathanena jātāḥ  
 skandhāḥ svam eva viśayaṃ bhuvi nirdahanti 3 ||)

- a: *dr̥ṣṭvāntaram S; anarthāntakaram S; kadāci S;*  
 b: *ca nātma° S.*

When they occasionally see another one who produces detriments, they repulse an opponent, but not their own party. Like fire, born from whirling, its own origin, so the groups burn up their own realm on the earth.

In the TDM, the series of Vasantatilakā stanzas continues with another two which appear closely related; then the section ends with two Śikhariṇī verses. No traces of them are found in the Turfan manuscripts.

**SHT 378b** (no folio no. preserved): lines r1–v4 = TDM 17.1.22–29 (fol. 37v3–38r1; see also SHT 1775a r7–8), all in Vaṃśastha meter; line v5 = TDM 17.3.1 (fol. 39r4–5; see also SHT 1621 r2–3), a Vasantatilakā

(varam daridro 'pi hi śīlavān bhaven  
 na cārthavān)(r1)n apy analamkṛto guṇaiḥ <|>

daridrābhāve 'pi hi sajjana(*stuto*  
*raso guṇānām a*)mṛtād viśiṣyate [1](8)

- b–d: various misreadings in SHT IV: *anālamkṛto*, *darī*°,  
*viśyate*;  
c: *daribhave* S : *daridrābhāve* T; *pa he* S : *pi hi* T;  
d: (*a*)mṛtaṃ S : *amṛtād* T.

It is better to be poor, but have morality, than have wealth, but be unadorned with virtues. Even in the state of a beggar one is praised by good people; the taste of virtues excels that of nectar.<sup>35</sup>

(*na māl*)yagandho hi tathā (*vikī*)(**r2**)ry(*a*)te  
pravāti gandho na tathānulepanāt < | >  
anuttama(*ḥ śī*)lamayo *yathā* satāṃ  
pravāti gandho divi ceha cāvyayaḥ [1](9) < || >

- a: *hi* T : *pi* editors SHT IV : *hi* ms.; (*vikī*)ryy(*a*)te S;  
c: (*śīla*)l(*ā*)mayo satāṃ S.

The scent of a wreath of flowers is not so dispersed, the scent from an ointment does not so blow forth, as the unsurpassable scent of morality of the good ones blows forth in heaven and on earth, imperishable.

(**r3**) ihātmatuṣṭiḥ p(*a*)r(*ataḥ śubhā gat*)ir  
yaśaḥ priyatvaṃ (*bahu*)māna eva ca < | >  
sukhaṃ ca tat tad bahu dṛṣṭadhārmikaṃ  
phalaṃ hi (**r4**) śīlasya (*maha*)rṣayo (*viduḥ*) (20) < || >

- a: *tuṣṭiṃ* S;  
c: *tat tad* S;  
d: editors SHT read *bahu[rasy i]ṣṭāyikaṃ*;  
ms. *bahu [dh]. d.iṣṭā[dha] ..ikaṃ*.

In this world contentment with oneself and in the hereafter a pleasant existence, fame, popularity, and also high esteem.

<sup>35</sup> This verse also occurs as SRKK 160.

This the great seers know as the pleasant and abundant fruit of morality in the present life.<sup>36</sup>

— — śraiṣṭhyam ajanma vā śivam<sup>37</sup>  
 tathecchataḥ śīlavato na dūrataḥ < | >  
 viśuddhaśīlasya (r5) (ca) tadgatātmano  
 nara(sya cetaḥpranīdhiḥ sa)mṛddhyati 21 < || >

- a: [v]āśeṣṭyamajanmu(?) editors SHT IV; S rather śreṣṭhyam; T nearly illegible in the beginning;  
 b: tathā- S : yathā- T; śīlavanto S;  
 c: tadbh(ū)tātmano S : tadgatātmano T;  
 d: (sa)mṛddhyati S.

..., primacy or a peace not subject to birth, for someone with morality who is wishing thus it is not far away. For a person with pure morality, who is bent on it, a wish of the mind comes true.

tathaiva duḥśīlam avekṣ(ya) duḥkhitam  
 vadhāparodhavyasan(ād)i(bh)i(h kṣatam) < | >  
 (v1) (a)y(am) n(a) tāvan mayi — — ×<sup>38</sup>  
 (ato 'pi toṣam) samupaiti śīlavān\* 22 < || >

- a: duśīlam S;  
 b: vadhāvarodha° T;  
 d: ///sukham eti śīlavān S.

<sup>36</sup> A similar version of this verse, shortened to a śloka, occurs as Bc 23.16 (Derge edition, no. 4156, vol. ge, fol. 80v5–6):

yid ni tshim zhing bkur mang dang || rnyed dang grags dang yid ches nyid ||  
 dga' ba nyid dang song nas bde || tshul khrims kyi ni 'bras bu che ||  
 “Great is the reward of discipline,—a contented mind, honour, gain, renown, trust and delight, and in the hereafter bliss.” (Johnston 1937: 70).

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *svayam ajanmaśīva* /// in Schlingloff 1955: 51, no. 101r4. Mitsuyo Demoto refers us to *Mahābhārata* 12,305.021a *gacchet prāpyākṣayam kṛtsnam ajanma śivam avyayam | śāśvataṃ sthānam acalam duṣprāpam akṛtātmanabhiḥ* (email dated Sept. 19, 2021).

<sup>38</sup> The manuscript of the TDM is very difficult to read; Mitsuyo Demoto and Kazunobu Matsuda read *doṣa aiṣyatīty*.

Equally, when he sees a suffering immoral person, torn by the disasters of killing and exclusion,<sup>39</sup> (he thinks:) This one not so far with me ..., and from there a person with morality finds contentment.

aho namasyā iti śīla(vatsu) ca  
pr(aśa)sya(māne)(v2)ṣu guṇapriyaiḥ parai(h) <|>  
(praharṣam āgacchati) śīlavān naro  
mamāpi te santi samā guṇā iti 23 <||>

b: paraiḥ S : naraiḥ T;

d: taiḥ S : te T; samā S : śubhā T.

“Ah, how worthy they are of veneration!”, when persons with morality are thus praised by others who love virtues, a man with morality experiences joy thinking “I too have the same<sup>40</sup> virtues.”

vināśakāle samupasthite tathā  
rujāsu tīvrāsu rudatsu bandhuṣu <|>  
śubhāni ś(ī)l(ā)ni (v3) mameti nirvṛto  
bhayaṃ (na mṛtyoḥ sam)upaiti śīlavāṃ 2[4] <||>

a–d: In S, the verse is in complete disorder. It starts in line 2 with śu[bhā]ni ś(ī)[l](ā)[ni] and continues in line 3 with m upaiti nirvṛto bhayaṃ + + + + (m)upaiti śīlavāṃ. After the large hole, an insertion begins between lines 2 and 3 marked with something closely resembling a *ma* in the beginning and in the end, which fills the remainder of the folio up to the right margin. Preserved is *ma vināśakāle samupasthite-s tathā rujāsu tīvrāsu* «ru»da 3 (exactly below the character for 20 and therefore part of the verse number) plus a strange sign *tsu* [bandhuṣu *ma*]. The verse is restored with the help of T.

c: śubhāni S : śucīni T.

<sup>39</sup> “Imprisonment” (*avarodha*) TDM.

<sup>40</sup> “Good” (*śubha*) TDM; the demonstrativum *te* speaks slightly in favor of *śubha*.

When the time of death has come and the relatives weep in racking pains, a person with morality is composed in the thought “my moral conduct is pure” and experiences no fear of death.

rujāsu śīlaṃ paramaṃ hi bheṣajaṃ  
bhayeṣu rakṣā vyasaneṣu bā(v4)ndhavaḥ < | >  
tamaḥsu dīp(o viṣa)meṣu saṃkramo  
mahaty agādhe maraṇāmbhasi plavaḥ < || >

a: śīlā [p]./// and ///ja SHT VII 1775a r7;

b–c: In S, about 12 akṣaras (one pāda?) are erased between *ndhavaḥ* and *tamaḥsu*. The remaining traces do not allow a reconstruction; *bhā[ye]*/// SHT VII 1775a r8;

d: after *plavaḥ* remains of two akṣaras are preserved in S which may be a daṇḍa and part of a rosette marking the end of the section.

Morality is the best remedy in case of sickness, a protection in dangers, a friend in misfortunes, a lamp in the darkness, a passage in rough grounds, a boat on the great and deep water of death.

(v5) atha bhadraghaṭam upākhy(ā)yāha ||

mānaṃ yaśaḥ s(ukham avipra)tiśāram arthaṃ  
svargaṃ paratra padam avyayam acyutaṃ v(ā |  
ādāya śīlam adhigacchati sarvaṃ iṣṭaṃ  
yakṣātisṛṣṭam iva bhadraghaṭam daridraḥ || 1 ||)

a: *sukham api pratisā*/// SHT 1621 r2;

b: *svarggaṃ* T;

c: *sarvvaṃ* T.

Then relating to the vase of fortune, it is said:

Respect, fame, pleasure, absence of regret, wealth, heaven, or in the beyond an undecaying imperishable state: with morality one achieves every wish like a pauper who gets a vase of fortune granted by a spirit.

**SHT 378c** fol. 50///; five Śārdūlavikrīḍita verses; the last one is a Vaṃśastha (samādāpake)<sup>41</sup>

— — — ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡ ◡ ◡ — | — — ◡ — — ◡ ×  
 — — — ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡ ◡ ◡ — | — — ◡ — — ◡ ×  
 — — — ◡ ◡ — ◡ — ◡ ◡ ◡ (r1) ca prajñādhimuktaṃ janaṃ  
 taṃ provāca muniḥ samādāpaka<sup>42</sup> ity ācāryyam ācāryyakṛt\* 1 ||

d: *taṃ* : *tat* ms.; *ācāryyam* : *ācāryyām* ms.<sup>43</sup>

... a person who is devoted to understanding, the sage who produces teachers has declared such a teacher an inspirer.

samuttejake ||

ya<ḥ> (r2) kṣī<ṇaṃ> kurute prayogavimukhaṃ tejaḥpradhāna<ṃ>  
 jana<ṃ>  
 yaḥ protsāhayati prayatnaśithilaṃ bhavyāpadārttaṃ (r3) janaṃ <|>  
 yaś connāmayati pralīnamanasaṃ nyastaprayogaṃ janaṃ  
 taṃ santejakam ity uvāca bhagavāṃṣ atya(r4)rthasaṃtejakah 1 ||

a: *ya<ḥ> kṣī<ṇaṃ> kurute* : *ya kṣī kurute* ms. : *yakṣīkurute* eds.

SHT;<sup>44</sup> °*pradhāna<ṃ> jana<ṃ>* : °*pradhāna jana* ms.;<sup>45</sup>

b: *bhavyāpadārttaṃ* : *bhavyapa[d]ār[ttha]ṃ* ms.;

<sup>41</sup> According to the phrase *dharmyayā kathayā saṃdarśayati samādāpayati samuttejayati saṃpraharṣayati*, very frequent in (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda canonical literature, there should be a verse on the *saṃdarśaka* before the one on the *samādāpaka*; for a study of the phrase itself, especially its use in Vasubandhu's *Vyākhyāyukti*, see Inoue 2021 and cf. Ueno 2021: 103–104.

<sup>42</sup> Correction in SHT IV: 311, note 4: Lies “samādāpaka. Kürze metri causa.” This is not very likely, if the text aims at good poetry, but at this point we have no better solution.

<sup>43</sup> SHT IV: 311, note 5: “Lies *ācāryya-m*-. Auch das Metrum verlangt eine Kürze. -*m* ist hier, wie häufig in dieser Handschrift, Gleitkonsonant.” This is surely wrong.

<sup>44</sup> SHT IV, note 6: “Pāda nur 18 silbig.”

<sup>45</sup> SHT IV, note 7: “Lies *tejaḥpradhāno jano* bzw. *janaḥ*. Die beiden Längen werden auch vom Metrum verlangt.”



c: *yaś connāmayati* : *yaś cānnāmayati* ms. : *yaś cā-n=nāmayati*  
eds. SHT,<sup>46</sup>

d: *atyārtha°* : *ātyārtha°* ms.

About the one who encourages:

He who turns a feeble person averse to undertakings into someone who is mostly on fire, who urges on a person of lax endeavour depressed by present misfortune, who props up a person of wearied mind and dropped undertakings, him the Blessed One, [himself] the exceedingly encouraging one, called a [person who] is encouraging.

saṃpraharṣake . ||

tyāgenāti <◡ —><sup>47</sup> visarggamanasaṃ śīlena vṛttānvitaṃ  
durgamdhena śamena (r5) śāntamanasaṃ jñānena vidyātmakam\* <|>  
yaḥ saṃrādhayati pracārasaḍṣaṃ bhūtair yathārthair guṇais  
tan dhīmā(r6)n iha saṃpraharṣaka iti provāca vādīśvaraḥ <1 ||>

About the one who delights:

With liberality one who has a mind of letting go . . . , with morality one who disposes of (good) behaviour; with badly smelling (?)<sup>48</sup> tranquillity one whose mind is peaceful, with knowledge one whose nature is learning; who satisfies/gladdens someone of similar activity with real and genuine virtues, of him the lord of those who speak said: 'The wise one here is one who delights.'

śīlaviśuddhau ||

dau<ḥ>śīlyam prati — ◡ ◡ ◡ — | —(v1) ś. ḥ n. yat pīḍyate  
śāntenaiva pari .r. — ◡ su .ṛ —. ñ. n. na yad dhāryya[te] <|>

<sup>46</sup> SHT IV: 311, note 8: "Längung von *ca* metri causa." This is absolutely impossible.

<sup>47</sup> SHT IV: 311, note 9 indicates the omission.

<sup>48</sup> *durgandha* here makes no sense at all, but it is difficult to see the original attribute.

– .ṛ – ◡ ◡ – ◡ (v2) nopadhikṛtvāyaṃ<sup>49</sup> prādeśikaṃ<sup>50</sup> nāpi  
 ya<t><sup>51</sup>  
 tad vijñeyam akhaṇḍa{ḥ}m āryya ◡ ◡ laṃ – laṃ ◡ – .dh. ◡  
 × ||

About purity of morality:

[No translation possible.]

(v3) sarvvasyāśya carācarasya jagato bhūmi<ḥ> pratiṣṭhā yathā  
 sarvvasyāśya guṇārṇavasya mahataḥ śīlaṃ pra(v4)tiṣṭhā  
 tathā <|>

yasmāc chodhayitavyam arthyamatinā śrāmaṇyakāmena tad  
 dharmāṇām<sup>52</sup> iha śīlaṃ eva hi pa(v5)raṃ tasmim sthite te<sup>53</sup>  
 sthitāḥ . ||

As the earth is the support of this whole world, movable and im-  
 movable, so is morality the support for this whole great ocean of  
 virtues;<sup>54</sup> wherefore one with an intelligent mind and aiming for  
 the ascetic life should purify here exactly this supreme morality  
 among the dharmas; those are standing firm who stand on this.

<sup>49</sup> SHT IV: 311, note 11: “Der Pāda ist überzählig. Vor der ersten Zäsur ist eine Länge zuviel.” This must be wrong: the pāda is not hypermetrical, but *kṛ* should be short, not long.

<sup>50</sup> SHT IV: 311, note 12: “Lies *pradeśikaṃ*?” This would destroy the meter.

<sup>51</sup> Thus also eds. SHT; ms. *dharmāṇām*.

<sup>52</sup> Thus also eds. SHT; ms. *ta*.

<sup>53</sup> SHT IV, note 15: “Lies *te*.”

<sup>54</sup> Pādas a and b of this stanza are essentially the same as TDM 17.1.10 (a *Vaṃśastha*) and Bc 23.17 (preserved only in Tibetan; most likely an *Anuṣṭubh*):

*yathā pratiṣṭhā pṛthivī śarīṇām*  
*vanaspatīnām api vīrudhām api |*  
*tathā śubhānām api sarvākarmaṇām*  
*paraṃ pratiṣṭhā bhuvi śīlaṃ ucyate ||* TDM 17.1.10

*'byung po rgyu dang mi rgyu yi || rten ni ji ltar sa yin pa ||*  
*de ltar yon tan thams cad kyi || rten ni tshul khrims dam pa'o ||* Bc 23.17

śakaputraṃ copākhyāyāha ||

varam praveṣṭu<ṃ><sup>55</sup> jvalito hutāśano<sup>56</sup>  
 na caiva (v6) bhettuṃ cirarakṣitaṃ vrataṃ <|>  
 iheva dāhaḥ<sup>57</sup> kṣamam<sup>58</sup> akṣatasya me  
 cyutasya dharmā<sup>59</sup> na tu me puno punaḥ (1 ||)

Relating to Śakaputra,<sup>60</sup> it is said:

It is better to enter into a blazing fire than to break a vow which has been kept a long time. Burning is only here; it is endurable for me (whose vow is) unbroken; but when I am fallen from the Dharma, it is not again and again.<sup>61</sup>

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It is interesting to note that both *rgyu dang mi rgyu* and *yon tan* point to the Śārdūla-vikrīḍita verse above, while *dam pa'o* corresponds to *param* in the Vaṃśastha. The exact relationship between the three versions needs further investigation.

<sup>55</sup> Thus also eds. SHT.

<sup>56</sup> Read *jvalitaṃ hutāśanaṃ*?

<sup>57</sup> SHT refers to BHSD.

<sup>58</sup> *kṣama-m-akṣatasya* SHT IV: 312 with note 18: "Anstelle von *kṣamo=kṣatasya*? -m- wurde als Gleitkonsonant verwendet, um metrumsgerecht eine Silbe mehr zu haben." This is absolutely impossible in good poetry.

<sup>59</sup> Read *dharmā<n>*, "fallen from the dharma"?

<sup>60</sup> It is unknown to whom this refers.

<sup>61</sup> We have problems understanding the fourth pāda.

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# Nāgārjuna on *svabhāva*, *parabhāva*, *bhāva* and *abhāva*\*

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1. Richard Hayes once published an article called “Nāgārjuna’s Appeal” (Hayes 1994) in which he claimed that despite the fact that Nāgārjuna’s “philosophical writings seem to have fascinated a large number of modern scholars of Buddhism,” they “had relatively little effect on the course of subsequent Indian Buddhist philosophy” (Hayes 1994: 299) and “Nāgārjuna’s arguments, when examined closely, turn out to be fallacious and therefore not very convincing to a logically astute reader.” (Hayes 1994: 299–300) Later Hayes says, “... many of Nāgārjuna’s arguments are undermined by the informal fallacy of equivocation, that is, using a key term in different senses.” (Hayes 1994: 325) As for example, he thinks that Nāgārjuna takes the term *svabhāva* to mean both ‘a thing’s own nature or identity’ and ‘a thing’s independence’ and *parabhāva* to mean both ‘difference’ and ‘dependence.’ (Hayes 1994: 311–312) Then he states:

“When one reads Nāgārjuna’s argument in Sanskrit, it is not immediately obvious that the argument has taken advantage of an ambiguity in the key terms. But when one tries to translate his argument into some other language, such as English or Tibetan, one finds that it is almost impossible to translate his argument in a way that makes sense

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in translation. This is because the terms in the language of translation do not have precisely the same range of ambiguities as the words in the original Sanskrit. In English, we are forced to disambiguate, and in disambiguating, we end up spoiling the apparent integrity of the argument. (Hayes 1994: 312)”

His paper provoked several critical reactions from contemporary scholars of Indian (Buddhist) philosophy. For example, Johannes Bronkhorst objected to Hayes by showing that Nāgārjuna certainly influenced subsequent Indian Buddhist thinkers. (Bronkhorst 1996: 14ff). Of course, Bronkhorst is right but I do not think that Hayes was not aware of Nāgārjuna’s long lasting influence upon the subsequent Mahāyāna Buddhist thinkers. Probably he just wanted to make his paper provocative at its outset.

John Taber published a substantial criticism of Hayes’ paper (Taber 1998) in which he argued that (i) “Nāgārjuna employs *svabhāva* univocally, in the sense of ‘nature,’ ‘essence’ or more exactly (but awkwardly), ‘own-being,’ in the arguments in question,” (ii) elucidated in detail that the arguments of MMK chapter 15 are plausible, and (iii) indicated that what he refers to as “the principle of coexisting counterparts”<sup>1</sup> employed by Nāgārjuna in MMK is not really a fallacy as pointed out by Hayes. I share the same understanding of *svabhāva* with Taber and come to the same conclusion that Nāgārjuna did not commit the fallacy of equivocation in MMK chapter 15, although I find some cases of the fallacy of equivocation in other works attributed to Nāgārjuna (but not established as the genuine works of Nāgārjuna) such as the *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* and *Vigrahavyāvarttanī*.<sup>2</sup> Regarding “the principle of coexisting counterparts,” I shall briefly discuss it later.

Tom Tillemans also raised an objection to Hayes’ evaluation of Nāgārjuna’s arguments. (Tillemans 2016)<sup>3</sup> First, he admits that there are two

<sup>1</sup> Taber refers to D. S. Ruegg’s naming “the principle of the complementarity of binary concepts and terms” in Ruegg 1977.

<sup>2</sup> In those two works the author presents an argument that is later criticized by the *Nyāyasūtra* and Dignāga as a kind of ‘wrong objection’ (*jāti*) called *prāptya-prāptisama*. I do not criticize Nāgārjuna for his uses of what we think are fallacious arguments, for in the debate (*vāda*) tradition of his time it is permitted to employ any means in order to refute the opponents.

<sup>3</sup> This is a significantly different version of his earlier publication, “Trying to Be Fair

aspects of *svabhāva* in MMK, namely, ‘intrinsic-nature-as-findable-identity’<sup>4</sup> and ‘intrinsic-nature-as-independent-existence’ that correspond to Hayes’ *svabhāva*<sub>1</sub> ‘identity’ and *svabhāva*<sub>2</sub> ‘causal independence’ respectively. Then, depending on MMK 18.10 and 24.18, he argues that there is a very close link between the two aspects, namely, “*x* has independent existence *if and only if x* is analytically findable.” He concludes that it “looks rather doubtful that Nāgārjuna is guilty of the gross equivocation of which he is accused by Hayes.” (Tillemans 2016: 26)

In the rest of this paper, I would like to discuss the possible meanings of *svabhāva* and related terms and to analyze the main line of arguments of MMK chapter 15, so that I will be able to demonstrate that Nāgārjuna did not commit the fallacy of equivocation as far as that particular portion of MMK is concerned.

2. In order to show the multiple meanings of key words, *bhāva*, *abhāva*, *svabhāva* and *parabhāva*, Hayes has recourse to the three different meanings of verbal nouns formed by the suffix GHaÑ, viz. (i) the performance (*P*), (ii) the instrument (*I*) and (iii) the location (*L*) of an action. Thus, he presents the following range of meanings of those key words. I have simplified and modified his list and dropped his analysis of the term *anyathābhāva*.

<i>bhāva</i> <sub>(P)</sub> ‘existence’	<i>abhāva</i> <sub>(P)</sub> ‘absence or nonexistence’
<i>bhāva</i> <sub>(L)</sub> ‘an existent’	<i>abhāva</i> <sub>(L)</sub> ‘an absentee or a nonexistent’
<i>svabhāva</i> <sub>1(P)</sub> ‘the fact of being identical’	<i>parabhāva</i> <sub>1(P)</sub> ‘difference or otherness’
<i>svabhāva</i> <sub>1(I)</sub> ‘an essence or identity’	<i>parabhāva</i> <sub>1(I)</sub> ‘a differentia’
<i>svabhāva</i> <sub>1(L)</sub> ‘an identifiable thing’	<i>parabhāva</i> <sub>1(L)</sub> ‘another thing’
<i>svabhāva</i> <sub>2(P)</sub> ‘independence’	<i>parabhāva</i> <sub>2(P)</sub> ‘dependence’
<i>svabhāva</i> <sub>2(L)</sub> ‘an independent thing’	<i>parabhāva</i> <sub>2(L)</sub> ‘a dependent thing’

I accept Hayes’ analysis of *bhāva*, *abhāva*, *svabhāva*<sub>1</sub> and *parabhāva*<sub>1</sub> but I have reservations about his analysis of *svabhāva*<sub>2</sub> and *parabhāva*<sub>2</sub> because, as far as MMK 15 is concerned, I do not think that Nāgārjuna uses *svabhāva* in the

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to Mādhyamika Buddhism,” The University of Calgary, Numata Yehan Lecture in Buddhism, Winter 2001.

<sup>4</sup> Tillemans got the idea of ‘findable’ from the later Mādhyamika definition of



sense of ‘independence/an independent thing’ and *parabhāva* in the sense of ‘dependence/a dependent thing.’ It is true that he defines *svabhāva* as ‘not produced [by causes and conditions]’ and ‘not dependent on something else’ (MMK 15.2cd: *akṛtrimañ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca*); hence, it is possible to understand *svabhāva* as ‘intrinsic-nature-as-uncaused-independent-thing’ (following the style of Tillemans); however, I am not convinced that Nāgārjuna used *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* in the senses of Hayes’ *svabhāva*<sub>2</sub> and *parabhāva*<sub>2</sub> in MMK 15.

3. Before going on to discuss the uses or meanings of *svabhāva* and other terms in MMK 15, I would like to refer to Vasubandhu’s AKBh and to determine the meanings of *svabhāva* in Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. The system of Abhidharma constructed by Vasubandhu (the 4<sup>th</sup> to 5<sup>th</sup> century) is far advanced than that criticized by Nāgārjuna (the 2<sup>nd</sup> century); nevertheless, I believe it is still meaningful to discuss Vasubandhu’s uses of *svabhāva* in order to understand Nāgārjuna’s.

Seiji Kimura once examined the entire AKBh of both Sanskrit and Tibetan versions, together with Yaśomitra’s *Sphuṭārthā* and other commentaries, and came to the conclusion that Tibetan translators of AKBh such as Jinamitra and dPal brtsegs (800 C.E.) distinguished three meanings of *svabhāva*; accordingly, they adopted three different Tibetan translations, namely, (1) *rang bzhin* meaning ‘material’ (素材)—at the end of compounds, it means ‘consisting of’ (～から構成される)—, (2) *rang gi ngo bo* meaning ‘itself [distinguished from others both in time and space]’ (時間的にも空間的にも完全に他と区別された自分自身), and (3) *ngo bo nyid* meaning ‘common property/essence [to be utilized to classify *dharma*s]’ (分類の観点に応じた、共通の *svabhāva*).<sup>5</sup>

Following his lead and relying on the textual data collected by Kimura 2002, I once examined the usages of *svabhāva* in the AKBh and came up with the following four usages/meanings:

“(i) The ‘intrinsic nature’ shared by a group of *dharma*s that are classified into the same Abhidharmic category such as ‘defiled’/‘undefiled’ (*sāsrava/anāsrava*), ... In other words, it functions as the criterion for determining in which category a particular individual *dharma* should be

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*saṃvṛtisatya* as *avicāramanīya*.

<sup>5</sup> Kimura 2002; he also analyzed *svabhāva* in MMK (Kimura 2003).

included. Since there are multiple levels of Abhidharmic categorization, a given *dharma* is characterized by multiple *svabhāvas*. They cannot be regarded as intrinsic nature in the strict sense. ... In short, they are *svabhāvas* in the sense of 'category' or 'genus.'

(ii) The 'intrinsic nature' of an individual *dharma*, such as the 'solidity' of the earth element. ... Thus, every individual *dharma* has one unique *svabhāva* of its own that should be distinguished from the generic *svabhāvas* mentioned above. This unique *svabhāva* is regarded as intrinsic nature in the strict sense. ... In short, *svabhāva* in the strict sense means the unique intrinsic nature of an individual *dharma* and, hence, that individual *dharma* itself.

(iii) When it appears at the end of a *bahuvrīhi* compound that describes a particular item, it may mean 'consisting of.' ... Generally speaking, the sentence "X *Y-svabhāvaḥ*" means, "X is included in the category of Y (i.e., "X is Y")," "X's intrinsic nature/essence is Y," or "X consists of Y."

(iv) When it appears as a single noun, it may be used as the reflexive pronoun 'itself.' ... (Katsura 2011: 274)

Kimura's three meanings of *svabhāva* well correspond with my observations; namely, his understanding of (1) *rang bzhin* ('consisting of') is the same as my analysis of *svabhāva*(iii) ('consisting of'), (2) *rang gi ngo bo* ('itself') is the same as my *svabhāva*(iv) and (3) *ngo bo nyid* ('commonality') more or less corresponds with my *svabhāva*(i) ('intrinsic nature' shared by a group of *dharma*s'). I cannot find my *svabhāva*(ii) in Kimura's list but I am sure he will agree that the term *svabhāva* is used not only in the sense of the common characteristic but also in the sense of the characteristic unique to an individual *dharma* in Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma literature. In spite of our common understanding of the term *svabhāva* I am not convinced by Kimura's distribution of three meanings of *svabhāva* to the three Tibetan terms. I do not think that the Tibetan translators applied the three different choices of Tibetan words consistently and correctly. I would regard those three Tibetan terms as more or less synonymous.

Now, my *svabhāva*(i) and *svabhāva*(ii) 'an intrinsic nature' correspond to Hayes' *svabhāva*<sub>1(I)</sub> 'an essence or identity' and my *svabhāva*(iv) 'itself' somehow corresponds to his *svabhāva*<sub>1(L)</sub> 'an identifiable thing' and *svabhāva*<sub>2(L)</sub> 'an independent thing.'

4. Now I would like to examine the meanings of *bhāva*, *abhāva*, *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* in MMK chapter 15. In this chapter (i) Hayes distinguishes two meanings of the term *bhāva*, namely, ‘existence’ (vv. 4, 6, 7) and ‘an existent’ (v. 5) but Siderits and Katsura (2013) take it to mean ‘an existent’ (vv. 4, 5, 6, 7) only. (ii) Regarding *abhāva*, Hayes consistently takes it to mean ‘absence’ (vv. 3, 5, 6, 7), while we recognize two meanings, namely, ‘nonexistence’ (v. 3) and ‘nonexistent’ (v. 5, 6, 7). (iii) Hayes distinguishes four meanings for *svabhāva*, namely, ‘an independent thing’ (v. 1, 2), ‘an identifiable thing’ (v. 3a), ‘identity’ (v. 3c, 6), and ‘independence’ (v. 4), while we consistently take it to mean ‘intrinsic nature’ (*svabhāva*<sub>2</sub>, vv. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6). (iv) Finally, Hayes distinguishes four meanings for *parabhāva*, namely, ‘difference’ (vv. 3b, 6), ‘a different thing’ (v. 3c), ‘a differentia’ (v. 3d) and ‘dependence’ (v. 4), while we take it to mean ‘extrinsic nature’ (*parabhāva*<sub>2</sub>, vv. 3, 4, 6) with an exception of ‘another existent’ (*parabhāva*<sub>1</sub>, v. 3c). The main difference between Hayes and us lies whether or not we interpret *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* as ‘independence’ and ‘dependence.’

Another key term *prakṛti* (vv. 8, 9) seems to be an equivalent of his *svabhāva*<sub>1(1)</sub> ‘essence,’ which we translate as ‘intrinsic nature.’ However, Hayes translates *prakṛti* as ‘nature,’ while we render it as ‘essential nature.’ He translates the phrase ‘*astitvam prakṛtyā*’ (v. 8) as ‘exist by nature,’ while we translate it as ‘exist by essential nature.’ However, regarding the similar phrase ‘*asti svabhāvena*’ (v. 11), Hayes translates it ‘exist independently,’ by identifying this *svabhāva* as *svabhāva*<sub>2(P)</sub> ‘independence,’ while we translate it as ‘exist by its intrinsic nature.’ I do not see any reason to differentiate the two parallel phrases ‘*asti prakṛtyā*’ and ‘*asti svabhāvena*’; on the contrary, I believe, that parallelism indicates that Nāgārjuna assumed the equivalence between *svabhāva* and *prakṛti*, though *svabhāva* is originally a unique term of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, which is later shared by other Abhidharma systems such as Theravāda’s, while *prakṛti* is a well-known technical term of the Sāṃkhya system and probably has Brahmanical origin.<sup>6</sup>

5. Regarding *bhāva*, it occurs in plural form at least 14 times in MMK, and twice it is modified by the word ‘*sarva*’, which seems to suggest that *bhāva*

<sup>6</sup> The idea of *svabhāva* as ‘intrinsic nature’ is shared by the *svabhāva* of the Lokāyata/Cārvāka and *prakṛti* as ‘nature’ (自然) is found in Mahāyāna Buddhist

acts as a substitute of *dharma* in MMK.<sup>7</sup> I assume that for Nāgārjuna one of the basic meanings of *bhāva* is *dharma*; or rather, he takes Abhidharmic *dharma* as *bhāva* ‘an existent thing,’ which goes very well with Abhidharmic notion of ultimately existent *dharma* in contrast with conventionally existent concept (*prajñapti*).<sup>8</sup> Another meaning of *bhāva* is ‘the state of being existent,’ namely, ‘existence.’ Then *abhāva*, which is in the relation of mutual dependence/expectation (*parasparāpekṣā*) with *bhāva*, must mean ‘a nonexistent thing’ as well as ‘nonexistence.’

Now, if we focus on one *svabhāva* (intrinsic nature/identity) such as ‘solidity’ (*khara*), we can distinguish one thing (*dharma*) such as the earth element (*prthivī-dhātu*) from the other things (i.e., the rest of *dharma*s) such as the water element, the fire element and the wind element. In this connection the thing focused on may be called *svabhāva* (a thing/*dharma* itself) in contrast with the other things that may be called *parabhāva*. It is to be noted that *svabhāva* and *parabhāva*(s) are in the relation of mutual dependence/expectation.

‘a thing itself’ <i>svabhāva</i> <sub>I</sub>	vs.	‘intrinsic nature/identity’ <i>svabhāva</i> <sub>II</sub>
<i>dharma</i> = <i>bhāva</i> = <i>svabhāva</i> <sub>I</sub>		
<i>dharma</i> A = <i>prthivī-dhātu</i>		<i>svabhāva</i> <sub>II</sub> = <i>khara</i>
<i>dharma</i> B = <i>ab-dhātu</i>		<i>svabhāva</i> <sub>II</sub> = <i>sneha</i>
<i>dharma</i> C = <i>tejo-dhātu</i>		<i>svabhāva</i> <sub>II</sub> = <i>uṣṇatā</i>
<i>dharma</i> D = <i>vāyu-dhātu</i>		<i>svabhāva</i> <sub>II</sub> = <i>īraṇā</i>

scriptures.

<sup>7</sup> Kumārajīva in his Chinese translation of MMK puts *bhāva* (in plural form) into Chinese 諸法, 一切法 or 一切諸法 and once 一切萬物 (MMK 12.9/10). Apparently he takes *bhāva* to be an equivalent of *dharma* because *dharma* occurs in plural form at least three times in MMK and he puts it into 諸法, 一切法 or 一切諸法 just like *bhāva*; he once translates the singular *dharma* by 一切法 (MMK 24.19). See Saigusa 1965.

Prof. Akira Saito kindly informed me that the *Akutobhayā* identifies *bhāva* (in MMK 1.1) with *dharma*: *ḍngos po zhes bya ba ni/ chos rnams te ḍngos po zhes bya ba'i sgras ni 'di mu stegs can thams cad dang thun mong ngo zhes bya bar sbyar ro//* (Derge Tsa 33a 5) The author of *Akutobhayā* seems to justify the use of *bhāva* in place of *dharma* because non-Buddhists also use the term *bhāva*.

<sup>8</sup> See Katsura 1976.

***bhāva*** ----- (*parasparāpekṣā*) ----- ***a-bhāva***  
 (existent things=*dharmas*/existence) (nonexistent things/  
 nonexistence)

***sva-bhāva<sub>I</sub>*** --- (*parasparāpekṣā*) --- ***para-bhāva<sub>I</sub>***  
 (a thing=*dharma* A itself) (other things=*dharmas* B, C, D, etc.)

***svabhāva<sub>II</sub>*** (intrinsic nature, identity)      ***svabhāva<sub>II</sub>*** (intrinsic natures, identities)  
***=parabhāva<sub>II</sub>*** (extrinsic nature, difference)      ***=parabhāva<sub>II</sub>*** (extrinsic natures, differences)  
 for *dharmas* B, C, D, etc.      for *dharma* A

<sup>9</sup> It is to be noted that Nāgārjuna does not use the term *parasparāpekṣā* in MMK; it played an important role in Candrakīrti's understanding of Nāgārjuna's thought. See Ozawa 2008.

“the principle of coexisting counterparts clearly seems erroneous, at least from the standpoint of common sense.” (Taber 1998: 233), but having identified ‘mutual dependence’ with ‘dependent origination’ (*pratītyasamutpāda*) (Taber 1998: 235), he concludes that Nāgārjuna adhered to the principle of coexisting counterparts “because he ultimately thought that the perspective of common sense must be overthrown. In that case, however, his philosophy can hardly be criticized from that standpoint.” (Taber 1998: 238)<sup>10</sup> I basically agree with Taber’s analysis except for his understanding that dependent origination is equated with mutual dependence. In the works attributed to Nāgārjuna other than MMK as well as in the works of later Mādhyamika thinkers we may find such an understanding of dependent origination but as far as MMK is concerned, I do not think that Nāgārjuna identified dependent origination with mutual dependence. In any case, as far as MMK is concerned, since *bhāva* and *abhāva* as well as *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* are respectively in relation of mutual dependence, they are mere concepts and ultimately unreal.

6. Now, let me present the main thread of arguments in MMK chapter 15. It is to be noted at the outset that Nāgārjuna must have known the basic doctrines of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma, namely, (i) all [conditioned] *dharma*s are originated depending upon causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpanna*); hence, they are not eternal; (ii) all *dharma*s possess their own intrinsic nature (*svabhāva<sub>II</sub>*) that is not produced by causes and conditions, i.e., not dependent upon something else (MMK 15.2); and as I noted before, (iii) there is no difference between a *dharma* (i.e., *svabhāva<sub>I</sub>*) and its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva<sub>II</sub>*).

Nāgārjuna first points out the inconsistency of the concept of *svabhāva<sub>II</sub>* (vv. 1, 2). He implicitly assumes that all *dharma*s are causally conditioned and that there is no difference between a *dharma* and its intrinsic nature (*svabhāva<sub>II</sub>*). He states that if an intrinsic nature were produced, by definition it could not be called ‘intrinsic nature.’ Then he implicitly concludes that there is no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva<sub>II</sub>*) because it is not produced by causes and conditions.

<sup>10</sup> When I presented this paper on some other occasion, Prof. Hiroshi Marui pointed out that Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of two *satyas* presented in MMK 24.8–10, which

In this connection I would like to refer to one well-known verse quoted in the AKBh 5.27b<sub>2</sub>-c:

*svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityaś ca neṣyate |*  
*na ca svabhāvād bhāvo 'nyo vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam |*

*svabhāva* exists at all times, but it is not admitted that *bhāva* is eternal, yet *bhāva* is not different from *svabhāva*—apparently, an act of *īśvara*!

The verse ridicules the core doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins according to which *dharma*s exist all the time; in other words, *dharma*s of the past, present and future are real existents. It states that *svabhāva* exists all the time (in other words, it is eternal) but *bhāva* (i.e. *dharma*) is not admitted to be eternal, yet *bhāva* is not different from *svabhāva*. In this way the verse implicitly points out the inconsistency between *svabhāva* and *bhāva* (i.e., *dharma*), which is precisely what Nāgārjuna meant in MMK 15.1–2.

In order to avoid such a criticism the Sarvāstivādins adopt a peculiar interpretation of ‘time period’ (*adhvaṇ*), viz. the past, present and future; namely, the three time periods are three ‘stages’ (*avasthā*) that conditioned *dharma*s go through. The future *dharma*s exist in the future stage and when causes and conditions for the origination of a certain *dharma* are available at hand, that *dharma* goes into the present stage. That *dharma* exists in the present stage only for one moment (*kṣaṇa*) and immediately goes into the past stage. Those *dharma*s that went through the present stage exist in the past stage eternally. In this interpretation, *dharma*s keep their intrinsic nature or identity throughout the three time periods; therefore, the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) that does not change can be regarded as eternal. Non-eternity of *dharma*s is explained by the momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of *dharma*s; namely, they exist in the present stage only for one moment. Sarvāstivādins distinguish the three time periods by existence and nonexistence of a function/operation (*kāritra*) of *dharma*s; namely, only the present *dharma*s possess and activate their function, while the *dharma*s in the future period are those which have not yet activated their own function and those in the past period have already activated their function. In this way Sarvāstivādins try to solve the riddle but it is still difficult to maintain the identity between *dharma* and its *svabhāva*.

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values *saṃvṛtisatya* and *vyavahāra*, may contradict Taber’s last assessment.

Nāgārjuna proceeds to deny 'extrinsic nature' (*parabhāva*<sub>II</sub>) on the ground of nonexistence of 'intrinsic nature' (*svabhāva*<sub>II</sub>) because, as I showed before, 'extrinsic nature' (*parabhāva*<sub>II</sub>) is an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*<sub>II</sub>) of another thing (*parabhāva*<sub>I</sub>) by definition (v. 3). In this connection, though the term *parabhāva* is used in two different meanings, I do not consider that this is the case of equivocation because there is no essential difference between *parabhāva*<sub>I</sub> (another thing) and *parabhāva*<sub>II</sub> (its intrinsic nature).

Next he argues that there is no *bhāva* on the ground of nonexistence of *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* (v. 4); in other words, there is nothing without intrinsic and extrinsic natures, which makes sense when we take into account the well-known Sarvāstivādin definition of *dharma* (i.e., *bhāva*), namely, that which possesses intrinsic nature is *dharma*. On second thought, however, if we consider the chart I presented above *bhāvas* (things) are subdivided into *svabhāva*<sub>1</sub> (a thing itself) and *parabhāva*<sub>1</sub> (other things) and there is no third party; hence, it is very easy to understand that in the absence of *svabhāva*<sub>1</sub> and *parabhāva*<sub>1</sub> there is no *bhāva*. If we adopt the second interpretation, we see the shift of meanings of *svabhāva* and *parabhāva* from v. 3 to v. 4 but again I do not consider that this is a case of equivocation because there is no essential difference between *svabhāva*<sub>1</sub> and *svabhāva*<sub>II</sub> as well as between *parabhāva*<sub>1</sub> and *parabhāva*<sub>II</sub>.

Then Nāgārjuna goes on to say that there is no *abhāva* in the absence of *bhāva* (an existent thing) because the former is the alteration or change of state (*anyathābhāva*) of the latter (v. 5). In this connection, as Hayes puts it, it might make better sense to think of *abhāva* not as 'nonexistence of an existent thing' but as the alteration or change of the state of an existent thing. However, I think *abhāva* must mean 'nonexistent thing' in opposition to 'existent thing' (*bhāva*) to be consistent with the preceding verse 4 and to lead to the following conclusion.

Nāgārjuna concludes that those who see intrinsic nature, extrinsic nature, existent and nonexistent do not see the truth of the Buddha's teachings because the Buddha denied both existence and nonexistence in the Instruction to Kātyāyana. (vv. 6, 7)

In the rest of MMK chapter 15 he points out that we cannot explain the concept of alteration or change of the state (*anyathābhāva*) whether we accept 'intrinsic nature' (*prakṛti* = *svabhāva*) or not. (vv. 8, 9) He concludes that we



should not rely on existence and nonexistence because they lead to eternalism and annihilation respectively. (vv. 10, 11)

7. Now I would like to present some observations from Chinese and Tibetan translations. There are at least three different Chinese translations of MMK by Kumārajīva (Taisho 1564), Prabhākaramitra (Taisho 1566) and Fahu (法護) (available at CBETA<sup>11</sup>). They translate *svabhāva*, *parabhāva*, *bhāva* and *abhāva* more or less consistently. Namely, (i) Kumārajīva translates *svabhāva* by 性 (vv. 1, 2), 自性 (vv. 3, 4, 6), and 定性 (v. 11). Prabhākaramitra translates it by 自性 except for v. 6 where he translates it simply by 自. Fahu always translates it by 自性. (ii) They translate *parabhāva* by 他性 except for v. 6 where Prabhākaramitra translates it simply by 他. (iii) Kumārajīva translates *bhāva* by 有法 (vv. 4, 5) and 有 (vv. 5, 6, 7). Prabhākaramitra translates it by 有法 (vv. 4, 7) and 有體 (vv. 5, 6). Fahu translates it by 有法 (vv. 4, 5), 有 (v. 5, 7) and 有體 (v. 6). (iv) Kumārajīva translates *abhāva* by 無 (vv. 5, 6, 7). Prabhākaramitra and Fahu translate it by 無法 (v. 5), 無體 (vv. 5, 6) and 無 (v. 7).

In summary, *svabhāva* is translated by 自性=性=定性 (an intrinsic nature), *parabhāva* by 他性=他 (an extrinsic nature/another object), *bhāva* by 有法=有體=有 (an existent nature/object), and *abhāva* by 無性=無體=無 (a nonexistent nature/object). Furthermore, (v) Kumārajīva translates *prakṛti* by 性, Prabhākaramitra by 自性 and Fahu by 自體 in vv. 8 and 9, which seems to indicate that they take *svabhāva* and *prakṛti* as synonymous.

There are two Tibetan translations of MMK by Klu'i rgyal mtshan (Derge 3853) and Nyi ma grags (Derge 3860). They translate those four keywords quite consistently. Namely, (i) Klu'i rgyal mtshan translates *svabhāva* by *ngo bo nyid* (an essential nature) except for v. 6 where he translates it by *ngos nyid*, while Nyi ma grags always translates it by *rang bzhin* (an intrinsic nature).<sup>12</sup>

<sup>11</sup> <https://cbetaonline.dila.edu.tw> (last accessed 30 June 2023)

<sup>12</sup> I cannot tell the subtle difference between *ngo bo nyid* and *rang bzhin* in Tibetan language. Prof. Seiji Kimura suggested that Nyi ma grags as the translator of the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti made a change from *ngo bo nyid* to *rang bzhin* probably under the influence of Candrakīrti's understanding of *svabhāva*. See Kimura 2003: 56. By the way Bhāviveka, commenting upon MMK 15.1ab, says: *ngo bo nyid (svabhāva) ni rang gi ngo bo ste, rang gi bdag nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go* (Derge No. 3853, 157b4).

(ii) They always translate *parabhāva* by *gzhan gyi dngos po* (or *ghzan dngos*, another object), *bhāva* by *dngos po* (an existent object), and *abhāva* by *dngos med* (a nonexistent object).<sup>13</sup> (iii) Regarding *prakṛti*, they translate it by *rang bzhin*; thus, it is clear that Nyi ma grags take *svabhāva* and *prakṛti* synonymous. It is interesting that Tibetan translators do not understand *parabhāva* as ‘an extrinsic nature’ (*gzhan gyi ngo bo nyid*) but as ‘another object’ (*gzhan gyi dngos po*).

Finally the Tibetan translation of verse 6 deserves special attention because Klu’i rgyal mtshan translates *svabhāva* not by his usual *ngo bo nyid* but by *dngos nyid*—Nyi ma grags translates it by *rang bzhin* as usual.

*gang dag dngos nyid*<sup>14</sup> *gzhan dngos dang* ||  
*dngos dang dngos med nyid lta ba* ||  
*de dag sangs rgyas bstan pa la* ||  
*de nyid mthong ba ma yin no* || 6 ||  
*(svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvaṃ eva ca |*  
*ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāsane* || 6 || )

The reason why Klu’i rgyal mtshan adopts a peculiar translation in this verse seems to be apparent; he wants to keep the same translation *dngos* for *bhāva* of all the four Sanskrit terms, viz., *sva-bhāva*, *para-bhāva*, *bhāva* and *a-bhāva* in this particular verse. However, his strategy of changing the translation of *sva-bhāva* from *ngo bo nyid* to *dngos nyid* can be accused by Hayes of committing a fallacy of equivocation. I quote the three English translations of the above verse in order to show how difficult it is for modern Buddhist scholars to come to the same understanding of Nāgārjuna’s thought.

In any case, there may be no essential difference among Tibetan terms such as *rang bzhin*, *ngo bo nyid*, *ngo bo* and *rang gi ngo bo*, as Prof. Hiroshi Nemoto once noted with reference to Tsong kha pa’s usages of those terms. See Nemoto (2016: 68, fn. 1).

<sup>13</sup> Garfield adopts different English phrases for *gzhan gyi dngos po* according to his understanding of the relevant verses; namely, ‘difference in entities’ and ‘entity of difference’ (v. 3), ‘otherness-essence’ (v. 4) and ‘essential difference’ (v. 6), which verifies Hayes’ opinion that there is the difficulty in translating MMK chapter 15. Regarding *dngos* and *dngos med*, Garfield puts them into ‘entity’ and ‘nonentity’ (vv. 4, 5, 6) or ‘reality’ and ‘unreality’ (v. 7). Thus, Tibetan translators, Garfield and I seem to share the same consistent understanding of the terms *bhāva* and *abhāva*.

<sup>14</sup> Nyi ma grags: *rang bzhin*.

Hayes: They who perceive **identity, difference, presence** and **absence** do not perceive the truth in the Buddha's instruction.

Garfield: Those who see **essence** and **essential difference** and **entities** and **nonentities**, they do not see the truth taught by the Buddha.

Siderits & Katsura: **Intrinsic nature** and **extrinsic nature, existent** and **nonexistent**—who see these do not see the truth of the Buddha's teachings.

## 8. Conclusions

Regarding Hayes' hypothesis that Nāgārjuna committed a fallacy of equivocation in MMK chapter 15, I do not agree with him. Nonetheless, as Robinson and Hayes pointed out, I think Nāgārjuna committed logical fallacies such as equivocation on other occasions because he was active a long time before Dignāga established a sophisticated system of Buddhist logic.

Hayes is right to point out that it is difficult to find the good equivalents for those key words in other languages because of the lack of the range of meanings in translation. For example, Tibetan translation of *gzhan dngos* or *gzhan gyi dngos po* for *parabhāva* can mean 'another thing or another existent' but I do not think it can mean 'extrinsic nature or otherness' which is the core meaning of *parabhāva*. But Tibetan translations *yod pa* and *med pa* for *bhāva* and *abhāva* seem to carry more or less the same range of meanings of those Sanskrit terms, viz. 'existent' and 'existence,' and 'nonexistent' and 'nonexistence.'

Finally, regarding the key word *svabhāva*, I think Nāgārjuna had the precise understanding of the Sarvāstivādin concept of *svabhāva* together with its problematic character.

## Appendix

In this appendix, the following abbreviations are used:

H = Hayes 1994

S & K = Siderits, M. and Katsura, S. 2013

G = Garfield 1995

Ku = Kumārajīva's Chinese translation. Taisho 1564.

Pra = Prabhākaramitra's Chinese translation. Taisho 1566

Fa = Fahu's (法護) Chinese Translation. CBETA.

Taber (in footnotes) = Taber 1998.

Nyi ma grags = Nyi ma grags's Tibetan Translation. Derge 3860.

### Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Chapter 15: *bhāvābhāva-/svabhāva-parīkṣā*

*na sambhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ |*  
*hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet || 1 ||*

H: Birth of **an independent thing** from causes and conditions is not reasonable. **An independent thing** born from causes and conditions would be a fabrication.

S & K: It is not correct to say that **intrinsic nature** is produced by means of causes and conditions. **An intrinsic nature** that was produced by causes and conditions would be a product.<sup>15</sup>

*ngo bo nyid ni rgyu rkyen las*<sup>16</sup> || 'byung bar rigs pa ma yin no ||  
*rgyu dang rkyen las byung ba yi* || *ngo bo nyid ni byas par 'gyur*<sup>17</sup> || 1 ||

G: **Essence** arising from causes and conditions makes no sense. If **essence** came from causes and conditions, then it would be fabricated.

Ku: 衆緣中有性 是事則不然 性從衆緣出 即名為作法

Pra: 法若有自性 從緣起不然 若從因緣起 自性是作法

Fa: 從因緣和合 諸法即無生 若從因緣生 即自性有作

*svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham |*  
*akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca || 2 ||*

H: But how could **an independent thing** be called a fabrication, given that **an independent thing** is not a fabrication and is independent of anything else?

<sup>15</sup> Taber: The arising of **own-being/essence** from causal conditions is not possible. **An essence** that has arisen from causal conditions would be caused (*kṛtaka*).

<sup>16</sup> Nyi ma grags: *rang bzhin rgyu dang rkyen las ni* ||

<sup>17</sup> Nyi ma grags: *rang bzhin byas pa can du 'gyur* ||

S&K: But how could there ever be **an intrinsic nature** that is a product?  
For **intrinsic nature** is not adventitious, nor is it dependent on something else.<sup>18</sup>

*ngo bo nyid ni byas pa zhes*<sup>19</sup> | *ji lta bur na rung bar 'gyur* ||  
*ngo bo nyid ni bcos min dang*<sup>20</sup> || *gzhan la ltos pa med pa yin* || 2 ||

G: How could it be appropriate for fabricated **essence** to come to be?  
**Essence** itself is not artificial and does not depend on another.

Ku: 性若是作者 云何有此義 性名為無作 不待異法成

Pra: 若有自性者 云何當可作

Fa: 自性名作法 云何當可得 自性無虛假 離他法所成

*kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati* |  
*svabhāvaḥ parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate* || 3 ||

H: How, in the **absence of an identifiable thing**, could there be a **difference**, given that the **identity of a different thing** is called a **differentia**?

S&K: Given the **nonexistence of intrinsic nature**, how will there be **extrinsic nature**? For **extrinsic nature** is said to be **the intrinsic nature of another existent**.<sup>21</sup>

*ngo bo nyid ni yod min na*<sup>22</sup> ||  
*gzhan gyi dngos po ga la yod* ||  
*gzhan gyi dngos po'i ngo bo nyid*<sup>23</sup> ||  
*gzhan gyi dngos po yin zhes brjod* || 3 ||

G: If there is no **essence**, how can there be **difference in entities**?  
The **essence of difference in entities** is what is called **the entity of difference**.

<sup>18</sup> Taber: For how could there be **an essence** which is caused? For **an essence** is uncaused and not dependent on anything else.

<sup>19</sup> Nyi ma grags: *rang bzhin byas pa can zhes byar* ||

<sup>20</sup> Nyi ma grags: *rang bzhin dag ni bcos min dang* ||

<sup>21</sup> Taber: How, in the **absence of an essence**, will there be other-being? For **other-being** is said to be **the essence of that which is other**.

<sup>22</sup> Nyi ma grags: *rang bzhin yod pa ma yin na* ||

<sup>23</sup> Nyi ma grags: *gzhan gyi dngos po'i rang bzhin ni* ||

Ku: 法若無自性 云何有他性 自性於他性 亦名為他性  
 Pra: 法既無自性 云何有他性  
 Fa: 若法無自性 云何見他性 自性於他性 亦名為他性

*svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām ṛte bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ |*  
*svabhāve parabhāve ca sati bhāvo hi sidhyati || 4 ||*

H: How can there be **existence** without either **independence** or **dependence**, given that **existence** is established when there is either **independence** or **dependence**?

S&K: Further, without **intrinsic nature** and **extrinsic nature** how can there be **an existent**? For **an existent** is established given the existence of either **intrinsic nature** or **extrinsic nature**.

*ngo bo nyid dang gzhan dngos dag*<sup>24</sup> | *ma gtogs dngos po ga la yod ||*  
*ngo bo nyid dang gzhan dngos dag*<sup>25</sup> | *yod na dngos po 'grub par 'gyur || 4 ||*

G: Without having **essence** or **otherness-essence**, how can there be **entities**? If there are **essences** and **entities** (*sic*) **entities** are established.

Ku: 離自性他性 何得更有法 若有自他性 諸法則得成  
 Pra: 自他性已遣 何處復有法  
 Fa: 離自性他性 復云何有法 若有自他性 即諸法得成

*bhāvasya ced aprasiddhir abhāvo naiva sidhyati |*  
*bhāvasya hy anyathābhāvam abhāvam bruvate janāḥ || 5 ||*

H: If **an existent** is not established, **an absence** is certainly not established, given that people call **the change of state** of **an existent** its ceasing to be **present**.

S&K: If **the existent** is unestablished, then **the nonexistent** too is not established. For people proclaim **the nonexistent** to be **the alteration** of **the existent**

*gal te dngos po ma grub na || dngos med 'grub par mi 'gyur ro ||*  
*dngos po gzhan du 'gyur ba ni || dngos med yin par skye bo smra || 5 ||*

<sup>24</sup> Nyi ma grags: *rang bzhin dang ni gzhan dngos dag ||*

<sup>25</sup> Nyi ma grags: *rang bzhin dang ni gzhan dngos dag ||*

G: If **the entity** is not established, **a nonentity** is not established. **An entity** that has **become different** is **a nonentity**, people say.

Ku: 有若不成者 無云何可成 因有有法故 有壞名為無  
 Pra: 有體既不立 無法云何成 此法體異故 世人名無體  
 Fa: 有法若不成 無法亦不成 有壞名為無 世人說無體

*svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvaṃ eva ca |*  
*ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāsane || 6 ||*

H: They who perceive **identity**, **difference**, **presence** and **absence** do not perceive the truth in the Buddha's instruction.

S&K: **Intrinsic nature** and **extrinsic nature**, **existent** and **nonexistent** – who see these do not see the truth of the Buddha's teachings.

*gang dag dngos nyid gzhan dngos dang<sup>26</sup> ||*  
*dngos dang dngos med nyid lta ba ||*  
*de dag sangs rgyas bstan pa la ||*  
*de nyid mthong ba ma yin no || 6 ||*

G: Those who see **essence** and **essential difference** and **entities** and **nonentities**, they do not see the truth taught by the Buddha.

Ku: 若人見有無 見自性他性 如是則不見 佛法真實義  
 Pra: 若人見自他 及有體無體 彼則不能見 如來真實法  
 Fa: 若見自他性 或有體無體 彼則不能見 如來真實義

*kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam |*  
*pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā || 7 ||*

H: In the Kātyāyanāvavāda the Lord, who clearly saw **presence** and **absence**, denied both the view that one **exists** and the view that one **does not exist**.

S&K: In "The Instruction of Kātyāyana" both "it **exists**" and "it **does not exist**" are denied by the Blessed One, who clearly perceives **the existent** and **the nonexistent**.

<sup>26</sup> Nyi ma grags: *gang dag rang bzhin gzhan dngos dang ||*

*bcom ldan dngos dang dngos med pa* || *ston pas ka' tya' ya na yi* ||  
*gdams ngag las ni yod pa dang* || *med pa gnyi ga'ang dgag pa mdzad* || 7 ||

G: The Victorious One, through knowledge of **reality** and **unreality**, in the Discourse to Kātyāyana, refuted both “it is” and “it is not.”

Ku: 佛能滅有無 如化迦旃延 經中之所說 離有亦離無  
 Pra: 佛能如實觀 不著有無法 教授迦旃延 令離有無二  
 Fa: 世尊已成就 離有亦離無 教授迦旃延 應離有無二

*yady astitvaṃ prakṛtyā syān na bhaved asya nāstitā* |  
*prakṛter anyathābhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate* || 8 ||

H: If a thing were to **exist by nature**, then it could not **fail to exist**, for the change of state of **a nature** is certainly not possible.

S&K: If something **existed by essential nature**, then there would not be the **nonexistence** of such a thing. For it never holds that there is the alteration of **essential nature**.<sup>27</sup>

*gal te rang bzhin gyis yod na* || *de ni med nyid mi 'gyur ro* ||  
*rang bzhin gzhan du 'gyur ba ni* || *nam yang 'thad par mi 'gyur ro* || 8 ||

G: If existence were **through essence**, then there would be no **nonexistence**. A change in essence could never be tenable.

Ku: 若法實有性 後則不應異 性若有異相 是事終不然  
 Pr<sub>1a</sub>: 法若有自體 則不得言無 法有自性者 後異則不然  
 Pra<sub>2</sub>: 若有是自性 則不得言無 自性有異者 畢竟不應然  
 Fa: 若自性他性 或有體無體 自體有異性 法即不可得

*prakṛtau kasya vāsatyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati* |  
*prakṛtau kasya vā satyām anyathātvam bhaviṣyati* || 9 ||

H: And in the absence of **a nature**, what can undergo the process of change? On the other hand, if **a nature** is present, what can undergo the process of change?

<sup>27</sup> Taber: If something existed **by nature**, it could not not exist; for the changing of **the nature** [of a thing] never occurs at all.



S&K: If **essential nature** did not exist, of what would there be the fact of alteration? If **essential nature** did exist, of what would there be the fact of alteration?<sup>28</sup>

*rang bzhin yod pa ma yin na* || *gzhan du 'gyur ba gang gi yin* ||  
*rang bzhin yod pa yin na yang* || *gzhan du 'gyur bar ji ltar rung* || 9 ||

G: If there is no **essence**, what could become other? If there is **essence**, what could become other?

Ku: 若法實有性 云何而可異 若法實無性 云何而可異  
 Pra: 若無自性者 云何而可異 實無有一法 自性可得者  
 Fa: 若見彼異性 非諸法有體 云何自體無 異性當可得

*astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstīty ucchedadarśanam* |  
*tasmād astitvanāstīve nāśrayeta vicakṣaṇaḥ* || 10 ||

H: The notion of perpetuity is that one **exists**; the notion of destruction is that one **fails to exist**. Therefore, a wise person should not experience **existence** or **non-existence**.

S&K: “It **exists**”; is an eternalist view; “It **does not exist**” is an annihilationist idea. Therefore, the wise one should not have recourse to either **existence** or **nonexistence**.

*yod ces bya ba rtag par 'dzin* || *med ces bya ba chad par lta* ||  
*de'i phyir yod dang med pa la* || *mkhas pas gnas par mi bya'o* || 10 ||

G: To say “it **is**” is to grasp for permanence. To say “it **is not**” is to adopt the view of nihilism. Therefore, a wise person does not say “**exists**” or “does **not exist**.”

Ku: 定有則著常 定無則著斷 是故有智者不應著有無  
 Pra: 有者是常執 無者是斷見 是故有智者 不應依有無  
 Fa: 有即著常 言無即斷見 是故有無性 智者無依著

*asti yad dhi svabhāvena na tan nāstīti śāśvatam* |  
*nāstīdānīm abhūt pūrvam ity ucchedaḥ prasajyate* || 11 ||

<sup>28</sup> Taber: If there is no **nature** [of a thing] what could become otherwise? And if there

H: Perpetuity follows from believing that that which **exists independently** does not fail to exist; destruction follows from believing that that which existed before no longer exists.

S&K: For whatever **exists by its intrinsic nature** does not become nonexistent; eternalism then follows." It existed previously [but] it does not exist now"—from this, annihilation follows.

gang zhig **ngo bo nyid** yod pa<sup>29</sup> || de ni med pa min pas rtag || 11 ||  
sngon byung da ltar med ces pa || des na chad par thal bar 'gyur ||

G: "Whatever **exists through its essence** cannot be **nonexistent**" is eternalism. "It existed before but doesn't now" entails the error of nihilism.

Ku: 若法**有定性** 非**無**則是常 先有而今無 是則為斷滅  
Pra: 若法**有自性** 非**無**即是常 先有而今無 此即是斷過  
Fa: 若法**有自性** 非**無**即是常 先有而今無 此還成斷見

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- AKBh *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Vasubandhu). Ed. Pradhan, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*. Patna 1967.
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is a **nature** [of a thing] what could become otherwise?

<sup>29</sup> Nyi ma grags: gang zhig **rang bzhin gyis** yod pa ||

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# Efficacy Matters: Human Sacrifice, Karma and Asceticism in the Jantu-Upākhyāna of the *Mahābhārata*\*

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## 1. Introduction: The early religious history of South Asia

The religious history of late Vedic and early classical South Asia was dominated by the intellectual interaction of two religious complexes that, in their earlier phases of development, appear to have been—at least to some degree—independent of each other.<sup>1</sup> One of these complexes is the religion of Vedic Brahmanism that developed in the northwestern part of South

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\* The core of this article, i.e., my interpretation of the Jantu-Upākhyāna as establishing a hierarchy of competing religious causalities, is from a paper I presented many years ago at the “28. Deutscher Orientalistentag” in Bamberg on March 28, 2001. More elaborate versions of different aspects of the present paper were introduced at two consecutive workshops which shared the title “Fate, Freedom, and Prognostication in Indian Traditions” at the International Consortium for Research in the Humanities, Friedrich-Alexander University of Erlangen-Nürnberg and which took place on February 1, 2012 and December 4, 2013, and at the online symposium “Greater Magadha: Evaluation and Retrospective,” University of Alberta, Edmonton, May 7, 2021. I wish to thank the respective audiences for the fruitful and thought-provoking discussions on different aspects of my presentations. I would also like to express my gratitude to Thomas Oberlies for his valuable comments on the paper I presented in Bamberg, to Eugen Ciurtin, Hugo David, Elisa Freschi, Timothy Lubin, Louis Gonzales-Reimann<sup>†</sup>, Sven Sellmer, and Dominik Wujastyk for their helpful and thought-provoking suggestions relating to earlier drafts of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank Robert Leach and Tyler Neill for carefully proof reading advanced draft versions of this article. All remaining errors are my own.

<sup>1</sup> See also for the following part of sections 1.1 and 1.2, Lubin 2005, Bronkhorst 2007: 13–172, Samuel 2008: 39–190, and Bronkhorst 2011. Jaini (1970: 50–52) briefly expressed comparable ideas, but his attempt to trace śramaṇic religious practices to the Indus Valley Civilisation (Jaini 1970: 52) and his chronology of sources now have become outdated.

Asia from around ca. 1000 BCE. Vedic Brahmanism was practiced by the descendants of nomadic tribes that had entered the sub-continent in various long-distance migration streams centuries earlier and other, enculturated ethnicities.<sup>2</sup> The second known religious complex in the early history of South Asia comprises the *śramaṇa* religions that originated in the region of Greater Magadha at the time of the second urbanization of South Asia around 500 BCE. Of these religions, Jainism and Buddhism have survived to the present time.

### 1.1. Vedic Brahmanism

The Vedic religion was based on the belief that the world we live in and the post-mortem fate of man can be manipulated using complicated sacrificial rites.<sup>3</sup> These rituals had to be performed by religious specialists, the Brahman priests, who recited and sang verses from the Vedic hymns composed in Vedic Sanskrit on behalf of the master of sacrifice, who sponsored the ritual. It was believed that the master of sacrifice, i.e., the sacrificer, and not the officiating priest or priests, would experience the result of the ritual, i.e., material wealth and success in battle, rich progeny, or a pleasant existence in heaven after death.<sup>4</sup>

Within the complex of Vedic Brahmanism, new forms of sanctioned lifestyles and contemporary religious practices were designed from the eighth century BCE onwards.<sup>5</sup> Brahmans employed ascetic techniques like fasting, sexual abstinence, and enduring the heat of fires or the sun to gain power that they used for pragmatic purposes.<sup>6</sup> In due course, even people who did not permanently practice an ascetic lifestyle were believed to partic-

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<sup>2</sup> On the early immigration of the descendant of Steppe pastoralists into South Asia, see Narasimhan *et al.* 2019.

<sup>3</sup> The expression “post-mortem fate” is a translation of the Sanskrit term *gati*, adopted from Wezler (1979: 53, n. 25), who translated *gati* into German as “Nachschicksal.”

<sup>4</sup> For more details of the Vedic theory of ritual agency, see below, section 3.3.3., p. 171.

<sup>5</sup> Bronkhorst (2011: 74–97) argues that the institution of the hermitage (*āśrama*) was invented as an adaptation of the institution of shelters and monasteries of ascetics in the *śramaṇa* religion of Greater Magadha.

<sup>6</sup> On Vedic asceticism, see Bronkhorst 1995: 43–66 and 2007: 80–85.

ipate in the power accumulated by Vedic ascetics if they visited hermitages or other sanctuaries on tours of pilgrimages (*tīrthayātrā*).<sup>7</sup> Although the historical origins of pilgrimage in South Asia are unknown, Vassilkov (2002) has argued that this religious practice developed from a fusion of Vedic beliefs and practices with “pre-Aryan folk tradition” and that pilgrimage played an important role in the development of the *Mahābhārata*. In any case, the epic clearly states that the religious merit attainable through visiting pilgrimage sites surpasses that of Vedic sacrifices.<sup>8</sup>

## 1.2. Śramaṇa religions

The *śramaṇa* religions are based on worldviews that are markedly different from the worldview of Vedic Brahmanism. A significant shared characteristic of *śramaṇa* religions is their common belief in karma and rebirth. South Asian karma theories vary widely in their forms and contents and the purposes for which they were employed.<sup>9</sup> Despite this diversity, it may be possible to state a lowest common denominator of early karma theories, which comprises the following views:

- a) To be in the world is to experience a cycle of rebirths, i.e., a beginning-less series of successive births on earth or in one of several other realms of the universe.
- b) The realm of rebirth, the quality of experiences in each existence, and the duration of that existence are determined by actions (*karman*) in former lives and in the present existence.
- c) Suffering is inevitable within the cycle of rebirths.

<sup>7</sup> See Shee 1986: 322–326, especially 325f.: “On the whole, one might characterize the connection between *āśrama* and *tīrtha* ... as a kind of magical feedback effect: *tapas* occurs at an especially suitable location, which itself becomes even more effective because of the *tapas* that is practiced.” My translation; the German original reads as follows: “Im ganzen könnte man den Zusammenhang zwischen *āśrama* und *tīrtha* ... als eine Art magischen Rückkopplungseffekt bezeichnen: *tapas* findet an einem hierfür besonders geeigneten Ort statt, der seinerseits wiederum durch das praktizierte *tapas* noch wirksamer wird.”

<sup>8</sup> MBh 3.80.39, referenced in Jacobson 2013: 54.

<sup>9</sup> See Halbfass 1991: 294–297 and Halbfass 2000: 28.

- d) It is desirable and possible, at least for some human beings, to stop the process of further rebirths (for themselves) and to gain liberation from suffering.

Some references to various theories of karma and rebirths can also be traced in the literature of late Vedic Brahmanism. In the earlier prose Upaniṣads, references to karma and rebirth theories are rare and ambiguous, and not a single one involves a cosmology involving the notion of different heavens and hells along with the earth as possible regions of rebirth.<sup>10</sup> More apparent references to theories of karma and rebirths, still based on a different cosmology, appear only in the metrical Upaniṣads, as, for example, in the Muṇḍaka and the Kaṭha Upaniṣads.<sup>11</sup> The dating of these works is notoriously difficult, but the Muṇḍaka can probably be dated to the 1<sup>st</sup> century CE.<sup>12</sup> The fact that references to karma and rebirth theories are rare and ambiguous in the older Upaniṣads, and that more explicit references emerge only in later texts, makes it unlikely that these theories originated within the religious complex of Vedic Brahmanism. It is more probable, as Bronkhorst has argued, that in the religious complex of Vedic Brahmanism karma and rebirth theories were reluctantly accepted due to their new prominence.<sup>13</sup>

### 1.3. Early Hinduism

Soon after their foundations, Buddhist and Jaina communities established themselves with patronage and economic support from royal courts and influential town citizens.<sup>14</sup> This support facilitated their spread over large parts of South Asia and, in the case of Buddhism, far beyond. Within a relatively short period, *śramaṇa* religions managed to dominate the religious landscape of South Asia, and they kept this position for approximately seven hundred years.

<sup>10</sup> See Bronkhorst 2007: 112–126.

<sup>11</sup> On the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, see Cohen 2008: 193–212.

<sup>12</sup> On the dating of the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, see below, n. 74.

<sup>13</sup> See Bronkhorst 2007: 80–135.

<sup>14</sup> See also for the following section, Lubin 2005. It appears that the Jains were initially supported by lay followers much more than by royal courts. See Dundas 2006: 391.

The hegemony of *śramaṇa* religions was only challenged in the first century CE when some rulers allied themselves with the Brahmanical priesthood of their kingdoms in North India. It appears that the priesthood offered the new rulers two assets: first, legitimation for their rule over a region that the followers of Vedic Brahmanism claimed to be their natural territory, and second, control over powerful rituals that were designed to support and perpetuate this rule.

An important instrument in the hands of the Brahmins is their knowledge of the Veda, a collection of texts that the vast majority of the population was not even allowed to hear recited, much less study. It is their often secret knowledge that gives them the power to work for the good of the kingdom, its ruler and its population. It also allows them to do the contrary, and this is an important reason to humour them (Bronkhorst 2011: 52).

The alliance between rulers and the Brahmanical tradition was tightened in the fourth century CE. At this time, the Guptas founded the second pan-South Asian empire, established a strong patronage of the Brahmanical religion, and promoted the flourishing of what came to be classical Sanskrit culture.

However, the newly emerging Brahmanical religion was not a simple continuation of the Vedic religion but a new form of Brahmanism that had developed over several hundred years in constant contact and conflict with the *śramaṇa* religions of Jainism, Buddhism, and others. It is this religion that was later called Hinduism. The development from Vedic Brahmanism to Hinduism is quite well reflected in inscriptional and literary sources, of which the late Vedic literature, the Sanskrit epics, the Dharma literature, and a whole range of other normative and scientific literatures figure prominently.

## 2. The *Mahābhārata* as a historical source

Among these sources, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of the *Mahābhārata*, the great Sanskrit epic that, in its main plot, narrates the story of the struggle between two antagonistic groups of cousins—the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas—for kingship over the realm of Kuru.<sup>15</sup> This extensive literary

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<sup>15</sup> For a summary of the plot of the *Mahābhārata*, see Brockington 1998: 28–34.



composition can be expected to mirror the religious developments sketched above because its period of composition and compilation by anonymous authors agrees roughly with the transitional phase from Vedic Brahmanism to early classical Hinduism. The exact dating of the *Mahābhārata*, whether as a whole or in its individual parts, is a difficult task on which scholarly consensus has not yet been fully reached. Traditionally, the oldest strata of the *Mahābhārata* were assumed to go back to the time of ca. 400 BCE, which is approximately when the *śramaṇa* religions of Jainism and Buddhism originated,<sup>16</sup> whereas the final redaction of the great epic, according to this view, may have taken place at the time of the Gupta dynasty around 400 CE. This is the period for the development of the *Mahābhārata* that Hopkins first suggested in 1901, which agrees with the state of research presented by John Brockington (1998: 130–158). More recently, Oliver Hellwig (2019) has shown that it is possible to detect diachronic changes in classical Sanskrit with computer-based methods. Applying his approach to the Bhīṣmaparvan of the *Mahābhārata*, Hellwig arrived at a stratification of this part of the epic that corresponds roughly to the traditional dating of the epic with philological means, i.e., between ca. 300 BCE and 300 CE.<sup>17</sup> Even if the final word on the scholarly dating of the *Mahābhārata* has not yet been spoken, previous studies have already established that the *Mahābhārata* reflects the intellectual rivalry between Vedic Brahmanism and the *śramaṇa* religions from a Brahmanical perspective.<sup>18</sup>

As expected for a literary work with such a long compositional history, the literature contained in the *Mahābhārata* is heterogeneous. Interlaced in the main plot are parts of the epic belonging to two literary genres: the so-called didactic and the narrative parts. The didactic parts, which are generally taken to belong to a relatively late textual stratum of the *Mahābhārata*, contain extensive monologues intended to instruct the audience

<sup>16</sup> Traditionally, Pārśvanātha is believed to have lived 250 years before Mahāvīra Vardhamāna, but “in actuality the chronological distance between the two teachers may have been much less than two and a half centuries” (Dundas 2002: 32 with reference to Dhaky 1997: 3–4).

<sup>17</sup> Hellwig’s study thus contradicts Alf Hiltebeitel’s argument (2005) that the *Mahābhārata* was entirely composed in a few generations between 150 BCE and the year zero.

<sup>18</sup> See, for example, Fitzgerald 2006. See also Bowles 2007: 117–132.

on religious, philosophical, and other learned topics. Bronkhorst (2007: 97–111) analyzed a small part of this material from the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata*, concluding that the author(s) or redactor(s) of this passage were well aware of the religious differences between the complex of Vedic Brahmanism and that of the *śramaṇa* religions of Greater Magadha.

The narrative parts consist of legends and other narratives introduced in the main plot to entertain, keep the arc of suspense, or for other literary reasons. However, at least in the case of narratives dealing with ascetics and asceticism, education, instruction, and propaganda are additional essential motives for introducing narratives into the main plot.

Every narrative is silently committed to a certain intention, which is the reason for its being told. ... [T]he narrative parts of the epic ... are ... in a certain sense definitely 'didactic,' because they serve in an open or hidden fashion the purpose of instruction. In this way, every 'ascetic narrative' contains a punchline, a 'moral' that it propagates (Shee 1986: x).<sup>19</sup>

The intention of the *Mahābhārata* as a literary creation is to communicate the "fundamental values and categories" of the societies in which it was created (Fitzgerald 2010: 72).

The following sections of this article will analyze an ascetic narrative, the Jantu-Upākhyāna (MBh 3.127–28),<sup>20</sup> and argue that the message of this narrative is to negotiate the efficacy of causalities that determine post-mortem fates. The Jantu-Upākhyāna, like, for example, the story of the Contrary Mongoose discussed by Hegarty (2012: 7–13), "allows for the

<sup>19</sup> „Hinter jeder ‚Geschichte‘ steht unausgesprochen eine bestimmte Absicht, derentwegen sie erzählt wird. ... [D]ie erzählenden Partien des Epos ... sind ... in einem gewissen Sinne durchaus ‚didaktisch‘, denn in offener oder versteckter Form dienen sie der Belehrung. ... Auf diese Weise erhält jede ‚Asketen Geschichte‘ eine eigene Pointe, eine ‚Moral‘, die sie propagiert.“ My translation.

<sup>20</sup> Madeleine Biarreau overlooked the relevance that this narrative may have had for her study of the *Mahābhārata* and decided to pass over it with silence: “Nous passons sous silence les chapitres 127–129 qui, dans leur désir de concentrer en cet espace le plus saint de l’Inde un maximum d’événements, n’échappent pas à l’incohérence et ne dégagent donc rien d’essentiel” (Biarreau 2002, Vol. 1: 524).

staging of a religious debate by narrative means.”<sup>21</sup> Interpreted in this way, the narrative becomes a vital witness for the integration of an essential aspect of the *śramaṇa* religions into Brahmanism, which eventually led to the transformation of Vedic Brahmanism into classical Hinduism.<sup>22</sup>

### 3. The Jantu-Upākhyāna

The Jantu-Upākhyāna is one of nine narratives that occur in the third book of the *Mahābhārata*, the *Āraṇyakaparvan*, or, more precisely, in the *Tīrthayātrāparvan*, “‘the tour of the sacred sites’ (3.80–153), which is our earliest textual evidence for the practice of pilgrimage,”<sup>23</sup> except, possibly, the Lumbini inscription of the Maurya king Aśoka.<sup>24</sup> This section of the *Mahābhārata* narrates the events during a journey to sacred sites that four of the Pāṇḍava brothers undertake with their common wife Draupadī under the guidance and protection of the heavenly seer Lomaśa. The pilgrimage takes place after the Pāṇḍava brothers had failed to assert their rule over the kingdom of Kuru and had to go into exile. Arjuna travels to heaven to secure a decisive advantage for the Pāṇḍavas in their future fight against their enemies by obtaining heavenly weapons from his father, Indra. In the meantime, his four brothers and their wife visit sacred sites throughout the South Asian sub-continent to ritually empower themselves.<sup>25</sup> The destination of their journey is Mount Śveta, located in the Himālayas. It was there that the five Pāṇḍava brothers reunited.

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<sup>21</sup> Hegarty 2012: 9.

<sup>22</sup> The narrative appeared early in Western scholarship, in 1889, when Edward W. Hopkins took Jantu’s Tale literally and interpreted it as a factual account of a human sacrifice (Hopkins 1889: 138, and n. §). I am grateful to Eugen Ciurtin for drawing my attention to this reference.

<sup>23</sup> Brockington 1998: 30.

<sup>24</sup> Many thanks to Timothy Lubin for reminding me of this attestation of the practice of pilgrimage in an altogether different religious setting than the storyworld of the *Mahābhārata*.

<sup>25</sup> On pilgrimages in the *Mahābhārata*, see Oberlies 1995 and Bigger 1999: 51–53. On the meaning of the pilgrimage as a ritual empowerment of Yudhiṣṭhira, see Oberlies 1995: 120. For the role and significance of pilgrimage in the *Mahābhārata* for the public imagination in South Asian societies, see Hegarty 2012: 151–159.

During this journey of theirs, Lomaśa narrates to Yudhiṣṭhira the foundational myths connected to the sacred places they visited. These myths serve different purposes. Thomas Oberlies (1995: 121) emphasized the narratives' meaning for the main plot's development. In his analysis, the stories are meant to comfort the king after he had lost his kingdom. Notably, they deal with kings who had to cope with similarly miserable situations. The myths are also meant to explain the foundation of the respective sanctuaries through narratives of the marvelous, magical, or heroic acts that extraordinary figures carried out in remote antiquity. Moreover, since the travel party participates in the religious merit and supernatural power that the heroes of old had accumulated, the stories explain how and why the pilgrimage leads to the empowerment of the four Pāṇḍava brothers and their wife.

Towards the end of their journey, the Pāṇḍavas reach the river Yamunā.<sup>26</sup> In connection with the great sacrifices that had taken place on the banks of this river, Lomaśa mentions the two kings Māndhātṛ and Somaka. He then tells the foundation myths of the sanctuary of the first of these kings. In this narrative (MBh 3.126), King Yuvanāśva, after having accidentally drunk a potion that was meant to impregnate his wife, became pregnant himself and miraculously gave birth to a son. This son, King Māndhātṛ, had full command of Vedic knowledge, conquered the whole world, and literally covered it with Brahmanical fire altars. The narrative's message is the propagation of the incredible supernatural power of Brahmanical rituals and the benefits that kings may accrue from a close alliance with Brahman priests in connection with a new ideal form of royal sovereignty based on power rather than on ethical principles.<sup>27</sup>

The Jantu-Upākhyāna, which follows next, is part of the inventory of stories of the Tīrthayātrāparvan since an early stage of the written transmission of the *Mahābhārata*. The tale's relatively early date of composition can be established from the fact that the narrative is transmitted in all the manuscripts that were used for the critical edition of this part of the *Mahābhārata* with only minor textual differences. Moreover, the Jantu-Upākhyāna

<sup>26</sup> MBh 3.125.23.

<sup>27</sup> The story surely deserves comprehensive treatment in its own right (Maas in preparation), not least because a king with the same name is known from Buddhist narrative literature. Already Madelain Biarreau (2002: 530f.) noticed that the narrative shows traces of Buddhist influence.

is listed in the two divergent tables of contents that are part of the first book of the *Mahābhārata*, appearing as the critically edited text of MBh 1.2.114–1.2.120 and 1.2.128\*, respectively.<sup>28</sup> The table of contents in MBh 1.2.114–1.2.120 represents an earlier redactorial stage of the textual development of the *Mahābhārata* than the actual sequence of stories in the third book of the *Mahābhārata* according to the critically edited version. The Māndhātṛ- (MBh 3.16.1–126.43) and Yavakrīta-Upākhyāna (MBh 3.135.1–3.139.24), were added to the *Mahābhārata* in the course of its transmission as stories number five and nine, and the story of Śibi (3.131.1–3.131.32) was transposed from the second to the seventh position of the stories.

No.	Sequence of Upākhyānas in the Tīrthayātrāpārvaṇ	Sequence according to MBh 1.2.128*	Sequence according to MBh 1.2.114–120
1	Agastya 3.94–108	Agastya	Agastya Śibi
2	R̥ṣyaśṛṅga 3.110–113	R̥ṣyaśṛṅga	R̥ṣyaśṛṅga
3	Kārtavīrya 3.115–117	Kārtavīrya	Kārtavīrya
4	Sukanyā 3.121–125	Sukanyā	Sukanyā
5	Māndhātṛ 3.126	Māndhātṛ	
6	Jantu 3.127–128	Jantu	Jantu
7	Śibi 3.131	Śibi	
8	Aṣṭāvakra 3.132–134	Aṣṭāvakra	Aṣṭāvakra
9	Yavakrīta 3.135–139	Yavakrīta	

Table 1: The sequence of narratives in the Tīrthayātrāpārvaṇ of the *Mahābhārata* in comparison with the two tables of contents in MBh 1.2.14–20 and 1.2.128\*. The sequence according to MBh 1.2.128\* matches the actual sequence found in 3.94–3.139.

The appearance of the Jantu-Upākhyāna in the older list shows that the narrative belongs to an early stock of pilgrimage narratives in the *Mahābhārata*. The fact that the narrative in its transmitted version is a story all of a piece and not the result of redactorial expansions can be deduced from the narrative analysis presented below. The Jantu-Upākhyāna consists of four distinguishable parts, each closely related to the other and indispensable for communicating the narrative's message. Before presenting my interpretation of the narrative, it is worth summarizing the story.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Table 1.

### 3.1. Summary

The virtuous (*dhārmika*) King Somaka was married to one hundred suitable (*sadṛśī*) wives.<sup>29</sup> Despite his efforts to produce male heirs, he only managed to father a single son after many years when he was already at an advanced age. His wives pampered the child, whose name was Jantu (which means “living being, person”), and they “permanently turned their back to the pleasures of love.”<sup>30</sup> One day, Jantu was stung on his buttock by an ant and started to cry. In despair, his one hundred mothers also began to cry. This commotion was so distracting to King Somaka when he conducted governmental business that he had to leave the council to comfort his son in person.<sup>31</sup> Back at work, Somaka complained to his court chaplain about how unfortunate he was to be the father of a single weak boy and enquired whether there was not a way to gain one hundred sons. The priest suggested sacrificing Jantu in a ritual he offered to carry out himself. After killing Jantu, he would burn the boy’s fat in a sacrificial fire. The smell of his burning omentum would then impregnate the king’s wives, who would subsequently give birth to one hundred glorious (*śrīmant*)<sup>32</sup> and very manly (*sumahāvīra*)<sup>33</sup> sons. Moreover, Jantu would be born again with a golden mark on his left side. The king agreed to this proposal. Against the mothers’ resistance, the priest killed and butchered Jantu according to ritual prescriptions (*vidhi*) and burned his omentum in the sacrificial fire. As planned, the mothers inhaled the smoke, became pregnant, and gave birth to one hundred sons. Jantu was born first, to his previous mother. Since Jantu possessed every possible virtue, he became even dearer to his ninety-nine stepmothers than their own

<sup>29</sup> It may be possible that the author of the Jantu-Upākhyāna used “Somaka” as the name of the protagonist of this narrative in order to evoke the prestigious memory of Somaka Sāhadevyā, who is mentioned as a prince in Ṛg Veda 4.15.9 and *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 7.34. Moreover, Somaka is mentioned as a king at different places in the *Mahābhārata*. He appears as a ruler of the Pañcāla country who performed impressive sacrifices. See Sörensen 1904–1924: 646af.

<sup>30</sup> “*mātaraḥ... satataṃ prṣṭhataḥ kṛtvā kāmabhogān...*” MBh 3.127.5.

<sup>31</sup> The story’s author indicates that this situation is entirely inappropriate for a king by designating the king who comforts his son and his wives as “the tamer of his enemies” (*ariṇdama*) in MBh 127.10d.

<sup>32</sup> MBh 3.127.19c.

<sup>33</sup> MBh 3.127.20c.

sons. A short time later, the sacrificial priest passed away. Soon afterward, also King Somaka died. Upon arriving in the afterworld, Somaka saw his priest suffering in a hell. The perplexed king defended his former priest in front of the god Dharma (or Yama),<sup>34</sup> the judge of the dead. The god, however, explained that the priest's torment resulted from the killing of Jantu in the sacrifice. Somaka disagreed with this verdict and demanded the release of his priest, claiming that he would accept punishment instead. Dharma (or Yama), however, refused. Because the king had lived a virtuous life, the god determined that his well-deserved post-mortem fate was to stay in heaven. Somaka insisted that he experience the same destiny as his priest. Dharma finally offered to judge the cases equally, so that king and priest would share the same post-mortem fate. It was decided that they would initially stay in hell before then being able to partake of heaven. Somaka agreed. Thus, after the two protagonists served their sentence in hell, they rose jointly to heaven.

This is the conclusion of the foundation myth of Somaka's *āśrama*. The narrative then returns to the frame story. The Pāṇḍavas had reached the vicinity of the *āśrama*, and Lomaśa explained that a man who stayed there patiently for six nights would gain a good post-mortem fate. The Jantu-Upākhyāna ends with Lomaśa suggesting to the Pāṇḍavas that they remain in Somaka's hermitage for precisely this period.

### 3.2. Structure

Except for the first stanza of the Jantu-Upākhyāna, which contains Yudhiṣṭhira's question concerning Somaka's hermitage and thus provides the occasion for the narrative to be told, the whole story is designed to be a monologue delivered by Lomaśa. Two levels of narration can be discerned: On the first level, Lomaśa, the omniscient narrator, reports the events that constitute the narrative. It appears that Lomaśa's expositions correspond strictly with the voice of the author of the narrative. On the second level, where the narration consists of plot-sustaining dialogues among the story's characters, the characters' statements may deviate from the author's voice or even contradict it when this supports the development of the storyline.

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<sup>34</sup> The southern recension of the *Mahābhārata* has "Yama" as the name of the god. On Yama in different periods of South Asian religious history, see Söhnen-Thieme 2009.

The narrative structure of the Jantu-Upākhyāna is based on this vertical composition in two different levels and the horizontal arrangement of the narrative into four sequential parts or episodes. The first part comprises the initial frame story. Yudhiṣṭhira enquires about King Somaka, which provides Lomaśa the opportunity to narrate the main plot. The second part, which may be designated as the “Episode in this World,” deals with Somaka’s problems with his wives and his son. These problems are solved using the successful performance of the sacrifice. The third part, the “Post-mortem Episode,” deals with the events after the death of Somaka and his priest. It narrates the retribution in hell for the human sacrifice and the intervention of Somaka on behalf of his priest with the god Dharma, which leads to Somaka’s voluntary stay in hell. Finally, the king and his priest ascend jointly to heaven. The fourth and final episode is the continuation of the frame story. The Pāṇḍavas reach Somaka’s hermitage, which provides the occasion for Lomaśa to mention the benefits of a stay at this sacred place as well as to hint at the religious practices that the Pāṇḍavas will perform.

### 3.3. Analysis

The following section of this article analyzes the four episodes and their relationship to the final message of the narrative, according to which different religious practices have different efficacies in this world and the next.

#### 3.3.1. The initial frame story

The initial frame story consists of a single question: Yudhiṣṭhira asks Lomaśa for information about King Somaka. Yudhiṣṭhira, just as in the case of other *upākhyāna*-s that Lomaśa narrates, already has a confident expectation of the content of the myth that he wants to be told.<sup>35</sup>

Which vigor (or potency) (*vīrya*) did King Somaka, the best of donors, possess? I want to hear the truth about his actions (*karman*) and his power (*prabhāva*).

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<sup>35</sup> See, for example, MBh 3.94.2f., where Yudhiṣṭhira, in requesting Lomaśa to narrate the story of Agastya, reveals that he already knows that Agastya killed a demon called Vātapi who possessed extraordinary power.



*kathamvīryaḥ sa rājābhūt somako dadatāṃ varaḥ*<sup>36</sup> / *karmāṇy asya prabhāvaṃ*  
*ca śrotum icchāmi tattvataḥ* // (MBh 3.127.1).

Yudhiṣṭhira enquires about the king's vigor, power, and actions. Manliness or potency and power are very fitting attributes for a king. However, these terms may also be interpreted as pointing to religious practices in the present context of pilgrimage to sacred places. On the one hand, "vigor" (*vīrya*) and "power" (*prabhāva*) evoke the association of ascetic practices (*tapas*) because these words refer to the aim of ascetic practice *par excellence* in the *Mahābhārata*.<sup>37</sup> The term "action" (*karma*), on the other hand, may refer to either a specific version of the law of karmic retribution or a ritual action (*karman*) in the context of a Vedic sacrifice. As we shall see below, all these conceptions provide the key to understanding the message of the Jantu-Upākhyāna by establishing a hierarchy of competing causalities that determine post-mortem fates. It should be noted, however, that the expectation of the audience that the key terms mentioned in the introductory stanza will play a prominent role is initially disappointed in the first part of the "Episode in this World."

### 3.3.2. The episode in this world

At the beginning of the "Episode in this World," King Somaka is portrayed neither as a mighty king nor as an ascetic nor as someone performing extraordinary (ritual) acts. He is, instead, a troubled man. We learn that although Somaka is married to one hundred wives, he cannot father a single son for a long time. As a result, he fails to meet a central aim in the life of

<sup>36</sup> Instead of the epithet *dadatāṃ varaḥ*, "the best of donors," which is transmitted by several northern manuscripts and in the Southern Recension of the MBh, the critically edited text reads *vadatāṃ vara* "o best of narrators," which refers as a byname to Lomaśa. The former reading, also used in MBh 3.128.13, is a) the more difficult reading because it refers to Somaka's fame as a generous sponsor of sacrifices rather than to Lomaśa's eloquence and b) preferable for stemmatic reasons.

<sup>37</sup> See Hacker 1978: 343: "Out of this fervor the human being possesses a power that exceeds the normal, which may be designated with the word *prabhāva*." My translation; the German original reads as follows: „Aus dieser Glut [*tejas*] heraus hat der Mensch dann eine... über das Normale hinausgehende ‚Macht‘, welche mit dem Wort *prabhāva* bezeichnet werden kann.“ See also Shee 1986: 211, 218f. and 222.

a Vedic householder. Moreover, Somaka needs a son to secure the throne's succession and the continuation of his dynasty.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, the king's sonlessness endangers his well-being in the next world. According to a common belief attested throughout the *Mahābhārata*, "only those who have sons can go to heaven."<sup>39</sup> When Jantu is finally born, the situation remains tense. His wives turn their back on the pleasures of love and fail to educate their son in manliness, apparently by caring for him too much.<sup>40</sup> When the situation escalates, the king wishes for a hundred sons.

The king's justification for this wish is his concern about his future and that of his wives, all of whom depend on the unsure health of this single son.<sup>41</sup> However, since the occurrence of the ant stinging his son's buttocks is hardly an appropriate cause for Somaka's reflections on the vulnerability of human life in general, it is much more the king's acute stress that provides the backdrop for his request.

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<sup>38</sup> The text does not indicate the reason for Somaka's childlessness, just like the Śunaḥśepa legend (see below, p. 169f) in its preserved version does not mention the cause of Hariścandra's failure to beget a son. Harry Falk (1984: 130) argued that in the original, i.e., reconstructed, version of the Śunaḥśepa legend, the god Varuṇa had possessed Hariścandra. It has to remain open whether the author of the Jantu-Upākhyāna assumed that his audience would assume a similar reason for Somaka's failure to procreate.

<sup>39</sup> Narahari 1946: 110.

<sup>40</sup> That Jantu is feeble is indicated in the description of the ant bite, which makes him cry so inconsolably that his mothers join in (MBh 3.127.6). In a warrior milieu, which may be the intended audience of this narrative, an ant bite would not have been considered a justification for a hysterical reaction. This also appears to have been the impression of the unknown redactor of the Jantūpākhyana in the Skanda Purāṇa, who changed the motif of an ant bite into that of a scorpion bite, and, accordingly, into a more severe injury. On the Jantūpākhyana in the Skanda Purāṇa, see Bedekar 1968.

<sup>41</sup> "Having only a single son is a misery in this world. It would be better to have no son at all. Since all beings are permanently ill, having a single son is a permanent worry. Youth, o best of twice-born, is completely gone for my wives and me. Their lives and mine exclusively depend on this single sonny (*putraka*)."  
*dhig astv ihai-  
 kaputratvam aputratavam varam bhavet / nityāturatvād bhūtānām śoka evaikaputratā ...  
 vayaś ca samatītaṃ me sabhāryasya dvijottama / āsāṃ prāṇāḥ samāyattā mama cātraika-  
 putrake /* (MBh 3.127.12–15b).

Over the course of the “Episode in this World,” a ritual action (*karman*), i.e., the second religious conception to which Yudhiṣṭhira alludes in his introductory stanza, figures more prominently. In contrast to the audience’s expectations, namely, to learn something about a good ritual that might justify the foundation of a sanctuary, the episode describes an ethically objectionable rite. When the king asks his priest for a way to obtain a hundred sons, Somaka explicitly mentions the possibility of performing a difficult act (*duṣkara*).<sup>42</sup> In fact, during the following dialogue with his priest, he is even willing to accept a misdeed (*akārya*).<sup>43</sup>

An additional indication that the sacrifice of Jantu is ethically objectionable can be found in Lomaśa’s description of the preparation for the sacrifice. There we read that the priest pulls Jantu by his left hand towards himself, whereas the crying mothers, who are trying to prevent the sacrifice, pull at his right hand. In this description, the son’s right hand apparently symbolizes the right conduct, whereas the left hand, which is under the priest’s control, represents the wrong conduct.

The ritual itself is not described in any great detail. We only learn that the sacrificial priest “cut him (i.e., Jantu) as prescribed and offered his fat.”<sup>44</sup> This brief statement, which alludes to a ritual prescription (*vidhi*) for the cutting of the body of the victim and to the fat—or more specifically, to the greater omentum as the part of the sacrificial victim that is burned in the sacrificial fire—suggests that the author of this passage wanted his audience to conceive the human sacrifice as consistent with the prescriptions of the Vedic ritual literature.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, the latter contains several references to human sacrifice.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>42</sup> “... may it be a great or a small, or may it even be a difficult act /ritual.” *mahatā laghunā vāpi karmanā duṣkareṇa vā* // (MBh 3.127.16cd).

<sup>43</sup> “Whether the task by which I will obtain a hundred sons is good or bad, take it to be already executed. Reverend, please relate it to me.” *kāryaṃ vā yadi vākāryaṃ yena putraśataṃ bhavet / kṛtaṃ eva hi tad viddhi bhagavān prabravītu me* // (MBh 3.127.18).

<sup>44</sup> *viśasya cainaṃ vidhinā vapāṃ asya juhāva saḥ* // (MBh 3.128.4cd).

<sup>45</sup> This is also the interpretation of Nīlakaṇṭha, the 17<sup>th</sup>-century commentator of the *Mahābhārata*, who glosses the word *jantunā* with *paśubhūtena*. For the prescriptions governing the carving of the sacrificial animal, see Malamoud 1996:170, which is based on Schwab 1886: 134–148.

<sup>46</sup> See Weber 1864.

The text passage that is presumably most frequently studied in connection with human sacrifice in Vedic literature is the legend of Śunaḥśepa, the oldest version of which occurs in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (33.2–6).<sup>47</sup> In this narrative, King Hariścandra, who has a hundred wives but no son, obtains a male child as a favor from the god Varuṇa on the condition that he will later sacrifice him to the god. However, Hariścandra's son Rohita escapes. The god, therefore, inflicts a disease upon the king. When the exiled Rohita learns about this, he decides to help his father and buys Śunaḥśepa, the son of a poor Brahmin, as a substitute for himself. Varuṇa accepts the substitute, and preparations are made for the sacrifice of Śunaḥśepa. However, Śunaḥśepa is rescued because he praises various Vedic gods before the rite is carried out. Rohita's father is also cured, despite everything.

This narrative shows that the performance of a human sacrifice was conceivable in the middle Vedic period (ca. 800 BCE). However, it is less clear whether human sacrifices at this time were actually performed in Vedic Brahmanism or whether they were regarded as theoretical extrapolations of the theory of animal sacrifice.<sup>48</sup> This question is not of much concern in the present context. It is more important to recognize that even for the author of the oldest version of the Śunaḥśepa legend, a human sacrifice was ethically objectionable. This may be concluded not only from the fact that the Vedic gods release Śunaḥśepa's bonds to spare him from being sacrificed. It is also apparent from the end of the narrative, in which Śunaḥśepa's father Ajīgarta Sauyavasi—who had first sold his son for a hundred cows and then agreed to bind and slaughter Śunaḥśepa for an additional two hundred—regrets his immoral (*pāpa*) action. The passage reads as follows:

Verily, Ajīgarta Sauyavasi said: "My son, this very evil act that I have committed causes me pain. Therefore the hundreds of cows shall

<sup>47</sup> For a comprehensive survey of secondary literature on the Śunaḥśepa legend, see Parpola 2007: 165, note 26. The connection of this legend to the ritual of royal consecration (*rājasūya*) is explained in Falk 1984.

<sup>48</sup> According to Parpola (2007: 161), "Vedic texts do indeed attest ... [that] real human sacrifices [were] performed within the memory preserved by the authors, and that by the time of the Brāhmaṇa texts, the actual practice of bloody offerings had already begun to diminish." For a brief survey of secondary literature on human sacrifice in pre-modern South Asia, see also Wujastyk 2009: 193.

become yours as reparation.” Śunaḥśepa replied: “Whoever wants to commit an evil deed once will want to commit the same later on. There is no compensation for your Śūdra-like behavior. Unforgiveable is what you did.”

*sa hovācājīgartaḥ sauyavasīḥ: “tad vai mā tāta tapati pāpaṃ karma mayā kṛtam/ tad ahaṃ niḥnave tubhyaṃ pratiyāntu śatā gavām // iti. sa hovāca śunaḥśepaḥ: “yaḥ sakṛt pāpakam kuryāt kuryād enat tato ’param / nāpāgāḥ śaudrān nyāyād asaṃdheyaṃ tvayā kṛtam iti /” (Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 7.17, p. 200, lines 14–20)*

This passage does not state which acts—i.e., the selling of the son, the willingness to kill him, or the acceptance of a payment—constitutes the evil act that Ajīgarta regrets. It may thus seem uncertain whether the author of the narrative thought human sacrifices were objectionable in general or whether he despised Ajīgarta’s behavior under the particular condition described in the narrative. However, Śunaḥśepa’s reply, in which he declines his father’s suggestion to atone for the wrongdoing by giving him the three hundred cows that the father had received earlier, may indicate that Ajīgarta’s actions were a single series of unacceptable actions. Ajīgarta’s willingness to ritually kill his son may have been the worst part. In the end, Śunaḥśepa judges the behavior of his father as Śūdra-like, i.e., outside the acceptable ethical norms of conduct for members of the Aryan society.

The Śunaḥśepa legend shares with the Jantu-Upākhyāna not only the motif of human sacrifice, which is depicted as ethically objectionable in both narratives, but also the motif of a king married to one hundred wives who remains perpetually childless. The similarity between the two narratives is not confined to similar literary motifs. The narratives also have distinct but comparable social and religious functions. Whereas the Śunaḥśepa legend was designed to reinforce through literary means the late Vedic ideology of the stratification of society into different classes (*varṇa*),<sup>49</sup> the Jantu-Upākhyāna, as I shall argue below in more detail, aims at an integration of originally mutually contradicting religious worldviews into a single hierarchy of religious efficacies. It is, therefore, conceivable that the “Episode in this World” of the Jantu-Upākhyāna was intended to allude to the Śunaḥśepa legend.

<sup>49</sup> See Falk 1984: 132f., and Sathaye 2015: 57f.

In any case, the “Episode in this World” does not satisfy the expectations raised in the introductory stanza. The episode deals neither with exemplary actions nor with the ascetic powers of King Somaka. On the contrary, the king is depicted as a householder whose principal aims in life remain largely unfulfilled. He has had no son for a long time, and when he finally begets one, his hundred wives deny him sexual pleasures. Moreover, in the end, their extreme care for the single child prevents Somaka from performing his duties as a king. To change this situation for the better, he resorts to immoral ritual action.

This depiction of the life of a householder as essentially troublesome indicates that the anonymous author may have been inclined to values and basic orientations in life that differ from that of Vedic householders. He may have belonged to (or had sympathy for) an ascetic milieu.

In any case, the events narrated in this episode do not justify the foundation of a sanctuary in Somaka’s honor. Accordingly, if the narrative has a moral, it must be found in the “Post-mortem Episode.”

### 3.3.3. The Post-mortem Episode

The “Post-mortem Episode” is located in the next world, where Somaka perceives his priest suffering in hell. Somaka can talk to the priest and the god Dharma, the judge of the dead in the next world. Although the information the narrative provides is not very comprehensive, one may suspect that Somaka’s and Dharma’s dialogue takes place in the court (*sabhā*) of Yama, which MBh 2.8.1 describes in more detail.<sup>50</sup> There the god administers justice over the dead, in analogy to worldly jurisdiction in which law is issued by human kings. This kingly function of Yama is indicated by his epithet “king of Law” (*dharmarāja*).<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> In MBh 2.8.8, Somaka is listed at the fifth position within a list of 108 royal seers who attend upon the god Yama.

<sup>51</sup> The epithet *dharmarāja* that Somaka (MBh 3.128.15a) and Lomaśa (MBh 3.128.12b) use to refer to the god points to this function of a king. Somaka and Lomaśa use this epithet in MBh 3.128.15a and MBh 3.128.12b, respectively.

Somaka sees his priest burning in a terrible hell when he enters the next world.<sup>52</sup> When the king enquires about the reason for his suffering, the priest replies:

O king, you sacrificed through me.<sup>53</sup> This is the result of that action (or ritual).

*tvam mayā yājito rājanṣ tasyedaṃ karmanāḥ phalam* // (MBh 3.128.11cd)

The text does not elaborate on the specific grounds for the verdict imposed on the priest. It only states that the priest has to suffer in hell because he served the king as a sacrificial priest, in sacrificing Jantu. But why did Dharma consider this an evil act? Two answers that are not mutually exclusive present themselves: First, the priest may have violated the general prohibition of killing a human being; second, he may have been guilty of performing a prohibited ritual, i.e., an act of black magic.<sup>54</sup>

For King Somaka, however, the question concerning the nature of the crime of his priest is irrelevant. He immediately demands that his highly distinguished or very virtuous (*mahābhāga*) priest be released. He further claims that he deserves to be condemned to hell, arguing that his priest is being punished for him (*matkṛte*).<sup>55</sup>

While this vague formulation does not precisely indicate how the king views his involvement in the case, it becomes clear that Somaka does not want to shoulder the punishment of his priest out of pity or compassion. He makes his demand, instead, because he thinks that the god misjudged the case. Why does Somaka think he is liable to the retribution of the sacrifice, whereas his priest is innocent?

One might argue that Somaka regards himself, and not his priest, as guilty because he ordered the sacrifice. However, this line of reasoning does not

<sup>52</sup> *atha taṃ narake ghore pacyamānaṃ dadarśa saḥ* / (MBh 3.128.10 ab).

<sup>53</sup> The causative of the Sanskrit root *yaj* means “to assist anyone as a priest at a sacrifice” from the middle Vedic times onwards. See PW, vol. 6, p. 9a, s.v. *yaj*.

<sup>54</sup> The MDhŚ prohibits “sorcery (*abhicāra*) and root witchcraft (*mūlakarman*)” in 11.64 (tr. Olivelle 2005: 218, see also Olivelle’s note on the unclear meaning of the designation “root witchcraft” on p. 340).

<sup>55</sup> “I want to enter this hell. Release my sacrificial priest! Because this highly virtuous man is being roasted on hellfire on my account.” *aham atra pravekyāmi mucyatāṃ*

appear to be the one the author of this narrative mainly had in mind. I would instead suggest that Somaka disapproves of the god's verdict against the priest because he assumes that sacrificial rituals have a specific efficacy relating to the next world. Before discussing this in more detail, it is worth briefly recalling the fundamental concept of agency on which Vedic *śrauta* rituals, i.e., rituals that involve the agency of sacrificial priests, are based. Alfred Hillebrandt describes this conception as follows:

The result of the sacrifice, its '*phala*,' benefits the sacrificer. However, he also suffers because of the priests' voluntary or involuntary mistakes (Hillebrandt 1897: 98).<sup>56</sup>

Hillebrandt does not state whether he takes "voluntary or involuntary mistakes" to imply technical or ethical shortcomings. It also remains open from the cited passage as to whether the "result of the sacrifice" refers to the destiny of the sacrificer in this world or the next. However, the question concerning the execution of a ritual in this world and its being an efficient cause of a post-mortem fate was already discussed in the earliest literature of Mīmāṃsā, namely in *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 3.7.18–20. The conception that the performance of certain rituals yields the sacrificer a post-mortem fate in heaven was a common belief.<sup>57</sup> However, different views are discussed regarding the actions the sacrificer has to perform to obtain the desired result. The conclusion of this passage states that the sacrificer is not required to (or indeed may not) perform any action other than securing for himself the "service of his priests" (*utsarga*).<sup>58</sup> In his commentary on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 3.7.20, Śabara states:

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*mama yājakaḥ / matkṛte hi mahābhāgaḥ pacyate narakāgninā* // (MBh 3.128.12 c–f).

<sup>56</sup> "Die Frucht des Opfers, sein »*phala*« kommt dem Opferherrn zugute, aber die absichtlichen und unabsichtlichen Fehler der Priester, ... , fallen ihm ebenfalls zur Last." My translation.

<sup>57</sup> In his commentary on this passage, Śabara (MS 563.1f.) lists the morning and evening libation (*agnihotra*), the new- and full-moon sacrifice (*darśapūrṇamāsa*), and the *jyotiṣṭoma*, which belongs to the Soma rituals.

<sup>58</sup> "[First position:] The result of rituals known from the Veda (*śāstra*) affects the person who performs the ritual, because this is indicated by the Veda. Therefore he himself has to [act] during the performance. [Second position:] Because the



[The sacrificer], through securing the service of the priests himself, renders the whole sacrifice into one that he performs himself.

*utsargaṃ tu svayaṃ kurvatā sarvaṃ svayaṃ kṛtaṃ bhavati* (Śabarabhāṣya 396.23 ad MS 3.7.20).

Although the technical term *utsarga* is not used in our narrative, it is clear that the conception of securing the service of a priest plays a role in the narrative. Somaka instructs his priest to perform the ritual to produce a result for himself. For him, as a Vedic householder, it is clear that the sacrificer has to experience the result of the ritual. Therefore, Somaka's protest against the verdict and his willingness to take the place of his priest in hell cannot result from compassion. They are based on Somaka's conviction that Dharma committed a judicial error, based on Somaka's conception of human agency in rituals, which corresponds to the Vedic theory of ritual agency. Appropriate sacrificial rituals lead the sacrificer, not the priest, to a place in heaven, whereas bad rituals are punished in hell.

The god, however, judges the sacrifice according to entirely different premises. In his view, it is not the ethical value of sacrificial acts but the ethical value of actions in general that decides the post-mortem fate of humans. A sacrifice, irrespective of its result in this world, is thus irrelevant to the future of men after death. Dharma expresses his karma theory when he justifies his verdict against the priest and denies Somaka a place in hell.

O king, nobody other than the performer of action ever experiences its result. Most generous one, the results that you will see are yours.

*nānyaḥ kartuḥ phalaṃ rājann upabhuṅkte kadācana / imāni tava dṛśyante phalāni dadatāṃ vara* // (MBh 3.128.13ab).

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main thing is done by securing the service of the priests, he is the one who performs besides the main thing [also] the remainder. Therefore it should be he or another one [who acts during the performance]. [Conclusion:] It has to be another one [who acts during the performance] because securing the service of the priests is prescribed and because it would lead to a contradiction if he (i.e., the sacrificer) would apply this [prescription] to himself." *śāstraphalaṃ prayoktari tallakṣaṇatvāt tasmāt svayaṃ prayoge syāt* MS 3.7.18 (395.19). *utsarge tu pradhānatvāc cheṣākārī pradhānasya tasmāt anyah svayaṃ vā syāt* MS 3.7.19 (396.9f.) *anyo vā syāt parikrayāmnānād vipratīṣedhāt pratyagātmani* MS 3.7.20 (396.15f.)

In this passage, Dharma reveals that he regards Somaka as free of any karmic responsibility for the killing of Jantu. Instead, the priest deserves punishment because he—not the king—committed the crime of killing Jantu for the ritual. The divine verdict of having to endure exposure to hellfire does not reflect an arbitrary judgment from Dharma but rather the principle of reciprocity between agency and punishment. This also determines the post-mortem fate of humans in *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa* 1.42–44.<sup>59</sup> The divine verdict, however, is based on a straightforward conception of karmic agency that only considers an action's concrete execution to be juridically valid.

This conception of karmic agency has parallels in Sanskrit literature that are not too far removed historically from the time of the composition of the Jantu-Upākhyāna. The Purāṇas and the *dharma* literature contain comprehensive lists in which misdeeds correspond schematically to undesirable post-mortem fates.<sup>60</sup> In these lists, human agency refers exclusively to the concrete execution of actions. Similar to this, but historically prior, is the early Jain conception of human agency, which also solely takes the concrete performance of actions, not the agent's intentions, to decide the karmic value.<sup>61</sup>

Against the backdrop of the apparent analogy between such a karma theory and worldly judgement, it is even conceivable that the author of the Jantu-Upākhyāna may have composed this myth as an implicit protest against an overly simplistic karma theory as well as against an overly-narrow definition of juridical responsibility.

Irrespective of exactly what authorial intentions may have led to the composition of the Jantu-Upākhyāna, the debate of Somaka and Dharma can be read as a clash of different views concerning the efficacy of actions

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<sup>59</sup> See Halbfass 2000: 46.

<sup>60</sup> The Pretakalpa of the Garuḍa-Purāṇa schematically allocates undesirable re-births on earth to evil-doers. See Abegg 1921: 82ff. (cited in Halbfass 2000: 219f.) The same work also refers to the conception that the fruits of evil action ripen in hells. See PK 3.64 as translated in Abegg 1921: 72. These two different conceptions of karmic retribution are integrated into a single comprehensive concept in MDhŚ 12.5–82, which states that grievous sins (*mahāpātaka*) cause a rebirth on earth after a sentence in hell.

<sup>61</sup> See Johnson 1995: 20–22.

for the post-mortem fate of humans.<sup>62</sup> Somaka believes that good or bad sacrificial actions decide the fate of humans in the next world. This view is consistent with the ritualistic worldview of Vedic Brahmanism. In contrast, Dharma subscribes to a karma theory, in which the ethical value of actions in general decides the fate of humans after death. By stating that “nobody other than the performer of an action ever experiences its result,” the god formulates a central principle of the “systematized and ‘axiomatic’ versions of the karma theory,” which is based upon the “two interrelated premises [that] there should be no underserved experience of suffering or well-being; and no effect of a past deed should be lost.”<sup>63</sup>

As mentioned above (n. 60), this theory—a kind of retributive automatism—is similar to the karma theories of early Jainism and the purāṇic and juridical literature of Hinduism. Moreover, it is widely discussed in Indian philosophical literature, starting with Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, and in several places in the *Mahābhārata*.<sup>64</sup> The similarity of the karma theory in the Jantu-Upākhyāna with that of early Jainism indicates that the author of this narrative may have been influenced by ideas that originated in the religious complex of the śramaṇa religions, which at the time of the composition of Jantu-Upākhyāna had started to be included in the worldview of early classical Hinduism.

In the course of the debate, Somaka modifies his initial position and suggests a different solution to the problem:

Somaka said: “I do not desire the worlds of merit without my Veda teacher. Only with him, o King Dharma, do I want to live in the world of gods or in hell because I am the same as he in regard to this (ritual)

<sup>62</sup> On similarly conflicting views in Indian philosophy, see Halbfass 1991: 291–345 (with a particular emphasis on Mīmāṃsā). Houben 1999 deals comprehensively with the ethical problem of ritual killing in South Asian pre-modern intellectual history.

<sup>63</sup> Halbfass 1991: 292.

<sup>64</sup> See Halbfass (1991: 329, n. 5), who refers, for example, to MBh 5.27.10: “In the afterworld, there is no loss of meritorious or immoral acts. Merit and demerit precede the acting person (to heaven or hell). Still, the actor necessarily follows them (*na karmanāṃ vipraṇāśo ’sty amutra puṇyānāṃ vāpy atha vā pāpakānāṃ / pūrvam kartur gacchati puṇyapāpam paścāt tv etad anuyāty eva kartā //*).

action. Whether its result is good or bad, it has to be the same for both of us.”

*somaka uvāca: “punyān na kāmāye lokān ṛte ’haṃ brahmacārinam / icchāmy aham anenaiva saha vastum surālaye //14// narake vā dharmarāja karmaṇāśya samo hy aham / punyāpunyaphalam deva samam astv avayor idam” //15// (MBh 3.128.14–15).*

On the one hand, Somaka’s argument differs from his initial view, according to which sacrificial acts decide the post-mortem fate of the sacrificer. Given the factual validity of a karma theory as the basis of divine judgement, the Vedic ritualistic concept of human agency turned out to be unfounded. Somaka has to realize that it is the law of karma that determines one’s fate after death. On the other hand, Somaka’s modified position on what would be a just verdict also differs markedly from the divine concept of action voiced by Dharma, in which the exclusive karmic responsibility falls on the executor of an action. Concerning its wording as well as its content, Somaka’s argument is similar to a juridical principle that is formulated in the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*:

1. The instigator, the one who agrees, and the actor partake of actions that have as their fruit a post-mortem fate in heaven or hell. 2. To him who is most involved, the fruit falls distinctively.

*prayojitā mantā karteti svarganarakaphaleṣu karmasu bhāginah //1// yo bhūya ārabhate tasmin phalaviśeṣah //2// (Āpastamba Dharmasūtra 2.11.29.1–2).*

This passage from the *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra* and Somaka’s argument with Dharma express the concepts of complicity and shared responsibility between several individuals. In the context of the Jantu-Upākhyāna, this elaborate version of the law of karmic retribution is presented as a synthesis of the Vedic ritualistic conception of agency and the conception of agency that provides the basis of a simple karma theory.

Somaka is willing to give up his well-being in heaven and stay with his priest in hell to validate this improved conception of human agency. This causes Dharma to finally change his mind:

King, if you wish it to be this way, experience the fruit together for the same time with him. After that, you will gain a good post-mortem fate.

*yady evam īpsitam rājan bhuñkṣvāśya sahitaḥ phalam / tulyakālam sahānena paścāt prāpyasi sadgatim // (MBh 3.128.16).*

The god offers Somaka the opportunity to modify the law of karma for his priest if the king is willing to suffer jointly with his priest in hell. Somaka accepts, and in the end, the king and the priest jointly ascend to heaven.

And again, he who loved his teacher, gained together with his Brahmin teacher his own beautiful worlds, which he had won by his action.

*punaś ca lebhe lokān svān karmaṇā nirjitān śubhān / saha tenaiva vipreṇa guruṇā gurupriyaḥ...* // (MBh 3.128.17 c-e).

Only in this final stanza of the episode in the next world are the initial expectations fulfilled that Yudhiṣṭhira's question has raised in the introductory stanza. Here, the audience is informed about King Somaka's extraordinary act (*karman*), namely his voluntary stay in hell.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, this exemplary act generates the ascetic power to change his priest's post-mortem fate and morally improve karmic retribution by introducing the concept of complicity.<sup>66</sup>

However, one may question whether the interpretation provided here is the one that most obviously presents itself. Might not the revised verdict be more easily explained as a transfer of merit, which Somaka performed because his teacher was so dear to him? As Wendy Doniger already observed (although she took the initial protest of the king to be an expression of a wish "to sacrifice his good karma"), the fact that the priest and king suffer in hell shows that:

In this way, the doctrine of karma is satisfied without any merit transfer—and yet ultimately everyone escapes to heaven... (Doniger O'Flaherty 1980: 35).

<sup>65</sup> The motif of a voluntary stay in hell also occurs at the end of the *Mahābhārata*, when Indra puts Yuddhiṣṭhira to a test by offering him a stay in heaven, while his relatives have to suffer in hell. Yuddhiṣṭhira declines the offer, which proves "he is a true follower of *dharma*" (Gonzales-Reimán 2011: 105).

<sup>66</sup> Strictly speaking, the narrative does not allow for a conclusion of whether Somaka achieves a general modification of karmic retribution, or whether the god Dharma approves of an exception. I prefer an interpretation along the lines of the first mentioned alternative because Somaka's improvement of karmic retribution would have constituted the more impressive achievement that would justify the foundation of an *āśrama*.

However, Doniger did not realize that this happy ending is not secured quasi-automatically through the normal process of karmic retribution. Somaka won (*nirjita*) the modification of the law of karma through his willingness to stay in hell, i.e., through asceticism, exposing himself to the ineffable heat of hell fire.

If this interpretation of the Jantu-Upākhyāna is accepted, it is possible to understand the message of this myth as an attempt to establish a hierarchy of competing causalities for post-mortem fates. According to this reading, the sacrifice is a powerful tool for manipulating the fate of the sacrificer in this world. It is ineffective in the next world. After death, the law of karma determines the fate of beings. There is, however, a way to overcome, or at least modify, the law of karmic retribution, namely through ascetic practice, i.e., voluntarily enduring excessive heat.<sup>67</sup>

### 3.3.4. The frame story continued

The possibility of influencing one's post-mortem fate using asceticism also plays a vital role in the continuation of the frame story, in which the Pāṇḍavas reach Somaka's *āśrama*. Lomaśa introduces this place as follows:

In front of us appears Somaka's meritorious hermitage. A man who stays there patiently for six nights gains a good post-mortem fate. We shall remain there for six nights, free from fever and exercising self-restraint. O Kurūdvaḥ, be prepared!

*eṣa tasyāśramah puṇyo ya eṣo 'gre virājate / kṣānta uṣyātra ṣaḍrātraṃ prāpnoti sugatiṃ naraḥ // etasminn api rājendra vatsyāmo vigatajvarāḥ / ṣaḍrātraṃ niyatātmānaḥ sajjībhāva kurūdvaḥ //* (MBh 3.128.18–19b).

Although this passage does not contain much detailed information about how the Pāṇḍavas are going to spend their time in Somaka's *āśrama*, it is still comprehensive enough to allow for some conclusions. First, the very fact that the word *āśrama* occurs implies that the Pāṇḍavas reached a place

<sup>67</sup> "The element of voluntariness, of consciously enduring physically and mentally incriminatory situations, is constitutive for ascetic practices in general." My translation; the original German reads: "Das Element der Freiwilligkeit, des bewußten Erduldens von körperlich und psychisch belastenden Situationen, ist konstitutiv für die Wirksamkeit der Askeseübung; ..." (Shee 1986: 191).

where ascetics live and where asceticism (*tapas*) is practiced.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, the Pāṇḍavas will likely perform ascetic practices themselves. This can be concluded from Lomaśa's call on Yudhiṣṭhira to be prepared (*sajjībhava*), which may, in turn, imply a *dīkṣā*, i.e., "a bodily, mental and spiritual preparation for the future practice of asceticism."<sup>69</sup> Also, the stay's six-night duration<sup>70</sup> and the attributes "restrained" (*niyatātman*) and "patient" (*kṣānta*) point to religious observances<sup>71</sup> and states of mind<sup>72</sup> that are constitutive of the practice of austerities. Finally, the stay in Somaka's hermitage essentially leads to an identical result to Somaka's voluntary stay in hell. It is designed to procure the Pāṇḍavas a favorable post-mortem fate in the same way that Somaka had won the heavenly worlds for himself and the priest.

### 3.4. The message: A hierarchy of competing causalities

If Somaka's voluntary stay in hell can be viewed as the archetype of the stay of ascetics in Somaka's *āśrama*, it is possible to infer how an early audience of the Jantu-Upākhyāna may have imagined the method and the aim of austerities practiced in the hermitage. It appears that ascetics in Somaka's *āśrama* were viewed as voluntarily exposing themselves to heat much in the same way as Somaka willingly endured the pain of hellfire.<sup>73</sup> Also, the aim of Somaka's asceticism may have been taken to be essentially identical to that of the ascetics in the king's hermitage. Just as Somaka had gained the power to change Dharma's verdict of the priest, which was based on the law of karma, so were ascetics in Somaka's hermitage believed to accumulate the power to change their karma. Their ascetic practice was meant to provide a secure

<sup>68</sup> See Shee: 1986: 305f.

<sup>69</sup> Shee: 1986: 335f., translated from the German original.

<sup>70</sup> Six nights is also the duration of ascetic practice in MBh 3.146.1.

<sup>71</sup> See Shee 1986: 341.

<sup>72</sup> See Wezler 1979: 56.

<sup>73</sup> "Pain is an essential constituent of the ascetic struggle; in this regard, pain resulting from heating and drying also figures prominently in epic texts." My translation. The German original reads as follows: "Der Schmerz ist wesentlicher Bestandteil des asketischen Sich-Abmühen; dabei steht der aus Erhitzung und Ausdörrung resultierende Schmerz auch in epischen Texten im Vordergrund" (Shee 1986: 194).

way to heaven, irrespective of the karmic value of their former or future acts. According to this view, asceticism—and this may be the message of the Jantu-Upākhyaṇa—is the most potent causal factor to determine the post-mortem fate of humans since the power accumulated by asceticism even exceeds the power of the law of karmic retribution. In contrast to this, ritual actions, i.e., Vedic sacrifices, which are believed to be all-powerful in this world, are of no avail when it comes to the destiny of humans in the next world.

#### 4. Conclusion: The Jantu-Upākhyaṇa as a mirror of the religious history of South Asia

This hierarchy of competing causalities regarding the post-mortem fate of humans is the consequence of specific developments in South Asian religious history. These developments appear to have taken place in the centuries around the beginning of the Common Era as a result of the conflict of worldviews between Vedic Brahmanism and śramaṇa religions as described above. As is well-known, the belief in the efficiency of Vedic rituals to secure the sacrificer a permanently blissful post-mortem fate began to be challenged in the late Vedic period, even within Brahmanical circles. This critique of the efficacy of Vedic sacrificial rituals received perhaps its most pointed formulation in the late Vedic *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*, which I would propose to date around the first century CE.<sup>74</sup> In stanza 1.2.10, which poses several text-critical and metrical problems in its transmitted version that cannot be discussed here, we read:

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<sup>74</sup> Cohen (2008) dedicated her monographic study to solving the problem of the relative chronology of the so-called older Upaniṣads. She refrained, however, from judging the absolute dates of the works. Salomon draws attention to the fact that the language of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* differs considerably “from the normal standards of late Vedic / early classical Sanskrit” (Salomon 1981: 100), whereas the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* shares several features with epic and Buddhist (Hybrid) Sanskrit. This led Salomon to adopt the designation “Vernacular Sanskrit” for the language of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*. Salomon stresses that this linguistic peculiarity neither justifies the assumption that the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* is later than other early or middle Upaniṣads nor that the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* was originally a Jaina or a Buddhist work (Salomon 1981:101f.). However, since the linguistic peculiarities of the Sanskrit in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* have parallels in Buddhist (Hybrid) and epic Sanskrit, it appears that the time of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*’s composition is close



Perfect fools regard the merit of sacrifices and donations as the best and cannot think of anything better. But when they have experienced the merit of their well-performed rituals on the vault of heaven, they come again to this deplorable world.<sup>75</sup>

*iṣṭāpūrtaṃ manyamānā variṣṭhaṃ nānyac chreyo vedayanti pramūḍhāḥ /  
nākasya prṣṭhe te sukr̥te 'nubhūte imaṃ lokam hīnataraṃ cāviśanti //*10// (MU 1.2.1).

The passage of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* from which this stanza is taken (MU 1.2.7–10) criticizes the belief in the unlimited power of Vedic rituals. Repeatedly, the proponents of the Vedic sacrificial religion (*karmin*) are called “fools” (*mūḍha*) or even, as in the passage cited above, “perfect fools” (*pramūḍha*) because they do not recognize that ritual activity does not lead to a permanent result. According to this critique, Vedic rituals yield a post-mortem fate in heaven for the sacrificer. However, his stay is limited to a specific period, after which a rebirth on earth is inevitable. Therefore, the critics of the Vedic ritual do not regard a ritually earned residence in heaven as a desirable salvational aim. Nevertheless, since the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* concedes that rituals lead to a temporary stay in heaven, its authors (and redactors) acknowledge the validity of the notion that sacrificial activity determines the post-mortem fate of the sacrificer. The critique of Vedic ritualism in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* differs in this respect from the criticism that is implicitly voiced in the Jantu-Upākhyāna, namely that Vedic rituals are of no avail in the next world.<sup>76</sup> According to the epic narrative, the determining factor for the destiny of the sacrificer after death is not ritually accumulated merit but the ethical value of actions performed during one’s

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to the time of the linguistic turn towards Sanskrit as a medium of expression for Buddhist and Jain authors, as well as to the time of the composition of the bulk of the Sanskrit epics at the beginning of the first century CE. This hypothesis is supported by the occurrence of the word *saṃnyāsayaoga* in MU 3.2.6. According to Olivelle (1981: 273), the word *saṃnyāsa* came to be used to designate Brahmanical ascetics only at the beginning of the Common Era.

<sup>75</sup> My translation follows with some variations the German translation of Slaje (2009: 357).

<sup>76</sup> The god Dharma states this in MBh 3.128.13ab, cited above on p. 174, when he justifies his verdict of the priest by saying that “nobody other than the performer of an action ever experiences its result.”

lifetime, i.e., the compliance of ethically relevant actions with the law of karma. In this regard, the critique of the Vedic ritual in the Jantu-Upākhyāna is more radical than that of the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*.

The karma theory propagated in the Jantu-Upākhyāna differs considerably from the early karma theories of the *śramaṇa* religions. These presuppose a karmic retribution that works, as it were, automatically and impersonally, i.e., without being under the control of any deity. According to the early theories of karma in the *śramaṇa* religions, as we can reconstruct them from Jaina and Buddhist sources, the gods were not conceived as having karmic retribution under their command but as being subject to its efficacy.<sup>77</sup> The occurrence of the specific karma theory of the Jantu-Upākhyāna within the *Mahābhārata*, according to which the god of the netherworld Yama or Dharma rules the law of karma, therefore appears to be an innovation resulting from the reluctant acceptance of the new religious doctrines of karma within the intellectual milieu of early classical Hinduism.

One aspect of early karma theories that may have facilitated the transfer of this religious belief from the *śramaṇa* milieu to early Hinduism consists of the limitations applied to the scope of karmic retribution during its process of assimilation. Unlike in early Jainism, where the quality of the life of any living being was believed to be primarily determined by the law of karma, the karma theories of the late Vedic and early classical period of South Asian religious history, as they can be reconstructed from the Sanskrit epic literature, allow considerable room for alternatives and modifying causes. For example, fate and time are essential factors that substitute or complement karmic retribution in the *Mahābhārata*.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, a whole range of empowering activities such as Vedic rituals, ascetic practices, pilgrimages, and, last but not least, listening to recitations of the *Mahābhārata* <sup>79</sup> interfere with and modify the karma-regulated post-mortem fate of humans.

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<sup>77</sup> See Halbfass 2000: 64–128.

<sup>78</sup> On various factors that determine the fate of humans in the *Mahābhārata*, such as time, fate and “God as the arranger,” see Long 1980: 44–49. On “time” as the decisive factor for the fate of men, see also Scheftelowitz 1929.

<sup>79</sup> See Hegarty 2012: 58–64.

## Literature and Abbreviations

### a) Abbreviations and Primary Sources

*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*. See Āgāṣe 1930.

*Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*. See Bühler 1892.

MBh *Mahābhārata*. See Sukthankar, Belvalkar *et al.* 1933(1927)–1966.

MDhŚ *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. See Olivelle 2005.

MS *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. See Nyāyaratna 1863.

MU *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*. See Hertel 1924.

PK Pretakalpa of the *Garuḍapurāṇa*. See Abegg 1921.

PW See Böhlingk and Roth 1871.

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# Vasubandhu's Considerations on 'Ignorance' (*avidyā*) in His "Commentary on Dependent Origination" (*Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā*) (II)

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Dedicated to Eli Franco, with respect and friendship.

## Introduction

Vasubandhu's (ca. 400–480 CE) *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā* (PSVy) is the only known commentary on the *Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-vibhaṅga-nirdeśa-sūtra*, a fundamental text on the doctrine of dependent origination.<sup>1</sup> Its first chapter "Explanation/analysis of ignorance" (*avidyā-vibhaṅga*), the longest of the fourteen chapters of the commentary, contains explanations of many important questions as e.g. the discussion on the so-called general formula of the *pratītyasamutpāda* ('dependent origination'), analysis of the term *a-vidyā*, or on the problem of *avidyā* as the beginning member of the twelvefold chain of dependent arising, etc.

Vasubandhu's commentary is replete with quotations from important sūtra and śāstra texts, viz. *Markaṭa-sūtra* of the *Nidāna Saṃyukta*, \*(*Astitva*)-*ādi-viśeṣa-vibhaṅga-nāma-dharma-paryāya* (preserved only in two Chinese translations), *Saḥetusapratyayasānidāna-dharmaparyāya*, *Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra* as well as long passages from the *Yogācāra* treatise, the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

The text of the PSVy is entirely preserved in the Tibetan translation.<sup>2</sup> It is followed in the Tanjur by a subcommentary composed by Guṇamati.<sup>3</sup> There

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<sup>1</sup> For an overview of the content of the sūtra and its commentary see Meior 1997a; Meior 1997b; Meior 2022; Muroji 1993.

<sup>2</sup> *Rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par dbye ba bshad pa* = Peking Tanjur 5496, Chi. 1a-71a8; Derge Tanjur 3995, Chi. 1b1-61a7; author: Vasubandhu (Dbyig gnyen); transl. by Surendrākara-prabha and Nam mkha'. The translators were active at the beginning of the 9th century.

<sup>3</sup> *Rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang po dang rnam par 'byed pa bstan pa'i rgya cher*



is no translation into Chinese. There exists only one incomplete Sanskrit palm-leaf manuscript discovered by Giuseppe Tucci<sup>4</sup> in Nepal.<sup>5</sup> Many parallel Sanskrit passages can be found in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, Vīryaśrīdatta's *Arthavinīścayasūtra-nibandhana* (chapter 5: *pratītyasamutpāda*), Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* and in other texts.

Generally, one can divide the first chapter (*avidyā-vibhaṅga*) into six parts as follows (the division into paragraphs is mine; the references to the Tibetan text in the Peking Tanjur are given in parentheses):

- A four opening stanzas <1>–<4> (Chi. 1a4–2a1);
- B description of the Sūtra and its introductory part (*sūtra-śarīra*), §§ 1–21 (Chi. 2a1–4a2);
- C exposition of the *ādi*-part, §§ 22–49 (Chi. 4a2–6a4);
- D exposition of the *vibhaṅga*-part, §§ 50–68 (Chi. 6a4–7b5);
- E excursus: grammatical explanation of the word *a-vidyā*, §§ 69–87 (Chi. 7b5–9b1);
- F exposition of the definition of ignorance (*avidyā-nirdeśa*), §§ 88–106 (Chi. 9b1–13b5).

An annotated translation of the *ādi* or the “beginning” part of the first chapter of Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā* (B–C) was published in a special issue of the journal *HÖRIN* (“Vasubandhu's considerations on causality in his ‘Commentary on Dependent Origination’ (*Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā*)”).<sup>6</sup> The translation of the remaining parts (A, D, E, F) of the *avidyā-vibhaṅga* is

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*bshad pa* = Peking Tanjur 5497, Chi. 71a8–283b6; Derge 3996, Chi. 61b–237a; author: Guṇamati (Yon tan blo gros); the same translators as above.

<sup>4</sup> Edited by Tucci in his paper “A Fragment from the Pratitya-samutpada-vyakhya of Vasubandhu”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 62–3 (1930), 611–623 (in Devanagari), reprinted in Roman characters in: G. Tucci, *Opera Minora*, Roma 1971, Part I, 239–248.

<sup>5</sup> National Archives, Kathmandu, No. B22/20. See Muroji 1993.

<sup>6</sup> See Mejor 2022. This is a thoroughly revised version of the paper presented at the Symposium “*Pratyaya/yaún/en 縁/rkyen* and its difference from the occidental idea of ‘cause’” at EKO-Haus der Japanischen Kultur in Düsseldorf, March 28<sup>th</sup>–31<sup>st</sup>, 2019.

offered here. In this way, a translation of the entire first chapter of Vasubandhu's PSVy will be available to readers.<sup>7</sup>

### Translation

#### Vasubandhu's Commentary on Dependent Origination (*Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā*) Chapter I: On Ignorance (*avidyā-vibhaṅga*)

[A. Salutory stanzas]<sup>8</sup>

Homage to all the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas.

<1> [In praise of the Buddha,] I bow my head to Him, (a) who has [his] mind [perfected] [and] is without ignorance in [the things] to be comprehended, (b) who is possessed of [perfect] purity [and] needs not purification in future, (c) who is the protector of the world, (d) [and who will] stay [in the world] to the end of the world [i.e. *saṃsāra*], (e) the most excellent among the mankind.

**Note to <1>** Vasubandhu, PSVy chapter XIV (P Chi. 66b4): (I)

*sangs rgyas la bstod par yon tan phun sum tshogs pa du zhig brjod ce na /  
ye shes phun sum tshogs pa ste / [5] shes bya thams cad la thogs pa med  
pa'i ye shes yin pa'i phyir ro // spangs pa phun sum tshogs pa ste / nyon*

<sup>7</sup> Acknowledgments. In this place I would like to express my most sincere thanks to Prof. Lambert Schmithausen for his insightful comments on the earlier draft of the translation. My special thanks go to Prof. Tom Tillemans who took the trouble of reading and improving the later draft of my translation. I would also like to thank my colleague Dr. Stanisław J. Kania for his help in preparing the final proofs. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for any shortcomings of the present version.

<sup>8</sup> The introductory stanzas (*maṅgala-śloka*) are also found in the beginning of Paramārtha's 決定藏論 *Jue ding zang lun* (T 1584, p. 1018b–c). The relevant passages were edited and studied in detail by Matsuda 1984. In the first three stanzas Vasubandhu pays homage to the Thriple Gem: Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha, according to the theory of *saṃpad*, or perfect accomplishment; the explanation is found in chapter XIV of his PSVy. Guṇamati's exposition differs at places from the theory of *saṃpad* as it was presented in Vasubandhu's AKBh ad VII.34, p. 415.17ff.; LVP, *Kośa*, VII, p. 81ff. Cf. also the explanation of *jñāna-saṃpad* and *prahāṇa-saṃpad* in *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa-ṭīkā* fol. 141bff. (Braarvig 1993, II, p. 296 n. 1, with reference to AKBh, loc. cit.).

*mongs pa'i phra rgyas thams cad bag chags dang bcas te spangs pa'i phyir ro // thugs rje'i phun sum tshogs [6] pa ni 'jig rten pa rnams 'khor ba'i mi bde ba thams cad las yongs su skyob pa'i phyir ro // mi zad pa phun sum tshogs pa ni 'khor ba'i mthar thug par mnga' ba'i phyir ro // 'jig pas na 'jig rten zhes bya ste / de'i [7] mtha' las 'das pa'o // mtshungs pa med pa nyid phun sum tshogs pa ni sems can thams cad kyi mchog yin pa'i phyir ro // de ltar len pa rnams la bcom ldan 'das kyis chos dang zang zing gi sbyin pas ni gzhan [8] mtha' dag la phan gdags par nus pa'i bya ba nyid dang / dbye bar 'dod pa nyid dang / rtag pa'i gnas thob pa nyid dang / gcig tu skyabs su gyur pa brjod pa yin no //*

Guṇamati explains that Vasubandhu in his first introductory stanza pays homage to the Buddha endowed with the fivefold (perfect) accomplishment of qualities (*guṇa-saṃpad*) (PSVy-ṭ, Chi. 72a4–5): *de la sangs rgyas la bstod pas ni yon tan phun sum tshogs pa rnam pa lnga bstan te /*. Accordingly, a) the first verse reflects Buddha's perfect accomplishment of knowledge (*jñāna-saṃpad*), which is unresisted, unimpeded (*avyāhata*) in all things to be known: (72a5–6) *ye shes phun sum tshogs pa bstan te / shes bya thams cad la thogs pa mi mnga' ba'i ye shes yin pa'i phyir ro //*. b) The second line expresses the Buddha's perfect accomplishment of abandonment (*prahāṇa-saṃpad*), because of abandonment of all misery of defilements (*kleśa*) and propensities (*anuśaya*). c) Then, the author shows the Buddha's perfect accomplishment of compassion (*karuṇā-saṃpad*), because he, out of compassion, is the protector of men in order to protect them from all misery of transmigrating world: (72a7–8) *thugs rje phun sum tshogs pa yin te / 'jig rten 'khor ba'i sdug bsngal thams cad las yongs su skyob par mdzad pa'i phyir te / thugs rje can ni 'jig rten pa'i mgon du gyur pa yin no //*. d) The next expression means the Buddha's perfect accomplishment of imperishableness (*akṣaya-saṃpad*), because of his staying till the end of the world: (72a8–72b1) *mi zad pa phun sum tshogs pa yin te / 'jig rten gyi mtha' gtugs par bzhugs pa'i phyir ro // 'jig rten mthar phyin pa zhes bya ba'i sgras 'dir 'jig rten gyi mtha' gtugs par bstan pa yin gyi 'jig rten gyi mchog la bya ba ma yin te / gang gis 'jig rten mthar 'byin ba de 'jig rten mthar 'byin pa zhes bya ste / mtha'i sgra ni 'dir gzhi la sgrub pa yin no // de nyid kyi phyir mi dge ba dang sdig pa med pa yin no // gzhan du na ni 'jig rten mthar phyin pa zhes bshad par 'gyur ro //*. e) Finally is mentioned Buddha's perfect accomplishment of excellence (*apratīṣama-saṃpad*), because of his superiority (*prakṛṣṭa*, *śreṣṭha*) over all sentient beings: (PSVy-ṭ, Chi. 72b2–3) *mtshungs pa med pa phun sum tshogs pa yin te / sems can thams cad pas mchog tu gyur pa'i phyir ro //*.

<2> The [threefold] Dharma<sup>9</sup> too, which was explained accordingly in terms of the [five perfections<sup>10</sup>], consists [respectively] in peace,<sup>11</sup> stability,<sup>12</sup> the path<sup>13</sup> and what is for the sake of the path<sup>14</sup>; by clearly realizing this [Dharma], the living beings in the three realms<sup>15</sup> (*sa gsum*) will revolve no more like a wheel.

**Note to <2>** In the second stanza is explained a threefold *dharma-pratisaṃvid*, i.e. special knowledge of the Doctrine (cf. LVP, *Kośa*, VII, p. 91 n. 1), as consisting of three elements, viz. i) *phala-dharma*, ii) *pratipatti-dharma*, and iii) *deśanā-dharma*; accordingly, the first is *nirvāṇa*, the second is the path (*mārga*), and the third is explanation (e.g. the *Sūtras*, etc.). See Yaśomitra AKVy, p. 652.14–19, and AVN, p. 276.2ff. & notes. Cf. LVP, *Théorie*, p. 71f. n. 6 (*Śālistamba*). To these three kinds of special knowledge of the Doctrine are further conjoined five kinds of perfect accomplishment which are listed by Guṇamati as follows (PSVy-ṭ, Chi. 75b) (see the subsequent notes): 1) *sdug bsngal dang kun 'byung ba dang bral ba phun sum tshogs pa*, 2) *rtag pa nyid phun sum tshogs pa*, 3) *de thob par byed pa'i yon tan phun sum tshogs pa*, 4) *de gsal bar byed pa'i yon tan phun sum tshogs pa*, 5) *'khor ba dang mi mthun pa nyid yon tan phun sum tshogs pa*. Here, the

<sup>9</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 75b4): *chos la bstod pas yon tan phun sum tshogs pa rnam pa lnga bstan to // 'dir chos rnam pa gsum gyis bstod pa la / 'bras bu'i chos ni mya ngan las 'das pa'o // sgrub pa'i chos ni lam mo // bshad pa'i chos ni mdo'i sde la sogs pa'o //*.

<sup>10</sup> The fifth perfection is a knowledge based on the three kinds of Dharma, Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 75b8): *yang gsum pa'i ni de la dmigs pa'i ye shes 'khor ba dang mi mthun pa nyid yon tan phun sum tshogs pa'o //*. See above, n. 3, and the following notes.

<sup>11</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 75b5–6): *de la zhi ba zhes bya ba tshig gis dang po'i ni sdug bsngal dang kun 'byung ba dang bral ba dang bral ba phun sum tshogs pa ste / rgyu dang bcas pa'i sdug bsngal thams cad nye bar zhi ba'i mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro //*.

<sup>12</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 75b6): *gnas zhes bya bas ni rtag pa nyid phun sum tshogs pa yin te / de kho na nyid las mi bskyod pa'i don gyis so //*.

<sup>13</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 75b6–7): *lam zhes bya bas sgrub pa'i chos kyi ni de thob par byed pa'i yon tan phun sum tshogs pa'o //*.

<sup>14</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 75b7–8): *lam gyi ched (xyl.: chid) du byas zhes bya ba gsum pas ni de gsal bar byed pa'i yon tan phun sum tshogs pa'o // lam gyi ched (xyl.: chid) du byas pa ni lam kyi ched (xyl.: chid) du gang yin pa ste / bshad pa'i chos so //*.

<sup>15</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 75b8–76a2): *gang zhig rab tu rtogs pas sa gsum 'di dag tu / 'khor lo bzhin du 'gro ba 'di dag 'khor ba med / ces bya bas phyin ci ma log par bshad pa'i don rtogs pa'i stobs kyi / mya ngan las 'das pa la zhi bar mthong ba dang / lam la lam du 'du shes pa'i rim gyis 'khor ba las ldog par 'gyur ro //*.

first four are connected with *zhi ba*, *gnas pa*, *lam*, and *lam gyi ched du byas pa*, respectively. Further, *zhi ba* and *gnas pa* are associated with 1) '*bras bu'i chos* (*phala-dharma*), *lam* is connected with 2) *sgrub pa'i chos* (*pratipatti-dharma*), and *lam gyi ched du byas pa* is associated with 3) *bshad pa'i chos* (*deśanā-dharma*); the fifth kind of perfection is connected with all three types of Dharma, as is said to be a "knowledge based on these" (*de la dmigs pa'i ye shes*).

Vasubandhu, PSVy, ch. XVI, (Chi. 66b8):

(II) *chos kyi yon tan phun sum tshogs par brjod pa gang zhe na / (67a1)*  
*chos la bstod pa 'dir rnam pa gsum ste / 'bras bu'i chos ni mya ngan las*  
*'das pa'o // sgrub pa'i chos ni lam mo // bshad pa'i chos ni 'chad pa'o //*  
*de la dang po'i yon tan phun sum tshogs pa ni sdug [2] bsngal rgyu dang*  
*bcas pa thams cad shin tu zhi ba'i phyir zhi ba nyid dang / gnas pa nyid*  
*de las mi g.yos pa'i phyir ro // de ltar na de ni dge ba nyid dang / rtag pa*  
*nyid du brjod pa yin no // gnyis pa'i ni de thob par byed pa nyid [3] do //*  
*gsum pa'i ni de dag gsal bar byed pa nyid do // gsum char gyi yang de la*  
*dmigs pa'i shes pa ni 'khor ba dang mi mthun pa nyid yin no //*

<3> The Noble Community [of monks and nuns] who abide in these [three sorts of] Dharma, having completely transcended attachment<sup>16</sup> and having

<sup>16</sup> Those who have completely transcended attachment, they abide in the *phala-dharma*, says Guṇamati (PSVy-ṭ Chi. 77a6): *de la chags pa las 'das zhes bya ba'i tshig gis 'bras bu'i chos la (7) gnas pa bstan te / de lta ma yin na 'das par mi rung ngo //*. Moreover, there are four kinds of them: 1) those who have completely, without remainder transcended afflictions which are to be abandoned through seeing, as e.g. those who have entered the stream (*srota-āpanna*), and 2–4) those who have completely transcended afflictions which are to be abandoned through meditation, as e.g. arhats.

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 77a8): *chags pa las 'das pa yang [77b1] rnam pa bzhi ste / mthong bas spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pa ma lus pa las 'das pa ni dper na rgyun du (xyl.: tu) zhugs pa lta bu ste / srid pa'i rtse mo pa'i tshogs gzhan dag ni de lta bu ma yin te / ma spangs pa'i phyir ro // khams (2) gsum gyi bsgom pas spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pa las 'das pa ni dper na dgra bcom pa lta bu ste / tshogs gzhan dag ni srid pa'i rtse mo las 'das pa ma yin no //*.

thoroughly surpassed the [other] communities,<sup>17</sup> have the ten [*aśaikṣa*<sup>18</sup>] members, the eight [*śaikṣa*<sup>19</sup>] members, and eight divisions<sup>20</sup> on account of

<sup>17</sup> Those who have thoroughly surpassed the other communities, they abide in the *pratipatti-dharma* and in the *deśanā-dharma*, explains Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 77a7): *tshogs pa dag las shin tu 'das gyur nas zhes bya ba'i tshig gis ni sgrub pa'i chos dang bshad pa'i chos la gnas pa yin par bstan te / de lta (8) yin na ni de las 'das pa yin te / sgrub pa'i chos la gnas pa yin pa'i phyir ro // bshad pa'i chos gsungs pa bzhin du rjes su 'brang na ni legs par zhugs pa yin no //*. Moreover, those who have thoroughly surpassed the other communities, as e.g. those who have attained to (*samāpanna*) [the higher stage], because of realization of the result of entering into the stream (*srota-āpatti-phala-sākṣāt-kṛtvā*), [77b2]: *tshogs (xyl.: chags) pa las shin tu yang dag par 'das (3) pa ni / dper na rgyun du (xyl.: tu) zhugs pa'i 'bras bu mngon du bya ba'i phyir 'jug pa lta bu ste / de la tshogs (xyl.: chags) thams cad las yang dag par 'das pa yod pa ma yin par 'dod kyang shin tu 'das pa ni yod pa kho na yin (4) no // de 'dra bar tshogs gzhan dag ni ma yin no //*.

There are also five kinds of those who have practised rightly (*supratipanna*) by means of: morality (*śīla*), listening (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*cintā*), meditation (*bhāvanā*), and result (*phala*), (PSVy-ṭ Chi. 77b6ff.).

<sup>18</sup> *Aśaikṣas* are those who no longer need a religious training, being in the 8<sup>th</sup> stage. See AKBh ad VI.75, p. 387.14ff. (LVP, Kośa, VI, p. 295), and Yaśomitra AKVy, p. 606.29ff.: *sūtra uktam "aṣṭābhir aṅgaiḥ samanvāgataḥ śaikṣo daśabhir aṅgaiḥ samanvāgato 'śaikṣaḥ" iti //*. BHSD s.v.

See *Saṅgītiparyāya* X.2 (vol. I, p. 205): *daśa śaikṣā dharmā / katame daśa / aśaikṣā samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ samyaksamkalpaḥ samyagvōk samyakkarmāntaḥ samyagājīvaḥ samyagvyāyāmaḥ samyaksamr̥tiḥ samyaksamādhīḥ samyagvimuktiḥ samyagjñānam /*; *Saṅgītiparyāya* VIII.1 (vol. I, p. 188): *yadutāṣṭāv āryamārgāṅgāni / samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ samyaksamkalpaḥ samyagvōk samyakkarmāntaḥ samyagājīvaḥ samyagvyāyāmaḥ samyaksamr̥tiḥ samyaksamādhīḥ /*.

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 78a1–2): *yan lag bcu zhes gsungs pa la yan lag bcu ni lam gyi yan lag brgyad dang / yang dag par rnam par grol ba dang / yang dag par rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong ba'o //*. Cf. AKBh, p. 198.24: *aṣṭau mārgāṅgāni*; p. 387.14ff.: *samyag-vimukti, samyag-jñāna* (LVP, Kośa, VI, p. 295).

<sup>19</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 78b4): *yan lag brgyad dang ldan pa nyid ni slob pa'i dge 'dun (5) gyi yon tan phun sum tshogs pa yin te / \*rig pa dang zhabs su ldan pa'i phyir dang / yang dag pa'i rnam par grol ba dang / ye shes mthong ba gnyis med pa'i phyir ro //*.

<sup>\*</sup>*rig pa dang zhabs su ldan pa*, BHSD: *vidyā-caraṇa-sampanna*, (= Mvy 3).

<sup>20</sup> *Saṅgītiparyāya* IV.10a (vol. I, p. 98): *catvāri śrāmaṇyaphalāni / katamāni catvāri / srotaāpattiphalaṃ sakṛdāgāmiphalaṃ anāgāmiphalaṃ agraphalaṃ arhatvam /*; IV.11: *catvāri srotāpattyaṅgāni / katamāni catvāri / satpuruṣasaṃsevaḥ saddharmaśravaṇaṃ yoniśo manasikāro dharmānudharmapratipattiḥ /*.

the [four] Paths [of the results] (*phala-mārga*) and the [four] results of the Path (*mārga-phala*).

**Note to <3>** According to Vasubandhu, the perfect accomplishment of good qualities of the Noble Community is, in short, (1) deliverance from the fetters [made] by afflictions which are to be abandoned through seeing and meditation, and (2) superiority over the other assemblies; moreover, in full, it is also (3) with the assembly of not trainees (*āśaikṣa*)—possessing ten members, because of possessing perfection in wisdom and good conduct (*vidyā-caraṇa-sampannatva*), deliverance from its fruits, and perfection in wisdom of deliverance; (4) with the assembly of trainees (*śaikṣa*)—possessing eight members, because of possessing the perfection in wisdom and good conduct; (5) with the both—there are eight kinds of perfection: accordingly, by the path of four results and by the result of four paths, because of difference in states of these members. PSVy, ch. XIV, (Chi. 67a3):

(III) *dge 'dun gyi yon tan phun sum tshogs par brjod pa gang zhe na / mdor na mthong [4] ba dang bsgom pas spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pas bcings pa las grol ba nyid dang / dge 'dun gzhan la khyad par gyur pa nyid do // rgyas par byas na yang mi slob pa'i dge 'dun gyi ni yan lag bcu dang ldan pa nyid de / rig pa [5] dang zhabs su ldan pa nyid dang / de'i 'bras bu rnam par grol ba nyid dang / rnam par grol ba'i ye shes phun sum tshogs pa yin pa'i phyir ro // slob pa'i dge 'dun gyi yan lag brgyad dang ldan pa nyid yin te / rig pa dang zhabs [6] su ldan pa yin pa'i phyir ro // gnyis ka'i ni yan lag de'i gnas skabs kyi bye brag yin pa'i phyir ji ltar rigs par 'bras bu bzhi'i lam dang / lam bzhi'i 'bras bu'i sgo nas phun sum tshogs pa brgyad do //*

Guṇamati explicitly mentions five kinds of the perfect accomplishment of the Noble Community, saying (PSVy-ṭ Chi. 77a5):

*dge 'dun la bstod pas kyang yon tan phun sum tshogs pa rnam pa lnga bstan te / mthong ba dang bsgoms pas spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pa'i 'ching ba las 'grol ba nyid dang </> mang po gzhan dang gzhan dag las khyad (6) par <du> 'phags pa nyid dang / yan lag bcu dang ldan pa nyid dang / yan lag brgyad dang ldan pa nyid dang / dbye ba rnam pa brgyad yin no //*

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Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 78b7): *dbye ba brgyad ni gnyis ka'i yon tan phun sum tshogs pa yin te / 'bras bu'i lam (8) dang lam gyi 'bras bu'i bye brag rab tu ston pa'i phyir ro //*. Cf. AKBh, p. 379.15: *phala-mārga*; LVP, Kośa, VI, p. 272; II, p. 276; VI, p. 241.

<4> I wish<sup>21</sup> to expound upon the Sūtra<sup>22</sup> named “On the dependent origination” (*Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*), which was little explained<sup>23</sup> (*nirukta*) [by the Buddha]; [thus,]<sup>24</sup> (a) having heard [it] from the Superior One, and (b) having perceived the others desire [an explanation], then (c) we will investigate [the subject] briefly by relying upon this [Sūtra].

[B. Subject of investigation—Sūtra]<sup>25</sup>

[C. *ādi*]<sup>26</sup>

[D. *vibhaṅga*]

50. What is the detailed exposition (*rnam par dbye ba, vibhaṅga*)<sup>27</sup> of dependent origination?

The divisions in terms of ignorance (*avidyā*) and the other [eleven members] are stated with reference to this [question].

<sup>21</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 80a2): *smra bar bdag 'dod ces bya ba'i tha tshig go /*.

<sup>22</sup> See Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 79b1ff.) for a few explanations of the term *sūtra*: *de la don brjod par byed pas na mdo sde'o // yang na don sbrengs pas na mdo sde ste / skud pa sbrengs pa bzhin te / rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba brjod pa zhes bya ba don gang yin pa'o //*. Cf. also *Sgra sbyor bam po gnyis pa*, No. 126, p. 52: *sūtra zhes bya ba arthasūcanād sūtra zhes bya ste /*.

<sup>23</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 79b8): *phyogs gcig nges par bshad pa zhes bya ba'i don gang yin pa ste /*.

<sup>24</sup> Guṇamati explains (PSVy-ṭ Chi. 80a3ff.) that the expressions (a), (b), (c) are used by Vasubandhu in opposition to the three faults (*nyes pa gsum*): a) lack of trust, lack of confidence (*yid mi ches pa, asampratyaya*), b) uncertainty, doubt (*the tshom, vicikitsā*), c) wrong attribution and denial, refutation (*sgro 'dogs pa dang skur ba 'debs pa, adhyāropa/apavāda*).

<sup>25</sup> Translation in Mejer 2022. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 80b4–82a6) quotes in extenso the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*.

<sup>26</sup> Translation in Mejer 2022. See NidSa 16 (*\*Ādi[-sūtra]*), p. 157 nn. 2, 5. Cf. de Casparis 1956: 73 nn. 99, 108, 113. The text of *ādi*-portion of the *avidyā*-chapter was edited by Muroji 1986; see also Takata 1958; Iida-Matsumoto 1978.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. NidSa, p. 157 n. 6, with further references; de Casparis 1956: 63 nn. 58, 64; 139 nn. 75, 76; BHSD s.v.



51. Ignorance and so forth are not dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). What are they then? They are [elements] originated in dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*).<sup>28</sup>

Such was stated by the Bhagavat in another **Sūtra** [where He said]:

What is dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpādaḥ*)?—When this exists, that comes into existence, etc.<sup>29</sup>

Which are the elements originated in dependence (*pratītyasamutpannā dharmāḥ*)?—From ignorance and formations, up to existence and old age and death.<sup>30</sup>

52. What is the intention (*dgongs pa, abhiprāya*) here?<sup>31</sup>

[Answer:] “Dependent origination” (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is the general characteristic (*spyi'i mtshan nyid, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of the originated elements: not having existed [earlier], it exists [now] (*abhūtvā bhavati*).<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> According to the Scripture, there is no difference between ‘dependent origination’ and the dharmas ‘originated in dependence’, both being constituted by conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) dharmas. Cf. AKBh III.27, p. 136.2–3: *uktaṃ bhagavatā / pratītyasamutpādaṃ vo bhikṣavo deśayisyāmi pratītyasamutpannāṃś ca dharmān iti / atha ka eṣāṃ viśeṣaḥ / śāstratas tāvan na kaścit / ubhayaṃ hi sarve saṃskṛtā dharmā iti* /. Cf. LVP, *Kośa*, III, p. 72 n. 4 [= SN II.25]. However, certain masters (sthavira Pūrṇaśa) claimed four possibilities (*catuṣkoṭika*) where “dependent origination” was different from the dharmas “originated in dependence”, cf. AKBh III.28a–b, p. 136.11–14: *sthavira-Pūrṇaśaḥ kilāha / syāt pratītyasamutpādo na pratītyasamutpannā dharmā iti / catuṣkoṭikaḥ / prathamā koṭir anāgatā dharmāḥ / dvitīyārhatāś caramāḥ / tritīyā tadanye 'tītapratyutpannā dharmāḥ / caturthy asaṃskṛtā dharmā iti* /. Source of quotation: Pāsādika 1989: 58 (no. 193); LVP, *Kośa*, III, p. 74 n. 2 (= *Vibhāṣā* 23.11). Cf. also Vism, p. 440: *paṭiccasamuppādo ti paccayadhammā veditabbā; paṭiccasamuppannā dhammā ti tehi tehi paccayehi nibbattadhammā* /.

<sup>29</sup> AKBh III.28a–b, p. 137.8–9: *pratītyasamutpādaḥ katamaḥ / yadutāsmin satīdaṃ bhavati, iti vistareṇoktvā (...)* /. See NidSa 14.2, pp. 147–149. Source of quotation: Pāsādika 1989: 59 (no. 194).

<sup>30</sup> AKBh III.28a–b, p. 137.13f.: *pratītyasamutpannā dharmāḥ katame / avidyā yāvaj jātir jarāmaraṇam* /. Source of quotation: Pāsādika 1989: 59 (no. 196).

<sup>31</sup> *artha-vibhaṅga/vibhāga*, see de Casparis 1956: 139 n. 76.

<sup>32</sup> Index AKBh I, p. 46. Cf. AKBh, p. 80.5: *jāyate ity abhūtvā bhavati* /; AKBh II.46a–b, p. 78.2–4: *saṃāsatas tv atra sūtre saṃskṛtasyedaṃ lakṣaṇam iti dyotitaṃ bhagavatā / saṃskṛtaṃ nāma yad abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca punar na bhavati, yaś cāśya*

53. How else could one explain the divisions (*vibhaṅga*)? How could one explain how growing old is something other than that which has grown old?

Why so?—What is [termed] dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) in that [other **Sūtra**], is said to be the point of departure (*ādi*) of dependent origination in this present [**Sūtra**, viz. the **Pratītyasamutpādasūtra**], and what are [termed] in that [other Sūtra] the dharmas originated in dependence (*pratītyasamutpannā dharmāḥ*) are [called] dependent origination(s) (*pratītyasamutpāda*) in this present [Sūtra].<sup>33</sup>

54. [Objection:] But if this were to be so, then why did [the Bhagavat] not say:

I shall explain to you dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and the divisions of what has originated in dependence (*pratītyasamutpanna*)?

[Answer:] Since this religious discourse (*dharma-paryāya*)<sup>34</sup> was intended to mean dependent origination, then in order to explain the aphorism (*mdo, sūtra*) of [dependent origination] as well as to explain it in extenso (*rgyas par, vistareṇa*), there is no contradiction in saying “I shall explain to you, o monks, the point of departure (*dang po, ādi*) of dependent origination and the divisions (*rnam par dbye ba, vibhaṅga*).”

55. Some<sup>35</sup> imagine (*rtog pa*) that what is originated (*byung ba, samutpanna*) and origination (*'byung ba, samutpāda*) are two different entities<sup>36</sup>—they too are refuted<sup>37</sup>: *pratītyasamutpāda* does not exist separately from *pratītyasamutpanna*, for it is shown that [these two] are qualities consisting in [mere] designations (*prajñapti-dharma, btags pa'i chos*).<sup>38</sup>

*sthitisaṃjñakāḥ prabandhaḥ so 'nyathā cānyathā ca bhavati, iti* /. Pāsādika 1989: 58 (no. 10): source of quotation unknown. Cf. LVP, *Kośa*, V, p. 57 n. 3 (sources of the definition *abhūtā bhāvāḥ*, see *Prasannapadā*, p. 263); Mvy 2182: *ma byung ba las ('byung ba = abhūtā bhāvāḥ*.

<sup>33</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 96a8ff.).

<sup>34</sup> See BHSD s.v.

<sup>35</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 96b8): *chos mngon pa pa dag* (= *ābhīdharmikāḥ*).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. AKBh III.28a–b, p. 136.9: *hetubhūtam aṅgaṃ pratītyasamutpādaḥ samutpadyate 'smād iti kṛtvā / phalabhūtam aṅgaṃ pratītyasamutpannam* /; LVP, *Kośa*, III, p. 74 n. 1.

<sup>37</sup> I read after Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 96b8): *de dag las kyang bsal ba yin te* /.

<sup>38</sup> BHSD sub *prajñapti*.

56. From [one] statement originates [another] statement.<sup>39</sup>

[Objection:] If ignorance too is *pratītyasamutpāda*, then what is its condition (*pratyaya*)?

[Answer:] It was said by the Bhagavat in the **Sahetusapratyayasanidāna-dharmaparyāya**<sup>40</sup> that incorrect judgement (*ayoniśomanasikāra*)<sup>41</sup> too is the condition of ignorance.

57. In the **Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra**,<sup>42</sup> [however,] the fivefold hindrance (*nīvaraṇa*)<sup>43</sup> is said to be [the cause of ignorance]:

What is it that brings about (or: establishes) (*gnas par byed pa*) ignorance?—It should be said, the five hindrances, [i.e. desire for lust, malice, torpor and drowsiness, frivolity and remorse, and doubt].

<sup>39</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 97a2–3): *tshig gang las zhe na / rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i chos rnams [3] gang zhe na / ma rig pa nas rga shi'i bar du gsungs pa gang yin pa de las tshig 'byung ba ni gal te ma rig pa yang rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba yin na zhes rgyas par 'byung ba 'di yin no //*.

<sup>40</sup> AKBh III.28a–b, p. 135.6: *ayoniśomanaskārahetukā'vidyoktā sūtrāntare\** /.

<sup>\*</sup> Yaśomitra AKVy, p. 288.25: *Sahetusapratyayasanidānasūtre*. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 97a3–6): *rgyu dang bcas rkyen dang bcas gzhi dang bcas pa'i chos kyi rnam grangs las ji ltar byas zhe na / dge slong dag ma rig pa yang rgyu dang bcas pa rkyen dang bcas pa nges par skyed pa dang bcas pa yin no // dge slong dag ma rig pa'i rgyu ni gang rkyen ni gang nges par skyed pa ci zhe na / ma rig pa'i rgyu ni tshul bzhin ma yin par yid la byed pa yin no // rkyen yang tshul bzhin ma yin par yid la byed pa yin no // nges par skyed pa yang tshul bzhin ma yin par yid la byed pa yin no zhes bya ba yin no //*. See Mejer 2001: 65(276)–69(272) for the translation of the *Sūtra*.

<sup>41</sup> See BHSD, SWTF sub *ayonis(ś)o-manas(i)kāra*. Cf. NidSa 25.6,7,16,17. Further see Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, Index s.v.

<sup>42</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 97a6–8): *Gsus po che'i mdo\* las sgrib pa lnga yang yin par gsungs te / de la sgrib pa lnga ni ma rig pa'i bdag nyid 'thob pa cing gnas par bya ba'i phyir sgrub par byed cing de'i rgyu na rjes su gnas par byed pa'i don gyis yin no //* For the Pāli text cf. AN V, p. 113.

<sup>\*</sup> On the problem of identification of the *Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra* cf. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, II, p. 280 n. 149; Schmithausen 1987: 338, 340; Muroji 1993, n. 68, 89. On *Mahākauṣṭhila* (*Gsus po che*) see Lamotte, *Traité I*, p. 47 n. 1.

<sup>43</sup> AKBh V.58d, p. 318.7f.: *yāni sūtre pañca nīvaraṇāṇy uktāni*, ① *kāmacchandaḥ* ② *vyāpādaḥ* ③ *styānamiddham* ④ *auddhatyakaukrtyam* ⑤ *vicikitsā ca* /. Cf. Guṇamati

58. False views (*mithyā-drṣṭi*, *log par lta ba*)<sup>44</sup> also [bring about ignorance] in that by having practiced (*āsevita*), cultivated (*bhāvita*), developed (*bahulīkṛta*) false views, a sentient being will be born in hell after the destruction of his body. Even if he should come to have the destiny of an unaware person (*brgyal mi*)<sup>45</sup>, then [due to his false views] he will be said to be one who is greatly bewildered (*rmongs pa chen po*, *mahāmoha*),<sup>46</sup> so it is said.<sup>47</sup>

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PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 97a7): *sgrib pa lnga ni 'dod pa la 'dun pa dang </> gnod sems dang </> rgod pa dang [/] 'gyod pa dang / rmugs pa dang gnyid dang </> the tshom mo //*. The same list in: *Saṅgīti-sūtra* & *Saṅgīti-paryāya* V.6 (vol. I, p. 135); cf. also ASBh §61F(x), p. 58f.. *Dhammasaṅgani* §§ 1152, 1486 lists 6 *nīvaraṇas*; *āvaraṇa* is a synonym of *nīvaraṇa* in DN I, p. 246; (*pañca*)-*nīvaraṇa*: AKBh IV.77d, p. 247.14; AVN, p. 180.2. Cf. Mvy: *sgrib pa* = (1383) *āvaraṇa*, (2146) *nīvaraṇa*. See also BHSD sub *āvaraṇa* (p. 107) and *nīvaraṇa* (p. 311). Further LVP, *Kośa*, V, p. 98 n. 5; LVP, *Siddhi*, II, pp. 639–657 (“Les dix et le onzième *āvaraṇas*”).

<sup>44</sup> For the definition cf. AK IV.78b–c, p. 247.20f.: *nāstidrṣṭiḥ śubhāśubhe mithyādrṣṭiḥ /* LVP, *Kośa*, IV, p. 167 n. 4. *Pañcaskandhaka*, p. 29: (3b5–6) *mithyādrṣṭiḥ katamā / hetum vāpavadataḥ phalam vā kriyāṃ vā sad vā vastu nāśayato vā yā kliṣṭā prajñā /*; cf. two definitions in YBh, p. 162.18–20; 182.13–14. See also BHSD s.v.

<sup>45</sup> Mvy: *brgyal ba* = *mūrcchā* (7578), *mūrcchita* (2195). Cf. Das, TED p. 88: *mi dang skal ba mnyam par skyes (māṇusāṇāṃ sabhāgatayābhyupapanna)* = “born with fortune equal to that of a human being.”

<sup>46</sup> *Suttanipāta* 730a: *avijjā h' ayaṃ mahāmoho*. The term *mahāmoha* is found in the *Sāṃkhya* and *Yoga* texts, e.g. YSBh ad I.8, p. 25: (...) *tamo moho mahāmohas tāmistro 'ndhatāmisra iti*; *Yuktidīpikā* ad *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 47, p. 240.11.

<sup>47</sup> AKBh IV.85a–b, p. 253.24ff.: *akuśalais tāvat sarvair evāsevitaḥbhāvitabahulīkṛtaiḥ narakeṣūpapadyate / tad eṣāṃ vipākaphalam / ced ittham āgacchati manuṣyāṇāṃ sabhāgatāṃ (...)* *mithyādrṣṭyā tīvramohaḥ / tasyā mohabhūyastvāt /* (= P Gu. 246a3ff.: *re zhiḡ mi dge ba kun du bsten pa dang goms par byas pa dang / lan mang du byas pa thams cad kyis ni dmyal ba* (4) *dag gi nang du skye bar 'gyur te / 'di ni de dag gi rnam par smīn pa'i 'bras bu yin no //* *brgyal 'di lta bur mi rnams dang skal pa mnyam par 'ongs nas yang (...)* (7) *log par lta bas ni gti mug shas che bar 'gyur ro //*). A parallel passage in AD IV.204, p. 177.7ff.: *tatrākuśalaiḥ sarvair āsevitaḥ bhāvitair bahulīkṛtaiḥ narakeṣūpapadyate tad eṣāṃ vipākaphalam / sa ced itthatvam āgacchati sa manuṣyāṇāṃ sabhāgatāṃ (...)* *mithyādrṣṭyā tīvramohaḥ /* LVP, *Kośa*, IV, p. 185, 186 n. 1, 2. Cf. Index AKBh III: *kun tu brten pa dang goms par byas pa dang lan mang du byas pa = āsevita–bhāvita–bahulīkṛta*.

As it was said in the three stanzas (*gāthā*) on desire and the rest [*rāga, dveṣa, moha*]<sup>48</sup>:

One who is attached does not know [the dharma(s)], one who is attached does not perceive the dharma(s).

59. Also contact (*sparsā, reg pa*) was indicated as a general condition (*sāmānya-pratyaya*)<sup>49</sup>: “Whatsoever [of the aggregates, be it the aggregate of feeling, the aggregate of perception, or] the aggregate of dispositions, all these arise in dependence on contact (*sparsā*).”<sup>50</sup>

60. In the **Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra**<sup>51</sup> ignorance (*ma rig pa, avidyā*) too was declared as a condition of ignorance (*ma rig pa*):

<sup>48</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 97a7–8): *tshigs su bcad pa gsum pa las zhes bya ba ni 'dod chags dang </> zhe sdang dang / gti mug rnams la tshigs su bcad pa gsum mo // chags pa pos ni chos mi shes zhes rgyas par 'byung ba de bzhin du khros pa po dang rmongs pa chos mi shes bya ba yin no //*.

<sup>49</sup> Derge & Cone Tanjurs read: *reg pa yang ci'i rkyen yin par bstan te*, but P, N, G Tanjurs and Guṇamati (PSVy-ṭ, both P 97b1 & C 88b2) read: *reg pa yang spyi'i rkyen yin par bstan te* = “‘contact’ was explained as a ‘general cause’ (*sāmānya-pratyaya*).” Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 97a8): *reg pa yang [97b1] spyi'i rkyen yin par bstan te zhes bya ba ni 'du byed kyi phung po'i rkyen nyid yin pa'i sgo (xyl.: sko) nas kyang 'du byed kyi phung po'i nang du 'dus pa yin no //*. AVN, p. 129.12ff.: *avidyā hi tṛṣṇāyāḥ sāmānyapratyayaṃ sandhāyoktā sparśaś ca / yasmāt sarvāsāṃ tṛṣṇānāṃ dhātu-[130.1]bhūmigatibhinnaṃ anyeṣāṃ ca kleśānāṃ avidyā sādharmaṇo hetuḥ, etad abhisandhāyoktam tṛṣṇāyā bhikṣavo 'vidyā hetur iti / sparśo 'pi tṛṣṇāsāmānyapratyaya eva, sarvacaitasikāsāmānyapratyayatvāt / ṣaṭ cakṣurādisaṃsparśajā tṛṣṇā, iti /*. Cf. also Ybh, p. 215.1ff.

<sup>50</sup> AVN, p. 124.7–8: *anyatroktam—yaḥ kaścīd vedanāskandhaḥ saṃjñāskandhaḥ saṃskāra-skandhaḥ sarvaḥ sparśaṃ pratītya, iti /*. Cf. also AD, p. 50.16.

<sup>51</sup> NidSa 23.11b, p. 192: *kim āsraṇān yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti / traya āsraṇāḥ / kāmāsravo bhavāsrava(vo ' )vidyāsravaḥ / ima āsraṇāḥ / evam āsraṇān yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti /*; [23.11c] *k(im ās)r(ava)samudayaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti / avidyāsamudayād āsraṇasamudayaḥ / ayam āsraṇasamu(da)yaḥ / evam āsraṇasamudayaḥ yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti /*. Cf. Nettippakaraṇa 79.9–11(–80.8): *avijjā avijjāya hetu, ayoniso-manasikāro paccayo /*.

What [does it mean that a noble disciple] recognizes correctly defilement(s) (*āsrava*)?<sup>52</sup> —[There are] three [kinds of] defilements: 1. desire as a defilement (*kāma-āsrava*), 2. existence as a defilement (*bhava-āsrava*), 3. ignorance as a defilement (*avidyā-āsrava*). From the origination (*samudaya*) of ignorance originate defilements.<sup>53</sup>

61. [Vasubandhu's opinion]<sup>54</sup>: Ignorance originates in dependence upon simple ignorance, but does not [originate in dependence] upon incorrect judgement (*ayoniśo-manasikāra*) and the rest because these, [i.e. incorrect judgement, hindrance (*āvaraṇa*), false view (*mithyā-drṣṭi*), passion (*rāga*), etc.] originate just from bewilderment (*moha*).<sup>55</sup>

When an [instance of ignorance] arises from its same kind (*rang gi rigs gcig las*), then incorrect judgement and so forth develop it far more, in that the developed seed<sup>56</sup> [of ignorance] will be far more difficult to eliminate.

<sup>52</sup> *Lalitavistara*, p. 348.21–22 lists 4 *āsravas*: *kāma-*, *bhava-*, *avidyā-*, *drṣṭi-* [= Pāli list, but there is also a list of only three, without *diṭṭhi*]; in the *AKBh* *āsrava* is equated with *anuśaya* (LVP, *Kośa*, V, p. 79); AVN, p. 273.8f. equates *āsrava* with the *kleśas*. Mvy 2141: *zag pa*. Cf. BHSD sub *āsrava*, “evil influence, depravity, evil, sin, misery”; SWTF s.v.

<sup>53</sup> According to Guṇamati it is so because ignorance is contained in the defilement(s) (PSVy-ṭ Chi. 97b1–2): *ma rig pa ni zag pa'i nang du gtogs pa'i phyir ma rig pa kun 'byung ba las zag pa kun 'byung zhes bstan pa yin no //*.

<sup>54</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 97b2): (...) *slob dpon gyi rang gi bsam pa ston par byed pa yin no //*. And further [97b3]: (...) *tshul bzhin ma yin par yid la byed pa dang sgrib pa dang log par lta ba dang 'dod chags la sogs pa skye ba'i phyir ro zhes bya ba tha tshig ste / tshul bzhin ma yin par yid la byed pa la sogs pa ni rmongs pa med par skye ba ma yin no // de bas na tshul bzhin ma yin par yid la byed pa la sogs pa las skye ba ma yin no // gal te de lta yin na sngar glengs pa'i mdo sde rnam ji ltar drang zhe na de'i phyir (...) //* (“...Incorrect judgement, etc. do not originate without [the presence of] bewilderment; therefore from incorrect judgement, etc. there is no origination. If it were so, then the formerly preached Sūtras would not be right. Therefore [the ācārya says]...”). See Mejer 2001.

<sup>55</sup> BHSD, *moha*: ‘bewilderment’.

<sup>56</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 97b6–7): *ji lta ji ltar tshul bzhin ma yin par yid la byed pa dang / sgrib pa dang log par lta ba dang / 'dod chags la sogs pa kun tu 'byung ba de lta de ltar ma rig pa'i sa bon yongs su rgyas [7] par 'gyur ro // yongs su rgyas pa na shin tu spang dka' ba yin te / de ltar na lhag par rgyas par byed pa yin no //* (“In as much as the incorrect judgement, hindrance, false view, passion, etc. arise, so much the seeds

Therefore, these [i.e. incorrect judgement, etc.]<sup>57</sup> are also declared to be conditions (*pratyaya*) of that [i.e. of ignorance].

62. Now, why were the conditions (*pratyaya*) [of ignorance] not stated in the present **Sūtra** [i.e. in the **Pratītyasamutpādasūtra**]?

[Answer:] In that [Sūtra] another [explanation] would have had to have been stated. That is to say, [the **Sūtra**] should have undertaken an explanation of the order of origination, viz. [of what originates] in dependence upon what. An explanation of the conditions of ignorance is unnecessary in that explanation as to why (*gang gi don du, yadartham*) there are the twelve members. And it will be explained later.<sup>58</sup>

63. Although a condition of ignorance may be something of its own type [i.e. ignorance itself], here it was not intended that there be mention of the conditions of the [twelve] members consisting in things of the own types [of the members], and hence here its [i.e. ignorance's] condition will not be explained.<sup>59</sup>

64. Here, [in this matter,] some object<sup>60</sup> :

Because the condition of ignorance has not been told, the wheel of existence (*saṃsāra*) has a beginning (*ādimat*), and with the

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of ignorance accumulate; having accumulated [they] are very difficult to abandon. Therefore [they] are very excessive.”).

<sup>57</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 98a1): *tshul bzhin ma yin pa yid la byed pa la sogs pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go /*.

<sup>58</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 98a5): *dgos pa'i dbang du byas te bstan pa yin no //*.

<sup>59</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 98a5): *ma rig pa'i rkyen rang gi rigs (6) yin yang zhes bya ba ni ma rig (xyl.: rigs) pa'i rigs ni rkyen yin te / ji skad du ma rig pa kho na la brten nas ma rig pa 'byung ba yin gyi zhes rgyas par smos pa yin no // 'dir yan lag rnam ky'i rkyen rang gi rigs brjod par (7) 'dod pa ma yin gyi 'o na ci zhe na rigs mi mthun pa rkyen yin no zhes bstan to // de lta ma yin na ni ming dang gzugs kyang ming dang gzugs ky'i rkyen yin pa dang / skye mched drug kyang skye mched drug gi rkyen yin no zhes brjod (8) par bya dgos par 'gyur ro //*. Cf. AVN, p. 122.10f.

<sup>60</sup> Mvy 2807: *rgol ba = codayati*; BHSD, *codayati* 'accuses', *codanā* 'accusation, reproof'.

additional member(s) the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum<sup>61</sup> is applicable.<sup>62</sup>

[Answer:] To this objection it is replied: in the previous mention (*pūrvanirdeśa*), in the other **Sūtra** [i.e. **Sahetusapratyayasānidāna**,] it was said:

Incorrect judgement (*ayoniśo-manasikāra*) is the cause of ignorance (*avidyā*).

65. [Thus, *saṃsāra* has no beginning and] there is no additional member<sup>63</sup> [to be put before *avidyā*], because it [i.e. incorrect judgement] is inherent in clinging to existence (*upādāna*).<sup>64</sup> Also the fallacy of regressus ad infinitum is not applicable, because both these [i.e. ignorance and incorrect judgement] are mutually conditioned, like a bird and an egg.<sup>65</sup>

As it was said in this very [**Sūtra**]: —

Defiled (*bsgos pa*) judgement (*manasikāra*) originates from bewilderment (*rmongs pa, moha*).<sup>66</sup>

66. Now, if one says that because all members were explained in the other [**Sūtra**, i.e. the **Sahetusapratyayasānidāna**] to be conditions, then it would

<sup>61</sup> Mvy 4722: *thug pa med par 'gyur (ba) = anavasthā-prasaṅga*.

<sup>62</sup> AKBh ad III.27, p. 134.20–23: *yadi khalu dvādaśāṅga eva pratītyasamutpādaḥ, evaṃ saty avidyāyā anupadiṣṭahetukatvād ādimān saṃsāraḥ prāpnoti, jarāmaraṇasya cānupadiṣṭaphalatvād antavān / aṅgāntaraṃ vā punar upasaṃkhyātavyaṃ tasyāpy anyasmād ity anavasthāprasaṅgaḥ //*. A parallel passage in AVN, p. 99.4–6.

<sup>63</sup> AKBh, p. 134.23; 135.5; AVN, p. 99.6; 99.12: *nopasaṃkhyātavyam /*.

<sup>64</sup> AKBh, p. 135.8: *sa cehāpy upādānāntarbhūtatvād ukto bhavatīti apare /*; cf. AVN, p. 100.3.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *Milindapañha*, p. 51.6–8: *kukkuṭiyā aṇḍaṃ, aṇḍato kukkuṭī*, simile hen and egg.

<sup>66</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 98b5ff.) refers to the \**Sahetu-sapratyaya-sanimitta-dharma-paryāya* (*Rgyu dang bcas rkyen dang bcas nges par skyed pa dang bcas pa'i chos kyi rnam grangs*): "Defiled judgement, i.e. incorrect judgement, because [it] is defiled with passions (*kleśa*), originates from bewilderment (or hindrance) (*rmongs pa, moha, tamas*), i.e. ignorance is said to be its cause, because [the expression] 'originates from bewilderment' means 'originates from [mental] bewilderment (*gti mug*,



follow absurdly that here [in the present **Sūtra**, i.e. the **Pratītyasamutpāda**-,] a/the condition<sup>67</sup> was not mentioned. And because [of the fact that], according to the **Abhidharma** opinion, both desire (*trṣṇā*) and ignorance (*avidyā*) are contained in clinging to existence (*upādāna*),<sup>68</sup> [we answer:] as for example, although a root was declared as a condition of the blue lotus, [then,] because a root was declared as a cause, there cannot be [its] causelessness. Here, given that [ignorance] would not (*ma yin na*)<sup>69</sup> become causeless due to the condition of ignorance not being stated, why should it follow absurdly

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*moha*)."

<sup>67</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 98b8–99a4): 'o na ni yan lag kun gzhan las rkyen nyid yin par gsungs pa'i phyir zhes rgyas par 'byung ba ni gal te mdo sde gzhan las ma rig pa'i rkyen gsungs [99a1] pas mdo sde 'dir de'i rkyen brjod par bya ba ma yin na 'du byed dang rnam par shes pa la sogs pa yan lag kun **mdo sde gzhan** las rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang rten cing 'brel par 'byung [2] ba'i chos yin par gsungs la mdo sde gzhan las kyang de dag rkyen yin par gsungs pa ni dge slong dag chos rnam sogs pa (*ādi*) dang 'grib pa (*apacaya*, *apāya*) yang bshad par bya'o zhes rgyas par 'byung ba dang / ma rig pa'i rkyen de bsod [3] nams 'du byed par mngon par 'du byed pa dang / ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis bsod nams ma yin pa dang mi g.yo ba'i 'du byed mngon par 'du byed pa'o zhes bya ba dang / gal te de bsod nams 'du byed pa mngon par 'du byed na ni [4] 'di'i rnam par shes pa bsod nams kyi rjes su 'gro bar 'gyur ro zhes rgyas par 'byung ba yin no //. ("If the condition of ignorance, having been declared in the other Sūtra, was not stated in this Sūtra, all [remaining] members: formations, consciousness, and the rest, which were declared in the other Sūtra as 'dependent origination' and 'the dharmas originated in dependence', would have been said to be the 'condition' in that Sūtra—"Monks, I shall tell you the dharmas, [their] beginning (*ādi*) as well as [their] decay (*apacaya*, *apāya*)." [In such a case] the condition of ignorance would form (*abhi-sams-kṛ*) the meritorious formations, and the non-meritorious (*apunya*) and immovable (*āniñjya*) formations would have been formed by the condition of ignorance. If the meritorious formations were formed by it, its consciousness would follow the meritorious [formations].")

<sup>68</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 99a4): *sred pa dang ma rig pa gnyis kyang chos mngon pa'i lugs kyis len pa'i nang du 'dus pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ci zhe na / brjod par* (5) *mi bya bar thal bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i skabs dang sbyar ro // de lta na ni rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba yan lag bcu yin par 'gyur te / chos mngon pa las kun nas dkris pa dang bcas pa'i nyon mongs pa thams cad* (6) *len pa yin par gsungs so // chos mngon pa smos pa ni mdo sde'i lugs kyis 'dun pa dang / 'dod chags nye bar len par 'byung ba'i phyir ro //*

<sup>69</sup> P, N, G read: *rgyu med pa can du 'gyur ba nyid ma yin na*; D, C omit negation, but it seems to be against the sense of the argument.

that *saṃsāra* would have a beginning? And why the cause of ignorance is not to be declared here?—this I have perceived (or: I understand).<sup>70</sup>

Just because of this, there is no occasion for controversy here. And just because of this no other (additional) member is [to be] declared beside old age and death (*jarāmaraṇa*), and [also] the [fallacy of] finiteness of the wheel of existence is not [to be applied].<sup>71</sup>

67. Others say<sup>72</sup> [that] through the demonstration of contact (*sparśa*) incorrect judgement (*ayoniśo-manasikāra*) is indicated [too]. Thus, in the other *Sūtra* this [incorrect judgement] is demonstrated at the time of contact:

In dependence on the eye and the visible [objects] comes into existence defiled judgement, which originated from bewilderment.

68. Also in speaking about feeling (*vedanā*), ignorance (*avidyā*) was mentioned. Since it was said in the other *Sūtra*<sup>73</sup>:

<sup>70</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 99a6–8): *dper na utpa la'i rkyen rtsa ba yin par bstan du zin kyang zhes bya ba rgyas* (7) *par 'byung ba ni ma smos pa'i phyir ma rig pa la rkyen med pa ma yin no zhes ston par byed de / yod du zin kyang dgos pa'i dbang gi phyir ram / dgos pa med pa'i phyir brjod par mi bya ba yin no // de nyid kyi phyir de ni bdag* (8) *gis rtogs te zhes smos pa ni de la yang gzhan brjod par bya dgos par 'gyur la gang nas brten te skye ba'i rim pa bstan pa brtsam par bya zhes bya ba yin no //*

<sup>71</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 99a8ff.): *de nyid kyi kyang 'di la rgol ba ma rig pa'i rkyen ma smos pa'i* [99b1] *phyir 'khor ba thog ma yod par 'gyur ba dang yan lag lhag pa dang de dag la thug pa med par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i skabs med pa yin no // (...)* [99b7].

<sup>72</sup> AKBh ad III.27, p. 135.10–12: *anyaḥ\* punar āha / ayoniśomanaskāro hetur avidyāyā uktāḥ sūtrāntare\*\* / sa cāpi sparśakāle nirdiṣṭaḥ / cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate āvilo manaskāro mohajāḥ, iti /*

\* Yaśomitra, AKVy, p. 289.23: *bhadanta-Śrīlābhah(-lātaḥ)*. \*\* Yaśomitra, AKVy, p. 289.24: *Saḥetusapratyayasānidānasūtre*.

Cf. *Nettipakaraṇa*, p. 79; AVN, p. 100.2–3. Further LVP, *Kośa*, III, p. 71 n. 3 (references to *Samyukta* 11.3; *Prasannapadā*, p. 452 [= *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*]). Cf. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 99b7).

<sup>73</sup> AKBh ad III.27, p. 135.12–13: *vedanākāle cāvaśyam avidyāyā bhavitavyam / avidyāsaṃsparśajam veditam pratītyotpannā tṛṣṇā, iti sūtrāntarāt /*. LVP, *Kośa*, III, p. 71 n. 4 (*Samyukta* 2.4; *Samyutta* iii.96).

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 99b8): *tshor ba bstan pas kyang ma rig pa bstan pa yin te zhes rgyas par 'byung ba ni mdo sde 'dir tshor ba'i rkyen gyis sred pa zhes gsungs pa ma rig pa*

Desire (*tṛṣṇā*) arises in dependence upon feeling (*vedanā*), which [in turn] arises from contact (*sparsa*) in which there is ignorance (*avidyā*),

then all these statements in the other **Sūtra** would also yield the fault (*skyon*) of it following that [various conditions] were not mentioned here [in the **Pra-tītyasamutpādasūtra**].<sup>74</sup>

[E. Grammatical excursus on the term *a-vidyā*]<sup>75</sup>

69. What is [the meaning of the word] ignorance (*avidyā*)?<sup>76</sup>

*med pa'i tshor ba ni sred pa'i* [100a1] *rkyen ma yin te / dper na dgra bcom pa'i lta bu'o // de ltar na 'dir tshor ba bstan pas ma rig pa bstan pa yin no // 'di skad bstan te reg pa dang lhan cig byung ba'i tshul bzhin ma yin par yid (2) la byed pa ni tshor ba dang lhan cig byung ba'i ma rig pa'i rgyu yin no zhes bya'o // ma rig pa'i 'dus te reg pa ni ma rig pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa la / ma rig pa'i 'dus te reg pa zhes bya'o // de las skyes (3) pa ni ma rig pa'i 'dus te reg pa las skyes pa'o //*

<sup>74</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 100a3): *mdo sde gzhan las gsungs pa de dag thams cad kyang 'dir mi brjod par thal bar 'gyur ro // ji tsam du rig par bkri (D: rigs par dkri) nus pa'i bar du \*kha che bye brag tu smra (4) ba dag na re ma rig pa dang rga shi gnyis la rkyen ma smos su zin kyang 'khor ba la thog ma dang tha ma yod par thal bar mi 'gyur te / mdo sde 'dir nyon mongs pa dang / las dang dngos po rgyur bstan pa'i phyir ro // ji (5) ltar nyon mongs pa las nyon mongs pa skye zhe na / sred pa las sred pa dang len pa'o // las kyang skye ste / ma rig pa las 'du byed dang len pa las srid pa'o // las las kyang dngos po skye ste / 'du byed (6) las rnam par shes pa dang srid pa las skye ba'o // dngos po las kyang dngos po skye ste / rnam par shes pa las ming dang gzugs ming dang gzugs las skye mched drug ces bya ba la sogs pa dang / skye ba (7) las rga shi'o </> nyon mongs pa yang dngos po las skye ste tshor ba las sred pa'o // de ltar byas na ma rig pa'i rgyu ni nyon mongs pa dang dngos po yin pa'am / dngos po yin no zhes shes par byas pa yin no // rga shi las (8) dngos po'am nyon (xyl.: nyin) mongs pa skye ba yin no // de bas na 'di la brgal du med do </> . \** Kāśmīrah.

<sup>75</sup> PSVy P Chi. 7b5–9a1; cf. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 100a8ff. Translated in Mejor 2002: 93–96 (slightly abridged). For the sake of completeness this section is included here in full, with corrections.

<sup>76</sup> AKBh ad III.28c-d, p. 140.24–141.1: *athāvidyeti ko 'rthaḥ / yā na vidyā / cakṣurādiṣv api prasaṅgaḥ / vidyāyā abhāvas tarhi / evaṃ sati na kiṃcit syāt / na caitat yuktam / tasmāt / (kārikā 28c-d) vidyāvīpakṣo dharmo 'nyo 'vidyāmitrānṛtādivat //* . LVP, Kośa, III, p. 88 and n. 3. Cf. Matilal 1985, esp. p. 322ff.

[Answer:] "Ignorance (*a-vidyā*, *ma rig pa*) is that what is not knowledge (*rig pa ma yin pa*)." The negative particle (*ma'i rnam pa*, *nañ-pratyaya*) is a synonym of the particle of opposition.<sup>77</sup>

This [negative particle *nañ* is observed as having seven meanings,<sup>78</sup> [viz. it may appear:]

<sup>77</sup> Yaśomitra, AKVy, p. 301.5: *tadvipakṣa iti / virodhe nañ\* iti darśayati /* 'gog pa'i rnam pa'i rnam grangs; Index AKBh III: 'gog pa = *nirodha*, *pratiṣedha*.

<sup>\*</sup> Pāṇini II.2.6: *nañ*. Abhyankar 1986: 213 sub *nañ* ('the negative particle which possesses the six senses').

<sup>78</sup> The sevenfold meaning of *nañ* is also found in the *Rasavaiśeṣika*, a treatise on medicine, p. 2f.: *ayaṃ ca pratiṣedhaḥ saptasv artheṣu vartate / katham /*

*pratiṣedhe ca sattāyāḥ, anyatve, sadrṣe 'pi ca /*

*kutsālpavirahārtheṣu vipakṣe cāpi nañ bhavet // iti /*

[1] *vastupratiṣedhe yathā abhāvāḥ, vastunaḥ sattām pratiṣedhayati /* [2] *anyatve abrahmaṇa iti "jātir aprāṇinām"* [Pāṇini 2.4.6] *iti ca /* [3] *sadrṣe abrahmaṇo 'yam akṣatriyo 'yam iti / brāhmaṇasadrṣo bhavati kṣatriyasadrṣo bhavati / tadvad iti gamyate /* [4] *kutsāyām aputra iti /* [5] *īṣadarthe alavaṇā yavāgūḥ, anudarā kanyeti /* [6] *virahārthe atapasvijano 'yam vihāra iti /* [7] *vipakṣe apuṇyam aśītam iti ca / atra tāvad vipakṣe draṣṭavyaḥ / rogavipakṣe (...)* / ("The negative occurs in seven meanings. In what manner? [Viz.:] 'This negative particle may be used in the sense of opposition to being [i.e. in the sense of absence], difference, similarity, contempt, smallness, separation, and contrariety.'—[Thus, the negative particle may be used] (1) in [the sense of] opposition to a real thing, as for example non-existence denies existence of a real thing; (2) in [the sense of] difference, [as e.g. in the case of the word] 'not a brahmin', and [according to the Pāṇini rule 2.4.6] 'species, without living beings'; (3) in [the sense of] similarity, [as e.g. the expressions] 'this [is] not a brahmin', 'this [is] not a kshatriya' [denote someone who] is like a brahmin, like a kshatriya, i.e. 'such as him'; (4) in [the sense of] contempt, [as e.g.] 'not a son', [i.e. 'bad son']; (5) in [the sense of] smallness, [as e.g.] 'not salty rice gruel', [i.e. not salty enough,] 'a girl without belly', [i.e. a girl with a slender waist,]; (6) in [the sense of] separation, [as e.g.] 'an abode without monks'; (7) in [the sense of] contrariety, [as e.g.] 'non-meritorious', [i.e. wicked,] 'not cold', [i.e. warm].—Here, then, it [= *ārogya* 'health'] should be perceived in [the sense of] contrariety, i.e. in [the sense of] contrariety (opposition) to disease (...)). I am indebted to Prof. A. Wezler for the reference.

AV-ṭikā (P 5852, Jo. 40b7–41a2) explicitly mentions four meanings of the negative particle: */ de la ma rig pa zhes bya ba 'gog pa'i tshig gi 'di don rnam pa bzhir 'gro ste / chung ba dang smad pa dang mi mthun pa dang med pa'o // de la chung ba'i don du 'gro ba ni [/] dper na bu mo rked pa phra mo la rked pa med pa zhes bya ba lta bu'o // smad pa'i don du 'gro ba ni dper na bu ngan pa la bu med pa zhes bya ba lta*

- ① [in the sense of] opposition of being (*sat-pratiṣedhe*), as e.g. [in the expressions] non-grasping (*an-udgrahaṇa*), non-existence (*a-bhāva*)<sup>79</sup> ;
- ② [in the sense of] difference (*anyatve*), as e.g. in [the grammatical rule] ‘species, without living beings’ (*jātir aprāṇinām*) [= Pāṇini 2.4.6], as it is evident from [the following expressions:] [a non-corporeal (*a-rūpin*, *gzugs can ma yin pa*), which is] different from the animated beings (*a-prāṇin*, *srog chags ma yin (pa)*), not being in the sphere of application [of a rule] (*a-pradeśastha*),<sup>80</sup> one which is different from corporeal (*rūpin*);<sup>81</sup>
- ③ [in the sense of] [difference in] similarity (*sadr̥ṣe*),<sup>82</sup> as it is evident in a saying: not a brahmin (*a-brāhmaṇa*), not a boy (*a-kumāra*), while [only] one

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*bu'o // med pa'i don du 'gro ba ni dper na zas med chu med ces bya ba lta bu'o // 'gal ba'i don du 'gro ba ni dper na 'grogs pa dang mi mthun pa la grogs ma yin zhes bya ba lta bu'o // 'di ni 'gal ba'i don du 'gro bar lta ste / rig pa dang mi mthun pa'i phyogs su gyur pa la ma rig pa zhes bya'o //* (“Here, regarding [the word] ‘*ma rig pa* (*a-vidyā*)’ the negative particle has the fourfold meaning, viz. [it may be used in the sense of] (1) smallness, (2) badness, (3) contrariety (opposition), (4) absence. In this, (1) the meaning of smallness is known [in such expressions] like ‘a girl without belly’, i.e. ‘[a girl having a] thin waist’; (2) the meaning of badness is known in [such expressions] like ‘not a son’, i.e. ‘a bad son’; (4) the meaning of absence is known in [such expressions] like ‘without food, without water’; (3) the meaning of opposition (contrariety) is known in [such expressions] like ‘not associated’, i.e. [in the sense of] ‘being contrary, in opposition to being associated’. [Thus, here] this [negative particle] should be known in the sense of ‘opposition (contrariety)’: ‘ignorance’ (*ma rig pa*) [means] ‘what is opposed/contrary to knowledge’ (*rig pa*).”

Cf. also Skandhila’s *Abhidharmāvatāraśāstra* (P 5599, Thu. 400a3–4): *rig pa'i gnyen po [xyl. pa] ni ma rig pa zhes bya'o // dgag pa ni gnyen po gzhaḡ pa'i phyir / mi mdza' ba la sogs bzhin no //* (“[The word] ‘ignorance’ means ‘what is contrary (opposite) to knowledge’, because the negative [particle] poses [here the meaning of] contrariety (opposition), like [in the words] ‘not a friend’, etc.”); Van Velthem 1977: 24 (T 1554, p. 983a11–13).

<sup>79</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 100b1): ‘*dzin* (2) *pa dang dngos po yod pa 'gog par nges par byed pa yin te / 'dzin pa yod pa ma yin dngos po yod pa ma yin zhes bya ba yin no //*.

<sup>80</sup> Mvy 6694: *phyogs na mi gnas (pa)*; Abhyankar 1986: 268 sub *pradeśa* (‘sphere, place of the application of a rule’).

<sup>81</sup> PSVy Chi. 7b6–7.

<sup>82</sup> PSVy Chi. 7b7: ‘*dra ba gzhan nyid la = \*sādr̥ṣyānyatve*, ‘in the sense of difference in similarity or resemblance’.

difference of another man resembling a brahmin, or a boy<sup>83</sup> is conspicuous, yet not a total difference<sup>84</sup> ;

④ [in the sense of] blame or contempt (*kutsāyām*), as it is evident in a saying: not a wife (*a-bhāryā*), not a son (*a-putra*), [with which are meant] a bad wife, a bad, contemptible son<sup>85</sup> ;

⑤ [in the sense of] small(ness), little quantity (*iṣad-arthe, alpārthe*),<sup>86</sup> as in [such expressions as] non-salty rice-gruel (*a-lavaṇā yavāgū*),<sup>87</sup> [i.e. with a small quantity of salt], a girl without belly (*an-udārā kanyā*), [i.e. a girl with a thin waist, very thin]<sup>88</sup> ;

⑥ [in the sense of] separation (*virahārthe*), as in [such expressions as e.g.] an abode without monks,<sup>89</sup> a hermitage without water (*\*an-udako 'yaṃ vihāraḥ*)<sup>90</sup> ;

⑦ [in the sense of] contrariety, opposition (*vipakṣe*), as in [such words as e.g.] non-meritorious (*a-puṇya*), inglorious (*a-prasiddha*).<sup>91</sup>

70. It was said in the recapitulating verse (*saṃgraha-śloka*)<sup>92</sup> :

<sup>83</sup> PSVy, all xylls. read: (*bram ze dang*) *gzhon nu ma\** (*dang 'dra ba*), *\*putrī*, fem. [sic!].

<sup>84</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 100b4): *'dra ba nye bar bya ba yin pa'i phyir //*.

<sup>85</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 100b4): *'dir chung ma dang 'dra ba gzhan dang bu dang 'dra ba gzhan (5) yin par nges par bya ba ma yin gyi / smad pa'i chung ma nyid la chung ma ma yin pa nyid ces bya / smad pa'i bu la bu ma yin pa nyid ces bya ba yin no //*.

<sup>86</sup> Yaśomitra AKVy, p. 310.8: *iṣadarthe 'yaṃ nañ draṣṭavyaḥ*.

<sup>87</sup> Tib. has: *tshod ma* = 'gen. cooked vegetables, greens' (Das, TED).

<sup>88</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 100b6): *res 'ga' zhig lan tshva med pa'i tshod ma zhes byas na 'di yang yod pa 'gog pa yin mod kyi / nyung ba'i don la yang de mthong ba yin no //*.

<sup>89</sup> *Rasavaiśeṣika*, p. 3.8: *a-tapasvijano 'yaṃ vihāraḥ*.

<sup>90</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 100b7): *dge slong nyung ba la yang dge slong med do // chu nyung ba la yang chu med do zhes nyung ba'i don la yang 'di mthong ste / 'dod mod kyi bral ba'i don la yang mthong ba yin no //*.

<sup>91</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 100b8): *bsod nams dang grags pa gnyis kyi mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi don la bya ste / phyogs dang 'gal ba la mi mthun pa'i phyogs (101a1) zhes bya'o //*.

<sup>92</sup> See supra n. 78 (*Rasavaiśeṣika*).

This [negative particle] is [used] in [the sense of] opposition to being [i.e. absence], difference, similarity, contempt, smallness, separation, and contrariety.

71. This [negative particle] here, [as applied to the term *a-vidyā*,] should be known as having several meanings.

Some [say:] ignorance is not a mere non-existence of knowledge (*vidyābhāva-mātra*); thus absence (*a-bhāva*) [is not the right meaning], because it is improper in the general conditioning (*adhipati-pratyayatā*) of arising of the formations (*saṃskāra*) [from ignorance (*avidyā*)].<sup>93</sup> [Otherwise how could be said that “conditioned by ignorance, i.e. non-existence of knowledge, there are formations”?] ]

72. [The meaning of] annihilation, cessation (*nirodha*) also does not fit (*na yujyate*) [the sense of mere non-existence of knowledge],<sup>94</sup> although it was said:

When ignorance has been annihilated (*avidyā-nirodha*) formations (*saṃskāra*) are annihilated [too].

73. Also [ignorance as] joining (*saṃyojana*), binding (*bandhana*), and the rest, [which was] mentioned in the other **Sūtra**,<sup>95</sup> does not fit [the sense].

74. Also incorrect judgement (*ayoniśo-manaskāra*) as a cause (*hetu*) does not fit [the sense of ignorance as a mere absence of knowledge].<sup>96</sup>

<sup>93</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 101a1): 'di ltar dngos po med pa ni 'du byed skye ba'i bdag po'i rkyen nyid du mi rigs pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba ni gang gi don du byas nas ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed ces brjod pa'o //.

<sup>94</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 101a1): gal te (2) ma rig pa 'gags pas 'du byed 'gag go zhes brjod pa'i 'gag pa yang ma rig pa dngos po ci yang med pa yin na rig pa ma yin no // ldog pa'i phyogs kyi dbang du byas nas rig pa med pa ci tsam (3) ni yang dngos po med par 'gyur bar mi rigs so //.

<sup>95</sup> AKBh ad III.29a, p. 141.7: *saṃyojanam bandhanam anuśaya ogho yogaś cāvidyocyate sūtreṣu* /. Cf. ADV, p. 298f.; LVP, Kośa, V, p. 73f. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 101a4): sogs pa'i sgras \*phra rgyas dang / \*\*kun nas dkris pa la sogs pa bzung ngo //. \*) phra rgyas = *anuśaya*; \*\*) kun nas dkris pa = *paryavasthāna*, BHSD: '(state of) possession'.

<sup>96</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 101a5–7): rig pa'i dngos po med pa tsam yin na ci zhe na / tshul

## 75. [Now,] some [say:]

In what manner non-indulgence in desire (*kāmālobha*)<sup>97</sup> becomes a condition of defiled (*saṃkliṣṭa*) worldly element(s) (*laukika-dharma*)?

This is a mere non-existence of craving (*lobhābhāva-mātra*). The imagining (*rnam par rtog pa*, *vikalpa*) that this is a mere mental object (*ālambana-mātra*), does not conform to the predominant condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*) of that [non-indulgence in desire]. From this imagining the desires for gain become defiled (*saṃkliṣṭa*).<sup>98</sup>

76. "Ignorance (*avidyā*) is bewilderment (*moha*)",<sup>99</sup> so it was explained [in another *Sūtra*<sup>100</sup>]. [Then,] if it [i.e. bewilderment] were a mere non-existence of knowledge, is non-bewilderment (*a-moha*) a mere non-existence of bewilderment (*mohābhāva*)? Or, if it [i.e. non-bewilderment, as a characteristic of knowledge] is a contrariety (*vipakṣa*, *gnyen po*) [of bewilderment], both are non-existent and are not knowledge, because of not being originated.<sup>101</sup>

*bzhin ma yin par yid la byed [6] pa rgyu yin par yang mi rigs te (PSVy: mi rung ngo) / ci'i phyir zhe na / dngos po med pa la rgyu yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir dang / 'dus byas rnam ni skad cig ma yin pa'i phyir dang / dngos po med pa ni bdag med pa yin pa'i yang [7] phyir ro // de dag gis ni snga na med pa yang bkag pa yin no //.*

<sup>97</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (P Chi. 101a7f. = C 92a2f.) also clearly reads 'dod ma chags pa = \**kāmālobha*; cf. also Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 104a8f.

<sup>98</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 101b2–3): *rnam par rtog pa de las rnyed pa 'dod pa rnam kun nas nyon mongs par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba ni ma rnyed par rnam par rtog pa las so // rnyed pa 'dod pa rnam zhes bya ba ni rnyed pa la chags pa ldan pa'o // de dag gis ni rnyed pa la rnam par rtog pa bye brag tu byas so //*. Cf. Das, TED, p. 498: *rnyed-'dod* = 'dod-chags, 'inclination for gain'.

<sup>99</sup> AKBh ad II.26a, p. 56.6: *tatra moho nāmāvidyā'jñānam asaṃprakhyānam /*; LVP, Kośa, II, p. 161. *Dharmaskandha* 3r1, p. 25: *saṃmohaḥ pramoho moham [!] mohajam iyam ucyate avidyā*.

<sup>100</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 101b3): *mdo sde gzhan las bstan*.

<sup>101</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 101b4): *gal te rmongs pa ni rig pa med pa'i dngos po tsam yin na rmongs pa med pa rig pa'i mtshan nyid dag ci rmongs pa'i dngos po med pa tsam yin nam / rmongs pa med (5) pa tsam ni ma yin pas de ltar mi 'dod de rmongs pa med pa ni shes rab kyi bdag nyid yin pa'i phyir rig pa yin no // 'on te ma rmongs pa rig pa'i mtshan nyid ni rmongs pa'i gnyen po yin na de gnyi ga yang (6) dngos po med pa la rig pa ma yin te zhes*



77. That what is different from knowledge (*vidyā*) cannot be ignorance (*a-vidyā*), because of [the fallacy of] too excessive application (*prasaṅga*), [viz.] with regard to the eye, etc.<sup>102</sup>

78. Ignorance is not a different thing, similar (*sadṛśa*) to knowledge, because of its non-existence, and because the entity (*dravya*, *rdzas*) of non-defiled indeterminate cognition (*akliṣṭa-avyākṛta-prajñā*) would become ignorance too.<sup>103</sup>

79. [Also] ignorance is not a bad knowledge (*ku-vidyā*),<sup>104</sup> because of its non-existence, and [because] also the entity (*dravya*, *rdzas*) of defiled wisdom (*kliṣṭa-prajñā*) would become ignorance.

[Query:] What [would be] the fault (*doṣa*)?

[Reply:] Defiled view (*kliṣṭa-dṛṣṭi*) would become ignorance.<sup>105</sup>

[Query:] What [would be] the fault?

[Reply:] [Because the propensity to ignorance (*avidyā-anuśaya*) and the propensity to false view(s) (*dṛṣṭi-anuśaya*)]<sup>106</sup> would not be mentioned separately. [Moreover,] if (*gal te*) the wisdom associated with defilement(s) (*kliṣṭa-prajñā*), [which are] different from it, [would] become ignorance.

[Query:] What [kind of] fault it [would] be?

[Reply:] [In such a case] independent ignorance (*āveṇikī avidyā*)<sup>107</sup> would not exist. [And] the bad view (*akuśala-dṛṣṭi*) too, would not be associated with the root of bad(ness) (*akuśala-mūla-saṃprayukta*).

*bya ba'i gnyi ga ci zhe na / dngos po med pa dang gnyen po'o // ci'i phyir zhe na / de'i phyir dngos po med pa ni skye ba med pa dang ldan pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba smos so // (...).*

<sup>102</sup> AKBh ad III.28c-d, p. 140.26: *athāvidyeti ko 'rthaḥ / yā na vidyā / cakṣurādīṣṭv api prasaṅgaḥ /*.

<sup>103</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 102a7): *rig pa dang 'dra ba'i chos gzhan yang bram ze ma yin pa dang / gzhon nu ma yin pa bzhin du ma rig pa ma yin te / de med pa'i phyir dang zhes bya ba ni rig pa dang (8) 'dra ba chos gzhan de med pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go / (...).*

<sup>104</sup> Cf. AK III.29b: *kuprajñā cen na darśanāt /*. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 102b4–7.

<sup>105</sup> AKBh, p. 141.11: *kutsitā hi prajñā kliṣṭā / sā ca dṛṣṭisvabhāvā iti nāvidyā yuyjate /*.

<sup>106</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 103a1f.): *ma rig pa'i phra rgyas dang lta ba'i phra rgyas*. Cf. BHSD: *anuśaya* 'propensity, proclivity, disposition'.

<sup>107</sup> On *āveṇikī avidyā* see AK V.12, 14 (p. 286.18ff., 288.5ff.). Explanation of the term *āveṇika* in Yaśomitra AKVy, p. 458.19ff.; ADV, p. 80.14f.: *āveṇikaṃ nāma cittam*

80. Small knowledge (*alpa-vidyā*) too is not [to be regarded as] ignorance (*avidyā*). [Otherwise] the eighth knowledge and the rest (*aṣṭamādi-vidyā*), the incomplete/not accomplished knowledge (*aparipūrṇa-vidyā*) too, would certainly be(come) *a-vidyā*.<sup>108</sup>

81. This one which is dissociated (*viraha*) with knowledge (*vidyā*) too is not [to be regarded as] *avidyā*, [in case one would identify *avidyā* with that what is dissociated with *vidyā*]; [otherwise] all these: the eye, etc. of a stream of non-originated (*anutpanna-srotas*) *vidyā*—certainly would be [regarded as] *avidyā*.

82. [Now,] ignorance (*avidyā*) should be understood as another element, contrary to/opposite of (*pratiṣedha*) knowledge (*vidyā*),<sup>109</sup> like [in such expressions as e.g.] unmeritorious (*a-puṇya*), unknown (*a-prasiddha*), and as [in the case of] non-craving (*a-lobha*) [and] non-hatred (*a-dveṣa*).<sup>110</sup>

83. [Question:] What is its [= ignorance] nature?  
[Answer:] Firstly (*tāvat*), one which has in its own nature non-craving (*alobha*) with regard to the thought of aspect of benevolence (*maitrī-ākāra*) and one which [has in its own nature] non-hatred (*adveṣa*) with regard to [the thought of] aspect of horrible (*aśubha-ākāra*).<sup>111</sup> Concerning these two [i.e. non-craving and non-hatred] are these two [i.e. the thought of the aspect of benevolence and the thought of the aspect of horrible,] [because they] are

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*yatrāvidyaiva kevalā nānyaḥ kleśo 'sti rāgādīḥ* /; AD k. 282, p. 241. Cf. AVN, p. 279.1ff. LVP, *Kośa*, V, p. 31. BHSD: *āveṇika* 'peculiar, individual, particular, special; Tib. *ma 'dres pa* = unmixed, unadulterated, pure'.

<sup>108</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 103a8–103b1.

<sup>109</sup> Vasubandhu declared ignorance (*avidyā*) to be a separate thing (*dharma-antara*), which is in the opposition to knowledge (*vidyā*), AKBh, p. 141.4–5: *evam avidyāpi vidyāyāḥ pratidvandvabhūtadharmāntaram iti draṣṭavyam* /. AVN, p. 103.8–104.1: *vidyāvīpakṣabhūtam amitrādivat / vipakṣeṇa ca vighānād iti darśitam bhavati* /. Cf. YSBh ad II.5, p. 136–137: *yathā nāmitro mitrābhāvo na mitramātram kiṃtu tadviruddhaḥ sapatnaḥ / yathā vāgoṣpadaṃ na goṣpadābhāvo na goṣpadamātram kiṃtu deśa eva tābhyām anyad vastvāntaram / evam avidyā na pramāṇam na pramāṇābhāvaḥ kiṃtu vidyāvīparītam jñānāntaram avidyēti* /.

<sup>110</sup> *alobha* = *chags pa med pa*; *adveṣa* = *zhe sdang med pa*. NidSa 23.7e; *trīṇi kuśalamūlāni / alobhaḥ kuśalamūlam adveṣa amohaḥ kuśalamūlam* /.

<sup>111</sup> On *aśubha* as *alobha* see AK VI.11c-d, p. 338, and see AK VIII.29–30, p. 452, on *maitrī*, *adveṣa*, *alobha*.

not [to be regarded as such if they have] no characteristics of the opposite to craving and hatred.

[Query:] Who will be able to ascertain the self-nature of the subtle matter (*rūpa-prasāda*, *gzugs dang ba*)<sup>112</sup> of the eye and other senses?

[Reply:] From the performance of action of seeing even of a sleeping [person] this will be ascertained to exist. Similarly, existence (*yod pa nyid*, *astitva*) of ignorance (*ma rig pa*) will be ascertained by the characteristic of contrariety to knowledge (*rig pa*).

**84.** Which is this knowledge (*rig pa*, *vidyā*)?

[Answer:] That one which has ignorance (*ma rig pa*, *avidyā*) as its contrary.<sup>113</sup> In principle, it is the supramundane wisdom (*lokottara-prajñā*)<sup>114</sup> and [that which is] corresponding to it (*de dang rjes su mthun pa*),<sup>115</sup> and also [that which is] attained afterwards (*de'i rjes la thob pa*, *tat-prṣṭha-labdha*).<sup>116</sup> Acting for the purpose of this [supramundane wisdom]<sup>117</sup> and making it completely purified,<sup>118</sup> wisdom (*prajñā*) which originated from hearing, reflection and meditation (*śrutā-cintā-bhāvanā-mayī*) is called knowledge (*vidyā*).<sup>119</sup>

<sup>112</sup> AKBh ad I.9, p. 5.27ff.; AVN, p. 93.7ff.: (94.1) *svavijñānāśraya-svaviṣayālocanakriyo rūpaprasāda iti bodhavyam* /.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. *Cūḷavedallasutta* (MN I, p. 304): *avijjāya pan' ayye kiṃ paṭibhāgo ti. avijjāya kho āvuso Visākha vijjā paṭibhāgo ti.*

<sup>114</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 105a1): *de ni mnyam par bzhaḡ pa zag pa med pa yin pa'i phyir don dam par rig pa zhes bya'o* //.

<sup>115</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 105a2): *de'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste / 'bras bu'i rgyur brjod pa yin no* //.

<sup>116</sup> Mvy 6572. AKBh ad VI.4, p. 334.11–13: *yathā lokottareṇa jñānena grhyate tatprṣṭha-labdheṇa vā laukikena tathā paramārthasatyam / yathānyena tathā saṃvṛtisatyam iti pūrvācāryaḥ* //.

<sup>117</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 105a2): *'jig rten las 'das pa'i shes rab kyi ched du byed pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go* //.

<sup>118</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 105a3): *'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye shes thob pa'i thabs su gyur pa thos pa las byung ba la sogs pa'i shes rab ni rig pa zhes bya ste* /.

<sup>119</sup> Yaśomitra AKVy, p. 306.3–4: *vidyety anāsravā prajñā / avidyā \*kliṣṭam ajñānam* /.

\*) Tib.: *nyon mongs pa can gyi shes rab po = kliṣṭā prajñā*; *ibid.*, p. 581.5f.: *ādhi-mokṣikajñāna-pratiṣedhārthaṃ jñānam iti / ābhimānikajñāna-pratiṣedhārthaṃ vidyetyi / sāsravajñāna-pratiṣedhārthaṃ buddhir iti* /.

LVP, Kośa, VI, p. 246 n. 4.

85. In the **Sūtra** told by bhadanta Śāriputra [it is said]<sup>120</sup> : —

That which is in the five aggregates of attachment (*upādāna-skandha*): knowledge, seeing, [etc.] up to wisdom, illumination, clear apprehension, this is called knowledge.

If it is asked why this is [called] knowledge [we answer:] because it is correct knowledge,<sup>121</sup> and because by it<sup>122</sup> one comes to emancipation or to understanding—for that reason it is [called] knowledge.

Thus the etymology (*nirukti*)<sup>123</sup> [of the word *vidyā* in its various forms—*lokottarajñāna*, etc.] should be explained according to what is suitable (*yathā-yogam*, *ji ltar rigs par*).

86. It is also said in the **Sūtra** related by Śāriputra<sup>124</sup> :

Venerable Mahākauṣṭhila, [because of] cognition (*rab tu shes pa*) it is called knowledge (*rig pa*).<sup>125</sup> What does it cognize?—It

<sup>120</sup> PSVy Chi. 9a1–2: *gnas brtan sâ ri'i bus gsungs pa'i mdo las (...) shes pa dang mthong ba na<s> shes rab dang snang ba mngon par par rtogs pa zhes bya ba gang yin pai'i bar'di ni rig pa zhes bya'o //*; cf. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 105a6–7): *tshor ba (xyl.: da) dang rig pa dang shes pa zhes bya ba rnam grangs so //*; cf. also 106b1–2. Cf. also AKBh ad VII.7, p. 394.9–10: *tadupādāya yat jñānam darśanam vidyā buddhir bodhiḥ prajñā āloka 'bhisamayam idam ucyate kṣayajñānam /*; Pāsādika 1989: 114 (No. 458). A similar list of (quasi-)synonyms of *vidyā* is found in Ybh: Yc [Taishō 1579, p.] 763a24f.; Yt [P Tanjur 5542: *Yogācārabhūmau paryāya-saṃgrahaṇī*,] Yi. 34b2ff. [= *shes pa, mthong ba, rig pa, rnam par shes pa, ye shes, blo, rtogs pa, shes rab, mngon par rtogs pa*—M.M.]. For the references I am much indebted to Prof. L. Schmithausen.

BHSD: *āloka* 'light, illumination'; *abhisamaya* 'clear apprehension'.

<sup>121</sup> *yathāvat* = *aviparīta*, Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 105a7): *phyin ci ma log pa'i don gyis so //*.

<sup>122</sup> "By means of supramundane knowledge and that which is acquired afterwards", cf. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 105a7–105b1.

<sup>123</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 105b1ff.

<sup>124</sup> PSVy Chi. 9a3f.; Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 105b3: "one which was fully understood by Śāriputra in order to explain [it to the others]."

<sup>125</sup> Cf. AKBh, p. 61.21: *vijānātīti vijñānam (rnam par shes pa rnam par shes pa'o)*, and Yaśomitra AKVy, p. 141.17; references in Honjō 1984: 18 (no. 31). Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 105b8. But cf. also Yaśomitra AKVy, p. 302.4–5: *Buddhasūtrāt / na ca prajānāti na ca prajānātīty āyusman Mahākauṣṭhila tasmād avidyocyata iti //*.

recognizes, properly and correctly, matter (*rūpa*), the origination of matter (*rūpa-samudaya*),<sup>126</sup>

etc. in full. Because of having the sense of cognition, it is knowledge and understanding, and therefore, by means of etymological explanation, this is expounded by a synonym 'knowledge' (*vidyā*), because it is very well-known.

87. It was said that wisdom (*shes rab*) is knowledge (*rig pa*).<sup>127</sup> [Here,] knowledge is '[that which] makes known' (*rab tu shes par byed pa*).<sup>128</sup> How to understand the explanation of an agent (*byed pa po, kartr*) which is not different (*gzhan med pa*) from the performing of action (*bya ba byed pa, kāritra-karaṇa*)?<sup>129</sup>

If it is queried that in such a case one could not perceive [its] connection/application with the rest (*lhag ma'i sbyor ba*), [i.e. with the synonymous expressions], [it is replied:] What concerns this, on the authority of the words of śāstra (*gtsug lag*), [saying] 'what will be accomplished by cutting into two?', one cannot see this application (*rab tu sbyor ba, prayoga*) or, the Śāstra is not<sup>130</sup> an authority (*tshad ma*).

[Objection:] Why the grammar (*śabda-śāstra*) is [to be regarded as] an authority? Yet in the common usage (*loke*) one can see an explanation of an agent not different from the performing of action, as for example it is said: "From a seed a sprout is arising."

[Query:] Why then the action (*karman, las*) is indicated?

[Reply:] Because the object (*viśaya, yul*) of wisdom is shown. It is said: "In which object has wisdom arisen, that one has been cognized." Or,

<sup>126</sup> Cf. SN II, p. 163 (Sutta 114): (4) *vijjā vijjāti bhante vuccati / katamā nu kho bhante vijjā kittāvatā ca vijjāgato hotīti / idha bhikkhu sutavā ariyasāvako rūpam pajānāti / rūpasamudaya / rūpanirodha / rūpanirodhagāminim paṭipadam pajānāti //*.

<sup>127</sup> PSVy Chi. 9a5; Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 105b7ff.

<sup>128</sup> Index AKBh: *prajānāti*.

<sup>129</sup> AKBh, p. 31.4–5: *yadi hi vijñānaṃ vijñānātītiṣyate na ca tatra kartṛkriyābhedaḥ /*. See long discussion in AKBh ad II.42 on the problem 'who is seeing, and who is cognizing'; cf. Yaśomitra AKVy, p. 82.13ff.

<sup>130</sup> D, C: *tshad ma ma yin*; P, N, G read: *tshad ma yin*.

where there is a statement of the opposite side (*vipakṣa*), there is [its] suppression/subduing.<sup>131</sup>

[F. *avidyā-nirdeśa*]<sup>132</sup>

88. "That which is" (*gang de, yat tat*),<sup>133</sup> i.e. former mention (*pūrvanirdeśa*, *sngar bstan pa*), which was explained in that **Sūtra**<sup>134</sup> and in this one.

(1) "Nescience concerning the former part [i.e. past time]", etc.<sup>135</sup> —[it] shows a classification of ignorance [separately] by its objects (*ālambana*) and by [its] (quasi-)synonyms (*paryāya*). The former part [i.e. past time], and the rest are the objects; nescience (*ajñāna*), and the rest are the (quasi-)synonyms.<sup>136</sup>

Here, the former part (*pūrvānta*) [means] a part of the former life (*sngon gyi tshe'i cha*); posterior (*aparānta*), [means] the posterior part [i.e. future time].

"The one which is the nescience concerning the past time", [i.e. ignorance] because of a doubt: "Did I exist in the past time, or [not]?"", etc.<sup>137</sup>

<sup>131</sup> PSVy Chi. 9a8; Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ 106a6.

<sup>132</sup> PSVy Chi. 9b1ff. From hereon begins the actual commentary on the definition of *avidyā-aṅga* of the *Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra*.

<sup>133</sup> *yat tat*: NidSa 16.4 (*Ādi-sūtra*), p. 158: *yat tat pūrvānte ajñānam aparānte ajñānam pūrvāntāparānte ajñānam*; AVN, p. 103.2: *yad utety upadarśanārtham visarjanam*.

<sup>134</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 106a8ff.): *gang [106b1] de zhes bya ba ni sngar bstan pa yin te / mdo sde <de> dang de las gsungs pa'o zhes bya ba ni 'di lta ste **Gsus po che'i mdo\*** las phung po lnga la zhes rgyas par gsungs nas nye bar len pa'i phung po lnga po de dag yang dag pa [2] ji lta ba bzhin du mi shes pa dang / mi mthong ba dang mngon par mi rtogs pa zhes rgyas par 'byung ba'o // de bzhin du skye mched drug po la zhes rgyas par 'byung ba'o // de bzhin du skye mched drug po la zhes rgyas [3] par gsungs nas skye mched drug po de dag nyid yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mi shes pa dang mi mthong ba dang / mngon par mi rtogs pa zhes rgyas par 'byung ba'o // rgyas pa smos pas ni sngon gyi mtha' nas [4] brtsams nas mun pa'i rnam pa'i bar du mdo sde'i dum bu thams cad ston par byed do //.* \*) **Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra**.

<sup>135</sup> Cf. NidSa 16.4, p. 158f.

<sup>136</sup> AVN, p. 103.2–6: *pūrvānte 'jñānam iti / avidyāyā vibhāgenāḷambanataḥ paryāyataś ca prabhedam darśayati / pūrvāntādīny ālambanam avidyādīni paryāyāḥ /*

<sup>137</sup> Lit.: "Am I one who did exist..." PSVy Chi. 9b2fff. AKBh, p. 133.20–23: *tatra pūrvāntasamṃmoho yata iyaṃ vicikitsā kiṃ nv aham abhūvam atīte 'dhvani* (19) *āhosvīn*

(2) “Nescience concerning the posterior part [= future time]”: due to a doubt: “Shall I exist in the future time or [not]?”<sup>138</sup>

(3) “Nescience concerning [both] the past and the future”,<sup>139</sup> [i.e. the nescience of one who] without differentiation/completely is bewildered [and is] in the process [of transmigration],<sup>140</sup> or [the nescience of one who] thinks like this<sup>141</sup> :

*nābhūvaṃ (/) ko nv aham abhūvaṃ, kathaṃ nv aham abhūvaṃ iti / aparāntasaṃmoho (20) yata iyaṃ vicikitsā kiṃ nu bhaviṣyāmy anāgate 'dhvanīti vistarāḥ / madhyasaṃmoho yata iyaṃ (21) vicikitsā kim svid idaṃ, ke santaḥ, ke bhaviṣyāma iti /*; source of quotation Pāsādika 1989: 57 (no. 183); LVP, Kośa, III, p. 68. AVN, p. 103.4ff.: *pūrvāntam atītaṃ janma / tatrājñānaṃ kiṃ nv aham abhūvaṃ atīte 'dhvanīty evamādi vicikitsataḥ / aparāntam anāgataṃ janma / tatrājñānaṃ kiṃ nv aham bhaviṣyāmy anāgate 'dhvanīty evamādi vicikitsataḥ / pratyutpannaṃ vartamānaṃ janma / tatrājñānaṃ kiṃ svid idaṃ ke santa ity evamādi vicikitsataḥ / ebhiś ca padair vicikitsāsaṃprayuktāvidyoktā / etenājñānam evāvidyoktā /*. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 106b8): *de la sngon gyi [107a1] mtha' dang phyi ma'i mtha' gnyis la the tshom za ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i ma rig pa yin par gsungs pa ni ci bdag 'das pa'i dus na byung ba zhig gam / 'on te ma byung ba zhig gam / ji lta (2) bur bdag byung ba yin / ji ltar bdag byung ba yin zhes bya ba dang / ci bdag ma 'ongs pa'i dus na 'byung bar 'gyur ram / 'on te 'byung bar mi 'gyur zhes the tshom za ba'i phyir ro zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro //*. For this and the next passages see: NidSa 14.9–11, p. 150f. and nn. (with copious references to Pāli and Sanskrit parallels); cf. YSBh ad II.39, p. 222: *asya bhavati / ko 'ham āsaṃ kathaṃ aham āsaṃ kiṃsvid idaṃ kathaṃsvid idaṃ ke vā bhaviṣyāmaḥ kathaṃ vā bhaviṣyāma ity evam asya pūrvāntāparāntamadhyeṣv ātmabhāvajijñāsā svarūpeṇopāvartate /*. Cf. ASBh § 40E(i), p. 32.

<sup>138</sup> AVN, p. 103.6f.

<sup>139</sup> AVN, p. 104.1–3: *kvacit pustake pāṭhaḥ pūrvānte 'parānte 'jñānam iti / abhedena pravṛttisaṃmūḍhasya yad ajñānam / evaṃ vā kalpayato nāsti pūrvānto nāsty aparāntaḥ / etāvān eva puruṣo yāvān indriyagocara iti /*

<sup>140</sup> According to Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 107a3) this is the ‘independent ignorance’\* (*ma 'dres pa'i ma rig pa, āveṇikī-avidyā*): *dbye ba med par rmongs pa 'jug pa zhes bya ba ni sngon gyi mtha' dang phyi ma'i mtha' la spyod pa med pa kho nar 'khor bar \*'jug cing rmongs pa'i\* shes pa gang yin pa de ni ma 'dres pa'i ma rig pa yin par bstan to //*. \*) BHSD s.v. *āveṇika*: ‘peculiar, individual, particular, special’. \*—\* ‘jug pa la rmongs pa = pravṛtti-saṃmūḍha (Index AKBh ad III.74; AKBh, p. 135.26).

<sup>141</sup> According to Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 107a4) this is ignorance connected with a false view: (...) *de ltar rtog pa'i mi shes pa gang yin pa de ni \*log par lta ba dang mtshungs par [5] ldan pa'i ma rig pa\* yin par bstan to //*. \*—\* *mithyādrṣṭi-saṃprayuktā*

Past time [= life] does not exist, future time does not exist; so a man is only that much as far as [his] range of sense faculties [extends].<sup>142</sup>

(4) "Nescience concerning the interior", i.e. [the nescience of one who] holds a view of a [real, existent] sentient being in [his] own personal series (*svasantāna*).<sup>143</sup>

(5) "Nescience concerning the exterior", i.e. [the nescience of one who] holds a view of a [real, existent] sentient being in [some] other personal series (*parasantāna*).<sup>144</sup>

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*avidyā*.

<sup>142</sup> PSVy Chi. 9b4. Vasubandhu refers here to the Lokāyata thesis. The *Prasannapadā* (p. 360.6–7 & n. 5) explicitly ascribes the saying to the Lokāyatas: *anātmetyapi prajñāpitaṃ lokāyatikair upapattiyātmānaṃ saṃsartāram apaśyadbhiḥ / etāvān eva puruṣo yāvān indriyagocaraḥ / bhadre vṛkapadaṃ hy etad yad vadanti bahuśrutāḥ // ityādinā* /. The first line of the stanza is quoted in AVN, p. 104.3. See the elaborate discussion in Del Toso 2019: 213ff. (with copious references).

<sup>143</sup> AVN, p. 104.4–5: *adhyātme jñānam iti / svasantāne sattvadrṣṭimato\* yad ajñānam / satkāyadrṣṭisaṃprayuktā veyam avidyoktā* /. According to Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 107a5) this is ignorance connected with a view upholding the existence of a real existent body (*satkāyadrṣṭi*). \*) Tib. renders Gen. Sing. -*mataḥ* (> -*mant*) as a ppp > *mata* (*man*); perhaps one should read: *bsams pa'i'o* (?).

<sup>144</sup> AVN, p. 104.5: *bahirdhā jñānam iti / bahir eva bahirdhā / nipātāntaram etad* (6) *draṣṭavyam / svasantānād anyatra yad ajñānam / iyaṃ apy* (7) *avidyā \*satkāyadrṣṭi-saṃprayuktaivety anye / tad ayuktam / yasmāt svasantānāmbanaiva sattvadrṣṭiḥ* [105.1] *satkāyadrṣṭiḥ / mithyājñānam punar etad yuktarūpaṃ \*\*paśyāmaḥ / āyatanato vā svaparasā(2)ntānikaṃ cakṣurādhyātmikam / dvādaśādhyātmikā iti \*\*\*vacanāt / rūpādi-viśaya(3)-pañcaka-svaparasantānaṃ bāhyam / etad ālambanā vā'vidyoktā* /.

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 107a6): *phyi mi shes pa ni zhes rgyas par 'byung ba'i mi shes pa 'di ni \*rnal 'byor spyod pa'i tshul gyis\* 'jig tshogs la lta ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa kho na'i ma rig pa yin par bstan to // \*\*kha che bye brag tu* (7) *smra ba dag ni 'di ni lta ba ma yin gyi 'o na ci zhe na / log pa'i shes pa yin no // rang gi rgyud la dmigs nas sems can du lta ba kho na 'jig tshogs la lta ba yin no zhes brjod do //*. \*) According to the Yogācāras this is the *satkāyadrṣṭi-saṃprayuktā avidyā*, but according to the \*\*Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas it is a *mithyājñāna*, not a *drṣṭi*. Vīryaśrīdatta, the author of the *Arthaviniścaya-nibandhana*, ascribes himself to the latter opinion. \*\*\*) Cf. AKBh ad I.39a, p. 27.1: *katy ādhyātmikā dhātavaḥ kati bāhyāḥ / dvādaśādhyātmikāḥ (...)* /.



(6) “Nescience concerning both, [interior and exterior]”, i.e. a bewilderment (*moha*) without difference with regard to [one’s] own and [some] other’s personal series.<sup>145</sup>

(7) “Nescience concerning the action” (*karman*), i.e. [the nescience] of one who doubts (*vicikitsāvat*) [and/or] denies (*apavādin*) the existence of meritorious and non-meritorious [acts] (*pun्यāpunya*), [and the nescience of those] who regard what is unmeritorious as meritorious, as e.g. abstaining from killing animals [or abstaining from a suicidal] entering into fire (*mer ’jug pa, agni-praveśa*),<sup>146</sup> etc., [and the nescience of those] who regard what is meritorious as unmeritorious, as e.g. killing animals, [suicidal] entering into fire, etc.<sup>147</sup>

(8) “Nescience concerning the [karmic] result”, i.e. [the nescience] of one who doubts and denies the existence of a [karmic] result [of an action]; [and the

<sup>145</sup> AVN, p. 105.3–5: *adhyātmabahirdhājñānam iti / svaparasantānayor abhedenaiva nirātmatām aprajānato yad ajñānam tad adhyātmabahirdhājñānam / āveṇikī ceyam avidyoktā* /. According to Guṇamati this is independent ignorance (*āveṇikī-avidyā*, *ma ’dres pa’i ma rig pa*): Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 107a7): *gnyi ga mi shes pa ni rang dang gzhan gyi* (8) *rgyud gnyi ga la bye brag med par rmongs pa’o zhes bya ba ni rang gi rgyud dam gzhan gyi rgyud la bdag tu rtog pa ma yin gyi ’o na ci zhe na / bdag dang gzhan gyi rgyud gnyi ga bye brag med pa kho nar bdag med pa yin par ma rtogs* (107b1) *pa’i mi shes pa gang yin pa de ni ma ’dres pa’i ma rig pa yin par bstan to* //.

<sup>146</sup> These practices are classified among the five afflicted views (*drṣṭi*) —considering as cause (of attaining to heaven) that which is not a cause (*ahetau hetudrṣṭi*): AKBh ad V.7 (p, 282.10): *agni-jala-praveśādayaś ca na hetuḥ svargasya*; ad V.8 (p. 282.19): *jalāgni-praveśa*; LVP, Kośa, V, p. 18f.; ADV, p. 231.9 & n. 2; 232.3; Yaśomitra, AKVy, p. 450.27ff.

<sup>147</sup> AVN, p. 105.6–8: *karmaṇy ajñānam iti / punyāpunyāstitvavicikitsāvatām yad ajñānam / punyāpunyāstitvāpavādinām vā yad ajñānam / seyaṁ karmaṇy ajñānam ity uktā / pūrvāsmiṁ pakṣe vicikitsāsaṁprayuktā dviṭīye tu mithyādrṣṭisaṁprayukteti viśeṣaḥ* /.

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 107b1): *las mi shes pa ni bsod nams dang bsod nams ma yin pa yod pa nyid la the tshom za ba dang skur pa ’debs pa’<i>’</i>o zhes bya ba de la bsod* (2) *nams dang bsod nams ma yin pa yod pa nyid la the tshom za ba dang ldan pa’i mi shes pa gang yin pa de ni the tshom za ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa’i ma rig pa yin par bstan to* // *bsod nams dang bsod nams* (3) *ma yin pa yod pa nyid la bsod nams yod pa ma yin no* // *bsod nams ma yin pa yang yod pa ma yin no zhes skur pa ’debs pa rnam kyī mi shes pa gang yin pa de ni log par lta ba dang mtshungs par ldan* (4) *pa yin no* // *bsod nams la yang bsod nams ma yin par ’du shes pa rnam kyī mi shes pa gang yin pa de ni tshul khrims dang brtul zhugs mchog tu ’dzin pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa dang log par lta* (5) *ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa yang yin no* // (...) (108b4).

nescience of] those who regard what is the result of karma to be not its result, saying: "Everything has [some] previously done cause"; [and the nescience of] those who regard what is not the result of karma to be its result, saying: "The gods have originated by themselves."<sup>148</sup>

(9) "Nescience concerning both", i.e. [nescience] of those who declare [a cause] what is not a cause [at all], or those who regard God,<sup>149</sup> etc. as a creator of the beings.<sup>150</sup>

<sup>148</sup> AVN, p. 105.8–10: *vipāke 'jñānam iti / vipākāstitoavicikitsāvatām apavādinām ceti pūrvavad eva vyākhyānam /*.

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 108a4): *rnam par smin pa mi shes pa zhes rgyas par 'byung ba 'di yang the tshom dang mtshungs par ldan pa dang log par lta ba* (5) *dang mtshungs par ldan pa nyid du bstan to // rnam par smin pa ma yin pa la yang zhes rgyas par 'byung ba 'di yang \*gcer bu pa rnam ki log par lta ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i ma rig pa yin par bstan te / skyes* (6) *bu byed pa'i rgyu la skur pa 'debs pa'i phyir te / de dag ni thams cad sngon byas pa'i rgyu can yin par brjod do // rgyu dang 'bras bu phyin ci log tu lta ba yang log par lta ba yin pa'i phyir ro // rnam par smin pa la* (7) *yang rnam par smin pa ma yin par 'du shes pa ni zhes rgyas par 'byung ba 'di yang log par lta ba kho na dang mtshungs par ldan pa yin te / rnam par smin pa dang rgyu la skur pa 'debs pa'i phyir ro // lha rnam ni* (8) *rang byung yin no zhes gang dag brjod cing rgyu dang 'bras bu phyin ci log par lta ba yin pa'i phyir te / lha'i lus rnam par smin pa yin pa de la rnam par smin pa ma yin par 'du shes pa'i phyir ro //* \*) **Gcer bu pa = Nirgrantha.**

<sup>149</sup> On *īśvara* see AKBh ad II.45 (LVP, Kośa, II, p. 311–313) and YBh, p. 144f., analysed in Chemparathy 1968–69.

<sup>150</sup> AVN, p. 105.10–106.4: *karmavipāke 'jñānam iti / karmaṇi tadvipāke cobhayatra / īśvarādisṛṣṭajagatsaṃjñānam yad ajñānam / seyaṃ śīlavrataparāmarśasaṃprayuktā-vidyoktā / ahetau hetudarśanam iti kṛtvā / tad idam ekam evājñānam ubhayatroktam / anena hi vipāke 'pi saṃmūḍhā bhavanti / tasyānyahetukalpanād iti / ahetujagadvādinām vā / yo hi hetum apavādanti sa vipākasya hetupūrvakatām na prajānāti / teṣāṃ mithyā-dṛṣṭisaṃprayuktā-vidyā ubhayatrājñānam ity ucyate /*.

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 108a8): *gnyis ka* [108b1] *mi shes pa zhes rgyas par 'byung ba de la gnyi ga zhes bya ba ni las dang rnam par smin pa'o // dbang phyug la sogs pa 'gro ba'i byed pa po yin par 'du shes pa rnam ki mi shes pa gang yin pa de ni tshul khrims dang* (2) *brtul zhugs mchog tu 'dzin pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i ma rig pa yin par bstan te / rgyu ma yin pa la rgyur lta ba'i phyir ro // 'di ni gcig kho na la mi shes pa yin yang gnyi ga yin par bstan te / 'dis rnam* (3) *par smin pa la yang rmongs pa yin te / de'i rgyu gzhan du rtog par byed pa'i phyir ro // rgyu med par smra ba rnam ki yang yin no zhes bya ba ni gang dag rgyu yod pa ma yin no zhes smra ba de dag kyang gnyi gar mi shes pa log par* (4) *lta ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i rig pa yin par bstan te / rgyu la skur pa 'debs pa gang yin pa de ni rnam par smin pa'i rgyu sngon gyi yin par mi shes pas*

(10–12) “Nescience concerning the Buddha, and the rest”,<sup>151</sup> i.e. [the nescience of] those who have not understood, [who] doubt, or deny, after having heard about [it duly], the enlightenment (*bodhi*) of the Buddhas, the well-proclaimed Dharma (*svākhyāta*), and the well-conducted Community (*supratipanna*).<sup>152</sup>

(13–16) Similarly, when [they] have heard the definitions of [the Noble Truth on] suffering, and the rest, [they do not understand, doubt, and deny it], as [it was said] before.<sup>153</sup>

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*gnyi gar mi shes pa yin no zhes bstan no //.*

<sup>151</sup> AVN, p. 107.8–10: *buddhe dharṃe saṅghe vā'jñānam iti / buddhānāṃ bodhiṃ dharmaṣya svākhyātātāṃ saṅghaṣya supratipannatāṃ yathākramaṃ śrutvā tad anavabodhato vā vicikitsato vā pavadato vā yad ajñānam iti pūrvavat /.*

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 108b4–6): *sangs rgyas la sogs pa (xyl.: par) mi shes pa zhes rgyas par 'byung ba la khong du mi (xyl.: ma) chud pa 'am zhes bya ba ni ma 'dres pa'i ma rig pa yin par bstan to // the tshom za ba 'am zhes bya ba ni the tshom za ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa yin no // log par lta ba 'am zhes bya ba ni log par lta ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa yin no //.*

<sup>152</sup> AKBh ad V.22, p. 2935f.: \**Ābhīdharmikā āhuh / tathāgato bhagavān arhan samyak-saṃbuddhaḥ svākhyāto 'sya dharmāḥ supratipannaḥ śrāvakaśaṅghaḥ (...)* /. \*) Identification of the canonical source in Pāsādika 1989: 96 (no. 374).

<sup>153</sup> AVN, p. 108.1–5: *duḥkhe 'jñānam iti / duḥkhasatyasyānityaduḥkhasūnyānātma-lakṣaṇaṃ śrutvā tad anavabodhata ityādi pūrvavat / samudaye 'jñānam iti / samudayasatyasya hetusamudayaprabhavapratyaya-lakṣaṇaṃ śrutvā pūrvavat / nirodhe 'jñānam iti / nirodhasatyasya nirodhasāntapraṇītiḥsaraṇa-lakṣaṇaṃ śrutvā pūrvavat / mārge 'jñānam iti / mārgasatyasya mārganyāyapratipannair yāṇikalakṣaṇaṃ śrutvā pūrvavat /.*

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 108b6–109a1): *de bzhin du sdug bsngal la sogs pa la sdug bsngal la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid thos na zhes bya ba la sdug bsngal gyi bden pa'i mtshan nyid ni mi rtag (7) pa dang sdug bsngal ba dang stong pa dang bdag med pa'o // kun 'byung gi mtshan nyid ni kun 'byung dang / rgyu dang rab tu skye ba dang / rkyen gyi mtshan nyid do // 'gog pa'i mtshan nyid ni 'gog pa dang zhi ba dang / gya nom pa dang nges (8) par 'byung ba'i mtshan nyid do // lam gyi mtshan nyid ni lam dang rig pa dang sgrub pa dang / nges par 'byin par byed pa'i mtshan nyid do // snga ma bzhin no zhes bya ba de khong du mi chud pa 'am the tshom za ba 'am skur pa 'debs [109a1] pa'o zhes smras pa gang yin pa'o //.*

(17–18) “[Nescience] concerning the cause and the elements originated from the causes”, i.e. twelve links of existence which become causes, [with regard to the subsequent link,] and results, [with regard to the former link].<sup>154</sup>

(19) “[Nescience concerning the] virtuous and non-virtuous [elements]”, up to [“nescience concerning] those which have originated in dependence on (together with ?) the opposites”<sup>155</sup> —these are [the elements] assistant to enlightenment (*bodhipakṣika*),<sup>156</sup> together with their opposites, and together with the causes [of both].

(a) These are [called] virtuous [elements] (*kuśala*), because [they] are for the sake of peace (*kṣemārtha*),<sup>157</sup> have a desirable result (*iṣṭaphala*), and are contrary to ignorance.<sup>158</sup>

<sup>154</sup> AVN, p. 106.9–107.7: *hetāv ajñānam iti / vipāke hetvādaḥ / phale 'jñānam iti vipākaphalādaḥ / ahetujagadvādināṃ vā yad ajñānam / yaś ca hetum apavadati sa vipākasyāpi hetupūrvakatvaṃ nābhyupagacchati / ato hetuphalāpavādināṃ mithyā-dṛṣṭisamprayuktā'vidyoktā / hetuphale 'jñānam ity anenaiva gatārtham / hetusamutpanneṣv iti saṃskṛteṣu dharmeṣv ity arthaḥ / pratītyasamutpādeṣv iti hetubhūtam avidyādikam aṅgaṃ pratītyasamutpādaḥ, samutpadyate 'smād iti kṛtvā / pratītyasamutpanneṣv iti / phalabhūtam aṅgaṃ pratītyasamutpannam / evaṃ ca kṛtvā sarvāṇy aṅgāny ubhayathāpi sidhyanti hetuphalabhāvāt / na caivaṃ saty avyavasthā hetuphalavat pītrputravac ceti / etad anavabodhato vā vicikitsato vā'pavadato vā yad ajñānam seyaṃ yathākramam āvenikī vicikitsāsamprayuktā mithyā-dṛṣṭisamprayuktā vā'vidyoktā /*

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 109a1): *rgyu dang rgyu las yang dag par byung ba'i chos rnams zhes rgyas par 'byung ba la rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa'i srid pa'i yan lag bcu gnyis zhes bya ba ni ma rig pa la sogs (2) pa nas rga shi la thug pa'i bar de dag ni yan lag phyi ma las bltos na ni rgyur gyur pa yin la / yan lag snga ma la bltos na ni 'bras bur gyur pa yin no // de la yang de khong du mi chud pa 'am / the tshom za ba 'am / skur (3) pa 'debs pa zhes brjod par bya'o //*

<sup>155</sup> NidSa 16.4, p. 158: *kuśalākuśaleṣu sāvadyānavadyeṣu sevītavāsevitavyeṣu hīna-praṇīta-kṣṇa-śukla-pratibhāga-pratītyasamutpanneṣu dharmeṣv ajñānam*.

<sup>156</sup> BHSD: 402; Lamotte, *Traité* III, pp. 1119–1137 (Ch. XXXI: “Les trent-sept auxiliares de l'illumination. Note préliminaire”).

<sup>157</sup> Cf. BHSD sub *kṣema*.

<sup>158</sup> AVN, p. 108.6–109.1: *kuśalākuśaleṣv ajñānam iti / bodhipakṣeṣu savipakṣeṣu / tatra bodhipakṣyāḥ smrtyupasthāna-samyakprahānārdhipādendriya-mārgāṅga-bodhy-āṅgāni / tadvipakṣā ajñāna-kausīdya-muṣitasmr̥ti-vikṣepā-samprajanyāni darśana-bhāvanā-heyāś cānuśayāḥ / te bodhipakṣyāḥ kuśalāḥ / kṣemārtheneṣṭaphalatvāt / tadvipakṣāś cākuśalāḥ / akṣemārthenāniṣṭaphalatvāt / teṣv ajñānam tadanavabodhato vā vicikitsato vā'pavadato vā pūrvavat /* Cf. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 109a3–109b6).

(b) They are non-sinful (*anavadya*),<sup>159</sup> because they are the objects of praise by the wise [men].<sup>160</sup>

(c) They are [the elements which are] to be practiced (*sevitavya*) again and again for the sake of being made manifest.<sup>161</sup> [In the sense of having to be realized (actualized) again and again.]

(d) They are excellent (*tshim par byed pa, praṇīta*), for the sake of satisfying/pleasing (*prīṇāna*) body and mind; because of having [been united with] specific alleviation(s) (*pras(ś)rabdhi*)<sup>162</sup> [these elements assistant to the enlightenment satisfy body and mind].<sup>163</sup>

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I am indebted to Prof. L. Schmithausen for his comment (personal communication): “Probably bad Tib. transl.: —[From] “virtuous and non-virtuous” [elements] up to (yāvat) “saprati(vi)bhāga-pratītyasamutpanna” [elements]: [these] are the bodhipakṣika [dharmas] together with their opposites (vipakṣa) and together with the causes [of both, G(uṇamati) 109a6–7f.]. These (AVinN 108.8f. ... / te ... kuśalāḥ...) [viz. the bodhipakṣikāḥ and their causes] are virtuous (kuśala) because...’. G 109a4f. clearly shows that these [x] are the akuśala elements (mi śes pa, le lo, etc.), i.e. vipakṣa in the usual negative sense.”

<sup>159</sup> Cf. BHSD sub *sāvadya*.

<sup>160</sup> AVN, p. 109.1–4: *sāvadyānavadyeṣv iti / sāvadyā bodhipakṣyāṇām yathoktā vipakṣāḥ / prāṇivadhādikaṃ hi kutsitatvād avadyam ity ucyate / tac ca tadvipakṣāṇām kāryam / atas te sāvadyāḥ / tadviparyayeṇānavadyāḥ / ta eva bodhipakṣyāḥ vidvatpraśastatvād /*

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 109b6): *smad pa'i don gyi kha na (7) ma tho ba zhes bya'o // de las bzlog pa kha na ma tho ba med pa ni mkhas pas bsngags pa'i don gyis yin no zhes bya bar grub pa yin no // mkhas pa smos pa ni rmongs shing phyin ci log pas bsngags (8) pa bsal ba'i phyir ro //*. Cf. Chi. 110a4.

<sup>161</sup> AVN, p. 109.5–7: *sevitavyāsevitavyeṣv iti / ta eva bodhipakṣyāḥ punaḥ punaḥ sam-mukhikartavyārthena hitatvāt sevitavyā ity ucyante / hitaṃ hi punaḥ punaḥ sevanām arhatīti kṛtvā / asevitavyās tadvipakṣāḥ / ahitatvān na sevanām arhanti /*

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 109b8): *bsten par bya ba ni yang nas yang mngon du bya ba'i don gyis so zhes bya ba ci'i phyir zhe na phan pa yin pa'i phyir te phan pa ni yang nas yang du mngon du bya ba yin pa'i don gyis [110a1] bsten par bya bar 'os pa yin no //*

<sup>162</sup> Cf. BHSD sub *prasrabdhi*.

<sup>163</sup> AVN, p. 109.8–10: *hīnās te vipakṣāḥ kāyacittāprīṇanārthenāprīṇanatvāt / praṇīta bodhipakṣyāḥ kāyacittaprīṇanārthatvāt / samāhitasya hi prasrabdhiviśeṣayogād eva te bodhipakṣyāḥ kāyacittaṃ ca prīṇayanti /*

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 110a1): *tshim par byed pa ni lus dang sems tshim byed pa'i don gyis te zhes bya ba ji ltar yin zhe na de'i phyir shin tu sbyangs pa'i bye brag dang ldan pa'i phyir ro zhes (2) bya ba smras te / de dag ni lus dang sems la tshim par byed pa*

(e) They are white (*śukla*), on account of [their] purity (*nirmala*); because [they] are without impurity (*anāsrava*).<sup>164</sup> Their opposites (*viparyaya*) are the elements which are contrary to those [mentioned above], [viz.] the non-meritorious [elements] (*akuśala*), etc., [i.e. black (*kṛṣṇa*)].<sup>165</sup>

(f) "Possessing distinctions" (*sapratibhāga*)<sup>166</sup> —those [elements] which are assistant to enlightenment, which originated in dependence [and] in the impure states are resembling the opposites, these are [called] possessing the opposites (*savipakṣa*); because of origination in dependence on (relaying upon/in intercourse with) good people and on bad people, etc. (*satpuruṣa-/asatpuruṣa-(saṃ)sevā*)<sup>167</sup> and [in dependence] on the cause of a former birth.

(20) "[Or<sup>168</sup> ], cognition concerning the real state of things in the six bases of contact", is a cognition in accordance with the real state of things by means

*yin no //*

<sup>164</sup> AVN, p. 109.10–12: *kṛṣṇās tadvipakṣāḥ sāsravatvād anirmalārthena / śuklā bodhipakṣyā anāsravā nirmalārthena / āsravā hi cittacaittānāṃ malasthānīyās teṣāṃ ca teṣu vigama iti /*.

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 110a2): *dkar pa ni dri ma med pa'i don gyis te / ji lta zhe na de'i phyir zag pa med pa yin pa'i phyir ro zhes ltar* (xyl.: *lta*) *zhe na / de'i phyir zag pa med pa'i* (3) *phyir ro zhes smras te / zag pa rnams ni sems dang sems las byung ba'i dri ma lta bu yin no // de las bzlog* (xyl.: *zlog*) *pa zhes rgyas par 'byung ba ji lta bu zhe na / de dag ni mi dge ba ste mi bde ba'i don gyis yin te / de* (4) *'bras bu yid du mi 'ong ba yin pa'i phyir dang / rig pa'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs yin pa'i don gyis so // kha na ma tho ba dang bcas pa ni mi mkhas pas bsngags pa'i don gyis sam / smad pa'i don gyis so //* (5) *bsten par bya ba ma yin pa ni mngon du bya ba ma yin pa'i don gyis te / mi phan pa yin pa'i phyir bsten bar 'os pa ma yin pas so // tshim par byed pa ma yin pa ni lus dang sems tshim par byed pa ma yin pa'i* (6) *don gyis te shin tu sbyangs pa ma yin pa'i bye brag dang ldan pa'i phyir ro // nag po ni dri ma med pa ma yin pa'i don gyis te / ji ltar zhe na zag pa dang bcas pa yin pa'i phyir ro //*

<sup>165</sup> AVN, p. 109.10.

<sup>166</sup> PSVy Chi. 10a7: *rnam par dbye ba dang bcas pa*. YBh, p. 205.8; Dharmaskandha 3r7,8, p. 26; Chakravarti 1932: 198.8 reads: *sapratibhāga*; NidSa 16.4, p. 158 reads: *pratibhāga*; AVS om.! Cf. BHSD s.v. *pratibhāga*.

<sup>167</sup> AKBh ad VI.40, p. 361.11f.: *satpuruṣagatayo nānyā iti / yat tarhi sūtre evoktaṃ \*satpuruṣaḥ katamaḥ / śaikṣyaḥ samyagdrṣṭyā samanvāgata iti vistaraḥ /*. Cf. AN, V, p. 113.

\*) BHSD: 'worthy, true man'; Mvy 7358.

<sup>168</sup> After Skt.: *vā*.

of the supramundane (*lokottara*) knowledge of non-self, having these [bases of contact] as its objects (*ālambana*).<sup>169</sup>

Nescience with regard to this [cognition], due to which without having comprehended one forms conceit (*abhimāna*), [i.e. the conception/conceit of having comprehended although one has not].

89. What is the difference between the nescience concerning the Path (*mārga* 'jñānam) and the nescience concerning the real state of things (*yathābhūtam ajñānam*)?

[Answer:] By the former [it is shown to those who,] like the heretics (*tīrthika, mu stegs can*),<sup>170</sup> do not believe in (or: adhere to) the Path (*mārga, lam*) as the Path; by the latter [it is shown to those who] become conceited [i.e. form the unjustified conception/conceit of attainment] with regard to that very teaching [on the Path].

90. The divisions/kinds of the objects of ignorance should be known as referring to (*ārabhya*) the entering into [the wheel of existence]-side (*pravṛtti-pakṣa*) and the coming back [from the wheel of existence]-side (*nivṛtti-pakṣa*).<sup>171</sup>

<sup>169</sup> AVN, p. 110.1ff.: *ṣaṭsu vā sparśāyataneṣu cakṣurādīṣu yathābhūtam ajñānam ity aprativedhaḥ* /; Nālandā [8]: *yathābhūtasamprativedhe iti* /; NidSa §16.4: *yathābhūtam asamprativedha iti* / ("Nichtdurchdringen"); YBh, p. 205.9: *yathābhūtasamprativedhe 'jñānaṃ katamat* /. Cf. BHSD: *prativedha* '(intellectual) penetration'.

<sup>170</sup> PSVy Chi. 10b2f.

<sup>171</sup> AVN, p. 110.2ff.: *so 'yam avidyāyā ālambanaprabhedah pravṛttipakṣaṃ nivṛttipakṣaṃ cārabhya veditavyaḥ / yā ca pravṛttir āgatigatī pūrvāntādinā yasyāś ca sattvākhyaḥ svaparobhayaśantateḥ yathā ca karmaṇo vipākābhiniivartanam ayaṃ pravṛttipakṣaḥ / yo nivṛtter āśrayas trīṇi śaraṇāni / yad ālambanaṃ catvāry āryasatyāni samāsataḥ / vyāsataḥ punar dvādaśāṅgapratītyasamutpādaḥ / yaḥ sambhāro bodhipakṣyāḥ / ye cāntarāyās tadvipakṣāḥ / yaḥ svabhāvaḥ ṣaṭsu sparśāyataneṣu yathābhūta-samprativedhaḥ, ahaṃ paśyāmi yāvā vijānāmīty ātmadrṣṭīlakṣaṇāyāḥ satkāyadrṣṭeḥ pratipakṣatvād ayaṃ nivṛttipakṣaḥ* // ("This division (*prabheda*) of objects of ignorance should be known as referring to (*ārabhya*) the progress-side (*pravṛtti-pakṣa*) and the cessation-side (*nivṛtti-pakṣa*). Now, the progress which is coming and going [in successive births] (*āgati-gati*) by means of a former end [= life], etc., of one's own and other's and both stream under the name of a sentient being, so that [there is] a producing of maturation of action(s), this is [called] progress-side [of the process of transmigration]."

(a) The entering of one's own or other's stream, which is coming [from the former life into the later] and going [from the later to the former], which is called sentient being, because of producing maturation of separate actions—this is [called] entering-side.

(b) The coming back of one's own nature, which is support and object, and also which is an equipment [assistant to the enlightenment] and impediment [opposing to the enlightenment]—this is [called] coming back-side.

91. Here, support (*āśraya*) [means] three protections (*skyabs, śaraṇa*).<sup>172</sup>

Object (*ālambana*), in short, [it is] the Four [Noble] Truths; at length, the twelve-membered dependent origination (*dvādaśāṅgaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*).<sup>173</sup>

Equipment (*tshogs, sambhāra*) and impediment (*bar du gcod pa, antarāya*), [these are, respectively,] the elements assistant to the enlightenment and those opposing to it.<sup>174</sup>

One's own nature [means] [intellectual] penetration (*khong du chud pa, prativedha*) with accordance to reality into the six bases of contact, [viz.] "I

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Cf. AVN, p. 102.4: *ityevam saṃsārapravṛttim ākhyāya nivṛttim āha /; Madhyānta-vibhāgaṭīkā*, p. 28.21: *so 'yaṃ pravṛttipakṣam adhikṛtya dvādaśāṅgaḥ pratītyasamutpādo darśitaḥ /*.

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 110a8): *reg (xyl.: rig) pa'i skye mched drug yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud par mi shes pa gang yin pa de ni mngon pa'i nga rgyal dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i [110b1] ma rig par bstan to // de la reg (xyl.: rig) pa'i skye mched drug ni mig dang rna ba dang / sna dang lce dang lus dang yid kyi skye mched rnams te de skye ba'i sgo'i don gyis so // de la dmigs pa 'jig rten las 'das pa (2) bdag med pa'i ye shes kyi ni de dag yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud pa yin no zhes bya ba ni mthong ba dang / thos pa dang bsnams pa dang / ro myangs pa dang reg pa dang / rnam par shes pa'i sgo nas (3) de dag la 'jig tshogs la lta ba 'byung bar 'gyur ro // de'i phyir bdag (xyl.: gdag) med pa'i ye shes ni de dag yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud pa zhes bya ste / de'i gnyen po yin pa'i phyir <ro> // mi rtag pa dang sdug (4) bsngal ba'i rnam pa dang ldan pa smon pa med pa'i shes pa de dag yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud pa ma yin te / yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud pa smos pa ni 'jig rten pa'i bdag med pa shes pa las (5) bye brag tu lta ba'i phyir ro // de nyid kyi phyir de la dmigs pa 'jig rten las 'das pa zhes bya ba smos te / yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud pa de ni 'jig rten pa ma yin no //*

<sup>172</sup> BHSD: 'refuge'.

<sup>173</sup> PSVy Chi. 10b5f.; AVN, p. 110.5.

<sup>174</sup> AVN, p. 110.6.



see", up to "I know/perceive"; because of opposition to the view of real personality (*satkāya-dr̥ṣṭi*), which is characterized by the [false] view of a self.<sup>175</sup>

92. "That which is [ignorance] in every case (*yat tatra tatra*)"—Why it was said [so]?

[Answer:] Because of declaring different synonyms (*paryāya*) of ignorance in every case: in the former part, etc.

93. And why the different synonyms were enumerated?<sup>176</sup>

[Answer:] In order to make the sense, [by means of different synonyms of ignorance,] thoroughly understood to someone somehow and in order to make audible its sense to one who is at that time dispersed.<sup>177</sup>

If they [i.e. the synonyms] are enumerated, they will be examined by the others.<sup>178</sup>

In order not to make [it] enumerated to the weak-minded [who] have known its meaning again and again [but still will examine it]; in order to remove deliberation on the different meanings when there is no [such] for one word; in order to make comprehensible the meaning which originated

<sup>175</sup> AVN, p. 110.6–8.

<sup>176</sup> YBh, p. 206.3: *ajñānam adarśanam anabhisamayas tamaḥ saṁmoho 'vidyā<-ndha-kāram> itīme śaḍ avidyāparyāyāḥ*; AVS, p. 7.1: *yathābhūtam ajñānam adarśanam anabhisamayas tamaḥ saṁmoho 'vidyāndhakāram /*.

<sup>177</sup> AVN, p. 110.9–10: *ajñānam adarśanam ity evamādi saptaparyāyoccāraṇaṁ kim artham / kasyacit kathamcid arthāvbodhārtham tatkalāvikṣiptānāṁ paryāyeṇa tadartha-śravaṇārtham /*.

Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (Chi. 111b8): 'ga' zhig ji ltar yang de'i don khong du chud par bya ba'i phyir dang zhes bya ba ni nyon pa po 'ga' zhig ji ltar yang rnam grangs tha dad pa dag gis kyang de'i don rtogs par bya ba'i phyir te / kha cig la ni tshig gi (112a1) don kha cig grangs ma (xyl.: pa) yin no // de'i tshe rnam par g.yengs pa rnams de'i don thos par bya ba'i phyir ro zhes bya ba ni nyon pa'i tshe g.yengs pa rnams de'i skabs kyi don thos par bya ba'i phyir te / rnam (2) grangs kyi tshig ni skyon med pa'i don dang ldan pa yin no // de nyid brjod na ni gzhan dag gis dpyad par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba ni de kho nas kyang de'i tshe g.yengs pa rnams kyi rtogs par bya ba de'i tshe g.yengs pa rnams la nus (3) mod kyi zhes bya ba'o //.

<sup>178</sup> AVN, p. 110.10–11: *tenaivābhīdhānenānyeṣāṁ avaśītam\* syād ityevamādīni bahūni prayojanāni granthabhārabhayāt nocyante /*. \*) Cf. AVN, p. 110 n. 7; cf. BHSD sub *avaśīrati*.

from the utterance with these words, like the synonymous words of medicine [herb].

94. The **Dharmavādins**<sup>179</sup> [say that the enumeration of synonyms is made] in order to make adequate both the obtaining of their meaning and putting together the words, and [also] in order to make the enumeration properly known [according to the Buddha's] own single Dharma, and in order to put a seed of it [i.e. the enumerated words] into the other [listeners].

95. Why the synonyms of ignorance are indicated just in [the case of] ignorance?

[Answer:] In order to point out without difference/completely the meaning [of ignorance] according to these separate synonyms.

96. Further, what is ignorance opposed to [and] how it is [opposed] is explained by means of threefold and fourfold [enumeration of] synonyms, [viz. the first three synonyms: nescience (*ajñāna*), not seeing (*adarśana*), and non-apprehension (*anabhisamaya*) point out to what is ignorance opposed to; how ignorance is opposed is shown by the other four synonyms: bewilderment (*moha*), complete bewilderment (*saṃmoha*), darkness (*tamas*), and darkness of ignorance (*avidyāndhakāra*).]<sup>180</sup>

(a) What is ignorance opposed to?

[Answer:] [It is opposed] to knowledge, which is called cognition originated from listening, thinking, and meditating, [and to those cognitions which are] called seeing (*darśana*) and comprehension (*abhisamaya*).

(b) How it is opposed?

[Answer:] [It is opposed] because its range [i.e. of knowledge] is being obscured by hidden/disguised meaning, and because of being associated with the defilements of inferior intelligence, lack of intelligence, and doubt, due to falsely perceived meaning.

97. When it is proper to describe the connection with afflictions of complete bewilderment and doubt, and to describe the connection with afflictions of darkness and lack of intelligence, how is described the connection with afflictions of ignorance and inferior intelligence?

<sup>179</sup> *Chos smra ba rnams*, PSVy Chi. 11a2f.; Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 112a7ff.

<sup>180</sup> After Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 113a2ff.

[Answer:] Feeling (*tshor ba*, *vedanā*), knowledge (*rig pa*, *vidyā*), and cognition (*shes rab*, *prajñā*) are of the same meaning. The negative particle (*nañ-pratyaya*, *ma'i rnam pa*) has a meaning of contempt, and here ignorance has the meaning of inferior/bad knowledge (*smad pa'i rig pa*, *kutsitā vidyā*).

98. The **Master**<sup>181</sup> explains (*'chad pa*, *vyācāṣṭe*):

“Nescience concerning the past”, and the rest [up to “nescience concerning the cognition of the real state of things in the six bases of contact”] should be known by twofold reason (*gtan tshogs*, *hetu*):

(a) conforming to (*rjes su mthun pa*, *anukūla*, *anugūṇa*, *anuloma*) the clinging to [the false view that there is] a self (*ātma-grāha*),<sup>182</sup> and (b) obstructing the deliverance from it.

(aa) Clinging to a self is threefold: ① clinging to a constant/lasting [self], [i.e. longing for a substantial lasting self; conforming to this is “nescience concerning the former...”,] ② clinging to a real (*vastu*) [self]; [conforming to this is “nescience concerning the inner...”,] and ③ clinging to [a self as] a doer and enjoyer, [conforming to this is “nescience concerning the action, result, and both”].

(bb) And obstructing the deliverance from it is fourfold: ① nescience concerning the seeking refuge (*śaraṇa-gamana*), ② nescience concerning the object of seeing (*darśana-artha*), ③ nescience concerning the abandoning (*prahīṇa*) of the opposites (*vipakṣa*) and generation (*utpādana*) of the antidotes (*pratipakṣa*), and ④ nescience concerning the absence of pride in the opposite.

99. The **Yogācārabhūmi**<sup>183</sup> explains:

1) Which is the nescience concerning the past?—It is the nescience of one who is thinking incorrectly (*ayoniśas*) about the past formations: “Did I exist in the past, or [did I not exist in the past? who were I, how did I exist...], etc.”<sup>184</sup>

2) Which is the nescience concerning the future?—It is the nescience of one who is thinking incorrectly about the future formations: “Shall I exist in the

<sup>181</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ (P Chi. 114a4; C 103a2): *slob dpon 'chad pa ni zhes bya ba ni slob dpon thogs med\* do //*. \*) ācārya Asaṅga.

<sup>182</sup> BHSD: *ātma-grāha* ‘belief in the (existence of a) self’; sub *-grāha* ‘clinging to the (false view that there is a) self’.

<sup>183</sup> Cf. YBh, pp. 204.2ff. = Peking Tanjur Dzi. 119a1ff. The text of YBh differs, see the Appendix for the edition.

<sup>184</sup> See above for the references to this and the following passages.

future? or [shall I not exist in the future? who shall I be, how shall I be...]", etc.

3) Which is the nescience concerning the past and the future?—It is the nescience of one who has doubts incorrectly inward(ly): "Who [they] are? who will [we] be[come]? from where did come this sentient being? where it will go after passing away from this [state of existence]?"<sup>185</sup>

4) Which is the nescience concerning the inward?—It is the nescience of one who incorrectly concentrates [his] mind (*manasi-karoti*) on the conditioned factors pertaining to the individual (*pratyātmika*)<sup>186</sup> as a self (*bdag tu, ātmatas*).<sup>187</sup>

5) Which is the nescience concerning the outward?—It is the nescience of one who incorrectly concentrates [his] mind on the outward conditioned factors which do not appertain to<sup>188</sup> the sentient being(s), as possessed by [= belonging to] a self (*bdag gir, ātmīyatas*).<sup>189</sup>

6) Which is the nescience concerning the inward and the outward?—It is the nescience of one who is incorrectly thinking about the conditioned factors of the other [personal] series, as if they were of an enemy, friend or indifferent (*arimitrodāsīna*).<sup>190</sup>

7) Which is the nescience concerning the action (*karmanī*)?<sup>191</sup> It is the nescience of one who is thinking incorrectly about the doer of action.

8) Which is the nescience concerning the [karmic] result?—It is the nescience of one who is thinking incorrectly about the conditioned factors collected as results of maturation as an experiencer (*vedaka*).<sup>192</sup>

<sup>185</sup> The text of PSVy is corrupt, see Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 119b8–120a1. SWTF 1.40 sub *adhyātmam*.

<sup>186</sup> YBh, p. 204.11 (see the Appendix). Cf. BHSD s.v.

<sup>187</sup> Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, II, p. 518 n. 1421.

<sup>188</sup> *grangs ma gtogs pa* = \**na saṃkhyāta*; YBh: *ston pa ma yin pa* = \**na ākhyāta* [sic!].

<sup>189</sup> Schmithausen, loc. cit.

<sup>190</sup> YBh, p. 204.14: *mitrāmitrodāsīna*-. Cf. SWTF 2.142 *ari-mitrodāsīna*: "n.pl. Feinde, Freunde und Indifferente (Neutrale)"; cf. 5.368. Mvy 2723: *mdza' ba* = *mitra*.

<sup>191</sup> There is a gap in all PSVy xylls.! Cf. YBh, p. 204.15–18. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 115b4–116a1 gives the text complete.

<sup>192</sup> BHSD s.v.

9) Which is the nescience concerning the action and the karmic result?—It is the nescience of one who thinks incorrectly (*ayoniśas*), falsely (*phyin ci log tu, vitatham*) about actions and their results as false.<sup>193</sup>

10) Which is the nescience concerning the Buddha?—It is the nescience of one who is not concentrating his mind on the enlightenment of the Buddhas, or [who] is concentrating his mind falsely (*phyin ci log tu*), or [who] is careless (*bag med pa, pramāda*), or [who] is irresolute (*the tshom za ba, vicikitsā, saṃśaya; kāñkṣā*), or denies it (*skur pa 'debs pa*).

11) Which is the nescience concerning the Dharma?—It is the nescience of one who is not concentrating his mind on the well proclaimed (*legs par gsungs pa, subhāṣita, suvyākhyāta, svākhyāta*) Law, or as above: [who is careless, or who is irresolute, or who denies it].<sup>194</sup>

12) Which is the nescience concerning the Saṅgha?—It is the nescience of one who is not concentrating his mind on the good behavior of religious community,<sup>195</sup> or, etc. as above.

13) Which is the nescience concerning the suffering (*duḥkha*)?—It is the nescience of one who is not concentrating his mind on suffering as suffering, or, etc. as above.

14–16) [Which is the nescience concerning the origination of suffering, cessation of suffering, and the path leading to cessation of suffering?—It is the nescience of one who is not concentrating his mind on the origin as origin,<sup>196</sup> cessation as cessation, etc.] So it is to be understood as above, up to [the nescience concerning] the path (*mārga*).<sup>197</sup>

<sup>193</sup> YBh, p. 204.17 (= P Dzi. 119b1–2, D Tshi. 104b3–4): *karmavipāke 'jñānaṃ katamat / vitatham (phyin ci log par) karma tatphalaṃ cāyoniśaḥ kalpayato yad ajñānam /*.

<sup>194</sup> YBh (P Dzi. 119b3): *chos kyi bsrungs pa* (D Tshi. 104b5: *-kyis~*) = *supratirakṣita, surakṣita; saṃrakṣita* (Index AKBh: *srungs*).

<sup>195</sup> YBh, p. 204.22: *saṅghasya supratipattim*; P 119b4: *dge 'dun gyi legs par bsgrub pa*; D 104b6: *~ gyis ~ bsgrubs pa = ~ bsgrub: suvidhi* (Mvy 410); *~ bsgrub pa: sam-udānayanāya* (Mvy 7421);—(b)*sgrub pa: pratipatti* (Index AKBh); BHSD s.v.: ‘good behavior (religiously), performance, practice’.

<sup>196</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 116a7f.

<sup>197</sup> YBh, p. 205.1–2 (P 119b6; D 104b7–105a1): *yathā duḥkhe evaṃ samudaye nirodhe mārga ajñānāni draṣṭavyāni /*.

17) Which is the nescience concerning the cause (*hetu*)?—It is the nescience of one who is incorrectly thinking that there is no cause, or [conceives of] an unsuitable (*mi mthun pa, viṣama*) [cause], [such as] God, etc. as a cause.

18) [Which is the nescience concerning the dharmas originated from the cause(s)? –] Like [the nescience regarding] the cause(s), so it is [to be understood here, regarding the nescience concerning] the dharmas originated from the cause(s).

These are, moreover: ① good (*kuśala*), because of faultlessness (*kha na ma tho ba med pa nyid yin pa, anavadyatva*)<sup>198</sup>; ② bad (*akuśala*),<sup>199</sup> because of being sinful; ③ to be cultivated (*sevitavya*), because of being wholesome (*phan pa nyid yin pa*); ④ not to be cultivated (*asevitavya*), because of being unwholesome; ⑤ faultless/excellent (*prañīta*), because of being white (*śukla*); ⑥ faulty (*hīṇa*), because of being black (*kṛṣṇa*); ⑦ connected with the [respective] counterpart (*sapratibhāga*), because of being mixed (*vyāmiśra*).

19) Which is the nescience concerning the comprehension in accordance with reality of the six bases of contact (*sparśa-āyatana*)?—It is the nescience of one who has false thoughts and [unjustified] conceit with regard to the spiritual realisation.<sup>200</sup>

**100.** All<sup>201</sup> these [kinds of] nescience (*ajñāna*) [as listed above] are, in short, the sevenfold bewilderment (*kun tu rmongs pa, saṃmoha*), [viz.:]

1) bewilderment regarding the time (*adhva-saṃmoha*), [from “nescience concerning the former part” up to “nescience concerning the former and later part”],

2) bewilderment regarding the object (*vastu-saṃmoha*), [from “nescience concerning the inward” up to “nescience concerning the inward and outward”],

3) bewilderment regarding the transmigration (*saṃkrānti-saṃmoha*), [from “nescience concerning the action” up to “nescience concerning the action and result”],

<sup>198</sup> SWTF 1.48: *an-avadya*, ‘mfn. untadelig, nicht verwerflich’; *anavadyatā*, ‘nicht zu tadelnder Zustand; zufriedenstellendes Befinden’.

<sup>199</sup> SWTF 1.3: mfn. “unheilsam, schlimm”; n. “das Unheilsame, Übel”.

<sup>200</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 117a5f. YBh, p. 205.9–10: *adhigame viparyastacetasa ābhimānikasya yad ajñānam* /; (P Dzi. 120a1–2; D Tshi. 105a3–4): *rtogs {D rtog} pa la sems phyin ci log tu gyur pa mngon pa'i nga rgyal can gyi mi shes pa gang yin pa ste* /.

<sup>201</sup> The following explanations are after Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 117a6ff. Cf. YBh, p.

- 4) bewilderment regarding the most excellent (*mchog, agra-saṃmoha*), [from “nescience concerning the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha”],
- 5) bewilderment regarding the reality (*de kho na nyid, tattva-saṃmoha*), [from “nescience concerning the Suffering” up to “nescience concerning the Path”],
- 6) bewilderment regarding the defilement (*kun nas nyon mongs pa, saṃkleśa-saṃmoha*) and purification (*rnam par byang ba, vyavadāna-saṃmoha*), [from “nescience concerning the cause” up to “[elements] originated in dependence with [their] opposites”],
- 7) bewilderment regarding the pride (*mingon pa'i nga rgyal can, abhimāna-saṃmoha*), [“nescience concerning the comprehension in accordance with reality of the six bases of contact”].

**101.** The six quasi-synonyms (*paryāya*) of ignorance—from nescience (*ajñāna*) up to darkness of ignorance (*avidyāndhakāra*)<sup>202</sup>—should be known as [referring to] the seven items of bewilderment (*saṃmoha-vastu*).<sup>203</sup> The last two items of bewilderment are taken as one, [so that] the two synonyms of darkness of ignorance are to be observed in it.<sup>204</sup>

**102.** Moreover, [according to] another enumeration: the opposites of wisdom which originated from hearing, thinking, and meditation are the three synonyms [of ignorance] according to order, [viz. nescience, non-seeing, and non-comprehension].<sup>205</sup>

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205.11–12.

<sup>202</sup> Tib. of the PSVy reads: *ma rig pa dang mun pa'i rnam pa*, as if it were \**avidyāndhākāra*.

I am indebted to Prof. L. Schmithausen for his comment (personal communication): “Tib. of the PSVy translates andhakāra as if the latter part were -ākāra. Y 206.3 (Ms.) ... ‘*vidyāndhakāram itīme ṣaḍ avidyākāraparyāyāḥ / (ākāra = Tib.)*. In the original *avidyāndhakāra* is one item (“darkness of (/consisting of) ignorance”), otherwise there would not be six items (as stated Y 206,3) but seven. Bhattacharya is wrong in omitting *andhakāra* there (cf. MS referred to in his footnote 3!). In 206,4 Y read with Ms *tu dve saṃmohavastunī* (Ms. -*nī*) and 206,5 *ekaṃ* (Tib.) *vastu kṛtvā paścino pi* in Ms.!”.

<sup>203</sup> Cf. AV-ṭikā (P Jo. 45a2,4,8); *Prasannapadā*, p. 357 n. 12; 461.7.

<sup>204</sup> YBh, p. 206.4–5.

<sup>205</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 118a6f. Cf. YBh, p. 206.6–9.

Those which are the opposites of it, because of being small, medium and large, are the other three synonyms, [viz. bewilderment, complete bewilderment and darkness of ignorance, respectively].

Due to the division into the opposite-kind (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs, vipakṣa-prabheda*) and into the own's-nature-kind (*ngo bo nyid, svabhāva-prabheda*), [in all] there are to be known six synonyms [of ignorance].

**103.** Moreover, in the *Ādi-viśeṣa-vibhaṅga-dharma-paryāya*<sup>206</sup> it was said [by the Bhagavat] with reference to [the statement] “nescience concerning the past”, etc.:

Monks, in short, the work(ing) of ignorance (*avidyā-karma*) should be known as twofold—ignorance which has the work of giving (*dāna*) support (*āśraya*) to the process [of transmigration] (*pravṛtti*)<sup>207</sup> in all forms (*sarvathā*); [ignorance which] has the work of causing obstacles (*antarāyika*)<sup>208</sup> to the cessation [of transmigration] (*nivṛtti*)<sup>209</sup> in all forms.

Reverend Sir (*btsun pa, bhadanta*), what is the process [of transmigration] (*pravṛtti*) in all forms (*sarvathā*)?

Monks, where is the process, what/who [is the subject of] the process, and how is the process—this is the process [of transmigration] in all forms.

Reverend Sir, where is the process [of transmigration]?

Monks, [the process of transmigration is] in [the three] time(s) (*adhvan*), due to imagining a self (*ātmavikalpa*).<sup>210</sup>

Reverend Sir, [with regard to] what is the process [of transmigration]?<sup>211</sup>

<sup>206</sup> PSVy Chi. 12b4–13a1: *Dang po'i bye brag rnam par 'byed pa'i chos kyi rnam grangs*; Matsuda 1982, fragm. 4, p. 65f. (T 717, p. 842a23–842b7).

<sup>207</sup> Cf. LVP, *Siddhi*, p. 169ff.: “le processus de l’existence [lieu-tchoan, 85.7, 159.10]”.

<sup>208</sup> Cf. BHSD s.v.

<sup>209</sup> Cf. LVP, *Siddhi*, p. 169ff.: “l’abolition de l’existence [hoân-mie, 162.13, 85.10]”.

<sup>210</sup> Guṇamati’s PSVy-ṭ text (confirmed by both Chin. transl.): ‘Due to imagining a self [one transmigrates] in [the three] time(s).’—Perhaps: *\*adhvasu, ātmavikalpena*.

<sup>211</sup> Skt. probably *\*kasya pravṛttilh /*.



Monks, [the process of transmigration is with regard to]<sup>212</sup> the [six] inward and outward bases [of cognition], due to the grasping of a self.

Reverend Sir, how is the process [of transmigration]?

Monks, [the process of transmigration is] due to the imagining of a self [as a doer of actions and an enjoyer of their results] and [due to other] false ideas [as e.g. the nescience of actions and results because of imagining different results by different actions].<sup>213</sup>

Reverend Sir, what is the cessation [of transmigration] (*nivṛtti*) in all forms?

Monks, in short, the cessation [of transmigration] in all forms is fourfold, [viz.] by support-cessation (*āśraya-nivṛtti*), [i.e. the nescience of the Three Jewels], by object-cessation (*ālambana-nivṛtti*), [i.e. the nescience of the Four Noble Truths], by mind-concentration-cessation (*manaskāra-nivṛtti*), and by accomplishment of result-cessation (*phalasiddhi-nivṛtti*).<sup>214</sup>

104. Here, too, the explanations are made, like in the **Yogācārabhūmi**, [that] there is a nescience of time (*dus mi shes pa*), [i.e. nescience concerning the former part, etc.].<sup>215</sup>

“Concerning the inward”, etc. [was explained] by distinction of [the nescience into] inward and outward bases [of cognition] (*adhyātmika-āyatana*, *bāhya-āyatana*), and by distinction of the locus of inward bases [of cognition].

“Mind-concentration-cessation”, [i.e.] of the causes and the elements which originated from causes. In [the last named] good (*kuśala*) [are those which are] for the sake of the antidote of ignorance; bad (*akuśala*) [are those which are] for the sake of its [=good] opposite. And also those which are good, which are outward (*bāhya*) of it, are having sins (*sāvadaya*); those with that quality (*dharma*) are not having sins (*anavadya*), [they are faultless].

<sup>212</sup> Thus Guṇamati’s PSVy-ṭ text, but no Locative in both Chinese versions! ‘*la*’ probably for Skt. Genitive, to be expected as the answer to a question \**kasya pravṛttiḥ*, asking for the “subject” of *pravṛtti*.

<sup>213</sup> Cf. Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 119a7.

<sup>214</sup> Guṇamati PSVy-ṭ Chi. 119a8ff.

<sup>215</sup> PSVy Chi. 13a1ff.

The faultless (*anavadya*) are to be cultivated (*sevitavya*); the sinful (*sāvadya*) are not to be cultivated (*asevitavya*).

Those which are good (*kuśala*), with afflictions (*sāsrava*), are inferior (*hīna*); [those which are] without afflictions (*anāsrava*) are excellent (*praṇīta*). [When they are] bad (*akuśala*), [they are called] dark (*kṛṣṇa*); [when they are] good, without afflictions (*kuśala*, *anāsrava*), [they are called] white (*śukla*).

[Dark, bad] different from it [are white, without afflictions], because [they] are mixed (*vyāmiśra*), [good, with afflictions,] have [their] (counter)parts (*savibhāga*, *sapratibhāga*). And all [of them: good, bad, etc.] due to having been originated in dependence, are [called] originated in dependence (*prāṭītyasamutpanna*).

105. In that [Sūtra, i.e. \***Ādi-viśeṣa-vibhaṅga**-<sup>216</sup>] too, regarding the explanation of nescience, etc. it is said:

Reverend Sir, what are the divisions of ignorance as an opposite?—Monks, ignorance should be perceived as one which is opposite to the best (*mchog*, *agra*) dharma, and also as one which is opposite to the great (*rgya chen po*, *udāra*) dharma.

Reverend Sir, how is ignorance opposite to the best dharma?

Monks, from among the five faculties—"This is to be activated, that is to be steadfast"—this is the faculty of wisdom (*prajñā-indriya*). Its opposite is ignorance. Thus, it is called opposite to the best dharma.

Reverend Sir, how is ignorance opposite to the great dharma?—Monks, ignorance is opposite to the knowledge originated from hearing [= *ajñāna*], thinking [= *adarśana*], and meditating [= *an-abhisamaya*] (*śrutā-cintā-bhāvanāmayī*). Thus, it is called opposite to the great dharma.

106.

<sup>217</sup> Reverend Sir, what are the divisions of connection(s) with ignorance?—Monks, with the sentient beings of the three realms

<sup>216</sup> PSVy Chi. 13a5–13b2; Matsuda 1982, fragm. 5, p. 66f. (T 717, p. 842b8–15).

<sup>217</sup> Continued from the same Sūtra. Matsuda 1982, fragm. 5', p. 68 (P 13b2–4; T 717,

below the peak of existence (*srid pa'i rtse mo, bhavāgra*), it is so that the ignorance which is among the sentient beings was not made into parts (*khaṇaśas*), was not made into a gutter-hole (*gsong ldong*),<sup>218</sup> was connected with proclivities (*bag la nyal ba, anuśaya*). Therefore these sentient beings are bound entirely (*mtha' dag, sakala*).

[Now], the nescience (*ajñāna*) of distinctions of cause and result in a good destination or a bad destination, if it is very little, it is of those sentient beings who are performing in the non-material/intelligible [realm of existence]; if it is medium—it is of those sentient beings who are performing in the material [realm]; if it is great—it is of [those sentient beings] who are performing in the [realm of] desire.

The Explanation of Ignorance from the **Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā** is finished.<sup>219</sup>

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## Appendix

### Yogācārabhūmi—pratītyasamutpāda

#### [vibhāgaḥ]

YBh Yogācārabhūmi, Sanskrit text, ed. Bhattacharya, pp. 204.2–206.5

P Peking Tanjur 5536, sems tsam, Dzi. 119a1–124a6

D Derge Tanjur 4035, sems tsam, Tshi. 104a4–105b6

T Taishō 1579 *Yu jia shi di lun* 瑜伽師地論, p. 322b–322c

vibhāgaḥ katamaḥ | yat pūrvānte 'jñānam iti vistareṇa <uktaṃ> sūtra<e> | [§99.1]<sup>220</sup> tatra pūrvānte 'jñānaṃ katamat | atītān saṃskārān ayoniśaḥ kalpayataḥ kiṃ <nv> aham abhūvam atīte 'dhvany āhosvin nāham abhūvam

p. 842c2–7).

<sup>218</sup> *Bod-rgya-tshig-mdzod-chen-po* iii, p. 3031: *gsong ldong* = *btsog chu 'gro ba'i wa kha*; Chin. *wu-shui-dou*: 'gutter-hole'.

<sup>219</sup> PSVy Chi. 13b4f.: *Rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba bshad pa las ma rig pa'i rnam par 'byed pa rdzogs so //*.

<sup>220</sup> The paragraph numbers refer to those of the translation of Vasubandhu's PSVy.

atīte 'dhvani | ko nv aham abhūva<m> | katham vābhūvam iti yad  
ajñāna<m><sup>221</sup> |

[§99.2] aparānte 'jñānaṃ katamat | anāgatān saṃskārān ayoniśaḥ kalpayataḥ  
kiṃ nv aham bhaviṣyāmy anāgate 'dhvany āhosvin nāham bhaviṣyāmy  
anāgate 'dhvani | kiṃ bhaviṣyāmi katham bhaviṣyāmīty ajñāna<m> |

[§99.3] pūrvāntāparānte 'jñānaṃ katamat | adhyātmam ayoniśaḥ  
kathamkathībhavataḥ ke santaḥ ke bhaviṣyāmaḥ | ayaṃ sattvaḥ kuta  
āgataḥ | itaś <cyu>taḥ kutra gāmī bhaviṣyatīti yad ajñānaṃ |

[§99.4] adhyātmam ajñānaṃ katamat | pratyātmikān saṃskārān ayoniśa  
ātmato<sup>222</sup> manasi kurvato yad ajñānaṃ |

[§99.5] bahirdhājñānaṃ katamat | bāhyān <a><sup>223</sup> sattvasaṃkhyātān  
saṃskārān ātmīyato 'yoniśo manasi kurvato yad ajñānaṃ |

[§99.6] adhyātmabahirdhājñānaṃ katamat | pārasāntānikān saṃskārān  
mitrāmitrodāsīnato 'yoniśaḥ kalpayato yad ajñāna<m> |

[§99. 7] karmaṇy ajñānaṃ katamat | karmakartāram<sup>224</sup> ayoniśaḥ kalpayato  
yad ajñāna<m> |

[§99.8] vipāke'jñānaṃ katamat | vipākaphalasaṃgrhītān saṃskārān  
vedakato 'yoniśaḥ kalpayato yad ajñāna<m> |

[§99.9] karmavipāke'jñānaṃ katamat | vitathaṃ karma tatphalaṃ cāyoniśaḥ  
kalpayato yad ajñāna<m> |

[§99.10] buddhe 'jñānaṃ katamat | buddhānāṃ bodhim amanasi kurvato  
vā mithyā vā manasi kurvataḥ pramādyato vā kāṅkṣato vāpavadato vā yad  
ajñāna<m> |

[§99.11] dharme 'jñānaṃ katamat | dharmasya svākhyātātām amanasi kur-  
vato vā mithyā vā manasi kurvataḥ pramādyato vā kāṅkṣato vāpavadato vā  
yad ajñāna<m> |

[§99.12] saṅghe 'jñānaṃ katamat | saṅghasya supratipattim amanasi kurvato  
vā mithyā vā manasi kurvataḥ pramādyato vā kāṅkṣato vāpavadato vā yad  
ajñāna<m> |

<sup>221</sup> YBh reads - *ṃ* (passim).

<sup>222</sup> Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, vol. II, p. 518, n. 1421: Ms. *ātmatas*; Bhattacharya: *ātmanā*.

<sup>223</sup> P Dzi. 119a6f./D Tshi. 104b1: *phyi rol gyi 'du byed sems can du ston pa ma yin pa rnam la /*; T p. 322b14: 非有情數諸行. Cf. Index AKBh s.v. *asattoākhyā*.

<sup>224</sup> D Dzi. 104b2: *las kyi byed pa por* (P: *po*). YBh p. 204 n. 1: "Tib. not clear".

[§99.13] duḥkhe 'jñānaṃ katamat | duḥkhaṃ duḥkhato 'manasi kurvato vā mithyā vā manasi kurvataḥ [YBh 205.1] pramādyato vā kāṅkṣato vāpavadato vā yad ajñānā<m> </>

[§99.14–16] yathā duḥkhe evaṃ samudaye nirodhe mārge ajñānāni draṣṭavyāni ||

[§99.17] hetāv ajñānaṃ katamat | ahetukaṃ vā kalpayato viśamahetuṃ vā īśvara-prakṛti-puruṣāntarādikāṃ vāyonīśaḥ kalpayato yad ajñāna<m> |

[§99.18] yathā hetāv evaṃ hetusamutpanneṣu saṃskāreṣu ||

te punaḥ kuśalā anavadyatvāt | akuśalāḥ sāvadyatvāt | sevitavyā hitatvāt | asevitavyā ahitatvāt | sāvadyāḥ kṛṣṇatvāt | anavadyāḥ śuklatvāt | sapratibhāgā vyāmiśratvāt ||

[§99.19] ṣaṭsu sparśāyataneṣu yathābhūtasamprativedhe 'jñānaṃ katamat | adhigame viparyastacetasa ābhimānikasya yad ajñāna<m> |

tad etad abhisamasya <sup>225</sup> <ekona->viṃśaty ākāraṃ ajñānaṃ bhavati |

[§100] punar anyat saptavidham ajñānaṃ | (i) adhvasaṃmoho (ii) vastusaṃmohaḥ (iii) saṅkrāntisaṃmohaḥ (iv) agrasaṃmohas (v) tattvasaṃmohaḥ (vi) saṃkleśavyavadānasaṃmoho (vii) 'bhimānasaṃmohaś ca ||

yac ca <sup>226</sup> <ekona->viṃśatividham ajñānaṃ yac ca saptavidham ajñānaṃ tatra kena kasya saṃgraho draṣṭavyaḥ | tribhiḥ prathamair ajñānaiḥ prathamasyaikasya saṃgrahaḥ | punas tribhir anu dvitīyasya | <punas

<sup>225</sup> YBh, p. 205 n. 3: "Here and also below after this [= *abhisamasya*—M.M.] occurs *ekānta* in the Ms, but there is nothing for it in Tib." P Dzi. 120a2/D Tshi. 105a4: *mi shes pa rnam pa bcu dgu yod do*. T p. 322c10: 如是略說十九種無知. Index AKBh; *ekānna-viṃśati*, *bcu dgu*.

<sup>226</sup> YBh, p. 205.12: *viṃśatividham ajñānaṃ*, against P, D and T p. 322c13: 前十九無知. See the previous note.

tribhir anu caturthasya |><sup>227</sup> punaś caturbhir anu pañcamasya | punaḥ  
 <dvābhyām><sup>228</sup> anu ṣaṣṭhasya | paścimenaikena <anu><sup>229</sup> saptamasya ||  
 punar anyat pañcākāram ajñāna<m> | (i) arthasaṃmoho (ii)  
 drṣṭisaṃmohaḥ (iii) pramādasam̐mohas (iv) tattvārthasaṃmoho (v)  
 'bhimānasaṃmohaś ca | yac ca <sup>230</sup><ekona->viṃśatividham ajñānam yac  
 ca pañcavidham <saṃmohaṃ><sup>231</sup> <tatra><sup>232</sup> katamena kasya saṃgraho  
 draṣṭavyaḥ | drṣṭisaṃmohena pūrvakāñāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ | hetusamutpanneṣu  
 ca dharmeṣv ajñānasya saṃgraho draṣṭavyaḥ | pramādasam̐mohena  
 karmaṇi vipāke tadubhaye cājñānasya saṃgrahaḥ | tattvārthasaṃ-  
 mohena buddhādiṣu mārṅasatya-[YBh 206.1]paryavasāneṣ<v> ajñānasya  
 saṃgrahaḥ | abhimānasaṃmohena paścimasya <saṃgrahaḥ><sup>233</sup> |  
 arthasaṃmohena punaḥ sarveṣāṃ saṃgraho draṣṭavyaḥ ||  
 [§101] ajñānam adarśanam anabhisamayasaṃmoho 'vidyā<-  
 ndhakāram><sup>234</sup> itīme ṣaḍ avidyāparyāyāḥ saptavidhe saṃmohavastuni  
 yathākramaṃ draṣṭavyāḥ | paścime <tu dve><sup>235</sup> saṃmohavastun<ṭ><sup>236</sup> |

<sup>227</sup> YBh, p. 105.14 omits [sic]; see Bhattacharya's n. 5. P 120a5/D 105a6: 'og ma gsum gyis ni gsum pa bsdu so. T p. 322c14f.: 次三無知攝第三.

<sup>228</sup> YBh, p. 205.15: ṣaḍbhir; P 120a6/D 105a6: drug gis drug pa bsdu so— the enumeration is wrong, but if we read according to T p. 322c16: 二無知攝第六, the enumeration is in full agreement: Nos. 1–3 = (i) *adhva-saṃmoha*, nos. 4–6 = (ii) *vastu-saṃmoha*, nos. 7–9 = (iii) *saṅkrānti-saṃmoha*, nos. 10–12 = (iv) *agra-saṃmoha*, nos. 13–16 = (v) *tattva-saṃmoha*, nos. 17–18 = (vi) *saṅkleśa-vyavadāna-saṃmoha*, no. 19 = (vii) *abhimānasaṃmoha*.

<sup>229</sup> Index AKBh: 'og ma = *adhara*, *adhas*; T 次 *ci* 'next'.

<sup>230</sup> YBh, 205.18: *ekānta-viṃśati*, against P, D, T which read "19".

<sup>231</sup> YBh, 205.19: om. P, D: om. Read *saṃmohaṃ* after T p. 322c18: 五種愚.

<sup>232</sup> YBh, 205.19: om. P, D: *de la*.

<sup>233</sup> YBh, p. 206.1. P/D: *bsdu*. Cf. T p. 322c21–22: 上慢愚攝最後無知.

<sup>234</sup> YBh p. 206.3 & Bhattacharya's n. 3: "After *avidyā* Ms has *andhakāram* for which there is nothing in Tib." In fact, D reads *ma rig pa'i mun pa* (against P: *bdun pa*); PSVy P 12b2/D 11b3: *ma rig pa dang mun pa'i rnam pa* (*\*avidyā-andha-ākāra*); C p. 322c22–23: 復次, 無知, 無見, 無有現觀, 黑闇, 愚癡, 及無明闇.

<sup>235</sup> YBh p. 206.4 & n. 4: *tattva-saṃmohavastuni*. P/D: *rmongs pa'i gzhi tha ma gnyis*. C p. 322c24–25:

<sup>236</sup> Ms: *-vastuni* (I am indebted to Prof. Schmithausen for this information).

<ekaṃ><sup>237</sup> vastu kṛtvā<sup>238</sup> paścimo 'vidyāndhakāraparyāyas tatra draṣṭavyaḥ ||

[§102] aparāḥ paryāyaḥ | śrutamayyāś cintāmayyā bhāvanāmayyāś ca prajñāyā vipakṣeṇa trayāḥ paryāyā yathākramaṃ <iti vartate><sup>239</sup> | tasyā eva vipakṣabhūtāyā mṛdumadhyādhimātratvād apare punas trayāḥ paryāyā iti vipakṣaprabhedataś ca svabhāvaprabhedataś ca ṣaṭ paryāyāḥ ||

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- ADV *Abhidharmadīpavibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*. Ed. P. S. Jaini, *Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣā-prabhāvṛtti*. Patna 1977.
- AK *Abhidharmakośakārikā* (Vasubandhu). See AKBh.
- AKBh *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (Vasubandhu). Ed. P. Pradhan. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*. Revised second edition with introduction and indices etc. by A. Halder. Patna 1975.
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- AKVy *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* (Yaśomitra). Ed. U. Wogihara, *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, the work of Yaśomitra*. Tokyo 1989 (originally published in 1936).
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- ASBh *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (Asaṅga). Deciphered and Ed. N. Tatia. Patna 1976.
- AVN *Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* (Vīryaśrīdatta). Ed. N.H. Samtani, *Arthaviniścaya-sūtra and its commentary (Nibandhana), written by Bhikṣu Viryasrīdatta of Sri Nalandavihara, critically edited and annotated for the first time with introduction and notes*. Patna 1971.
- AV-ṭikā *Arthaviniścayaṭikā*. P 5852; D 4365.
- BHSD F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*. New Haven 1953.

<sup>237</sup> YBh p. 206.5: *evaṃ*. P/D: *gzhi gcig tu byas pa ni*.

<sup>238</sup> YBh loc. cit.: *kṛtvāpi*; in the Ms there is no (a)pi (I am indebted to Prof. Schmitthausen for this information).

<sup>239</sup> YBh p. 206.7: *yojyante*. Tib. *sbyar ro*; Index AKBh: (iti) *vartate*.

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*Dhammasaṅgani* See PTS ed.

*Dharmaskandha* Ed. S. Dietz, *Fragmente des Dharmaskandha. Ein Abhidharma-Text in Sanskrit aus Gilgit*. Göttingen 1984.

DN *Dīgha Nikāya*. See PTS ed.

G *Bstan 'gyur*, Dga' ldan Golden Manuscript (*gser bris ma*).

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LVP La Vallée Poussin, L. de

LVP, *Kośa* L. de La Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*. Traduction et Annotations. Nouvelle édition anastatique présentée par É. Lamotte. 6 vols. Bruxelles 1980.

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- NidSa *Nidānasamṣyukta*. Ed. C. Tripathi, *Fünfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasamṣyukta*. Berlin 1962.
- P *Bstan 'gyur*, 1724 Pe cing edition Peking edition of the Kanjur and Tanjur, compiled and edited by D.T. Suzuki and S. Yamaguchi. Tokyo/Kyoto 1955–1961.
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- PSVy *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā* (Vasubandhu). P5496/D 3995.
- PSVy-ṭ *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā-ṭikā* (Guṇamati). P5497/D3996.
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- Suttanipāta* PTS ed.

- SWTF *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden und der kanonischen Literatur der Sarvāstivāda-Schule*. Göttingen, 1973–.
- T 大正新脩大藏經 *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*. The Tripiṭaka in Chinese. Eds. J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe. Tokyo 1924–35.
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- Vsm *Visuddhimagga* (Buddhaghosa). In: *The Path of Purification*. Translated by B. Ñāṇamoli. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Kandy 2010.
- YBh *Yogācārabhūmi*. Ed. V. Bhattacharya, *The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga, the Sanskrit Text Compared with the Tibetan Version*. Calcutta 1957.
- YSBh *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* (Patañjali). Critically edited with introduction by Polakam Sri Rama Sastri and Krishnamurthi Sastri. *Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa of Śaṅkara-bhagavatpada*. Madras 1952.
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# Amṛtānanda's *Cidvilāsastava* / An Annotated Translation

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Amṛtānanda was an erudite exponent of the Tantric Śākta tradition of Tripurā, later known as Śrīvidyā. The earliest authoritative scriptures of this tradition, which constitutes the Southern Transmission (*dakṣiṇāmnāya*) of the Kulamārga,<sup>1</sup> are the *Nityāṣoḍaśītkārṇava* (NṢA) and the *Yoginīhrdaya* (YH), which were composed in Kashmir in the 11<sup>th</sup> century CE.<sup>2</sup> Thereafter the Tripurā tradition spread and flourished in South India, where the Kashmirian Śaiva non-dualism of the Pratyabhijñā and Spanda schools continued—as for the NṢA and the YH—to permeate its philosophical and soteriological teachings. This influence was exerted through the medium of the South Indian commentators of the Kashmirian works, namely Śivānanda (ca. 1225–1275) and his contemporary Vidyānanda, both authors of commentaries on the NṢA, and Amṛtānanda (ca. 1325–1375) who authored a commentary on the YH.

Information about Amṛtānanda is sparse.<sup>3</sup> He calls himself Amṛtānanda-yogin or Amṛtānandanātha—*nātha* being usually added to the names of spiritual preceptors—and, within the lineage of the *gurus* of the Tripurā tradition, he declares to be a disciple of Puṇyānanda (ca. 1300–1350), the author of the *Kāmakalāvilāsa* (KKV).<sup>4</sup> His most important work is his commentary (*Dīpikā*, “The Lamp”) on the YH, where Amṛtānanda explains and interprets the speculative, esoteric teachings of this work in the light of the Śākta-Śaiva dynamic non-dualism of Abhinavagupta (ca. 975–1025) and his disciple Kṣemarāja (ca. 1000–1050); besides the Kashmirian authors, in his *Dīpikā*, Amṛtānanda also quotes several South Indian works, particularly those of

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<sup>1</sup> For a historical survey and classification of the Śākta literature of the Kulamārga, see Sanderson 2012/13: 57ff; for the dates of the authors mentioned below, see Ibid.: 72.

<sup>2</sup> For detailed information on the NṢA and the YH, see Padoux (ed.) 1994: 24–29.

<sup>3</sup> Most of the following data are based on Ibid.: 46–50.

<sup>4</sup> For detailed references, see Sanderson 2007: 412, notes 606, 607.

his predecessors Śivānanda and Vidyānanda. He also authored a *paddhati*, the *Saubhāgyasudhodaya*, and a *stotra*, the *Cidvilāsastava*, both texts critically edited by Vrajvallabha Dviveda and published in the appendix of his edition of the NṢA. Moreover, Amṛtānanda might be identified as the author of the *Alaṅkārasaṃgraha*, a treatise on poetics probably composed around 1350.<sup>5</sup>

The *Cidvilāsastava* (CVS)—translated here for the first time, on the basis of the text edited by Dviveda—belongs to the literary genre of the hymns of praise (*stotra*, *stuti*, *stava*) which, with its rich variety of styles, contents and purposes, is well represented throughout the history of Indian religious literature up until modern times. The CVS can be classified in the category of the speculative hymns, expressing theological and philosophical ideas, rather than giving voice to devotional feelings through the eulogy of deities and the celebration of their mythological feats. This text can be compared to Abhinavagupta's hymns, where the author discloses the essence of his teachings, addressing himself to those qualified disciples who can understand his philosophical concepts even if just allusively expressed.<sup>6</sup> This holds true also for the CVS, which appears as a work written by a learned initiate and meant for his peers.

In the forty verses of his *stotra*, Amṛtānanda touches upon a variety of topics, which will be summarized here, to give an idea of the richness and complexity of this text. He upholds the main tenets of non-dualistic Śaivism. While explicitly advocating the superiority of non-dualism over dualism (verses 7, 9–10b), he also expresses his philosophical-theological views in metaphorical terms: the fusion of the two complementary and inseparable metaphysical principles of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, embodied by Śiva and Śakti, is symbolized by the one-and-twofold venerable footprint of the *guru* (verse 1); the relationship between Śiva and his Śakti is compared with that of the sun and its rays (verse 5); the twofold-yet-non-dual reality of the supreme godhead is likened with the twilight which, as junction of day and night, is regarded as a paradigm of the union of opposites (verse 4). As for the relationship between the godhead and the world, the doctrine of reflection (*ābhāsavāda*) is briefly alluded to (verses 6, 27), and the ultimate identity between Śiva and the world is implicitly expressed (verses 28–29).

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<sup>5</sup> See Ibid.: 413–415.

<sup>6</sup> See Silburn (ed.) 1986: 5.

It is worth remarking that, although the Sṛīvidyā is centred on the cult of Tripurasundarī—who is worshipped as the supreme deity, personifying the non-dual Energy of Consciousness—the Goddess is never explicitly mentioned in the CVS. In fact, the final reward bestowed by the teachings disclosed in this *stotra* is said to be “the complete attainment of the identity with the supreme Śiva” (*paraśivaikyasiddhi*, verse 40). Nonetheless, references to essential elements of the Tripurā tradition are clearly made at several points of the text: the Śrīcakra—to be regarded as the aniconic form of the Goddess and the dynamic model of the cosmic activity of the divine Energy—is referred to as the best sacred diagram (verse 19); the symbolic meaning of its structure and of the worship of the deities abiding in its constituent parts is briefly mentioned (verses 13, 23); there is also an extremely concise description of the *kāmakalā*, the diagrammatic symbol of the union of Śiva and Śakti represented at the core of the Śrīcakra (verse 14). Furthermore, Amṛtānanda also draws elements from the Krama system, the Śākta tradition known as Northern Transmission (*uttarāmnāya*), which exerted an important influence on Abhinavagupta: after mentioning the *khecarī*, a form of divine Energy moving in the space of consciousness (verse 38), the author implicitly suggests that the understanding of the meaning of the Wheel of Energies (*śakticakra*) enables the adept to master his own body, thanks to the meditative realization of the absorption of his sense-organs into their source, namely his heart (verse 39).

Several verses of the CVS are devoted to considerations about ritual, which is deemed to be interiorized, not so much in the sense of the *antaryāga*—the internal worship in which the devotee performs, mentally, the ritual acts prescribed for the external cult—but in the sense of a spiritual practice involving every aspect of the adept's inner life. In fact, by mental worship Amṛtānanda intends the concentration and absorption of one's internal organs—beginning with the mind—into the domain of the supreme Consciousness; this promotes the attainment of a transmental state (*unmana*), beyond and above the states of consciousness, including the *turya* (verses 35-37).

The following outline of the ritual portions of the CVS already reveal how Amṛtānanda makes use of the language of ritual in order to communicate the spiritual experiences undergone by the adept; the ritual's technical terminology, which was familiar to the Tantrics, enables him to express

in metaphorical ways the meaning and purpose of what one may call spiritualized ritual practices, or ritualized spiritual practices. The order of the references made in the course of the hymn to some of the principal steps of the *pūjā* follow, approximately, the sequence of the ritual procedure. Accordingly, the text begins with the homage to the footprints of the *guru*, which is deemed to foster the awareness of the non-dual nature of reality (verses 1–2); the ritual ablutions are supposed to cleanse from the impurity of ignorance (verse 3); the *saṃdhyā* service symbolizes the union of opposites, the polarity of the supreme godhead (verse 4); the shrine where ritual worship is to be performed is none other than one's own self (verse 6), and the altar on which the divine Consciousness is venerated is the heart (verse 8), where the divine throne is meditatively built (half-verse 10cd). As for the purification of the hands (verse 11), it has been noted that "Amṛtānanda interprets it as symbolizing the dissolution of all actions in the purity of the absolute".<sup>7</sup> The *nyāsa* described in verses 15–17 is directed to the subtle body, hence to a conceptualized rather than a visualized image of the body.<sup>8</sup> The invocation (*āvāhana*) of the deity produces the fusion of the individual consciousness with the supreme Consciousness (verse 20); the services offered to the deity (*upacāra*) are equated with the states of consciousness to be dissolved into the conscious self (verses 18, 21); the worship of the goddesses associated with the lunar days enables the transcendence of time (verse 22); the offering of food (*naivedya*) to the deity becomes the oblation of the adept's individual self to the divine Consciousness (verse 30), and the best offering is said to be that of one's own self-restraint (verse 33); the lamps swung before the cult-image in the temple are likened with the sense-organs, and when these are withdrawn into the conscious self, the state of oneness shines (verse 25); finally, the fourfold *bali* offering is equated with the dissolution of the fourfold cycle of the godhead's cosmic activity into the fifth and highest domain (verse 24). Regarding *japa*—as can one expect from his sublimated understanding of ritual—Amṛtānanda extols the mental, silent recitation of *mantras*, whereby the word dissolves into the primal silence of the Absolute (verse 26). His interiorized concept of ritual is also highlighted by the reference to the *dīkṣā*, where, rather than mentioning any step of this

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<sup>7</sup> TAK II 2004: 54

<sup>8</sup> See below notes 29–31.

ceremony, the author lays stress on the salvific power of the *guru*'s glance cast upon the disciple (*gurukaṭākṣapāta*), which may be likened with the intense divine grace cast upon the devotee (*śaktipāta*) (verses 31, 32, 34).

These few introductory remarks are meant to provide some basic information about Amṛtānanda and his background, as well as a first glimpse at the contents of the CVS. Given the richness and complexity of this text, whose concise allusions to speculative and ritual elements are sometimes difficult to interpret, this annotated translation should be considered just a preliminary, tentative attempt to make the work of this learned exponent of the South Indian Śrīvidyā more widely known.

### **Eulogy of the Playful Manifestation<sup>9</sup> of [the Supreme] Consciousness Composed by Amṛtānandayogin<sup>10</sup>**

One is the form of the self-luminous Śiva, [and] one is the manifestation of his reflective awareness; the supreme imprint of the feet of the spiritual preceptor, who has the nature of the supreme Śiva, is regarded as the embodiment of the fusion of these two.<sup>11</sup> [1]

<sup>9</sup> The polysemic term *vilāsa*—which, stemming from the root *vi-las*, may mean “shining forth, appearance, manifestation; play, pleasure, playful action; wantonness; grace, charm” (MW 985a)—conveys the idea of the luminous manifestation of the supreme Consciousness, whose unfolding in the world is the result of her divine play; since this Consciousness is personified by Tripurā, the term is also suggestive of the charming, seductive features of this goddess. On the meanings of *vilāsa*, see also Padoux (ed.) 1994: 162, note 268.

<sup>10</sup> I would like to offer my heartfelt thanks to Gavin Flood and Bjarne Wernicke Olesen, who kindly devoted their time to discuss with me several difficult verses of this hymn. Their criticism, useful corrections, and valuable suggestions contributed to substantially improving the first drafts of my translation. It goes without saying that any remaining shortcomings in this annotated translation of the CVS must be attributed exclusively to me.

<sup>11</sup> The hymn opens with praise of the imprint of the feet, or the sandals, of the spiritual preceptor, who is to be identified with the supreme Śiva. While the *guru*'s footprints, or his sandals, are generally venerated as a mark of the divine presence in the world, in this verse the one-and-twofold imprint of the feet of the divine preceptor represents the union, the perfect fusion of the two complementary metaphysical principles of *prakāśa* (conscious light, or luminous consciousness) and



Reciting a *mantra*<sup>12</sup> before the imprint of the feet of the spiritual preceptor [and of those who belong to] his lineage<sup>13</sup> is that by which nature [arises] the awareness regarding the sense-organs [and their] objects, according to their threefold distinction (i.e. illuminated by the three luminaries) of Sun, Moon and Fire.<sup>14</sup> [2]

The immersion [performed] according to the prescribed method in the bathing place of the ocean of nectar of non-duality, surrounded by the shore of one's own reflective awareness, is the ablution known as releasing from the impurities beginning with the innate one.<sup>15</sup> [3]

The night is depriving of consciousness all the world, the day is then awakening everybody. In this world the junction of these two [represents]

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*vimarśa* (reflective awareness), which are embodied by Śiva and Śakti, respectively. One may note the shades of meanings conveyed by the quasi synonymous terms *mūrti*, *tanu* and *vapus*: *mūrti* is the *form*, the *appearance* of Śiva as self-manifest light; *tanu* indicates the *manifestation* of his own *self*, i.e., his self-awareness; *vapus* is the *essence* of the union of the two principles, whose fusion is *embodied* by the *guru*'s footprint. On the meaning of *gurupādukā*, see the relevant entry in TAK II 2004: 195–196. See also the interpretation of this verse in Sanderson 2007: 413–414 and note 609.

<sup>12</sup> *Japa*, the muttered or silent recitation and repetition of a *mantra*, occurs in many and various ritual practices. Presupposing mental concentration, *japa* acquires the metaphysical dimension of a spiritual-meditative-yogic practice, especially in the Śākta-Śaiva traditions. For a general treatment of *japa* see Padoux 2015: 24–53; see also the relevant entry in TAK II 2004: 264–265.

<sup>13</sup> *Samaṣṭi* (aggregate, totality) is taken here as synonymous with *pañkti*, the line of succession of the spiritual preceptors who handed down the lore of a given Tantric tradition, and to whom the adept should pay homage. See the entry *gurupañkti* in TAK II 2004: 194–195, 1.

<sup>14</sup> The compound *citrabhānuśaśi*, indicating the Fire and the Moon, occurs also below in verse 14c; *bhānuṣūrvaka* should thus stand here for the Sun. This triad occurs in many places and diverse contexts in the Tantric texts.

<sup>15</sup> In non-dualistic Śaivism, the *āṇava mala* is the innate, fundamental impurity pertaining to the limited being (*aṇu*, “atom”); this impurity is ignorance, in the sense of an incomplete knowledge which, erroneously mistaking the self for the non-self, conceals one's own essential nature. This ignorance is the result of the contraction of the divine Consciousness, whereby the Lord, out of his sovereign freedom, obscures his own essence. Unlike the dualistic Śaiva Siddhānta, for which the *āṇava mala* is a substance (*dravya*) which can be eliminated by ritual

the condition of oneness; indeed the deity of the twilight [may be identified with] the supreme Goddess.<sup>16</sup> [4]

Because the self-luminous Śiva is truly the sun, with whose rays of light—which have the power of his reflective awareness—he illuminates the entire sphere of the knowable, the [illuminated] thought [inspires] his worship together with the I-ness (i.e., the Goddess).<sup>17</sup> [5]

In this system, the principle of the [individual] self is the sacrificial pavilion created on the surface consisting of the playful manifestation of [the supreme] Consciousness; [as] its quality of darkness/ignorance is vanishing

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action, for the non-dualistic Śaivism ignorance can be overcome only by means of true knowledge. In this verse the metaphorical description of the ritual ablution—in the ocean of non-duality, on the shore of reflective awareness—denotes the mental nature of the act of cleansing of the soul's impurities, beginning with the fundamental one. See the relevant entry in TAK I 2000: 182, 2. On the concept of *āṇava mala*, see TĀ, I, 23–38, in M. K. Shāstri (ed.) 1918, vol. I: 54–77, and the Fr. trans. by Silburn, with the related explanations taken from Jayaratha's commentary, in Silburn, Padoux (eds.) 1998: 82–86.

<sup>16</sup> The supreme Goddess (*śrīparā*) is here likened with the deity of the twilight because this, as the point of junction between day and night, represents the fusion (*sāmarasya*) of two opposites; accordingly, it can be taken as a metaphor of the perfect non-duality characterizing the supreme godhead.

<sup>17</sup> The relationship between Śiva alias *prakāśa* and Śakti alias *vimarśa* is expressed in this verse by the analogy of the sun and its rays, where the latter are the illuminating power of the former. As reads the *Tripurārahasya*, a later text of the Tripurā tradition: “Because of [their] connection, without Śiva, Śakti never exists; so also Śiva without Śakti, who is the self of his own being, [does not exist]. Indeed, where and when might the sun exist without its illuminating power? [54c–55]” (TR, mk, 79, 54c–55: *āśrayatvācchivamṛte śaktir naiva tu vidyate || 54cd || iti cen nijasattātmaśaktihīnaḥ śivas tathā | prakāśaśaktihīno vai raviḥ kutra kadā bhavet || 55 ||*). Śiva and Śakti are therefore to be worshipped together. The I-ness (*ahaṁtā*) probably stands here for the Goddess. Her identification with this principle, and that of the Lord with the complementary principle of the ‘I’ (*aham*), is asserted, for instance, in the *Lakṣmī Tantra* (LT), a South Indian Pāñcarātra scripture composed after the 11<sup>th</sup> century, and whose doctrinal background is indebted to the Kashmirian non-dualistic Śaivism of the Pratyabhijñā (see Sanderson 2001: 35–38). Lakṣmī says: “He, Hari being the I (*aham*), is regarded as the self in all beings. I am the eternal I-ness (*ahaṁtā*) of all living beings [13] ... The I-ness is always recognized as the source of the I; for the one cannot exist without the

at the lamp of knowledge, ritual worship is the method of Its (i.e. of the Self) veneration.<sup>18</sup> [6]

The best salvation from the difficulty of the argument marked by dualism is, in this world, the preservation of the self; because of its having the nature of [the supreme] Consciousness, reflective awareness is connection on all sides.<sup>19</sup> [7]

The divine Consciousness dwells on the altar in the pericarp of the lotus of the heart; indeed Bhairava destroys the bonds of he who is eagerly engaged in the act of her worship. [8]

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other and each is invariably linked to the other. [17] Realize that the relationship between me and the Lord as that of identity because without I-ness the I would for want of association be meaningless. [18] [In the same way] the I-ness without the I would, for want of a basis, lack meaning. [19ab]" (LT, 2, 13, 17–19b: *ātmā sa sarvabhūtānām ahaṃ bhūto hariḥ smṛtaḥ | ahaṃtā sarvabhūtānām ahaṃ asmi sanātānī || 13 || ... ahamarthasamutthā ca sāhaṃtā parikīrtitā | anyonyenāvinābhāvād anyonyena samanvayāt || 17 || tadātmyaṃ viddhi saṃbandhaṃ mama nāthasya cobhayoḥ | ahaṃtayā vināhaṃ hi nirupākhyo na sidhyati || 18 || ahaṃ arthaṃ vināhaṃtā nirādhārā na sidhyati | 19ab*), trans. effected from the Eng. trans. in Gupta (ed.) 1972: 9.

<sup>18</sup> In this verse *ātmatattva* is to be understood as the principle of the individual, limited self; when ignorance that characterizes it vanishes, this self attains the identity with the supreme Self. *Iha*, "here", may mean "in this system", in which the individual self is envisaged as the temple where, as darkness is dispelled by the lamp of knowledge, ritual worship is the inner performance of the adoration of the supreme Self. One may note that in the compound *civīlāsamayabhittibhāvitam*, the term *bhitti* evokes the *ābhāsavāda* elaborated by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. According to this doctrine the divine Consciousness is likened to a mirror, or a canvas, on whose surface (*bhitti*) the phenomenal world appears as a reflection, or a painting. This analogy conveys the idea of the inwardness, non-separation and ultimate non-difference between the multifarious phenomenal world and the single divine Consciousness, which constitutes the substrate of all things. Whereas the phenomenal world is ontologically dependent on the divine Consciousness, the latter, in her sovereign independence, freely manifests the objects appearing in herself, who is to be considered as their active background.

<sup>19</sup> According to the meaning given to the words *vimarśana* and *bandhana*, this verse may be rendered in two different ways, which are not mutually exclusive. If *vimarśana*, considered as synonymous with *vimarśa*, indicates the reflective awareness—i.e., the active aspect of the supreme Consciousness—then *bandhana*, referring to it, is not to be taken in its usual meaning of bondage, but is to be understood in the sense of connection of all things; accordingly, by means of

The series of difficulties characterized by mental construction has the power [to cause] every differentiation; its opposite in this respect is said to be the rest in one's own abode free from mental construction, where Śambhu himself, characterized by the consciousness that has no [division between subject and] object, is incessantly present. [9–10b]

The [divine] throne is regarded as possessing all its component parts, [namely] the multitude of principles beginning with the earth and ending with Śiva.<sup>20</sup> [10cd]

The purification—considered as the best—of one's own hands, [which are] the two impure organs of action here related to the *ātmatattva*, consists in the meditative realization of their dissolution into the pure Reality.<sup>21</sup> [11]

Now, for he who has consciousness of the knowable, breath control is said to be the best practice, in the form of a reflective awareness of non

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reflective awareness one realizes the truth of non-duality, i.e., the ultimate unity of individual self and supreme Self, as well as the identification of everything with the Self. If *vimarśana* is instead taken—as it is in classical Indian logic—as an investigation, discussion regarding two alternatives, namely an argument (*pakṣa*) and a counter-statement (*vipakṣa*), and if *bandhana* keeps its usual meaning of bondage, then the verse may be rendered as follows: “In this world the best salvation from the difficulty of the argument marked by dualism is the preservation of the self by she who has the nature of the supreme Consciousness, [whereas] discussion entails bondage on all sides”. In this case the verse signifies that only the pure, supreme Consciousness (*saṃvid*), the sole protector of the self (*ātman*), can carry across the difficulties of the arguments of the followers of dualism; conversely, the philosophical debate based on the means of intellectual knowledge ends up in carry on the state of bondage of the soul. For the meaning of the terms *vipakṣa* and *vimarśa* in classical Indian logic, see the relevant entries in Oberhammer et al. 2006: 142–143, 145–147.

<sup>20</sup> While verse 9–10b is linked to verse 7, this half verse linked to verse 8 refers to the divine throne (*āsana*) that the devotee should meditatively build and visualize in his own heart during the mental, internal worship which, in Tantric ritual, always precedes the external worship performed on a cult-image. This throne, on which the deity is to be installed and worshipped, represents the entire universe; accordingly, it is said to be composed of all principles, or fundamental realities (*tattva*) of the cosmos. See the entry *āsana* in TAK I 2000: 209–210, 1.

<sup>21</sup> The ritual purification of the hands (*karaśuddhi*) generally precedes the placing of *mantras* on the hands (*karanyāsa*), the latter rite aiming at the progressive divinization of the officiant devotee, to make him fit for worshipping a deity (see

duality, [and] consisting in the absorption of the luminous, vibrating self in the consciousness of the knower.<sup>22</sup> [12]

For he who has consciousness of his own self [occurs] the understanding of his being a share of the sixfold pathway, [that is to say] of the arrangement of the aggregate of six components<sup>23</sup> [and of] the places of [the manifestations of the supreme] Consciousness in the nine *cakras*, [where] the birth,

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the relevant entries in TAK II 2004: 54 and 53). This verse is quoted by Amṛtānanda himself in his commentary on YH, 2, 2; 3, 125cd [see Padoux (ed.) 1994: 182–183, 342–343], where he explains that the hands are organs of action to be regarded as impure because they pertain to the *ātmatattva*. The latter, along with the *vidyā*- and *śiva-tattvas*, form the *tattvatraya*, the three *tattvas* considered to be the constituents of the cosmos; as Brunner notes [see Brunner (ed.) 1977: 428–429, note 2], these are not three single principles out of the thirty-six *tattvas* of Śaiva ontology, but are to be understood as clusters of principles whose aggregate encompasses the entire universe. Within the series of *tattvas*, the *ātmatattva* comprises the principles from the earth to *māyā*, belonging thus to the level of the impure manifestation. In order to become fit for performing the ritual actions, the hands must undergo a purification from the *ātmatattva*, and this purification is realized by their meditative dissolution into the pure Reality (*suddhatattva*).

<sup>22</sup> In line with Amṛtānanda's conceptualization of the ritual and yogic practices, *prāṇāyama* likewise becomes a spiritual exercise.

<sup>23</sup> This is a reference to the system of the six pathways (*ṣaḍadhvan*), which is found in several Tantric texts and traditions, with specific variants about the concepts, ritual use, and order of the *adhvans* (see the relevant entry in TAK I 2000: 110–111 and TAK II 2004: 296). The six *adhvans* are regarded as ways of manifestation of the universe by the divine Energy, as well as paths leading man towards liberation; in the so-called liberating initiation (*nirvāṇadīkṣā*) they represent initiatory paths, along which the entities related to each *adhvan* must be purified by the adept. In his TĀ, Abhinavagupta discusses the metaphysical, cosmological, and ritual aspects of the *ṣaḍadhvan*, ordering the *adhvans* hierarchically, from the highest to the lowest. Accordingly, from the standpoint of the manifestation and progressive differentiation of the Word-Energy—which takes place in time—the highest is the *varṇādhvan*, the path of the phonemes, followed by the *mantrādhvan*, the path of the *mantras* which constitute a first condensation of the Word-Energy into subtle linguistic entities, and ending with the *padādhvan*, the path of the words of human language. From the standpoint of cosmic evolution—which takes place in space—the first is the *kalādhvan*, the path of the fragmenting and condensing energies producing the thirty-six *tattvas*, which constitute the *tattvādhvan*, the path of the principles, followed by the *bhuvādhvan*, the path of the worlds. This verse seems

maintenance and dissolution of the universe [are actualized] three by three.<sup>24</sup>  
[13]

This is *kāma*: the *bindu* tending upward, the face, the Sun; below this are the two breasts, the Fire and the Moon, both are the *kalā*; here is the vulva

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to imply that he who is endowed with self-consciousness is also aware of being part of the cosmos, the steps of whose emanation have to be progressively purified in his path towards liberation.

<sup>24</sup> *Navacakra* stands here for the Śrīcakra. In fact, in the first chapter (*cakrasaṃketa*) of the YH this diagram is outlined according to a nine-fold structure, whose constituent parts are: first, the three outer square lines called the house of the earth (*bhūgrha*); second, the sixteen-petal lotus; third, the eight-petal lotus; fourth, the fourteen triangles; fifth and sixth, the two ten-angled figures; seventh, the figure of eight triangles; eighth, the central triangle; ninth, the centre of this triangle [see YH, 1, 79c–82a in Padoux (ed.) 1994: 175]. In the YH the Śrīcakra is also described as having a three-fold structure, to which this verse alludes. This is constituted by: a first portion of the diagram including the eight-angled figure called *navayoni*, formed by three superimposed intersecting triangles, one pointing upward and two pointing downward, and surrounding the central triangle with the *bindu* at its centre; a second portion made of the two ten-angled figures and the fourteen triangles; a third portion comprising the eight- and sixteen-petal lotuses within the threefold circle, and the three outer square lines. Since the Śrīcakra as a whole is a dynamic model of the cosmic activity of the divine Energy, in the first of these portions the aspect of the reabsorption of the universe predominates, in the second its maintenance, and in the third its emanation. But, while in each portion of the Śrīcakra one of these three aspects is predominant, in each portion all three are simultaneously present, so that the structure is in fact three-times-three-fold [see YH, 1, 72c–78b and Amṛtānanda's commentary in Padoux (ed.) 1994: 170–173]. By means of his realizing meditation (*bhāvanā*), the adept can reproduce the dynamics of the divine Energy symbolized by the Śrīcakra: by contemplating the diagram from its centre to its outer circles he actualizes the process of the cosmic emanation, then proceeding from its outer circles to its centre he realizes the cosmic reabsorption into its source, the divine Consciousness, with which he should finally identify. In the Śrīcakra *pūjā*, the adept worships the deities abiding in and animating the constituent parts of the diagram; this verse refers to these deities (designated by the genitive plural of *saṃvid*), who dwell on the nine-fold/three-fold structure of the Śrīcakra, and who are all manifestations of the supreme divine Consciousness.

(*yoni*), with at the opposite side (i.e., above in the middle) the *kuṇḍalinī*.<sup>25</sup> [14]

So they say that in this world the ritual placing of *mantras*<sup>26</sup>—causing distinction to be sameness—on one's own self as characterized by the

<sup>25</sup> This verse provides a concise description of the *kāmakalā*, which symbolizes the union of Śiva (*kāma*) and Śakti (*kalā*), and is regarded as the source of both the Śrīcakra and the Śrīvidyā (i.e., the root-*mantra* of Tripurā). The *kāmakalā* is depicted as a diagram formed by two superimposed intersecting triangles, one pointing upward, representing Śiva, and one pointing downward, representing Śakti. On the apex of the triangle of Śiva is a *bindu* symbolizing the phoneme A, the Sun, and the face of the Goddess; on the two angles at the base of this triangle are two *bindus* symbolizing the *visarga*, the Fire and the Moon, and the breasts of the Goddess; on the lower angle of the triangle of Śakti is a *bindu* symbolizing the phoneme HA and the *yoni* of the Goddess. This is a diagrammatic symbol of the Goddess—represented by her face, breasts and *yoni*—united with Śiva. In the central part of the two triangles is the letter Ī in *devanagari* script, symbolizing the *kuṇḍalinī*, which is rising, prompted by the union of Śiva and Śakti, from HA to A—the last and first phonemes of the Sanskrit alphabet, encompassing the totality of the phonemes—so that in her ascent the *kuṇḍalinī* retraces the phonematic emanation of the universe in the sense of its reabsorption. For a detailed explanation of the complex symbolic meanings of the *kāmakalā* diagram—merely summarized here—see Padoux (ed.) 1994: 201–203 and note 99. See also the relevant entry in TAK II 2004: 85. A mention of the *kāmakalā* is quite appropriate here, given that the structure of the Śrīcakra was referred to in the previous verse. As symbol of the divine union, the *kāmakalā* is envisaged as the luminous and vibrating core of energy which unfolds in the Śrīcakra. In fact, in his KKV, Puṇyānanda states that the knowledge of the *kāmakalā* is the knowledge about the Śrīcakra (see KKV, 8ab: *iti kāmakalā vidyā devīcakram ātmikā seyam | 8ab*).

<sup>26</sup> Verses 15–17 deal with *nyāsa*, the act of placing *mantras* on the body, generally accompanied and sealed by particular hand gestures (*mudrā*). Through this ritual practice, the body, impregnated by the power of the *mantras*—which represent the essential aspect and highest manifestation of cosmic entities or deities—is transformed, cosmicized and divinized. For a general treatment of *nyāsa* see Padoux 2015: 54–80.

aggregate of all *tattvas* [and] consisting of the four *kalās*<sup>27</sup>, [is performed] through the practice of speech in its stage of Corporeal Word.<sup>28</sup> [15]

The best rite is the ritual placing of the *mantras* of the eight goddesses of Speech<sup>29</sup> [beginning] from one's own subtle body—named *puryaṣṭaka*<sup>30</sup> [and] causing the attainment of personhood—[and ending] in the abode of Consciousness, according to the order of dissolution. [16]

<sup>27</sup> Several Tantric sources testify to a group of four *kalās*, which are homologized with various sections of the universe (see the entry *kalā* in TAK II 2004: 71, 6.). On account of the correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm, the body of the adept—here expressed by *ātman*, his own self—is said to be made of the series of *tattvas*, or the four *kalās*.

<sup>28</sup> As Padoux remarks, the nature of *mantras* is somehow contradictory: insofar as they are forms of *Vāc*—the primeval Word-Energy, identical with the divine Consciousness and the highest Reality—*mantras* pertain to the transcendent level of the Supreme Word (*parā vāc*); but since they exist empirically as uttered phonetic elements, they also belong to the level of the articulate human language, that of the Corporeal Word (*vaikhari*), which is the last of the four progressive stages in which the Word-Energy unfolds into increasingly differentiated and concrete forms (see Padoux 2015: 22–23 and 89).

<sup>29</sup> The eight goddesses of Speech (*vāgdevatā* or *vāgdevī*) preside over the eight divisions of the Sanskrit alphabet, constituted by the vowels and the seven groups of consonants [see Sanderson (ed.) 2017: 12, note 15].

<sup>30</sup> The notion of *puryaṣṭaka* (the eight in the body), derived from Sāṃkhya, is found in several Tantric sources. It indicates the transmigrating body, subtle and yet material, carrying the soul from one gross body to another, hence enabling the soul's reincarnation—that which is possibly meant in this verse when it is said that this subtle body causes the attainment of personhood (*pūruṣatva*). The *puryaṣṭaka* is made up of eight constituents, which may vary in the different sources; according to the Sāṃkhya definition, also adopted by some Tantric texts, these eight constituents are: *manas* (mind), *buddhi* (intellect), *ahaṃkāra* (egoity), plus the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*). For more details, see the relevant entry in TAK III 2013: 476–478, and also Padoux (ed.) 1994: 151, note 228.

It is worth remarking that, generally speaking, the support for *nyāsa* is the yogic body, whose centres (*cakra*) and channels (*nāḍī*) are to be imagined, visualized and experienced by the adept while imposing the *mantras*, whose energy is deemed to permeate these places of his inner bodily structure (see Padoux 2015: 103–105, 107); conversely, the *puryaṣṭaka* is the subtle body which “can be conceived, but not visualized” (Ibid.: 103). Its mention in this verse may therefore refer to a particular, intellectualized sort of *nyāsa* which, on the basis of a correspondence



[When] the internal organs, [which are] the attributes of the self-luminous sun (i.e., the self), gradually get into the state of seats,<sup>31</sup> the ritual placing of *mantras* on these [seats causes] the absorption of the heart into the supreme domain.<sup>32</sup> [17]

[After having offered] the three items, [namely] the drink, the vessel and the excellent nectar, [and] the purifying *arghya*<sup>33</sup> in the sense-organs

between the *mantras* of the eight *vāgdevatās* and the eight constituents of the subtle body, is directed to a conceptualized, rather than visualized, image of the body. The *mantras* are thus placed on the symbolic seats of the internal organs, namely *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, and the five *tanmātras* which, as qualities of the elements, somehow stand for the qualities of the perceptions of the sense-organs.

<sup>31</sup> The *pīṭhas* (seats) are generally intended as cult centres of the Goddess, sacred places of pilgrimage found in various places in India, where the pieces of the dismembered body of Sati fell, according to the well-known myth. In the *pīṭhanyāsa*, these *pīṭhas* are interiorized and imagined as coinciding with diverse parts of the human body which, while reproducing a sacred geography, is charged by the divine energy of the *mantras* placed therein (on this meaning of *pīṭha*, see the relevant entry in TAK III 2013: 461, 4.). In this verse, *pīṭhas* seem simply to indicate the seats of the internal organs, namely *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, and possibly also the sense-organs, the very ones implicitly referred to in the previous verse as the constituents of the *puryaṣṭaka*. Hence, the *nyāsa* performed on these seats enables the reabsorption of the adept's internal and sense-organs—collectively referred to as his heart (*hṛd*)—into the supreme domain of Consciousness.

<sup>32</sup> Verses 15–17 seem to refer to a particular practice of *nyāsa*, or at least to a particular conceptualization of this ritual, to be regarded as the best rite (*iṣṭam uttamam*, verse 16d). Since the *vāgdevatās* collectively preside over the entire Sanskrit alphabet, which is homologized with the universe in its entirety, the placing of their *mantras* on the seats of the adept's internal and sense-organs—according to the concept of the *puryaṣṭaka*—effects the cosmicization of the adept's subtle body. The definition of *nyāsa* as “causing distinction to be sameness” (*samaviśeṣabhāvanam*, verse 15d) may be explained by the order of dissolution to be followed in this ritual practice, whereby the adept's internal and sense-organs are to be progressively reabsorbed into the domain of the supreme Consciousness (*citpade* in verse 16c, *paradhāmnī* in verse 17d); this reabsorption enables the final identification of the adept's consciousness with the supreme Consciousness, that is to say, the disappearance of his distinction from and the realization of his sameness with the supreme Consciousness.

<sup>33</sup> The term *arghya* indicates various sorts of consecrated water to be offered to the deity in the course of several rites (see the relevant entry in TAK I 2000: 140–141).

[and] their objects, according to their threefold distinction consisting of the phonemes, the *tattvas* and [their respective] domains, [occurs] the resting in the fourth [state of consciousness].<sup>34</sup> [18]

In this world the *cakra* of the *tattvas*, beginning with the earth and ending with Śiva, is considered the best *cakra*. The deity whose splendour is inherent in her own nature becomes the [dynamic] Energy of Consciousness.<sup>35</sup> [19]

The invocation [of the deity] in the objective consciousness [which is] outside one's own inner conscious self, [whereby the deity is invited to be] placed [there] by means of the *bijamantra* of the Mother [Goddess], is characterized by a sense of identity.<sup>36</sup> [20]

<sup>34</sup> What is possibly meant by this verse is that, after performing an internal ritual, making a series of offerings directed to the sense-organs and their objects, one may rest in the fourth state of consciousness; in fact, the latter is beyond the states pertaining to the domain of the sense-organs and their objects, i.e., the domain of the phenomenal world, whose fundamental realities (*tattva*) are brought into existence by the phonemes (*mātrkā*) which, according to the theory of the phonematic emanation of the universe, are regarded as forms of the Word-Energy. It is also to be noted the correspondence between the four (three plus one) offerings and the four (three plus one) states of consciousness.

<sup>35</sup> The best sacred diagram (*cakra*) is the Śrīcakra which, as a dynamic model and structure of the cosmic activity of the divine Energy, includes all the fundamental realities (*tattva*) manifested in the creation of the universe. The deity of the Śrīcakra is Tripurasundarī, who is the shining embodiment of the Energy of Consciousness. The locution *saṃvidī kalā* is found also in a verse of Śivānanda's *Saubhāgyahṛdayastotra* (SHS), which reads: "All that which shines in the manifold variety of forms, every object pertaining to space and time, it is she who shines in all these forms: I worship this [dynamic] energy of Consciousness. [4]" [SHS, 4: *deśakālapadārthātma yadyadvastu yathā yathā | tattadrūpeṇa yā bhāti tāṃ śraye sraye saṃvidīm kalām || 4 ||*, Dviveda (ed.) 1985: 304].

<sup>36</sup> In the Tantric *pūjā*, the *āvāhana* is the invocation by which the deity is invited to descend into the cult image—may it be an external icon or a mentally constructed image—in order to permeate it with her/his presence (see the relevant entry in TAK I 2000: 206–207). This verse seems to mean that, when the divine presence is invoked and placed in (where *samarpaṇa* is taken as synonymous with *nyāsa*) the individual consciousness, hence made to penetrate it—which, unlike one's own true, inner self, is turned outwards (*bahis*), directed towards the external world—then, thanks to the power of the *bijamantra* of the Goddess (where *akṣa*, "seed", is taken as synonymous with *bīja*), this invocation produces the fusion

Truly this fivefold manifested world [entails] the constant development of a fivefold experience; the pure act of its dissolution into one's own pure conscious self is a ritual act of service [offered to the deity].<sup>37</sup> [21]

Now, this time which is determined by the regular course of the appearance of the moon is divided into fifteen parts; the daily homage to the [sixteenth] moon's digit is regarded as the ritual act of dissolution [of this time] into the eternal domain.<sup>38</sup> [22]

The rays of light of the conscious Self shining in the multitude of the *tattvas* are going towards the external circle; surpassing its worship is the ritual act performed according to the order of dissolution into the domain of the inexpressible, consisting of [the supreme] Consciousness.<sup>39</sup> [23]

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(where *samarasatva* is taken as synonymous with *sāmarasya*) of the individual consciousness with the deity.

<sup>37</sup> The adjective *aupacārikam* derives from *upacāra*, a term indicating the services offered to a deity during the Tantric *pūjā*; these include at least five essential items, namely fragrant substances (*gandha*), flowers (*puṣpa*), incense (*dhūpa*), lighted lamps (*dīpa*), and food offerings (*naivedya*). This verse seems to make use of a *śleṣa*, playing with the double meaning of *aupacārikam*, which can also signify “non literal, figurative, metaphorical”. Accordingly, what is offered to the deity is the whole world and its subjective experience—which are both said to be five-fold, just as the *upacāra* is five-fold—and this offer is metaphorical in so far as it does not consist of substances like flowers, incense and so forth, but it is made up of the objective and subjective phenomenal world, which has to be reabsorbed into the individual conscious self which, thereby identified with the supreme Self, becomes worthy to be offered to the deity. Another possible meaning of five-fold—qualifying both the world and its experience—may refer to the five cosmic functions of the deity: creation, maintenance, destruction, occlusion and grace.

<sup>38</sup> The term *kalā* indicates here the digits of the moon, corresponding to the lunar days, and associated with the Nityā goddesses, the Eternal ones, whose ancient cult is linked to the Tripurā tradition (see the relevant entry in TAK II 2004: 69–70, 2.). The *kalās* are fifteen plus one, whereby the sixteenth is deemed to surpass the group of fifteen, both in the case of the invisible sixteenth lunar digit, and in that of Mahātripurasundarī, head of the fifteen Nityās. In this verse, time—that is, empirical time—is said to be divided into fifteen parts, according to the course of the moon; the daily worship of the sixteenth *kalā* therefore seems to enable the transcendence of time, which is expressed in terms of its dissolution or absorption into eternity.

<sup>39</sup> The external circle (*bāhyacakra*) indicates the outer portion of the Śrīcakra, repre-

The imperishable inner form shines brightly [as] this form of reality which is fourfold; the ritual act of the latter's dissolution into the fifth domain is thus regarded as a fourfold *bali* offering.<sup>40</sup> [24]

Indeed, five-fold is the spreading of the inner conscious self through the path of the external sense-organs; the conscious self brings about this supreme state of oneness [as] in this world [does] the swinging of lamps before the image of a deity.<sup>41</sup> [25]

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senting the emanation of the universe by the divine Energy unfolding in the series of *tattvas*; this portion of the diagram is presided by the deities who are likened to rays of light spreading from Tripurasundarī, who personifies the supreme Consciousness and abides in the centre of the diagram. The *anākhyā*, the nameless or inexpressible, denotes the fourth and supreme phase in the cycle of the cosmic activity of the divine Energy, beyond creation, maintenance and destruction, when everything is reabsorbed into the supreme Consciousness (see the relevant entry in TAK I 2000: 115, where the following extract from Jayaratha's comment on TĀ, 3, 258 is quoted: "What transcends this three-fold condition, consisting of the emanation and so forth, is the inexpressible" (*tasya sṛṣṭyādyātmana upādhitrayasya atyayo'nākhyam*). This verse implies that the meditative contemplation and worship of the Śrīcakra, which proceeds from its outer circles to its centre, following the order of dissolution, culminates in the realization of the universal reabsorption into the inexpressible domain of the supreme Consciousness (see also above, note 24).

<sup>40</sup> One may propose the following tentative interpretation of this rather obscure verse, which is probably to be related to the previous one: the imperishable inner form, i.e., the highest Reality, manifests itself in the fourfold reality made up of its three aspects plus the *anākhyā* (mentioned in verse 23); the ritual dissolution of this fourfold reality into the fifth domain of the highest Reality is then symbolically likened to a four-fold *bali*. This indicates, in several Tantric sources, the offerings of food presented to various deities towards the end of a ritual worship.

<sup>41</sup> The term *ārātrika* indicates a protecting rite performed in the temples, where an uneven number (one to nine) of lamps are swung before the idol or above its head (see the relevant entry in TAK I 2000: 202–203). In this verse the five sense-organs are likened with these lamps: whereas in the temple the divine image shines when it is illuminated by the lamps, when the self-luminous conscious self withdraws the sense-organs, as a light source reabsorbing its rays, the state of oneness shines.

Truly, [when] both speech and mind vanish because of the pure, undivided, unattainable [state], then, resting in the domain destitute of mind and speech, the restrained *japa* is the best one.<sup>42</sup> [26]

The aspect of [the supreme] Consciousness [as a] mirror within which flashes, from the outer objectivity, the reflection of all this world of animated and unanimated beings, is the supreme mirror of the heart.<sup>43</sup> [27]

[The one] who abides in the sky of consciousness, covering all that has the nature of Śiva (i.e., the world) with his conscious self, rescues from the threefold insurmountable pain. [28ac]

Here the five-fold [arrangement of] the parasol, the lotus, the pure nectar, the chowrie whose flashing vibration [evokes] the Consciousness, [and] various pleasing circumambulations, [all this is meant for] the homage to

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<sup>42</sup> There are three sorts of *japa*: voiced and audible (*vācika*), uttered in a low voice, in secret (*upāṃśu*), and mental (*mānasa*). This verse extols the inner, mental recitation of *mantras*, which is “restrained”, i.e., not uttered, and “destitute of mind and speech”, i.e., beyond discursive thought and language. This silent enunciation of *mantras* is considered the highest form of *japa*, which amounts to a spiritual practice, whereby the adept transcends the word, dissolving into the silence of the Absolute. As Padoux remarks, the “persisting ideology which extols the brief over the long, the concentrated over the diffuse, the retained over the emitted, the silent over the audible, and the unexpressed over the expressed, results ... for *japa*, in placing the mental, externally unexpressed one over the vocal audible one” (Padoux 2015: 26). In fact, “Silence is higher than the highest plane of the word (*vāc*) because it is its primal Source” (Ibid.: 99), “the word is manifested by issuing forth from this primal Silence—into which it is eventually to dissolve” (Ibid.: 25).

<sup>43</sup> The doctrine of reflection (*ābhāsavāda*)—already alluded to in verse 6 (see above, note 18)—is clearly referenced in this verse: the world appears as a reflection in the mirror of the divine Consciousness, not separate and ultimately not different from her, in the same way as it appears in the mirror-like heart of the adept who has become aware of his identification with the divine. The locution *idantayā bahiḥ* is somehow misleading, because it seems to assume the existence of an external objective reality, whereas, according to this doctrine, nothing exists outside the divine Consciousness: unlike the insentient mirror which needs the existence of original, external objects in order to reflect them, the divine Consciousness, thanks to her active awareness and sovereign freedom, manifests the world by projecting it as a reflection within herself.

Bhava (Śiva), the all-seeing, by the blinking of whose eyes the world<sup>44</sup> is wonderfully created and destroyed. [28d–29]

Indeed [one should present] the mental offering<sup>45</sup> of one's own self, [i.e.,] of the body made of the three-fold desire, made of the multitude of *tattvas*, to [the supreme] Consciousness, the pure domain surpassing [all] *tattvas*. [30]

The spiritual preceptor, who is Śiva,<sup>46</sup> bestows his grace by means of his self-luminous body on the head of the disciple; having obtained this grace purifying [all] *tattvas*, the happy [disciple] attains joy.<sup>47</sup> [31]

This net of fetters (i.e., the outer world) is the chief cause of ruin for the individual soul; hence, truly, [it is] believed that a pure oblation which is

<sup>44</sup> The word used to indicate both the world and Śiva is *bhava*, since Bhava is also one of Śiva's names (verse 29d). Thereby the text may intend to make explicit the locution *śivātmakam* (verse 28c), whereby "that which has the nature of Śiva" means the world, because in non-dualistic Śaivism, Śiva is everything, he is the sole and entire reality.

<sup>45</sup> By *nivedana* (offering) the text may refer to the *naivedya*, the rice-based food offering presented to the deity in the Tantric *pūjā*. In the Kaula Tantras this offering may include also impure substances, such as meat and alcohol, and even impure secretions of the human body (see the relevant entry in TAK III 2013: 338–340). In this verse the offering in question is envisaged as a mental ritual consisting in the oblation—to be presented to the supreme Consciousness—of the individual self of the adept, represented by his body with its psycho-physical components (the *tattvas*). Unfortunately, it is unclear what is meant by *eṣaṇātraya* (the three-fold desire).

<sup>46</sup> As in verse 1, the identification of the *guru* with Śiva, their sameness of nature, are reasserted here. See also Amṛtānanda's commentary on YH, 2, 50–51a: "The nature of the spiritual preceptor is the same as Śiva" [*guror api tadrūpatvaṃ śivātmakatvaṃ*, Dviveda (ed.) 1988: 176].

<sup>47</sup> Amṛtānanda quotes this very verse in his commentary on YH, 3, 6ab: "The adept totters, intoxicated with the realization of non-duality with the supreme. [3.6ab]" (*paramādvaitabhāvanāmadaghūrṇitaḥ* | 6ab), Eng. trans. in Padoux with Jeanty (eds.) 2013: 95. The commentary reads: "Receiving the grace of the spiritual preceptor [entails] the meditative realization of the non-duality with the supreme Śiva, [the being] subdued by the radiance of the supreme happiness" [*paramaśivādvaitabhāvanālakṣaṇaguruprasādasvīkāra samullasat-paramānandaparavaśa ityārthaḥ* || 6 ||, Dviveda (ed.) 1988: 226].

reached by the gaze of one's own spiritual preceptor [shall be] purified.<sup>48</sup> [32]

By conquering all the knowable, everywhere, indeed the empirical consciousness,<sup>49</sup> provided with latent impressions free from differentiation, [becomes] self-controlled; for Śiva, the best among the various offerings is that of self-restraint.<sup>50</sup> [33]

The meditative realization of the identity with the supreme Śiva is granted [and] the multitude of all evils is destroyed<sup>51</sup> by the bridge carrying across

<sup>48</sup> The virtues of the *guru's* gaze (*nirīkṣaṇa*) are such that, besides its purifying power, it can release the adept from every worldly bondage. As Amṛtānanda puts it in his commentary on YH, 2, 50–51a: “The gaze of the spiritual preceptor is capable of cutting all bonds” [*tasya guror nirīkṣaṇam nikhilapāśchedanasamarthanam*, Dviveda (ed.) 1988: 177]. See also the entry *nirīkṣaṇa* in TAK III 2013: 308–309.

<sup>49</sup> On the rendering of *citta* as “empirical, limited consciousness”, see the entry *cit* in TAK II 2004: 243.

<sup>50</sup> In this verse the synonyms *damana* and *damanaka* have different shades of meaning: in its first occurrence, as a neuter action noun stemming from the root *dam* (to tame, subdue, conquer), *damana* indicates the power of mastering all the knowable for the empirical consciousness which is free from the mental constructs of a differentiating knowledge; in its second occurrence, as an adjective *damana* indicates the self-controlled *citta*; in its third occurrence, as a masculine noun *damanaka* generally indicates the plant *Artemisia indica*, while *damana* as a neuter noun means self-restraint. The offerings of *Artemisia indica* to Śiva during his worship is explained by an aetiological myth in which Bhairava, as tamer (*damana*) of gods and demons, took the form of the *damana* plant, and henceforth Śiva had to be worshipped with offerings of sprigs of this plant (see the entries *damana* and *damanapūjā* in TAK III 2013: 147–148). While the myth plays with the double meaning of *damana*, whereby the power of taming of Bhairava is evoked by the name of the plant he takes the form of, similarly this verse suggests a symbolic interpretation of the offering of *Artemisia indica*, that amounts to a mental offering of the individual's self-restraint to Śiva.

<sup>51</sup> This verse propounds an etymology of *dīkṣā* as deriving from *dīyate* and *kṣīyate*, passive forms from the roots *dā* and *kṣi*, respectively; accordingly, the initiation grants the identification with the godhead and destroys all evil. A similar etymology is cited by Madhu Khanna in her analysis of the *dīkṣā* according to Vidyānanda's *Jñānadīpavimarśinī*: “*Dīkṣā* is that which bestows identity with Śiva and destroys the three impurities” (*dadāti śivatādātmyam kṣīṇoti ca malatrayam*), for which see Khanna 1986: 183–184.

the ocean of [the supreme] Consciousness, [that is to say] the initiation [performed through] the inspection of the glance<sup>52</sup> of the spiritual preceptor. [34]

In this system, the best ritual worship, for the four transmissions devoted to the diverse deities<sup>53</sup>, is the concentration of one's own internal organs<sup>54</sup> on the supreme Soul, resting on the peak of the transmental [plane].<sup>55</sup> [35]

The five organs of cognition (i.e., the sense-organs), the perceptions [derived] from the appearance of the objects, for those six [ways of] experiencing, the absorption into [the supreme] Consciousness becomes mental worship. [36]

The [illuminated] thought of the absorption in the fifth domain, [which is] nothing but Consciousness, beyond the four-fold junctures of the [states of consciousness] beginning with wakefulness, and above the separation of inner self and supreme Self, [is] the worship [of the supreme Consciousness].<sup>56</sup> [37]

In the sequence of ritual action [in which] all is removed, the consciousness which moves in the inner void is constantly rising; She who moves in

<sup>52</sup> In the compound *kaṭākṣavīkṣaṇa*, both *vīkṣaṇa* and *kaṭākṣa* are synonymous with *nirīkṣaṇa* (see above, verse 32 and note 48), while *kaṭākṣapāta* is "the casting of the glance" of the *guru*, which has the power of bestowing grace, or spiritual influence on the disciple. See the entry *kaṭākṣapāta* in TAK II 2004: 42, and also Padoux (ed.) 1994: 169, note 291.

<sup>53</sup> Here the four *srotas* (rivers, streams) probably refer to the four *āmnāyas* (currents, or transmissions) into which the Śākta tradition of the Kulamārga is subdivided. Each of these *āmnāyas*, respectively named after the cardinal points, is associated with the cult of particular goddesses, namely: the *pūrvāmnāya* (Eastern Transmission) with Parā, Parāparā and Aparā, the three goddesses of the Trika; the *uttarāmnāya* (Northern Transmission) with Kālī; the *paścimāmnāya* (Western Transmission) with Kubjikā; and the *dakṣiṇāmnāya* (Southern Transmission) with Tripurasundarī. For detailed information on the *āmnāyas*, see, for instance, Sander-son 2012/13: 59ff.

<sup>54</sup> As in verse 17, by *antaraṅgakarāṇa* are meant *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra*, forming the three-fold internal organ (*antaḥkarāṇa*), and possibly also the sense-organs.

<sup>55</sup> *Unmanī*, the transmental plane, refers to a state of consciousness which is deemed to be mindless, beyond any mental activity; it represents the highest stage of concentration. See the relevant entries in TAK I 2000: 234–235.

<sup>56</sup> The fifth domain is the *turyātīta*, the state above the fourth (*turya*), which is itself



the void (*khecarī*) effects the attainment of the state of Śiva [and] dispels all distress.<sup>57</sup> [38]

In this system, the Wheel of Energies is the manifold tortuous motion of lines which by itself is glorious power; its dissolution [and] creation [are realized] through the understanding of the highest meaning of its nature.<sup>58</sup> [39]

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beyond the three states of consciousness, namely wakefulness (*jāgrat*), sleep with dreams (*svapna*) and deep sleep (*suṣupti*). The adept absorbed in the *turyātīta* experiences the cessation of any differentiation between his self and the supreme Self (see the relevant entry in TAK III 2013: 111–112). According to this verse, this absorption in the *turyātīta* amounts to the inner worship of the divine Consciousness. For the semantic richness of the term *mati*, see Padoux 1994 (ed.): 265, note 1.

<sup>57</sup> *Kha* is the innermost empty space of the heart, the inner void where the adept experiences the presence of the divine Consciousness within himself (see the relevant entry in TAK II 2004: 161, 1.). In the Krama tradition, the *khecarīs* are forms of divine Energy animating both the universe and the consciousness of human beings. Kṣemarāja explains that the *khecarīs* move in the space/sky of consciousness, manifesting the fullness of non-duality for he who is purified by an intense divine grace. In the *Śivasūtra*, 2, 5, *khecarī* is identified with the state of Śiva (*khecarī śivāvasthā*) (for these references, see the relevant entry in TAK II 2004: 168–169, 2. and 3.). This may be the background of this verse, whose interpretation is somewhat problematic, and where *krama*, indicating a sequence of ritual in the compound *nirastanikhilakriyākrame*, may also evoke the Krama system, from which the concept of *khecarī*, along with that of *śakticakra* mentioned in the next verse, are borrowed.

<sup>58</sup> This verse refers to the notion of *śakticakra*, the Wheel of the Energies which are to be understood in both their cosmic and human aspects. The first stanza of the *Spandakārikā* (SK) praises Śiva—who makes the universe disappear and appear by the opening and closing of his eyes—as the source of the glorious power of the Wheel of Energies. [See SK, 1: *yasyonmeṣanimeṣābhyāṃ jagataḥ pralayodayau | taṃ śakticakravibhāvaprabhavaṃ śaṅkaraṃ stumaḥ || 1 ||*, Singh (ed.) 1980: 5.] The *śakticakra* denotes the circle of divine energies whose vibrating, whirling motion animates, manifests and reabsorbs the universe; as Kṣemarāja explains in his commentary on this stanza of the SK, the *śakticakra* may be homologized with the sphere of the human sense-organs and their activities. In her commentary on Abhinavagupta's "Hymn in praise of the wheel of deities placed in the body" (*Dehasthadevatācakraṣṭotra*), Lilian Silburn compares the twofold movement of the Wheel of Energies to a spiral: when it coils up towards its centre, the manifold nature of the manifested world disappears, and when it uncoils, the manifoldness

For the complete attainment of the identity with the supreme Śiva, one should perform the triple repetition of the ritual action which [has been] explained here, beginning with the meditation on the spiritual preceptor [and] the meditative realization of the disappearance of [all] differentiation. [40]

The eulogy of the playful manifestation of [the supreme] Consciousness is concluded.

*cidvilāsastavaḥ*  
*amṛtānandayogiviracitaḥ*

*svaprakāśaśivamūrtir ekikā tadvimarśatanur ekikā tayoh |*  
*sāmarasyavapur iṣyate parā pādukā paraśivātmāno guroḥ || 1 ||*  
*citrabhānuśaśibhānupūrvakatritribhedaniyateṣu vastuṣu |*  
*tattadātmakatayā vimarśanam tatsamaṣṭigurupādukājapah || 2 ||*  
*tīrtham advayasudhārasodadher vāritam nijavimarśavelayā |*  
*āṇavādimalamocanocitam snānam atra vidhinā nimajjanam || 3 ||*  
*sā niśa sakalalokamohanī vāsarah sa khalu sarvabodhakah |*  
*sāmarasyam iha sandhir etayoh śrīparaiva nanu sāndhyadevatā || 4 ||*  
*svaprakāśaśiva eva bhāskarar tadvimarśavibhavā marīcayah |*  
*yaiḥ sa bhāsayati vedyamaṇḍalam tasya pūjanam ahantayā matiḥ || 5 ||*  
*cidvilāsamayabhittibhāvitam jñānadīpavigalattamoguṇam |*

reappears. This image applies also to the “tortuous motion of lines” by which Amṛtānanda expresses the dynamics of the *śakticakra*. The ignorant individual remains prisoner of the uncoiling of the spiral, i.e., of the continuous dispersion of his energies in the outer world. Conversely, the adept who abides by his own centre masters both the coiling and the uncoiling; by bringing the whirling of his energies, i.e., the activities of his sense-organs turned towards the outer world, back to his essence, his heart, the pulsating core of his being, he becomes a *kṣetrapati*, lord of his body, mastering thus his sense-organs and their objects. Such an adept becomes like Śiva who, while setting in motion, for mere play, the Wheel of Energies impelling the creation, maintenance and destruction of the universe, remains the only guide of the cosmic machine [see Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra*, 47: *iti śakticakrayantram kṛdāyogena vāhayan devaḥ | ahameva śud-dharūpaḥ śaktimahācakranāyaka padasthaḥ || 47 ||*, Silburn (ed.) 1979: 59]. For an elucidation of the complex meaning of the *śakticakra*, just summarized here, see Silburn (ed.) 1986: 89–97.

ātmatattvam iha yāgamaṇṭapaṇi tasya pūjanavidhānam arcanam || 6 ||  
 bhedalakṣaṇavipakṣasaṃkatāt tāraṇaṃ param ihātmarakṣanam |  
 saṃvidātmakatayā vimarśanaṃ bandhanaṃ bhavati sarvato diśām || 7 ||  
 vedikā hr̥dayapadmakarnikā cinmayī vasati tatra devatā |  
 yo hi tadyajanakarmakarmathas tasya pāsabhiduraḥ sa bhairavaḥ || 8 ||  
 viśvabhedavibhavā vikalpadhīlakṣaṇā bhavati vighnasantatiḥ |  
 nirvikalpanijadhāmaviśramas tannirākaraṇam atra kīrtitam || 9 ||  
 yatra nirviśayabodhalakṣaṇaḥ svātmaśambhur avatiṣṭhate' niśam |  
 tattvajālakam idaṃ śivāvadhī kṣmāmukhaṃ sakalam āsanaṃ matam || 10 ||  
 ātmatattvagatayor aśuddhayor atra karmakaraṇātmanor dvayoḥ |  
 śuddhatattvalayabhāvanāmayī śuddhir ātmakarayoḥ parā matā || 11 ||  
 vedyasaṃvida idaṃ sphurātmano vetṛsaṃvidi vilāpanāmayī |  
 vṛttir advayavimarśavigrahā prāṇasaṃyatir udīritottamā || 12 ||  
 āsanāni navacakrasaṃvidām udbhavasthitilayās trīśas trīśaḥ |  
 aṅgaṣaṭkaracanā ṣaḍadhvanām aṃśatāvagatir ātmasaṃvidaḥ || 13 ||  
 kāma ūrdhvagatabindur ānanaṃ bhānur eṣa tadadhogatau stanau |  
 citrabhānuśaśināv ubhau kalā yonir atra saparārdhakunḍalī || 14 ||  
 evam ātmani catuṣkalāmaye sarvatattvasamavāyalakṣaṇe |  
 nyāsam āhur iha vaikhārīti vāgavṛttitaḥ samaviśeṣabhāvanam || 15 ||  
 pūruṣatvasamavāptihetupuryaṣṭakākhyaniḥśukṣmavarṣmanaḥ |  
 citpade layavidhānam aṣṭavāgdevatānyasanam iṣṭam uttamam || 16 ||  
 antaraṅgakaṇāny upādhayaḥ svaprakāśanabhaso'tra saṃkramāt |  
 pīṭhabhāvam upayānti tāni tannyāsakarma paradhāmni hr̥llayaḥ || 17 ||  
 tattvadhāmuyugamātrkātmakatritribhedanīyateṣu vastuṣu |  
 pānapātraparamāmṛtatrayaṃ turyaviśramaṇam arghyaśodhanam || 18 ||  
 medinīpramukham āśīvaṃ matam tattvacakram iha cakram uttamam |  
 svasvabhāvasamavāyabhāsinī devatā bhavati sāmvidī kalā || 19 ||  
 āntarasya nijasaṃvidātmano māturalakṣakaraṇādhdvanā bahiḥ |  
 meyasamvidi samarpaṇaṃ tadāvāhanaṃ samarasatvalakṣaṇam || 20 ||  
 pañcadhaiva yad idaṃ prapañcitaṃ pañcadhā' nubhavaśāśvatodayam |  
 tatsubhaṃ haraṇam aupacārikaṃ karma nirmalanijātmasaṃvidi || 21 ||  
 yas tu pañcadaśadhā prakalpyate kālā eṣa śaśibhānusaṃkramāt |  
 tasya śāśvatapade layakriyā nityavāsarakalārcaṇaṃ matam || 22 ||  
 bāhyacakram upagā marīcayas tattvajālalasadātmasaṃvidaḥ |  
 tatsamarcanam atīva cinmayānākhyadhāmni vilayakramakriyā || 23 ||  
 yac caturvidham idaṃ vibhāsate tattvarūpam amṛtāntarākṛti |

tasya pañcamapade layakriyā saṁmataṁ balicatuṣṭayam tathā || 24 ||  
 pañcadhā prasarataś cidātmano hy āntarasya bahirindriyādhvanā |  
 sāmarasyam iha saṁvidātmanārātrikaṁ param idaṁ samīritam || 25 ||  
 vāk sahaiva manasā nivartate'prāpyaniṣkalanirāñjanād yataḥ |  
 tatra nirmanasi śabdavarjite dhāmni viśramaṇam uttamo japaḥ || 26 ||  
 bimbitaṁ sphurati yatra saṁvido rūpam āntaram idantayā bahiḥ |  
 viśvam etad akhilaṁ carācaram darpaṇaṁ hṛdayadarpaṇaṁ param || 27 ||  
 chādayan nikhilam ātmasaṁvidā trāyate trividhatāpasamīkatāt |  
 yac cidambaragata śivātmakaṁ chatram atra kamalaṁ sudhāmalam || 28 ||  
 pañcadhā sphuraṇam eva saṁvidaś cāmaraṁ vividhacārucanīkramam |  
 viśvadr̥g layavicitrānirmitaḥ svekṣaṇakṣaṇabhavo bhavastavaḥ || 29 ||  
 eṣānātrayamayasya varṣmaṇas tattvasaṁcayamayasya saṁvidi |  
 dhāmni tattvasamatītasattvake svātmanaḥ khalu nivedanaṁ matam || 30 ||  
 svaprakāśavapuṣā guruḥ śivo yaḥ prasīdati padārthamastake |  
 tatprasādam iha tattvasodhanaṁ prāpya modam upayāti bhāvukāḥ || 31 ||  
 pāśajālakaṁ idaṁ paraṁ paśor nāśakāraṇam ato mataṁ haviḥ |  
 tattvato nijaguror nirīkṣaṇāt prāpyate tad amalāṁ pavitritam || 32 ||  
 vedyarāśidamanena viśvato nirvikalpamayavāsanolbanam |  
 cittam eva damanaṁ śive'mukasyārpaṇaṁ damanakārpaṇaṁ param || 33 ||  
 dīyate paraśivaikyabhāvanā kṣīyate sakalapāpasamīcayāḥ |  
 yena cijjaladhipārasetunā dīkṣaṇaṁ gurukaṭākṣavīkṣaṇam || 34 ||  
 antaraṅgakaṛaṇātmanāṁ catussrotasāṁ vividhadevatājuṣām |  
 pūjanaṁ param ihonmanīśīkhāmadhyavartiparamātmamāyojanam || 35 ||  
 pañcabodhakaraṇāni mānasaṁ darśanāni viṣayapradarśanāt |  
 darśanāni ṣaḍ amūni tāni tatpūjanaṁ bhavati tallayaś citi || 36 ||  
 jāgradādisamayāś caturvidhāś cāntarātmaparamātmavīgrahāḥ |  
 pañcame'tra tadatītacidghane dhāmni tallayamatis tadarcanam || 37 ||  
 khe nirastanikhilakriyākrame yā citiś carati śāśvatodayā |  
 sā śivatvasamavāptikāriṇī khecarī nikhilakhedahāriṇī || 38 ||  
 yatsvarūpamahimā vikalpitaṁ śakticakram iha rajjusarpavat |  
 tatsvarūpaparamārthabodhataḥ tatra tasya vilayo visarjanam || 39 ||  
 yā kriyāsamabhihāratas tridhā darśitā'tra gurubhāvanādikā |  
 sā vibhedalayabhāvanādikā'bhyasya tāṁ paraśivaikyāsiddhaye || 40 ||

iti cidvilāsastavaḥ samāptaḥ ||

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# Is Metaphysics Madness? A Sixth-Century Polemic Unpacked

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I think almost no one would have predicted that before the end of the millenium—even given some predictable end-of-millenium madness—the existence of tables would again be called into question.

Eli Hirsch, “Against Revisionary Ontology”<sup>1</sup>

## 1. The preamble

There is a passage from the sixth-century C.E. Buddhist Middle Way thinker (*mādhyamika*) Candrakīrti that has long intrigued me for its trenchant critique of a seductive type of philosophy: metaphysics, or ontology, the science of what there really is. The passage came to my attention almost forty years ago when I was first working on Āryadeva, Dharmapāla, and Candrakīrti—also about the time I met my friend and colleague Eli Franco. For some decades, Eli Franco and I have had exchanges on various issues in the thought of the great sixth/seventh-century Buddhist logician, metaphysician, and epistemologist Dharmakīrti. I have profited from those discussions with him and my other colleagues around the world: this is one of the world’s great philosophical systems. Nevertheless, what was once a nagging feeling is now more like a conviction: some of Dharmakīrti’s thought and Buddhist Epistemology, important as it is, may well also be an object lesson in a flawed way of thinking that, over centuries, has been predominant in philosophy, in the East as in the West. I am thinking of his and Dignāga’s metaphysics, more exactly his nominalism, i.e., the position that only spatially unextended particulars really exist. Properties common to several entities, macroscopic physical objects (like tables and vases), enduring entities, continua, negative facts,

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<sup>1</sup> Hirsch 2011: 97.



abstract entities, exclusions, relations, meanings, reasons, implications—all are said to be only fictional.<sup>2</sup>

What people have meant by “metaphysics” and “ontology” from Aristotle on is extraordinarily hard to explain in a precise fashion. At least one professional philosopher nowadays wants to preserve metaphysics from ontology, promoting a version that is predominantly conceptual analysis but stripped of the preoccupation with what there really is.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps that will turn out to be worthwhile doing. Stripped of ontology, however, what remains is, I think, something of a shell compared to what metaphysics was throughout much of its history. Certainly, in past Indian philosophy, such a separation between the two seems very hard to justify. For our purposes in this paper—which unpacks an historical sixth-century Indian debate where ontology clearly looms large—we’ll treat metaphysics as tied to ontology. More generally, I think ontological concerns have indeed played a major role in motivating metaphysicians in the East, and in the West, to do what they do.

Instead of a watertight definition, a description will have to suffice: metaphysics typically uses *a priori* reasoning to discover the broadest architecture and deepest fundaments of reality. Influential contemporary Western practitioners characterize it as the discipline that theorizes about which facts ground others and which hold “in reality,” or the discipline that “explains the world” and its fundamental structure. Others speak of “serious metaphysics” as a comprehensive and complete account of the world in terms of a small number of basic notions, thus eliminating many putative features of our world or “locating” them somewhere in the more basic theory or its superstructure.<sup>4</sup> Buddhist and other Indian metaphysicians do all of this, too, even though there is no simple term in classical Sanskrit that translates perfectly “metaphysics.” They seek basic theories and positions on reality

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<sup>2</sup> Dharmakīrti maintains that they lack causal powers and so are fictions, i.e., nonexistent things (*asadārtha*). For Dharmakīrti on causal powers/efficacy and existence, see Tillemans 2020.

<sup>3</sup> See Thomasson 2015: 325–330.

<sup>4</sup> See Van Inwagen and Sullivan 2021. The allusions are to the positions of Kit Fine and Theodore Sider. Cf. Jackson 1998: 4–5 on “serious metaphysics.” Buddhist adherences to the program of serious metaphysics are discussed in Tillemans 2016: 222–225.

as it is in itself, or intrinsically (*svabhāvena*), eliminating or reducing putative features along the way, and using *a priori* reasoning (rather than empirical science) to do so. Not surprisingly, their “neither one nor many” analyses, error theories, nominalism, and more find contemporary traction amongst some analytic philosophers.

On the other side of the divide, there are many philosophers, disbelieving of all metaphysics, who have offered diagnoses as to where it goes wrong. The twentieth-century Western revolt took well-known forms, from positivists, who banished it outright as unempirical, unverifiable pseudoscience, to pragmatists following William James and John Dewey, to quietistic Wittgensteinians, who sought insight into its hold through clarity about language-games and forms of life. It is, I think, time to better understand the position of a sixth-century quietist, Buddhist critic of metaphysics. Diagnoses and alternatives have been around a long time, sometimes in unexpected places and underappreciated.

The passage I want to revisit and unpack, with a close reading of the Tibetan and Sanskrit texts and some cross-cultural philosophical analysis, is in the beginning part of Candrakīrti’s *Ṭīkā* (or *Vṛtti*) on Āryadeva’s *Catuhśataka* XIII, the chapter on the sense organs and their objects (*indriyārtha*). There, Candrakīrti focused on “logicians” (*rtog ge ba* = *tārkika*), by which he meant his coreligionist adversaries, the fifth-century thinker Dignāga and his school of Buddhist Epistemology. We find a long discussion about the meaning of the Sanskrit term *pratyakṣa*, with Dignāga’s school taking it to mean the noun *perception* and Candrakīrti instead understanding it adjectivally as *perceptible*. The dispute is thus whether *pratyakṣa* means “that [cognition] which occurs in connection with the various individual sense organs” (*akṣam akṣaṃprati vartata ity pratyakṣam*)—following Dignāga’s etymological explanation in his *Nyāyamukha*—or whether *pratyakṣa* applies primarily as a quality of macroscopic objects, like vases, that we can perceive, and only metaphorically to the cognition that perceives them. Candrakīrti argues that the logician’s version is badly out of step with the ordinary, adjectival usage.<sup>5</sup>

Dismissive historians will perhaps have little interest in analyzing the complex content of the debate and be reluctant to expand its philosophical

<sup>5</sup> See Schmithausen 1972: 160–161 for some Buddhist and non-Buddhist uses of *pratyakṣa* as an adjective in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *Carakasamhitā*, and *Yuktidīpikā*.

relevance beyond the first millenium in India. They may well insist, instead, that the *Catuhśatakaṭikā* debate with logicians should be read primarily (or exclusively) as another religious or political tirade in the sectarian power-battles Buddhists waged amongst themselves and with the Brahmanical schools that were resurging in the sixth century. True, it was a polemical episode in some historical power-struggles, but it is a lot more. Let me try to clear the air a bit, invoking Bernard Williams's distinction between a history of ideas—roughly, the history of the complex processes leading to the production of ideas—and the history of philosophy, a history done philosophically and itself yielding a good measure of philosophy as a result.<sup>6</sup> Both histories need to be pursued in Asian thought as they do in Greek, Arabic, English, or German thought. Indeed, I have long been leery of more or less avowed attempts to dismiss philosophical content as an epiphenomenon to politics, social factors, or economics, to explain it away in terms of the origins of the ideas, or to limit legitimate investigation of it purely to the thought of specific geographic zones, writers, and historical periods. First of all, the robust rhetoric of sectarian politics is often not incompatible with good philosophical content, and, I think, the *Catuhśatakaṭikā* passage is a case in point. Second, Candrakīrti's critique of metaphysics can, and should, be read as turning on sophisticated problems that go well beyond a purely Indian context. What we find is a coherent, wide-ranging second-order position on metaphysics, viz., that *a priori* investigations of the broadest architecture and fundamentals of reality somehow masquerade as capturing real entities but do not do so. This position, as I will try to show, is not only relevant to sixth-century Indian philosophy but also to twenty-first century discussions in analytic metaphysics and to the current second-order debates—in *metametaphysics*—about the possibility, pretensions, and worth of metaphysics in general.<sup>7</sup>

The *Catuhśatakaṭikā*'s discussion of *pratyakṣa* is connected with a much larger scholastic discussion in approximately twenty pages of Candrakīrti's

<sup>6</sup> See his "Descartes and the Historiography of Philosophy," in Williams 2006. See also Tillemans 2022b. It's odd and disturbing that pursuing the history of philosophy philosophically was so disproportionately problematic for such a long time when it came to Asia.

<sup>7</sup> "Metametaphysics" is the term used in Chalmers et al. 2009. On Buddhist metaphysics and metametaphysics, see Tillemans 2018.

*Prasannapadā* I.<sup>8</sup> There he criticizes the logicians' two sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), i.e., perception and inference, and the correlated two-fold objects of knowledge (*prameya*), viz., particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) and universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*).<sup>9</sup> He invokes facts about linguistic usage to refute the logicians' idea of real *svalakṣaṇa*, especially the logicians' incoherent use of Sanskrit grammatical categories in their version of the conceptual pair *lakṣaṇa-lakṣya* (definiens-definiendum) involved in *svalakṣaṇa*. Crucially, in both texts, in the course of the discussions, Candrakīrti frequently says that he, contrary to his adversaries, acquiesces in what is accepted by the world (*lokaprasiddha*) and the ordinary usage of the world (*lokaavyavahāra*).<sup>10</sup> He thus will have nothing to do with the logicians' version of perception nor its ontological counterpart, real particulars. In effect, in both texts he generalizes, saying that realist metaphysicians go wrong *across the board* because of their way of doing philosophy: they engage in wide-scale, metaphysically inspired theoretical posits, conceptual revisions, verbal reforms, and other artifice, saying that they are providing canonical ways of thinking and speaking that are more faithful to reality as it is in itself than the ways of ordinary people. They don't realize how mad they are.

## 2. The passage

Here, then, is the passage in question from the *Catulṣatakaṭikā*. The numbers marked with a "§" indicate the numbered paragraphs in the English translation and Tibetan text in Tillemans 1990. There is no extant Sanskrit for this part of the text, but I have given Sanskrit equivalents to Tibetan terms where one can be confident that they are reliable. The present translations have some word choices different from those of 1990.

<sup>8</sup> *Prasannapadā* 55–75 (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin), translated and explained in Arnold 2005. The detailed discussion of the adjectival versus nominal understandings of *pratakyṣa* begins at the end of p. 69.

<sup>9</sup> On Dharmakīrti's explanation of Dignāga's match-up between *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*, see Franco and Notake 2014.

<sup>10</sup> I am translating *vyavahāra* in what follows as "usage," as that English term (like the Sanskrit) covers both rule-guided uses of words and also the habitual or customary practices and transactions—i.e., forms of life—with which language usage interweaves. For the reasons behind my choice of "customary truth" as a

§17 “In conclusion, when this logician has gone mad (*smyos par gyur* = *unmatta*; *unmāda*) because he is intoxicated (*myos pa*) through imbibing the brew of dialectics (*rtog ge’i chang*), he abandons the excellent path (*lam* = *mārga*) known as dependent origination (*rten cing ‘brel bar ‘byung ba* = *pratītyasamutpāda*) and dependent designation (*brten nas btags pa* = *upādāya prajñapti*). He will then completely fail to see through the collection of unholy, confused verbiage (*tshig ‘khyal* = *saṃbhinnapralāpa*) propounding real entities (*dnegos po* = *bhāva*; *vastu*) that is set forth in the Outsiders’ treatises. He considers this world (*‘jig rten* = *loka*) as being generally inferior, too, and then this [logician], who is confused about both worldly and transcendent states of affairs, uses simply his own conceptions (*rang gi rtog pa tsam gyis sbyar*), blocks the path to heaven and liberation, and completely meaninglessly embarks on the path of dialectics (*rtog ge ba’i lam*). Thus, just like one who has consumed craze-inducing drink (*smyo chu*), he cannot turn away from pointless, confused talk (*don med pa’i ngag ‘khyal*).”<sup>11</sup>

Let me organize my thoughts on this passage in a quasi-traditional format. In section 3 of this paper, I’ll begin by criticizing two potential *pūrvapakṣa*, i.e., what others might intelligently think it says. I then take up what I think it means in section 4. In section 5 I look at further developments, possibilities, and objections.<sup>12</sup>

### 3. Two inadequate readings of the passage

I need to discuss from the outset two readings of the passage that are tempting but incomplete and misleading. One is to take Candrakīrti as dismissing metaphysics as turning on nothing more than verbal disputes.

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translation of the closely related term *saṃvṛtisatya*, see Tillemans 2016: 42–43n3.

<sup>11</sup> *de’i phyir rtog ge ba ‘di gal te rtog ge’i chang ‘thungs pas myos pas smyos par gyur na ni rten cing ‘brel bar ‘byung ba dang brten nas btags pa zhes bya ba lam bzang po spangs nas mu stegs can gyi gzhung las bstan pa’i dnegos po rnams gsal bar byed pa dam pa ma yin pa’i tshig ‘khyal gyi tshogs ches brtol bar mi ‘gyur ba zhig go // ‘jig rten ‘di yang phal cher ma’i bzhin ltar dpyod cing ‘jig rten dang ‘jig rten las ‘das pa’i dnegos po gnas pa la rnam par rmongs pa ‘dis rang gi rtog pa tsam gyis sbyar zhing mtho ris dang thar pa’i lam la bar du gcod par byed pa shin tu don med par rtog ge ba’i lam la bkod pa yin no // de’i phyir ‘dir smyo chu ‘thungs pa ltar don med pa’i ngag ‘khal las bzlog par mi nus so //.*

<sup>12</sup> Connoisseurs will recognize the usual Tibetan topical outlines (*sa bcad*): *gzhan lugs*

The other would see him as prioritizing philosophies of common sense and ordinary language as closer to reality as it is in itself.

### 3.1 Verbal disputes?

To take up the first, someone might reasonably read the *Catuhśatakaṭīkā*'s charge that metaphysicians engage in dialectics because they are seduced by “confused verbiage” (*tshig 'khyal* = *saṃbhinnapralāpa*)<sup>13</sup> and “use only their own conceptions” (*rang gi rtog pa tsam gyis sbyar*) as saying that metaphysical positions and debates turn on confused and idiosyncratic linguistic usage and the verbal disputes that such usage engenders.

There would seem to be some Buddhist support for such a reading. Buddhists have indeed long maintained that words and concepts are all only *prapañca* (“proliferation [of distinctions],” “frivolous discourse”), and that quietism, or *prapañcopaśama* (“pacification of *prapañca*”), is what we should value instead. Although *prapañca* does not *just* consist of words and talk, language has the preponderant role in engendering and proliferating distinctions.<sup>14</sup> It is telling that the usual Chinese rendering of *prapañca* is *xi lun* 戲論, which could be translated as “frivolous discourse,” or, less literally, as “word-play” or even “blether.” Here is a typical passage from the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (attributed by Chinese sources to Nāgārjuna), which I'll give in Étienne Lamotte's French translation (with an English

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*dgag pa, rang lugs bzhang pa, rtsod pa spong ba.*

<sup>13</sup> *tshig 'khyal*, *saṃbhinnapralāpa* “confused/senseless verbiage,” “idle chatter,” “verbal silliness” is one of the ten non-virtuous actions (*akuśalakarmapatha*) and is characterized in Śāntideva's *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (ed. C. Bendall) 74.1–2 as *pūrvottarābaddhapadaṃ nirarthakam asaṃgatam*... “words having no relation between what comes before and after, senseless, incoherent.” Cf. *Meriam-Webster Dictionary* s.v. verbiage: “a profusion of words usually of little or obscure content.” In Tillemans 1990, I had translated *tshig 'khyal* as “bad jokes”—although it is clearly a stretch philologically, it does capture the relentless absurdity, and obnoxiousness, that Candrakīrti seems to see in metaphysical betterment.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Williams 1980: 32: “‘*prapañca*’ in the *Madhyamaka* seems to indicate firstly the utterance itself, secondly the process of reasoning and entertaining involved in any articulation, and thirdly further utterances which result from this process.” On *prapañca* see also Mills 2021; Buswell and Lopez 2014: 662–663.

version in a note). Lamotte's translation of *prapañca*, following the Chinese *xi lun*, is *vains bavardages*, "futile nonsense":

[*Traité* I, 41:] "Les vains bavardages (*prapañca*) sont l'origine des querelles [= *vivāda*]," ...

[I, 42:] "Le Yogin qui sait ainsi n'accepte aucun système (*dharma*), n'accueille aucun bavardage (*prapañca*), il n'adhère à rien et ne croit à rien. Ne prenant réellement part à aucune discussion (*vivāda*), il connaît la saveur d'ambrosie (*amṛtarasa*) de la loi du Buddha. Agir autrement, c'est rejeter la loi."<sup>15</sup>

These sorts of scriptural passages, of course, lend themselves to interpretations of various sorts, mystical, anti-intellectual, non-rational, meditative, psychological, what have you. I can't do justice here to the range of what has been said about *prapañca*, *prapañcopaśama*, and the pacification of all thought and language. Interpreting such passages and the critique of "confused verbiage" (or "idle chatter") in the *Catuhṣatakaṭīkā* passage as expressing a *rational* position about the worth of theoretical analyses and debates (*vivāda*), however, might go something like this: doctrinal or metaphysical theories/discussions are frivolous and mere verbiage because they turn only on more or less sophisticated verbal differences but nothing of consequence or substantive. In other words, they are *idle* debates and merely *verbal*. Let's give those notions a run for the money and then put this interpretation of *Catuhṣatakaṭīkā* §17 aside as still significantly incomplete.

William James had long ago attempted to make a pragmatic difference between idle and serious debates, the former being those that are without practical consequences when one side is right and the latter being those that are consequential.<sup>16</sup> David Chalmers, in his 2011 article "Verbal Disputes," made a more precise (but in many respects similar) diagnosis using as touch-

<sup>15</sup> "Futile nonsense (*prapañca*) is the origin of quarrels [= *vivāda*]," ...

"The yogin who knows this does not accept any system (*dharma*), does not accept any nonsense (*prapañca*), adheres to nothing, and believes in nothing. Not really taking part in any discussion (*vivāda*), he knows the taste of the ambrosia (*amṛtarasa*) of the Buddhadharma. To act otherwise is to reject the doctrine." (English translation of Ani Migme Chodron)

<sup>16</sup> James 1907: 45–46: "If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a

stone the parties' eventual agreements or lasting disagreements. Following his method, i.e., the subscript gambit, those agreements and disagreements become clear when we subscript key terms appropriately in keeping with the debating parties' different uses and then see if the parties themselves still think there is anything left to disagree about. If nothing is left, the debate was verbal; if issues remain, it was substantive.

Verbal disputes have a partially deserved reputation of being trivial and obvious. William James famously gave an example of an idle debate about whether a man circumambulating a tree also goes around the squirrel hiding from him behind the trunk. James then applied a move very much like a subscript gambit: "Make the distinction [between "go around" in one sense and "go around" in another sense], and there is no occasion for any farther dispute" (James 1907: 44).<sup>17</sup> Would Candrakīrti be saying, then, that *all* or most major metaphysical debates are flawed in such largely trivial ways? That seems hopelessly uncharitable to him. Are there deeper, more sophisticated confusions over idiosyncratic language that are responsible for major metaphysical controversies, so that the controversies would cease when various senses are exposed? As Chalmers suggests, some longstanding debates, on free-will and ethical responsibility or the type of justification needed for knowledge, might cease (or, at least, significantly gain in clarity) with judicious use of the gambit to expose different senses of "freedom" or "justification." The problem with reading §17 as promoting that diagnosis, however, is that it does not extend across the board. William James, himself, did not say that all or even the majority of metaphysical debates were thoroughly idle—he argued that it was consequential which side was right in a debate over one-many issues or theism versus atheism. Nor did David Chalmers pretend that metaphysics would just disappear all together when key terms were appropriately subscripted. The problem of the existence of consciousness, for example, would remain.

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dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other's being right."

<sup>17</sup> The squirrel constantly moves to keep facing the man. The man therefore does not go around the squirrel in the sense of being in front of him, to the left of him, behind him, and to the right of him. The man does, however, go around him in the sense of being to his north, east, south, and west.



Verbal debates in philosophy *can* be a lot more wide-ranging, sophisticated, and interesting than the inane debate from William James would seem to suggest. In the last section of this paper, I will briefly take up what I take to be the most promising analysis of how *some* specific philosophical debates can be seen to be importantly verbal, viz., that of Eli Hirsch. What we should be clear on for now, however, is that Candrakīrti is claiming more than simply the failure of *some* specific debates that pretend to be about reality. He is generalizing and seems to find a recurrent methodological feature in *all* metaphysical claims about reality that makes them flawed. Neither William James' diagnosis, nor David Chalmers,' nor even Eli Hirsch's diagnosis of verbal disputes yields anything as sweeping as that generalized critique.<sup>18</sup> Candrakīrti is criticizing something else, more at the heart of all ontology, and not just select issues.

### 3.2 More ordinary language philosophy?

It might be thought that there is a very different way to read §17, one that better emphasizes Candrakīrti's promotion of the ordinary. That reading would go like this. Candrakīrti is inveighing against speculative metaphysics, saying that the resultant revisionary ontologies are often thoroughly false representations of how reality is; they aren't just products of word-play with nothing substantive riding on them, but are concoctions of thinkers who have lost touch with the truths of common sense. Read this way Candrakīrti's metametaphysics would be comparable to that of George Edward Moore, the influential twentieth-century defender of common sense who argued that we can justifiably think that many metaphysical arguments (e.g., for idealism or solipsism) falsely represent reality *because* they contradict what common sense knows—the certainty of common sense in the existence of external objects or other minds will always be greater than that of any revisionist arguments to the contrary.<sup>19</sup>

A variant on the Moorean reading would be to think that because Candrakīrti so repeatedly endorses *lokaprasiddha* and ordinary ways of speaking in

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<sup>18</sup> Hirsch thinks that ontological debates about physical objects, like tables, are verbal, but that many other traditional debates, such as those with nominalists about abstract entities, are not. See Hirsch 2011: 144–145.

<sup>19</sup> See Moore 1959/1977: chapters II and VII.

his *Prasannapadā*, *Madhyamakāvatāra*, and *Catuhśatakaṭīkā*, it must be ordinary language philosophy that he is promoting, as if he could have just as well been a fully fledged participant in J. L. Austin's Saturday discussions in Oxford in the 1950s about the merits and subtleties of ordinary speech. Austin famously wrote:

"[...][O]ur common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the most favoured alternative method." (Austin 1957/1961: 130).

The commonality between G.E. Moore and J.L. Austin is, thus, that both think the distinctions conveyed by ordinary language possess better pedigrees than the various arm-chair, *a priori* fantasies of metaphysically oriented, professional philosophers. The ordinary is subtle, worth analysis, and more likely to capture the real.

There is, of course, a lot that can be said—and has been said—in favor of commonsensical or ordinary language philosophy by those skeptical of grand-scale, metaphysical thinking, its revisions and theoretical posits. Promoters of common sense could rightly see Candrakīrti as *some kind* of kindred spirit. Interestingly, too, when Austin dismisses the arm-chair thinkers who place their trust in what they have personally thought up (rather than in what ordinary people have been intelligently saying throughout the ages), his words seem to echo Candrakīrti's polemic against Indian metaphysicians privileging their own conceptions, getting drunk on their reasoning, denigrating the world, and thus going all wrong. Nonetheless, it is also important to be clear about how Candrakīrti did *not* take the ordinary or the commonsensical in the way Austin or Moore probably did. He took broad-scale acceptance of ordinary usage (*vyavahāra*) and customary truths (*saṃvṛtisatya*) as the common denominator for life in communities, but, what is potentially telling against a Mooreian or Oxford reading, he did not claim that the ordinary or commonsensical would somehow capture real entities better than would metaphysical speculation and canonical languages. For

Candrakīrti, *no* language or way of thinking captures real entities (*bhāva*; *vastu*); all such would-be real entities are to be rejected as hypostatizations.

Essentially, to state the endpoint of our investigation first, Candrakīrti valorizes the ordinary for its potential to be innocent. It is not valorized because ordinary people have a surer hold on what there really is, but rather because their world-view, or at least the important parts of it, *can* be embraced by Mādhyamika thinkers in a fashion untroubled by issues about how reality is in itself. Indeed, later Candrakīrtians following Tsong kha pa (1357–1419) go so far as to speak of acceptable and unacceptable “aspects” or “parts” (*cha*) of the ordinary person’s understanding of the customary, with the two “mixed together” (*dres pa*) confusedly for the unenlightened. While the ordinary person, thus, does not understand ordinary things in the Madhyamaka way and actually contaminates his thinking with hypostatizations, nonetheless the Mādhyamika adept can make a separation between what can be innocently conserved and what is to be rejected in such ordinary conceptions.<sup>20</sup> The ordinary, then, *need* not involve real entities (*bhāva*, *vastu*) that are as they are intrinsically and are the referents of our words. On the other hand, it seems undeniable that most metaphysicians (East-West) put forth the revisions and posits that they do because they believe *they* are doing ontology and somehow coming closer to entities that are really thus and so in themselves. Language reforms and accounts of how language and thought function are not innocent when ontologically motivated.

#### 4. The passage revisited as a critique of realist semantics

It is high time to say what *Catuhśatakaṭīkā* §17 *does* mean. The two readings I have discussed do not account well enough for §17, as they only focus on parts of it. Let’s stay closer to the text. Crucially, Candrakīrti invokes the principle of dependent designation (*upādāya prajñapti*) or, equivalently here, dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), saying that Mādhyamika Buddhists accept such a principle, while their adversaries do not. Let us say, for short, that Candrakīrti advocates that we understand ordinary language via a semantics of dependent designation. Metaphysicians, on the other hand, go wrong and fall into “confused verbiage” because they think words must represent real entities and that only their proposed vocabulary and

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<sup>20</sup> See Tillemans 2016: 39–40.

syntax can do so.<sup>21</sup> Their metaphysics requires a canonical language with a realist semantics.

#### 4.1 Realism and real entities

We clearly need to have some idea what the words “realism” and “real entities” mean here. Let me approach the matter in a somewhat roundabout, Buddhist fashion by looking at the moral of a story from Buddhapālita, an early Mādhyamika commentator whom Candrakīrti regarded as one of his principal influences. In the eighteenth chapter of the *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, Buddhapālita gives a curious parable about people arguing over the identities of two gods depicted pictorially. They look at the tell-tale accoutrements that the gods are depicted as holding in their hands, namely, a discus and a trident, the former being, in Indian culture, a customarily accepted identifying feature of Viṣṇu (Nārāyaṇa) and the latter being an identifying feature of Śiva (Maheśvara). The disputants, however, disagree about which feature identifies which god. A passerby monk then arbitrates, saying who is right and who is wrong, even though, as the monk says, he knows that neither depiction is actually Viṣṇu or Śiva but is only a picture of the gods. The parable is said, by Buddhapālita, to illustrate how there are no intrinsically existing, real natures (*svabhāva*) that make statements true or false, but only truths due to worldly usage (*lokavyavahāra*).<sup>22</sup>

Buddhapālita, in effect, says that conformity with Indian rules of customary usage (*vyavahāra*) plus the observed features in the picture are *sufficient conditions* to make correct determinations of truth; one need not step outside the context of the picture and usage to find something further that grounds those determinations because of what it intrinsically is. (Indeed, as Thubten Jinpa points out, referring to Tsong kha pa’s interpretation, if the arbitrator had insisted that the depicted gods were neither Viṣṇu nor Śiva because it was all never more than a picture, such a response and outside perspective

<sup>21</sup> The underlying “correspondence principle” in Indian philosophy of language and its consequences are discussed in detail in Bronkhorst 2011. I would only add that the demand for correspondence is *not* peculiar to India—it is a version of what Huw Price and others would term “representationalist” philosophy of language.

<sup>22</sup> See Lindtner 1981: 208 for a translation of Buddhapālita’s parable; Jinpa 1998: 279–280 for Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of the parable.

would have been completely inappropriate.) The example is intended to be generalizable: it illustrates what we could call the “self-sufficiency” of the customary: such matters are to be settled without any recourse to anything outside them.

In what follows, I’ll use “realist” to capture the Buddhist scholastic term *ngos smra ba*, or *ngos po yod par smra ba*, “promoters of real entities,” “promoters of the existence of real entities (*ngos po* = *bhāva*, *vastu*).”<sup>23</sup> They could profitably be termed “metaphysical realists,” to adopt the terminology of Hilary Putnam, who contrasts philosophers’ insistence upon intrinsically existing reality with an innocuous, indispensable realism. The latter is the commonsensical acceptance of external objects, like mountains and stars, that are described by language but are not creations of language and thought, and are often not what individuals, or even whole societies, think or say they are. In effect, one can be innocuously realistic about each truth concerning the external world, and could, if need be, revise them piece by piece, without somehow stepping outside customary procedures. The former, i.e. metaphysical realism, on the other hand, demands more. Following Putnam, it requires (impossibly) a viewpoint from which thinkers can look theoretically at truth and the connection between language/thought and reality as a whole, all at once; and it then holds there are discoverable facts about precisely which portions of our language and thought are connected with things that are what they are intrinsically.<sup>24</sup> The *ngos smra ba* that Candrakīrti criticizes do have this additional set of demands about words’

<sup>23</sup> The term is very frequent in Tibetan doxography and is already found in early second-diffusion (*phyi dar*) texts such as that of the twelfth century author Khu lo tsā ba (Khu ston mdo sde ‘bar)—see Apple 2018. In *Catuhśatakaṭīkā* ad XI.11 (ed. Suzuki 1994: 230, line 18) one finds a surprising Sanskrit term *vastusat-padārthavādin* translated into Tibetan as *ngos po ngos po yod par smra ba*. That Sanskrit term does not seem to be much used, but it may well have played a role in the genesis of the Tibetan idea of a metaphysical realist. Sophomorically, one could imagine an underlying Sanskrit term *bhāvavādin*, but that does not seem right. The latter term is used in a very different fashion by writers such as Kamalaśīla in his *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* ad XXI.1787–1790 to designate specific eternalist Sarvāstivādin in the context of their debates about time. See n. 47 below.

<sup>24</sup> See Putnam 1996: 295 et seq. (“The Question of Realism”). See, e.g., p. 303: “[M]etaphysical realism is the notion that there is—in some philosophically privileged sense of ‘object’—a definite Totality of All Real Objects, and a fact of the

reference and the intrinsic natures of the real entities to which those words must refer. For them the merely customary is not sufficient to ensure that language has the needed connection with the world; besides observations and rules of usage, they hold that there must be an underlying totality of entities with intrinsic natures that somehow determine truth. For example, the realist Buddhist logicians that later Candrakīrtians attack will notoriously require that any thought, if it is to be a genuine source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), must “proceed via the force of real entities” (*vastubalapravṛtta*).

The realism targetted in §17, with its special language and semantics, is not to be simply dismissed as a straw man, neither when it comes to Asian philosophies nor Western. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers posit denoted entities, or real categories (*padārtha*), underlying proper, canonical Sanskrit—*samavāya* (“inherence”), for example, is thought to be necessary to account for predication by providing the link between substances and their qualities. Dharmakīrtians neutralize ordinary talk’s seeming commitment to unacceptable entities, from enduring mid-sized objects to universals; they leave as real only momentary, unextended, uncomposed, particulars that, along with other contributing factors—notably, longstanding error—, causally produce understandings that “make us reach” (*prāpaka*) the reality that is as it is intrinsically outside of language. Analytic metaphysicians, following the methodology of W.V. Quine’s extraordinarily influential article “On What There Is,” rely on a canonical, formal language in which ontological commitments to real entities are perspicuous and binding, contrary to the vagaries of ordinary usage. Indeed, philosophers regularly have talked about there

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matter as to which properties of the objects are the intrinsic properties and which are, in some sense, perspectival.” Elsewhere (see Tillemans 2016: 230–231) I have interpreted Buddhist metaphysical realism as reliant upon a “sideways-on” perspective, where one would have to stand completely outside one’s linguistic/conceptual scheme in order to evaluate its connection with the real entities serving as truth-makers—sideways-on perspectives are criticized trenchantly by the Wittgensteinian quietist thinkers John McDowell and Cora Diamond. Indeed, a Madhyamaka-style quietism does ensue once it is recognized that the sideways-on standpoint comparing the customary as a whole with reality is unavailable: theses about existence or nonexistence in reality as it is intrinsically become incoherent and are best left aside. Note, too, that the same quietism applies to anti-realists who try to adopt a sideways-on view to establish that all is, somehow, only a creation of thought and language.

being a metaphysically privileged language, one that would “hook on to the world.”<sup>25</sup> Nowadays, some, like Theodore Sider, argue strongly for an “Ontologese,” the best language to describe reality, the language in which the unique existential quantifier (“there exists something such that...”) “carves the world at its joints” and captures what is “really out there” in reality’s “objective structure.”<sup>26</sup> And so on. The East-West examples are multiple of canonical languages and corresponding ontologies. Privileging a language that mirrors the real, or at least significantly captures its fundamentals, then enables one to climb down a semantic ladder that takes us from grand-scale facts about that language to grand-scale facts about reality.<sup>27</sup> What Candrakīrti suggests in §17 is that this program so dear to metaphysicians, with its canonical language, theoretical posits and artifice, is unnecessary, and that the ordinary is self-sufficient. There is no ladder going down from language. We need to understand better why he thinks we can and should do without it.

## 4.2 A semantics of dependent designation

Let me backtrack and give more of Candrakīrti’s own input on the difference it makes to hold a semantics of dependent designation, going back to the start of this debate about *pratyakṣa*, i.e., Āryadeva’s *Catuhśataka* XIII.1 (= 301). This verse and the most relevant parts of Candrakīrti’s *Ṭīkā* on it show how we can only say that things like vases exist and are perceptible when they are understood as dependent designations (*upādāya prajñapti*):

<sup>25</sup> The phrase is that of Putnam 1996: 295, who rejects such a language and the metaphysical realism behind it as seductive but unintelligible.

<sup>26</sup> Sider 2009: 401. The joints are the intrinsic structures of reality, e.g., natural properties à la David Lewis, which supposedly act as “reference magnets” for words; they explain why we could not just as well speak of strange, unnatural properties, like the grue, bleen and such of Goodman 1955: chapter III.

<sup>27</sup> The image of a “semantic ladder” figures in deVries 2011, a review of Huw Price’s critique of representationalism in his *Naturalism without Mirrors*, Oxford, 2011.

“[Āryadeva’s *Catuhṣataka* XIII.1 = 301] When one sees the [visual] form, indeed, one will not see the whole vase. Which connoisseur of truth could say, too, that the vase is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*)?”<sup>28</sup>

§4 “[Candrakīrti’s *Catuhṣatakaṭīkā* to XIII.1] ... The vase is a designation in dependence (*brten nas* ‘dogs *pa* = *upādāya prajñapti*) upon the eight substances (*rdzas* = *dravya*), i.e., the four elements and the four [types] of form that are causally derived [from the elements]. Just as fire is designated in dependence upon fuel, houses in dependence upon grass and wood, and the self in dependence upon the aggregates but if one searches [for these entities] in the fivefold manner (*rnam lnga* = *pañcadhā*) nothing is apprehended (*dmigs pa* = *upalabdha*) apart from their causes (*rgyu* = *hetu*), so too a vase, which is something perceptible for the world because it is understood by the sense faculty which sees that it can scoop up honey, water and milk, is established in dependence upon its causes as being the owner (*nye bar len pa po* = *upādātṛ* “appropriator”) [of its eight substances.] However, rival conceptions, which do not hold that [things] are dependently designated as just explained, are unable (*nus pa ma yin*) to establish [anything] as being a vase.”<sup>29</sup>

§6. “... As the complete vase is not seen by the eye, then, not differentiating intrinsic natures of entities, we take the world’s own conceptions as valid as they might be (*ci rung rung ltar*), and so we can then say that for us the vase is perceptible. But whoever differentiates [intrinsic natures], is learned in intrinsic natures of real entities, [and] does not take it to be possible that one sees the whole (*ril*) by [merely] seeing one side, he may not (*mi* ‘os) say things like ‘the vase is perceptible.’”<sup>30</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Sanskrit in *Prasannapadā* (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin) 71.6–7: *sarva eva ghaṭo ‘drṣṭo rūpe drṣṭe hi jāyate / brūyāt kas tattvaiva nāma ghaṭaḥ pratyakṣa ity api //*.

<sup>29</sup> ‘byung ba chen po bzhi dang rgyur byas pa’i gzugs bzhi ste / rdzas brgyad po de dag la brten nas bum pa ‘dogs te / ji ltar bud shing la brten nas me dang / rtswa dang shing la sogs pa la brten nas khyim dang phung po dag la brten nas bdag tu ‘dogs la / de yang rang gi rgyu las rnam pa lngas btsal na ma dmigs pa de bzhin du rang gi rgyu la brten nas sbrang rtsi dang chu dang ‘o ma ‘chu zhing ‘dzin par nus pa mthong ba’i dbang pos go bar bya ba yin pas ‘jig rten gyi mngon sum du gyur pa’i bum pa nye bar len pa po nyid du rnam par gzahag gi / ji skad bshad pa’i brten nas btags pa ‘di khas ma blangs par rtog pa gzhan gyis bum par rnam par gzahag par nus pa ni ma yin no //.

<sup>30</sup> de’i phyir bum pa thams cad mig gis mi mthong ba’i phyir na dngos po’i rang gi ngo bo rnam par ma phye bas ‘jig rten ci rung rung ltar rang gi rtog pa tshad mar byas nas bum pa bdag gi mngon sum yin no zhes smra la rag mod / gang zhig rnam par ‘byed par byed cing dngos po’i rang gi ngo bo la mkhas pa gang phyogs gcig mthong bas ril mthong bar



The essential point these passages make is that one can rightly say that there are vases and that they are perceptible under one type of semantics but never under the other. In the first case, successful designation of vases can occur given other things that are not themselves vases—e.g., the parts of the vase, the causes, the sides of vases, or the function of being able to scoop up water and the like. For convenience, let's adopt some terms routinely used by later Tibetan Mādhyamika scholastic writers: the “designated phenomenon” (*btags chos*, *btags don*), and “the bases of designation” (*btags gzhi*). To take Candrakīrti's own example, the designated phenomenon is the vase while the bases are the parts, sides, shape, functional capacities, and possibly a number of other things on the basis of which we designate vases—Candrakīrti terms these bases of designation “causes” (*hetu*). Following a semantics of dependent designation, then, “vase” refers to vases, or designates a vase successfully when bases of designation (or causes) are present. If they are, then in dependence upon them one can unproblematically say that vases exist and are perceptible.

On the other hand, Candrakīrti, in §4, stresses that if one analyzes, or “searches for” (*btsal*) the designated phenomenon—an analysis that traditionally can be done using Nāgārjuna's fivefold (*pañcadhā*) reasoning<sup>31</sup>—one comes up with nothing more than the bases of designation. The point he takes from this unfindability is subtle. It is *not* that the unfindable vase is therefore nonexistent, or at most a practically useful fiction. Rather his point is that there are vases—we know they exist because they pass the world's rules of usage for the term. Thus, analytic findability of the designated phenomenon is *not needed* for existence, as designation in dependence upon bases suffices for affirming existence. By contrast, suppose one adopts a

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*srid par mi byed pa de ni bum pa mngon sum mo zhes bya ba rnam pa de lta bur smra bar mi 'os so //.*

<sup>31</sup> Nāgārjuna's fivefold reasoning in *Madhyamakakārikās* XXII.1 is as follows: a would-be partite real entity is not identical with its parts; it is not something that exists as separate from them; it is not in them; they are not in it; and it does not possess them. Candrakīrti, in the sixth chapter of his *Madhyamakāvatāra*, refutes two additional hypotheses, viz., that an entity is identical with the collection (*samudāya*) of its parts or identical with its shape (*saṃsthāna*). This expanded argument in *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.151 becomes known in Tibetan as the “sevenfold reasoning” (*rnam bdun gyi rigs pa*). See Tillemans 1990: 272n363.

realist semantics because of the worry that the customary is not self-sufficient and that ontological foundations, or some grounding in intrinsic natures of real things, are needed to distinguish right and wrong applications of terms. Then for vases to exist, and not just be said or thought to do so, there would have to be, in addition, a fully real entity (*bhāva*) that is being designated by the words: the designated phenomenon must then be analytically findable, either identifiable with bases of designation—taken singly or collectively—, or as a further, distinct, real entity that somehow comes into existence when composed by the bases.

The general perspective is then applied in §6 to the problem of how one can see a designated phenomenon when one sees the bases. On a semantics of dependent designation, it is usually legitimate to say that one sees a vase when one sees a side of a vase, even though a side is not identical with the vase and one doesn't see a vase that is something further, different from the sides. Conversely, on a realist semantics, if one sees a side without an additional entity, one sees only a side and no more. The vase itself would not be seen. A realist's semantic position would oblige her or him to say that ordinary household objects are imperceptible.

Proponents of realist semantics do not surrender easily. Some argue that one *does* often see an additional real entity when one sees a side. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Outsiders (= non-Buddhists) Candrakīrti mentions in his commentary to *Catuhśataka* XIII.1 postulate *ad hoc* impartite entities, like an *avayavin* ("whole"), that would inhere in all the parts and thus account for how one could see the whole by seeing a part. Nor do Candrakīrti's coreligionists lack ingenuity. The Ābhidharmika and logician Buddhists would concede outright that the vase itself is unreal and not seen, but then maintain that impartite elements/tropes (*dharma*)—like visual form (*rūpa*)—and infinitesimal atoms (*paramāṇu*) are real entities with intrinsic natures and that they are seen. The object (*viṣaya*) of perception is thus not the vase but only its constituent *dharms* and aggregated atoms, that is to say, the various particulars that are themselves partless simples and possess their own characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*).<sup>32</sup> This latter move is familiar. Both in the East and West we find metaphysicians who propound versions of

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<sup>32</sup> For Dharmakīrti's (Sautrāntika-style) espousal of infinitesimal atoms as spatially unextended particulars, see Dunne 2004: 98 et seq.

“mereological nihilism” and thus claim that wholes like tables and vases are unreal, but accept real, impartite simples, usually explaining away the popular acceptance of macroscopic wholes with an error theory. Such is the revisionary move of Buddhist Ābhidharmikas and logicians. It is also the move of twentieth century metaphysicians like Peter van Inwagen and Peter Unger.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, Unger’s position would probably get a nod from many approving Ābhidharmika Buddhists: “According to this prevalent view [i.e., common sense], there are various sorts of *ordinary things* in the world.... I believe that none of these things exist, and so that the view of common sense is badly in error.” (Unger 1979: 1). Table-denial is resurging in analytic metaphysics these days. Ābhidharmikas and Dharmakīrtian Buddhists have subscribed to it for a long time.

A straightforward identity between a single real entity and its many bases of designation clearly leads to one-many absurdities—they are developed at length in Madhyamaka literature. Composition of a single real entity that is somehow *distinct* from the many bases is a more serious and seductive option. In that case, metaphysicians East and West are faced with an intractable question, “When and how could several real things come together to make up the single real entity?” Van Inwagen has famously given this “special composition problem” a technical formulation, “When is it true that there is a *y* such that the *xs* compose *y*?,” as well as a practical version, “Suppose one had certain (nonoverlapping) objects, the *xs*, at one’s disposal: what would one have to do—what *could* one do—to get the *xs* to compose something?” (Van Inwagen, 1990: 30–31).

Metaphysicians like Van Inwagen and others are puzzled as to which principle could govern and restrict how the *xs* come together to make a new,

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<sup>33</sup> The former maintains that inanimate composites do not exist while simple impartite entities do, because the activities of those would-be composites are only the disguised cooperative activities of simple entities (Van Inwagen 1990: 122). The latter holds that ordinary objects do not exist because they inevitably would fall prey to Sorites arguments, i.e., to the unsolvable problems about whether and when heaps exist. The first person, to my knowledge, to read Buddhism as mereological nihilism along the lines of Peter Van Inwagen, Peter Unger, Trenton Merricks and others, is Mark Siderits. See Siderits 2015: chapter IV. For him, Buddhists treat tables, carts, and other such macroscopic composites, as “conceptual fictions,” or “convenient designators,” which are only accepted for pragmatic reasons, depending upon our needs.

unified, acceptable, real *y*, viz., one that is genuinely an object/entity, like a table, and not just a conglomeration of miscellany (like the sum of the number two, my car, and Napoleon's nose). Ābhidharmikas and Buddhist Epistemologists, on the other hand, did not formulate the composition problem as the quest for a principled way to exclude absurd conglomerations. Their emphasis was on the identity or difference between the *xs* and the *y* they supposedly compose: not only is it impossible to take the single *y* as identical with the many *xs*, but it is especially hard to see how a single *y* could somehow be existent over and above, or separate from, those *xs*. In *Catuhśataka* XIII.1, we encounter a third, recognizable variant upon the composition problem: when and how could/do we perceive a composed real entity *y* and not *just* some of the *xs* that are parts of *y*? The interconnection between the three is interesting and complex but cannot be taken up here. Suffice it to say, for now at least, that on all these perspectives, the push toward mereological nihilism—the denial that any partite entities exist—becomes very difficult to resist.

### 4.3 Dependent designation as a way out from metaphysics

The genius of Candrakīrti's semantics of dependent designation is that it sticks close to the world's usage (*lokavyavahāra*), recognizes its self-sufficiency, and skirts the composition problem all together. Let's speak of "satisfaction of the conditions for applying a term" (The shorthand formula figures prominently in Amie Thomasson's easy ontology, which I will discuss below). Application conditions being satisfied means, essentially, that the accepted rules of usage are obeyed and the requisite facts obtain. When there are, for example, various things and processes like a charter, buildings, accreditation agreements, professors on the payroll, conferral of doctorate degrees, and so forth, we can, following the commonly accepted rules of usage, say correctly that there is a university—it suffices, in normal situations, that there be some of these things for the application conditions to be satisfied. True, as an Ābhidharmika might argue, one could not identify the university with some or all things that figure in the conditions, nor would it be at all clear how the university could be a composed, but distinct, entity. But, most importantly, however, *one need not even try* to solve the puzzles of composition. The composition problem in all its three variants is avoidable: satisfaction of

application conditions suffices for us to say that there is a university; there are no accepted application conditions for language designating an absurd entity that is a conglomeration of the university with miscellaneous things; we normally can say that we see the university when we see things like buildings, commencement ceremonies, etc. The problem of how and when *xs* compose a new *y* does not arise.

One can now also see better how acquiescence in *lokaprasiddha* could be a sophisticated stance all the while innocently free of ontology.<sup>34</sup> Many Indo-Tibetan Candrakīrtian exegetes have maintained that ordinary things are just widely endorsed mistakes, there being no sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that could ever rightly establish their existence—one simply acquiesces in what the world thinks because, in any case, there can never be right answers to worldly issues. That latter interpretation of Candrakīrti's thought, no doubt, has passages in *Madhyamakāvatāra* and other works in its favor.<sup>35</sup> That said, Candrakīrti's *Catuhṣatakaṭīkā* would give a different and, in my view, considerably more subtle picture of his acquiescence in the world:

<sup>34</sup> We won't take up the vexing question of how many of the world's truths (some, all, the best confirmed?) Candrakīrti endorses or acquiesces in. Uncritical acquiescence in all that worldings accept on specific, factual matters (and not their broad-stroke acceptance of other minds, the external world, etc.) could dumb down the quest for truth, rob truth of normativity, or lead to extreme relativism. See Tillemans 2016: chapter II; see also Tillemans 2019 on the textual background influencing Candrakīrti to drift in a dangerously populist direction in his use of the term *lokaprasiddha*.

<sup>35</sup> See, e.g., *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti, chapter VI, verse 23. The Sanskrit is found in Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (ed. P.L. Vaidya) 361: *saṃyaṅ-mṛṣādarśanalabdhabhāvam / rūpadvayaṃ bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ // saṃyagdr̥śāṃ yo viśayaḥ sa tattvam / mṛṣādr̥śāṃ saṃvṛtisatyam uktam //* "All things bear two natures constituted through correct and false views. The object (*viśaya*) of those who see correctly is said to be 'reality' (*tattva*) and the object of those who see falsely is said to be 'customary existence' (*saṃvṛtisatyam*)."<sup>36</sup> See The Yakherds 2021 on the Tibetan controversies about whether Candrakīrtians must reject sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*, *tshad ma*), espouse a global error-theory of customary existence, or perhaps recognize the ultimate alone as fully real. The frequent phrase amongst those Mādhyamikas who reject *pramāṇas* is that worldly things only "exist from the perspective of mistaken minds" (*blo 'khrul ba'i ngor yod pa*). In Tillemans 2016, chapter II, I called this common interpretation—with its no-*pramāṇa* stance, fictionalism, and global error-theory—"typical Prāsaṅgika" and suggested that it

satisfaction of the world's application conditions for a term 'y' is a sufficient condition for the world to *rightly* establish that *ys* do exist. While there can and will be debate about *whether* those application conditions are in fact satisfied in particular cases, there will be truths and right understandings about what exists. And those truths will remain innocent in that ontology will play no role in grounding or determining them; they are, to put things in Buddhist terms, always "truths of usage" (*vyavahārasatya*).

The contrast with Eastern and Western varieties of mereological nihilism is striking, as such nihilists usually maintain that the combination of ordinary rules of usage and empirical data is *not* sufficient to affirm rightly that there are composites; they present various arguments to show that the world is just wrong in those ascriptions of existence, that composite objects are illusory, and that they cannot exist at all no matter what ordinary people invariably believe and say. The burden then falls on mereological nihilists to provide a well-developed rational or causal account as to why people, quasi-universally, wrongly believe in such a panoply of illusions. Pragmatists might try to show that illusory composites can be reasonably taken to be "existent" (in scare quotes) on account of the utility gained in doing so; Dharmakīrtian Buddhists might invoke so-called "tendencies [toward error ingrained] from beginningless time" (*anādikālavāsanā*). The followers of the *Catuhśatakaṭikā*, however, need do neither. There is no such burden on them to explain or rationalize quasi-universal mistaken belief in illusions, because, for them, the world can *rightly* say that vases and tables exist and are seen. It is telling that the *Catuhśatakaṭikā* *likens* all composed things (*saṃskṛta*) to illusions (*māyā*) that do not exist, but they are not said to *be* illusions.<sup>36</sup> The analogy with illusions is that all composed things appear to be one way (*rnam pa gzhan du snang ba*)—viz., existent with intrinsic natures—and are another (*rnam pa gzhan du gnas pa*)—viz., empty of such intrinsic natures. That mismatch, due to superimposition of intrinsic natures where there are none, is a general feature of human cognition and does not imply that composites like tables and vases are literally illusory and non-existent.

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was also a natural reading of Candrakīrti's own words. I now think that the jury should still be out about how much of a typical Prāsaṅgika Candrakīrti himself was throughout his *oeuvre*.

<sup>36</sup> See §16 and Tillemans 1990: 179.

Recognizing the existence of the things most everyone in the world accepts (including mereological nihilists when they go about their daily lives) circumvents *ad hoc* theoretical posits, too, like wholes (*avayavin*) and inherence (*samavāya*). It is, thus, a way out from numerous Indian metaphysical problems and pseudo-solutions. Seeing John's physical form, for example, ordinarily fulfills the conditions of use to say "I see John"; no necessity to postulate a substantial self (*ātman*) or personal identity (*pudgala*) with which John can be identified, nor proceed with a complicated reduction or elimination of John in favour of aggregates (*skandha*) of impersonal, impartite tropes (*dharma*). Seeing a potter manipulating clay on a wheel is ordinarily enough to say, "A potter is making a vase"—we thus sidestep the pan-Indian conundrums about how anyone could say that a potter is making a vase if it did not yet exist at the time of the potter's labour on the unformed clay, or more generally, if effects did not exist at the time of their causes.<sup>37</sup> There are numerous other such debates about disputed entities where this light-touch approach to what exists will apply nicely.

#### 4.4    **Liberality about what exists**

Metaphysicians, not surprisingly, vaunt the merits of *not* being light-touch in their approaches to existence. They usually seek a substantive feature other than, or in addition to, the satisfaction of ordinary application rules, a criterion which then allows them to decide if *y* actually exists and is not just widely said or thought to exist. There are a number of candidates, from *y*'s having "the ability to perform such and such a function" (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*), i.e., causal efficacy (as in Buddhist Epistemology from Dharmakīrti on), to the indispensability of *ys* in our best scientific theories. And, conversely, arguments to show that various widely accepted *ys* do not pass such substantive muster to exist, and are thus at most "existent" (in scare quotes), constitute the stock in trade of metaphysics. However, it follows from the light-touch version of existence that most of the types of things—e.g., universal properties, absences, relations, numbers, minds, people, external things, etc.—that were passionately questioned by traditional metaphysicians in their debates about ontology, or perhaps relegated to a

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<sup>37</sup> On this pan-Indian problem and its various attempted solutions, see Bronkhorst 2011.

shadow-realm of pragmatic “existence,” should be unproblematically and liberally accepted in the world as existent *tout court*. (If, for example, we rightly grant that most Swiss bankers have the common property of being financially prudent, then it follows immediately, and trivially, that there are common properties, or universals.) A debate about *which* properties should be ascribed to which things or people might well be important and difficult; a debate about whether there are any properties or people *at all* is not.

Candrakīrti and Candrakīrtians seem to have had that kind of liberality on a very wide range of existence-questions. They saw no reason to reject the world’s basic stance that there are macroscopic physical things, an external world, absences, and abstract entities. Indeed, in the *Prasannapadā* I section examining *pratyakṣa*, Candrakīrti himself made his liberality quite explicit, undercutting Buddhist nominalist metaphysics:

“Therefore, in the world, when any and all subjects of characterization (*lakṣya*) whatsoever, be they particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) or universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), are visible (*aparokṣa*) because they are directly perceived, they are therefore established as *pratyakṣa*, along with the cognitions that have them as objects.”<sup>38</sup>

This passage, in effect, shows that for him universal properties and particulars are on the same footing: just like particulars, there are universals that are directly perceived. And from that, it is a very short step to granting that universals exist.<sup>39</sup> One can go further. It looks like much of what followers of Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s nominalism relegated to problematic, fictional status was taken by many Tibetan Candrakīrtian thinkers as simply customarily existent but empty of intrinsic or real being, like everything else, no more no less. They were, I think, pushing this philosophy to its logical conclusion.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> *Prasannapadā* I.75.2–4 (ed. La Vallée Poussin): *tasmāl loke yadi lakṣyaṃ yadi vā svalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ vā sarvaṃ eva sāksād upalabhyamānatvād aparokṣaṃ / ataḥ pratyakṣaṃ vyavasthāpyate tadviṣayeṇa jñānena saha* /. See also Arnold 2005: 460–461.

<sup>39</sup> From “There is an *x* such that *x* is a universal and *x* is visible” we can uncontroversially infer “There is an *x* such that *x* is a universal.”

<sup>40</sup> The same Tibetans, when commenting on Dharmakīrti, too, read Dharmakīrti as much less of a nominalist than he probably was. Georges Dreyfus and I, in separate



## 5. Whither metaphysical madness and Buddhist critiques of it?

A final discussion beckons, although only the broad outlines can be taken up: what could be made of a semantics of *upādāya prajñapti* and the rejection of *prapañca* nowadays in a period where metaphysics has made a significant comeback in much analytic philosophy? There are philosophical problems in Buddhist texts where we can think alongside Buddhist philosophers and say how they could further develop a position, without pretending that they ever did so historically. Indeed, it is important to see how a larger East-West picture plays out in a cosmopolis of ideas where questions of citizenship and provenance are sometimes deliberately put aside. Well-informed, imaginative cosmopolitanism makes for good philosophy, good Buddhist Studies, and, I am convinced, a more interesting and relevant Buddhism.<sup>41</sup>

### 5.1 Easy ontology

Candrakīrti's semantical position would come out well if we used some recent work on "easy ontology." This is a deflationary position, elaborated in Thomasson 2015, according to which existence of *Fs* follows easily, or trivially, from the satisfaction of *application conditions* for correctly applying the term 'F'. There will be several such conditions that are sufficient, but not necessary, for the correct application of a term, some explicitly acknowledged, many merely tacitly accepted, subtle, and, I would venture to add (in a Wittgensteinian vein), embedded in very complex activities, or forms of life (*Lebensformen*).<sup>42</sup> In any case, no substantive, hard, or deep account of what it means for *Fs* to exist is needed. Existence of *Fs* is instead entailed by the satisfaction of application conditions. And there is no circularity here: the application conditions for 'F' do not include the existence of *Fs* as one of those conditions.

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publications, have looked in detail at Tibetan schools' acceptance of universals (*spyi* = *sāmānya*) as real (*dnegos po ba*). See Dreyfus 1992; Tillemans 1999: chapter X. On dGe lugs pa acceptance of real continua, see Dreyfus 1997: 109 et seq.

<sup>41</sup> Such methodological matters are taken up in detail in "Methodology: Meditations of a Philosophical Buddhistologist," i.e., Tillemans 2022b.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §19: "[T]o imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."

Thomasson herself, relying on Rudolf Carnap's seminal article "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (included in Carnap 1956), analyzes ontological questions as being of two sorts: internal, factual questions *using* the language and rules of usage we have adopted, or external questions that *mention* terms and ask whether their use is advantageous to us and to be continued. In the first case, questions about the existence of universals and other such entities disputed in ontology can usually be easily answered in the affirmative; in the second case, the dispute is no longer about the existence of such things, but whether we should modify our languages or keep them as they are. The danger is to confuse using a language's vocabulary to talk about things, on the one hand, and mentioning that same vocabulary to discuss its features and utility, on the other. Miscontrual of external questions as talking about things (e.g., Granted we use the word "property" regularly, but should we, for there aren't really any?) is a frequent confusion and gives an illusion of depth and difficulty. What is more, as both Thomasson and Hirsch emphasize, once use and mention are properly distinguished, nothing in Carnap's position would imply that things—from mountains and tables to properties—are somehow *created* by our language, or that their existence is only relative to, or only *within*, specific language frames. A rather common, and arguably quite woolly, anti-realist view that truth and existence are products of language and conceptual schemes—a kind of in vogue "linguistic idealism" that is also sometimes attributed to Mādhyamika Buddhists—could, fortunately, fall by the wayside, too.

Thomasson 2007 also ably takes up numerous complex counter-arguments (e.g., violation of parsimony rules, impossible colocation, causal redundancy, Sorites problems) against ordinary objects and easy ontology. W.V. Quine's famous use of parsimony arguments—following Occam's maxim that multiple entities should not be posited unnecessarily—are answered by pointing out that there is no overarching sortal concept of thinghood or entityhood that covers both an ordinary object, a bunch of subatomic particles, universals, numbers, absences, events, thoughts, and other things/entities, so that all could meaningfully be counted in the same tally as cases of a clearly defined universal (i.e., thinghood). It is not clear to me how much importance was actually attached to the principle of parsimony in Indian philosophical literature and how much argumentation

turned on it.<sup>43</sup> But *if* one argued in favour of a Buddhist metaphysical position (like impartite, simple *dharma*s being the only things that really exist) because of its parsimonious number of *bhāva/vastu* (“real entities”) or *viśaya* (“objects”) and the like, a Candrakīrti-style counter-argument could be that one is intoxicated by words if one thinks there are sortal concepts of *bhāva*, *vastu*, and *viśaya*. These words might seem to resemble substantives such as “elephant,” “table” and the like, but they function quite differently. We can count elephants, people, thoughts, atoms, tables, and chairs, etc. by using their respective, different conditions, but we don’t have any further, single set of conditions to count how many real entities or objects there are.<sup>44</sup>

Where does such a discussion, then, leave us in evaluating the importance of a semantics of dependent designation? Readers of Candrakīrti, myself included, often have quite mixed reactions to his thought. I have probably insurmountable difficulties with much of what Candrakīrti himself promotes in the name of the customary, especially his attempts to justify extreme

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<sup>43</sup> Mark Siderits thinks that it was regularly used, and he interprets Buddhist arguments against selves or wholes as turning on parsimony. See Siderits 2015: 12, 43, 145. There is indeed a principle of “lightness” (*lāghava*) that figures in non-Buddhist Mīmāṃsaka exegesis of Vedic injunctions and in their philosophy of language (e.g., accounts of types of primary and secondary meanings, or of the meaning-capacities of words). It is a requirement for ease/simplicity in semantic explanation and for directness, or lack of artifice, in interpretation, especially in Vedic exegesis where it serves to minimize human, corrupting influences—it was arguably used more as a governing principle of hermeneutics and semantics than as a way to settle ontological issues about entities’ existence. See Keating 2022, Bronkhorst 1997. Lightness figures, too, in Navya-Nyāya works like those of Gaṅgeśa (c. 1325), especially in discussions concerning inherence (*samavāya*); it seems to be an ontological use of parsimony. See Phillips 1995: 352n120 et passim. That said, I don’t see any clear evidence that Abhidharma and other Buddhist writers invoked such a principle explicitly or that they themselves recognized that their arguments hinged on prioritizing parsimony in ontology. I think they hinge more on a rejection of what some analytic philosophers call “spooky entities.” Instead of parsimony, Ābhidharmikas and Dharmakīrtian Buddhists tend to aim at “weirdness-avoidance.” See Tillemans 2016: 223–224.

<sup>44</sup> Satisfaction of the application conditions for “there are five elephants in the room” allows us to infer “there are five things in the room.” Nothing further is needed to determine the elephants’ thinghood. The same holds *mutatis mutandis* for objects.

Buddhist ethical views and dogma in a Madhyamaka fashion.<sup>45</sup> His use of a semantics of dependent designation to critique metaphysics, however, may well be right on the mark. It certainly deserves to be better understood.

## 5.2 Quantifier variance

I had said earlier that a reading of §17 as just criticizing metaphysicians' verbal debates seems to underestimate the range of Candrakīrti's own critique. That said, at least some important Indian metaphysical debates could still turn out to be interestingly verbal. And such an analysis could also, I think, be part (although certainly not the whole) of a multi-faceted Candrakīrtian Buddhist strategy to quieten *prapañca*—"proliferations [of distinctions]," "frivolous discourses"—and acquiesce in the ordinary.

Different languages or idiolects can be truth-conditionally equivalent, i.e., for any sentence in one there is a sentence in the other that will have the same truth value in the same possible worlds. Apply that principle to some traditional big (East-West) debates. If one could adequately establish such equivalences between one philosopher's language and another's, there would be little reason to choose between them. It would be a verbal dispute with nothing about reality riding on it. The idea comes from Eli Hirsch, who traces it back to J.O. Urmson: "Truth-conditionally equivalent languages are of equal metaphysical merit" (Hirsch 2011: xi). Hirsch speaks of "quantifier variance." Two equivalent languages can have their respectively different construals of existentially quantified statements like "Something exists such that it is *F*." In effect, the word "something" or "some entity" would be interpreted differently depending on the respective philosopher's views of what kinds of things exist, but neither language would be the uniquely best way to describe reality.

Such a strategy would seem to apply to the longstanding and complex debate between Buddhists and Brahmanical philosophers over impermanence. Buddhists seek to prove, with *a priori* reasoning, that real entities can exist only momentarily (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*) and that, instead of something that endures, there is only a continuum (*saṃtāna*) of like-moments. Naiyāyikas

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<sup>45</sup> See Tillemans 2022a, which takes up Āryadeva's and Candrakīrti's quietism about ontology in more detail and their attempts to harmonize such a quietism with traditional Buddhist dogma and ethics.

and Mīmāṃsakas, by contrast, say that entities do endure throughout time and that one can therefore correctly apprehend the same object one saw yesterday. One could proceed Urmson-style to construct truth-conditionally equivalent Buddhist and Brahmanical languages, i.e., where Buddhists talk of continua of new momentary entities, Brahmanical philosophers talk of enduring (*sthira*) entities that have new qualities, and vice versa.<sup>46</sup> Similarly, to take an example from Buddhist Abhidharma debates, Sarvāstivādins talk in an eternalist fashion (i.e., according to their *traikālyavāda* or “espousal of triple temporality”) and say that vases exist throughout the past, present or future, but change states or modes. The Sarvāstivādin’s assertion “The vase exists” as it would be rendered in the presentist language of the Sautrāntika could be “The vase existed, exists, or will exist,” while Sautrāntika’s own use of “exists” would have its equivalence in Sarvāstivādin talk as “exists and is in a present state.”<sup>47</sup> Language-equivalences could take us a considerable distance on the road to quietening some traditional Indian metaphysics. In converting to one position or another in such verbal debates, people might well claim, somewhat pretentiously, that they had deeply understood the fundamentals of reality. Instead, they mastered a new language.

The moral of a Candrakīrtian Buddhist story updated in these two contemporary ways could thus be radical: forgo dazzling *a priori* arguments and the metaphysical pursuit of the deepest fundamentals and broad architecture of reality as flawed all along. Forgo, too, the search for a metaphysically privileged language that hooks on to the world. That was a daring stance in the sixth century when the illustrious Nālandā-university paṇḍit fulmi-

<sup>46</sup> This type of move is what Hirsch 2011, chapter XII (“Ontology and Alternative Languages”), does with the Western perdurantism-endurantism debate in order to show that it is verbal and hence unsubstantive. For the details of comparable Indian debates about momentariness and permanence, see Mimaki 1976.

<sup>47</sup> To be more precise, first and early second century C.E. Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivādins differ on what those “states” are: Dharmatrāta holds that the past, present, and future are “modes” (*bhāva*); Ghoṣaka takes them to be characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*); Vasumitra indeed takes them to be states (*avasthā*); Buddhadeva takes them to be differences that are relative (*apekṣā*) to each other. One could adapt translations of Sautrāntika-talk accordingly. The recurrent Vaibhāṣika analogy is that substances’ existence throughout time is like the persistence of gold: the gold persists but changes from lumps to earrings, etc. For the basic literature on these debates, see the collection of articles in Prasad 1991.

nated against “the collection of unholy, confused verbiage propounding real entities,” and it would be now if a latter-day Candrakīrtian took aim at analytic metaphysics and Ontologese. The resultant quietism with regard to numerous theses could be significant as could be the clarity. Buddhists and the rest of us might be able to think better, more sanely, and certainly much less pretentiously without the deadweight of ontological concerns.

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# Afterthoughts on Camatkāra\*

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## Camatkāra and philosophy

Though I have already dealt at length with the assessment of the real meaning of *camatkāra* (Torella, forthcoming), I am well aware that some side issues are still open. One is the close association, upheld by some scholars, of *camatkāra* with philosophy—or, to be more precise, of *camatkāra*, understood as “wonder”, with the birth of philosophical reflection. Obviously, western indologists have in mind the famous statements by Plato and Aristotle of wonder (θαυμάζειν) as the very starting point (ἀρχή) of philosophy. The first question is whether the texts dealing with *camatkāra* may lend themselves to such an interpretation.

<sup>1</sup> *Camatkāra* makes its entry into the philosophic literature of the Pratyabhi-jñā in a decidedly abrupt way. Abhinavagupta himself, who will develop so much of his philosophical and aesthetic speculation around this term, on his first meeting with it does not conceal his perplexity. We are in the fifth āhnika of the Jñānādhikāra of the *Īśvarapratyabhi-jñā-kārikā*, where crucial metaphysical and epistemological problems are investigated. The first two verses read:

ĪPK I.V.1–2:

*vartamānāvabhāsānām bhāvānām avabhāsanam |*  
*antaḥsthitavatām eva ghaṭate bahirātmanā ||*  
*prāg ivārtho 'prakāśaḥ syāt prakāśātmatayā vinā |*  
*na ca prakāśo bhinnah syād ātmārthasya prakāśatā ||*

The objects that are manifested in the present can be manifested as external only if they reside within. If it were not essentially light,

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\* I dedicate this article to my old friend Eli, to his sparkling intelligence and sound scholarship, remembering our many meetings all over the world. I wish to thank Dr. Michael Wakoff for kindly checking my English.

<sup>1</sup> The following passage is drawn from Torella, forthcoming.

the object would remain non-light as before; and the light is not differentiated [from the object]: being light constitutes the very essence of the object. (tr. Torella 2002: 151)

Utpaladeva's discourse develops through a sustained dialogue particularly with the Buddhists and Mīmāṃsakas until the other side of *prakāśa*, i.e. *vimarśa* 'reflective awareness', comes into play:

ĪPK I.V.11:

*svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarśaṃ vidur anyathā |*  
*prakāśo 'rthoparakto 'pi sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ ||*

The essential nature of light is reflective awareness; otherwise light, though 'coloured' by objects, would be similar to an insentient reality, such as crystal and so on. (tr. Torella 2002: 118)

At first, the *Vṛtti* seems not to have much to add to the verse, limiting itself to a slightly clearer formulation:

ĪPKV ad ĪPK I.V.11: *prakāśasya mukhya ātmā pratyavamarśaḥ, taṃ vinā arthabheditākārasyāpy asya svacchatāmātraṃ na tv ajādyam [...]*

Reflective awareness (*pratyavamarśaḥ*) constitutes the primary essence (*mukhya ātmā*) of light. In the absence of this reflective awareness, light, though objects make it assume different forms, would merely be limpid, but not sentient [...] (tr. Torella 2002: 118)

As we know from Abhinavagupta, *kārikā* and *vṛtti* were composed by Utpaladeva at the same time, so their relationship to each other is closer than their relationship to Utpaladeva's own *Vivṛti*, which was composed only subsequently. The last phrase of the *Vṛtti* should be taken as complementary to the statement of the *kārikā*: "[...] since there is in it no *camatkāra*." Abhinavagupta gives voice to the surprise of the reader, who instead of *camatkāra* would have expected the term *vimarśa*, a more familiar term and already introduced by Utpaladeva's argument.

ĪPVV II pp. 176–177: *nanu vimarśābhāvāt jaḍatā syād iti vaktavye camatkṛter abhāvāt iti katham vṛttiḥ*

One might object: why does the *Vṛtti* say that it is "because of the absence of *camatkāra*" that there is no sentience, instead of saying "because of the absence of *vimarśa*"?

The reply given by Abhinavagupta to his own query is complex, and, moreover, has already been analysed in the above article. What seems very clear is that, according to Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, sentience depends on *camatkāra*. A further step is the one taken by Raniero Gnoli with his elegant formulation:

Aesthetic sensibility, as Abhinava says, is nothing but a capacity of wonder [*camatkāra*] more elevated than the ordinary one. An opaque heart does not wonder, *non obstupescit*. (Gnoli 1968: XLVII)

Thus, in Indian culture, wonder (of course, provisionally assuming that *camatkāra* means “wonder”) would lie at the very basis of both awareness (including philosophical awareness) and aesthetic experience. But let us try to test this statement against the “facts” of Indian philosophy. In my frequentation of the philosophical texts of premodern Indian philosophy, I never came across the affirmation of philosophical thinking being triggered by wonder. On the contrary, I would fully subscribe to Dasti’s remark (“If, for Aristotle, philosophy begins in wonder, for Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana it begins with doubt [...]”; Dasti 2017, 209). The centrality of *saṃśaya* “doubt” is affirmed at several points of the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, indeed one of the master-works of Indian philosophical literature (we could even think of heuristically extending Dasti’s remark to the whole of Indian philosophy<sup>2</sup>). Perhaps the most fundamental statement can be found in the long commentary on the first sūtra (*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1).

NBh p. 6: [...] *nānupalabdhe na nirṇīte 'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate, kiṃ tarhi? saṃśayite 'rthe | yathoktaṃ vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ' iti | vimarśaḥ saṃśayaḥ | pakṣapratipakṣau nyāyapravṛttiḥ | arthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayas tattvajñānaṃ iti | sa ca ayam kiṃsvid iti vastu-vimarśamātram anavadhāraṇaṃ jñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ prameye 'ntarbhavann evamarthaḥ prthag ucyate*

Systematic reasoning is brought about not regarding an object which has not been [previously] cognised or has been definitively ascertained, but regarding an object that is doubtful. It has been said: “Definitive ascertainment is the accurate determination of an object on the basis of

<sup>2</sup> In the limited span of this article I cannot extend my inquiry to the Buddhist and Jaina texts, whose basic position on the subject, however, would not differ

thesis and antithesis, after critically pondering [various alternatives]" [Nyāyasūtra I.1.41]. Doubt (*saṁśaya*) is precisely such critical pondering. [Prospecting] theses and antitheses is bringing about systematic reasoning. Accurate determination of an object, i.e., its definitive ascertainment, is knowledge of its real nature. Doubt is a knowledge that does not feature the accurate determination of an object, but is confined to pondering its real nature "is this so [or not]?"

This same doubting attitude is conspicuously present in one of the best candidates for the translation of the Western term "philosophy": *ānvīkṣikī*, a much-debated term very close to *nyāya* in this context.<sup>3</sup>

NBh p. 7: *kaḥ punar ayaṁ nyāyaḥ? pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇaṁ nyāyaḥ | pratyakṣāgamāśritam anumānaṁ sāvīkṣā | pratyakṣāgamābhyāṁ īkṣitasā-nvīkṣaṇam anvikṣā | tayā pravartata ity ānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyāśāstram*

What is this systematic reasoning (*nyāya*)? Systematic reasoning is a thorough examination (*parīkṣā*) of the object by using means of right knowledge. Inferential reasoning is based on perception and authoritative testimony. This is what is named *ānvīkṣā*, i.e., a subsequent (*anu*) inquiry (*īkṣā*) concerning something that has already been the object of inquiry by perception and authoritative testimony. *ānvīkṣikī* "inquisitive"—in that it acts by virtue of such subsequent inquiry (*ānvīkṣā*)—is called the art of systematic reasoning (*nyāyavidyā*), the science of systematic reasoning (*nyāyāśāstra*).

One more term, close to *ānvīkṣikī*, of which it constitutes one of the main instruments, is to be included in the constellation of doubt: it is *tarka* "hypothetical reasoning". Let us listen again to the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*.

NS 1.1.40 & NBh, pp. 54–55:

*avijñātātattve 'rthe kāraṇopapattitas tattvajñānārtham ūhas tarkaḥ* [NS 1.1.40] ||

*Bhāṣya: avijñāyamānatattve 'rthe jijñāsā tāvaj jāyate jānīyemam artham iti | atha jijñāsitasya vastuno vyāhatau dharmau vibhāgena vimṛṣati kiṁśvid it-tham āhośvin nettham iti | vimṛśyamānayo dharmayo ekaṁ kāraṇopapattiyā-nujñānāti sambhavaty asmin kāraṇaṁ pramāṇaṁ hetur iti kāraṇopapattiyā syād evam etan netarad iti*

significantly from that of the Brahmanical texts.

<sup>3</sup> On *ānvīkṣikī* I refer the reader to the thorough study of P. Balcerowicz (2012); see

*Tarka* is reasoning that proceeds by considering what is consistent with knowledge sources, in order to know the truth about something that is not definitively known (NS 1.1.40).

*Bhāṣya*: Desire to know arises, in the first instance, when the truth about something is not known. “This thing should be understood.” And the thing being considered has two contrary properties attributed to it, such that one wavers, thinking, “Maybe it is this way, maybe not.” Granting that there is a means to establish one of the two properties, he holds that there is a *pramāṇa* that would settle which is possible. One side is possible, given the evidence of knowledge sources, and not the other. (tr. Dasti & Phillips 2017: 44)

Thus, any kind of inquiry both in scientific treatises and debates is assumed to proceed from some doubt. That is why in the list of *prameyas* doubt stands first.<sup>4</sup>

If the role played by doubt and an inquisitive attitude in arousing the philosophical quest is generally acknowledged, the connotation of these two triggering factors may vary considerably. As aptly shown by P. Balcerowicz (2012: 199), even the same text, the *Mahābhārata*, one of the main foundation stones of the brahmanical establishment, contains both praises and reprobations of *ānvīkṣikī*, the latter becoming utterly prevalent in the later part of the epic. Well known is also the condemnation of *ānvīkṣikī* in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, especially when such a critical attitude targets revealed texts. The one who doubts about everything (*sarvābhiśaṅkin*) is equated in the *Mahābhārata* with the fool (Balcerowicz 2012: 201). He is blamed for being *too* curious and inquisitive. This is the cause of deep regret by the jackal in a famous passage of the *Mahābhārata* (XIII.36.46–48):

I used to be such a pseudo-expert, a reasoner, a denigrator of the Veda, fond of methodology [*ānvīkṣikī*], i.e. a discipline of reasoning, which is useless. I formulated doctrines based on logical reason, in assemblies I spoke about what is based on logical reason, I calumniated and verbally assaulted the twice-born during Vedic sacrifices. [47] I was a nihilist, putting everything to doubt [*sarvābhiśaṅkin*], a thickhead, considering

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also Halbfass 1990: 273-281.

<sup>4</sup> NBh p. 81: *yatra yatra saṁśayapūrvikā parīkṣā śāstre kathāyāṃ vā, tatra tatraivaṃ saṁśaye pareṇa pratiśiddhe samādhir vācya iti | ataḥ sarvaparīkṣāvīpitvāt prathamam saṁśayaḥ parīkṣita iti.*

myself an expert. This [present] life of mine as a jackal, O Twice-Born, is a consequence of all this. (tr. Balcerowicz 2012, 200).

### Curiosity (*kutūhala*)

Does “curiosity” play any role in the genuine quest for knowledge? In chapter XIII of his *magnum opus*, the *Tantrāloka*, Abhinavagupta says that the ideal master should expose himself to the “flux of various gurus and philosophical-religious traditions” (XIII.343a *nānāguruvāgamasrotah*). Then, in the next verses Abhinavagupta refers to his own experience:

TĀ XIII.344cd–345ab:

*aham apy ata evādhahśāstradr̥ṣṭikutūhalāt ||*  
*tār̥kikaśrautabauddhārhadvaiṣṇavādīnn aseviṣi |*

Precisely for this reason, I too have attended a multiplicity of masters, such as logicians, ritualists, buddhists, jains, viṣṇuites, doing so out of curiosity for the scriptures and doctrines of inferior rank.

Jayaratha comments on *-kutūhalāt* “out of curiosity” by *na tv ādarāt* “not with a zealous attitude” (but I do not know to what extent Abhinava would have liked this gloss...). The second case is drawn from Abhinavagupta’s *Dhvany-ālokalocana*. The occasion is a verse by Ānandavardhana himself, which Abhinavagupta paraphrases:

DhĀL: *evaṃ prathamam eva parameśvarabhaktibhājaḥ kutūhalamātrāvalambitakaviprāmāṇikobhayavṛtteḥ punar api parameśvarabhaktiviśrāntir eva yukteti manvānasyeyam uktiḥ*

Accordingly, this stanza represents the words of a man who first took part in devotion to God, then, out of mere curiosity [*kutūhalamātrāvalambita*°], lived the life of both a poet and philosopher, only at the end to realize once more that repose in the love of God is best” (tr. Ingalls et al. 1990: 655).

Once again *kutūhala* is associated with the powerful urge towards experiencing something seen as out of the mainstream. That *kutūhala* can be a very powerful passion/feeling is shown by its mention in an oft-quoted verse of the *Vijñānabhairava* (v. 118), which lists curiosity—side by side with other strong experiences, such as terror, sorrow, etc.—as a psychological state

whose cultivation is able to produce a condition “made of brahman”. In its essence, *kutūhala* “curiosity” is not radically different from *jijñāsā* “desire to know”; sometimes, the two terms even occur in analogous contexts basically as synonyms.<sup>5</sup> In a more specific sense, “curiosity” is often invoked to justify the creation of new traditional texts which are not intended to substitute prestigious scriptures of the remote past, but to update them by introducing new or more specialized topics. To the case of the Purāṇas, studied by G. Bonazzoli (1983: 95-97), that of the Tantras may be added, which frequently begin with the interlocutor of Bhairava, Śiva, Kārttikeya, etc., begging the god to clear his “doubts” (then, the new teachings start).<sup>6</sup>

### Jijñāsā

In the passage of the NBh quoted above (*avijñāyamānatattve 'rthe jijñāsā tāvaj jāyate jānīyemam artham iti*) one more *dramatis persona* in the knowledge play comes to the stage side by side with doubt: desire, or more precisely desire-to-know. We may say that doubt is associated to philosophical inquiry in an indirect way, that is, in that it arouses the desire-to-know, which in

<sup>5</sup> E.g. “This subject has been examined at length by me in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, a commentary on the Veda of Theatre. He who is curious about the matter should look upon this work” (ĪPVV II p. 177, *ayam artho 'bhinavabhāratyāṃ nāṭyavedavivṛtau vitatya vyutpādito 'smābhir iti | tatkutūhalī tām eva avalokayet*). “Who desires to know can thoroughly ascertain this subject on the basis of this work [the *Mālinīślokaavārttika*]” (TĀ XXXI.37ab *jijñāsus tata evedam avadhārayitum kṣamāḥ*).

<sup>6</sup> One may be reminded of the varied attitude to “curiosity” in classical antiquity. Plutarch’s derogatory judgment (but limited to “vulgar” curiosity) is not shared by Apuleius who instead appreciates it, while others—such as Cicero and Seneca—oscillated between praise and blame (see their criticism of excessive zeal displayed in pursuing the knowledge of abstruse matters, not necessary for orienting moral conduct; cf. Seneca’s *De brevitate vitae* 13: *inane studium superuacua discendi* “the vain passion for learning useless things”). Among the Fathers of the Church, who generally condemn curiosity (Tertullianus does it with special virulence), particularly interesting is the case of Augustine who is willing to appreciate *curiositas* but only to the extent that it leads to knowledge and love of the Christian God (cf. Labhardt 1960: 221). St Thomas, in the footsteps of Augustine, sharply distinguishes between vulgar *curiositas* from its more noble version, *studiositas*, properly motivated devotion to learning (Walsh 1988: 84). For a thorough and insightful philosophical and historical analysis of “curiosity” see Blumenberg 1985: 229–453.



turn arouses philosophical inquiry.<sup>7</sup> As is well known, the root texts of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta show an almost identical incipit: *atha dharmajijñāsā* and *atha brahmajijñāsā* “Now the desire to know *dharmā/brahman* starts”. My perplexity as to the reason why both sūtras start with “now the desire to know *dharmā/brahman*” instead of, for example, “now the teaching about *dharmā/brahman*” is only partially solved by Śābara’s and Śaṅkara’s comments. Both of them open the discussion by the same scholastic argument<sup>8</sup>: if one desires to know something, it means that he does not know it, but how can one desire to know something which is totally unknown, and, on the other hand, if something is already commonly known, why should one desire to know it?<sup>9</sup> Śaṅkara, basically following the footsteps of Śābara, says that an inquiry is made necessary by the variety of the opinions on the matter, caused by the different standpoints of the philosophers and a certain ambiguity of the scriptures:

BSBh p. 83: *evam bahavo vipratipannā yuktivākyatadābhāsamāśrayāḥ santaḥ | tatrāvicārya yatkiñcit pratipadyamāno niḥśreyasāt pratihanyetān-arthaṃ ceyāt | tasmāt brahmajijñāsopanyāsamukhena vedāntavākyamīmāṃsā tadavirodhitarkopakaraṇā niḥśreyasaprayojanā prastūyate.*

Thus, many people hold conflicting positions, basing them sometimes on sound arguments and scriptural texts, sometimes on the mere appearance of them. If therefore a man would embrace one of these opinions without a critical examination, he would exclude himself from the highest beatitude and incur demerit. By the mention of “desire to know *brahman*”, deep investigation into the Vedānta texts is intended, being supported by reasoning (*tarka*) not conflicting with them and having as ultimate goal the highest beatitude.

<sup>7</sup> The desire to know may also have another cause: existential pain. As the initial verse of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* says, it may be aroused by the attack of the threefold suffering (*duḥkhatrayābhighātāj jijñāsā*).

<sup>8</sup> We can read it with the useful clarification by Vācaspatimiśra in his *Bhāmati* (p. 79): *yadi prasiddham, vedāntavākyasamutthena niścayaājñānena viśayīkṛtam; tato na jijñāsitaḥ, niṣpāditakriye karmaṇi aviśeṣādhāyinaḥ sādhanasya sādhananyāyātīpātāt | athāprasiddham vedāntebhyaḥ, tarhi na tad vedāntāḥ pratipādayantīti sarvathāprasiddham naiva śakyam jijñāsītum | anubhūte hi priye bhavatīcchā na tu sarvathānanubhūtāpūrve; na ceṣyamāṇam api śakyam jñātum, pramāṇābhāvāt.*

<sup>9</sup> The same issue is raised and carefully worked out in Plato’s *Meno* (71b): “If I do not

Thus, even for Śaṅkara it is the doubt cast by conflicting views that sets methodical reasoning into motion and opens the way to philosophical speculation. In the words of Vācaspati: “The desire to know being the effect of doubt indicates doubt as its cause. Doubt prompts sustained investigation to start” (*Bhāmatī* p. 46, *jijñāsā tu saṁśayasya kāryam iti svakāraṇaṁ saṁśayaṁ sūcayati saṁśayaś ca mīmāṃsārambhaṁ prayojayati*). Just as Vātsyāyana said, only what is partially and problematically known can be the starting point of any sustained inquiry.

In closing this paragraph my mind goes to another domain of Indian culture where doubt, taken in the broadest sense, enjoys a significant role. In the *Alaṁkāśāstra*, we find *saṁśaya* both as an *alaṁkāra* proper (“A figure in which two similar but discriminable things are said to be subject to a doubt concerning their respective nature or modes of action”; Gerow 1971: 306) and as qualification of other *alaṁkāras* (*saṁśaya-atīśayokti*, *saṁśaya-upamā*). Very close to *saṁśaya* is the *alaṁkāra-saṁdeha* (“A figure in which the speaker hesitates to identify which of two similar things is which; the expression of a similitude through the affectation of an inability to decide the relative identity of two things—the subject and object of comparison”, with its subtypes *aniścaya*, *niścayagarbha*, *niścayānta*; Gerow 1971, 312–314). They belong to a constellation of terms, including *śleṣa*<sup>10</sup> “simultaneous expression” and even the broader term *vakrokti* (“crooked expression” or, adopting Bronner’s translation, “distortive talk”), which all point to indefiniteness, vagueness, crookedness—in a word, doubtfulness—as a device to enhance the power of ordinary word and push it to its higher incarnation, i.e. poetical word, which the precise and one-to-one *abhidhāna* word could never reach. Let me conclude this quick incursion into poetics by quoting what the greatest theoretician of Baroque rhetoric, the count Emanuele Tesauro, said—in his supremely elegant XVII c. Italian—apropos metaphor:

[M]a quella solamente, che senza dolo malo, scherzevolmente imita la verità, ma non l’opprime: imita la falsità in guisa, che il vero vi traspaia come per un velo: accioché da quel che si dice, velocemente tu intendi

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know what a thing is, how could I know what is its nature?”

<sup>10</sup> On *śleṣa* I refer the reader to the excellent studies of Mazzarino (1991, especially 25–150) and Bronner 2010, especially 195–265).

quel che si tace: e in quell'imparamento veloce (come dimostrammo) è posta la vera essenza della Metafora. (*Il cannocchiale aristotelico*, p. 326)<sup>11</sup>

### Plato and Aristotle on wonder

So far it seems that in Indian philosophy there is no place for wonder among the sources of philosophical inquiry, as famously Plato and Aristotle maintained. However, before proceeding it would be not out of place to examine more closely their positions and find an answer to a preliminary question: are Plato and Aristotle saying the same thing? (cf. Cusinato 2017, 229–230).

We may begin with Aristotle's position on wonder as it is more linear and less complex than Plato's. These well-known passages all come from the *Metaphysics*.

All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to [980a25] action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer sight to almost everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things. [...] [982b10] That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their wonder [*θαυμάζειν*] that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize [*ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν*]; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then [15] advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled [*ἀπορώς*] and wonders [*θαυμάζων*] thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of wisdom, for myth is composed [20] of wonders); therefore since they philosophized in order to escape from ignorance [...] [983a10] Yet the acquisition of this science must in a sense end in something which is the opposite of our original inquiries. For all men begin, as we said, by

<sup>11</sup> Tr.: [But that only, which without malicious intent playfully imitates truth, but does not oppress it: it imitates falsehood in such a way that the true shines through it as through a veil, so that from what is said quickly you understand what is kept silent: and in that quick learning (as we showed) is placed the true essence of metaphor].

wondering that the matter is so (as in the case of automatic marionettes or the solstices or the incommensurability [15] of the diagonal of a square with the side; for it seems wonderful to all men who have not yet perceived the explanation that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by the smallest unit). But we must end in the contrary and, according to the proverb, the better state, as is the case in these instances when men learn the cause; for there is nothing which would surprise a geometer so much as if [20] the diagonal turned out to be commensurable. (tr. Ross 1984: 3343–3350; with slight modifications; here and in the following passages the citation of the original Greek, whenever deemed useful, is my own addition).<sup>12</sup>

What emerges from these passages is the “provisional” nature of Aristotle’s wonder whose task is only to trigger the cognitive process and, hopefully, disappear as soon as possible, i. e., once the grounds for perplexity are cleared and the causes of the puzzling phenomenon are finally highlighted.

Quite different is the case of Plato, whose ideas on the nature of wonder can be gleaned particularly from two dialogues, the *Theaetetus* and the *Meno*.

In the former, the young Theaetetus tries to answer an apparently innocent question asked by Socrates: “What is knowledge?”. All Theaetetus’ replies are dismantled one after the other until he is weary and more and more confused:

*Theaetetus*: [155c] By the gods, Socrates, I am exceedingly in wonder [ὑπερφυῶς ὥς θαυμάζω] when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim [σκοτοδινῶ].

*Socrates*: Theodorus seems to be a pretty good guesser about your nature. For this feeling,—wonder [τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν]—shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy [ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας], and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumias made a good genealogy. (tr. Fowler 1921: 55; with modifications).

This short passage deserves an in-depth analysis, which unfortunately the limited space of this article does not allow. Suffice it to point out that:

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<sup>12</sup> At least also another passage of Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1371a30) is worth mentioning: “Learning things and wondering at things are also pleasant for the most part; wondering implies the desire of learning, so that the object of wonder is an object

a) wonder (θαυμάζειν) results in an existential disorientation (σκοτοδινῶ) involving the whole of the person; b) it is πάθος “feeling, passion”; c) it is the beginning (ἀρχή) of philosophy—but ἀρχή might also be taken in the sense of “foundation”; d) the last sentence puts the entire passage into a very indefinite and mysterious landscape.<sup>13</sup> More light is shed on this theme by another Socratic dialogue, the *Meno*. Here we find the interlocutor of Socrates at a loss in front of the multiplicity of positions regarding what virtue is.

[79e7–80b3] *Meno*: Socrates, I used to be told, before I began to meet you, that yours was just a case of being perplexed yourself [ἀπορεῖς] and making others perplexed also; and so now I find you are merely bewitching me with your spells and incantations, which have reduced me to utter perplexity [μεστών ἀπορίας]. And if I am indeed to have my jest, I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are extremely like the flat torpedo sea-fish; for it benumbs anyone who approaches and touches it, and something of the sort is what I find you have done to me now. For in truth I feel my soul and my tongue quite benumbed, and I am at a loss what answer to give you. And yet on countless occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue to various people—and very good speeches they were, so I thought—but now I cannot say one word as to what it is. (tr. Lamb 1952: 297–299, with slight modifications).

Here the focus is on doubt, perplexity (ἀπορία). Apparently, this is just a paralysing factor, but in a subsequent passage Socrates shows that such paralysis can also prove to be the condition for a deeper inquiry and understanding. Here, Socrates addresses a slave of Meno and with the same technique demolishes his wrong presuppositions about some geometrical problem. The theme of intellectual paralysis comes in again (and the simile of torpedo as well), but this time even Meno has to acknowledge the potentially positive effects of such paralysis.

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of desire [τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐπιθυμητόν]; while in learning one is brought into one's natural condition” (tr. Rhys Roberts 1984, 4681).

<sup>13</sup> Apparently, Iris should refer to philosophy, but, as far as I know, this equation has never been made in Greek mythology. Iris is apparently a joyful and serene figure (she is the rainbow and the messenger of the gods), but her having the Arpias as sisters casts a disturbing shadow on her. Her father, Thaumas (assimilated to wonder) is a minor god, belonging to an ambiguous lineage; some myths make

[84] *Socrates*: There now, Meno, do you observe what progress he has already made in his recollection? At first he did not know what is the line that forms the figure of eight feet, and he does not know even now: but at any rate he thought he knew then, and confidently answered as though he knew, and was aware of no difficulty; whereas now he feels the difficulty he is in, and besides not knowing does not think he knows.

*Meno*: That is true.

*Socrates*: And is he not better off in respect of the matter which he did not know [οὐκοῦν νῦν βέλτιον ἔχει περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα]?

*Meno*: I think that too is so.

*Socrates*: Now, by causing him to doubt [ἀπορεῖν] and giving him the torpedo's shock, have we done him any harm ?

*Meno*: I think not.

*Socrates*: And we have certainly given him some assistance, it would seem, towards finding out the truth of the matter: for now he will push on in the search gladly, as lacking knowledge [ζητήσειν ἂν ἡδέως οὐκ εἰδώς]; whereas then he would have been only too ready to suppose he was right in saying, before any number of people any number of times, that the double space must have a Une of double the length for its side.

*Meno*: It seems so.

*Socrates*: Now do you imagine he would have attempted to inquire or learn what he thought he knew, when he did not know it, until he had been reduced to the perplexity [ἀπορία] of realizing that he did not know, and had felt a craving to know [ἐπόθησεν τὸ εἰδέναι]?

*Meno*: I think not, Socrates.

*Socrates*: Then the torpedo's shock was of advantage to him ?

*Meno*: I think so. (tr. Lamb 1952: 314–315)

Not only does this passage show that any knowledge process starts with wonder/paralysis, but also that in order to ensure the effectiveness of any cognitive activity such an initial wonder/paralysis attitude should be carefully maintained, stored, so to speak, in the background.<sup>14</sup> Besides keeping the desire for knowledge constantly alive, it also features two side effects:

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him the son of Pontos, the sea in its wild and dangerous aspects.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Napolitano Valditara 2007: 258: "It actually figures in this passage of the *Meno*

making the subject humbly aware of his limits and creating a “respectful” cognitive attitude toward the object.<sup>15</sup> A sentence by the Neoplatonist Ammonius Saccas, quoted by Plutarch in the *De E apud Delphos* (385c; p. 720), represents a perfect synthesis of Plato’s position: “For the beginning of philosophy is inquiry (ζητεῖν), and the beginning of inquiry is wonder (θαυμάζειν) and doubt/perplexity (ἀπορεῖν) [...]”.

### A short digression on Descartes and Kant

In 1649 Descartes published a highly acute and influential treatise on the human passions, *Les passions de l’âme*, his last work, in which wonder holds pride of place. The word for “wonder” is the French *admiration*, deriving from Lat. *admiratio* (*admirari* has the same emphasis on vision as the Gr. θαυμάζειν, and is the standard translation of θαυμάζειν by Latin authors).

#### 53. Wonder

When our first encounter with some object surprises us and we find it novel, or very different from what we formerly knew or from what we supposed it ought to be, this causes us to wonder and to be astonished at it. Since all this may happen before we know whether or not the object is beneficial to us, I regard wonder as the first of all the passions. It has no opposite, for, if the object before us has no characteristics that surprise us, we are not moved by it at all and we consider it without passion. (tr. Stuthoff 1985: 350)

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the verb πόθειν (84c6: ἐπόθησεν τὸ εἰδέναι) indicating yearning, nostalgic longing of something lost, previously enjoyed, perfect homologue of eros that leads us to contemplate copies of Beauty: it is therefore certain that the pain we are talking about, that the pain of ἀπορεῖν is not only positive (because, as hypothesized, natural), but necessary, it is the only possible access for us to the true, as the pain of childbirth or the pain of therapy are necessary to promote the natural processes of birth and healing” (my translation of the Italian original).

<sup>15</sup> I should like to refer to what R.W. Hepburn says in the essay that I consider the most insightful, and concise, philosophical introduction to the concept of wonder: “From a wondering recognition of forms of value proper to other beings, and a refusal to see them simply in terms of one’s own utility-purposes, there is only a short step to humility. Humility, like wonder, involves openness to new forms of value: both are opposed to the attitude of ‘We’ve seen it all!’ ” (Hepburn 1984: 146). In fact, also the famous *nil admirari* of Cicero, Horace, Seneca, etc., would deserve

70. *Wonder: its definition and cause*

Wonder is a sudden surprise of the soul which brings it to consider with attention the objects that seem to it unusual and extraordinary. (tr. Stuthoff 1985: 353)

72. *What the strength of wonder consists in*

This does not prevent it from having considerable strength because of the element of surprise, i.e. the sudden and unexpected arrival of the impression which changes the movement of the spirits. Such surprise is proper and peculiar to this passion, so that when it is found in the other passions—and it normally occurs in and augments almost all of them—this is because wonder is joined with them. (tr. Stuthoff 1985: 353)

Although wonder is defined by Descartes “the first of all the passions”, the rest of his considerations are more and more cautious, if not derogatory. Wonder serves to raise attention to a certain object and, more in general, to awaken the subject from his ordinary state of indifference and open him to cognition (and passions). However, Descartes adds, if wonder is useful to awaken the subject’s attention, this is not enough to drive him to truly scientific inquiry. On the contrary, an excessive dose of wonder may block him at the door of knowledge and halt his cognitive progress.<sup>16</sup>

76. *In what ways it can be harmful, and how we can make good its deficiency and correct its excess.*

But more often we wonder too much rather than too little, as when we are astonished in looking at things which merit little or no consideration. This may entirely prevent or pervert the use of reason. Therefore,

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a close investigation with a view to assessing its proper (and deeper) meaning...

<sup>16</sup> This will also be the position of Spinoza in the *Ethica more geometrico demonstrata*. Wonder (*admiratio*) immobilises the subject in front of the object, and this hypnotic adhesion to the object in its singularity prevents the subject from furthering his cognitive activity, which would be expected to establish relations among different entities (III, def. IV, p. 230 “[H]ence, I do not include wonder [*admiratio*] among the emotions, nor do I see why I should so include it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another” (cf. Barrier 2017: 51–54). In sum, for Spinoza it is impossible to proceed from wonder to



although it is good to be born with some inclination to wonder, since it makes us disposed to acquire scientific knowledge, yet after acquiring such knowledge we must attempt to free ourselves from this inclination as much as possible. (tr. Stuthoff 1985: 355)

The dark side of wonder (*admiration*) is precisely the excess of it, which Descartes calls *étonnement* ("astonishment"). After some remarks about its "physiology", he concludes:

73 . *What astonishment is.*

[...] As a result the whole body remains as immobile as a statue, making it possible for only the side of the object originally presented to be perceived, and hence impossible for a more detailed knowledge of the object to be acquired. This is what we commonly call 'being astonished'. Astonishment is an excess of wonder, and it can never be other than bad. (tr. Stuthoff 1985: 354)

We may conclude this short journey into Western wonder by referring to a beautiful passage of Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, which may be taken as the synthesis of a very long tradition. Once again the focus is on a sharp distinction between paralyzing and dynamising wonder (i.e. *Verwunderung* vs. *Bewunderung*), thus bringing us back to Plato (not to Aristotle).

*Analytic of Teleological Judgement, §62*

Now astonishment [*Verwunderung*] is a shock that the mind receives from a representation and the rule given through it being incompatible with the principles already grounded in the mind, and that accordingly makes one doubt one's own eyes or question one's judgement; but admiration [*Bewunderung*] is an astonishment that keeps continually recurring despite the disappearance of this doubt. [*Bewunderung aber eine immer wiederkommende Verwunderung, ungeachtet der Verschwindung dieses Zweifels*]<sup>17</sup> Admiration is consequently quite a natural effect of observing the above-mentioned purposiveness in the essence of things (as phenomena), and so far there is really nothing to be said against it. For the agreement of the above form of sensuous intuition, which is

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systematic knowledge.

<sup>17</sup> I do prefer the translation "wonderment" for *Bewunderung*, proposed by Ronald W. Hepburn (Hepburn 1984, 133), unless we bear in mind the original, and wider, meaning of the Latin word *admiratio* from which the English "admiration" derives.

called space, with the faculty of concepts, namely understanding, not only leaves it inexplicable why it is this particular form of agreement and not some other, but, in addition, produces an expansion of the mind in which it suspects, so to speak, the existence of something lying beyond the confines of such sensuous representations, in which, perhaps, although unknown to us, the ultimate source of that accordance could be found. (tr. Meredith-Walker 2007: 193)

## Conclusion

The attempt to identify a meeting point in the diverse positions held by Western and Indian philosophers about the ἀρχή of philosophy appears more problematic than expected. Wonder seemed to be the best candidate, but it failed to even pass a very cursory examination. In the West, “wonder” is conspicuously present in the investigations about the ἀρχή of philosophy, but with a multiplicity of shades of meaning, already nested in the archetypal word θαυμάζειν (and derivatives) of the Greek tradition, then continued by the Latin *admiratio*. Furthermore, notwithstanding what has sometimes been argued, in Indian philosophical texts, and in general in Indian culture, the association of wonder with the birth of philosophy has never been maintained. Not even the view of *camatkāra* in the sense of “wonder” as the pre-condition of philosophical awareness and aesthetic experience can be admitted, simply because *camatkāra*, though having the meaning “wonder” within its semantic area, has been used in a very different sense by the great Kashmiri authors Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, who assigned to this concept a central role in their philosophico-aesthetical speculation<sup>18</sup>. However, if wonder has proved to be an unsuitable candidate, doubt seems to impose itself

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<sup>18</sup> In fact, the fortune of *camatkāra* as a technical term in Indian thought largely derives from their works. As to the grounds of my statement about the ‘real’ meaning of *camatkāra*, I refer the reader to my forthcoming article, of which I can anticipate some of the conclusive remarks: “Tentatively, we may say that this concept was borrowed from ordinary gustative experience and given a central place in epistemological discourse, from which a brilliant career started with a rebirth in the higher sphere of gustative experience, namely poetry and theatre, or more in general of aesthetic experience as a whole. A comprehensive translation (which I have purposely suspended so far) might be: ‘inner deep savouring, marked by a sense of bliss and aesthetic appreciation’ ”.

as a much-better alternative. As we have seen, in the Indian tradition, *saṃśaya* (or *saṃdeha*) “doubt” is acknowledged as the prime component of the group of factors driving man towards knowledge, along with *kutūhala* “curiosity” and *jijñāsā* “desire-to know”. The same can be said for the Western tradition, including the Greek one, which takes doubt/perplexity as a significant component of wonder: the paralysing astonishment before the conflicting aspects of reality (ἀπορία) is the preliminary stage—or even the presupposition—for the starting of intellectual inquiry. While for some Western philosophers, such as Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza and others, doubt/perplexity and wonder are to be overcome and finally abandoned once the knowledge process has successfully started, for others—such as Plato and Kant—a doubting-wondering attitude should remain in the heart of any genuine quest for knowledge. This same attitude is considered the core itself of *ānvīkṣikī*, the inquisitive attitude whose legacy was explicitly claimed by the Nyāya system. In Śaṅkara’s commentary on *Brahmasūtra* II.1.11 the topic of the fundament of human reasoning is examined at length. The arguments against human *tarka*—in which Śaṅkara also includes the *tarka* of the *mahāpuruṣas*, such as Kapila and Kaṇabhuk (Kaṇāda)—are the usual ones, and can be summarized by what he says at the very outset: it is not possible for the *tarkas* to be based on a solid foundation because of the diversity of human opinions (*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* p. 448, *na pratiṣṭhitatvaṃ*<sup>19</sup> *tarkāṇāṃ śakyam āśrayitum, puruṣamativairūpyāt*). However, in the course of a sustained discussion between the upholder of the scriptures as the sole unshakable basis of knowledge and the defender of human *tarka*, an unexpected position is put forward: Why consider the diversity of human reasoning as a fault, while it is in fact a positive quality enabling men to question any given knowledge, and due to unending refinements arrive at higher and higher achievements?

BSBh, p. 449: *ayam eva tarkasyālāṅkāro yad apratiṣṭhitatvaṃ nāma | evaṃ hi sāvadyatarkaparitāgēna niravadyas tarkaḥ pratipattavyo bhavati*

But such a lack of unshakable basis is just an ornament of human reasoning! For it is precisely by abandoning faulty reasonings that faultless reasoning may be obtained.

<sup>19</sup> On *apratīṣṭhitatvaṃ* cf. Halbfass 1991, 147.

Unfortunately this is just a *pūrvapakṣa*, immediately liquidated by Śaṅkara: the knowledge of Brahman can only be attained through revelation and reasoning clinging to revelation (ibid. *āgamavaśēnāgamānusāritarkavaśēna ca*). All the same, we must be grateful to Śaṅkara for giving voice to a nostalgic of the glorious *ānvīkṣikī*...

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# A Note on *satya*

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## 0. Introduction

In the commentary Vyākhyāsudhā on Amara 1.7.22<sup>a</sup>: *satyaṃ tathyaṃ ṛtaṃ samyag*, the nominal stem *satya-* is analysed as follows: *sati sādhu satyam*<sup>1</sup> ‘the truth is that which is fit for, in other words, accords with, that which is existent.’ Both Böhtlingk-Roth and Monier-Williams translate the triplets *paramārthena*, *paramārthataḥ* and *paramārthāt* as, among others, ‘in Wirklichkeit, in reality.’<sup>2</sup> The third of these *paramārthāt* occurs, e.g. in Mbh 3.297.71<sup>ab</sup>: *ānṛṣaṃsyam paro dharmāḥ paramārthāc ca me mataṃ*, which van Buitenen translates into ‘uncruelty is the highest of Laws, this I know as the final truth.’<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, Johnson puts it into ‘compassion I consider the highest Law, superior to the highest goal.’<sup>4</sup> It is also possible to put it into, e.g. ‘uncruelty is, in reality or from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, the highest Law, this is my thought.’ I agree with Böhtlingk-Roth and Monier-Williams that the ablative in the present context refers to an *apādāna* ‘a point of departure’ in the form of a standard of judgement. By which rule can the ablative *paramārthāt* function predicatively in the sense of ‘this I know as the final truth’? The twins *saṃvṛtyā* and *paramārthataḥ* occur, e.g. in Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā.<sup>5</sup> Some translate them into, among others, ‘from the surface [point of view], from the ultimate [standpoint]’<sup>6</sup> or ‘selon la convention mondaine, du point de vue de la réalité absolue.’<sup>7</sup> Does *paramārthataḥ*

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<sup>1</sup> A.4.4.98: *tatra sādhuḥ (yat 75)*.

<sup>2</sup> S.V. *paramārtha*.

<sup>3</sup> Van Buitenen 1981: 803.

<sup>4</sup> Johnson 2005: 323.

<sup>5</sup> MacDonald 2015: I 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 261, 262, 268; de la Vallée Poussin 1992: 492, 493.

<sup>6</sup> MacDonald 2015: II 114, 115.

<sup>7</sup> May 1959: 182, 227.



in question really correspond not to the instrumental *paramārthena* which denotes a lakṣaṇa (attribute, characteristic) but to the ablative *paramārthāt* which denotes an apādāna in the form of a standard of judgement, such as a viewpoint? Does the instrumental *saṃvṛtyā* in question really refer not to a lakṣaṇa but to a karaṇa in the form of a standard of judgement? In this essay, standing on pioneers' painstaking studies and basing myself on Pāṇiniyas, I would like to examine these problems.

### 1. Threefold truth

Amara 3.3.83<sup>cd</sup> runs as follows: *satye sādhanau vidyamāne praśaste 'bhyarhite ca sat*. Therefore the nominal stem *sat-* 'that which is existent' means 'that which is true,' i.e. the truth<sup>I</sup> (*satya*). If each of A and B is a *sat* and it remains unuttered, I define it as a fact/reality. Once the *sat* A is uttered, the *pada* (word) A corresponding to the *sat* A accords with the *sat* A, not with the *sat* B. Therefore the *pada* A is the truth<sup>II</sup>. The *artha* (meaning) A of the *pada* A accords also with the *sat* A, not with the *sat* B; accordingly the *artha* A is also the truth<sup>III</sup>. Similarly, if each of 'A is B' and 'A is C' is a *sat* and it remains unuttered, I define it as a fact/reality. Once the *sat* 'A is B' is uttered, the *vākya* (utterance) 'A is B' corresponding to the *sat* 'A is B' accords with the *sat* 'A is B,' not with the *sat* 'A is C.' Therefore the *vākya* 'A is B' is the truth.<sup>II</sup> The *artha* 'A is B' of the *vākya* 'A is B' accords also with the *sat* 'A is B,' not with the *sat* 'A is C'; accordingly the *artha* 'A is B' is also the truth.<sup>III</sup> In this way, the *karmadhāraya*<sup>8</sup> compound *paramārtha-* whose last member is equivalent to *abhidheya*<sup>9</sup> implies 'die höchste Wahrheit, the highest truth.'<sup>10</sup> Between the *sat* 'A is B' (truth<sup>I</sup>) and the *vākya* 'A is B' (truth<sup>II</sup>) there is much difference in that, the former has not yet been uttered, whereas the latter has been. But the *vākya* 'A is B' (truth<sup>II</sup>) and the *artha* 'A is B' (truth<sup>III</sup>) are one and the same truth in that both of them accord with the *sat* 'A is B.'

<sup>8</sup> Cardona 1997: par. 314.

<sup>9</sup> Amara 3.3.86<sup>ab</sup>: *artho 'bhidheya-rai-vastu-prayojana-nivṛttiṣu*.

<sup>10</sup> See note 2.

## 2. A.2.3.21

A.2.3.21: *itthaṃbhūtalakṣaṇe (tṛtīyā 18)* provides that the third case ending denotes an attribute of someone/something that has attained such-and-such a mode/state.

### 2.1. The speaker's desire to express (*vivakṣā*)

If by the phrase *jaṭābhis tāpasah* a speaker desires to express the matted hair as a *karaṇa*, he appeals to A.2.3.18: *karṭṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā*. Thus the phrase means 'an ascetic [recongnized as such] by means of the matted hair.' If he desires to express the matted hair as a *hetu*, he appeals to A.2.3.23: *hetau (tṛtīyā 18)*. The phrase means 'an ascetic [recognized as such] because of the matted hair.' If he wants, however, to express the matted hair as a *lakṣaṇa* of the ascetic, he resorts to A.2.3.21. The phrase means 'an ascetic [marked as such] with the matted hair.' In this way the present third case ending<sup>11</sup> refers to a *lakṣaṇa* not as a subordinate item (*upasarjana*) but as a principal item (*pradhāna*).

### 2.2. Three types of attributes

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word attribute as follows<sup>12</sup> :

1. [Type A] A quality or character ascribed to any person or thing, one which is in common estimation or usage assigned to him; hence, *sometimes*, [Type B] an epithet or appellation in which the quality is ascribed. 3. [Type C] A material object recongnized as appropriate to, and thus, symbolic of, any office or actor; *spec.* in *Painting, Sculpture*; A conventional symbol added, as an accessory, to denote the character or show the identity of the personage represented.

<sup>11</sup> Referring to Pāṇini (*ayam*), Patañjali explains a *lakṣaṇa* as a principal item (*prādhānyena lakṣaṇam*) as follows. Mahābhāṣya II: 503<sup>b</sup>–504<sup>a</sup> on A.2.3.21: *ayam prādhānyena lakṣaṇam pratinirdiśati—itthaṃbhūtasya lakṣaṇam itthaṃbhūtalakṣaṇam tasminn itthaṃbhūtalakṣaṇa iti*. In Bṛhacchabdenduśekhara on SK 566, Nāgeśa amplifies as follows: *jaṭābhir iti. jñāpyatvarūpaḥ sambandhas tṛtīyārthaḥ. tad āha jaṭājñāpyeti. yat tu 'jaṭābhis tāpaso jñāta' ity arthāj jñānakriyāyām jaṭādīnām karaṇatvād eva tṛtīyāsiddher idam vyartham' iti. tan na. karaṇatvāvivakṣāyām śaṣṭhībādhanārtham āvaśyakatvāt. etena 'hetutṛtīyayedam siddham' ity apāstam. lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāvasyaiva vivakṣitatvāt ceti dik.*

<sup>12</sup> S.V. attribute.

Prasannapadā runs: *svata iti vidyamānaṃ hetutvena bravīṣi*.<sup>13</sup> MacDonald's translation is: [When you say] "from self" (*svataḥ*), you assert something [already] existing to be the cause (*hetutvena*).<sup>14</sup> Here the property of being a cause (*hetutva*) is ascribed to something [already] existing (*vidyamāna*), and so corresponds to Type A. In other words, the property *hetutva* belonging to a *hetu* belongs also to a *vidyamāna*, and so the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*) of the property *hetutva* is one and the same thing, such as a *vidyamāna*. Therefore the accusative *vidyamānaṃ* and the instrumental *hetutvena* refer to one and the same substratum, such as something [already] existing. Thus the instrumental *hetutvena* can function predicatively.<sup>15</sup> Abhijñānaśākuntala 2.18<sup>cd</sup> runs: *parihāsajalpitaṃ sakhe paramārthena na grhyatāṃ vacaḥ*.<sup>16</sup> Kāle's translation is: O friend, let not (my) words, uttered in jest, be taken in earnest (as of true import).<sup>17</sup> It is also possible to put it into: O friend, let my words, uttered for a joke, not be taken for the ultimate meaning.<sup>18</sup> Here the ultimate meaning (*paramārtha*) in which the quality of being the ultimate meaning (*paramārthatva*) of a *vacas* is ascribed corresponds to Type B. The appellation *paramārtha* belonging to a *paramārtha* belongs also to a *vacas*. Thus the substratum of the appellation *paramārtha* is one and the same thing, such as a *vacas*. Therefore the nominative *vacaḥ* and the instrumental *paramārthena* refer to one and the same substratum, such as (my) words. Like *paramārthatvena*, the instrumental *paramārthena* can, therefore, function predicatively. The matted hair in the phrase *jaṭābhis tāpasah* 'an ascetic [marked as such] with the matted hair,' which is a material object recognized as appropriate to, and thus, symbolic of, the office of an ascetic, corresponds to Type C. The property *jaṭatva* belongs to the matted hair. On the other hand,

<sup>13</sup> MacDonald 2015: I 143.

<sup>14</sup> MacDonald 2015: II 59.

<sup>15</sup> The sentence *vidyamānaṃ* (A.2.3.2) *hetutvena* (A.2.3.21) *bravīṣi* is substantially equivalent to *vidyamānaṃ hetuṃ* (A.1.4.51) *bravīṣi*. A similar construction such as 'instrumental + (na) + *arthah*, *prayojanam* or the like' often occurs in the Sanskrit texts. To sum up, the instrumental laid down by A.2.3.21 can function predicatively under a given condition.

<sup>16</sup> Kāle 1969: 84.

<sup>17</sup> Kāle 1969: 85.

<sup>18</sup> Rāghavabhaṭṭa's comment is: *parihāsena vividhaṃ jalpitaṃ yatra tad vacaḥ śakuntalāyām anurāgakathanarūpaṃ paramārthena na grhyatām*.

the property *tāpasatva* belongs to an ascetic. Thus the substratum of the property *jaṭātva* is different from that of the property *tāpasatva*. Therefore the instrumental *jaṭābhis* refers to the matted hair while the nominative *tāpasah* refers to an ascetic. This instrumental form cannot function predicatively.

### 3. Candrakīrti's grammatical interpretation of *satyadvaya*

Nāgārjuna's MMK XXIV. 8 runs: *dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmaśānanā, lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ*.<sup>19</sup> May translates this verse as: Les Buddha enseignent la loi sur la base de deux vérités: la vérité mondaine de surface et la vérité absolue.<sup>20</sup>

#### 3.1. *Lokasaṃvṛtisatya*

Candrakīrti analyses *lokasaṃvṛtisatya*- as follows: *loke saṃvṛtir lokasaṃvṛtiḥ ... lokasaṃvṛtyā satyam lokasaṃvṛtisatyam*.<sup>21</sup> According to Patañjali, A.2.1.4: *saha supā* is split into two rules, i.e. A.2.1.4<sup>a</sup>: *saha (samārthena 1, sup 2)* and A.2.1.4<sup>b</sup>: *supā (saha 4<sup>a</sup>, sup 2)*. In addition, A.2.1.4<sup>b</sup> is not only an *adhikāra* (heading) but also a *lakṣaṇa* (prescriptive rule).<sup>22</sup> Therefore, in the present case, A.2.1.4<sup>b</sup> is applicable in order to form a compound. *loke* 'in the world' and *saṃvṛtiḥ* 'the convention' combine by A.2.1.4<sup>b</sup>, and form the compound *lokasaṃvṛtiḥ* 'the convention in the world.' *lokasaṃvṛtyā* 'the convention in the world' and *satyam* 'the truth' combine according to A.2.1.4<sup>b</sup>, and form the compound *lokasaṃvṛtisatyam* 'the truth as the convention in the world.' The instrumental *lokasaṃvṛtyā* refers, in my opinion, not to a *karaṇa* in the form of a standard of judgement but to a *lakṣaṇa* in the form of an epithet of the truth.

#### 3.2. *Paramārthasatya*

With regard to MMK XXIV.8<sup>d</sup>: *satyam ca paramārthataḥ*, I do not know Nāgārjuna's opinion about the way in which *paramārthataḥ* is construed with

<sup>19</sup> De la Vallée Poussin 1992: 492.

<sup>20</sup> May 1959: 225.

<sup>21</sup> De la Vallée Poussin 1992: 493.

<sup>22</sup> Mahābhāṣya II: 358<sup>b</sup>: *adhikāraś ca lakṣaṇam ca. yasya samāsasyānyalakṣaṇam nāstīdam*

*satyaṃ*. But Candrakīrti paraphrases this part by the phrase *paramārthasatyaṃ ca*.<sup>23</sup> His analysis of *paramārthasatya-* is: *paramaś cāsāv arthaś ceti paramārthaḥ. tad eva satyaṃ paramārthasatyaṃ*.<sup>24</sup> *paramaḥ* ‘that which is ultimate,’ i.e. this very term and *arthaḥ* ‘the meaning’ combine by A.2.1.57: *viśeṣaṇam* (sup 2) *viśeṣyeṇa* (*samānādhikaraṇena* 49) (*saha* 4) *bahulam*, and form the karmadhāraya *paramārthaḥ* ‘the meaning which is ultimate, i.e. the ultimate meaning.’ This very term and *satyaṃ* ‘the truth’ combine according to A.2.1.57, and form *paramārthasatyaṃ* ‘the truth which is the ultimate meaning, i.e. the truth as the ultimate meaning.’ Judging from his paraphrase of *satyaṃ paramārthataḥ* by *paramārthasatyaṃ* and his analysis of *paramārthasatyaṃ* into *tad eva satyaṃ*, it is natural to think as follows: The indeclinable *paramārthataḥ* functions predicatively, in other words, refers to a *lakṣaṇa* in the form of an epithet of the truth.

### 3.3. The term *lakṣaṇa*

In the *Prasannapadā*, the term *lakṣaṇa* occurs often. For example<sup>25</sup>, *saṃvṛti-paramārthalakṣaṇasatyadvayasya* ‘two truths having as their mark the convention and the ultimate meaning respectively,’ *paramārthalakṣaṇām śūnyatām* ‘the emptiness whose mark is the ultimate meaning’ and *ayaṃ śūnyatālakṣaṇo dharmah* ‘this law the mark of which is the emptiness.’ From these we can say as follows: The convention is the epithet of one truth while the ultimate meaning is that of the other; the ultimate meaning is the epithet of the emptiness; the emptiness is the epithet of this law.

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*tasya lakṣaṇam bhaviṣyati.*

<sup>23</sup> De la Vallée Poussin 1992: 492.

<sup>24</sup> De la Vallée Poussin 1992: 494.

<sup>25</sup> De la Vallée Poussin 1992: 494, 495, 498.

#### 4. Conclusion

##### 4.1. *Paramārthataḥ* equivalent to both *paramārthena* and *paramārthāt*

Vt.1 on A.5.4.44 runs as follows: *tasiprakaraṇa ādyādibhya upasaṃkhyānaṃ*.<sup>26</sup> Because the group beginning with *ādi-* is a type listing (*ākṛtigaṇa*),<sup>27</sup> *paramārtha-* is included in an *ādyādigaṇa*. In the present case, the wording *ādyādibhyaḥ* occurs in A.5.4.46: *atigrahāvyathanakṣepeṣv akartari tṛtīyāyāḥ*, and turns into a new rule, i.e. A.5.4.46<sup>a</sup>: (*akartari tṛtīyāyāḥ* 46) *ādyādibhyaḥ* (*tasīḥ* 44, *anyatarasyām* 42) and A.5.4.46<sup>b</sup>: *atigrahāvyathanakṣepeṣu* (*akartari tṛtīyāyāḥ* 46<sup>a</sup>, *tasīḥ* 44, *anyatarasyām* 42). Therefore *paramārthataḥ* corresponds by A.5.4.46<sup>a</sup> to *paramārthena* (A.2.3.18). If we resort to the division of a rule (*yogavibhāga*), A.5.4.46 can be split into two rules, i.e. A.5.4.46<sup>c</sup>: *akartari tṛtīyāyāḥ* (*tasīḥ* 44, *anyatarasyām* 42) and A.5.4.46<sup>d</sup>: *atigrahāvyathanakṣepeṣu* (*akartari tṛtīyāyāḥ* 46<sup>b</sup>, *tasīḥ* 44, *anyatarasyām* 42). Therefore *paramārthataḥ* corresponds by A.5.4.46<sup>c</sup> to *paramārthena* (A.2.3.18). On the other hand, *paramārthataḥ* corresponds also to *paramārthāt* (A.2.3.28) by A.5.4.45: *apādāne ca* (*pañcamyās* *tasīḥ* 44, *anyatarasyām* 42) *ahīyaruhoḥ*. Whether the taddhita suffix *-tas* corresponds to the third case ending which refers to a *karaṇa* in the form of a standard of judgement or to the fifth case ending which refers to an *apādāna* in the form of a standard of judgement, the indeclinable *paramārthataḥ* denotes a standard of judgement, such as the point of view. Therefore MMK XXIV.8<sup>cd</sup>: *lokasaṃvṛtisatyam* [= *lokasaṃvṛtyā satyam*] *ca satyam* *ca paramārthataḥ* [= *paramārthena/paramārthāt*] means, e.g. ‘the truth according to the convention in the world and the truth from the point of view of the ultimate meaning.’ This is, in my opinion, untenable because of Candrakīrti’s analysis of *paramārthasatya-* mentioned in 3.2 and of his wording *saṃvṛtiparamārthalakṣaṇasatyadvayasya* mentioned in 3.3.

##### 4.2. *Paramārthataḥ* equivalent to *paramārthena*, not to *paramārthāt*

When *-tas* corresponds, by A.5.4.46<sup>a</sup> or A.5.4.46<sup>c</sup>, to the third case ending which refers to a *lakṣaṇa*, *paramārthataḥ* can function predicatively. In other

<sup>26</sup> Mahābhāṣya IV: 414<sup>a</sup>. *-Tas* according to vt. 1 on A.5.4.44 is sometimes designated as *sārvavibhaktika* (corresponding to all the case endings). See, among others, Bṛhacchabdenduśekhara II: 1542.

<sup>27</sup> Cardona 1997: par. 204 and par. 210.

words, *paramārthataḥ* is equivalent to *paramārthena* (A.2.3.21), which is the so-called predicative instrumental. Therefore 8<sup>cd</sup> means ‘the truth as the convention in the world and the truth as the ultimate meaning.’ If one asserts that because *-tas* usually corresponds to the fifth case ending it is the so-called predicative ablative, his assertion is untenable, for this means that the ablative *paramārthāt* as well as *paramārthataḥ* can function predicatively. But I think that so far such an ablative has not been attested. By which rule can an ablative such as *paramārthāt* function predicatively? The so-called predicative ablative is, in fact, a predicative instrumental. This is proved by the fact that *-tas* is a svārthika suffix.<sup>28</sup>

#### 4.3. Tanji’s translation

Tanji translates MMK XXIV. 8 as follows: The teachings of the law by the Buddhas are based on two truths, the truth which is the convention in the world and the truth as the ultimate meaning (諸仏の法の説示は二諦に依っている。世間世俗諦と勝義としての諦とである).<sup>29</sup> His translation of the phrase *lokasaṃvṛtyā satyaṃ lokasaṃvṛtisatyam* is: The truth which is the convention in the world is the truth as the convention in the world (世間世俗諦は世間世俗としての諦である).<sup>30</sup> I agree with, among others, Tanji that Candrakīrti considers both of *saṃvṛtyā* and *paramārthataḥ* to be the so-called predicative instrumental which refers to a lakṣaṇa.

#### References and abbreviations

A.: Aṣṭādhyāyī.

Amara: Amarakoṣa. Ed. Ś. Dādhimatha, *Nāmalingānuśāsana alias Amarakoṣa of Amarasimha with the commentary Vyākhyāsudhā or Rāmāśramī of Bhānuji Dīkṣita*. Revised by Pt. Vāsudeva Lakṣmaṇa Paṇasīkara. Reprinted from 1915 edition of Ninaya Sagar Press. Delhi 1984.

<sup>28</sup> Mahābhāṣya III: 162<sup>b</sup> on A.3.2.4: “*anirdiṣṭārthāś ca pratyayāḥ svārthe bhavanti*” *ti*.

<sup>29</sup> Tanji 2006: II 115.

<sup>30</sup> Tanji 2006: II 116.

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- vt.: Kātyāyana's vārttika.





# Kucha's Pictorial Programmes: The Example of Kizil Cave 175 (Temptation Cave)

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Unlike the countless reliefs, whose position within the context of a sanctuary can rarely be determined, painted temples provide us with an insight into the placement of individual scenes in the interior and their position in relation to the neighbouring or facing images. Both the caves in Ajanta, India, and in Kucha, Central Asia, reveal well thought-out pictorial programmes. Examples of compositional symmetry—be it due to purely formal similarities or because the topics illustrated were connected by content or underlying meaning—show that the painters coordinated all components of the decoration to create the pictorial programme of the entire temple. These observations inspired attempts to explain the cave decoration as a programme that encompasses the entirety of paintings and is closely related to the architecture of the respective cave. The latter is decisive; it determines the selection of themes depicted and thus the entire programme. This, however, also results in an inherent danger of seeing a soteriological significance in the classification of paintings even in cases when it may just be the rooted in the given architecture.

Determining the pictorial programmes is difficult for many reasons. Numerous paintings have been destroyed or detached; the original locations of fragments housed in museums have to be established before any programme can be identified, and only comparative analysis of many caves will reveal the regularities of the depictions and thus their possible significance. The identification of these programmes in the caves of Kizil and its neighbouring sites is, however, one of the most important tasks of the long-term project “Buddhist Murals of Kucha on the Northern Silk Road” at the Saxon Academy of Sciences and Humanities in Leipzig. I would like to dedicate this essay, the result of painstaking labour by the entire team, to Eli Franco, the Project Director, as gratitude for his enduring support and first of all as a token of our decades-long friendship.

What this essay will try to show is that the choice of topics depicted as well as the organisation of the paintings is guided by principles of symmetry in the interiors, in relation to the existing architecture.

What is already generally known about the Kucha paintings—which are mostly of narrative character—is the following: The most common type of painted cave at Kucha is the so-called “central pillar cave.” The walls of their main chamber show the Buddha’s sermons in square images, while the scenes in the vaulted ceilings—mostly sermons represented only by their main elements in a “telegraphic style,” more rarely *jātakas*—are embedded in a highly stylised landscape: the narrative contents appear in the lozenges imitating the mountains. The mountains on vaults merge into the mountain landscape in the lunette of the rear wall, where the visit of Indra and the *vīṇā*-playing *gandharva* Pañcaśikha are shown around the sculpture of the Buddha placed in the main cult-niche. The corridors at the back of the caves contain scenes from the *parinirvāṇa* narrative cycle and the lunette above the exit door depicts the Bodhisatva Maitreya. Additional space for even more narrative content is provided by narrow strips below the sermon scenes on the walls, where *jātakas* can be shown.

Non-narrative content also has its place within the pictorial programmes: below the vaults, deities are placed on balconies. These seem to observe and comment the events in the square sermon scenes below—the inhabitants of heaven are present in the cave. Images of “real” (i.e. contemporary) donors and monks—sometimes labelled with inscriptions—are located either on the walls of the corridors, always facing the main room, or on the front wall on either side of the entrance. However, this position can also be occupied by non-human guards—*yakṣas* and *nāgas*.

As we can see, an organization of the space is there, but the artists and those who commissioned them were able to include variations, so that it actually seems questionable whether we can speak of a “typical” programme. Variations are not at all uncommon, and they in turn repeat themselves; it appears thus that other programmes, perhaps used parallel to “the typical,” also existed. Instead of Maitreya, the defeat of Māra appears, Indra’s visit is sometimes replaced by the scene with the young Brahmin ascetic standing on one leg in front of the Buddha (Buddha Puṣya, *vide infra*). Below the sermon

scenes on the side walls, *jātakas* can appear or images of the seascape (Zin 2019a) while the *parinirvāṇa* events can be reduced or even omitted.<sup>1</sup>

Based on our current knowledge it is impossible to determine whether the deviations in the programme indicate a change in meaning. For example, how do we explain the replacement of Maitreya (of Brahmin caste) in the lunette above the door by a scene showing a Brahmin ascetic, presumably Bāvāri with his disciples, one of whom is called Ajita (as Maitreya is also called),<sup>2</sup> or by the attempt of the Kāśyapas—Brahmin ascetics—to extinguish the burning hut of the Buddha.<sup>3</sup> While such questions remain unanswered, it can be said with certainty that the sermon scenes in which the demons worship the Buddha were placed opposite each other intentionally—perhaps indicating their interchangeability?—as such scenes occur frequently and are consistently placed like that (Zin 2023, 3.10–3.15).

When fundamental innovations appear in the caves' programmes—such as the standing Buddhas on all walls (Konczak-Nagel 2022), or *jātakas* as large-scale scenes in the side corridors<sup>4</sup>—these are often described as late deviations. This may be true for some of the topics depicted but to relate such deviations to chronological development presupposes that the caves decorated following the “typical plan” are the earliest among the “central pillar caves” and that the model was repeated exclusively for some time. Whether this premise can be upheld in view of the many deviations we are facing, remains questionable until much refined dating methods can help to confirm or reject it. For the time being, it therefore seems reasonable only to document the deviating programmes, since attempts to interpret them remain just as uncertain as those of the “typical” programmes.

The question arises, what is actually “typical” about the programmes or whether the deviations do not actually outweigh the typological parallels and make each cave unique.

<sup>1</sup> Scenes from the *parinirvāṇa* cycle (Zin 2020) can be traced in ca. 100 of the Kucha caves; this includes representations positioned in places other than the corridors in the back parts of the caves.

<sup>2</sup> This is the case in Kizil Cave 114, illus. *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 2, pl. 121; Zin 2023, drawing 16.

<sup>3</sup> Kizil, Cave 101, illus. Zin 2023, drawing 426.

<sup>4</sup> For example in Kizil Caves 198 and 199, Kizilgaha Caves 13, 14, 16, 30 or in Simsim Cave 1.

Certainly “typical for Kucha” is the strict symmetry of representations in the interior of the caves. This symmetry also applies, for example, to images in the *parinirvāṇa* cycle: the composition of the paintings on the outer walls of the side corridors is a mirror image, although a visitor to the cave never sees both sets of paintings simultaneously.<sup>5</sup> It has to be mentioned that events shown on both sides of the reclining Buddha happened prior to his death: those on the left side took place three months earlier, those on the right side one day before his death, i.e. the order of scenes was not determined by the *pradakṣiṇa* walk of the visitor.<sup>6</sup>

The sermon scenes on the side-walls of the main chamber are also composed inversely.<sup>7</sup> Opposite each other, for example, appear scenes in which the Buddha sits in the “European” way, with both feet on the floor. Such scenes often form the start of the registers of images, next to the front wall. This is the case in Kizil Cave 100, among others; in this cave the sermon scenes alternately show the Buddha sitting under the tree and in a building—an arrangement mirrored on the other side wall. The stories depicted and their placements are thus governed by formal compositional reasons. At present, it seems impossible to clarify what this symmetry meant. Researchers must first become aware of them and realize that, for example, the two Vajrapāṇis on the sides of the landscapes on the main wall of the caves (compare our Fig. 3a, 3b, 3c) may be of a purely compositional nature and do not necessarily require further interpretation. The entire decoration of the caves is thus organised according to architectural forms, if not more than that: it results from them.

<sup>5</sup> The best—but only one of many—example is Kizil Cave 4, compare Zin 2020, pp. 129–135.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Zin 2020, pp. 36–53.

<sup>7</sup> This phenomenon has already been observed by Grünwedel (1920, pp. II 19–25) in his analysis of Kizil Cave 207: the nine sermon scenes on each side wall are mirror images of each other in both content and composition. Opposite each other are scenes in which Vajrapāṇi forces the submission of a recalcitrant candidate for conversion with a glowing *vajra* (cf. Hiyama 2016, pp. 107–118). Scenes placed in the middle of the left wall and in the middle of the right wall depict the content of the Buddha’s sermon with Sumeru in the lower part of the images; the sermons concern the origination of the world and the dissolution of the world at the end of a *kalpa*, cf. Hiyama 2016, pp. 122–126, 135–138.

As far as the meaning of the programmes is concerned, I would like to mention here only one interpretation of several proposed that seem to me personally the most obvious and thus the most probable. Rajeshwari Ghose (2004) explains the programme of the “central pillar caves” as a well-planned spiritual experiential route for the visitor. It leads from the earthly deeds of the Buddha in the previous births and the conversions of different beings in his last existence, to the experience of the *parinirvāṇa* cycle, which after leaving the back corridors culminates in the meeting with Maitreya above the exit door—a truly spiritual experience of the believer. This interpretation, however, must be expanded in future research by exploring the significance of the abovementioned symmetry. As the latest analyses have shown (Zin 2023), it is also significant that an unexpectedly large portion of the paintings shows demonic beings, the images of which, to all appearances, were not of soteriological but rather of apotropaic importance.

But let us try to analyse a programme of one cave. I have chosen the interesting Cave 175 in Kizil which is similar in many ways to a “typical” one, but different in some others.<sup>8</sup> As a matter of fact it appears to me a real definition of a “typical cave” in Kucha. The pictorial programme of this cave, i.e. of the main chamber and the rear corridors since the antechamber is destroyed as in nearly all caves, can be reconstructed almost completely; it reveals the interdependence of image programme and architectural structure much clearer than the programmes of other caves.

Many fragments of the murals from Kizil 175 have been detached and are today in Berlin and in St. Petersburg. Several fragments taken to Berlin were destroyed in the Second World War and are known today only from historical photographs.

Cave 175 in Kizil (**Fig. 1**),<sup>9</sup> bears the German name “Versuchungshöhle” (Temptation Cave). The designation goes back to the depiction of the

<sup>8</sup> Descriptions of the cave were previously given in *Kezi'er shiku neirong zonglu* 2000, pp. 195–197 and by Teiser 2006, pp. 249–252; Howard in: Howard/Vignato 2015, pp. 147–150; description and reconstructions of the detached fragments in Zhao *et al.*, 2021, pp. 392–418.

<sup>9</sup> **Fig. 1:** Fragment of a historical photograph in the archives of the Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Berlin, no. B 1268; photograph © Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, CC BY-NC-SA.

defeat of Māra (**Fig. 2**)<sup>10</sup> in the lunette above the door. This placement apparently seemed so strange to Grünwedel that it became eponymous. The recent comparative survey of Kucha caves (Zin 2023, 3.5) shows, however, that representation of the *Māravijaya* above the door is not unique and is encountered in four other caves (Kizil Caves 8, 98, 178 and Simsim Cave 44). Since there are no more than 14 known representations of the *Māravijaya* in Kucha, and the placement of the remaining nine does not seem to follow a general rule, the placement above the doors is actually rather typical.

A typical element of the programme in the caves is the depiction of the visit of Indra and the musician Pañcaśikha to the Buddha meditating in a cave; it is placed on the main wall of the cave above the main cult niche (**Fig. 3a, 3b, 3c**).<sup>11</sup> As in most cases—though by no means all—these depictions in the lunette, it is set in a magical landscape, inhabited by animals, Brahmanical ascetics and two Vajrapāṇis, to which pairs of music-making deities fly down from above. The landscape is so crowded that the main actors of the scene, Indra and Pañcaśikha, had to be depicted in the reveals of the niche. The presence of a Bodhisatva in this abundant landscape has hitherto remained unnoticed,<sup>12</sup> although he takes the centre of the whole composition. This is probably Maitreya<sup>13</sup> who is not shown anywhere else in the cave. It is remarkable how dominant the standing Bodhisatva was among

<sup>10</sup> **Fig. 2:** Kizil, Cave 175, detached, today in Berlin; Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8878, illus. among others in Härtel/Yaldiz 1982, no. 33, p. 99; Ding 2015, pp. 90–91; Zhao *et al.*, 2021, p. 406; Zin 2023, fig. 115 and drawing 265. This and other drawings in the paper in hand © Monika Zin, CC BY-NC-SA.

<sup>11</sup> **Fig. 3a:** Kizil, Cave 175, main chamber, lunette above the rear wall, *in situ*; illus. *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 3, pls. 14–18, 20; *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 2, pp. 221, 223–225, pls. 196, 198–200; Zhao *et al.*, 2021, pp. 394–396; Zin 2023, drawing 274; **Fig. 3b:** niche in the rear wall, left reveal, *in situ*; illus. Zin 2023, drawing 275; **Fig. 3c:** niche in the rear wall, right reveal, *in situ*; illus. *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 2, p. 222, pl. 197; Zin 2023, drawing 276.

<sup>12</sup> Unlike the head nimbus, a mandorla in Kucha is used exclusively to represent fully enlightened Buddhas and great Bodhisatvas.

<sup>13</sup> In Kizil Cave 178 (a cave where the *Māravijaya* is placed above the entrance, like in our Cave 175), above the cult niche on the main wall there is a smaller niche with a mandorla on its rear wall that is suitable for a standing person (illus. Zhao *et al.*, 2021, pp. 429–430)—very probably for Maitreya. A Bodhisatva (Maitreya) together

the paintings (Fig. 1), especially in the landscape on the rear wall, while Indra and Pañcaśikha, being depicted in the reveal of the niche, are not visible.

A particularity of Cave 175 are the images in the lunettes of the rear aisle: the left lunette shows the four encounters of the Bodhisatva (Fig. 4),<sup>14</sup> where he sees an old man, a sick man, a dead man and a monk. The right lunette (Fig. 5)<sup>15</sup> shows the birth of the future Buddha, his first bath and the first seven steps. It seems strange that these topics are represented here, in the “*parinirvāṇa* space,” at all—and in reverse since in accordance with the principle of *pradakṣiṇa*, the birth should be depicted in the left lunette and the encounters in the right. The “*parinirvāṇa* space” (Zin 2020, pp. 198–202)—contains on the back wall of the rear corridor the Buddha entering the *parinirvāṇa*, and on the opposing wall the cremation of the coffin with the Buddha's body in the upper part (Fig. 6)<sup>16</sup> and the division of the relics below.<sup>17</sup> Let us try to imagine the situation: In the narrow back passage the visitor finds himself between the Buddha on his deathbed, cremation and division of the holy relics while at the same time seeing both the physical and the spiritual birth of the Master—can this be without reason? Rather not.

Scenes from the birth and *abhinīṣkramaṇa* cycles in the area of the *parinirvāṇa* events are no unique feature of Kizil 175. Similar depictions

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with Indra's visit appears also on the main wall in Kizil Cave 58 (illus. Zhao *et al.*, 2021, p. 150, Zin 2023, drawing 270); here the Bodhisatva is shown below, and Indra's visit above in the lunette.

<sup>14</sup> Fig. 4: Kizil, Cave 175, rear corridor, lunette above the left side wall, illus. *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 3, pl. 35.

<sup>15</sup> Fig. 5: Kizil, Cave 175, rear corridor, lunette above the right sidewall, illus. Tan/An 1981, vol. 1, pl. 98; *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 3, pl. 36; *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China: Kucha* 2008, p. 123, pl. 108; *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 2, p. 240, pl. 203.

<sup>16</sup> Fig. 6: rear corridor, inner wall, upper part; illus. Zin 2020, drawing 38.

<sup>17</sup> Illus. Zhao *et al.*, 2021, pp. 417–418 including fragments brought to Berlin and hosted today in the Museum für Asiatische Kunst (no. III 8857b) and in the Hermitage (no. IB 8857a; ВДсз 906).



appear in Cave 99<sup>18</sup> as well as in Cave 14 in Taitai'er.<sup>19</sup> Is the combination of *parinirvāṇa* episodes with those from the birth and *abhiniṣkramaṇa* cycles an elaborate thought-construction? The art of South Asia provides several comparable examples: the leaving of Kapilavastu—the spiritual birth, the prelude to the quest for enlightenment and all that it entailed—can be depicted in Andhra art as the main event in the Buddha's life (also his visual sign of the events, the prince's turban that the gods took to heaven),<sup>20</sup> so we may surmise—taking the risk of over-interpretation in the process—that the three events, birth, leaving the house and *parinirvāṇa*, were not combined unintentionally in Kucha either.

The rendition of episodes from the Buddha legend in the rear part of the cave, however, does not end with the birth and the four encounters in the lunettes of the rear corridor. The outer walls of the side corridors each have three niches for seated Buddha statues; the two closest to the main chamber were considered the centres of the four narrative representations.<sup>21</sup> The first

<sup>18</sup> On the sides of the *parinirvāṇa* cycle in the rear chamber (which includes in this case the reclining Buddha on the rear wall, the episode with the stone of the Mallas and probably also the episode with the river in Vaiśālī; cf. Zin 2020, pp. 174–175), scenes from the life of the Buddha are depicted on the outer walls of the side corridors. In the left corridor is birth cycle: birth, seven steps and first bath (illus. Tan/An 1981, vol. 1, pl. 197; Wang forthcoming, Pictures 3 and 4, drawings). In the right corridor is the *abhiniṣkramaṇa* cycle with sleeping women and the Bodhisatva leaving Kapilavastu on horseback (see Wang forthcoming, Pictures 24 and 25, drawings).

<sup>19</sup> Zin 2020, pp. 313–314. Depictions of the *parinirvāṇa* cycle there include cremation of the coffin, the arrival of the knights to seize their share of the relics and the division of the relics; the last scene is not preserved. On the sides the paintings show the first bath of the new-born Bodhisatva and the changing of cloth with the hunter, i.e. an episode which took place immediately after leaving of Kapilavastu.

<sup>20</sup> Compare the relief from Amaravati in The British Museum, no. 1880,0709.7, illus. Knox 1992, p. 59, no. 11; further examples in Zin 2019b.

<sup>21</sup> The corridors are visually separated from the main chamber and the rear corridor by strong horseshoe-shaped “door frames” decorated with ornaments, thus gaining the character of separate rooms; this is enhanced by *ovolo*-shaped cornices (illus. Zhao *et al.*, 2021, pp. 408–410), which only occur in three other caves in Kizil: 101, 104 and 198. These cornices separate the paintings on the walls from the vaults covered with highly stylised “mountains” in the form of geometric lozenges.

niche in the left corridor is surrounded by the subduing of the fire serpent. The serpent itself, beset with blue clouds, is shown on the right reveal of the niche (**Fig. 7**),<sup>22</sup> while below there is a lotus pond from which the Kāśyapa ascetics draw water that is poured on the burning hut (**Fig. 8**).<sup>23</sup>

A very similar lotus pond is also depicted below the niche further to the right (**Fig. 9**),<sup>24</sup> and here too the niche is framed to indicate that the Buddha is sitting in some kind of dwelling. Only a fragment of the painting has survived to the viewer's right of the niche. In front sits a monk pouring something from a bottle onto his leg. The similarity of this depiction with a picture in Kizil Cave 110 (Treppenhöhle, Staircase Cave),<sup>25</sup> which shows the ordination of Puṣkarasārin, suggests that the same scene is depicted here. In the Staircase Cave the Buddha is shown in the hut of a potter.

The niches in the outer wall in the right corridor in Kizil 175 are stylised representations of caves and both show stories of the/a Buddha staying in a cave. The left niche (**Fig. 10**)<sup>26</sup> shows Devadatta's attempt to kill the Buddha with a huge stone which was caught by the *yakṣa* of the mountain, named Kumbhīra. The *yakṣa* below is part of the scene surrounding the right niche (**Fig. 11**).<sup>27</sup> It deals with a Buddha of a previous age, named Puṣya. A young

<sup>22</sup> **Fig. 7:** left corridor, outer wall, 1<sup>st</sup> niche, right reveal; illus. Zhao *et al.*, 2021, pp. 408–410.

<sup>23</sup> **Fig. 8:** left corridor, outer wall, 1<sup>st</sup> niche, detached fragment from the left of the niche is housed in Berlin, Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 9201 (illus. historical photograph in the Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. B 21; *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 2, p. 243, pl. 216; Ding 2015, p. 92); the fragment to the right of the niche was also taken to Berlin (no. IB 9200, cf. Dreyer/Sander/Weis 2002, p. 203) and is housed today in St. Petersburg, Hermitage, no. ВДсэ 902; the part underneath the niche is still *in situ* (illus. *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 2, pl. 33); illus. with reconstruction Zhao *et al.*, 2021, pp. 411–412.

<sup>24</sup> **Fig. 9:** left corridor, outer wall, 2<sup>nd</sup> niche, *in situ*.

<sup>25</sup> Kizil, Cave 110, Wang, Picture 57; for the narrative cf. Ren 2009, pp. 70–73.

<sup>26</sup> **Fig. 10:** right corridor, outer wall, 2<sup>nd</sup> niche, *in situ*, illus. Tan/An 1981, vol. 2, pl. 95; *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 3, pls. 23–24; *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 2, pp. 241–242, pls. 214–215; Zin 2006, fig. 1.6 (drawing); Zin 2023, drawing 311.

<sup>27</sup> **Fig. 11:** right corridor, outer wall, 1<sup>st</sup> niche from the main chamber, left side *in situ* (illus. see fn. above); the detached fragment from the right side has been taken to Berlin (no. IB 8853, cf. Dreyer/Sander/Weis 2002, p. 173) and is today housed

Brahmin (the Buddha Śākyamuni in a previous birth) meditated standing on one leg and chanting pious hymns at the entrance to the cave where Puṣya sat until Puṣya gave him prophecy of his future Buddhahood. An evil *yakṣa* wanted to disturb the Brahmin's meditation—he is shown at the other side of the cave as he plugs his ears to avoid hearing the pious songs.

Angela Howard (Howard/Vignato 2015, p. 148) has claimed that the paintings in the corridors focus on narratives from the life of the Buddha. Except one scene, this holds true; however, when it comes to the reasoning behind the choice of subjects for the programme, the stories to be represented seem to have been selected solely because they dealt with the Buddha sitting in a particular dwelling or a cave. It should be re-emphasised that three of the four illustrations depicted the Buddha Śākyamuni, while the fourth depicted Buddha Puṣya.

There are more depictions in the side corridors, in addition to the paintings around the niches. An only fragmentarily preserved frieze runs immediately above the floor, and there are paintings in the reveals of the niches. What is surprising about the latter is that mythological images and the worshipping monks and donors are shown here side by side. In reveals on one niche, monks with *uṣṇīṣas* and large flames appearing from their shoulders were shown—they belong to “holy time of the Buddha”<sup>28</sup>—while in other niches donor figures are shown in the same place.<sup>29</sup> In one reveal we see Vajrapāṇi and a diminutive donor monk with an incense burner next to him (Fig. 12).<sup>30</sup>

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in St. Petersburg (Hermitage, no. BДсэ 693); illus. Le Coq/Waldschmidt 1933, pl. 16a; Deshpande (ed.) 2008, p. 437; reconstruction Zhao *et al.*, 2021, pp. 415–416; Zin 2023, drawing 302.

<sup>28</sup> Both fragments with the monks have been taken to Berlin. According to the reconstruction by the Zhao Li, the left monk (the fragment was destroyed during the war and only the photograph in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. B 21a exists) was originally located in the left reveal on the 2<sup>nd</sup> niche in the left corridor (i.e. narrative of Puṣkarasārin), and the other monk (fragment IB 8855, cf. Dreyer/Sander/Weis 2002, p. 173, hosted today in St. Petersburg, Hermitage, no. BДсэ 907) in the right reveal; illus. Zhao *et al.*, 2021, pp. 413–414

<sup>29</sup> Visible in Zhao *et al.*, 2021, p. 415.

<sup>30</sup> **Fig. 12:** left reveal of the third niche in the right corridor, *in situ*.

As for the main chamber of the cave, much here is in accordance with the “typical” model. Only a tiny fragment of the median strip is preserved near the front wall. A white snake (in a cloud?) and two flying white geese can be identified, all on a blue background. The haunches of the vaults<sup>31</sup> are covered in the usual manner with lozenges containing sermon scenes in the “telegraphic style” while the lowest row of triangles shows *jātakas*—the model repeated in most vaulted caves. The narratives depicted contain usual pictures like the subjugation of the elephant or the conversion of Aṅgulimāla. But there is also one really remarkable one (**Fig. 13**):<sup>32</sup> The Buddha sits in a device with wheels. Such devices are shown in Kucha a few more times in representations presenting different kinds of enlightened persons on their way towards the city of *nirvāṇa* (Konczak-Nagel 2020, pp. 49–55). The device with a monk sitting inside it is apparently a *yāna* by means of which the *saṃsāra* can be crossed.

The paintings from the front and side walls of the main chamber of our cave were all brought to Berlin,<sup>33</sup> where they are unfortunately only partially preserved. The majority, particularly the sermon scenes from the side walls, were lost in the Second World War. Black-and-white photographs of the upper part of left wall, taken while the paintings were still *in situ*, do exist (**Figs. 14**,<sup>34</sup> and **Fig. 15**).<sup>35</sup> Photographs taken after the arrival of

<sup>31</sup> Illus. *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 3, pls. 19–22; *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 2, pp. 226–233, pls. 201–207. The shape of the lozenges as such is, however, a rarer one; in Kizil it occurs only in Cave 69. It can be observed that the lozenges of the vault and the lozenges of the landscape on the lunette of the rear wall are different. We are obviously dealing with works from different workshops or even from different time periods.

<sup>32</sup> **Fig. 13**: barrel vault, right side, illus. *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 2, p. 226, pl. 201.

<sup>33</sup> IB 9174 and IB 9175, cf. Dreyer/Sander/Weis 2002, p. 198, illustrated (see next Figs. 14–16).

<sup>34</sup> **Fig. 14**: left side wall, upper left part, historical photograph in the archives of the Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. B 543; photograph © Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin.

<sup>35</sup> **Fig. 15**: left side wall, upper right part, historical photograph in the archives of the Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. B 544; photograph © Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin.

the fragments in Berlin (**Fig. 16**),<sup>36</sup> show them assembled incorrectly, mixing parts from the left and right walls.<sup>37</sup>

There were eight scenes in two rows on each side wall. The photographs of the left side wall (Figs. 14 and 15) reveal that the sermon scenes, at least those in the upper row, were arranged in chronological order. The first scene, i.e. adjacent to the front wall, was already severely damaged at the time of the German expeditions. In its lower right corner, however, the booted foot of a person is clearly visible. A comparison with other depictions<sup>38</sup> gives good reason to assume that this is the food offering of Trapuṣa and Bhallika. In all probability, the picture also included the Four Great Kings gifting the bowls. In the upper row of the scene are deities playing music.

The next picture to the right shows the first sermon (**Fig. 17**).<sup>39</sup> Five monks are present, but also Vajrapāṇi, Indra, Brahma and deities, who differ from the previous and subsequent scenes in that they are not playing music but display gestures of admiration or commenting. Below the Buddha's throne, the wheel of *dharma* is shown between two opposite antelopes, or rather deer. The wheel stands on a kind of knot which in turn is placed on a pedestal no longer recognisable and has an omega-shaped sign at the top. The wheel thus is part of the *nandyāvarta* in its shape typical of Kucha. The Buddha's right hand hovers immediately above the wheel; this gesture was adapted from Gandhara where the hand actually touches the wheel, i.e. sets it in motion. The Buddha's left hand is in front of his chest.

<sup>36</sup> **Fig. 16:** fragments from left and right sidewalls, historical photograph in the archives of the Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. C 8; photograph © Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin.

<sup>37</sup> The two scenes from the left are fragments belonging to the second and third scenes of the left wall (compare Figs. 14 and 15).

<sup>38</sup> Compare depiction in Kizil Cave 110, *in situ*; Tan/An 1981, vol. 2, pl. 7; *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 2, pl. 116; further examples of depictions of this scene in Wang forthcoming, Picture 37.

<sup>39</sup> **Fig. 17:** left side wall, upper register, 2<sup>nd</sup> scene, Berlin, no. IB 9175, lost due to war, compare Fig. 14. A fragment documented on a historical photograph in the Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. C 217b, includes the musician from the scene to the left and persons from the first sermon to the viewer's left of the Buddha, St. Petersburg, Hermitage, no. ВДсэ 704.

The sermon scene further to the right (**Fig. 18**)<sup>40</sup> shows the Buddha's encounter with King Bimbisāra, often depicted in Kucha, which took place shortly after the first sermon. The Buddha converted the Kāśyapa ascetics and Urubilva-Kāśyapa displayed before Bimbisāra his superhuman abilities, which he had only acquired as a monk. He rose into the air, multiplied his form showing himself in the four directions, and then bowed at the Buddha's feet, watched by Bimbisāra.

The adjacent scene (**Fig. 19**)<sup>41</sup> on the right, the last in the register, connects to the previous one insofar as in this story Bimbisāra plays an essential role as a missionary. Bimbisāra taught his pen pal Udrāyaṇa about Buddha's teachings, the latter became a monk and left his city of Roruka to his wicked son. His unrighteous deeds cause the downfall of the city, which was buried by a rain of sand. The inhabitants covered by masses of sand are depicted in the corners of the painting.<sup>42</sup>

It is a great pity that the lower row of sermon scenes has not been preserved and we cannot identify their sequence.<sup>43</sup> Historical photographs show a number of heads belonging to deities but we can only say that the second scene, i.e. below the first sermon, showed Vajrapāṇi with the pointed ears of a demon and a round object in his left hand (**Fig. 20**),<sup>44</sup> which he was obviously hurling at a malefactor of the illustrated story.

As for the right sidewall of the main chamber, we know far less, as no photograph taken *in situ* is available. The photograph of the detached fragments taken to Berlin allows us to identify the visit of the Buddha to

<sup>40</sup> **Fig. 18:** left side wall, upper register, 3<sup>rd</sup> scene, Berlin, no. IB 9175, lost due to war, compare Fig. 15.

<sup>41</sup> **Fig. 19:** left side wall, upper register, 4<sup>th</sup> scene, Berlin, no. IB 9175, lost due to war, compare Fig. 15.

<sup>42</sup> The narrative (*Divyāvadāna* 37) has been recognized in Kucha paintings by Inoue 2017.

<sup>43</sup> In St. Petersburg a fragment of the scene underneath Kāśyapa and Bimbisāra is preserved (i.e. left side wall, lower register, 3<sup>rd</sup> scene, Berlin, no. IB 9175, compare Figs. 14 and 15, St. Petersburg, Hermitage, no. ВДсэ 711). Unfortunately, the fragment encompasses only the Buddha with Indra und Brahma above so nothing can be said about the narrative illustrated in this painting.

<sup>44</sup> **Fig. 20:** left side wall, lower register, 2<sup>nd</sup> scene, Berlin, no. IB 9175, lost due to war, compare Fig. 14.

Ajātaśatru on which occasion the latter fell at the Buddha's feet repenting the murder of his father Bimbisāra. (**Fig. 21**).<sup>45</sup> Unfortunately we can no longer determine whether the picture once faced the Buddha's encounter with Bimbisāra (Fig. 18).

It appears peculiar that at least in the preserved documentation no depictions with demons are accounted for. Such scenes (Zin 2023, 3.9–3.15), both of narrative character, such as conversion of Hārītī or *yakṣa* Āṭavika, and of a non-narrative nature, show the Buddha being worshipped by different classes of demonic beings. Their absence is unusual.

At least benevolent spirit-deities are present: the musicians on the lowest parts of the vault's haunches. As we have seen (Fig. 16), paintings have been wrongly reconstructed in the museum. This is true also with regard to the musicians. Those on the left side wall (**Fig. 22**),<sup>46</sup> can be reconstructed as they are visible on the photographs taken *in situ* (Figs. 14–15). The reconstruction in the museum (Fig. 16) includes only a part of the row which must have been taken from the right wall (**Fig. 23**),<sup>47</sup> the remaining pieces are fragments from the left wall (compare Fig. 22).<sup>48</sup>

The rows of divine musicians are not the only part of the non-narrative decoration of the cave. The other examples are the representations of donors and monks. Of the front wall of the cave nothing has survived the ages (compare Fig. 1) except the narrow vertical strips next to the corners, which

<sup>45</sup> **Fig. 21:** right side wall, position unknown, Berlin, no. IB 9174, lost due to war, compare Fig. 16.

<sup>46</sup> **Fig. 22:** left side wall; Berlin, no. IB 9175, lost due to war, compare Figs. 14 and 15.

<sup>47</sup> **Fig. 23:** right side wall; Berlin, no. IB 9174, lost due to war, compare Fig. 16.

<sup>48</sup> It is surprising that the ancient Indian *vīṇā* or bow harp *Pañcaśikha* is playing, is not shown. It seems that the strings of the angle harps (Fig. 22, the 7<sup>th</sup> the 17<sup>th</sup> musician) and flutes have not been depicted at all and only the position of the hands suggests they are there. The left hands of the 6<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> musicians in Fig. 22 and the last musician on the right side in Fig. 23, are held in a very peculiar position. It indicates that the drums they hold under their arms are string-drums, *tantrīpaṭahikās* (Zin 2004, p. 340), i.e. drums which membrane tension can be changed by means of a cord held in the left hand which connects the membrane tension cords. It is unusual that one of the 12<sup>th</sup> musicians plays the *tantrīpaṭahikā* with a stick. To my knowledge, in all the examples from India and also in other pictures in Kucha, the instrument is played only with the hand.

have been brought to Berlin. They show the last figure of each of the two registers represented on both sides of the door: the upper register contained kneeling monks, the lower one standing donors.<sup>49</sup>

Donors and monks are also depicted on the inner wall of the left corridor. The monks (**Fig. 24**),<sup>50</sup> eight in number (one is destroyed, only one of his feet is preserved), are shown in the upper register pacing towards the main chamber. One of them is shown with *uṣṇīṣa*, next to him is an old monk wearing a patchwork robe, the *pāṃśukūla*. Are they perhaps Ānanda and Mahākāśyapa<sup>51</sup> shown among the “contemporary” donors and monks?

The lower register of the mural, where donors are shown, is no less enigmatic (**Fig. 25**).<sup>52</sup> The three men on the left wear heavy cloaks, typical clothing of the donors, but the person in the middle and the one on the right end are shown with bare upper bodies, like the persons dressed in the “Indian style” in the narrative pictures. On their sides are dwarves offering them gifts on trays and between them are two women. They, too, are not shown like donors in local coats<sup>53</sup> but rather resemble *yakṣiṇīs* or the women and goddesses seen in the narrative paintings. Perhaps the donors are shown here side by side with persons from the Buddha narrative (donors, like Anāthapiṇḍada?),<sup>54</sup> to link them—like the monks above—with the sacred time of the Buddha.

<sup>49</sup> Right front wall: male donor (lower part), monk (upper part) both facing right, taken to Berlin, no. IB 9187; today in St. Petersburg, Hermitage, no. BДсэ 617; cf. Dreyer/Sander/Weis 2002, p. 173; left front wall: monk facing left, taken to Berlin, no. IB 9034, today in St. Petersburg, Hermitage, no. BДсэ 647; lower part: male donor facing left, taken to Berlin, no. IB 8858; today in St. Petersburg, Hermitage, no. BДсэ 620; cf. Dreyer/Sander/Weis 2002, p. 200.

<sup>50</sup> **Fig. 24:** left corridor inner wall, upper register; illus. Tan/An 1981, vol. 2, pl. 87; Kizil Grottoes 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 3, p. 32; *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 2, p. 234–235, pl. 208.

<sup>51</sup> For the iconography of Mahākāśyapa and Ānanda see Zin 2020, pp. 41–44 and 75–76.

<sup>52</sup> **Fig. 25:** left corridor inner wall, lower register; illus. Zin 2023, drawing 6.

<sup>53</sup> As argued elsewhere (Zin 2023, p. 28), the painting may show local deities clad in local dresses.

<sup>54</sup> The name Anāthapiṇḍada appears in an inscription in one of the side corridors in Kizil Cave 58; the persons in the painting below the inscription look rather like *yakṣas* (cf. Zin 2023, p. 523).



The peculiarity of the respective painting, on the inner wall of the right corridor, however, is much bigger. This is one of the very few cases where the donors or monks do not have a similar counterpart or “mirror image” on the respective wall in the other corridor. It therefore seems that something connects the images, even if this connection still eludes us. The painting on the inner wall of the right corridor is unique and among the strangest in Kucha (**Fig. 26**).<sup>55</sup> It depicts the Buddha—apparently preaching—surrounded by originally seventeen (the right side of the painting is mostly destroyed) small seated and standing Buddhas, pointing to figures between their images. These persons are partly organised in scenes that appear like pictorial quotations from the narrative paintings and the entire composition is arranged mirror symmetrically. For example, the seated Buddhas on both sides of the head of the central Buddha figure point at courtly scenes of which the one on the right is very reminiscent of the illustration of the Udrāyaṇa narrative in Kizil 83.<sup>56</sup> The standing Buddhas further outside point to field workers, of which the left scene is a pictorial quotation from the illustration of the first meditation; the working ploughman is shown wearing a royal headdress like King Śuddhodana.

The enigmatic depiction has given rise to several interpretations. Chinese research regards the painting as a representation of the possibilities of rebirths, similar to the wheel of *saṃsāra*,<sup>57</sup> Schlingloff<sup>58</sup> refers to the emanations of figures during the Śrāvastī miracle. Teiser (2006, p. 250) and Howard<sup>59</sup> write of the “cosmological Buddha” with the world depicted not on the body itself but next to the Buddha.

<sup>55</sup> **Fig. 26:** Kizil, Cave 175, right corridor, inner wall, illus. Tan/An 1981, vol. 2, pls. 89–94; *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 3, pls. 25–31; Teiser 2006, fig. 10.5; *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 2, pp. 237–239, pls. 210–212; Howard/Vignato 2015, figs. 251 and 252 (drawing); Schlingloff 2015 and 2018, fig. 47 (drawing); Zin 2023, fig. 105, drawing 265, drawings 15 and 254 (details).

<sup>56</sup> Berlin, Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8443; illus. Grünwedel 1920, pls. 40–41; *Mural Paintings in Xinjiang of China* 2009, vol. 1, p. 173, pl. 153.

<sup>57</sup> Ma in *Kizil Grottoes* 1983–1985/1989–1997, vol. 2, pp. 225–227 and pp. 217–219 respectively.

<sup>58</sup> Schlingloff 2015, p. 63 and 2018, p. 61

<sup>59</sup> Howard in Howard/Vignato 2015, pp. 149–150.

The figures presented in a different scale on the lower left of the picture must be understood as the addressees of Buddha's teachings. Unfortunately, we do not know who was on the other side. Based on what was said before, donors may have been represented. Even if there remains nothing but speculation here—there is, however, enough in the cave (compare Figs. 14, 26, 27a–27e) to show that mythological and contemporary persons were shown side by side—the painting is a reminder that, as Teiser (2006, p. 250) has put it, “the Buddha has not passed away into oblivion, but rather has been revealed as the centre of life.”

The representations discussed so far are of the pious purpose, aiming at salvation; this includes the deities, donors and monks worshipping the Buddha. However, one image of a royal person in the left corridor to whom small servants are offering gifts (Fig. 25) might be of different character since it is this person and not the Buddha who is being worshipped here. It might be a tutelary deity. But it is not the only representation in the cave which may not have a soteriological motivation: The other painting is large and must have been of importance to the entire programme of the interior and its general message. The mural in question is a frieze over eight and half metres in length. It was taken to Berlin and is housed now in the study collection of the Museum für Asiatische Kunst.<sup>60</sup> As the museum file cards state, they are fragments from our Versuchungshöhle, however no historical photograph documents their original location. As we will see, it perfectly fits the architecture of the cave: The frieze was originally placed below the sermon scenes, directly above the floor. With its height of about 40 cm the frieze made up a significant part of the approximately 2 m high wall. The 870 cm long frieze corresponds in length with the walls of the cave's main chamber; both side walls differ in length. Difficulties in ascertaining the original location of the frieze were caused by the fact that two fragments had been glued together after the pieces arrived in the museum (III 8869b); only when reading them as two separate pieces thus raising the total number of fragments to five, their positions in the interior become clear (**Fig. 27a, 27b, 27c, 27d, 27e**).<sup>61</sup> Two fragments in Berlin, each measuring 120 cm, can easily

<sup>60</sup> Berlin Museum für Asiatische Kunst, nos. III 8869a–b, III 8870, III 8871; illus. Zin 2023, figs. 157–160 and drawings 437–440.

<sup>61</sup> **Fig. 27a:** Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8869b, left side (L: c. 105 cm, W: c. 40

be fitted to the two front walls; the fragment of 230 cm to the left side wall; the fragment of 250 cm length to the right side wall (the right wall in this cave is longer than the left one). The remaining fragment of 150 cm length can be fitted to the main wall covering the pedestal under the main niche.

The frieze is undoubtedly narrative in character. The story it illustrates deals with a solitary hero fighting against hosts of demons. The fitting of the painting fragments described above corresponds to the logic of the events depicted when seen in *pradakṣiṇa*. The story begins (Fig. 27a) on the left front wall when the hero is awakened from sleep and receives a message; only in this fragment is the hero not dressed for war. Then (Fig. 27b), on the left side of the left side wall, the hero is shown in front of a group of peaceful-looking persons (which will not reappear in the further course of events)—obviously demons, who first show themselves in their peaceful forms and greet the hero with gifts. But this soon changes as the demons show their true faces—with pointed ears, hair standing on end and two “feathers” above the forehead characteristic of demons—and the hero attacks them with a sword. Among the demons are several women. The hero attacks them with brutality, dragging them by the hair. The painting on the left wall ends with the hero standing in front of a demon king sitting on a throne. The hero’s fight against the demons continues on the back wall (Fig. 27c) and also on the right side wall (Fig. 27d), at the end of which another demon king is shown; this time multi-armed and holding a trident. The right front wall (Fig. 27e) shows two scenes. In the first, the hero has fought a monster beast—unfortunately its appearance can no longer be reconstructed. The following event could not have been shown earlier, as it is only here that the demons kneel before the hero. He does not fight them any further, but admonishes them with a raised forefinger.

The exact interpretation of the painting based on a corresponding text is a task for the future. If the illustrated narrative is a *jātaka*, it is very strange that

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cm), fitting to main chamber, front wall, left from the door; **Fig. 27b**: Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8870 (L: 225,5 cm, H: c. 42,5 cm), fitting to left side wall; **Fig. 27c**: Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8869b, right side (L: c. 150 cm, H: c. 40 cm), fitting to rear wall under the cult niche; **Fig. 27d**: Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8871 (L: c. 246,5 cm, H: c. 37,5), fitting to right side wall; **Fig. 27e**: Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8869a (L: c. 119,5 cm, H: c. 43 cm) fitting to right front wall.

the hero (i.e. the Buddha in a previous birth) should act so cruelly against the women. To my knowledge, such behaviour is not depicted elsewhere in the Buddhist art.<sup>62</sup> In Kizil 175 it was apparently important to show that the demons were being overpowered with all cruelty.

We will return now, as announced in the beginning, to the analysis of the overall programme of the cave decoration and its interpretations in the sense of the religious experience; it will become apparent that the representation in the frieze changes the message of the decoration to a certain extent. The frieze certainly illustrates a narrative that begins with a request for the hero's intervention and ends with the subjugation of the demons. It seems to be significant that the painting contains several elements ridiculing the demons and demonesses. Considering this, it would certainly not be correct to put the painting in too serious a context, for example as a symbolic representation of the disturbing factors in meditation. The statement of the painting in the frieze is of a different nature, and it obviously served an apotropaic purpose.

As already stated, images showing the conversions of different demonic beings and adoration of the Buddha by such creatures are very often repeated in the painting of Kucha. Their general message was certainly that the demons could not harm the Buddha, and they were probably understood as apotropaic: as images providing protection against the demons.

This is a very important aspect of the pictorial programmes and must not be omitted. In our Cave 175, the usual scenes with demons worshipping the Buddha, common in other caves, are not to be found. As if to make up for this deficiency, the battle of the hero against the demons was shown in the cave. The apotropaic aspect of the paintings is undoubtedly part of the "typical" pictorial programmes of the caves. But it is also something more. The painting is undoubtedly designed to be humorous. Perhaps it can be explained as a psychological device to eliminate the fear of demons. This is speculation, but it seems certain that the pictures of the fight against the demons and demonesses are far removed from the general topic of enlightenment that governs the other pictures of the cave.

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<sup>62</sup> Compare, for example, the painting of *Siṃhalāvadāna* in Ajanta XVII (Schlingloff 2000/2013, no. 58 (28–29)), in which the attacking *rākṣasīs* are exposed, although we know that the army under Siṃhala's command fought them; illus. Yazdani 1930–1955, vol. 4, pl. 55; Schlingloff vol. 1, p. 274 (drawing).

As mentioned in the beginning, the Cave 175—as every cave in Kucha—is specific in its own way. More than anywhere else, the intermingling of mythological and contemporary figures is depicted in it. Most interesting about the cave is, however, that we can observe—in the four scenes located in the niches in the side corridors (Figs. 8–13), one of them a *praṇidhi* story and three others stories from the life of the Buddha—how the selection of stories was informed by the architecture. In analysing the significance of Indra’s visit on the main walls of the caves, it must be remembered that it was primarily the architectural form—the niche with the Buddha surrounded the entire interior depicting the mountainous landscape—that explains the selection of the story. It should also not be forgotten that the story of Brahmins and the Buddha Puṣya (Fig. 13) was depicted around the main niche of the caves (Kizil 176, 184 and 187).

The pictorial programmes that we can observe in the caves were certainly of significance to visitors to the caves in ancient times, even though they may have been a secondary development based on the default of the cave architecture. It is quite possible that the image programmes and cave architecture influenced each other.

Let us try to describe briefly what visitors to our cave would have experienced when looking at the images.

They entered the interior, full of stories that began with Trapaṣa and Bhallika who were ordinary people, like him or her and the first sermon, showing conversion stories and the worship of the Master. And the visitors saw, in the vault, this strange image of the Buddha presenting himself to a monk and a layman in the vehicle that can cross the *saṃsāra*. The deities were cheering from above. Below were demons—but no longer dangerous. Then there is this strange reflection of fighting the Māra and the landscape with Maitreya, above the cave with the Buddha, from which he will come shortly, awakened from meditation by the music of the *gandharva*, just as Maitreya will come one day.

When the visitors proceed to the rear corridors, they see more of the Buddha’s deeds in the caves—in caves like the one they are in—and also see their own contemporaries among the devotees.

Then they see the Buddha dying, but this is accompanied by views of his birth and spiritual birth, which are reminders of the causes of being a Buddha. The visitors probably find comfort in the image of the relics that

connect the present with the sacred time, not unlike the monks standing with Kāśyapa and Ānanda, and in the Master's teaching, which lives on even though he himself died.

Perhaps a visitor may have perceived it different. But probably not much different.

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
### Figures\*



**Fig. 1:** Fragment of a historical photograph in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Berlin, no. B 1268; photograph © Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, CC BY-NC-SA.

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\* All line drawings © Monika Zin, CC BY-NC-SA.



**Fig. 2:** Kizil 175, main chamber, lunette above front wall; detached and taken to Berlin, housed in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8878.



Fig. 3a: Kizil 175, main chamber, lunette above rear wall; *in situ*.



**Fig. 3b:** Kizil 175, main chamber, rear wall, reveal of the main niche, left side; *in situ*.



**Fig. 3c:** Kizil 175, main chamber, rear wall, reveal of the main niche, right side; *in situ*.



**Fig. 4:** Kizil 175, rear corridor, lunette above the left side wall; *in situ*.



**Fig. 5:** Kizil 175, rear corridor, lunette above the right side wall; *in situ*.



Fig. 6: Kizil 175, rear corridor, inner wall, upper part; *in situ*.




Fig. 7: Kizil 175, left corridor, outer wall, 1<sup>st</sup> niche, right reveal; *in situ*.




**Fig. 8:** Kizil 175, left corridor, outer wall, 1<sup>st</sup> niche; part underneath the niche *in situ*, fragments on the sides detached and taken to Berlin, left side housed in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 9201, right side housed today in the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, no. ВДсэ 902.



**Fig. 9:** Kizil 175, left corridor, outer wall, 2<sup>nd</sup> niche; *in situ*.





**Fig. 10:** Kizil 175, right corridor, outer wall, 2<sup>nd</sup> niche; *in situ*.



**Fig. 11:** Kizil 175, right corridor, outer wall, 1<sup>st</sup> niche from main chamber; left and lower parts *in situ*, right side detached and taken to Berlin, housed today in State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, no. ВДсэ 693.





Fig. 12: Kizil 175, left corridor, outer wall, 3<sup>rd</sup> niche, left reveal; *in situ*.



Fig. 13: Kizil 175, main chamber, barrel vault, right side; *in situ*.



**Fig. 14:** Kizil 175, main chamber, left side wall, upper left part, historical photograph in archives of the Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. B 543; photograph © Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, CC BY-NC-SA.



**Fig. 15:** Kizil 175, main chamber, left side wall, upper right part, historical photograph in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. B 544; photograph © Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, CC BY-NC-SA.




Fig. 16: Kizil 175, main chamber, fragments from left and right side walls, historical photograph in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. C 8; photograph © Museum für Asiatische Kunst, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, CC BY-NC-SA.



**Fig. 17:** Kizil 175, main chamber, left side wall, upper register, 2<sup>nd</sup> scene; detached and taken to Berlin, no. IB 9175, partially destroyed in WW II, fragment housed today in the State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, no. ВДсэ 704.



**Fig. 18:** Kizil 175, main chamber, left side wall, upper register, 3<sup>rd</sup> scene; detached and taken to Berlin, no. IB 9175, destroyed in WW II.



**Fig. 19:** Kizil 175, main chamber, left side wall, upper register, 4<sup>th</sup> scene; detached and taken to Berlin, no. IB 9175, destroyed in WW II.



**Fig. 20:** Kizil 175, main chamber, left side wall, lower register, 2<sup>nd</sup> scene; detached and taken to Berlin, no. IB 9175, destroyed in WW II.



**Fig. 21:** Kizil 175, main chamber, right side wall, exact position indeterminable; detached and taken to Berlin, no. IB 9174, destroyed in WW II.



**Fig. 22:** Kizil 175, main chamber, left side wall, frieze underneath the barrel vault; detached and taken to Berlin, no. IB 9175, destroyed in WW II.






**Fig. 23:** Kizil 175, main chamber, right side wall, part of the frieze underneath the barrel vault; detached and taken to Berlin, no. IB 9174, destroyed in WW II.



**Fig. 24:** Kizil 175, left corridor, inner wall, upper register; *in situ*.




**Fig. 25:** Kizil 175, left corridor, inner wall, lower register; *in situ*.




Fig. 26. Kizil 175, right corridor, inner wall; *in situ*.




**Fig. 27a:** Kizil 175, main chamber, frieze from the lowest part of the left front wall; detached and taken to Berlin, housed in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8869b (left side).



**Fig. 27b:** Kizil 175, main chamber, frieze from the lowest part of the left side wall; detached and taken to Berlin, housed in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8870.



**Fig. 27c:** Kizil 175, main chamber, frieze from the lowest part of the rear wall; detached and taken to Berlin, housed in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8869b (right side).



**Fig. 27d:** Kizil 175, main chamber, frieze from the lowest part of the right side wall; detached and taken to Berlin, housed in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. III 8871.



**Fig. 27e:** Kizil 175, main chamber, frieze from the lowest part of the right front wall; detached and taken to Berlin, housed in Museum für Asiatische Kunst, no. 8869a.

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ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE**

GEGRÜNDET VON  
ERNST STEINKELLNER

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON  
BIRGIT KELLNER, KLAUS-DIETER MATHES  
und MARKUS VIEHBECK

HEFT 104.2

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# **TO THE HEART OF TRUTH**

FELICITATION VOLUME FOR ELI FRANCO  
ON THE OCCASION OF HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY

EDITED BY

HIROKO MATSUOKA, SHINYA MORIYAMA,  
and TYLER NEILL

PART II

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## **Part II**

# **The Buddhist Logical–Epistemological Tradition**



# Yamāri on the Scope of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* and Devendrabuddhi's Transmission Thereof

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## 0. Introduction

To begin, I would like to comment on my reasons for choosing the topic of this paper. Eli Franco is a well-known scholar on, among other areas, Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (hereafter PVA). About ten years ago, at the University of Leipzig, he established a project of editing a newly found manuscript of Yamāri's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* (hereafter PVAN),<sup>1</sup> a sub-commentary on the PVA. Within the framework of this project, I had the opportunity to work together with him for six years. I am therefore honored and delighted to contribute the present paper on a topic related to that project to this volume to celebrate his seventieth birthday.

In the introductory section of his PVAN, Yamāri discusses various topics concerning the nature of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (hereafter PV). The newly found manuscript has provided a large amount of new material in the original Sanskrit. Based on this, it has become possible to reconsider some of the conclusions that modern scholars have reached until now concerning the PV. The first significant study based on this fresh material concerning one such topic, the order of the PV's chapters, was published in Franco 2018; as a humble addition to that study of Franco, in this paper I will discuss a related topic, namely, the scope of the PV. The discussion will focus on how Yamāri regards Devendrabuddhi's view that the PV was written to explain

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<sup>1</sup> For more details on this manuscript, cf. Chu, Franco and Li 2020. For the title *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* which appears in the colophon of the manuscript, cf. Matsuoka *forthcoming*; cf. also Chu, Franco and Li 2020: 37. All quotations from the PVAN in this paper are based on our reading of the manuscript which has been critically edited; however I omit the critical notes to provide a clean text for convenience of reading, and mention only selectively the variants in the Tibetan translation.

the thinking of Dignāga, and Yamāri's own opinions about the nature and scope of the PV.

### 1. On the statement “Dignāga[’s system] is explained by the [PV]”

With regard to the scope of Dharmakīrti's PV, the opponents, that is, certain interpreters of Prajñākaragupta, probably (as in many other cases) the group represented by Jayanta, hold the opinion that the PV was written to explain the Buddha's teaching, not to explain the thinking of Dignāga. Thus they argue strongly against the statement “Dignāga[’s system] is explained by the [PV]”<sup>2</sup> (*dignāgo 'nena vyākhyāyate* PVAN 7a3, 7a5), a statement attributed to Devendrabuddhi. While this phrase or something similar to it is repeated several times in the PVAN, to my knowledge, no equivalent of this statement can be found in Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (henceforth PVP) itself. We are obviously not dealing with a direct quotation, but merely a report of an opinion held by Devendrabuddhi. But indeed, one can easily come to this conclusion from Devendrabuddhi's statement in the first sentence of the PVP, which states that inference is the precondition to “the explanation of the treatise on the characteristics of valid means of cognition by the teacher [Dignāga]. . . .”<sup>3</sup>

This opinion that the PV was written for Dignāga's system certainly has its deep historical background. A similar idea in a more elaborated form can be found in Śākyabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (PVT) D 3a6–4b6, which in turn is incorporated into Karṇakagomin's *Pramāṇavārttika(śva)vārttiṭīkā* (PVSVT) 3,25–4,28<sup>4</sup> and further utilized, with some reading variants, in Vibhū 515,3–

<sup>2</sup> It is noteworthy that in many cases, only Dignāga's name is mentioned; such cases obviously refer to Dignāga's system as a whole as developed in his various works, not merely his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Cf. Steinkellner 2013: I, xxviif.

<sup>3</sup> *ācāryīyapramāṇalakṣaṇaśāstravyākhyā* . . . , cf. Ono 1997: 702, Kellner 2004: 150, Franco 2018: 251f.

<sup>4</sup> On the relationship between Śākyabuddhi's PVT and Karṇakagomin's PVSVT, cf. Steinkellner 1981: 286: “Since Karṇakagomin incorporates the commentary of Śākyamati [i.e., Śākyabuddhi, also below—Chu] into his own with very few changes, and uses it here for that part of his own commentary that gives word-explanation, his PVSVT must be considered as the main-source for the first chapter of Śākyamati's PVT. In this circumstance the original text of the PVT is preserved

23.<sup>5</sup> Śākyabuddhi presents an alternative interpretation of the second introductory verse of the PV,<sup>6</sup> according to which Dharmakīrti is stating that his PV has been written for the sake of Dignāga. Since Śākyabuddhi was a disciple of Devendrabuddhi (cf. Frauwallner 1961: 145), what he reported may have been Devendrabuddhi's opinion, or an opinion they shared.<sup>7</sup> In comparison with the more widely accepted understanding of Dharmakīrti's verse, the striking feature of Śākyabuddhi's interpretation is that it places the center of gravity on Dignāga. According to this interpretation, the scope of Dharmakīrti's verse is to answer the question of why he composed an explanation of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) in the manner of a *vārttika*, not as an independent treatise.<sup>8</sup> Thus, the gist of Dharmakīrti's verse is that Dharmakīrti became desirous to explain Dignāga's PS due to worry and compassion; his worry and compassion were caused by the fact that the treatise composed by Dignāga was not particularly useful, which was caused by the fault of the audience.<sup>9</sup> The key points of this interpretation can be

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almost entirely." In Steinkellner 1979, a more detailed investigation of PVSVT 374,25–376,29 (*ad* PVSV 103,2–14) leads to the same conclusion; additionally, Karṇakagomin's dates are suggested to be around 800 CE (*ibid.* 149), later than Śākyabuddhi, who is dated to ca. 660–720 (cf. Frauwallner 1961: 145). Note that Gnoli (1960: XXI) has a different opinion, according to which Śākyabuddhi's PVT is based on Karṇakomin's PVSVT.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the annotated Japanese translation of this passage in Katsura 1994.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. PVSV 1,4–7: *prāyaḥ prākṛtasaktir apratibalaprajñā janah kevalam nānarthya eva subhāṣitaiḥ parigato vidveṣṭy api īrṣyāmalaiḥ | tena ayaṃ na paropakāra iti naś cintā api cetaś ciraṃ sūktābhyāsavivardhitavyasanam ity atra anubaddhaspṛham ||* Cf. the translations in Stcherbatsky 1930: 35f., Frauwallner 1954: 151, Hayes and Gillon 1991: 2, 14, Steinkellner 2013: II, 3 and Franco 2018: 260.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Steinkellner 1981: 286, n. 16: "Śākyamati, therefore, has already been able to refer to another, possible earlier, commentatorial tradition on the first chapter."

<sup>8</sup> Cf. PVSVT 3,25–27: *anye tv anyathā—kasmād ayam ācāryadharmakīrtir vārttikanyāyena pramāṇasamuccayavyākhyāṃ karoti, na punaḥ svatantram eva śāstram ity asmin praśnāvasare prāha—prāya ityādi.*

<sup>9</sup> Cf. PVSVT 3,27–29: *asya ślokaśyāyaṃ samāsārthaḥ—cintayā karuṇayā ca me pramāṇasamuccayavyākhyāyāṃ ceto jātābhilāṣam iti. cintā karuṇā ca ācāryadignāgaracitaśāstrasya ālpopakāritvena, alpopakāritvaṃ ca śrotrjanāparādhena<sup>a</sup>. [°śrotrjana- Vibhū : śrātrjana-PVSVT]*

described as follows (omitting some literal/grammatical explanations and other elements inessential to our topic):

1. People “are attached to the vulgar” (*prākṛtasaktiḥ*). The vulgar, i.e., what people call “inferior,” is connected to a defect; non-Buddhist treatises and the objections raised by others against the treatise of Dignāga’s system (*ācāryanītiśāstra*) are similar,<sup>10</sup> since they are caused by wrong knowledge and connected to defects, and they are therefore also vulgar. (...) Due to the lack of wisdom adequate for properly understanding the eloquent speech of Dignāga, taking it as being faulty, they are disinterested in Dignāga’s (not the Buddha’s) eloquent speech; they are even hostile toward Dignāga.<sup>11</sup>
2. Dignāga (not Dharmakīrti) “has increased [his] addiction for eloquent speech through repeated practice” (*sūktābhyāsavivardhitavyasanam*). Although it is separated by some words, this sentence is connected to the one above, according to the rule that a sentence is connected to what it belongs to, even if what it belongs to is distant from it.<sup>12</sup> (...) Dignāga has increased his addiction to eloquent speech, i.e., he is excessively attached to it. Dignāga’s accumulated merit and wisdom is thereby stated. (...) Because people who lack adequate wisdom

<sup>10</sup> *nītiśāstra* refers to the treatise of Dignāga’s system; it is also used this way in PST 1,10–11: *udbhāvītārthatattvasvāduraso ’yaṃ mayopakārāya | diñnāganītiśāstravyākhyānakaraṇḍakaḥ kriyate ||* “This honeycomb (*karaṇḍaka*) of the explanation of the treatise of Dignāga’s system, having the sweet taste of the revealed reality of things, is made by me in order to help [people].”

<sup>11</sup> Cf. PVSVT 3,30–4,6: *prākṛta ucyate loke nīcaḥ, yasya duṣṭānvayaḥ.<sup>a</sup> evaṃ tīrthikaśāstrāṇi parapranītāni cācāryanītiśāstradūṣaṇāni, viparyastajñānaprabhavatvād duṣṭānvayāni,<sup>b</sup> ataḥ prākṛtāni. ... apratibalaprajñatvād eva cācāryasubhāṣitāni svayaṃ yathāvad avaboddhum akṣamaḥ, doṣavattvena gṛhītvā<sup>c</sup> tair ācāryasubhāṣitair anarthī, ācārye ca vidveṣavān bhavatīti. [<sup>a</sup>duṣṭānvayaḥ Vibhū : duṣṭonvayaḥ PVSVT. <sup>b</sup>duṣṭānvayāny ataḥ Vibhū : ānvayād yataḥ PVSVT. <sup>c</sup>doṣavattvena gṛhītvā PVSVT : no equivalent in PVT.]*

<sup>12</sup> It is interesting to observe that here, abandoning a more natural construction in order to make Dignāga the subject who “has increased addiction,” the sentence is constructed using the first half verse; the remaining parts are left for Dharmakīrti.



are disinterested in Dignāga's eloquent speech and are attached to the vulgar, his PS is not very useful.<sup>13</sup>

3. Dharmakīrti has an anxious thought (*asmākaṃ cintā*, "I have an anxious thought"), namely, that Dignāga's work (not his own work) will not be useful for many people, although it is of great importance, and that he, Dharmakīrti, could not make it excessively successful. Furthermore, people's hostility toward Dignāga, who is equal to a Bodhisattva, even if that hostility is only a little, will cause them harm.<sup>14</sup> Thus, Dharmakīrti also has compassion, i.e., the desire to free people from suffering. By increasing the great respect of Dignāga through a non-erroneous manifestation of Dignāga's system, he will turn people away from the cause of harm. (...) Thus, being worried about Dignāga's works, as well as having compassion for people, Dharmakīrti has long been desirous to compose the PV, which is an explanation of the PS.<sup>15</sup>

Regardless of whether this interpretation of the verse is convincing or not, it shows that there were different opinions about the scope of the PV in the circles of its commentators.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Cf. PVSVT 4.12: *kiṃ bhūtaṃ sūktābhyāsavivarddhitavyasanam. vyavahitenāpi sambandho bhavaty eva, yena yasyābhisambandho dūrasthasyāpi tena sa iti nyāyāt. ... tatra vivarddhitam vyasanam tattraivātyartham āsaktatvaṃ yasyācāryadignāgasya sa tathoktaḥ. anenācāryadignāgasyopacitapunyajñānatvam āha. ... yenāpratibalaprajña ācāryasubhāṣitair anarthī prākṛtasaktiś ca tena kāraṇenāyaṃ pramāṇasamuccayo na paropakārah.*

<sup>14</sup> Cf. the equivalent of *anartha* in PVT: *phung bar 'gyur ba*. On the special meaning of *artha* and *anartha*, cf. Kellner 2004: 153. For a more extensive discussion of this topic, cf. Steinkellner 2013: II, 5–14, n. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. PVSVT 4,20–28: *asmād dhetor asmākaṃ<sup>a</sup> cintā—mahārtham apīdam śāstraṃ na bahūnām upakārakaṃ jātam, tat katham asyātyarthaṃ sāphalyaṃ kuryām ity evamākārā. ācārye ca bodhisattvakalpe vidveṣaḥ svalpo 'py anarthahetuḥ. ato 'ham ācāryanīter aviparītaprakāśanenācārye bahumānam utpādyā tato 'narthahetor janaṃ<sup>b</sup> nivartayīṣyāmīty evaṃ duḥkhaviyogecchākārā karuṇāpy apīśabdāt. ... ity ābhyāṃ cintā-karuṇābhyāṃ cetaś ciraṃ dīrghakālam atra pramāṇasamuccayavyākhyābhūtapramāṇa-vārttikaracanāyām anubaddhasprhaṃ santānena pravṛtteccham iti. [<sup>a</sup>asmākaṃ PVSVT, *bdag gi* PVT; *nāsmākāṃ* (sic!) Vibhū. <sup>b</sup>janam PVSVT, Vibhū : no equivalent in PVT]*

<sup>16</sup> Indeed, Jayanta also briefly mentions an opinion similar to this interpretation, in part identical to it, then negating its validity based simply on the fact that Dharmakīrti did not say, "I am explaining his text." Cf. PVAṬ D 2a2–5: *de la sdug bsngal gyi*

Let's now go back to the objections of Devendrabuddhi's opinion. In reply to these, Yamāri negates straightforwardly the possibility of Devendrabuddhi's mistake. He argues first in general that even though it is known that these earlier commentators made very serious mistakes, nevertheless such a mistake is not possible about something as profound as the subject-matter of a treatise, insofar as it is within the power of a person who is familiar with the entire manuscript. Then, he emphasizes particularly that, it is impossible for Devendrabuddhi, "a direct disciple of Dharmakīrti," to make such mistake about the subject-matter, since even a child does not lack the ability to understand the expression "this [i.e., Dignāga's system] is explained by the [PV]."<sup>17</sup>

Here, we see that in the face of objections against Devendrabuddhi Yamāri seems to defend the Devendrabuddhi's position. But does Yamāri really agree with Devendrabuddhi about the scope of the PV? When we read further, we immediately discover that Yamāri has a different view of the scope of the PV. Indeed he says that, if Dharmakīrti presents the words

*rgyur gyur pa'i log pa'i shes pa can la yang dag pa'i<sup>a</sup> shes pa bstan pa dang 'dra bar slob dpon la brnyas pa'i kha na ma tho bas 'khrul pa'i skye bo yongs su bskyang bar 'dod pa'i thugs rjes de'i gzhung gi<sup>b</sup> bshad par gyur pa tshad ma rnam 'grel mdzad pa yin no zhes zer ba de ni mi rigs te | 'di la tshad ma med do || gang gi<sup>c</sup> phyir de'i gzhung la kho bos bshad ces bya ba'i tshig med pa'i phyir ro ||* [<sup>a</sup>yang dag pa'i D : yang dag par P. <sup>b</sup>gi em. : gis D, P. <sup>c</sup>gi D : gis P.]

<sup>17</sup> PVAN 7a2: *yady api ca teṣāṃ atibhūyaśī bhrāntir upalabdhā, tathā pi gambhīre 'bhidheyādaṃ na tāvatā lipimātraparicayavato 'pi gocare sambhāvyaṭe. yady evaṃ, abhidheyabhrāntir eva katham ācāryadevendrasya sāṅśācchrāvīṇaḥ, bālasypāḍam anena vyākhyāyata iti grahaṇasāmarthyāpracyuteḥ.* Cf. the translation in Franco and Preisendanz *forthcoming*. A similar statement is repeated again in PVAN 7a3: *na hi sāṅśācchrāvīṇa idam anena vyākhyāyata iti niścayo vipāścitanāmno durlabhāḥ, ...* Cf. the translation in Franco and Preisendanz *forthcoming*.

After finishing this paper, I received a copy of Franco and Preisendanz *forthcoming*, in which PVAN 7a2–7b5 and some other short passages are translated and explained. Thus my translations of the same sources in an earlier version of this paper became unnecessary. In the present version I have replaced my translations with summaries or paraphrases of only those passages necessary for understanding the context; these are accompanied with references to Franco and Preisendanz *forthcoming*. In a few cases, I have a slightly different interpretation. That being said, by no means do I mean that my interpretation is better; I rather am simply offering another possible reading of the text.

of Dignāga somewhere in his own work and also Prajñākaragupta quotes the *Pramāṇavārttika*, all that is expressed is a kind of agreement<sup>18</sup> with what they quoted. But, if one writes down the three chapters composed by Dignāga with the original words in the original order, what remains is the impossibility of considering the faults in the treated topic; there is no independent opinion.<sup>19</sup>

What Yamāri is saying is that, insofar as his PV is a *vārttika*, Dharmakīrti can quote Dignāga's words, and he can also say something different from Dignāga.<sup>20</sup> Then the question arises: Why is it not a mistake when Devendrabuddhi says: "Dignāga[’s system] is explained by the [PV]"?

## 2. On the so-called "transmissions" (*sampradāya*)

In the next passage, Yamāri attempts an answer to the above question. He says first that Devendrabuddhi did not directly learn the *Pramāṇavārttika* from Dharmakīrti, rather only the teaching of Dignāga, and it was merely for this purpose that he followed Dharmakīrti. And thus, from the explanations of Dharmakīrti, the unsurpassed ocean of self-confidence that ends in attachment, Devendrabuddhi attained a special mental formation in such a way that, having fixed upon both Dharmakīrti's attachment to Dignāga and his self-conceit of understanding the text independently of the instruction with regard to the *Pramāṇavārttika*, also having seen here and there passages that destroy the hostility<sup>21</sup> toward Dignāga, and thus having ascertained

<sup>18</sup> *saṃsyandana*, cf. Edgerton 1953: 543f. s.v., where he quotes the *Bodhicaryāvatāra-ṭīkā*: *sūtrādisaṃsyandanaṃ buddhavadānatve hetur...* The word appears also in another place in the PVAN in the context of citation of the Buddha's words, cf. below fn. 49. This word is translated in PVAN<sub>T</sub> as *khungs*, "source," i.e., "source quotation."

<sup>19</sup> Cf. PVAN 7a7–7b1: *yadi yathā vārttikakāreṇācāryīyaṃ kvacit kvacid eva tad a-kṣaram utkalitam, vārttikam api bhāṣyakṛtā, tadā saṃsyandanamātram abhidhīyate. yadā tu prārabdhaparicchedatrayaṃ tadakṣaram tatkrāmam ullikhati, tadā prakṛtadoṣa-samarthanāsāmarthyam evāvaśīsyate, na tu svāntantryakhyātiḥ*. Cf. the translation in Franco and Preisendanz *forthcoming*.

<sup>20</sup> This topic is discussed in more detail in § 3 below.

<sup>21</sup> *doṣadālanāni* is translated in Franco and Preisendanz *forthcoming* as "dispel (i.e., where Dharmakīrti dispels) faults (i.e., errors) of Dignāga" (cf. the remark on the word *dālana* in Franco and Preisendanz *forthcoming*). With regard the word *doṣa*, I would like to suggest to read it in the so-called "Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit" as

that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is nothing other than a commentary on Dignāga, he endeavored to compose his own work, the *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*.<sup>22</sup>

In Yamāri's view, since Devendrabuddhi did not study the PV directly with Dharmakīrti, he did not apprehend the true essence of the PV's contents. Nonetheless, Devendrabuddhi considered that Dharmakīrti was attached to Dignāga, observing that in various passages Dharmakīrti defends Dignāga from attacks. These are the basis for his regarding the PV as having been written for Dignāga. Yamāri also mentions that Dharmakīrti was unconcerned by Devendrabuddhi's "additional superimposition" that the PV is a *vārttika* on Dignāga.<sup>23</sup> Thus, his conclusion regarding Devendrabuddhi's mistake is two-sided. He first says that since there was no direct transmission of the PV to Devendrabuddhi,<sup>24</sup> it is reasonable to regard what he said about the subject-matter of the PV as being incorrect (*ayukta*), i.e., mistaken.<sup>25</sup> But even if he did not make any mistakes, on account of Dharmakīrti's "attachment

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it is defined in Edgerton 1953: 272: *s.v.* "hatred, malice, aversion, for Skt. *dveṣa*, ..." It has a similar meaning in Pāli as well; see Rhys Davids and Stede 1921: 332. Otherwise, it would be self-contradictory to say that Devendrabuddhi considers Dharmakīrti to be attached to Dignāga by seeing that he "destroys" Dignāga's faults or errors in numerous passages. Actually this statement seems to agree with the statement quoted above in fn. 11, i.e., that people are hostile to Dignāga. However, the Tibetan translation does not support this interpretation: *skyon*.

<sup>22</sup> PVAN 7b1–2: *na khalu vārttikakārād vārttikaṃ sāṅśād ācāryadevendreṇa śrutam, api tu dignāga eva. tadartham evācāryam asāv anusṛtaḥ. tatra ca tasyābhiniveśāvasāyino niratīśayapraudhivāridher vārttikakārasya vyākhyānād ācāryadevendraḥ tathā saṅskāraviśeṣam adhijagāma, yathā vārttikakārasya dignāgābhiniveśam vārttike copadeśā-napekṣabodhābhimānaṃ cāropya dignāgadoṣadālanāni ca sthānasthānāni samīkṣya tad-vārttikatvam eva niścītya granthakaraṇam utsehe.* Cf. the translation in Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. PVAN 7b4: *dignāge ca vārttikatvāropo 'dhiko na bādhaḥ*.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. the statement in above fn. 22 that Devendrabuddhi did not learn directly the *Pramāṇavārttika* from Dharmakīrti, rather only the teaching of Dignāga, and it was merely for this purpose that he followed Dharmakīrti.

<sup>25</sup> In another place he says: "objects of sensory mistake, etc., which are doubted and not based on transmission, have been proven right" (cf. below fn. 45, as I understand it, this "mistake" refers to his observation of Dharmakīrti's attachment to Dignāga, i.e., his overestimating the attachment).

to Dignāga" as viewed by Devendrabuddhi,<sup>26</sup> Devendrabuddhi would have connected the PV by all means to him.<sup>27</sup> Here, Yamāri first confirms that Devendrabuddhi may have made a mistake, i.e., his opinion about the scope of the PV, on the basis that he did not receive a direct transmission of the PV. Then he also grants the possibility of his not having made a mistake, whereby Devendrabuddhi observed Dharmakīrti's attachment to Dignāga, this corroborated by Devendrabuddhi's observation of Dharmakīrti's defense of Dignāga. On this basis, Yamāri maintains that Devendrabuddhi was right in connecting the PV to Dignāga. Putting these two points together, it appears that Yamāri suggests that Dharmakīrti is indeed attached to Dignāga, but not to the extent of dedicating his PV exclusively to Dignāga's system.

In an objection against accepting that the PV has a different order of chapters than the PS, the opponent argues that if this were accepted, it would be incoherent to believe that, Dharmakīrti's PV is a commentary on Dignāga's work, because it takes Dignāga's work as its subject-matter.<sup>28</sup> Yamāri's reply reiterates his view above. On one hand, he accepts the statement that the PV is a commentary on Dignāga, saying that the reason this became widely reported (*vārttā*) is that what is well known, even to children, is difficult to deny. And he does not accept the general doubt of the validity of all transmissions raised in the objection, "because if a non-invalidated [transmission] is not regarded as valid knowledge, in practice we would be unable to use even [arguments like]: 'These are the words of the teacher [Dharma]kīrti' "!<sup>29</sup> That is to say, in his view, Devendrabuddhi's statement is, to a certain extent, a non-invalidated transmission. On the other hand, he also confirms that the PV is not merely about the work of Dignāga:

<sup>26</sup> *dignāgābhiniveśāt*: from the expression itself it is unclear whose attachment it refers to; however, taking the previous sentence into consideration, i.e., *vārttikakārasya dignāgābhiniveśaṃ ... āropya* (see fn. 22, above), it should refer to Dharmakīrti's attachment in Devendrabuddhi's eyes.

<sup>27</sup> PVAN 7b4–5: *tasmād devendre sampradāyasaṅkrānter abhāvād abhidheye 'yukto yuktaḥ abhrame 'pi vā dignāgābhiniveśāt tatraiva yojayed vārttikam*. Cf. the translation in Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming.

<sup>28</sup> PVAN 8a7: *nanu tathā py asaṅgatārtham etad—dignāge hi vārttikatvāt tad evābhidheya-m iti cet*.

<sup>29</sup> PVAN 8a7–8b1: *kutaḥ punar iyaṃ vārttā dignāge vārttikam idam iti, ābālaprasiddher durapahnavatvāt. yat tūcyate—sampradāyaś ca na sarvaḥ pramāṇam iti tad ayuktam*,

But as for what is said: “‘His [i.e., Dignāga’s] work (*grantha*) is explained according to the meaning,’<sup>30</sup> this means that the teaching tradition (*āmnāya*) [he follows is explained], not merely [his] work,” exactly to that extent the [*Pramāṇa*]*vārttika* is established, so any further [qualification] is redundant.<sup>31</sup>

In another passage, Yamāri reformulates this idea again in more detail. There, the opponents, probably some interpreters who did not follow Jayanta, accept that the PV is a *vārttika* that does not adhere to a word-by-word explanation (see the discussion in § 3 below), but they argue that the PV’s having Dignāga’s system as its scope is a fact well known even to children, and that this cannot be denied without an invalidating cognition.<sup>32</sup> Yamāri’s reply runs as follows:

Indeed, it has been displayed that this renown in the eyes of all has its origin in Devendra[buddhi], and he did not get the approach to the transmission through the teacher [Dharmakīrti] (cf. fn. 27 above). Thus, in this case, precisely the doubt whether the [*Pramāṇa*]*vārttika* is for Dignāga or the [Buddha’s] teachings by the heart of the teacher [Dharmakīrti] is the cause of regarding this renown as lacking authority. On the other hand, in a [statement] for which there is no suspicion of [there having been a] break in the transmission, there must be authority; this [authority] does not arise merely by removing the suspicion of opposed opinion, because such kind of ascertainment cannot be achieved in any statement at all.<sup>33</sup>

In answering the question as to why doubts arise regarding Devendrabuddhi’s statement, Yamāri also confirms Devendrabuddhi’s mistakes on

*abādhitasyāpramāṇīkaraṇe hy ācāryakīrter imāny akṣarāṇīty api na vyavahartavyam.*

<sup>30</sup> This seems to refer to Jayanta’s opinion. Cf. above fn. 16.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. PVAN 8b1: *yac cokatam—arthatas tadgrantho vyākhyāyata ity āmnāyaḥ na grantha eveti, etāvataiva vārttikasiddhenāparānupayogaḥ.*

<sup>32</sup> PVAN 8b7–9a1: *vārttikatvaṃ siddham eva kīrteḥ, kevalam ābālaprasiddhaṃ dignāga-viśayam apahnotum aśakyam bādhakam antareṇeti tac cet.*

<sup>33</sup> PVAN 9a1–2: *devendraprabhavā hi sarvair iyaṃ prasiddhiḥ, tasya cācāryasampradāyasamkrāntir asambhavinīti darśitam. tad atrācāryahṛdā dignāge pravacane vā vārttikam iti sandeḥa eva tatprasiddher apramāṇīkaraṇakāraṇam. yatra tu na sampradāya-vicchedaśaṅkā, tatrāstu prāmāṇyam, na vipakṣaśaṅkā mātranivṛtīyā tadbhāvāḥ, vacane*

a large scale in his commentary, so Dharmakīrti was dissatisfied with him, wiping up many times his text.<sup>34</sup> In his view, only with regard to Dignāga, Devendrabuddhi was a student in the true sense; but with regard to the PV, he did not attain a transmission. Therefore, the renown originating from him is not valid at all.<sup>35</sup>

Through above discussion Yamāri's intention can be summarized as follows: On one hand, Devendrabuddhi's opinion that Dignāga is explained by Dharmakīrti is on the basis of his observation of Dharmakīrti's attitude toward Dignāga, that is to say, in a sense, the PV was written for Dignāga, since for Devendrabuddhi Dharmakīrti is attached to Dignāga and defends Dignāga. On the other hand, since Devendrabuddhi did not receive a direct transmission, the assertion that the PV is restricted to Dignāga (*dignāgaviśaya*) is not acceptable. To repeat this in a nutshell: In Yamāri's view, while the PV truly explains Dignāga's system, its scope extends much beyond it and includes a commentary on the teachings of the Buddha.

### 3. On the term *vārttika*

Everything that Yamāri says about the scope of the PV is based on his notion of the term *vārttika*,<sup>36</sup> which appears in the title of the PV. Thus Yamāri had to clarify his understanding of this term. As a matter of fact, he discusses the term specifically. First, he differentiates between two types of commentaries. The one concentrates on the words of a text (*vadaparam*) and is called "*vṛtti*," or something similar; in this type of commentary the words of the text in question are quoted directly and the commentary follows the text's sequence. The other type of commentary, called "*vārttika*," takes the sense or intention of the text in question as its chief subject matter (*arthaparam*); this type of commentary is characterized by special explanations of the objections and

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*kvacid apy evaṃṇiyamasyaśākyasādhanatvāt.*

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Frauwallner 1960: 119, and 120, n. 4.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. PVAN 9a2–3: *kiṃ punar atra śāṅkābījam iti cet. sthānasthāneṣu sthūlaskhalaṇāny eva. ... tathā ca devendra-grantham ācārya 'sakṛt proñchitavān iti viditam eva. dignāga-dvāreṇaiva tu tattvato 'sau śiṣyaḥ, vārttike tu nāsyā sampradāya iti. tasmāt tatprabhāvā prasiddhir apramāṇam eva.*

<sup>36</sup> For a general discussion on the term *vārttika* and other related terms, such as *sūtra*, *bhāṣya*, *nibandha*, and *vṛtti*, cf. Ganeri 2011, esp. 103ff.

responses, and while they do not break apart the words, they are independent of the words' sequence.<sup>37</sup> According to Yamāri, Dharmakīrti's PV clearly belongs to the second category.

Based on this, when Yamāri addresses the topic of what is being explained "according to the meaning" (cf. fn. 31 above), although he defends Devendrabuddhi's position that the PV explains Dignāga's system, he nevertheless emphasizes that it is not limited to a literal explanation, but rather that it explains "the whole teaching tradition," i.e., also the Buddha's teachings. He continues the discussion by applying his distinction between *vārttika* on the one hand, and *ṛtti* and its similar types on the other hand:

Therefore, the establishment of what is said: "His [i.e., Dignāga's] text book is explained according to the meaning" does not impair my position, and we do not assert that this [PV,] in its nature, is a *literal commentary* (*ṛtti*)<sup>38</sup> and its similar types on Dignāga. On the other hand, there is no harm to [hold that] it is a *critical commentary* (*vārttika*) on the very ground that it explains mainly the meaning, because otherwise the consequence would follow that it is groundless to accept it as a critical commentary of the [Buddha's] teachings, too.<sup>39</sup>

The opponents then say that also with respect to the Buddha's teaching, Dharmakīrti's work cannot be a *vārttika* in its primary sense; rather, it is a *vārttika* only in appearance, i.e., in its secondary sense. In the opponents' opinion, according to the definition, a *vārttika* should quote the words to be explained directly and in order, and reprove improper elements, etc.<sup>40</sup> The commentaries of Uddyotakara and Kumārila are like this. They tried

<sup>37</sup> Cf. PVAN 8b1–2: *dvidham hi vyākhyānam—vadaparam ca ṛtṭyādi sākṣāt padāny ullikhya tatkrāmānuṛtti, arthaparam ca padāny anirvadhya tatkrāmānapekṣam ākṣepa-parihāraviśeṣavyākhyānamātralakṣaṇam vārttikam iti*. Cf. the translation in Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming in part.)

<sup>38</sup> Cf. NK 796 s.v., *ṛtti*: *śābdabodhahetupadārthopasthityanukūlaḥ padapadārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ*.

<sup>39</sup> PVAN 8b2: *yad ucyate—tato 'rthatas tadgrantho vyākhyāyata iti sādhanam matpakṣasya na bādhanam, na ca dignāge ṛtṭyādirūpam idaṃ pratijānīmahe. vārttikatāyās tv arthaparavyākhyānatvād eva na kṣatiḥ. anyathā pravacane 'pi vārttikatvābhyupagamasya nirbījatāprasāṅgāt*.

<sup>40</sup> The second element appears also in the definition mentioned by Prajñākaragupta:



to prove through a formal reasoning that the designation *vārttika* cannot be applied to Dharmakīrti's work.<sup>41</sup> Yamāri refutes this by pointing out that even the opponents admit the widely accepted definition of *vārttika*, i.e., "a reflection on what is stated, not stated, or badly stated."<sup>42</sup> He then rejects the element "being dependent on the sequence [of the words], etc." in the definition required by the opponent, because otherwise, he says, it would follow that the designation of *vārttika* could not be applied to the work of Akalaṅka, i.e., the *tattvārtharājavārttika*.<sup>43</sup>

Yamāri argues further: If, after having dismissed (*dūrībhāvād*) the idea that Dharmakīrti's PV has the character of a literal commentary like a *vr̥tti*, etc., it were not a *vārttika* either, then Dharmakīrti would be, in the fashion of a means of valid cognition, a *sūtra*-maker independent of the Exalted One, who, by his nature, is the means of valid cognition with regard to the five categories, i.e., (1) the means of valid cognition, (2) the object to be validly cognized, (3) reality, (4) the factor to be proved, (5) the proving means. In consequence (*prasaṅge*), Dharmakīrti would become ill-famed, since he is not in a position to make independent inventions, and he would not be keeping the promise made in PV 2,283'd–284ab that he is praising the true nature of the Exalted One's teaching in order to prove the reality of the valid means of

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"The definition of *vārttika* consists in 'reproving the improprieties of the *sūtras*, refuting them and expresses something different.' " (PVA 521,24–25: *sūtrānām anupapatticodanā tatparihāro viśeṣābhīdhānam ceti vārttikalakṣaṇam*.) A similar formulation can be found in Vibhū 516,11–12: *vārttikaṃ ca viśeṣābhīdhānādirūpaṃ yathoktaṃ sūtrānām anupapatticodanāt tatparihāro viśeṣābhīdhānam iti lakṣaṇam*. Note that the variant reading of *anupapatticodanāt* in Vibhū is not supported by the Tibetan translation of the PVA.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. PVAN 8b2–4: *anye tv āhuh—pravacane 'pi nedaṃ vārttikaṃ mukhyavṛtṭyā, api tu vārttikam iva vārttikam. tathā hi—krameṇa vyākhyeyapadāni sāksād ullikhyānupapatticodanādikam yatra tad vārttikam, yathoddyotakarakumārīlau, na ca tathehopalabhyate.tasmād yatra yadvoyavahāranimittam nāsti, na tatra tadvoyāvahārah, yathā gavi turaga iti. nāsti ca kīrtau vārttikaavyavahāranimittam iti kāraṇānupalabdhiḥ*.

<sup>42</sup> This is the definition given in traditional Sanskrit lexicons. Cf. AC 42,1 (*Kārikā* 256ab): *uktānuktaduruktārthacintākāri tu vārttikam* |; NK 741 s.v.: *uktānuktaduruktānām cintā yatra pravārate, taṃ gratham vārt[t]ikaṃ prāhur vārt[t]ikajñā manīṣiṇaḥ*. Cf. the discussion this definition in Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. PVAN 8b4: *pareṣām api hy uktānuktaduruktacintaiṃ vārttikam. kramādyapekṣam eva tallakṣaṇam iti cet. na, akalaṅke vārttikaavyavahārābhāvaprasaṅgāt*.

cognition in accordance with His teaching. Of course this cannot be the case, so the conclusion is that there is no fault with the work being a *vārttika*.<sup>44</sup>

Next, the discussion turns its focus from whether or not the PV is a *vārttika*, to whether it is about the Buddhist tradition or about Dignāga. In Yamāri's view, Dharmakīrti would never show a predisposition (*pakṣapāta*) for Dignāga in the way he did for the Buddhist tradition, since objects of sensory mistake, etc., which are doubted and not based on transmission, have been proven right.<sup>45</sup> This seems to me to refer to Devendrabuddhi's above-mentioned statement that the PV has Dignāga's system as its scope, since Devendrabuddhi did not attain the transmission (cf. above fn. 27, 33, 35).

The opponents continue: Even if a commentary lays its stress on the meaning rather than the words, the words being commented upon should be quoted everywhere. And yet, in the PV the Buddha's words are not as visible as those of Dignāga. In reply, Yamāri emphasizes that no object to be validly cognized can be attained that go beyond the five above-mentioned categories, and these are the contents of the Buddha's words, which aim at the ultimate purpose of human beings. To disprove the opponents' argument, he mentions several utterances in the PV that do contain the contents of statements of the Buddha.<sup>46</sup> The opponents argue that these utterances are merely in agreement with the tradition.<sup>47</sup> This objection apparently means that while these statements serve the purpose of supporting arguments, they

<sup>44</sup> Cf. PVAN 8b5–6: *kiṃ ca vṛttyādisvarūpadūrībhāvād yadi nedaṃ vārttikam api, tadā pravacanārthe pramāṇarūpe bhagavati pramāṇamukhena pramāṇaprameyatattvasādhya-sādhanalakṣaṇapañcapadārthyāṃ svatantrasūtrakāratvaprasaṅga ācāryakīrtir akīrtir eva, svopajñatvābhāvāt, anabhyupagamāc ca yad āha—tadupadeśataḥ pramāṇatattvasiddhyartham iti. tasmān na vārttikatvasya kṣatīḥ.*

<sup>45</sup> Cf. PVAN 9a3: *athaivam api yathā kathamcid āmnāye pakṣapātaḥ, dignāge 'pi mā bhūd vārttikam kīrtiḥ, vimatānām asāmpradāyikānām aindriyakabhrāntyādīnām arthānām samarthanāt.*

<sup>46</sup> Cf. PVAN 9a5–6: *nanv arthaparātve 'pi vyākhyānasyāvaśyaṃ vyākhyeyollekhaḥ kvacit paryavasyati. na ca dignāgasyeva pravacanasyāpy upalabhyate. naivam. na hi pravacanābhidheyam paramapuruṣārthopayoginīm pañcapadārthīm atikramya kiñcid atra prameyam upalabhyate. vacanarītyanukārās ca moho nidānaṃ doṣāṇām ata evābhidhīyate (PV 1.223ab), ato lakṣaṇasūnyatvān niḥsvabhāvāḥ prakāśitā (PV 3.215cd) ityādayaḥ. tathā tadupekṣitatattvārthaiḥ (PV 3.219a). vyākhyeyo 'tra virodho ya (PV 2.214a) ityādibhir virodhaparihārayatnena ca tātparyaṃ pratīyate.*

<sup>47</sup> *saṃsyaṇdana*, cf. above fn. 18.

do so merely by showing compliance with the tradition: they themselves are not words being explained (*vyākhyeya*). Yamāri replies that also in the case of quotations from Dignāga's works, such as *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVin 3: 35,10f.)—which quotes PSV *ad* PS 3,2cd, beginning with “[a thesis in which] there is no inference because of its being over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇatva*)”<sup>48</sup>—no relief can be gained. He means that also here, the PSV sentence is not what is being explained. Yamāri also rejects that Dharmakīrti is treating the Buddha's teaching and Dignāga's works in the same way. Rather, Dharmakīrti's way of speaking (*vacanarīti*) is strengthened by being primarily based on the Buddha's teaching.<sup>49</sup>

The opponents then argue from another angle, saying that labeling the PV a *vārttika* not in the primary sense but in the “secondary sense”<sup>50</sup> serves the purpose of avoiding disrespect for Dignāga.<sup>51</sup> This probably means that to be a *vārttika* on the Buddha's teachings “in the secondary sense” implies that the commentator has not left Dignāga, that is, is not independent of him. This argument invokes an interesting discussion on the relationship between a commentator and the author of the text being commentated upon:

If [the purpose of avoiding disrespect for Dignāga were the intention] of the teacher [Dharmakīrti, then] precisely being primarily [based on the Buddha's teaching] would express his way of following Dignāga, just as Uddyotakara praises [the *sūtra*-maker]: “Akṣapāda is the best among the sages” (NV 1,3), [and thus] this cannot be [a sign of] his unskilfulness in speech.

[Opponents:] First of all, only that which establishes the unestablished and brings the established into practice is the proper way of following Dignāga.

<sup>48</sup> This is the fourth of the four invalid theses that are denied based on perception, inference, authorities, or what is commonly recognized (*pratyakṣānumānāptaprasiddhena*). For an English translation and a detailed explanation and discussion of this PSV passage, see Tillemans 1997: 166f.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. PVAN 9a7: *saṃsyandanamātraṃ tad iti cet. yatrāpy asādhāraṇatvād ityādāo api ka āśvāsah. yady evaṃ sāmīyam ubhayatra, etad api nāsti, ācāryavacanarīteḥ pravacana eva mukhyatayā balanāt.*

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *na ca mukhyāṃ vṛttim atikramya gaunīśaraṇam, prayojanābhāvāt* quoted below in fn. 69.

<sup>51</sup> Cf. PVAN 9b1: *ācāryadignāgāvajñoddharaṇaṃ prayojanam iti cet.*

[Yamāri:] Why was this way abandoned by the venerable teacher Dignāga?

[Opponents: For Dignāga,] another [new] work would be preferable to redeeming the various failures in Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstra*.

[Yamāri:] It is exactly the same as [Dharmakīrti] toward Dignāga. And by viewing the root [teacher]<sup>52</sup> Dignāga and [Dharma]kīrti in this way, it then becomes clear that they all have products (*śṛṣṭi*) which are different [from the works of their forerunners]. Exactly for this reason, Dignāga is not spread out to become renowned, like Vātsyāyana, and so on.<sup>53</sup>

Yamāri's conclusion is the following: In view of many aspects of incoherence (*duḥśliṣṭa*), the PV has been developed on the basis of Dignāga's work as a new work. Nonetheless, it cannot be negated that it also depends on the Noble One (*ārya*), i.e., the Buddha, because the Noble One is the primary source of knowledge (*tadupajñatva*). So, if we follow the mind of Dharmakīrti, the PV is definitely for explaining the Buddha's teachings, because Dharmakīrti is attached to them as his primary source, and because, as a commentator, his word-connection (*yukti*) is directed towards them.<sup>54</sup>

#### 4. Digressional discussion on the scope of the PVin

Related to the topic of whether Dharmakīrti's PV is about the teachings of the Buddha or the works of Dignāga, the initial verse of Dharmakīrti's other work, the PVin, is drawn into the discussion. There Dharmakīrti states: "His

<sup>52</sup> Prajñākaragupta calls Dignāga "the root teacher" (*mūlācārya*) when he quotes from his PSV *ad* PS 1.6ab (cf. Hattori 1968, 94 note 1.47) in PVA 305,16–17: *atrāpi mūlācāryavacanam virudhyate—rāgadveṣamohasukhaduḥkḥādiṣu svasaṃvedanam indriyānapekṣatvān mānasam pratyakṣam iti*.

<sup>53</sup> PVAN 9b1–3: *yady ācāryasyābhaviṣyat, mukhyataiva dignāgānugāminīm rītim avakṣyat, yathā akṣapādāḥ pravaro munīnām ityādi, yad avacanakaṣālam asahyam. ucitas tāvad ayam eva mārgo yad avihitam vidhīyate, vihitam ca pravartyata iti cet. ācārya-dignāgapādair eva tarhi katham ayaṃ parihṛto mārgaḥ. vādaśāstrau bahuvidhopa-dravapratikaraṇād varam anyakriyeti cet. tad etad dignāge 'pi samānam. tathā ca mūladignāgaṃ kīrtiṃ cāvalokayato 'nyaiva śṛṣṭir atra parisphurati. ata eva dignāgo na tanyate śrotum, vātsyāyanādivat*.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. PVAN 9b3–4: *tasmād anekaduḥśliṣṭadarśanam anyakriyām atrāpi puṣṇāti. na caivam*

system will be explained [in this work]."<sup>55</sup> This is usually also understood as indicating that Dharmakīrti was dedicating his work to Dignāga, as suggested by the commentators Dharmottara and Jñāśrībhadrā.<sup>56</sup> However, there were others who interpreted it completely differently. According to Jayanta, for instance, in this sentence, "his" (*tad°*) does not refer to Dignāga, but to the Exalted One, i.e., the one who favored Dignāga.<sup>57</sup> In this context, while Yamāri does not mention Jayanta, he does refer twice to a commentary on the PVin, the *Pramāṇaviniścayaḷaṅkāra*, and although I have yet to identify this work, it seems to contain ideas similar to those of Jayanta. Thus, it is possible that it was one of Jayanta's sources.

As we have mentioned above (cf. fn. 17), in the passage discussing Devendrabuddhi's "mistake" in his statement "Dignāga[ʼs system] is explained by the [PV]," Yamāri negates the possibility of such a mistake. To support his opinion or explain it more clearly, Yamāri introduces an opinion of certain interpreters of the PVin (*kecit*), who follow his judgment (*tadanu*). This runs as follows: Since the initial verse in the PVin can be interpreted in another way,

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*āryāpekṣayāpi pāratantryaparihāraḥ śakyah, tadupajñatvāt. tasmān mukhye tatraiva bhaktiniveśāt, vārttikakārayukteś ca tatpravaṇatvāt, tadvārttikam evedam, yady ācārya-hṛdayam anurudhyate.*

<sup>55</sup> Cf. PVin 1 1,2–5: *sa śrīmān akalaṅkadhīḥ svayam upetya āryo ʼujagrāha yaṃ vyaktaṃ tasya na vetty ayaṃ jaḍamatir loko garīyaḥ padam | tatropāsitalokabhartari kṛtā svalpāpy anarthodayā sammohād avadhīraṇā iti kṛpayā tannītir uddyotyate ||* "The glorious [Dignāga], whom the honorable [Mañjuśrī] favored through himself coming to him, has a stainless mind. Stupid people do not clearly understand his very difficult words. Due to ignorance, disrespect, even if very little, is given to the supporter of the people devoted [to him], which gives rise to harm [to them]. So, due to compassion, his system will be explained [in this work]." (Cf. the German translation in Vetter 1966: 31.)

<sup>56</sup> The following quotations should be enough to show their intention: PVinT<sub>Dh</sub> D 2a2–4: *sdug bsngal dang sdug bsngal gyi rgyu las bsgral bar ʼdod paʼi snying rje de ni brtse ba ste | de rgyur gyur pas gang la ʼphags pas rjes su gzung ba deʼi gzhung kho bos dgrol bar byas te | deʼi mdoʼi rnam ʼgrel byaʼo ||*; PVinT<sub>Jñ</sub> D178b5–6 (=P210b3–4): *de ni dpal ldan zhe byaʼi tshigs su bcaḍ pa ʼdis ni phyogs kyi glang poʼi zhal snga nas bshad paʼi yang dag paʼi shes paʼi yul can gyi rigs pa rab tu byed pa ʼdis gsal bar byaʼo zhes ston to ||* [<sup>a</sup>*shes paʼi P* : omitted in D]

<sup>57</sup> Cf. PVAṬ 2b5: *deʼi lugs zhes bya ba la sogs pa yang | de zhes bya ba ni bcom ldan ʼdas sam rjes su ʼdzin pa po zhes bya baʼi don to ||*

the *Alaṅkāra*'s (i.e., the *Pramāṇaviniścayaālaṅkāra*'s) assertion that the PVin is a commentary on the Buddha's teaching displays the extent of Dharmakīrti's self-confidence. Nonetheless, it is not the case that it was not intended as a commentary on Dignāga, so there is no fault that he does not follow Dignāga (*doṣa*<sup>58</sup>).<sup>59</sup> Certain other people (*anye*), however, cannot accept this interpretation of *Alaṅkāra*'s assertion, saying that being a commentary on the Buddha's teachings<sup>60</sup> is Dharmakīrti's intention, this is in fact ascertained from his writing, i.e., his PVin, because what is said in other sources is not reliable.<sup>61</sup> While Yamāri admits its being reasonable, he says that the above-mentioned fault remains. He explain: If so, i.e., if Dharmakīrti is an explainer of the Buddha's teaching independently of Dignāga, then, just like him, Prajñākaragupta should also be an explainer exactly of the Buddha's teaching independently of Dharmakīrti. Indeed, the fault of a commentator not following his teacher's teaching arises when he claims to be explaining his teacher's work. When independent of his teacher, a commentator has an advantage, because he can discuss a repeated reference (*anuvāda*)<sup>62</sup> of an old topic. In the PVin, the teacher Dharmakīrti also brings something

<sup>58</sup> For *doṣa*, cf. *tadīyānanuvarttanadoṣaḥ* quoted below in fn. 63. In another place Yamāri mentions an opinion that labeling the PV a *vārttika* in the "secondary sense" serves the purpose of avoiding disrespect for Dignāga, cf. above fn. 51.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. PVAN 7a5–6: *tadanu kecid ācakṣate—tannītir uddiyotyata ity anyathāpi nirvoḍḍhum śakyatvāt, pravacanavārttikatvapratijñānam prauḍhimātrāviśkaraṇam, na tu dignāge vārttikatvam anabhipretam evālaṅkārasya, tato na doṣa iti*. Cf. the translation in Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming.

<sup>60</sup> To my understanding, *tad* in *tad asya hṛdayam* refers to *pravacanavārttikatva*<sup>o</sup> in the previous sentence (cf. above fn. 59).

<sup>61</sup> Cf. PVAN 7a6: *anye tv etan na saḥante—tad asya hṛdayam iti hi lekhanād avadhāryate, anyatrāpy anāśvāsād iti*. Cf. the translation in Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming.

<sup>62</sup> On *anuvāda* cf. NS 2.1.65–67: *vidhivihitasyānuvacanam anuvādaḥ. nānuvādapunaruktayor viśeṣaḥ śabdābhyāśopapattēḥ. śīghrataraḡamanopadeśavad abhyāśān nāviśeṣaḥ*. "Reiteration is the recitation of an injunction or of that which has been enjoined. [Objection:] There is no difference between reiteration and tautology, because [in both cases] repetition of the [same] word occurs [Reply:] It is not non-different, because [in the case of reiteration,] through the repetition [an action of highest quality is caused,] like the instruction 'go faster!' " (Cf. NV 256,5–257,10 *ad loc.*). For a discussion of the word used in current context, see Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming.

of Dignāga into his own work, in order to make sure that such a discussion is possible. It is thus not improper.<sup>63</sup> Yamāri's intention seems to be clear. He agrees with the first group of interpreters (*kecit*), i.e., he also considers that the PVin, which is a *vārttika* on the Buddha's teaching, also intends to explain Dignāga; thus there is no fault of not following Dignāga. With regard to the second group of interpreters (*anye*), who do not accept that the PVin is also for Dignāga, Yamāri points out that in this case, the mentioned fault would remain. He explains further that the fault exists if one claims to be an explainer of one's teacher. To be independent of this, one can only examine repeatedly discussed topics, as is exactly the case for the PVin. While it is an independent *vārttika* on the Buddha's teachings, it also contains explanations of Dignāga's words.

To strengthen his argument, Yamāri discusses also the closing verse of the PVin, in which Dharmakīrti expresses that the *sūtra* has been ascertained by him with the statement "this content is correct," etc.<sup>64</sup> From the context, it seems that Yamāri is considering the word "*sūtra*" to refer to the Buddha's teachings, not Dignāga's PS, as other commentators interpreted it.<sup>65</sup> This is why Yamāri is saying that in that case the reasoning-master, i.e., Dharmakīrti, permits himself to disrespect (*anādara*) the transmission, i.e., Dignāga's

<sup>63</sup> Cf. PVAN 7a6–7: *yuktaṃ caitat. kevalaṃ sa doṣas tadavastha eva—evaṃ tarhi vārttikakāravat pravacana eva bhāṣyakāro 'py astu svātāntryeṇa. ācāryavyākhyāsvīkāre hi tadīyānanuvarttanadoṣaḥ. svātāntrye tu sa eva guṇaḥ, prācyaprameyānuvādasya vaktum śakyatvāt. viniścaye ca dignāgād ācāryākaṛṣaṇam ātmīye tathā sambhavinam eva dr̥ḍhīkartum iti kim anupapannam.* Cf. the translation in Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. PVin 3 137,7–10: *yukto'yam artha iti sūtram amoghanīter draṣṭur mayāgamitam āgamam adhyupekṣya | tasyāpy avaśyam avadātadhiyo 'yam eva bhāvo 'vibhāvitadhiyā-vidito janena ||* "Disregarding the tradition [i.e., the commentaries], the *sūtra* of the one who apprehends the unfailing system is ascertained by me in the form: 'the content is correct.' Also of his certainly purified mind the very intention is not understood by the people whose mind is not clear."

<sup>65</sup> For example, according to Dharmottara, *sūtra* refers to Dignāga's PS, while *vṛtti* refers to the commentaries of Īśvarasena and others who follow him. Cf. PVin<sub>T</sub><sub>Dh</sub> D177a4 (=P208b4): *m̐do b̐dag<sup>a</sup> gyis b̐stan gyi | 'grel pa<sup>b</sup> ni ma yin gyi 'grel pa<sup>c</sup> ni 'di nyid yin no<sup>d</sup> || dbang phyug sde dang de'i phyogs pa gzhan snga ma dag gis ni 'grel pa<sup>e</sup> phyin ci log tu byas so ||* [<sup>a</sup>b̐dag P : dag D. <sup>b</sup>'grel pa em. : 'grel pas D : 'brel ba P. <sup>c</sup>'rel pa D : 'brel ba P. <sup>d</sup>yin no P : ma yin no D, <sup>e</sup>'grel pa em. : 'brel ba D, P.]

teachings. The opponent argues against this, saying that Dharmakīrti is recognizing his respect to Dignāga in the PVin's initial verse: "His system will be explained." In reply, Yamāri again cites the explanation in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaśālikāra*, according to which Dharmakīrti is saying that what people do not understand are the words of the Exalted One who supports them, not the words of Dignāga.<sup>66</sup> Thus Dharmakīrti recognizes that his PVin is certainly on the Buddha's teachings.<sup>67</sup>

Yamāri draws the following conclusion: At the beginning of the PVin, the phrase "supporter of the people who are devoted [to him]" refers to the Exalted One. This is because at the end of the treatise, the expression "the one who apprehends" in the phrase "the *sūtra* of the one who apprehends [the unfailing system] is ascertained by me" cannot refer to Dignāga, since Dignāga had not attained the stage (*bhūmi*) of a *sūtra*-maker. Also the word "*sūtra*" cannot be applied to something other than the Buddha's teachings on objects to be validly cognized, such as "non-existence of self." But since "non-existence of self," etc., are in this position, also Dharmakīrti can treat them directly as *sūtra*. And it is not taking refuge in the "secondary sense" by passing over the use of the primary sense,<sup>68</sup> because there is no need to do so.<sup>69</sup>

With regard to the PVin, Yamāri is following the *Pramāṇaviniścayaśālikāra*'s interpretation, which holds the PVin to be a commentary on the Buddha's teachings. This opinion is also shared by Jayanta. However, Yamāri does

<sup>66</sup> Cf. the verse quoted above in fn. 55. Note the difference in the interpretation. In the PVin, *śrīmān* is usually understood to refer to Dignāga, whom the Exalted One supports and whose words are not understood by people. But here, in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaśālikāra*, it is said that the people whom the Exalted One supports do not understand the Exalted One's words.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. PVAN 9a3–5: *athātroktam evācāyeṇa—yukto 'yam artha ityādinā, sampradāye 'nādaras tarhi svayam anujñāto nyāyanātheneti, kim ataḥ param. tannītir udyotyata iti svayam eva pratijñānam iti cet. śrīmān āryo bhāgavān yaṃ lokam svayam anujagrāha, ayaṃ lokas tasya padaṃ na vetīty artho vyākhyātaḥ pramāṇaviniścayaśālikāre. ataḥ pravacana eva tadvārttikatoḥ pratijñānam.*

<sup>68</sup> Cf. *pravacane 'pi nedaṃ vārttikam mukhyavṛttyā, api tu vārttikam iva vārttikam* quoted above in fn. 41.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. PVAN 9a7–b1: *prārambha upāśitalokabhartarītyādikaṃ bhagavaty eva nyāyayam, paryante ca draṣṭuḥ sūtram mayāgamitam iti bhūprāpter abhāvād ācāryadignāgasya draṣṭṛśabdasyānupapatteḥ. sūtram ity api nairātmyādaḥ prameye na pravacanād anyatra.*



not exclude the other aspect of the work: It also explains Dignāga's system. The purpose of Yamāri's discussion on the PVin is apparently to support his position with regard to the PV, which he also considers to be about the Buddha's teachings, not merely about the works of Dignāga.

## 5. Conclusion

Based on the above survey, we can draw the following conclusions about Yamāri's opinions:

1. The statement "Dignāga is explained by the [PV]" attributed to Devendrabuddhi reflects the historical background that a group of explainers of Dharmakīrti regarded Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* as having been written to elucidate the work of Dignāga.
2. Yamāri does not consider Devendrabuddhi to be wrong in saying this, because, in his view, such a statement is easy to understand, even for a child. Yamāri also mentions that Devendrabuddhi ascertained the *Pramāṇavārttika* to be a commentary on Dignāga by considering Dharmakīrti's attachment to Dignāga and seeing his defense of Dignāga's position. On the other hand, Yamāri also holds that Devendrabuddhi did not receive a direct transmission of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, and thus his restriction of the *Pramāṇavārttika* to Dignāga's system is not accepted. That is to say, in Yamāri's view, the *Pramāṇavārttika* does not explain Dignāga's system alone, but is rather much more a commentary on the Buddha's teachings.
3. In discussing the definition of "*vārttika*," Yamāri makes his view still more clear. The *Pramāṇavārttika*, being a "*vārttika*," is not only a new work based on Dignāga's system, it is also dependent on the Buddha's teachings. In this way, we understand that Yamāri's basic opinions are consistent.
4. To support his opinion about the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, Yamāri also discusses the initial and closing verses of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. He follows the *Pramāṇaviniścayālaṅkāra*, and thus he agrees in fact also with Jayanta, although he does not say this specifically. He states clearly that

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*tatsthānīyatvāt tu kīrtir api sūtram eva. na ca mukhyāṃ vṛttim atikramya gauṇīśaraṇam, prayojanābhāvāt.*

it is a commentary on the Buddha's teachings. But he admits also that it includes the explanations of Dignāga's system.

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# What Comes First, Word or Sentence Meaning? Dharmakīrti as a Contextualist\*

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## Introduction

I have long been puzzled by the Buddhist philosophers' ostensible reluctance to deal with the difficult issue of sentence meaning (*vākyārtha*). To judge from later digests on this and related topics, such as Śālikanātha's *Vākyārthamātrkā* (9<sup>th</sup> c.), Mukulabhaṭṭa's *Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā* (end of the 9<sup>th</sup> c.), and Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattvabindu* (10<sup>th</sup> c.), in which their views hardly appear, their contribution seems to have been—or at least felt—negligible. To the best of my knowledge, the Buddhists did not systematically criticize the grammarians' *vākyasphoṭa* and “the view that a sentence is an indivisible unit”<sup>1</sup> (*akhaṇḍapakṣa*)—a reason for this possibly being Dignāga's embarrassing endorsement of the latter. Nor did they object to the two competing Mīmāṃsaka models known as the “denotation of connected [meanings]” (*anvitābhīdhāna*) and the “connection of denoted [meanings]” (*abhihitānvaya*).<sup>2</sup> And in spite of sporadic but generally non-technical occur-

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<sup>1</sup> Hattori 1979: 64. On Dignāga's view of *pratibhā*, “intuition,” “insight,” as the sentence meaning, see Hattori 1979, Pind 2015: II.166–177, David 2021: 857–862 (and p. 831–832, n. 14, for numerous references on Bhartṛhari's treatment of *pratibhā* in VP 2.143–151), and below.

<sup>2</sup> According to Saxena's (2022: 287–288) rendering of these two terms; alternative translations are “expression of relational meanings” vs. “relation of expressed meanings” (Ollett 2022: 254) and “theory of the denotation of a connected referent” vs. “theory of connection between denoted referents” (Kataoka 2021: 532 and 534–

rences of *ākāṅkṣā*, the three (sometimes four) conditions responsible for verbal understanding (*śābdabodha*), i.e., compatibility (*yogyatā*), proximity (*sannidhi*), and dependency/expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), are conspicuous by their absence in the Buddhist treatises I am aware of.

To be sure, the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra and Sautrāntika teachers developed interesting, albeit quite rudimentary, views on sentence (*pada* [kāya]) in their treatment of the factors dissociated from thought (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*), a category of *dharma*s the existence of which was hotly disputed among Buddhist dogmaticians.<sup>3</sup> In this debate, the Vaibhāṣikas were inclined to grant meaning a unitary, hypostatic, and “transphonetic” nature that was regarded as dangerously close to the non-Buddhists’ *sphoṭa* by the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras.<sup>4</sup> In a typically reductionist vein, the

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535). On these theories of sentence meaning, see, e.g., Kunjunni Raja 1963: 95–148 and 189–227, Hattori 1979, Bronkhorst 2019: 56–61 and 227–289, Kataoka 2020 and 2021, Ollett 2020, Saxena 2022.

<sup>3</sup> See AK 2.47ab and AKBh 80,12–81,28 thereon (La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931: I.238–243), Jaini 1959, Cox 1995: 159–171 and 377–408. Vasubandhu (AKBh 80,15–16) provides a twofold definition of the sentence (*pada*[kāya] = *vākyā*[*saṃukti*], AK 2.47ab; cf. Cox 1995: 377), with a first part he inherits from earlier Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika treatises, the other being apparently his own: *vākyam padam yāvātārthaparisaṃnāptiḥ / tadvyathānityā bata saṃskārā ityevamādi / yena kriyāguṇakālasambandhaviśeṣaṃ gamyante* /. “With ‘*pada*,’ [we mean] a sentence, to the extent that the meaning [of the statement] is complete, as in the [*logion*]: ‘Impermanent indeed are the conditioned things,’ etc. [A sentence is that] by which the distinctive relations of verbal activity, quality, and tense are understood.” Translation of the second definition Cox 1995: 399, n. 8. Cf. TSP<sub>K</sub> 723,15–16/TSP<sub>S</sub> 614,11: *parisaṃnāptārtham śabdārūpam vākyam ucyate* /. “What is called a sentence is a linguistic nature having a complete meaning.” While commenting on Vasubandhu, Yaśomitra quotes MBh 2.1.1 *vārttika* 9 (I.367,10): *[ākhyātam] sāvyayakāraṇaviśeṣaṇam vākyam* /. “[La phrase] consiste dans le verbe et les invariants (= adverbes), les formes casuelles (= régimes) et leurs déterminants.” Translation Renou 1942: 271. He provides the following examples (AKVy 182,28–29): *pacati paṭhati gacchatīti kṛṣṇo gauro rakta iti pacati pakṣyaty apākṣīd iti*. According to Yaśomitra, “in that way, it is said that name is that which indicates the particular inherent characteristic [...], and phrase is that which indicates the distinctive relations of verbal activity, and so on.” (AKVy 182,31–32: *evam svalakṣaṇābhidyotakam nāma kriyādisambandhaviśeṣābhidyotakam padam ity uktam bhavati* /. Translation Cox 1995: 399, n. 8.)

<sup>4</sup> The Vaibhāṣika author (Vimalamitra?) of the ADīp already defended him-

representatives of these two intellectual traditions advocated the physical nature of phonemes (hence of words, sentences, etc.)<sup>5</sup> and the purely conventional character of meaning. In the 6<sup>th</sup> century at the latest, this intra-Buddhistic controversy died down with the Sautrāntikas/Yogācāras gaining the upper hand as logic and epistemology became the main focus of the Buddhist intellectuals.<sup>6</sup> However, no sooner had that debate subsided than a symmetrical front line came to oppose the Buddhists and the Grammarians over the *sphoṭa*. Although Dharmakīrti (around 600?) and his followers concentrated their arguments on what may be called the *padasphoṭa* and left the *vākyasphoṭa* largely unconsidered,<sup>7</sup> their uncompromising rejection of a non-phonetic meaning bearer made their acceptance of an indivisible sentence and sentence meaning very unlikely. And indeed, no Buddhist thinker I am aware of ever endorsed this position after Dharmakīrti, and plausibly even after Dignāga.<sup>8</sup>

Given his own reductionist tendencies and his indebtedness to Vasubandhu, Dignāga's acceptance of an indivisible sentence meaning seems

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self against the charge of appropriating the Brahmanical *sphoṭa* (ADīp 2.146ab): *sphoṭākhyo nāparo ghoṣāc chabdo nityaḥ prasidhyati* /. "[Our factor dissociated from thought] is not established as the permanent linguistic unit (*śabda*) called *sphoṭa* [that according to the Brahmanical grammarians is] distinct from [physical] sound." Kamalaśīla (TSP<sub>K</sub> 723,3/TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 613,31 on TS<sub>K</sub> 2713–2714/TS<sub>Ś</sub> 2712–2713) explicitly identifies the Vaibhāṣika position with the *sphoṭavāda*: *vaibhāṣikā hi kecit padakāyā\*bhīdhānena vākyasphoṭam anityatvāj janyaṃ pratipannāḥ* /. \*-kāyā- em.: -kāryā- Eds. "For with the expression '*padakāya*,' certain Vaibhāṣikas teach a *vākyasphoṭa* that can be produced because it is impermanent." See Eltschinger 2007b: 164, n. 15.

<sup>5</sup> For a useful summary, see Omae 1999. Here as elsewhere, Dharmakīrti recognizes as meaningful those sound particulars (*śabdasvalakṣaṇa*, i.e., *dhvani*, *varṇa*, etc.) that have been conceptually identified, or recognized, as similar with others. The homogeneousness and repeatability of *varṇas* is due to intellectual construction, not to their ontological character.

<sup>6</sup> Or is this impression rather to be explained by the paucity of later, "Neo-Vaibhāṣika" sources?

<sup>7</sup> On Dharmakīrti's critique of the *sphoṭa*, see Eltschinger 2001.

<sup>8</sup> Note David 2021: 858: "Dignāga [...] is the earliest advocate of Bhartṛhari's theory of *pratibhā* or, to be more precise, its only known advocate outside the field of Vyākaraṇa if we except [a] brief passage on injunctions and prohibitions from Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*."

difficult to explain. Is it just that our acquaintance with the intellectual tradition he initiated and its dominant theoretical attitudes makes this philosophical choice surprising to us? After all, ideas of that sort had proved rather appealing in Sarvāstivāda circles, and Bhartṛhari exerted a strong influence on Dignāga, as is testified, e.g., by the latter's *Traikālyaparīkṣā*. Needless to say, Dignāga had no Buddhist epistemological tradition against which to measure the relative orthodoxy of his positions—the Buddhist epistemological tradition's exegesis of Dignāga was to a large extent an attempt to smooth out his views in order to align them with the dominant, Dharmakīrtian paradigm. To judge from the paucity of later statements on the subject of sentence meaning, Dignāga's successors likely disapproved of their *ācārya*'s wholesale adoption of Bhartṛhari's ideas. Indeed, in addition to the reductionist tendencies mentioned above, the few statements I am aware of rather point in direction of proto-*abhihitānvaya* and proto-*anvitābhidhāna* positions—keeping in mind that in the 7<sup>th</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> centuries, the debate between *abhihitānvayavāda* and *anvitābhidhānavāda*, the coalescence of which is generally credited to Śālikanātha, likely had not crystallized yet; ascribing either of these positions to pre-9<sup>th</sup> century Buddhist philosophers may thus very well be anachronistic. To be honest, none of the Buddhist positions examined below can be said to exhibit more than family resemblance with these two models. As far as my knowledge goes, Dharmakīrti makes no pronouncement on sentence meaning proper,<sup>9</sup> but rather formulates certain ideas on word meaning that have indirect consequences for the issue of sentence meaning.

As suggested by Masaaki Hattori in his pioneering article “*Apoha* and *pratibhā*” (1979), Śāntarakṣita (725–788) may have leant toward the *abhihitānvaya* model, and this quite plausibly under the pressure of Kumāra's (around 600?) critique of the *apoha* theory. In the present paper, I would like to discuss a short passage from the PVSV that, in my and especially Karṇaka-

<sup>9</sup> In my opinion, claiming, as Dharmakīrti so systematically does in the framework of his controversy with the Mīmāṃsā, that words refer to their speaker's intention and that this intentional content can be successfully inferred by the listener on the basis of shared linguistic conventions (on *pratibhā* as an inferential mark of the speaker's intention, see PST<sub>MS B</sub> 238a7–b1 in Pind 2015: II.176, n. 592), is not tantamount to explaining how words and especially sentences mean what they are intended to mean.



gomin's (around 800) opinion, possibly hints at Dharmakīrti's preference for something like the *anvitābhīdhāna* model, or, better, at his truthfulness to Dignāga's contention that in linguistic practice words are not used in isolation and only yield meaning in the explicit or implicit framework of a sentence. By prioritizing sentence over word meaning, this type of approach, though taking for granted the conventional existence of words, may have been considered closer to Dignāga's original pronouncement in favor of an undivided *pratibhā* and the nonexistence of individual words. In doing so, Dharmakīrti came close to Gottlob Frege's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's "Context Principle" ("never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition"), which reflects these philosophers' "conviction that in order to understand how language is meaningful, we need to explore how people actually use it."<sup>10</sup> Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (740–795) were of course well aware of this passage, which they substantially amplified, apparently without perceiving it as contradictory with the *abhihitānvayavāda* they supposedly favored. Their position might thus have been more nuanced, or, better perhaps, theoretically less conscious, than suggested by Hattori's depiction, especially if the controversy surrounding sentence meaning was at best still in its formative stage around 760.

Dharmakīrti's somewhat abstruse statement would remain almost unintelligible without the help of Śākyabuddhi's (660–720?) and Karṇakagomin's PVT and PVSVT commentaries. As usual, whereas Śākyabuddhi has very little to offer beyond literal and plain philosophical explanations, Karṇakagomin's gloss abounds in historically relevant information, identifying opponents, adducing textual parallels, recontextualizing and updating arguments, etc. There are reasons to believe that Karṇakagomin was the first Buddhist philosopher to show a clear awareness of the controversy and its terminology. This raises interesting questions on the early history of the distinction between *anvitābhīdhāna* and *abhihitānvaya*, hence on the relative chronology of Śālikanātha and Karṇakagomin.

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<sup>10</sup> Lucas 2015 (not paginated); I am much obliged to my friend John Taber for drawing my attention to this publication. On contextualism in the framework of the *anvitābhīdhānavāda*, see Ollett 2020: 252–253.

## Dignāga and Bhartṛhari

Dignāga presents his views on sentence meaning toward the end of the *apoha* chapter of his PS(V) (stanzas 5.46–49). In spite of his elliptic and at times even cryptic style of exposition, suffice it here to quote PS 5.46–47 together with their autocommentary—needless to say, my understanding is heavily indebted to earlier work on this passage by Hattori, Pind, and David:

The [above-mentioned] meaning of the word [i.e., the exclusion of other things,] is conceived of after extracting [the word] from the sentence. [As for] the meaning of the sentence, which is called ‘intuition,’ it arises first by means of the [meaning of the word].<sup>11</sup> Although the [individual] word does not exist [as a signifier of its own], its meaning is established by way of assumption (*utprekṣā*) according to [the different linguistic-philosophical] traditions once [it has been] extracted from the sentence, because [a word] is not used in isolation, in the same way as [verbal] bases and affixes [are not used in isolation]. [In our tradition,] however (*ca*), this assumption apprehends a meaning [i.e., the exclusion of other things,] that is not [regarded as] correct in the other traditions. It is why this different meaning[, which alone is rational, has been] posited (*utkṣipta*, PSV<sub>KV</sub> *bkod pa*, PSV<sub>VR</sub> *ñe bar b’zag pa*), because, at the beginning, for those with no [cognitive] habituation of the relation between word and meaning (PSV<sub>KV</sub> *sgra la don gyi ’brel pa*, PSV<sub>VR</sub> *sgra’i don dan ’brel pa*), the intuition of the sentence meaning is mediated (*-upāya*) by the apprehension of the word meaning. [But] it is the sentence, together with its meaning, that are the primary linguistic unit and meaning (*śabdārtha*), because they are indivisible. For the alternative (*anya*) belief, the mistaken apprehension (*anyaḥ... -abhimānaḥ*) of a linguistic unit and [its] meaning in the interval [between the first element heard and the grasping of an entire linguistic unit], it is [merely] due to assumption, because [this assumption] is [entirely] autonomous. As for those who disregard an intuition of meanings and think of another sentence meaning, i.e., the external object or the [mutual] relation between these [external objects], this is mere thinking! Why? Because various kinds of undertakings arise from sentences according to [one’s cognitive] habituation even in the absence of an [external] object, in

<sup>11</sup> Jinendrabuddhi’s PST<sub>MS B</sub> 236b2–6 (quoted and translated in Pind 2015: II.166–167, n. 557) provides an interesting explanation of PS 5.46.

conformity with one's own ideas.<sup>12</sup> [To explain:] Together with the [corresponding] conceptual representation, the undertaking of an efficacious activity arises from a sentence in various shapes in dependence on the impression [left] by the [past] habit of the meaning, [and this] even in the absence of an external object, in conformity with one's own ideas, as when one hears 'a tiger [is coming]' [although no tiger is around].<sup>13</sup> Or, [even] if the [thing] is the same, from hearing a love poem, [persons who are] passionate have an understanding that conforms with passion, whereas those who are detached [have an understanding] that conforms with distress.<sup>14</sup>

As was pointed out by Hattori and shown even more systematically by Pind, there is hardly anything in Dignāga's account of sentence meaning that

<sup>12</sup> Understanding *pratyaya* as "idea(s)," and not as "cause(s)/condition(s)" (suggested by PS[V]<sub>Tib</sub> *rkyen*, and PST<sub>MS B</sub> 237b2–3, in Pind 2015: II.172, n. 580). On the meaning of *svapratyay(ānukāreṇ)a*, see Pind 2015: II.172, n. 580; see also below. My translation of *pratipatti* as "undertakings" instead of "cognitions" is indebted to David 2021: 859; although Buddhist philosophical texts frequently use *pratipatti* in the sense of *anuṣṭhāna*, I have to confess that I am still hesitant about the exact value of this word in the present context. The same is true of my (= David's) translation of *arthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpā*, below.

<sup>13</sup> For abundant materials concerning this simile, see Pind 2015: II.173–174, n. 587; see also David 2021: 830, and 861–862.

<sup>14</sup> PSV<sub>rec. Skt.</sub> 55,9–58,2 with PS 5.46 (quoted in TSP<sub>K</sub> 294,16–17/TSP<sub>S</sub> 255,5–6 on TS<sub>K</sub> 922/TS<sub>S</sub> 921) and PS 5.47: *apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ*①/ *vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yaṃ tenādāo upajanyate*② // *padasyāsato 'pi vākyād apoddhṛtasya yathāgamam utprekṣayārtho vyavasthāpyate kevalasyāprayogāt prakṛtipratyayavat. sā cotprekṣānyeṣv āgameṣv ayuktārthagrahaṇī. tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣiptam, yasmād ādāo anabhyastaśabdārthasambandhānām padārthagrahaṇopāyā vākyārthapratibhā. vākyam eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdārthau, tayoṛ abhinnavat. yo hy anyas tadantarāle śabdārthagrahaṇābhimānaḥ, sa utprekṣayā, niraṅkuśatvāt. ye 'py artheṣu pratibhāṃ hitvānyaṃ bāhyaṃ arthaṃ tatsambandhaṃ vā vākyārthaṃ kalpayanti, teṣāṃ api tat kalpanāmātram. kasmāt? yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate / svapratyayānukāreṇa pratipattir anekadhā // asaty api bāhye 'rthe svapratyayānūrūpenārthābhyāsavāsanāpekṣā vākyād arthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpotpadyate vikalpaś ca, vyāghrādīśrutivat. tadaviśeṣe vā śṛṅgārakāvyaśya śravaṇād rāginām rāgānūrūpā pratītir bhavati, vītarāgāṇāṃ tu saṃvegānūrūpā. ①vikalpitaḥ PS<sub>Pind</sub>, PST<sub>pratīka</sub>, PS<sub>Tib KV/VR</sub> (*rnam par brtags*): *vivecitaḥ* TSP. ②*upajanyate* PS<sub>Pind</sub>, TSP: *upajāyate* PS<sub>Hattori 1979,63</sub>. For alternative translations, see Hattori 1979, *passim*, and Pind 2015: II.166–175.*

cannot be traced to Bhartṛhari's VP(V), a fact Jinendrabuddhi (710–770) was well aware of, who quotes several stanzas from this grammatical treatise while commenting on the PS(V). As mentioned above, Dignāga's understanding of the *vākyārtha* as *pratibhā* is directly indebted to the grammarian-philosopher,<sup>15</sup> to whose name this doctrine is generally associated as the foundation of the so-called *akhaṇḍapakṣa*.<sup>16</sup> Like Dignāga in the above-quoted passage, Bhartṛhari regards individual words as non-existent<sup>17</sup> and artificially abstracted from the sentence,<sup>18</sup> although they are the initial and purely provisional means of apprehending larger, meaningful units.<sup>19</sup> Both authors insist on the role and autonomy of *utprekṣā* in the abstraction process (see below).<sup>20</sup> Dignāga's ideas on these aspects of the theory, as well as the example of the verbal bases and affixes (*prakṛtipratyayavat*),<sup>21</sup> are borrowed without significant change from the VP. The Buddhist philosopher also agrees with Bhartṛhari and earlier Sanskrit grammarians on the fact that individual words are not resorted to in everyday usage, a conception that likely played an important role in shaping Dharmakīrti's ideas on the relationship between word and sentence meaning.<sup>22</sup> The same can be said of his allusion to

<sup>15</sup> VP 2.143 (Pind 2015: II.166, n. 557; Hattori 1979, 62), and more generally VP 2.143–152; VP 1.110, VP 2.117. According to David's in-depth study of this concept, the early testimonies concerning *pratibhā* present it "as a cognition 1. without a referent (*artha*, *vastu*, *ālambana*) in the external world; 2. having the form of verbal knowledge (*śabdajñānākāra*); 3. arising because of traces (*vāsanā*, *bhāvanā*) left by training (*abhyāsa*) and 4. the direct cause of an activity or the cessation of it (*pravṛtti*/*nivṛtti*)" (2021: 862). To put it otherwise, "*pratibhā* is a non-representational form of *practical knowledge*, immediately leading one to action, and that cognition is the only 'object of a sentence'" (2021: 834). Much emphasis is laid on the *pratibhā*'s twin properties of incommunicability and unfathomability.

<sup>16</sup> Hattori 1979: 64.

<sup>17</sup> VP 1.85.

<sup>18</sup> VP 2.269 (Pind 2015: II.166, n. 555), VP 2.10 (Hattori 1979: 64), VP 3.1.1.

<sup>19</sup> VP 1.85 (*grahaṇopāya*).

<sup>20</sup> On *utprekṣā*, see Pind 2015: II.253–255 = Appendix 14, and the discussion of VPV 1 65,1–6, below; VP 3.3.86 (Pind 2015: II.170–171, n. 573); on *nirāṅkuṣa*, see also below, n. 35.

<sup>21</sup> VP 2.10, VP 3.1.1.

<sup>22</sup> VP 2.271, quoted in PST<sub>MSB</sub> 237a2–3 (Pind 2015: II.168, n. 562, Hattori 1979: 65), VPV 1 65,1ff. (below); see also MBh I.219,10–18 (*vārttikas* 7–8) and VP 2.194ab

the mistaken apprehension of individual linguistic units and meanings in the interval between the first utterance and the end of the word/phrase.<sup>23</sup> Prior to Dignāga, Bhartṛhari emphasized the intuition's intimate connection with purposeful action (*arthakriyā*).<sup>24</sup> Dignāga's insistence on cognitive habituation or repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) in the rise of meaning and action,<sup>25</sup> as well as on the role of latent dispositions/impressions (*saṃskāra*, *vāsanā*), was already pointed out by Bhartṛhari.<sup>26</sup> Finally, several expressions—*svapratyayānukāreṇa*, *pratipattir nānāvidhotpadyate*—are silent quotations or at least discernible echoes from the VP.<sup>27</sup>

It is to be noted, however, that contrary to Kumārila's opinion (see below), Dignāga did not lose sight of the *apoha* proper while appropriating Bhartṛhari's views on sentence meaning. According to PS(V) 5.48, a competent speaker's intuition points to a sentence meaning (e.g., "Devadatta, bring a white cow") that is excluded (*vyavacchinna*) from the meanings of all other sentences (e.g., "Yajñadatta, go to Pāṭaliputra").<sup>28</sup> Moreover, Dignāga regards the intuition that arises from a sentence as a genuine perception<sup>29</sup> (*pratyakṣa*) inasmuch as it is self-conscious (*rañ rig yin pas/phyir*),<sup>30</sup> and this in spite of the fact that this cognition "entail[s] various representations" (*rnam rtog sna tshogs*<sub>PS VR</sub>, *sna tshogs rtog pa*<sub>PS KV</sub>, *\*nānākalpikā*?<sup>31</sup>). Its synthetic

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(Pind 2015: II.169, n. 563)

<sup>23</sup> VP 1.85, quoted in PST<sub>MS B</sub> 236b6–237a1 (Pind 2015: II.167, n. 558; Hattori 1979: 64).

<sup>24</sup> See VPV 1 75,4–5 on VP 1.24–26 (Pind 2015: II.173, n. 582); see also VP 1.113, VP 2.146 (*itikartavyatā*) (Hattori 1979: 72, n. 19).

<sup>25</sup> VP 2.117 (*abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ*) (Hattori 1979: 66; see below, n. 32), VP 2.152 (Pind 2015: II.173, n. 584).

<sup>26</sup> See VP 1.113 (*pūrvāhitasamskāra*, *bhāvanāsamskāra* [VPV 1 187,1]) (Pind 2015: II.173, n. 585), VP 2.146 (*bhāvanā*) (Hattori 1979: 72, n. 19).

<sup>27</sup> VP 2.134 (*pratipattir anekadhā*) (Pind 2015: II.172, n. 579), VPV 1 199,4 (*pratipattir utpadyate*) (Pind 2015: II.173, n. 586); cf. VPV 1 187,2 (*pratipattir utpadyate*); VP 2.135 (*svapratyayānusāreṇa*) (Pind 2015: II.172, n. 580).

<sup>28</sup> These examples are taken from Jinendrabuddhi's PST<sub>MS B</sub> 238a5–6 (see Pind 2015: II.175–176, n. 591).

<sup>29</sup> Mental perception according to Pind 2015: II.176, n. 596.

<sup>30</sup> PS(V) 5.49 (Hattori 1982: 146–147).

<sup>31</sup> Pind 2015: II.176, n. 594.

character is emphasized in an interesting explanation by Kamalaśīla on TS<sub>K</sub> 892/TS<sub>5</sub> 891 ( $\approx$  VP 2.117<sup>32</sup>).<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> VP 2.117: *abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuḥ śabdaḥ sarvo 'paraiḥ smṛtaḥ*① / *bālānāṃ ca tiraścāṃ ca yathārthapratipādanā* // ①TS<sub>K</sub> 892/TS<sub>5</sub> 891: *sarvaḥ śabdaḥ samāsataḥ*. “It is held by some others [who maintain the *akhaṇḍapakṣa*] that every word becomes the cause of *pratibhā* by repeated practice, just as in the case of teaching the meaning to children and animals.” Translation Hattori 1979: 66. According to Hattori (*ibid.*), “[t]he practice of apprehending the meaning of speech is repeated not only in the present life but also in the past life, so that even children and animals are evoked to *pratibhā* by dint of the impression (*saṃskāra*, *bhāvanā*) of repeated practice. It is through *pratibhā* that they understand what to do (*itikartavyatā*).” On *abhyāsa* and *pratibhā*, see especially David 2021: 843–845, and *passim*.

<sup>33</sup> TSP<sub>K</sub> 286,12–19/TSP<sub>5</sub> 247,29–248,7 (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 319b3–7): *śabdasya kvacid viśaye punaḥ punaḥ pravṛttidarśanam abhyāsaḥ / niyatasādhanaṇvacchinna*①*kriyāpratipatty-anukūla prajñā pratibhā / sā prayogadarśanāvṛttisahitena śabdena*②*janyate / prati-vākyam pratipuruṣam ca sā bhidyate / sa tu tasyā aparimāṇo bhedaḥ śabdavyava-hārasyānanyān na śakyate vidhātum [...]* / *yathāiva hy aṅkuśābhighātādayo hasty-āḍīnām arthapratipattau kriyamāṇāyām*③*pratibhāhetavo bhavanti / tathā sarve 'rthavatsammata vṛkṣādayaḥ śabdā yathābhyāsaṃ pratibhāmātropasamhārahetavo bhavanti na tv artham sākṣāt pratipādayanti / anyathā hi katham parasparaparāhatāḥ pravacanabhedā utpādyakathāprabandhāś ca svavikalpoparacitapadārthabhedadyotakāḥ syur iti* /. ①TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *rnam par bcad pa* rather suggests *vyavacchinna* or *vicchinna* (with *niyatasādhana*?). ②TSP<sub>Tib</sub> with no equivalent of *śabdena*. ③*kriyamāṇāyām* TSP<sub>K</sub>: *kriyamāṇāyā* TSP<sub>5</sub>. “[Cognitive]① habituation consists in observing a [certain] linguistic unit (*śabda*) being used again and again in reference to a certain thing. [As for] intuition, [it consists in] an insight that leads one to undertake an action circumscribed by specific factors.② This [intuition] is produced by a [certain] linguistic unit accompanied by the recurrent③ observation of [its] employment, and differs with every sentence and for every person, but this immeasurable difference cannot be [properly] formulated due to the infinity of verbal practice.④ [...] In the same way as [actions] such as beating with a hook are the causes for elephants, etc., to have a [certain] intuition when the understanding of a [certain] thing [by the animal] is to be achieved,⑤ in the same way, all the linguistic units recognized as meaningful, such as ‘tree,’ are, in conformity with a [certain cognitive] habituation, the causes for bringing in a mere intuition,⑥ but they do not communicate [their] meaning directly. For otherwise, how could mutually contradictory statements [ever] occur, and how could narrative works devised (*utpādyakathāprabandhāḥ*, TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *gtam rgyud [g]sar pa*) [by the poet’s imagination] reveal different things (*padārtha*, but TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *dños po*) constructed by one’s own conceptual representations?⑦” ①Kamalaśīla’s interesting explanation is translated

Before I turn to Śāntarakṣita's views on sentence meaning, let me briefly come back to Dignāga's use of the term *utprekṣā*. The word, which refers to a figure of speech and entails a strong imagination (*sambhāvana*) component,<sup>34</sup> has undergone interesting conceptualizations and systematizations in the hands of the later Kashmirian poeticians, who interpreted it in close connection with the newly available Buddhist notion of *adhyavasāya/adhyavasāna*. In this context, *utprekṣā* has been variously rendered as "poetic(al) fancy," "seeing as," and "assumption/identifying."<sup>35</sup> In his pioneering study of

and discussed by bits and pieces in David 2021: 846 (n. 61), 855 (n. 79) and 860 (n. 96). ②As hinted at by David (2021: 854–855), *niyatasādhanāvachchinnakriyā-pratipattyanukūlā prajñā pratibhā* is likely borrowed from Maṇḍanamīśra's ViV 29 (prose introduction); my translation of this segment is borrowed from David's (on *pratipatti* as "undertaking," see David 2021: 854, n. 77). ③On *āvṛtti* = *abhyāsa*, see David 2021: 844, n. 56. ④On the impossibility to communicate and to explain *pratibhā*, see VP 2.144 and David 2021: 831–832, VP 1.35 and David 2021: 843–846, 848, and *passim*. ⑤See already VP 2.217–218 and David 2021: 845–846. ⑥On the difficult *pratibhāmātropasamhāra* (cf. VPV 67,4 *pratibhopasamhāra*), see David 2021: 848, n. 64, whose rendering of *upasamhāra* as "bringing in" I am following here (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 319b6 *spobs pa tsam ñe bar sdud pa'i rgyu*, if it is not a purely mechanical rendering, would rather plead for "causes of a contraction [of the word meanings] into a mere/simple intuition," which may accord with Bhartṛhari's idea in VP 2.145 [*upaśleṣam ivārthānām*]). ⑦Interestingly, the *kathāprabandhas* recur at TSP<sub>K</sub> 822,7/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 697,11, this time in direct connection with *utprekṣā*. Kamalaśīla refers there to "poets authoring narratives [entirely] invented (*utprekṣita*) by themselves" (*svotprekṣitakathāprabandhakāriṇo 'pi kavayaḥ*; on poets and *pratibhā*, see David 2021: 836, n. 28). In TSP<sub>K</sub> 642,13–14/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 547,30, Kamalaśīla explains *kathā* (TS<sub>K</sub> 2338/TS<sub>ṣ</sub> 2337) as *nāṭakākhyāyikādikathā*, i.e., "drama, tale, etc."

<sup>34</sup> Porcher 1978: 98–109.

<sup>35</sup> See Ratié 2010: 343, Bronner 2016: 114–115 and 343–344, n. 6, and Vasudeva 2016: 503 (chart). From the seventeen occurrences of *utPREKṢ-* (5) and its derivatives (*utprekṣita* [7], *utprekṣamāṇa* [2], *utprekṣā* [3]), about a dozen are significant (not mere repetitions, *pratīkas*, etc.). Most of them are rendered by Jha (1987–1991) as "imagine," "imagined," "imaginary," "imagination," etc. Though correct, this translation is liable to some specification. "Imagined" may not be strong enough in the case of the poets' narrative works (TSP<sub>K</sub> 822,7/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 697,11: *svotprekṣita*; see above, n. 33), where "invented" (by their authors' unlimited inspiration) likely is the intended meaning. As in Bhartṛhari and Dignāga (see above, nn. 14 and 20), this *svotprekṣā* is regarded as *niraṅkuṣā*, "unbrindled"; this is the case when it characterizes the Vedic sacrificers (*yājñika*) who, without any basis (*niṣkāraṇa*,

Dignāga's PS(V) 5, Pind generally<sup>36</sup> translates *utprekṣā* as "invention." In the copious endnote he dedicates to that term (no. 14, p. 253–255), the late Danish scholar emphasizes, as we have just seen, Dignāga's indebtedness to Bhartṛhari's VP, and especially VPV 1. Basing himself on VPV 1 65,1–6 on VP 1.24, Pind concludes that "Bhartṛhari's invention in this particular context is similar to systematic deliberation, which involves the inductive

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*nirribandhana*), "concoct" or "invent" the meanings of Vedic statements such as *agnihotrām juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ* in order to make a living (*ājīvīkārtham*; see TSP<sub>K</sub> 642,11–13/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 547,27–29; *utprekṣita* is glossed *upakalpita* at TSP<sub>K</sub> 652,19/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 556,16; arbitrarily concocting meanings for Vedic words is also the subject matter of TSP<sub>K</sub> 652,14/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 556,11, TS<sub>K</sub> 2385/TS<sub>ṣ</sub> 2384, and TSP<sub>K</sub> 652,26/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 556,23; see also Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012). *utPREKṢ-* and its derivatives are sometimes perceived as semantically equivalent to (*vi-/pari-*)*KḸP-*, as is obviously the case in TSP<sub>K</sub> 582,10–11/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 462,28–29 (cf. TSP<sub>K</sub> 399,22/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 341,9 on TS<sub>K</sub> 1347/TS<sub>ṣ</sub> 1346, *kalpita*), where a sky-lotus is adduced as an example of a conceptual representation (*vikalpa*) whose object (*artha*) is *utprekṣita*. Closer to "(wrongly) believing" or "thinking" is the *utprekṣante* that characterizes ordinary people (under the sway of ignorance) who imagine that the series (*santāna*) is continuous, i.e., undestructed (TSP<sub>K</sub> 639,25/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 545,21; cf. TSP<sub>K</sub> 195,9/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 172,13, and TS<sub>K</sub> 2872/TS<sub>ṣ</sub> 2871 [*mohāt*]). Illustrating the pseudo-distinction (*utprekṣito bhedaḥ*, TS<sub>K</sub> 1347/TS<sub>ṣ</sub> 1346) between means and result of valid cognition (*pramāṇaphala*), Kamalaśīla (TSP<sub>K</sub> 399,21–22/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 341,8–9) stresses that this difference is similar to the one we make while alternatively conceiving (*kalpita*), of one and the same bow, that it is an agent, an instrument, etc. (*kartrtvādi*), when we say "the bow pierces," "he pierces with the bow," or "the arrow released from the bow pierces." In a few cases, *utPREKṢ-* seems close in meaning to *āśANK-*, "to imagine," "to think," "to suspect," "to fear" (see TS<sub>K</sub> 2875/TS<sub>ṣ</sub> 2874, TSP<sub>K</sub> 791,15/TSP<sub>ṣ</sub> 670,30). For want of an explanation, two occurrences of *utprekṣā* remain at least provisionally unclear to me: in TS<sub>K</sub> 1217/TS<sub>ṣ</sub> 1216 (*cintotprekṣādikāle*), where it seems to refer to imagination as an intellectual/mental faculty, and in TS<sub>K</sub> 3633/TS<sub>ṣ</sub> 3632 (*śamotprekṣānimitta*), where Jha (1987–1991: II.1697) translates *uprekṣā* as "dispassion" (plausibly, but in spite of the very literal TS<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 132b3 *ñer rtogs*; the wording of the Sanskrit and/or Tibetan verse needs further examination). The personal, arbitrary and idiosyncratic character of *utprekṣā* is also observable in Dharmakīrti's *svayam utprekṣya* at PVSV 116,21 (see Eltschinger 2007b: 261–262), dealing with a person's reasons for creating, or fancying, a relation between intrinsically unrelated entities.

<sup>36</sup> Note, however, "deliberation" in Pind 2015: II.254, and *passim*.



process of generalization through joint presence and joint absence.”<sup>37</sup> I am not sure, however, whether Pind is entitled to conclude from this passage that *utprekṣā* is intimately connected to inferential procedures based on the observation of copresence and coabsence. To begin with, as noted by Pind himself, Vṛṣabhadeva (VPP 10,20) defines *tarka* (“deliberation”) as *liṅgam antareṇa svayam utprekṣāpratibhānam*, “personal/spontaneous *utprekṣā* and intuition [arising] independently of an [inferential] mark,” suggesting that *utprekṣā* and inferential reasoning are not, at least not necessarily, connected. Moreover, a different reading of the admittedly “central” VPV 1 65,1–6 is possible in my opinion. Here is this passage:

*tatrāpoddhārapadārtho nāmātyantasamśrṣṭaḥ saṃsargād anumeyena parikalpitenā rūpeṇa prakṛtapravivekaḥ*<sup>38</sup> *sann apoddhriyate. praviviktasya hi tasya vastuno vyavahārātitaṃ rūpam. tat tu svapratyayānukāreṇa yathāgamam bhāvanābhīyāsavaśād utprekṣayā prāyeṇa vyavasthāpyate. tathaiṣa cāpravibhāge śabdātmani kāryārtham anvayaavyatirekābhīyāṇi rūpasamanugamakalpanayā samudāyād apoddhṛtānām śabdānām abhidheyatvenāśriyate.*

Pind translates as follows:

Now, what is called the referent of the syntactical word obtained by means of abstraction, is abstracted from its connection [with the other syntactical words] although it is closely connected [with them], its separation [from them] being accomplished in an inferred conceptually constructed form. For the form of this object in its isolated state is beyond common usage. In general, however, it is defined by way of invention in accordance with one’s own ideas, under the influence of residual memory traces due to the repeated practice according to this or that *āgama*. And thus in the segmentless speech unit it is taken as the denotable object of the speech units as isolated from their aggregate

<sup>37</sup> Pind 2015: II.253. Note also Pind 2015: II.254–255, about *utprekṣā*: “In the passage from VPV quoted above Bhartṛhari refers expressly to *anvayaavyatireka* as the means of positing thought up speech units as referents for the sake of explaining the relevant grammatical explanations.” Pind 2015: II.169, n. 563 (1): “[...] the above conclusion (cf. n. 560 above) that it denotes deliberation by means of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.”

<sup>38</sup> *-pravivekaḥ* VPV<sub>Biardeau</sub>: *-vivekaḥ* Ed., Pind.

through grammatical analysis<sup>39</sup> by way of constructing conceptually the recurrence of their form through joint presence and joint absence for the sake of the grammatical operations.<sup>40</sup>

Pind's rendering is correct, even if one certainly can, as ever with translations, disagree on a few minor points.<sup>41</sup> But whereas Pind seems to interpret the VPV's statement as describing a unique procedure, I am inclined to understand the passage as distinguishing between two alternative ways of providing abstracted words with a meaning, i.e., a technical, śāstric or grammatical method, and an ordinary or "worldly" one, the latter being distinguished from the former by the adversative/contrastive *tu* ("however," in Pind's translation) and the adverb *prāyeṇa* ("in general").<sup>42</sup> This interpretation is supported by the immediately following passage, i.e., VPV 1 65,6–7, which Pind unfortunately left unquoted:

*so'py ayam apoddhārapadārthaḥ śāstravyavahāram anupatati, śāstravyavahārasadrśaṃ ca laukikaṃ bhedavyavahāram.*

And the referent of the syntactical word obtained by means of abstraction<sup>43</sup> follows the [grammarian's] technical usage as well as the ordinary usage of differentiation, which is similar to the technical usage.

This statement seems to involve two different but ultimately converging procedures, or usages (*vyavahāra*), one grammatical-technical (*śāstra*-), the other ordinary (*laukika*). Granting that the ordinary usage is the one referred to in VPV 1 65,3–4 (*tat tu... prāyeṇa vyavasthāpyate*), one cannot but notice that *utprekṣā* occurs only in this description, and not in the description of grammatical-technical usage (VPV 1 65,1–3, *tatra... apoddhriyate*), in which allusions to inferential processes (*anumeyena*, VPV 1 65,2, and likely *anvayaavyatirekābhyām*, 65,4–5) seem to be concentrated. If I am not mistaken, this important passage suggests that, whereas the grammarian isolates a

<sup>39</sup> As far as I can see, "through grammatical analysis" has no Sanskrit counterpart.

<sup>40</sup> Pind 2015: II.253.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Biardeau's French translation of the passage (Biardeau 1964: 63).

<sup>42</sup> I take the final sentence (VPV 1 65,4–5, *tathaiva ca... āśriyate*) to again refer to the śāstric procedure.

<sup>43</sup> Following Pind's above translation of the same expression.

word's meaning inferentially, by the method of agreement and difference, ordinary people arrive at a meaning "by *assuming* [it] in conformity with their own ideas, by means of their [cognitive] habituation to a conception [of the meaning developed] in accordance with [their respective] traditions."<sup>44</sup> Thus in my opinion, Pind's interpretation of *utprekṣā* is conflating two distinct procedures. I leave it for scholars of Bhartṛhari to decide whether this interpretation is acceptable or not.

### Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on sentence meaning (I)

It is well known that Kumārila directed a devastating critique against Dignāga's *apoha*.<sup>45</sup> As hinted at by Hattori, two of his arguments are directly connected to the question of sentence meaning, both of which have been duly reported and answered in Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's TS(P).

The first objection points to an apparent contradiction in Dignāga's doctrine of exclusion: "Just as intuition is accepted [by you] as the sentence meaning even though there is no external object, so the word meaning should be that as well [namely, a cognition]. So why is *apoha* postulated?"<sup>46</sup> Kamalaśīla comments on Kumārila's stanza as follows:

Even if there is no external object [to serve] as the signified of a linguistic unit, the sentence meaning is described by you as a [positive] intuition

<sup>44</sup> VPP 65,16 explains *tat* as *kalpitaṃ rūpaṃ*; according to Vṛṣabhadeva, the sentence is intended to clarify the falsity of this abstraction process (*tad evāsatyatvaṃ draḍhayati*, VPP 65,17). Whereas *svapratyayānukāreṇa* expresses the factor immediately responsible for the abstraction based on *utprekṣā*, *yathāgamam*, etc., presents the basis or foundation (*mūla*, "root," VPP 65,18) of these *pratyayas*. Vṛṣabhadeva seems to interpret *bhāvanā* as *abhiprāpti* ("arriving at, obtaining"; *bhāvanābhiprāptiḥ*, VPP 65,19–20), with the following meaning for *yathāgamaṃ bhāvanābhyāsavaśāt*: "on account of the repeated practice of the meaning arrived at on the basis of [their respective] traditions" (*āgamataḥ prāptasyārthasyābhyāsāt*, VPP 65,19). Should *bhāvanā* rather be interpreted in the sense of "impulse"?

<sup>45</sup> For a recent assessment, see Kataoka/Taber 2021, and especially the authors' interpretive essays at the end of the volume.

<sup>46</sup> ŚV *apohavāda* 40 = TS<sub>K</sub> 923/TS<sub>Ś</sub> 922: *asaty api ca bāhye 'rthe vākyārthaḥ pratibhā yathā / padārtho 'pi tathaiṣa syāt kim apohaḥ prakalpyate //*. Translation Kataoka/Taber 2021: 84 (slightly modified); see also Hattori 1979: 67–68. See Kamalaśīla's introduction

[and] not as an exclusion. In the same way, the word meaning, too, should consist in nothing but a [positive] intuition, like the sentence meaning. Why is it, then, that an exclusion is postulated [by you] as the word meaning? Let the two meanings, [those] of the word and the sentence, be just of an affirmative character! Such is [Kumārila's] intention.<sup>47</sup>

As already noted by Hattori, Śāntarakṣita did not answer Kumārila's objection by emphasizing the negative or *apoha* aspect of intuition (as Dignāga himself had done in PS[V] 5.48), but by interpreting word meaning, which he understood as of a primarily affirmative character, as intuition: "An exclusion consisting in the [positive conceptual] image [of a certain thing, and] called 'intuition,' arises immediately [not only from a sentence, but] also from a word. This very [intuition] is [therefore] also the meaning of the word according to us."<sup>48</sup> In other words, *pratibhā* is the meaning, not just of the sentence, but of the word as well, and consists in the conceptual image or reflection (*pratibimba*) appearing in both the speaker's and the listener's cognition. According to Hattori, in so doing, Śāntarakṣita was responsible for "chang[ing] the negative tone of the *apoha*-theory to the positive by giving weight to the fact that there appears in the conceptual cognition the image of a thing. [...] The inconsistency found by Kumārila in Dignāga's view

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at TSP<sub>K</sub> 294,15–18/TSP<sub>ś</sub> 255,3–7 (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 324a5–7).

<sup>47</sup> Explanation, TSP<sub>K</sub> 294,21–23/TSP<sub>ś</sub> 255,10–12 (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 324a7–b1): *yathā bāhye 'rthe śabda*①*vācyatvenāsaty api vākyārtho bhavadbhiḥ pratibhālakṣaṇa eva varṇyate, nāpohalakṣaṇaḥ, tathā padārtho 'pi vākyārthavat pratibhālakṣaṇa eva syād ity apohaḥ padārthatayā kimiti kalpyate / dvayor api padavākyārthayor vidhirūpatvam evāstv iti bhāvah /*. ①*śabda*- TSP<sub>ś</sub>, TSP<sub>Tib</sub>: *śabdā*- TSP<sub>K</sub>.

<sup>48</sup> TS<sub>K</sub> 1028/TS<sub>ś</sub> 1027 (TS<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 38b2): *pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ padād apy upajanyate*①*/ pratibhākhyo jhaṭ ity eva padārtho 'py ayam eva naḥ //*. ①*upajanyate* TS<sub>K</sub>: *upajāyate* TS<sub>ś</sub>. Cf. Hattori 1979: 69. TSP<sub>K</sub> 323,14–15/TSP<sub>ś</sub> 278,22–23 (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 341a3): *yathaiḥ hi pratibimbātmakaḥ prati*①*bhākhyo 'poho vākyārtho 'smābhir upavarṇitaḥ, tathaiḥ padārtho 'pi, yasmāt padād api pratibimbātmako 'poha utpadyata*② *eva*. ①*pratibimbātmakaḥ prati*- em.: *pratibimbātmakapрати*- TSP<sub>K</sub>, TSP<sub>ś</sub>. ②Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> 'thad pa (*upapadyate*) for *utpadyate*. "For, just as an exclusion consisting in the [positive conceptual] image [of a certain thing, and] called 'intuition,' is presented by us as the sentence meaning, in the very same way, it constitutes the word meaning, too, because an exclusion consisting in a [positive conceptual] image does in fact arise from the word as well."

is thus dissolved by Śāntarakṣita with the new interpretation of the *apoha*-theory."<sup>49</sup> As shown by Akamatsu, Śāntarakṣita's position was the starting point of what later authors such as Ratnakīrti labelled *vidhivāda*, Dharmottara being the initiator of the concurrent model, known as *pratiṣedhavadā*.<sup>50</sup>

As for the second objection raised by Kumāṛila in connection with Dignāga's ideas on *apoha* and sentence meaning, it occurs in ŚV *apohavāda* 143cd (= TS<sub>K</sub> 978cd/TS<sub>5</sub> 977cd), where Kumāṛila criticizes the apparent lack of a negative counterpart (*apohya*, *vyavacchedya*, *nivartya*) in the case of the sentence: "And in the case of the sentence meaning, the elimination of another cannot be designated."<sup>51</sup> Here again, Kamalaśīla's explanation is illuminating:

Moreover, sentence meaning, like a variegated color, is accepted as [both] diverse and [yet] one. Therefore, it is not possible to designate the negation of another in the case of the [sentence meaning], because a finite [negative] counterpart is not cognized [inasmuch as a sentence denotes a non-finite action]. As for the negation of another which, in the case of a [sentence] such as 'Caitra, bring the cow,' is described as the exclusion of non-Caitra, etc., by taking the [successive individual] parts, it would concern just the word meaning, not the sentence meaning, because this partless [sentence] cannot be divided in this way. Thus [your] determination of [the *anyāpoha* as] the meaning of any linguistic unit is too narrow.<sup>52</sup>

Here is Śāntarakṣita's interesting answer:

<sup>49</sup> Hattori 1979: 68–69. Note also Hattori 1979: 68: "Kumāṛila's criticism gave an incentive to the Bauddhas to modify the *apoha*-theory. The thought that a word has as its direct import a positive image is found clearly expounded by Śāntarakṣita in the Śabdārthaparīkṣā of his *Tattvasaṃgraha*."

<sup>50</sup> See Akamatsu 1986. The gist of Śāntarakṣita's interpretation appears in TS<sub>K</sub> 1004–1013/TS<sub>5</sub> 1003–1012 (TS<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 37b3–38a1).

<sup>51</sup> ŚV *apohavāda* 143cd: *vākyārthe 'nyaniṣṛtīś ca vyapadeṣṭuṃ na śakyate* //. Translation Kataoka/Taber 2021: 146.

<sup>52</sup> TSP<sub>K</sub> 312,6–10/TSP<sub>5</sub> 269,14–17 (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 334b5–335a2): *kiṃ ca vākyārthaḥ kalmāṣavarṇavac chabalaikarūpa iṣyate*① / *atas tatrānyaniṣṛtīś vyapadeṣṭuṃ na śakyate* / *niṣpannarūpasya pratiyogino 'pratīteḥ* / *yā cātra caitra gām ānayetyādāv acaitrādi-vyavacchedarūpānyaniṣṛtīś avayavaparigraheṇa varṇyate* / *sā padārtha eva syān na*

And in the case of the sentence meaning, the negation of another is very easily known, for what is called the sentence meaning merely consists of certain word meanings in association (*sahita*). Now, the negative counterparts that are so evidently the contraries (*viparīta*) of these [word meanings] are exactly those of the sentence meaning as well, for there is absolutely no [sentence meaning] apart (*anya*) from these [word meanings].<sup>53</sup>

Let me start with the second part of the answer. In Kamalaśīla's wording, Kumārila is asking the following question: "The word meaning is one thing, the sentence meaning, another; how then can you say that the negative counterparts that are those of the word meanings themselves are exactly those of the sentence meaning as well?"<sup>54</sup> Answering this question provides Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla with an opportunity to dismiss the hypothesis of an indivisible sentence and sentence meaning—Bhartṛhari's and Dignāga's position:

[To answer this objection, Śāntarakṣita] says: 'for there is absolutely no [sentence meaning] apart from these [word meanings].' For, distinct from the [individual] word meanings, there is no sentence meaning that would be partless or have a variegated nature like a variegated color, because one does not perceive a [sentence meaning] of that sort, which [nonetheless] fulfils the conditions for perception—this is [Śāntarakṣita's] intention [here]. To clarify this by means of an example, he says [what follows]: 'Once one has grasped the meaning of a sentence such as 'Caitra, bring the cow,' one understands by implication (*arthāt*) the exclusion of the agent, the action, etc.' To explain (*hi*), in this

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*vākyārthaḥ / tasyānavayavasyetthaṃ vivektum aśakyatvād ity avyāpīnī śabdārthavyavasthā /*. ①Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *gzan yañ ñag gi don khra bo'i dños po ni khra bo'i glañ du 'dod de*, to be compared with TSP<sub>K</sub> 355,1–10/TSP<sub>ś</sub> 304,10–19, below, n. 55. Cf. Kataoka/Taber 2021: 147, n. 121.

<sup>53</sup> TS<sub>K</sub> 1160–1161/TS<sub>ś</sub> 1159–1160 (TS<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 43a3–4): *vākyārthe 'nyanivṛttiś ca sujñātai-va tathā hy asau / padārthā eva sahitāḥ kecid vākyārtha ucyaṭe // teṣāṃ ca ye vijāṭīyās te 'pohyāḥ supariṣphuṭāḥ / vākyārthasyāpi te caiva tebhyo 'nyo naiva so 'sti hi //*. Cf. Hattori 1979: 69.

<sup>54</sup> TSP<sub>K</sub> 354,27–355,1/TSP<sub>ś</sub> 304,9–10 (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 357b2–3): *nanu padārtho* ① *'nyo 'nyas tu* ② *vākyārthas tat katham ucyaṭe—ya eva padārthānām apohyā vākyārthasyāpi ta eveti [...]* /. ①*padārtho* TSP<sub>K</sub>, TSP<sub>Tib</sub>: *padārtho 'pi* TSP<sub>ś</sub>. ②*anyas tu* TSP<sub>ś</sub>, TSP<sub>Tib</sub>: *anya-*

sentence, no other meaning appears (*prativartate*, TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *snañ ba*) in the cognition except the meaning of the words ‘Caitra,’ etc., for once ‘Caitra’ is understood in its meaning, one indirectly (*sāmarthyāt*) understands the exclusion ‘non-Caitra,’ etc. Otherwise, if the exclusion of other agents, etc., were not what is intended (*abhīṣṭa*), then mentioning (*upādāna*, TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *blañs pa*) Caitra, etc., would be entirely pointless, and therefore, since nobody would say anything, the world would just be inactive.<sup>55</sup>

In other words, just as the sentence is nothing but its word constituents, the sentence meaning exhausts itself in the individual words’ meanings. This sounds like a radical departure from Dignāga’s views on sentence meaning, and reflects the Buddhist epistemologists’ reductionist spirit seen at work in the rejection of the *sphoṭa*. But, one may ask, now that an independent, unitary sentence meaning has been discarded, how do the individual words give rise to the sentence meaning? As we have just seen, Śāntarakṣita is content with saying that “what is called the sentence meaning merely consists of certain word meanings in association (*sahita*).” Kamalaśīla’s explanation is even more laconic: “‘in association’ means that they are interconnected by causality relations.”<sup>56</sup> How to interpret Śāntarakṣita’s brief statement? Hattori unhesitatingly characterizes it as an expression of *abhihitānvayavāda*, the doctrine according to which the sentence meaning is the connection of the meanings denoted by the individual words.<sup>57</sup> And indeed, Śāntarakṣita’s

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*vastu* TSP<sub>K</sub>.

<sup>55</sup> TSP<sub>K</sub> 355,1–10/TSP<sub>ś</sub> 304,10–19 with TS<sub>K</sub> 1162/TS<sub>ś</sub> 1161 (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 357b3–6; TS<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 43a4): *na hi padārthavyatirikto niravayavaḥ śabalātmā vā kalmāṣavarṇapra-khyo vākyaṛtho ‘sti / upalabdihlakṣaṇaprāptasya tādrśasyānupalabdher iti bhāvaḥ / etad evodāharanena sphuṭayann āha—caitretyādi / caitra gām ānayetvādivākyaṛthe ‘dhigate sati / kartṛkarmāntarādīnām apoho gamyate ‘rthataḥ // na hy asmin vākye caitrādipadā-rthavyatirekeṇa buddhāv anyo ‘rthaḥ prativartate①/ caitre hy arthagate ca sāmarthyād acaitrādivyavacchedo gamyate / anyathā yady anyakartrādivyavacchedo nābhīṣṭaḥ syāt tadā caitrādīnām upādānam anarthakam eva syāt / tataś ca na kiñcit kaścid vyāhared iti nirīham eva jagat syāt /* ①TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *snañ ba*; to be read *parivartate*?

<sup>56</sup> TSP<sub>K</sub> 354,26/TSP<sub>ś</sub> 304,8 (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 357b1–2): *parasparaṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvena sambaddhā ity arthaḥ /*

<sup>57</sup> Hattori 1979: 69–70: “The theory that the meaning of a sentence is the relation of the individual meanings expressed by the component words (*abhihitānvaya*) is

wording looks pretty close to Śābara's when the latter claims that "words have completed their operation once they have denoted their own meanings. Now, being known [in this way], the word meanings then cause the sentence meaning to be known."<sup>58</sup> However, no more than Śābara and even Kumārila does Śāntarakṣita explain how the sentence meaning comes about once all the individual words (which in this model are nothing but the indirect causes of the sentence meaning) have denoted (*abhiDHĀ-*) their respective meanings, a function that, according to Śālikanātha, Kumārila or unidentified early Bhāṭṭas ascribed to the *lakṣaṇā*, viz., "secondary denotation/signification," so that the communication of the *vākyārtha* remains the function of the words themselves.<sup>59</sup> As we shall see later (Appendix), however, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to endorse Dharmakīrti's position when they deny a meaning, or at least a fixed and distinct meaning, to individual words, i.e., words used independently of a pragmatic motivation and a sentence environment. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla obviously did not regard the two perspectives as mutually contradictory.

### Dharmakīrti's views on word and sentence meanings

Let me first briefly characterize the polemical context of Dharmakīrti's short statement on the relationship between word meaning and sentence meaning.

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known to have been maintained by Kumārila. [...] In the above-cited statement [= TS<sub>K</sub> 1160–1161/TS<sub>Ś</sub> 1159–1160, VE] it is noticed that Śāntarakṣita is very close to Kumārila in holding that the sentence is nothing other than the conjunction of the individual word-meanings. The ground for advancing this view was prepared by Śāntarakṣita through the new interpretation of the *apoha*-theory, according to which the positive images are directly produced by the words constituting the sentence."

<sup>58</sup> ŚBh 116,5–6 on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.25: *padāni hi svam svam artham abhidhāya nivṛtta-vyāpārāṇi. athedānīm padārthā avagatāḥ santo vākyārtham avagamayanti*. Cf. Kataoka 2021: 535.

<sup>59</sup> PrP 396,6: *vākyārtho lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ*. "It is our thesis that in all cases, without exception, a sentence-referent is [the entity] secondarily signified [by words]." Translation Kataoka 2021: 536. Note Kataoka 2021: 537: "We can say that Kumārila, at least as perceived by Śālikanātha, tries to overcome the problem of the indirect model by introducing another operation of *language*, i.e. secondary signification (*lakṣaṇā*). [...] A sentence-referent, i.e. the connection between



In PVSV 61,8–62,15 (around PV 1.122–123), Dharmakīrti, just as Śāntarakṣita above, briefly answers an objection criticizing the *apoha* theory for being too narrow (*avyāpitatva*), i.e., failing to satisfactorily account for several types of words (*pada*, *śabda*).<sup>60</sup> Whereas he himself focuses on the word “knowable” (*jñeya*), his commentators mention words such as “all” (*sarva*, *viśva* [Tib. *ril*]), “collection” (*samudāya*), “cognizable” (*\*prameya*, *gṣal bya*), “expressible” (*\*vācya*, Tib. *brjod bya*), and number (*dvyādi*),<sup>61</sup> most of which can be traced to Uddyotakara’s NV and Kumābila’s ŚV.<sup>62</sup> Here is, in Dharmakīrti’s own words, the gist of this objection:

Let there indeed be for words such as ‘pot’ an exclusion from other things, but how [is that possible] in the case of words such as ‘knowable’? For there is nothing that is not knowable from which there could be a difference, since if[, as you maintain, that knowable] were to be referred to by being distinguished from that [which is allegedly unknowable], the latter would [in fact] be knowable.<sup>63</sup>

According to these opponents, one of the problems of the *apoha* theory is that there is nothing “unknowable” (*ajñeya*) that could serve as the negative counterpart of the word “knowable”—for if there were, it would *ipso*

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word-referents, is not something directly expressed but something only indirectly expressed by words. This is the view of the Bhāṭṭas as understood by Śālikanātha.”

<sup>60</sup> PVT P *je* 160b7–8 ≈ PVSVT 242,28–243,7: *anyāpohe śabdārthe parair*① *avyāpitatvaṃ coditam / tatparijihīṣavān pūrvapakṣadiṇmātraṃ tāvat karoti* [...] /. ① *śabdārthe parair* em. (PVT *sgra’i don* [...] *la gzan dag gis*): *śabdārthaparair* PVSVT<sub>MS</sub> 89b2, Ed. “Against [the theory according to which] the exclusion of other [things] is the meaning of a word, opponents [such as Uddyotakara and Kumābila] have objected that [this theory] is [too] narrow [in that it fails to cover several types of words]. Wishing to refute this, [Dharmakīrti] first provides a mere outline of the objection.” This statement is directly indebted to NV 314,13.

<sup>61</sup> See PVT P *je* 160b8, PVSVT 243,12, and PVT P *je* 161a7 = PVSVT 243,28–244,8.

<sup>62</sup> See NV 314,13–22 (*sarva*, *samudāya*, *dvyādi*) and ŚV *apohavāda* 144cd–146ab (*jñeya*, *prameya*); see Kataoka/Taber 2021: 147–148.

<sup>63</sup> PVSV 61,8–11: *bhavatu nāma ghaṭādiśabdeṣv arthāntaravyavacchedaḥ / atha jñeyādi-padeṣu katham / na hy ajñeyaṃ kiñcid asti yato bhedaḥ syāt / tato bhedenā viṣayīkaraṇa eva tasya jñeyatvāt* /. Unless otherwise stated, all translations of the PV(SV) are drawn from Eltschinger/Taber/Much/Ratié forthcoming, and remain provi-

*facto* be(come) knowable. As we shall see, Dharmakīrti's answer (PVSV 61,11–62,15) owes less to general semantics than to a pragmatic account of language that is itself part of a broader picture of human practice.<sup>64</sup> This communication-based approach to semantic problems, which permeates much of his account of the *apoha* theory, is likely responsible for his view that individual words have a predominantly relational meaning. In this regard, Dharmakīrti's approach has much in common with the Prābhākaras' reliance on the process of language acquisition while arguing in favor of the *anvitābhīdhāna* model. More fundamentally perhaps, Dharmakīrti's position can be interpreted as an attempt to accept Dignāga's contention that isolated words are never used in actual practice, while at the same time remaining true to his own anti-*sphoṭa* agenda, which made his *ācārya*'s endorsement of *pratibhā* as sentence meaning unacceptable to him.

If it is to make sense, our use of words must serve a practical purpose. Human practice consists in acting (*pravṛtti*) towards what is desirable (*iṣṭa*, *abhimata*) and refraining from action (*nivṛtti*) towards what is undesirable. In the pragmatic situation underlying Dharmakīrti's description, a certain person (described as the listener, *śrotr*, *pratipādyā*) who is uncertain (*āśaṅkamāna*) about the way to act or the way things are expected (*ākāṅkṣ*-) some knowledge from another (the speaker, *vaktr*, *pratipādayitr*). In this context, the speaker's use of a word can only "direct [the listener's] awareness towards a certain thing while deflecting it away from something [else],"<sup>65</sup> that is, "affirm [one meaning] and negate [another]."<sup>66</sup> Indeed, "if no meaning were excluded by this word, its employment would be pointless,"<sup>67</sup> every utterance being intended for semantic restriction (*avadhāraṇa*). This is especially true of injunctive and prohibitive speech (*vidhipratīṣedha*). Consider the command, "Bring water with a pot" (*ghaṭenodakam ānaya*). Each of its three elements contributes to narrow down the scope of the statement by restricting its meaning: "with a pot" indirectly excludes other instruments

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sional.

<sup>64</sup> See Eltschinger 2007a.

<sup>65</sup> PV 1.122ac<sub>1</sub>: *kvacin nīveśanāyārthe vinivartya kutaścana buddheḥ...*

<sup>66</sup> PVSV 61,16: *anvayavyatirekau*; see PVT P je 161a5 = PVSVT 243,25.

<sup>67</sup> PVT P je 161a6 = PVSVT 243,27–28: [...] *yadi tena śabdena na kaścīd artho vyavacchidyeta vyarthah śabdaprayogaḥ syāt /*.

(*karaṇa*) such as cupped hands (*añjali*);<sup>68</sup> “water” excludes other objects of action (*karman*) such as rubbish (*pāṃśu*); “bring” excludes other actions (*kriyā*), or no action at all. For indeed, hearing only “Bring water,” a person would be uncertain about the particular instrument (*karaṇaviśeṣa*) to be used and require additional information concerning it; hearing only “Bring,” this person would be confused (*mūḍhamati*) about the object and need information concerning it. It is in order to eliminate this uncertainty (*āśaṅkā[sthāna]*), that is, to guide the listener by ridding him of this semantic expectation (*ākāṅkṣāpanayana*, PV[SV]T), that words are used. This account is equally relevant for descriptive speech, for, as Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin explain, “when there is an uncertainty as to whether sound is unknowable as impermanent, etc., [someone] uses the [expression] ‘It is knowable as impermanent, etc.’ In this case, that which is excluded is the [sound’s] unknowability as impermanent, etc., that [the listener] was uncertain [about].”<sup>69</sup> This is what Dharmakīrti himself makes clear in the statement that immediately precedes our passage:

<sup>68</sup> PVSVT 244,21–23: *atra hy udakam ānaya ity ukte śrotuḥ karaṇaviśeṣe 'vaśyam ākāṅkṣā bhavati / tatra ca niyamārtham ghaṭenety ucyate / so 'yam ghaṭeneti*① *śabdaḥ svārthābhīdhānapurāḥsaram eva karaṇāntaravyavacchedākṣepāt phalavān bhavati /* “For in this case, when [some]one says, ‘Bring water,’ the speaker necessarily expects a complement concerning the particular instrument [that is to be used for bringing water]. And in order to limit [the meaning] accordingly, [some]one says, ‘with a pot.’ Since it implies the exclusion of other instruments following the expression of its own meaning, that word ‘with a pot’ is useful.” ① *ghaṭeneti* PVSVT<sub>MS</sub> 90a4: *ghaṭo neti* Ed. To be compared with PVT P je 161b6–7: ‘*di chu 'on cig ces bya ba 'dis byed pa tsam 'phaṅs pa la byed pa'i khyad par rtogs par bya ba'i phyir bum pas*① *zés bya ba brjod de / bum pas*① *zés bya ba'i sgra 'di ni sñim pa la sogs pa rnam par bcad pas rnam par ñes pa'i don la blo bskyed par byed na 'bras bu dan ldan par 'gyur ro //* ① *pas* em.: *pa P*. “The [expression] ‘Bring water’ implies (\**ākṣIP*-) just an instrument in general (\**karaṇamātra*), and in order to cause [the listener] to know the particular instrument (\**karaṇaviśeṣa*) [to be used for bringing water, the speaker] says ‘with a pot.’ That word ‘with a pot’ produces (\**utpādayati*) the cognition (\**buddhi*) of a delimited meaning (\**vinīyatārtha*) by way of excluding (\**vyavacchedena*) [other instruments] such as cupped hands (\**añjali*), and thus it is useful (\**phalavat*).”

<sup>69</sup> PVT P je 162a8–b2 = PVSVT 245,13–15: *tathā hy anityādirūpenājñeyayaḥ*① *śabda ity āśaṅkāyām idaṃ prayujyate 'nityādinākāreṇa jñeya ity / tatrānityādyākāreṇa yad ajñeyatvaṃ āśaṅkitaṃ tad eva vyavacchidyate /* ① PVT reads \**jñeyayaḥ* (*ajñeyayaḥ* PVSVT<sub>MS</sub> 90a7–b1).

Similarly, for words such as ‘knowable,’ insofar as they are meant (*upanīta*) for everyday practice, there must also be something which is excluded [i.e., something unknowable], because one would not employ [‘it is knowable’] if there were no uncertainty as to the contrary (*anya*). For in such cases, what is to be excluded is what the confused person is uncertain about; alternatively, why does one who is not uncertain [about something] need instruction from another [person]? And how would someone who says [something] that does not inform (*saṃskāra*) the listener not be insane? For indeed words are assigned conventions solely for the sake of informing the [listener].<sup>70</sup>

### PVSV 62,5–15

According to Dharmakīrti’s opponent, the above hypothesis may well be true of everyday transactions involving injunctive and prohibitive speech, but it is not satisfactory for words used in isolation independently of any instructional/practical purpose. Such is the purport of Śākyabuddhi’s and Kaṇṇakagomin’s introductory objection:

Let us admit that, when they occur in sentences [and] are meant for everyday practice, words such as ‘knowable’ do have a negative counterpart as [you have just] said. But how about words such as ‘knowable’ when, not being meant for everyday practice, [they stand] in isolation? For in this case, there is no uncertain matter for the listener.<sup>71</sup>

Here is Dharmakīrti’s answer:

<sup>70</sup> PVSV 61,26–62,5: *tathā vyavahāropanītānāṃ jñeyādīpadānām api kenacid vyavacchedyena bhavitavyam / ananyāśaṅkāyāṃ prayogābhāvāt / tatra hi yad eva mūḍhamater āśaṅkāsthānaṃ tad eva nivartyam / anāśaṅkamāno vā kiṃ parasmād upadeśam apekṣate / aśroṭṣaṃskāraṃ ca bruṇāṇaḥ kathaṃ nonmattaḥ / tatsaṃskārāyaiva śabdānāṃ kṛtasaṅketatvāt /*. On *saṃskāra*, i.e., benefitting someone else by instructing her/him, see below, Appendix, text no. 1.

<sup>71</sup> PVT P je 163a6–7 = PVSVT 246,10–12: *bhavatu nāma vākyasthānāṃ vyavahārārtham upanītānāṃ jñeyādīśabdānāṃ yathoktaṃ vyavacchedyam / ye tv avyavahāropanītāḥ kevalā eva jñeyādīśabdāḥ teṣu kathaṃ / na hi tatra pratīpattur āśaṅkāsthānam astīti [...]* /. On *vākyastha* and *kevala*, see already VP 2.41.

Moreover, there is no word ‘knowable,’ etc., that is not meant for everyday transactions, since one [only] considers the meaning of a word when it occurs in a sentence.<sup>72</sup>

Dharmakīrti’s answer is well in line with Bhartṛhari’s and Dignāga’s insistence on the fact that words used in isolation are foreign to everyday usage (*vyavahārātīta*, see above), which consists of sentences. And indeed, according to his commentators, Dharmakīrti’s point is that only the sentence conveys a meaning,<sup>73</sup> and that there is no denotative (*vācaka*) word that does not belong to a sentence.<sup>74</sup> This contextualist<sup>75</sup> stance is also emphasized by Śākyabuddhi, for whom “words are known to be meaningful (*\*arthavat*) in virtue of their employment (*\*prayogavaśāt*), but (*\*ca*) [in practice] employment [is made] only of [words] occurring in sentences (*\*vākyastha*).”<sup>76</sup>

In what follows, Dharmakīrti dismisses the idea that words are meaningful when they are used in isolation. To be sure, considering the abstract constructs of various language theoreticians, one might be tempted to believe that isolated words are meaningful. As Śākyabuddhi and Kaṇakagomin make clear, however,

the [isolated words] that the grammarians enumerate in lists such as [those of] ‘*sarva*,’ ‘*viśva*,’ etc., or form by dividing them into bases and affixes—[and] similarly the etymologists—[these words] are comparable to the sketch of a gayal [in the well-known maxim]<sup>77</sup> and must be regarded as means to cognize just the [real words] occurring in sentences, but they have no ordinary meaning. Therefore, it is only when they occur in sentences that words are meaningful, and it is

<sup>72</sup> PVSV 62,5–7: *avyavahāropanītaś ca naiva kaścij jñeyādīśabdo ‘sti / vākyagatasya pada-syārthacintanāt /*. See also Appendix, text no. 1.

<sup>73</sup> According to PVṬ P je 163b1: *de kho na la don yod pa’i phyir ro sñam du bsams pa yin no //*, and PVSṬ 246,17–18: *tasyaivārthapratipādakavād itī bhāvaḥ /*.

<sup>74</sup> According to PVṬ P je 163a7–8 = PVSṬ 246,12–13: *vākyeṣv anantarbhūto vācakaḥ śabdo nāstīty arthaḥ /*.

<sup>75</sup> On this notion, see above, Introduction, and n. 10.

<sup>76</sup> PVṬ P je 163a8–b1: *sgra rnam ni sbyor ba’i dbaṅ gis don dan ldan par śes la / sbyor ba yaṅ ñag*① *la gnas pa rnam kho na’i yin no //*. ① ñag em.: *dag* PVṬp.

<sup>77</sup> See Singh 1926: 304 (*Nyāyāvalī* maxim no. 313).

their meaning inasmuch as they stand in these [sentences] that one considers.<sup>78</sup>

According to Dignāga and Bhartṛhari, and ultimately to Kātyāyana and Patañjali, affixes (*pratyaya*) are not used in isolation.<sup>79</sup> In the same way, words are not employed independently of sentences in ordinary usage:

It is when we [theoretically] reflect on the point of the employment [of words occurring in a sentence, asking], ‘With reference to what are these words employed?’ that we say [that the meaning of a word is] exclusion of another, but there is no purpose in asking about the meaning of the word ‘knowable’ irrespective of [its] employment, since one does not understand anything from that [word alone]. [And] so it is also for words such as ‘pot.’<sup>80</sup>

Dharmakīrti’s answer echoes Dignāga’s and Bhartṛhari’s above-quoted statement to the effect that the function of *utprekṣā* is to provide individual words with a tradition-specific meaning. For, as Jinendrabuddhi says, “the meaning of [individual] words is [only] determined by departing from ordinary [usage], for (*ca*) no isolated word is employed in the world.”<sup>81</sup> As emphasized by Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, even those rare words that are used in isolation (as in the case of a one-word answer to a question), do in fact implicitly depend, as to their meaning, on their immediate linguistic environment:

And since in everyday practice, which results in [various] injunctions and prohibitions, the word ‘knowable’ is not employed in isolation, how

<sup>78</sup> PVT P je 163b1–4 = PVSVT 246,19–22: *ye tu vaiyākaraṇaiḥ sarvaviśvetyādigaṇeṣu paṭhyante / prakṛtipratyayavibhāgena vā saṃskriyante / tathā niruktakārais te ’pi rekhā-gavayasthānīyā vākyasthānām eva pratipattyupāyā draṣṭavyā na tu teṣāṃ laukikaḥ kaścīd artho ’sti / tasmād vākyasthānām eva padānām arthavattā / tatraiva cāvasthitānām arthacintanā kriyate /*

<sup>79</sup> See above, n. 21, and MBh I.219,10–18 (*vārttikas* 7 and 8), VP 2.194ab (Pind 2015: II.169, n. 563).

<sup>80</sup> PVSV 62,7–10: *kva punar ete śabdāḥ prayujyanta iti prayogaviśayacintāyām anyāpoha ucyate / anirdiṣṭaprayogaṃ tu jñeyaśabdasya ko ’rtha iti praśne na kaścīd arthaḥ / tataḥ kvacid apratipatteḥ / tathā ghaṭādiśabdānām api /*

<sup>81</sup> PST<sub>MS</sub> 237a2–3 (quoted in Pind 2015: II.168, n. 562): *laukikād viprayogāc chabdānām*

could [its] meaning be known? Even when, once all of the foregoing has been said, [i.e.,] 'Is sound knowable as impermanent, etc., or is it unknowable [as impermanent]?,' the [word<sub>PVT</sub>] 'knowable' is used in isolation [as a reply], even then, [our] cognition of [its] meaning arises in dependence on the word 'sound,' etc., which is the subject of discussion, and [thus] originates from the sentence alone, for a sentence consists in a word accompanied by other words. Therefore, one does not cognize [any] meaning from an isolated word which is independent of other words.<sup>82</sup> [And] just as isolated words such as 'knowable' have no referent (*vācya*), isolated words such as 'sound' [have no referent] either.<sup>83</sup>

The opponent now argues that, as Dharmakīrti's (*vidhivādin*!) *apoha* theory itself makes clear, a word gives rise to the conceptual representation of an object. According to him, a word's meaning consists in just that self-contained cognitive appearance:

But in case [it is asked,] 'Shall I bring water with a pot or with cupped hands?,' one uses [the isolated word] 'with a pot' [in reply]. Now in this case, even for that listener (*pratipattr*) who is not familiar with the context of discussion (*prakaraṇa*), a cognition having the form of a pot does in fact arise from hearing the isolated word 'with a pot.' Therefore, how can you claim that one does not know [any meaning] from a word [used] in isolation?<sup>84</sup>

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*artho nirdhāryate / na ca loke kevalasya padasya prayogo 'sti /.*

<sup>82</sup> Translated on the basis of PVT; see the next footnote, philological note no. ④.

<sup>83</sup> PVT P je 163b7–164a3 = PVSVT 247,11–16: *vidhipratīṣedhaphale vyavahāre ca kevalasya jñeyaśabdasya prayogābhāvāt kuto 'rthapratipattiḥ / yadāpi śabdo*① *'nityādirūpeṇa kiṃ jñeyo bhavaty athājñeya ity evaṃ prakrānte jñeya iti*② *kevalaḥ prayujyate / tadāpi yārthapratipattiḥ sā prakṛtaṃ śabdādīpadam*③ *apekṣya bhavanti vākyād eva jāyate / padāntarasahitasya padasya vākyatvāt / tasmān nāsti padāntaranirapekṣāt padārthapratipattiḥ*④ */ yathā jñeyādīpadānāṃ kevalānāṃ na kiñcid vācyaṃ tathā ghaṭādisabdānāṃ api kevalānāṃ /.* ①*yadāpi śabdo* PVSVT<sub>MS</sub> 91a6 (PVT *gañ gi tshes, yadā*): *yadādisabdo* Ed. ②Note PVT *śes bya zes bya ba'i sgra, jñeya iti śabdaḥ*. ③*śabdādīpadam* PVSVT<sub>MS</sub> 91a7 (PVT *sgra la sogs pa'i tshig*): *śabdādīpadam* Ed. ④Note PVT *de lta bas na tshig gzan la mi ltos pa'i tshig yan gar ba las ni don rtogs pa med do, \*tasmān nāsti padāntaranirapekṣāt kevalāt padād arthapratipattiḥ*.

<sup>84</sup> PVT P je P164a3–5 ≈ PVSVT 247,17–20: *nanu ca kiṃ ghaṭenodakam ānayāmy athā-*

According to Dharmakīrti, however, such a cognition (or meaning) is incomplete, hence dubious and unsatisfactory, due to the feeling of incompleteness triggered by previous experiences of this meaning's context-dependence:

Even the cognition that [arises] from hearing an isolated word [such as 'pot'] in an [unfamiliar] context is incomplete as to the meaning [that one wishes to know] because it requires a complement in accordance with the [previously] observed employments [of that word in various sentences]. [Hence] in the case of [isolated] words such as 'pot,' [this cognition] is just a distortion [inasmuch as it is in need of a complement].<sup>85</sup>

Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin provide the following explanation:

The [listener] has [previously] observed the word 'pot' being employed in a many sentences involving an injunction toward actions such as carrying away and bringing near (*nayanānāyana*, Tib. *phar khyer ba dan tshur khyer ba*); in conformity with those [many previous sentences, his] cognition requires a complement. [And] since it thus requires a complement [to ascertain] whether this or that is the intended meaning, the meaning is incomplete inasmuch as it is of a dubious nature, [and therefore] it is just a distortion, i.e., just an error. [Here is] what [Dharmakīrti] is saying: It is not the case that the cognition of the meaning [arises] from hearing just an isolated word; rather, a [person] who is distracted/misled (*apahr̥tabuddhi*) by [this isolated word's] resemblance with the meaningful word observed in [previous] sentences, [merely] imagines/believes to know the meaning from hearing [such] an isolated word.<sup>86</sup>

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*ñjalineti prastāve ghaṭeneti prayuñkte / tatra ca yaḥ prakaraṇaṃ na jñānavān tasyāpi pratipattur ghaṭeneti kevalaśabdaśravaṇād ghaṭākārā pratipattir utpadyata eveti* ① *katham ucyate kevalāc chabdān na pratipattir* ② *iti [...]* /. ① Instead of *katham ucyate kevalāc chabdān na pratipattir iti*, PVSṬ reads *gal te yan gar ba la don med na de'i tshe thos pa las ji ltar don rtogs še na* ("if an isolated [word] has no meaning, how is it, then, that we know [its] meaning from hearing [it]?"). ② PVSṬ<sub>MS</sub> 91b1 (*post correctionem*) *chabdān na pratipattir*: PVSṬ<sub>MS</sub> 91b1 (*ante correctionem*) *śabdāt pratipattir*.

<sup>85</sup> PVSṬ 62,10–12: *yāpi kvacit prakaraṇe kevalaśabdaśravaṇāt pratipattir dṛṣṭāprayogānu-sāreṇa sākāṅkṣatvāt sā 'parisamāptatadarthā viplava eva ghaṭādīśabdeṣu* /.

<sup>86</sup> PVSṬ P je 164a6–b1 ≈ PVSṬ 247,21–26: *yāvatsu nayanānāyanaṇḍikriyācodanāpravr̥tteṣu vākyeṣu* ① *tena ghaṭaśabdasya prayogo dṛṣṭas tadanusāreṇa tāvatsu pūrova-*



Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, whose account is much indebted to Śākyabuddhi's explanation, describe such a cognition as "hazy" (*plavamāna*) and "with no fixed object" (*apratīṣṭhitārtha*). Dharmakīrti can thus conclude that

such [a distortion] in accordance with [one's previous] observation [of usage] does occur in the case of words such as 'knowable,' as well. Therefore,<sup>87</sup> every employment of a word serves to direct [the listener's] awareness towards a certain thing while deflecting it away from something [else], because it is [meant to be] purposeful.<sup>88</sup>

## Conclusion

Dharmakīrti does not present his views on the relation between word and sentence meaning as indebted to any school or philosopher (not even to Dignāga). As far as I can see, his terminology does not betray any influence from Prabhākara. At any rate, the Buddhist philosopher mentions neither *anvitābhīdhāna*, which Prabhākara uses in his *Bṛhatī*, nor *anvita*, which Śābara already resorts to in the context of sentence meaning.<sup>89</sup> Nor does he, in spite of his insistence on *ākāṅkṣā*, refer to the three conditions (*upādhi*,

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*vākyeṣu*② *ākāṅkṣāvati* pratītiḥ bhavati / kim ayam artho vivakṣitaḥ kiṃ vāyam ity evaṃ sākāṅkṣatvād upaplavamānarūpatvenā③ *samāptārthā* viplava eva bhrāntir eva④ / etat kathayati / naiva kevalaśabdamaṭraśravaṇād arthapratipattir asti kintu vākyeṣūpalabdhasyārthavataḥ padasya sādṛśyenāpahrta⑤ *buddheḥ* (blo phrag pa can) kevalaśabdaśravaṇād arthapratipattiyabhimāna iti /. ① *vākyeṣu* PVSVT<sub>MS</sub> 91b2, PVT<sub>1</sub> (ñag): Ed. om. *vākyeṣu*. ② Note PVT<sub>1</sub> ñag gi don sña ma (pūrvavākyārtheṣu?). ③ *upaplavamānarūpatvenā*-PVSVT<sub>MS</sub> 91b2 (gtol med pa'i ño bo ñid kyis): *upaplavamānaṃ rūpatvenā*-Ed. ④ *viplava eva bhrāntir eva* em. (PVT<sub>1</sub> bslad pa kho na yin te 'khrul pa kho na yin no): *viplavabhrāntir eva* PVSVT<sub>MS</sub> 91b2, Ed. ⑤ *-āpahrta*- em. (VPV 89,2–3; TSP in Appendix, text no. 2, below): *-opahrta*- PVSVT<sub>MS</sub> 91b2–3, Ed. Cf. Appendix, text no. 2.

<sup>87</sup> PVT<sub>1</sub> P je 164b4 = PVSVT<sub>1</sub> 248,11–12: *yataḥ sarvaṃ vākyam sāvadhāraṇam vākya-sthānām eva padānām arthavattā tasmāt...* "Since every sentence brings [semantic] restriction [and] words are meaningful only when they occur in a sentence, therefore..."

<sup>88</sup> PVSV 62,13–15: *tādṛśo jñeyādīśabdeṣv api yathādarśanam asty eva / tasmāt sarva eva śabdaprayogaḥ kutaścīd buddhiṃ nivartya kvacin niveśanārthaḥ / tatsāphalyāt /*

<sup>89</sup> ŚBh IV.125,3 (*na hy ananvitaḥ padārtho bhavati vākyārthaḥ*) on Mīmāṃsāsūtra 3.2.1; see Kataoka 2021: 538–539, n. 14.

*upalakṣaṇa*) allegedly responsible for the relationality of word meanings and, ultimately, for sentence meaning itself. However, Dharmakīrti obviously holds individual words to be, if not entirely meaningless, at least semantically incomplete (hence responsible for a cognitive distortion, an error), and therefore to be relational in the sense that they require a semantic complement from the context (*prakaraṇa*), the sentence (*vākya*), or their practical use (*prayoga*). According to him, words, though (conventionally) real, are only semantically and practically meaningful in the framework of a sentence, and his commentators are adamant that “there is no denotative word that does not belong to a sentence.”<sup>90</sup> Even in purely descriptive statements, words are not used in isolation, a claim that somehow echoes the Prābhākaras’ ideas on language acquisition. Whatever his judgment on *pratibhā* as sentence meaning, Dharmakīrti was obviously inspired by Dignāga in his contextualist conviction. In my opinion, Dharmakīrti sought to remain true to the *ācārya*’s rejection of the meaningfulness of individual words while at the same time refusing any *sphoṭa*-like account of meaning, be it at the level of words or sentences. This “middle way” brought him to a position that shares a number of features with the future *anvitābhīdhanāvāda*.

Śākyabuddhi, who may have been active toward the end of the 7<sup>th</sup> century, has nothing to say about Dharmakīrti’s hypothetic sources. Nor do Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who show no awareness of any intra-Mīmāṃsaka debate on sentence meaning, associate Dharmakīrti’s doctrine, which they develop at some length,<sup>91</sup> with any doxographic position. As for, Kaṇvakagomin, he is well acquainted, not only with Śākyabuddhi’s rather dry commentary, but also with Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s historically and doxographically rich TS(P). Himself very learned, he frequently identifies Dharmakīrti’s opponents and quotes from their works. Although he has nothing similar to offer while commenting on the passage discussed above, he makes the interesting comment that follows:

A speaker aiming at a [practical] result first uses [the expression] ‘Devadatta, bring the cow’ in the [above-mentioned] way with the [following] intention: ‘With this word, I shall impart this object connected with a specific [verbal] action to this [person].’ Therefore, it is [insofar as

<sup>90</sup> See above, n. 74.

<sup>91</sup> See below, Appendix.

they are] related with the [verbal] action that the word meanings are denoted, but it is not the case that word meanings [that have already been] denoted are related subsequently, for it would follow that, in [a statement like] ‘cow,’ etc., an ending such as the accusative’s would not be produced. Therefore, one uses just [words] occurring in a sentence.<sup>92</sup>

Although Karṇakagomin refers neither to *anvitābhīdhāna(vāda)* nor to *abhihitānvaya(vāda)*, his short remark leaves little room for doubt that he was aware of this distinction, which he apparently considered sufficiently well-known to be presupposed. Karṇakagomin obviously—and quite anachronistically—regarded Dharmakīrti’s position as very close to the *anvitābhīdhāna(vāda)*.

As shown by Steinkellner (1979), Karṇakagomin’s period of activity cannot be earlier than the end of the 8<sup>th</sup> century on account of the fact that his PVSVT makes use of Dharmottara’s (740/750–800/810) *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*. What could have been his source(s) for this distinction? Umbeka (active between 700 and 750), whom Karṇakagomin quotes at length,<sup>93</sup> uses the expression *anvitābhīdhāna*, which he associates with Prabhākara,<sup>94</sup> but seems not to be aware of the notion of *abhihitānvaya* (note, however, that his commentary on Kumāriḥa’s ŚV is incomplete).<sup>95</sup> Pointing to Śālikanātha’s and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s common use of these two expressions (but with “no clear evidence that Jayanta had read Śālikanātha”<sup>96</sup>), Ollett points to the possibility that “both Śālikanātha and Jayanta had borrowed the chiasmic framing from earlier followers of Prabhākara whose works are now lost.”<sup>97</sup>

<sup>92</sup> PVSVT 246,13–17: *yato vaktā phalārthī prathamam tāvad imam artham viśiṣṭakriyā-sambaddham anena śabdenāsmāi pratipādayiṣyāmīty abhiprāyeṇa devadatta gām ānayet evam prayuṅkte / tena kriyānvitānām eva padārthānām abhidhānam / na tv abhihitānām padārthānām paścād anvayaḥ / gām ityādaḥ karmādivibhakter anutpādaprasaṅgāt / tasmād vākyasthānām eva prayogaḥ /*. I am uncertain about the meaning of *prathamam tāvāt*.

<sup>93</sup> See, e.g., PVSVT 497,19–498,21 (Eltschinger 2007b: 370, n. 595).

<sup>94</sup> The expression indeed first occurs in Prabhākara’s *Bṛhatī*; see Kataoka 2021: 538, and especially Yoshimizu 1997: 43, n. 57, for numerous references.

<sup>95</sup> See Ollett 2020: 253–254.

<sup>96</sup> Ollett 2020: 254

<sup>97</sup> Ollett 2020: 254

Note, however, that no *terminus ante quem* is known for Kaṇṇakagomin.<sup>98</sup> Śālikanātha's chronology being equally unclear (9<sup>th</sup> century according to Kataoka 2021: 531; 800–900 according Saxena 2022: 286; early 9<sup>th</sup> century in Ollett 2020: 251), one cannot dismiss the possibility that Kaṇṇakagomin was acquainted with him, or, at least, with the doxographic labels he contributed to establish. This might confirm the early 9<sup>th</sup> century for Śālikanātha, or suggest a somewhat later date for Kaṇṇakagomin.

## Appendix: Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on word and sentence meaning (II)

TS<sub>K</sub> 1166–1178/TS<sub>Ś</sub> 1165–1177 & TSP<sub>K</sub> 356,3–358,23/TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 305,5–307,16<sup>99</sup>  
 1—TS<sub>K</sub> 1166–1170/TS<sub>Ś</sub> 1165–1169 & TSP<sub>K</sub> 356,3–357,10/TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 305,5–306,5<sup>100</sup>  
*yad uktaṃ prameyajñeyaśabdāder*<sup>101</sup> *ityādi tatrāha –*

*prameyajñeyaśabdādeḥ*<sup>102</sup> *kasyāpohyaṃ na vidyate /*  
*na hy asau kevalo 'kāṇḍe prekṣāvadbhiḥ prayujyate //*

*kasya prameyādiśabdasyāpohyaṃ nāstīty abhidhīyate / yadi tāvad avākyasthaṃ kevalaṃ padāntarasambandharahitaṃ prameyādiśabdān āśrityocyate / tadā sid-dhasādhyatā / kevalasya prayogābhāvād eva*<sup>103</sup> *nirarthakatvāt / tad darśayati—na hy asau kevalo 'kāṇḍa iti / kevala ity anyāśabdarahitaḥ / akāṇḍa*<sup>104</sup> *iti pra-stāvam antareṇa*<sup>105</sup> *yataḥ śrotṛjanānugrahāya prekṣāvadbhiḥ śabdāḥ prayujyate na vyasanitayā / na ca kevalena satā śrotur ekasmin*<sup>106</sup> *sandehaviparyāsanivṛttilakṣaṇo*

<sup>98</sup> Steinkellner 1979: 148–149.

<sup>99</sup> Tibetan versions in TS<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 43a6–b5, TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 358a4–359b6.

<sup>100</sup> Tibetan versions in TS<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 43a6–b1, TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 358a4–b7.

<sup>101</sup> TS<sub>K</sub> 978cd/TS<sub>Ś</sub> 977cd.

<sup>102</sup> *-śabdādeḥ* TS<sub>Ś</sub>: *-śabdādaḥ* TS<sub>K</sub>

<sup>103</sup> TSP<sub>Tib</sub> with no equivalent of *eva*.

<sup>104</sup> *akāṇḍe* rendered *skabs min par* TS<sub>Tib</sub>, but *glo bur du* TSP<sub>Tib</sub>.

<sup>105</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *skabs las gžan du'o*.

<sup>106</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *'ba' žig la sbyor bas ṅan pa po 'ba' žig...*

'nugrahaḥ kṛto bhavet / tathā hi yadi śrotuḥ kvacid arthe<sup>107</sup> samutpannau saṁśayaaviparyāsau<sup>108</sup> nivartya niḥsandigdham pratyayam utpādayet pratipādaka evaṁ tenānyānugrahaḥ kṛto bhavet<sup>109</sup> na ca kevalena prayuktena tathā'nugrahaḥ śakyate vaktum<sup>110</sup>

tasmāt saṁśayādinivartane niścayotpādane ca śrotur anugrahāc chabdaprayoga-sāphalyam iti vākyaasthasyaivāsya prayoga iti darśayati –

**kinto ārekaviparyāsasambhave sati kasyacit /  
kvacit tadvinivṛttyartham dhīmadbhīḥ sa prayujyate //  
niḥsandehaviparyāsapratyayotpādanād ataḥ /  
tenaiva taiḥ prayuktena sāphalyam anubhūyate //**

ārekaḥ saṁśayaḥ / kasyacid iti śrotuḥ<sup>111</sup> kvacid ity arthe / tadvinivṛttyartham iti tayor ārekaviparyāsayor vinivṛttyartham / teneti jñeyādīpadena / tair iti prekṣāvadbhīḥ /

atha vākyaastham eva jñeyādīśabdam adhikṛtyocyate / tad asiddham iti darśayati –

**yat tatra jaḍacetobhir āśaṅkāspadam iṣyate /  
tad eva kṣipyate tena viphaloccāraṇā<sup>112</sup> 'nyathā //**

tatra hi vākyaasthena prameyādīśabdena yad eva jaḍacetobhir mandamatibhir āśaṅkyate<sup>113</sup> tad eva nivartyata ity ato 'siddham etat prameyādīśabdānāṁ nivartyaṁ nāstīti / **anyatheti** yadi jaḍadhībhir āśaṅkitam na nivartayed ity arthaḥ / syād

<sup>107</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> ñan pa po de 'ga'\* žig la... \*'ba' D.

<sup>108</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> the tshom dan phyin ci log gi blo skyes pa...

<sup>109</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> des 'di rjes su gzuñ bar byas par 'gyur gyi gžan du ni ma yin no.

<sup>110</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> de ltar rjes su gzuñ bar nus pa yañ ma yin no. I would expect kartum instead of vaktum.

<sup>111</sup> TSP<sub>Tib</sub> with no equivalent of kasyacid iti śrotuḥ.

<sup>112</sup> Skt. viphaloccāraṇā can hardly be a bahuvrīhi compound, so that one has to admit that Śāntarākṣita uses the feminine uccāraṇā, which, as far as I can see, is not attested in current dictionaries. As pointed out to me by Johannes Bronkhorst, the feminine vicāraṇā can be found in addition to vicāraṇa.

<sup>113</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> dogs pa'i gnas su 'dod pa...

etat—*naiva*<sup>114</sup> śrotṛā kiñcid āśaṅkitam<sup>115</sup> ity āha—*kiñcid dhy aśaṅkamāno*<sup>116</sup> *kimartham paripṛcchati / atatsaṃskāarakam śabdaṃ bruvan vā svasthadhīḥ katham* // yadi hi śrotā na kvacid arthe saṃśete tat kimiti parasmād upadeśam apekṣate / niścayārtham hi paraṃ pṛcchati / anyathonmattaḥ syāt / syād etat—yadi nāma śrotur āśaṅkāsthānam asti tathāpi tacchabdena na nivartyata evety āha—*atatsaṃskāarakam* ityādi / tasya śrotur ajñānādinivṛttilakṣaṇasaṃskāras tatsaṃskāraḥ / na vidyate tatsaṃskāro yasmin śabda iti tad atatsaṃskāarakam<sup>117</sup> *śeṣād vibhāṣā*<sup>118</sup> iti kap<sup>119</sup> *bruvann* iti pratipādakaḥ / *svasthadhīḥ katham* ity unmattaka eva syād ity arthaḥ / śrotṛsaṃskārāyaiva śabdānāṃ prayogāt /.

“To what [Kumārila] has said in ŚV *apohavāda* 143cd, [Śāntarakṣita] answers as follows: **Which is the word ‘cognizable,’ ‘knowable,’ etc., that [allegedly] has no negative counterpart? For such [a word] is not used in isolation, out of context (*akāṇḍe*), by rational [persons].** Which word ‘cognizable,’ etc., is said [by you Mīmāṃsakas] not to have any negative counterpart? To begin with, if it is said with reference to the isolated word ‘cognizable,’ etc., which does not occur in a sentence [and] has no relation to any other word, then [this is nothing but] demonstrating what is [already] established, for [according to us, too, such a word] has no meaning on account of the fact that it is simply never used in isolation. This [is what Śāntarakṣita] shows with [the second part of the stanza, i.e.,] ‘For such [a word] is not used in isolation, out of context,’ etc. [Here,] ‘**in isolation**’ means ‘with no other word,’ [and] ‘**out of context**’ means ‘without a discursive framework.’ [This is] because rational [persons] use a word to benefit the people who listen, not out of selfish interest. And [inasmuch as benefitting him] consists in the removal of the listener’s doubt and error about something, one would not benefit him with a [word] being [used] in isolation. To explain, if the speaker (*pratipādaka*) removed the doubt and the error that have arisen in the listener

<sup>114</sup> *naiva* TSP<sub>5</sub>: *na hi* TSP<sub>K</sub>

<sup>115</sup> *kiñcid āśaṅkitam* TSP<sub>5</sub>: *kiñcic chaṅkitam* TSP<sub>K</sub>

<sup>116</sup> *aśaṅkamāno* TS<sub>K</sub> (TS<sub>Tib</sub> *yid gñis... med na*): *āśaṅkamāno* TS<sub>5</sub>

<sup>117</sup> *tad atatsaṃskāarakam* TSP<sub>K</sub>: *tad atasamskarakam* TSP<sub>5</sub>; note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *de ñid ‘du mi byed pa’o*.

<sup>118</sup> A 5.4.154.

<sup>119</sup> *śeṣād vibhāṣā iti kap* with no equivalent in TSP<sub>Tib</sub>.

concerning a certain thing and caused an indubitable cognition to arise [in him], then (*evam*) he would benefit [this] other [person], but one cannot speak of benefitting [anyone] in this way, i.e., with a [word] used in isolation.

Therefore, if it removes doubt, etc., and causes ascertainment, the use of a word is fruitful since [in this way] it benefits the listener; thus it is only [inasmuch as] it occurs in a sentence that one uses this [word]. [Śāntarakṣita] shows [this in the next two stanzas]: **Rather, when someone has uncertainty or is in error about something, thoughtful [persons] use this [word] in order to remove them by causing an indubitable and true cognition to arise; therefore, it is only with this [word as it is] used by them that fruitfulness is met with (*anubhūyate*).** ‘Uncertainty’ means ‘doubt’; ‘someone’ refers to the speaker, ‘something’ is for a [certain] thing; ‘in order to remove them’ means ‘in order to eliminate these two, uncertainty and error; ‘this’ refers to the word ‘knowable,’ etc.; [finally,] ‘by them’ refers to the rational [persons].

But if[, on the contrary,] it is said with reference to the word ‘knowable,’ etc., as it occurs in a sentence, [then] it is unestablished. [Śāntarakṣita] shows this [in the next stanza]: **This [word] removes exactly that which is regarded by idiotic [persons] as a point of uncertainty concerning this [thing]; otherwise, [its] utterance [would be entirely] pointless.** For it that which idiotic, i.e., unintelligent [persons] are uncertain about that is removed by the word ‘knowable,’ etc., as it occurs in a sentence. Therefore, it is not established that words such as ‘knowable’ have no negative counterpart. ‘Otherwise’ means ‘if what idiotic [persons] are uncertain about were not removed.’

Suppose the following be urged: There is strictly nothing the listener is uncertain about! [Against this, Śāntarakṣita] says [the next stanza]: **For if there is nothing [the listener] is uncertain about, why is he asking? Or, should [someone] utter a word that does inform the [listener], how [could this person be considered] sound in mind?** For if the listener is not in doubt about anything, why then does he rely on the instruction [to be received] from someone else? For one asks another [person] for the sake of ascertainment, otherwise one would [just] be insane. Suppose the following be urged: Even if there is a point of uncertainty for the listener, even so, it is certainly not removed by that word. [Against this, Śāntarakṣita] states [the second part of the stanza, i.e.,] ‘**Or, should [someone] utter,**’ etc. The listener’s information[, which is] characterized by the removal of ignorance,

etc., is ‘his being informed’; a word in which his information is lacking, hence ‘[a word] that does not inform him.’ [As for the affix *-ka*, it is to be explained with Pāṇini’s *sūtra*] ‘After all other *bahuvrīhi* compounds not covered by the foregoing rules, may optionally be added the affix *kap*.’<sup>120</sup> ‘Should [someone] utter,’ i.e., the speaker; ‘how [could he be considered] sound in mind’ means that he would just be insane, because words have no other use than for the sake of the listener.”

[...] <sup>121</sup>

2—TS<sub>K</sub> 1176–1178/TS<sub>Ś</sub> 1175–1177 & TSP<sub>K</sub> 358,11–28/TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 306,31–307,16<sup>122</sup>  
*nanu ca kim anityatvena śabdāḥ prameyā āhosvīn neti prastāve prameyā iti prayoge  
 tatra yaḥ prakaraṇānabhiñās tasyāpi pratipattuḥ prameyā iti kevalaśabdaśravaṇāt  
 plavamānarūpā*<sup>123</sup> *śabdādiṣu buddhir upajāyate eva / tad yadi kevalasya śabdasyā-  
 rtho nāsty eva tat katham arthapratipattir bhavātīty ata āha—*

*prameyajñeyaśabdādeḥ pratipattinimittatām /  
 itthaṃ vākyasthitasyaiva dṛṣṭvā kālāntareṣv api //*  
*kevalasyopalambhe yā pratītir upajāyate /  
 plavamānārthabhedeṣu sā tadvākyānusārataḥ //*  
*ghaṭādiḥpi śabdebhyaḥ sāsty eva ca tathāvidhā /  
 tasmād ghaṭādiśabdena jñeyādīdihvanayaḥ samāḥ //*

*ayam atra samudāyārthaḥ—naiva kevalaśabdaśravaṇād arthapratipattir asti /  
 kintu vākyeṣūpalabdhasyārthavataḥ śabdasya sādṛśyenāpahr̥tabuddheḥ*<sup>124</sup> *kevala-  
 śabdaśravaṇād arthapratipattyabhimānaḥ / tathā hi yeṣv eva vākyeṣu prameya-  
 śabdam upalabdhavān śrotā tad*<sup>125</sup> *artheṣv eva sā buddhir apratiṣṭhitārthā*<sup>126</sup>  
*plavamānarūpā*<sup>127</sup> *samupajāyate / tac ca ghaṭādiśabdānām api tulyam / tathā hi kiṃ*

<sup>120</sup> Vasu 1962: II.1034.

<sup>121</sup> Not included: TS<sub>K</sub> 1171–1175/TS<sub>Ś</sub> 1170–1174 & TSP<sub>K</sub> 357,11–358,10/TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 306,6–30 (Tibetan versions in TS<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 43b1–4, TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 358b7–359b1).

<sup>122</sup> Tibetan versions in TS<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 43b4–5, TSP<sub>Tib</sub> D ze 359b1–6.

<sup>123</sup> TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *gñis dan bcas pa’i no bo’i. . .*

<sup>124</sup> TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *blo ’khrul pa.*

<sup>125</sup> TSP<sub>Tib</sub> with no equivalent of *tad*.

<sup>126</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *rab tu mi gnas pa.*

<sup>127</sup> TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *yid gñis kyis no bo.*



*ghaṭenodakam ānayāny utāñjalineti prastāve ghaṭeneti prayoge*<sup>128</sup> *prastāvānabhi-jñasya yāvatsu vākyeṣu ghaṭeneti*<sup>129</sup> *prayogo dṛṣṭaḥ / tāvatām artheṣv ākāṅkṣā-vatī*<sup>130</sup> *pūrvavākyānusārād eva pratipattir bhavati*<sup>131</sup> *tasmād yathā ghaṭādi*<sup>132</sup> *śabdā viśiṣṭārthavacanās tathā prameyādiśabdā apīti darśayati—tasmād ityādi /*

“Objection: But in the discussion whether words are cognizable as impermanent or not, when [someone answers] using [the word] ‘cognizable,’ even a listener who is not acquainted with the context will have a hazy (*plavamānarūpa*) cognition of words, etc., from hearing the isolated word ‘cognizable.’ Thus if[, as you maintain,] an isolated word has no meaning, how is it then that [such] a cognition of the meaning occurs? [Against this, Śāntarakṣita] states [the next three stanzas]: **When [a listener] has observed in earlier times that the words ‘cognizable,’ ‘knowable,’ etc., are the cause of a cognition only when they stand in a sentence in the way [we have just described], the hazy understanding of various meanings that arises [in him/her] when (s)he apprehends the isolated [word, arises] in accordance with these [earlier] sentences. And [an understanding] of that sort does in fact also occur from [hearing isolated] words such as ‘pot.’ Therefore, utterances such as ‘knowable’ are similar to a word such as ‘pot.’** Such is the general meaning here: There certainly is no cognition of a meaning from hearing an isolated word. Rather, being misled by [that word’s] resemblance with a meaningful word perceived [earlier] in [various] sentences, [the listener] is under the impression that (s)he cognizes (*pratipattiyabhimāna*) a meaning from hearing an isolated word. To explain: This hazy cognition with no fixed object arises in regard to the meanings that are those of the sentences in which the listener has [formerly] perceived the word ‘cognizable’ [being used]. Now, this is [exactly] the same even for words such as ‘pot.’ To explain: In case (*prastāve*) [someone asks,] ‘Do I have to bring water with a pot or with cupped hands?,’ when [another person answers] using [the word] ‘with a pot!,’ it is in accordance with the previous[ly heard] sentences that,

<sup>128</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *sbyor ba na* for *prastāve ghaṭeneti prayoge*.

<sup>129</sup> Note TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *ji sñed cig la des bum pas žes* (*sbyor...*).

<sup>130</sup> TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *’dod pa dan ldan pa*.

<sup>131</sup> *bhavati* TSP<sub>ś</sub> (TSP<sub>Tib</sub>): *bhavati* (*iti*) TSP<sub>K</sub>

<sup>132</sup> *yathā ghaṭādi-* TSP<sub>ś</sub> (TSP<sub>Tib</sub> *ji ltar bum pa la sogs pa’i...*): *yathā’rthavādi-* TSP<sub>K</sub>

for him/her who is not acquainted with the context (*prastāve*), a cognition that requires a complement arises in reference to the meanings of as many sentences in which (s)he has [previously] observed [the word] ‘with a pot’ being used. Therefore, just as words such as ‘pot’ denote specific objects, so also do words such as ‘cognizable.’ This is what [Śāntarakṣita] shows [in the last two *pādas*, when he says,] ‘Therefore, utterances,’ etc.”

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# Conventional Validity

## A Study of Prajñākaragupta's Interpretation of *Pramāṇavārttika* II 4d–5a in the Light of Yamāri's Sub-commentary\*

I N A M I M a s a h i r o  
T o k y o G a k u g e i U n i v e r s i t y

### 1. Introduction

How is the validity of cognition established? Is it truly established? Can the cognitions we accept as valid really be considered valid? Dharmakīrti accepts two kinds of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), and defines valid cognition as non-deceptive cognition (*avisaṃvādi jñānam*). If a person who sees a fire takes action to use that fire, he can actually experience some causal efficacy from the fire, e.g., burning something, cooking, making himself warm, etc. According to Dharmakīrti, only the things that have some causal efficacies are regarded as real things (*vastu*), and the cognition that reveals such things is thought to be valid.

Judging from our common sense, this practical understanding of validity is relatively satisfactory. However, there are a few problems to be solved with regard to this definition of the validity of cognition. For example, in some cases, a cognition that is not accompanied by any actions may be regarded as valid. And some cognitions are known to be valid before any action has been taken. Moreover, how can the subsequent cognition validating the preceding cognition be considered valid? Further, according to the Buddhist doctrine of ignorance (*avidyā*), our daily cognitions are all comprised of misunderstanding. Only the Buddha can truly know the truth. How can Dharmakīrti's theory of truth accommodate Buddhist thought? Thus, Dharmakīrti's definition of valid cognition leads to various problems that must be resolved. But since Dharmakīrti did not give any detailed explanations, his followers had to provide various explanations of the validity of cognition.

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\* This paper is a revised version of the paper I read at the workshop "Prajñākaragupta and Yamāri," which was held in Leipzig 26 June–1 July 2019.

In this paper, I examine Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of *Pramāṇa-vārttika* (PV) II 4d–5a: *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ / prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*, and his criticism of his predecessors' interpretations.<sup>1</sup> It is well known that Prajñākaragupta often implicitly criticizes his predecessors' understanding of Dharmakīrti's theories. His criticism becomes clearer when we read sub-commentaries; moreover, Jayanta and Yamāri sometimes explain who Prajñākaragupta is criticizing. In order to clarify Prajñākaragupta's own understanding of the PV, it is important to recognize and examine his points of criticism one by one. This type of analysis plays a significant role in elucidating the historical development of Buddhist thought after Dharmakīrti.

I will attempt to clarify Prajñākaragupta's interpretation by using Yamāri's sub-commentary on Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (PVA).<sup>2</sup> Regarding Yamāri's sub-commentary, until recently all we had available was its Tibetan translation as preserved in the Tibetan Tripitaka. It was thus a great pleasure to finally see the Sanskrit text of this work.<sup>3</sup> I had thought that the Tibetan translation of Yamāri's sub-commentary was relatively good. However, when I checked certain portions, I discovered that the Tibetan translation is sometimes quite different from the Sanskrit text. Moreover, on occasion the translation omits passages, or presents parts of the text out of order (this is especially the case in the sDe dge' edition). I am now convinced that Yamāri's explanations are much clearer if one reads the Sanskrit text together with the Tibetan translation.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the portion of the PVA dealt with in the present paper, three Sanskrit editions—PVA<sup>S</sup>, PVA<sup>O</sup>, and PVA<sup>W</sup>—are now available.

<sup>2</sup> A discussion of Jayanta's sub-commentary on PVA *ad* PV II 4d–5a lies outside the scope of this paper.

<sup>3</sup> For the Sanskrit text of Yamāri's sub-commentary, in this paper I use the tentatively edited text that was distributed to the participants of the workshop and which was later revised. The folio and line numbers I give in this paper are based on that final edited text. A critically edited text of Yamāri's sub-commentary on the entire *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the PV is currently being prepared for publication and will be available in the near future.

<sup>4</sup> On the unreliability of the Tibetan translation of Yamāri's sub-commentary, see also Franco and Preisendanz 2022.



## 2. Dharmakīrti's PV II 4d–5a

Prior to Dharmakīrti, Dignāga had explained that there are two kinds of *pramāṇa*, namely, perception and inference. However, Dignāga did not define *pramāṇa*, nor did he explain any characteristics common to all *pramāṇas*. To explain the word “*pramāṇabhūtāya*,” found in the *namaskāraśloka* of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Dharmakīrti had to offer an explanation of the word *pramāṇa*. This explanation is found at the beginning of the *pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV II 1–6).

The context of PV II 1–6 is as follows<sup>5</sup>:

### Explanation of the word “*pramāṇa*”

#### Defining characteristic of *pramāṇa* (1): non-deceptive cognition

PV II 1a–b<sup>1</sup>: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam*

PV II 1b<sup>2</sup>–c<sup>1</sup>: *arthakriyāsthitiḥ / avisaṃvādanam*

#### Verbal cognition is non-deceptive with regard to the object intended by speaker

PV II 1c<sup>2</sup>–d: *śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt //*<sup>6</sup>

PV II 2: *vaktṛvyāpāraviśayo yo 'rtho buddhau prakāśate / prāmāṇyam tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam //*

#### Conceptual judgment is not admitted as *pramāṇa*

PV II 3a–b<sup>1</sup>: *grhītagrahaṇān neṣṭam sāmṛtam*

#### *Pramāṇa* is nothing but cognition

PV II 3b<sup>2</sup>–d: *dhīpramāṇatā / pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyo-pādeyavastuni //*

PV II 4ab: *viśayākārabhedāc ca dhiyo 'dhigamabhedataḥ /*

PV II 4c: *bhāvād evāsya tadbhāve*

<sup>5</sup> For an outline of PV II 1–6, see Katsura 1984, van Bijlert 1989, etc.

<sup>6</sup> Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of PV II 1c<sup>2</sup>–d: *śābde 'py abhiprāyanivedanāt* is different from that of other commentators. He understands Dharmakīrti as saying here that auditory knowledge (*śabdajñāna*) is also regarded as valid cognition because it does not betray expectations. See Inami 2022.

### Cognition and its validity

PV II 4d–5a: *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ // prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*

### Significance of śāstra

PV II 5b: *śāstraṃ mohanivartanam /*

**Defining characteristic of *pramāṇa* (2): that which reveals an unknown object**

PV II 5c: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*

***Svalakṣaṇa* is meant by the word “an unknown object”**

PV II 5d–6a: *svarūpādhigateḥ param // prāptam sāmānyavi-jñānam*

PV II 6bc: *avijñāte svalakṣaṇe / yajjñānam ity abhiprāyāt*

PV II 6d: *svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ //*

To begin, Dharmakīrti defines and explains a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). He states:

[1] PV II 1a–b<sup>1</sup>: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam*

*Pramāṇa* (valid means of cognition) is [to be defined as] non-deceptive cognition.

[2] PV II 1b<sup>2</sup>–c<sup>1</sup>: *arthakriyāsthitiḥ / avisaṃvādanam*

Non-deceptiveness means the certainty as to the causal efficacy [of the object known through the cognition].

Here, Dharmakīrti defines a valid means of cognition as non-deceptive cognition (*avisaṃvādi jñānam*). He seems to straightforwardly think that only a cognition which is a reliable or trustworthy source of information should be regarded as *pramāṇa*. Since he later explains that the Buddha is a *pramāṇabhūta*, he may have had the Buddha’s reliability in mind, that is, the Buddha or his teachings, which ordinary people consider reliable, should be regarded as *pramāṇa*. It thus seems that a definition which can be applied to the Buddha is being presented here.

After these phrases, Dharmakīrti explains, step by step, that verbal cognition is non-deceptive regarding the object intended by the speaker (PV

II 1c<sup>2</sup>–2); that perceptual judgment is not *pramāṇa* (PV II 3a–b<sup>1</sup>); and that *pramāṇa* is nothing but cognition (PV II 3b<sup>2</sup>–4c). He then makes an important remark on cognition itself and its validity:

[3] PV II 4d–5a: *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ || prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*

[Cognition] itself is known by itself. [However, its] validity is [understood] through actions.

This phrase is significant when thinking about Dharmakīrti's theory of truth. As is well known, Kumārila presented a theory of intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmāṇya*). After Kumārila, Indian philosophers had to explain how validity of cognition is established. In discussing this problem, commentators on Dharmakīrti's works often mention PV II 4d–5a along with PV II 1a–b<sup>1</sup>.<sup>7</sup>

According to some commentators, such as Devendrabuddhi, the validity of cognition is basically determined through the experience of some causal efficacy of the object. Therefore, in this case validity is established extrinsically.<sup>8</sup> However, there are some exceptional cases. For example, in the case of an object that has been repeatedly experienced in the past, the validity of its cognition is intrinsically established without waiting for any validation. Moreover, the validity of self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) is intrinsic as well.<sup>9</sup>

However, there are some problems that remain with Dharmakīrti's definition of the validity of cognition: If the validity of a preceding cognition (C1) is understood through the following cognition (C2) of *arthakriyā* obtained after action has been taken toward the object, how is the validity of C2 established? If it is established by yet another cognition (C3), there would be an infinite

<sup>7</sup> Prajñākaragupta criticizes Kumārila's theory of *svataḥprāmāṇya* in PVA<sup>S</sup> 23,15–24,32 (PVA<sup>O</sup> 58,8–63,10). I do not deal with his criticism in the present paper.

<sup>8</sup> As is well known, Vātsyāyana explained the validity or usefulness of *pramāṇas* as follows: *pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam* / (*Nyāya-bhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1.) "Since a person's action with regard to an object that he understands on the basis of a *pramāṇa* is successful, the *pramāṇa* is regarded as fruitful (*arthavat*).” For example, through some cognition, we first understand that there is a fire someplace. Second, we take action to go there in order to use the fire for some purpose. Third, we get the fire and use it. Through this process, the cognition of fire in the first stage is found to be valid.

<sup>9</sup> On Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's interpretations of PV II 1a–b<sup>1</sup> and 4d–5a, see Inami 1993.

regress. And, strictly speaking, the object of C2 is different from the object of C1. How can the validity of C1 be established by C2? If C2 is a *pratyakṣa*, it reveals only its own object. Neither C1 itself nor the validity of C1 is understood through C2. Furthermore, even if C2 is a kind of *anumāna*, it presupposes another *pratyakṣa*, because pervasion (*vyāpti*) is established by means of a *pratyakṣa* that must be validated. If the pervasion is established by another inference, also in this case, an infinite regress would occur. And even if an inference based on C2 determines the validity of C1, *vyāpti* must be determined by yet another cognition, which in turn needs to be validated.

After PV II 4d–5a, Dharmakīrti refers to the significance of *śāstra*. He might be assuming the objection: “If the validity of cognition is established in our conventional world, it does not need to be explained in treatises on *pramāṇa*.” He answers this by saying “*śāstraṃ mohanivartanam*” (PV II 5b). Even if the validity of cognition is established in our conventional world, it also needs to be explained in treatises, since there are people who misunderstand it and give erroneous explanations.

Then Dharmakīrti provides another definition of *pramāṇa* with the following statement:

[4] PV II 5c: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*

Or/Or rather, [the cognition] that reveals an unknown object [should be regarded as *pramāṇa*].

The commentators argue about why Dharmakīrti gave this second definition.<sup>10</sup> Some explain that *pramāṇa* has two different characteristics, namely, non-deceptiveness (*avisamvāda*) and the elucidation of an unknown object (*ajñātārthaprakāśa*). Only when cognition has both characteristics, can the cognition be regarded as a *pramāṇa*. On the other hand, some commentators believe that the first definition is of the conventional *pramāṇa* and the second is of the ultimate *pramāṇa*. Validity as non-deceptiveness is merely conventional or empirical and should be negated from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth. Accordingly, the phrase “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*” (PV II 5a) is interpreted as indicating conventional validity.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> On commentators’ interpretations of two definitions, see Ono’s paper in this volume.

<sup>11</sup> The Sanskrit word *sāṃvyavahārika* or *vyavahārika* is tentatively translated in this

If this is applied to the Buddha, the second definition might be seen as related to the Buddha's wisdom, that is, his insight in revealing truth that is not known by ordinary people. The two definitions of *pramāṇa* provided by Dharmakīrti thus would correspond, first, to the Buddha's preaching, and, second, to his enlightenment.<sup>12</sup>

### 3. Prajñākaragupta's Interpretation of PV II 4d–5a

#### 3.1. Basic Interpretation

##### 3.1.1. On PV II 4d: *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ*

Prajñākaragupta explains PV II 4d–5a in various ways.<sup>13</sup> To begin, he presents his basic interpretation of PV II 4d: *svarūpasya svato gatiḥ* as follows:

[5] PVA<sup>S</sup> 25,4–7; PVA<sup>O</sup> 63,14–64,2; PVA<sup>W</sup> 8,6–11: *svato hi svarūpa-syaiva gatiḥ, na pararūpasya / sāksādgatir hi pratyakṣam / sāksātkaraṇam ca svarūpasya, na pararūpasya prāptikālaviśeṣaṇasya / pramāṇatā ca prāpya-padārthāvyabhicāritā / na ca prāpyapadārthāgrahṇe tatsambandhagrahaṇam / na ca tathānavasīyamānaṃ pramāṇam ity avasitaṃ bhavati / purovartirūpāsamgītā tu sarvajñānānām aviśiṣṭā / na tayā bhāvīrūpasambandha-parigrahaḥ /*

A [cognition] itself alone is known by itself, but others are not. For perception (*pratyakṣa*) is [defined as] direct cognition (*sāksādgati*), and what is directly cognized [by the present cognition] is [the present cognition or the object appearing in the present cognition] itself, and not other [cognitions or objects] that have the time of acquisition as their qualifier. Being *pramāṇa* is nothing but being inevitably related to the object to be obtained (*prāpyapadārthāvyabhicāritā*). But when the object to be obtained is not grasped, the [cognition's] being related to it cannot be grasped. Then a perception that is not determined as such cannot be determined as *pramāṇa*. On the other hand, being connected to the present object is not different for all cognitions. [Therefore,] by this, [a certain cognition] being [inevitably] related to a future object cannot be understood. [Thus, being *pramāṇa* is not understood.]

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paper as “conventional.” On the translation of this term into English, see Franco 2021: n. 1.

<sup>12</sup> See Inami 1989.

<sup>13</sup> The sentences in PVA *ad* PV II 4d–5a are individually quoted by Bhāsarvajña in his *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* and severely criticized (NBhū 199,13–209,13). His criticism is interesting, but will not be analyzed in detail in the present paper.

According to Prajñākaragupta, Dharmakīrti states here that cognition knows only its own object. The object appearing in the cognition of an accomplishing means or in the cognition of the means (*sādhanañjñāna* = C1) is known by the same cognition itself. But the object at the time of acquisition is not known by the *sādhanañjñāna* (C1). The validity of *sādhanañjñāna* consists in being inevitably related to the object to be obtained (*prāpyapadārthāvyabhicāritā*). However, since the object to be obtained is not grasped, such a relation is not grasped. In other words, only the present object is known (or only the present cognition in which the present object is appearing is known). The future object that will be obtained is not known. Since the relation between the present cognition and a future object is never known, the validity of the present cognition can never be known.

Then, can the validity of *sādhanañjñāna* (C1) be understood by means of a future cognition (C2)?

[6] PVA<sup>S</sup> 25,7–9; PVA<sup>O</sup> 64,2–4; PVA<sup>W</sup> 8,11–13: *nāpi bhāvinārthakriyāñjñānena pūrvārthasaṃbandhapariagrahaḥ / tataḥ svarūpasamvedanātmatoḥ na pratyekaṃ saṃbandhapariagrahaḥ /*

The relationship to a previous object is not grasped by the future cognition of causal efficacy. Therefore, since each cognition merely knows itself, its relation [to something else] is not grasped at all.

A future cognition also reveals only its own object. The validity of a present cognition is not understood through a future cognition. Therefore, the validity of cognition cannot be appropriately understood by any means. Prajñākaragupta concludes as follows:

[7] PVA<sup>S</sup> 25,17–18; PVA<sup>O</sup> 64,16–65,2; PVA<sup>W</sup> 10,6–8: *tato 'pravṛttinivṛttikaṃ svasvarūpasamvedanamātram eva, na bhedaṇvādāvātāraḥ / tasmān na prekṣāvadbhīḥ kvacit pravartitavyaṃ na nivartitavyaṃ vā kutaścit /*

Thus, there is merely cognition cognizing itself, which brings neither positive nor negative action. There is no place for the theory of distinctionism. Therefore, [since nothing can be known apart from cognition itself in reality,] the wise should not take positive or negative action on anything.

In truth, cognition merely cognizes itself. Then, distinctionism (*bhedavāda*) should be denied. Therefore, the wise should not take positive or negative action on anything.

Yamāri comments on these words ([7]) as follows:

[8] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 59a7–b1 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D272b7–273a1, P329a2–4): *yathā ca bhāvi-toād apratīyamānena prāpyarūpeṇa na sambandhapratītiḥ, tathā jaḍatayā svabhāvaviprakaśād vartamānenāpi bāhyena na sambandhabuddhir asyedaṃ grāhakam iti / tato jñānasya svarūpamātraṃ citram ābhāsamānam, anyasya pratibhāsāyogād ity āha—na bhedavādāvatāra iti / evaṃ tattvaṃ vyavasthāpya sādhyam āha—tasmād iti / eṣa eva saṃkṣepād apavarga ity arthaḥ /*

[The present cognition's] relationship to the object to be obtained is not understood. This is because that future object is not understood [at that moment]. Similarly, [the present cognition's] relationship to the present external object in the form "This [cognition] grasps this [external object]" is not known, because external objects, which are essentially apart [from cognition] in that they are material, [can never be involved in cognition]. Therefore, what is merely cognition itself appears in various forms. For it is not reasonable for other things to appear. This is what Prajñākaragupta means when [he] says, "There is no place for the theory of difference (*na bhedavādāvatāraḥ*)."<sup>14</sup> After establishing the truth in this way, he states what is to be accomplished: "Therefore (*tasmāt*)."<sup>15</sup> It is meant by the sentence that in short, this is the final beatitude.

Since the object to be obtained is in the future, the validity of a present cognition, which is nothing but the inevitable relation between the grasped and the obtained, cannot be understood. In the same way, external objects (*bāhyārtha*), which are essentially different from cognition, cannot be understood as related to cognition. Thus, distinctionism (*bhedavāda*), which is our delusion that cognition is related to something other than itself, or that something other than cognition is grasped by cognition, is denied. Cognition merely cognizes itself. It cannot be differentiated from anything. It appears without any distinction. Therefore, the wise should not act toward anything other than a cognition. Such a state is nothing but the final beatitude (*apavarga*).<sup>14</sup>

In this way, Prajñākaragupta shows that the ultimate truth is given in PV II 4d. In truth, there is only self-cognizing cognition. Validity can never be truly

<sup>14</sup> On *bhedavāda* as criticized by Prajñākaragupta in the argument on *citrādvaita*, see Inami 2004, Inami 2011, and Inami 2021. According to Prajñākaragupta, it is also denied that cognition cognizes itself. This is because cognition has neither the aspect of grasping, nor of being grasped. It is only the distinctionism that sets up the distinction between the two. In truth, there merely appears cognition. Cognition does not have any distinction. It cannot be differentiated, even from that which is not cognition.

known. However, it should be noted that validity as an inevitable relation to the object to be obtained is denied here. The validity of self-cognizing cognition is not in question.

### 3.1.2. On PV II 5a: *prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*

Prajñākaragupta's basic interpretation of PV II 5a is as follows:

[9] PVA<sup>S</sup> 25,19–20; PVA<sup>O</sup> 65,3–5; PVA<sup>W</sup> 10,9–11: *kathaṃ tarhi prāmāṇyam apramāṇato nivṛttaṃ vyavasthāpyate / prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa / sāmvyavahārikam etad iti pratipāditam / sāmvyavahāraś ca vicāryamāṇo viśīryata eva /*

[Question:] Then, why can some cognition be determined to be valid as excluded from cognitions that are not valid? [Answer:] [Answering this, Dharmakīrti states] “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*.” He intends to say that this [validity] is conventionally accepted. And [it is meant by him that] conventional activity must cease when it is examined.

According to Prajñākaragupta, here Dharmakīrti intends to say that the concept of validity as non-deceptiveness is conventionally accepted (*sāmvyavahārikam etad*).<sup>15</sup> In reality, non-deceptiveness can never be known by any means. It is just conventional validity. Our conventional activity must cease when it is examined. This is reminiscent of the statement of Dharmakīrti: “*yathā yathā 'rthāś cintyante viśīryante tathā tathā /*” (PV III 209cd), which is mentioned in the *citra-advaita* argument.<sup>16</sup> Expressions like the phrase “*vicāryamāṇo viśīryate*” are found in certain parts of PVA. These expressions are used when some tentative acceptance has been abandoned.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Kumārila's definition of *pramāṇa* is as follows: *tatrāpūrvārthavijñānaṃ niścitaṃ bādha-varjitaṃ / aduṣṭakāraṇārabdhaṃ pramāṇaṃ lokasammatam //* (See PVA<sup>S</sup> 21, 17 (PVA<sup>O</sup> 53,4–5); RNĀ 113,11–12.) We should pay attention to the word “*lokasammatam*” in this definition.

<sup>16</sup> See Inami 2004, Inami 2011, and Inami 2021.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. PVA<sup>S</sup> 31,25 (PVA<sup>O</sup> 83,7): *vicāryamāṇaṃ hi sakalam eva viśīryate /*; 92,21: *iyam eva khalu samvṛtīr ucyate yeyaṃ vicāryamāṇā viśīryate 'nyathā paramārtha eva bhavet /*; 273,22–23: *yataḥ parīkṣamāṇo viśīryata eva /*; 286,25: *tasmād yathā yathā vastu cintyate tathā tathā viśīryata eveti kim atra kurmaḥ /*, etc. Bhāsarvajña criticizes Prajñākaragupta's stated view here by pointing out that an examination (*vicāra*) which destroys the foundation cannot be treated as valid. NBhū 204,1–2: *vicāro hi*



Yamāri explains Prajñākaragupta's understanding by using the Buddhist concept of two truths:

[10] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 59b1–3 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D273a2–5, P329a5–b1): *tad evaṃ svarūpasya svato gatiḥ ity anena paramārthasatyam ullikhya śeṣeṇa saṃvṛtyāśrayaṃ prapañcam āpādayitum* (kun rdzob kyi bden pa bstan pa'i don du T) *anuyogenopakramate—kathaṃ tarhīti / (...) siddhāntī punar—ubhe satye samāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā /* (Cf. MMK XXIV 8ab) *ity abhi-prāyavān āha—prāmāṇyam iti /*

After explaining above that [Dharmakīrti states] the ultimate truth by this [phrase], “*svarūpeṇa svato gatiḥ*,” and then explaining that [Dharmakīrti states] the conventional truth by the remaining [phrase],<sup>18</sup> [“*prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa*,”] [Prajñākaragupta] begins by propounding the question: “Then, why?” (...) The siddhāntin[, namely Prajñākaragupta,] says, “*prāmāṇyam*,” keeping in mind [Nāgarjuna's statement:] “The Buddhas preach the Dharma by relying on the two truths.”

According to Yamāri, Dharmakīrti explains the ultimate truth with the words “*svarūpasya svato gatiḥ*” (PV II 4d), and the conventional truth with the words “*prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa*” (PV II 5a). Here, Yamāri is quoting the well-known words of Nāgarjuna.<sup>19</sup>

Regarding the words “*saṃvyavahāraś ca vicāryamāṇo viśīryata eva*,” Yamāri explains as follows:

[11] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 59b4–60a1 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D273a6–b7, P329b2–330a5): *saṃvyavahāraś ceti / pramāṇakāryakāraṇabhāvaparavedanāpalāpāir ity arthaḥ / (...) tad evaṃ svasaṃvedanam eva pāramārthikaṃ pramāṇam, itarat tu sāmṛtām eva / tathāpi lakṣaṇapranāyanaṃ saṃvṛtim evāśrityeti darśitam (...)*

*pramāṇam ucyate na ca mūlaghātinaḥ pramāṇatvaṃ yuktam iti /*

<sup>18</sup> My translation of this section is based on the Tibetan translation: (...) *kun rdzob kyi bden pa bstan pa'i don du* (...) (D273a2, P329a5).

<sup>19</sup> Commentators on Kumāri's *Ślokavārttika* quote the same verse of Nāgarjuna when criticizing the Buddhist theory of two truths. See Inami 2018. Yaśo-mitra also quotes this verse and comments on it as follows: AKVy 524,22–30: *uktaṃ ca / dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā / lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthata iti / tathā paramārthasatyam iti / paramasya jñānasyārthaḥ paramārthaḥ / paramārthaś ca satyam ca tat paramārthasatyam / yathā 'nyena jñānena laukikena grhyate tathā saṃvṛtisatyam / saṃvṛtyā saṃvyavahāreṇa jñānena vā kṣiṇākṣiṇeṇa vā grhyata iti saṃvṛtisatyam / trivaidhaṃ hi yogācārāṇāṃ sat /*

The sentence “*saṃvṛtyavahāraś ca (...)*” can be explained as follows: This sentence means that since valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*), causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*), and cognition cognizing others (*paravedana*) are denied when they are closely examined, [conventional activities must cease]. Thus, self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) alone is regarded as an ultimately valid means of cognition (*pāramārthikam pramāṇam*). Others are all just conventional cognition (*sāṃvṛta*). However, the definition of *pramāṇa* is presented here based on our convention. This is shown here [by Prajñākaragupta].

It is important that Yamāri refers to *pramāṇa* (valid means of cognition), *kāryakāraṇabhāva* (causality), and *paravedana* (cognition cognizing others) as being denied when they are examined closely. These concepts are also regarded as conventional by Prajñākaragupta. Yamāri concludes that only *svasaṃvedana* is regarded as an ultimately valid means of cognition; other means of cognition, including sense perception and inference, are all just conventional cognition (*sāṃvṛta*). The definition of *avisaṃvādi jñānam* is given from the viewpoint of conventional truth.<sup>20</sup>

[12] PVA<sup>S</sup> 25,24–25; PVA<sup>O</sup> 65,10–12; PVA<sup>W</sup> 10,15–16: *kiṃ ca sāṃvṛtyavahārikam prāmāṇyam pratipādayatā paramārthata ekam eva svasaṃvedanam pratyakṣam ity uktam bhavati /*

Moreover, by explaining that [anything other than self-cognition] is only conventional *pramāṇa*, Dharmakīrti is stating that only the *svasaṃvedana* perception is ultimately accepted as *pramāṇa*.

[13] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 60a2–3 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D274a1, P330a7–8): *pūroaṃ svarūpasya svato gatiḥ iti pāramārthikam prāmāṇyam pratipādyā prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa iti sāṃvṛtyavahārikam prāmāṇyam pratipādayatā paramārthata ekam eva svasaṃvedanam anantaroktam na bhinnaviśayam /*

After explaining first that self-cognition alone is ultimately accepted as *pramāṇa* by saying “*svarūpasya svato gatiḥ*,” explaining that [anything other than self-cognition] is only conventional *pramāṇa* by saying “*prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa*,” Dharmakīrti is stating that only the *sva-*

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*paramārthasaṃvṛtisat dravyasac ca / dravyataḥ svalakṣaṇataḥ sad dravyasad iti / (...)*

<sup>20</sup> Cf. SSŚ III 416,18–22: *saṃvādāc ca prāmāṇyam, na ca kvacid bhinne vastuni saṃvādah / tasmāt svavedanātirikatasya prāmāṇyam sāṃvṛtam eva, tathā hetuphalavyavahāro 'pi sāṃvṛta eva, ekapratītikatvād ubhayoh / na paratra yathā mānam tathā hetuphale ca na / yathā ca hetuphalate paratrāpi tathā pramā //* See Inami 2004, Inami 2011, and Inami 2021.

*saṃvedana* perception, which has been explained before, is ultimately accepted as *pramāṇa*, and that other cognitions which have as their object a different thing from the cognition itself are not.

In summary, in Prajñākaragupta's understanding Dharmakīrti is explaining the ultimate means of cognition, namely *svasaṃvedana*, in PV II 4d, and the conventional validity of other means of cognition in PV II 5a. According to Prajñākaragupta, Dharmakīrti intends to insist here that the *svasaṃvedana* perception is the one and only valid means of cognition in the true sense.<sup>21</sup>

### 3.2. Derivative Interpretations

#### 3.2.1. Validity of cognition is based on its being motivator (*pravartaka*)

Prajñākaragupta explains PV II 4d–5a in various ways. It seems that his intention is not to present various interpretations, but to explain his basic interpretation based on certain aspects of other interpretations.

First, Prajñākaragupta explains that people take action toward an object because they understand its future effect on the basis of the relation that is established conventionally.

[14] PVA<sup>S</sup> 25,28–31; PVA<sup>O</sup> 66,4–9; PVA<sup>W</sup> 12,2–6: *tasmād vyavahāramātraprasiddhānumānāśrayeṇa prasiddhaṃ saṃbandham āśritya tad etad arthakriyāsāadhanam iti darśanena sprṣyādisāadhanasya pratipattau pravartate / paścād abhyāsād anumānam antareṇāpi pratibhāsamātrād eva vṛttir iti pratyakṣam api pravartakatvāt pramāṇam / ata ucyate—prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇeti /*

Therefore, relying on the relation that is established based on the inference that is established only in our conventional activity (*vyavahāra*), we, by seeing [the color of the fire], understands that it brings about the feeling [of heat, etc.], as in “This brings about causal efficacy,” and then we act [with regard to that fire]. [In this case, since inference motivates us to act with regard to the object, it is considered *pramāṇa*.] Later, after repeated experiences, we can act only by seeing [the color of the fire], even without inference. Therefore, since perception can also motivate us to take action, it is regarded as *pramāṇa*. Hence, Dharmakīrti states here “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*” (PV II 5a).

<sup>21</sup> Bhāsarvajña criticizes this view by pointing out the following: If only the *svasaṃvedana* perception is finally admitted as *pramāṇa*, the cognition of the omniscient

The relation between *sādhana* and *arthakriyā* is established by means of the “basis” of inference, which is established only in our conventional activity. Based on such a relation, we understand that the object will produce its effect. Then, we act toward that object. In this way, inference motivates us to act toward objects, which is the reason why inference is regarded as a *pramāṇa*. After repeated experiences, however, we no longer need to infer. Perception of *sādhana* can directly cause our action. Then, since perception motivates us to act toward the object, perception is regarded as a *pramāṇa*. Thus, since both perception and inference can be motivators, they are both regarded as *pramāṇas* (*pravartakatvāt pramāṇam*).

However, neither a future object itself, nor its effect is truly known. Such actions are erroneous in truth. They are caused by our mistaken beliefs.<sup>22</sup>

Yamāri explains the cognitive process that leads to action as follows:

[15] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 60a4–5 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D274a4–7, P330b2–6): *anumānasyāśrayaḥ kāraṇam, pūrvaṃ yad evambhūtaṃ tad evam arthakriyākārīti vyāptigrāhakam anusandhānam, tac ca vyavahāramātraprasiddham / pratyakṣagrāhite hy anusandhānam bhavati / na ca pratyakṣasya vastuni tathā vyāpāra iti tadāropād anusandhānam vyāvahārikam eva / tato vyavahāramātraprasiddhānumānāśrayeṇānusandhānena prasiddham sambandham āśritya svīkṛtya paścāt tādṛgvastudarśane pakṣadharmatāgrahāt tad etad arthakriyāsāadhanam iti tad arthakriyāsāadhanam, tādṛśatoāt, pūrvavad iti tādṛpyānumānena pravartate pratipattā /*

The basis (*āśraya*), namely cause (*kāraṇa*), of inference is *anusandhāna*, which grasps pervasion in the manner that what is the same as a thing seen before has the same causal efficacy as that [thing] had. It is established only in our convention. The *anusandhāna* occurs regarding the object known by perception. However, perception does not function as such regarding the real. Therefore, the *anusandhāna*, which is directly based [not on perception, but] on the superimposing something on the [perceived object], is merely conventional. Hence, after relying on, or accepting, the relation that is established based on the basis of inference, namely *anusandhāna*, that is established only in our conventional activity (*vyavahāra*), the cognizer, when seeing a similar thing, grasps the probans belonging to the subject; understands

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one would not be admitted as *pramāṇa*. See NBhū 207,22–30.

<sup>22</sup> Prajñākaragupta discusses this problem in PVA *ad* PV III 53–58. See Kobayashi 2011, Inami 2016, etc.

that “This brings about causal efficacy,” namely, “It will produce an effect because it is such a thing, like before”; and then takes action [with regard to the object].

According to Yamāri, “the basis of inference” (*anumānāśraya*) means *anusaṃdhāna*, that is, combining two things differing in time. For example, it is cognition that combines two fires differing in time. Two momentary fires should be completely differentiated from each other and perceived separately. However, after perceiving two fires, we tend to mistakenly combine these two fires and accordingly determine that both have the same causal efficacy. Such *anusaṃdhāna* is established only in our conventions.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, inference that causes action toward a future object is based on *anusaṃdhāna*, which is conventionally admitted.

Moreover, this inference is explained as follows: “It will produce an effect because it is a thing like before.” The inference can be understood as a kind of analogy. Based on such an analogical type of inference, we act toward the future object.

On perception as a motivator, Yamāri points out that here, Prajñākara-gupta takes a different approach toward cognition than before.

[16] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 60a6 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D274b1, P330b8–331a1): *pūrvam tṛṇakubjīkaraṇe 'py asamarthaṃ paramārthata uktam, vyavahāre tu pravartakam ucyate /*

From the viewpoint of ultimate truth, it has been said before that perception cannot even make a person curve a blade of grass. However, in our conventional world, it is said to be a motivator.

From the viewpoint of ultimate truth, it has been said before that perception cannot even make a person curve a blade of grass, because it is just *svasaṃvedana* in the ultimate sense. Namely, perception can never be a motivator. Now, from the viewpoint of conventional truth, it is said that both perception and inference can be motivators and accordingly treated as *pramāṇas*.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Cf. SŚS III 412,3–5: *na pūrvā na parā nāpi tadubhayavāsanāprasūtānusandhānarūpā buddhir asmād idam iti bhedagrahaṇāntarīyakam hetuphalabhāvānubhavavyavahāram avatarītuṃ śaknoti, sarvāśaṃ svavīnmātramayatayānyadīyavārtāparicayānupapatteḥ /*

<sup>24</sup> See PVA<sup>S</sup> 24,18, PVA<sup>O</sup> 61,9–10: *svarūpasvāmbanākāraparicchedi hi pratyakṣam tṛṇasyāpi na kubjīkaraṇe samartham /* Cf. DhP 20,15–20: *vikalpeneti tatprṣṭha-bhāvinā 'nurūpeneti draṣṭavyam / ananurūpavikalpānugatavyāpārasya tatrāprāmāṇyāt*

### 3.2.2. The validity of cognition is determined on the basis of the conventional judgment of singularity or non-difference

Next, Prajñākaragupta explains that the determination of validity is based on the judgment of singularity or non-difference.

[17] PVA<sup>S</sup> 26,5–9; PVA<sup>O</sup> 67,2–9; PVA<sup>W</sup> 12,11–17:

*vyavahārata ekatvāt pramāṇatvaavyavasthitiḥ /  
deśādyabhedād ekatvaṃ dravyasya vyapadiśyate // 199 //*

*uktam etat prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇeti / tato vyavahāraprasiddham avayavina ekatvaṃ samāśritya yad eva drṣṭaṃ tad eva prāptaṃ iti vyavasāyāt pramāṇatāvyavahārah / sa caikatvādhyavasāyo deśakālādyabhedāt / tadabhedo 'pi tatsāmarthyasāmagrījananāt / evaṃ bhāvibhūtayor api tayor ekasamānāpatitatvena samānārthakriyātaś caikatvābhimānaḥ /*

[Based on the fact that the two things differing each other] are conventionally treated as the same thing, validity [of the preceding cognition] is established. [The two things are different from each other in reality. In our conventional world, however, they] are expressed as the same thing because there is no difference in location, etc. (v. 199)

This is intended by Dharmakīrti [when he] says “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*.” Therefore, since, based on the single whole (*avayavin*) which is conventionally admitted, we determine that which is seen as being what is obtained, the preceding cognition is treated as *pramāṇa*. Based on our understanding that they are not different in place, time, etc., we determine their singularity or identicalness. And such non-difference is based on our understanding that they arise from the same causal complex which is able to produce them. Similarly, we have a mistaken belief in singularity or identicalness of the two, of future and present things, because we understand that they belong to the same continuum (*santāna*), or that they have the same causal efficacy.

Strictly speaking, the object to be obtained (*prāpya*) is different from the object grasped (*grāhya*).

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*kṣaṇikatva iva / evaṃ bruvataś cāyam abhiprāyaḥ—sāṃvyavahārikasya pramāṇasyedam lakṣaṇam ucyate / tato vastuvṛttyā prakāśamānam apy anurūpa vikalpenā viśayīkṛtaṃ sad apratibhāsamānam nātīśete, vyavahārāyogyatvāt / evaṃ tadgrāhakaṃ api tathāvidhavikalpenānanugamyamānavyāpāraṃ vyavahārayitum aparyāptaṃ sat tṛṇasyāpi kubjīkaraṇe 'samartham agrāhakaṃ nātivarttate /*

However, in our conventional world, the two objects are seen as identical to each other. For example, in the case of a person obtaining the warmth of a fire after having seen the color of the fire, the warmth and the color are completely different from each other. However, a person who thinks the same fire was seen and is felt regards the cognition of the color as non-deceptive. This is because he conventionally admits the single whole (*avayavin*).<sup>25</sup> And, although the two things differ in time, he thinks they are the same thing and considers the first cognition as non-deceptive. In both cases, the validity of cognition is established based on a determination of singularity or identicalness (*ekatvādhyavasāya*), or a mistaken belief in singularity (*ekatvābhimāna*), which in reality is invalid.

According to Prajñākaragupta, this misunderstanding is caused by the fact that a causal complex (*sāmagrī*) produces the aggregate of color and other components. This is due to the fact that the two momentary things differing in time belong to the same series (*santāna*), or the fact that the two things have the same causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*). Yamāri supplements this explanation by noting that in the case of grasping pervasion (*vyāpti*) and such, the judgment of identicalness (*ekatvābhimāna*) is caused by an exclusion of anything that is not that thing (*atadvyāvṛtti*).<sup>26</sup> These concepts can be all attributed to Dharmakīrti.

### 3.2.3. The cognition of *sādhana* is regarded as valid because it enables one to know the future *arthakriyā* through inference, which is based on the conventionally established relation.

Moreover, Prajñākaragupta explains the conventional validity of cognition by pointing out that it is determined by means of inference, which is based on the two kinds of relations that are conventionally recognized. He does not accept the argument that since a future object cannot be understood by any means, only doubt can cause a person to act toward an object. He insists that any action toward an object must be caused by determination, not by doubt.

<sup>25</sup> The whole (*avayavin*) is not admitted by Buddhists. Prajñākaragupta also rejects the whole. (See PVA<sup>S</sup> 22,8–9 = PVA<sup>O</sup> 55,5–8.) Bhāsarvajña points out that the view of Prajñākaragupta stated here conflicts with his own rejection of the whole. NBhū 203,13–14: *avayavyekatvābhyupagame tatpratīṣedhavirodhaḥ* /

<sup>26</sup> Y<sup>Skt</sup> 60b3 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D275a2, P333b3): *evaṃ vyāptigrahaṇādāu atadvyāvṛttikṛta ekatvābhi-*

[18] PVA<sup>S</sup> 27,13; PVA<sup>O</sup> 70,2–3; PVA<sup>W</sup> 18,4–5:

*arthakriyāsvārūpasya niścitasyāvbodhanāt /  
jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ tādātmyatadutpattiprabhāvataḥ // 205 //*

[The cognition of *sādhana* (C1)] is regarded as a valid means of cognition just because it causes a person to understand the [future] causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*) which itself is determined through inference based on essential identity (*tādātmya*) or causality (*tadutpatti*).

The cognition of *sādhana* (C1) is regarded as a valid means of cognition because it causes a person to understand the future effect (*arthakriyā*) through inference based on essential identity (*tādātmya*) or causality (*tadutpatti*). Namely, the future object as an *arthakriyākārin* can be inferred from *sādhana*, because *sādhana* is essentially identical to the *arthakriyākārin* or is an effect of the *arthakriyākārin*.

Such a determination causes our actions, but it is derived from our mistaken belief. As is well known, Dharmakīrti insists that inference is based on two kinds of relations, namely essential identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*). However, according to Prajñākaragupta, both relations are just conventional.<sup>27</sup>

Yamāri comments as follows:

[19] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 61a2–4 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D275b6–276a3, P332b2–8): *niścitasya, na tu sandigdhasyety arthaḥ / nanv arthakriyāsvārūpasya bhāvitoāt kathaṃ niścayaḥ? ity āha—tādātmyeti / tad arthakriyākāritvam, ātmā svabhāvo yasya sādhanajñānasya, tat tathā, tasya bhāvas tādātmyaṃ [ca] / tasmād arthakriyāsvārūpabhāvina utpattir yasya, tat tathā / [tac ca] tayoh prabhāvah sāmartyaṃ tena / pūrvaṃ hi sādhanasyarthakriyākāritvam avadhāritam arthakriyāsvārūpād utpannatvaṃ ca, sādhanajñānād uttarakālaṃ niyamenārthakriyāsvārūpadarśanāt / tataḥ sādhanajñāne yad evaṃbhūtaṃ tad arthakriyākāri, bhāvvyarthakriyāsvārūpāvyabhicāri vā / yathā prāgdrṣṭaṃ sādhanam / tathā cedam iti tādātmyatadutpattyapekṣayā prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / etac caitadvivarane vyaktam / etajjātīyam evānumāna-dvayaṃ paralokasiddhaye 'pi vakṣyati /*

*māna upalakṣaṇīyaḥ /*

<sup>27</sup> Dharmakīrti also thinks that our logical debating is just conventional. See PV I 85–87: *dharmadharmivavyavasthānaṃ bhedo 'bhedaś ca yādṛṣaḥ / asamikṣitatat-toārtho yathā loke pratīyate // 85 // taṃ tathaiva samāśrītya sādhyasādhanaśamsthitiḥ / paramārthāvatārāya vidvadbhir avakalpyate // 86 // saṃsrjyante na bhiḍyate svato arthāḥ*



The word “determined” (*niścitasya*) means that it is not in doubt. [Question:] How can a causal efficacy that is in the future be determined? [Answer:] Answering this, Prajñākaragupta says “*tādātmya*.” Essential identity (*tādātmya*) is that state of the cognition of *sādhana* in which the cognition has the nature (*ātman* = *svabhāva*) of being that which brings about causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*). And causality (*tadutpatti*) is that state of [cognition] in which the cognition arises from the future causal efficacy itself. [The causal efficacy is determined] by the force (*prabhāva* = *sāmarthyā*) of these two [relations]. For, it has previously been determined that the means (*sādhana*) is that which brings about its effect, or that it is caused by the [future] effect itself. This determination is due to the fact that it is always after the cognition of the means that the efficacy itself is known. Therefore, the validity of the cognition of *sādhana* is determined through the following inference based on essential identity or causality: “[Vyāpti:] Whatever appears as such in the cognition of *sādhana* will produce an *arthakriyā*, or will not deviate from a future *arthakriyā* itself, like the *sādhana* seen before. [Pakṣadharmatā:] This is also such [*sādhana*].” And this is clearly explained in Prajñākaragupta’s own explanation [on v. 205]. He will also later speak of two inferences of the same kind as those stated here, in order to argue for the other world (*paraloka*).

Yamāri presents the following syllogism at this point:

[20] *sādhanañjñāne yad evambhūtaṃ tad arthakriyākāri, bhāvvyarthakriyāsvarūpāvyabhicāri vā / yathā prāgdrṣṭaṃ sādhanam / tathā cedam /*

[Vyāpti:] Whatever appears as such in the cognition of *sādhana* will produce an *arthakriyā*, or will not deviate from a future *arthakriyā* itself, like the *sādhana* seen before.

[Pakṣadharmatā:] This is also such [*sādhana*].

This syllogism contains two alternative *sādhyas*, namely, being what produces an *arthakriyā* (*arthakriyākāri*), and being what will not deviate from a future *arthakriyā* itself (*bhāvvyarthakriyāsvarūpāvyabhicāri*). In the case of the first, the reason is regarded as a *svabhāvahetu*. The *vyāpti* is based on the *tādātmya* relation. On the other hand, in the case of the second one, the same reason is regarded as a *kāryahetu*. The *vyāpti* is based on the *tadutpatti* relation. The future effect that would necessarily result from its cause is considered the

“cause” of it. Yamāri comments that these two types of inferences are also mentioned in the proof of the other world (*paraloka*).<sup>28</sup>

Prajñākaragupta explains the inference based on the *tādātmya* relation as follows:

[21] PVA<sup>S</sup> 27,14–17; PVA<sup>O</sup> 70,4–9; PVA<sup>W</sup> 18,6–10: *yat khalv arthakriyā-jñānam, tad arthakriyātmato vād arthakriyāṃ gamayati / tadarthakriyāyāṃ tad eva sādhanajñānam / pūrvakaṃ tu sādhanajñānam, yadi sthīratayāsāv avadhrto 'rthaḥ, tadā / pūrvako hi svabhāvo bhāvinam prāptikāle 'vaśyaṃ bhāvayatīti tatprāptiḥ / tata uttaraḥ svabhāvaḥ pūrvakasya svabhāva eva vastutaḥ / tatas tatrāpi tādātmyam eva /*

The [subsequent] cognition (C2) of *arthakriyā*, being essentially identical with *arthakriyā* itself, can make *arthakriyā* known. Therefore, regarding the *arthakriyā*, the [subsequent] cognition (C2) is regarded as a *sādhana-jñāna*. On the other hand, the preceding cognition (C1) is regarded as a *sādhana-jñāna* [of *arthakriyā*], if the object [of C1] is determined to continue to exist. The essential nature of the preceding object inevitably causes the future thing at the time of acquisition. Therefore, based on C1, the future thing can be obtained. Hence, in fact, the essential nature of the subsequent object is nothing but the essential nature of the preceding object. Therefore, there is also an essential identity between the preceding and subsequent objects[, between the preceding and subsequent cognitions, and between the preceding cognition and the subsequent object].<sup>29</sup>

According to Prajñākaragupta, first of all, there is a *tādātmya* relation between *arthakriyājñāna* (C2) and *arthakriyā* (A). Therefore, C2, which indicates A, is

<sup>28</sup> On Prajñākaragupta's proof of the other world (*paralokasādhana*), see Moriyama 1998.

<sup>29</sup> Y<sup>Skt</sup> 61a4–7 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D276a4–b2, P333a1–8): *vyācāṣṭe—pūrvakaṃ tu sādhanajñānam ity arthakriyāṃ gamayatīti sambandhaḥ / kadā? ity āha—yadītyādi, tadetyantam / yas tv artho 'sthiro yogyādibhir apahārāt, svapnadṛṣṭavat, nāsāv arthakriyākārīti na tajjñānam pramāṇam ity abhiprāyaḥ / arthaś ca na jñānam antarenārthakriyāgamaka iti jñānam gamayatīti uktam / kasmāt punar arthakriyāṃ gamayati? ity āśaṅkāṃ apākurvan tādātmyaprabhāvata iti / vivṛṇoti—pūrvako hīti / bhāvayatīti niṣpādayati / tatprāptir bhāvvyarthaprāptiḥ / etenārthakriyākāritvātmakatvād arthakriyākāritvaṃ gamayann arthakriyāgamaka iti darśitam / vastuta iti vyavahāre sthītvoktam / ato 'py adharavyavahārāpekṣayā / tata iti pūrvottarasvabhāvayor ekatvāt / tatrāpi pūrvottarajñānayor api tādātmyam eva, viṣayarūpānukārād vijñānasya / tato viṣayavijñānayor 'pi tādātmyam*

regarded as a *sādhana*jñāna (cognition as a reason). Similarly, the preceding cognition (C1), which was also mentioned as *sādhana*jñāna (cognition of *sādhana*), indicates *sādhana* (S) because there is a *tādātmya* relation between them. Moreover, C1 can also indicate the future *arthakriyā* (A), but only when it is determined that its object, namely *sādhana* (S), continues to exist. This is because there is a *tādātmya* relation between *sādhana* (S) and its *arthakriyākāritva*, namely, *arthakriyā* (A). Furthermore, there is also a *tādātmya* relation between C1 and C2. Thus, all four (S, C1, A, and C2) are linked in the *tādātmya* relation.

On the other hand, the *tadutpatti* relation is explained as follows:

[22] PVA<sup>S</sup> 27,18–20; PVA<sup>O</sup> 70,10–13; PVA<sup>W</sup> 18,11–13: *athavā tad avaśyaṃbhāvikāryaṃ kāraṇam eva, tena vyāptatvāt kāraṇasya / yac ca vyatiriktaṃ vyāpakam, tat kāraṇam eva, tena vinā tadabhāvāt / anutpannam katham kāraṇam, utpannam api katham iti samāno doṣaḥ /*

Or rather, the effect that will inevitably occur (*avaśyaṃbhāvikārya*) is nothing but a [future] cause, because the [present] cause is pervaded by it. For, when there is a pervasion between two different things, the pervader (*vyāpaka*) is nothing but a cause, because it never exists without it. [Question:] How can a [future] thing that has not yet arisen be the cause[, since it does not exist in the present]? [Answer:] How can the [past] thing that has already occurred be the cause[, since it does not exist in the present]? Thus, the same error [applies to things in the past that have already occurred].

The future *arthakriyā* can be regarded as a cause, because it is no more than the effect that will inevitably occur (*avaśyaṃbhāvikārya*). This is because when there is a pervasion between two different things, the pervader (*vyāpaka*) can be regarded as the cause, and the pervaded can be regarded as the effect. Thus, a future effect that is inevitably produced is regarded as the cause, this being inferred from the present cause, which is regarded as the effect. This is Prajñākaragupta's famous theory of the future cause (*bhāvikāraṇavāda*). He continues by explaining this theory in detail. In this paper, I do not address this particular theory.<sup>30</sup>

After the explanation of *bhāvikāraṇavāda*, Prajñākaragupta goes back to the main topic and summarizes the argument:

*yuiyata eva /*

<sup>30</sup> On *bhāvikāraṇavāda*, see Ono 1995, Moriyama 1998, Inami 1999, Franco 2015, etc.

[23] PVA<sup>S</sup> 28,26–30; PVA<sup>O</sup> 74,7–13; PVA<sup>W</sup> 24,9–26,4:

*tasmāt kāraṇaṃ yadi taj jñānaṃ svabhāvo vārthajanmanah /  
kāryaṃ vā sarvathā tena jñāpyate 'rthakriyodayaḥ // 211 //*

*yadi sādhanajñānaṃ arthakriyāyāḥ kāraṇaṃ, yadi svabhāvaḥ, yadi kāryaṃ,  
sarvathā tena saṃbandhasaṃbhavāḥ jñāpyate / etac ca vyāpitādātmyaṃ kārya-  
kāraṇabhāvaś ca vyavahāraprasiddha iti vyavahāreṇa prāmāṇyaṃ jñāyata  
iti /*

Hence, if the cognition [of *sādhana*] is the cause, nature, or effect of the arising of the effect (*arthajanma* = *arthakriyā*), then in any case the [arising of the effect] is known by the cognition. (v. 211) If the cognition of *sādhana* is the cause, nature, or effect of *arthakriyā*, then the [arising of the effect] is known by the [cognition] because there exists a relation to the [cognition] in any case. However, both essential identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) are established [only] by our conventional activity (*vyavahāraprasiddha*). Therefore, Dharmakīrti said here that validity [of the cognition of *sādhana*] is conventionally known.

The cognition of *sādhana* (C1) indicates *arthakriyā* (A) because C1 is 1) a cause (*kāraṇa*) of A; 2) the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of A; or 3) an effect (*kārya*) of A. According to Yamāri, 1) *kāraṇa* is mentioned from the point of view of other schools, such as Naiyāyikas, who accepted that an effect can be inferred from the cause.<sup>31</sup>

The important thing to note is that here, Prajñākaragupta points out that both essential identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) are established by our conventional activity (*vyavahāraprasiddha*). He concludes that for this reason, Dharmakīrti said *prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*. Yamāri explains that inevitable occurrence or inevitability is established only by conceptual judgment (*vyavasāyamātraprasiddha*).

[24] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 63b1 (n.e. in Tib.): *vyavahāraprasiddha ity avaśyaṃbhāvādhy-  
avasāyamātraprasiddhaḥ / vyavahāreṇety adhyavasāyamātreṇa /*

The phrase “[Both essential identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) are] established [only] by our conventional activity” (*vyavahāraprasiddha*) means that they are established only by our judgment that it must occur. The word “*vyavahāreṇa*” [in PV II 5a] means “merely through our erroneous judgement” (*adhyavasāyamātreṇa*).

<sup>31</sup> Y<sup>Skt</sup> 63a6 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D280a3–4, P337b1–2): *etat paramatāpekṣayoktam, naiyāyikādīnām api*

According to Yamāri, here Prajñākaragupta is interpreting the word “*vyavahāreṇa*” in PV II 5a as meaning “*adhyavasāyamātreṇa*.” This would mean that Dharmakīrti had stated that validity is merely determined through erroneous judgments in our conventional world.

### 3.3. PV II 4d–5a referred to elsewhere in PVA

#### 3.3.1. PVA *ad* PV II 5c

References to PV II 4d–5a (especially PV II 5a) are also found in other parts of Prajñākaragupta’s PVA. These references are useful for understanding his interpretation of these lines. Here I take up and examine some of them.

Prajñākaragupta refers to PV II 4d–5a when commenting on PV II 5c: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*.<sup>32</sup> He interprets PV II 5c in more than one way. In his second interpretation, he refers to PV II 4d–5a as follows:

[25] PVA<sup>S</sup> 30,19–22; PVA<sup>O</sup> 79,15–19 *ad* PV II 5c: *atha vārthaśabdenātra paramārtha ucyate / ajñātārthaprakāśa iti paramārthaprakāśa ity arthaḥ / paramārthaś cādvaitarūpatā / tatprakāśanam eva pramāṇam / tathā ca pratyapādi—svarūpasya svato gatiḥ iti / uktaṃ ca—prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇeti / tatra pāramārthikapramāṇalakṣaṇam etat, pūrvam tu sāmvyavahārikasya /*

By the word *artha* [in PV II 5c], the ultimate (*paramārtha*) is indicated. Therefore, the phrase *ajñātārthaprakāśa* means “what reveals the ultimate” (*paramārthaprakāśa*). The ultimate is nonduality. Only what reveals it is regarded as *pramāṇa*. Therefore, it has been said [by Dharmakīrti] that “*svarūpasya svato gatiḥ*” (PV II 4d). It is also said [by him] that “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*” (PV II 5a). It is intended by him that this [*ajñātārthaprakāśa*] is the defining characteristic of the ultimate *pramāṇa*, and the previous one[, namely, *avisamvādi jñānam*, is that of the conventional [*pramāṇa*].

According to this interpretation, the word “*artha*” in “*ajñātārthaprakāśa*” means the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*), namely, nonduality (*advaitarūpatā*). Thus, self-cognizing cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) is considered to reveal the ultimate, which until then has been unknown. Prajñākaragupta points

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*kāraṇāt kāryānumānābhyupagamād arthakriyāniścayo ’bhyupagata iti darśayitum /*

<sup>32</sup> On Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of PV II 4d–5a in his commentary of PV II 5c, see also Ono’s paper in this volume.

out that this was also stated by Dharmakīrti in PV II 4d–5a: in PV II 4d, the ultimate *pramāṇa* (*pāramārthikapramāṇa*), namely, the *svasaṃvedana* perception, is explained; in PV II 5a, it is explained that the validity of other means is just conventional. Prajñākaragupta makes it clear that the first definition *avisamvādi jñānam* (PV II 1a–b<sup>1</sup>) is of the conventional *pramāṇa* and the second definition *ajñātārthaprakāśaḥ* (PV II 5c) is of the ultimate *pramāṇa*.<sup>33</sup>

[26] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 66a2 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D284a2–3, P341b2–3): *tad evaṃ pūrvalakṣaṇānapekṣatām pratipādyātrāsaṃtuṣyaṇ bhāṣyakāro viśayabhedapakṣāśrayeṇa lakṣaṇadvaitaṃ saphalayann āha—athaveti / pūrvapramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ saṃvṛtau, anyat tu paramārtha ity arthaḥ /*

After explaining above that this definition has nothing to do with the previous one, Bhāṣyakāra (= Prajñākaragupta), not satisfied with this, says “*athavā*” (PVA 75,15) to explain that the two definitions are meaningful, based on the theory that the two definitions have different subject domains. Namely, the former definition of *pramāṇa* is for the conventional, while the other is for the ultimate.

It is clear that Prajñākaragupta also interprets PV II 4d as indicating that only *svasaṃvedana* exists in reality, and PV II 5a as indicating that validity based on non-deceptiveness is just conventional.

### 3.3.2. PVA *ad* PV III 330ab

Prajñākaragupta refers to PV II 4d–5a also in the *pratyakṣa* chapter. As a Vijñānavādin, Prajñākaragupta insists that the inference of external objects

<sup>33</sup> The Jains, for example Prabhācandra (11th century) or Anantavīrya (11th/13th century), refer to and criticize the view that PV II 1a–b<sup>1</sup> and PV II 5c explain the conventional *pramāṇa* and ultimate *pramāṇa*, respectively. NKC 633,4–7: (...) *ataḥ “pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam ityādi vyavahāreṇa, ajñātārthaprakāśo vā ity etat tu paramārthena pramāṇam” ity ayuktam; vyavahāravatiriktasya paramārthasyāsaṃbhavāt / (...); SVT 12,15–17: tato yad uktam “pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam ityādi vyavahāreṇa pramāṇalakṣaṇam uktam, ajñātārthaprakāśo vā iti paramārthena, pramāṇāntarenājñātasya advayapratibhāsārthasya ātmavedanasya evaṃ abhidhānāt /” iti tan nirastam /* According to Anantavīrya, it is an advocate of the nonduality of cognitive appearance (*pratibhāsādvaitavādin*) who insists on the conventional validity of logical grounds by quoting PV II 5a. See SVT 405,8–9: *aparas tv āha—na mayā pratibhāsādvaitavādinā paramārthataḥ kvacid hetuḥ iṣyate, yas tu iṣyate sa vyavahāreṇa, “pramāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa” ity abhidhānāt iti; taṃ praty āha (...)* /

should be rejected by perception, and that the validity of inference depends on perception. However, some opponents criticize this claim by pointing out that the perception of a double moon is rejected by inference and insist, on the contrary, that the validity of perception depends on inference. According to these opponents, a perception that has not been experienced before provokes the cognizer to act toward the object with the help of inference. Accordingly, the validity of perception depends on inference. Prajñākaragupta's answer is as follows:

[27] PVA<sup>S</sup> 364,18–21 *ad* PV III 330ab: *yady evam itaretarāśrayaṇadoṣa eva syāt, na tu prāmāṇyam ekasyāpi / uktam etat—svarūpasya svato gatiḥ / prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa / vyatirikte pravṛttiviśaye 'rthātmani / tac cānādivyavahārāndhaparaṃparayā / tac ca saṃvādāt pramāṇam / saṃvādaś ca bhāvini / bhāvini cāsaṃvedanam eva / tataḥ katham arthaviśayaṃ prāmāṇyam /*

If so, mutual dependence would occur. Then, not even one [of the two *pramāṇas*] should be regarded as *pramāṇa*. [Therefore, Dharmakīrti] said, “*svarūpasya svato gatiḥ / prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*” (PV II 4d–5a). Regarding an external object that is the object of action and is distinct [from the cognition itself], the validity of cognition is just conventional. Validity is brought about merely by a series of conventional behaviors that have continued from the beginning-less past, just like a continuous series of blind persons (*andhaparaṃparā*). A cognition is considered *pramāṇa* on the basis of its consistency or non-deceptiveness (*saṃvāda*). Its consistency is with respect to the future [object to be obtained]. But the future object is not cognized [at the time of the present cognition]. So how can we say that it is *pramāṇa* with respect to the [future] object?

If the validity of perception depends on inference and, in turn, the validity of inference depends on perception, then a mutual dependence occurs. Therefore, both should be rejected as being valid means of cognition. Their validity is accepted only at the conventional level. Dharmakīrti also said in PV II 4d–5a that cognition itself is cognized by itself, and that with regard to an external object to be obtained, the validity of cognition is just conventional. The future object to be obtained cannot be properly known. Therefore, the non-deceptiveness of the present cognition can never be known. Here, Prajñākaragupta interprets Dharmakīrti's PV II 4d–5a as claiming that since every cognition merely cognizes itself, its validity is not truly known.

### 3.3.3. PVA ad PV IV 192a

Also in the *parārthānumāna* chapter, Prajñākaragupta refers to PV II 5a. In PV IV 192a, Dharmakīrti insists that a sentence (*vākya*) indicates exclusion (*vyavaccheda*). Prajñākaragupta explains<sup>34</sup>: “A person who listens to some sentence understands some exclusion and acts on the object. Then, he obtains the excluded object. Such a sentence is admitted as valid because it is non-deceptive.” However, an opponent presents the following question: “Strictly speaking, the exclusion obtained differs from the exclusion understood from the sentence before. Why can it be seen as being non-deceptive?” To answer this question, Prajñākaragupta states, “This is a trivial question said by a person who clings to trivial things. People are satisfied with the obtained object, and do not care about such a subtle distinction.”

[28] PVA<sup>S</sup> 587,23–588,4 ad PV IV 192a (*vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyaṃ*) :  
*tasmād vyavahārijanaprītyāvisaṃvādo 'yam ucyate / na tattvam avisaṃvādaḥ*  
*paramārthavicāraṇe // uktam etat / sāṃvyavahārikam eva vyatirekaviśayaṃ*  
*pramāṇam / prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇeti vacanāt / yadi pramāṇena pra-*  
*māṇaṃ pratīyate, anavasthā / pramāṇam antareṇa pratipattau prameyasyāpīti*  
*na pramāṇādhiṇaḥ prameyādhiḡamaḥ syāt / tata uktam /*

*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa gamyate na tu tattvataḥ /*  
*pramāṇe na matis tattvam anavasthā tathoditā // 386 //*

(...) *tasmād avicāritasūkṣmatattvaṃ vyavahāramātram āśritya sarvatrāvisaṃ-*  
*vādaḥ, na paramārthataḥ / tathā hi—*

*itas taṭam ito vyāghraḥ kenāstu prāṇino gatiḥ /*  
*bhedābhede 'visaṃvādo dvaye 'pi hi na yujyate // 389 //*

*yadi pratīyamānāt prāpyaṃ vastu bhinnam, katham anyaprāptau visaṃ-*  
*vādābhāvo 'visaṃvādaś ca / athābhinnaṃ sarvātmanā, tathā sati tad api tadaiva*  
*pratipannaṃ kimarthaṃ pravartate kiṃ vā prāpsyati / tato nāvisaṃvādaḥ / so*  
*'yam itas taṭam ito vyāghra itī nyāyaḥ /*

Therefore, this is mentioned as non-deceptive in that worldly people are satisfied just obtaining the object expected. Upon considering the ultimate truth, non-deceptiveness is not found to be true. It has already been explained [by Dharmakīrti] saying “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*” (PV II 5a) that with respect to an object which is distinct from cognition itself, the cognition is conventionally admitted as *pramāṇa*. If a cognition is understood by *pramāṇa* to be *pramāṇa*, then there would be an endless

<sup>34</sup> See Inami et al. 2005.



[regress]. On the other hand, if it is understood without *pramāṇa*, then the object of *pramāṇa* (*prameya*) is likewise understood without *pramāṇa*, and the understanding of the *pramāṇa* would not require any *pramāṇa*.

Hence, it is known conventionally, not ultimately, that cognition is *pramāṇa*. Understanding by *pramāṇa* for *pramāṇa* is not accurate. It was stated that in such a case there would be an endless [regress]. (v. 386)

(...) Therefore, in any case, non-deceptiveness is just based on our worldly behaviors, where the truth of the matter is not considered down to the smallest detail and there is no non-deceptiveness in the ultimate sense. That is to say:

A tiger over here and a precipice over there. One cannot go either way. Whether the object to be obtained is the same as the object cognized or not, neither non-deceptiveness is appropriate. (v. 389)

If the real thing to be obtained is different from the object that is cognized in the present, how can there be the absence of deception (*viśaṃvādābhāva*) or the non-deceptiveness (*aviśaṃvāda*) when another thing is obtained? Or, if the object to be obtained is completely the same as the object that is cognized in the present, in which case the object to be obtained is also cognized in the present, then for what purpose does one act, and what is acquired [after acting]? Therefore, [in any case,] non-deceptiveness cannot be [properly explained]. Thus, the maxim, “A tiger over here and a precipice over there” is mentioned here.

According to Prajñākaragupta, a cognition is described as non-deceptive because people are satisfied with just obtaining the object. Upon considering the ultimate truth, non-deceptiveness is not found to be true. A cognition that has a thing other than itself as its object is conventionally recognized as valid. Dharmakīrti also said this in his PV II 5a.

If valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is understood as valid by means of another valid cognition, an infinite regress will occur. If it can be understood without another valid cognition, its object (*prameya*) could also be understood without a valid cognition. Therefore, the validity of cognition is recognized as conventional, but not as true. Prajñākaragupta concludes: In any case, non-deceptiveness is based only on a human being's activity that is not examined in detail regarding whether it is true or not. If it is thoroughly examined, non-deceptiveness does not exist whatsoever.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that Prajñākaragupta states here “*avicāritasūkṣumatattvam*” as

Moreover, if the object to be obtained (A) is different from the object cognized (B), the cognition of A cannot be non-deceptive with respect to B. If A is exactly the same as B, A is obtained at the time of the cognition of B. Then, the cognizer would not need to act with regard to A. In any case, non-deceptiveness of the cognition cannot be appropriately explained. It is just conventionally admitted.

In this way, Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of PV II 4d–5a is consistent in his PVA. It should be noted that he sometimes refers to PV II 5a without clearly quoting it. In such cases, Yamāri often explains Prajñākaragupta's intention and quotes PV II 5a.<sup>36</sup>

#### 4. Prajñākaragupta's criticism of his predecessors' interpretations of Dharmakīrti's theory

##### 4.1. Criticism of Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's interpretations

Next, I will examine Prajñākaragupta's criticism of his predecessors' interpretations of Dharmakīrti's theory of validity. Prajñākaragupta does not mention any of his predecessors by name. According to Yamāri, however, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Arcaṭa, Dharmottara and others are criticized by Prajñākaragupta in his commentary on PV II 4d–5a.

First, Yamāri points out that Prajñākaragupta is criticizing Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi by stating the following:

[29] PVA<sup>S</sup> 25,24–27; PVA<sup>O</sup> 65,10–66,4; PVA<sup>W</sup> 10,15–12,2: *kiṃ ca, sāmvy-  
avahārikam prāmāṇyam pratipādayatā paramārthata ekam eva svasaṃvedana-  
m pratyakṣam ity uktaṃ bhavati /*

*tathā hi yadi mānatvam adhyakṣād anumānataḥ /  
siddhim ṛcchaty\* asaṃdeham vyavahārapadam vṛthā // 198 //*

*yadi pratyakṣato 'numānato vā parisphuṭā pramāṇatvasiddhiḥ, kimartham  
ucyate—vyavahāreṇeti / tasmād (...) (\*ṛcchaty PVA<sup>S</sup>, PVA<sup>W</sup>, PVA<sup>MSB</sup>;  
icchaty PVA<sup>O</sup>.)*

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a qualifier of the word “*vyavahāramātram*.” As is well known, the term “*avicārya-  
ramaṇīya*” is used by the later Mādhyamikas in explaining conventional truth. Pra-  
jñākaragupta often uses similar terms in his PVA. See Inami 2011: 180, fn. 11.

<sup>36</sup> According to Yamāri's explanation, for example, in the beginning section of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, Prajñākaragupta refers to PV II 5a three times: (1) PVA<sup>S</sup>

Moreover, explaining that validity [based on non-deceptiveness] is conventional, Dharmakīrti implicitly states that ultimately, *svasamvedana* is the only valid means of cognition.

Namely, if validity is established without a doubt by perception or inference, the word “*vyavahāra*” [mentioned in PV II 5a] would be meaningless. (v. 198)

If validity is clearly established by perception or inference, what is the purpose of the word “*vyavahāreṇa*” stated [in PV II 5a]? Therefore, (...)

Here, Prajñākaragupta states: By declaring the conventional validity of cognition, Dharmakīrti implies that only the *svasamvedana* perception is true *pramāṇa*. According to Prajñākaragupta, Dharmakīrti, who says “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*,” clearly has the conventional validity of cognition in mind. Validity as non-deceptiveness cannot be truly known by any means. If it were truly known, Dharmakīrti would not mention the word “*vyavahāreṇa*” in PV II 5a.

According to Yamāri, Prajñākaragupta is criticizing certain persons (Deveṇdrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, as mentioned later) who believe the validity of cognition is truly understood by means of perception or inference.

[30] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 60a1–3 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D273b7–274a4, P330a5–b2): *ye tu tāttvikam eva pramāṇetaravibhāgaṃ manyante, vyavahāreṇeti cottarārthakriyājñāneneti vyācakṣate, teṣaṃ yuktivirodhas tāvad darśitaḥ, śāstravirodhaṃ ca darśayitum āha—kiṃ ceti / (...) tad evaṃ vṛttiṭīkādimite niraste yathā vyavahārataḥ prāmāṇyaṃ tathopasaṃharati—tasmād iti /*

Some persons think that the distinction between valid means of cognition and invalid ones is metaphysically true (*tāttvika*) and explain that the word “*vyavahāreṇa*” means ‘by the future cognition of *arthakriyā*’ (*ut-tarārthakriyājñānena*). However, it has been shown by Prajñākaragupta that a conflict with logical arguments would occur to them. Next, in

4,9; PVA<sup>O</sup> 3,18; PVA<sup>W</sup> 6,6: *kathaṃ tarhi pravartanakāle tajjñānam / etad uttaratra vakṣyāmaḥ /* [Y<sup>Skt</sup> 22b7 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D208b7, P251a1–2): *etad uttaratreṇi prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇety atra prastāve /*; (2) PVA<sup>S</sup> 5,7; PVA<sup>O</sup> 6,1–2: *vyavahāramātram evedaṃ svapnāsvapnabheda nāma / tathā pramāṇāpramāṇabheda iti hi vakṣyate /* [Y<sup>Skt</sup> 24b2–3 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D211b1–2, P254b7–8): *katham etad ubhayaṃ vyavahāramātram ity āha—iti vakṣyata iti / prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇety atrāntare /*; (3) PVA<sup>S</sup> 5,19; PVA<sup>O</sup> 7,3–4: *atha kena dvayam etad iti pratīyate / etad api vakṣyāmaḥ /* [Y<sup>Skt</sup> 25b6–7 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D214a7, P258b5): *uttaram—etad apīti / vakṣyāmaḥ prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇety atrāntare /*].

order to show that a conflict with *śāstra* would occur, he says “*kiṃ ca.*” (...) After rejecting the explanations presented in the *vr̥tti*, *ṭīkā*, and other works (*vr̥ttiṭīkādimata*) as above, Prajñākaragupta then concludes by saying “*tasmāt,*” that validity is conventional.

Yamāri’s explanation can be interpreted as follows: Some persons think that the distinction between valid and invalid means of cognition is metaphysically true (*tāttvika*) and explain that the word “*vyavahāreṇa*” means ‘by the future cognition of *arthakriyā*’ (*uttarārthakriyājñānena*). It has been shown by Prajñākaragupta that a conflict with logical arguments would then occur. Next, in order to show that a conflict with *śāstra* would occur, he says “*kiṃ ca.*”

Moreover, in the concluding parts of this passage, Yamāri states: “After rejecting the explanations presented in the *vr̥tti*, *ṭīkā*, and other works (*vr̥ttiṭīkādimata*) as above” and so on. Yamāri attributes the explanation criticized here to Devendrabuddhi, the author of the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*, and Śākyabuddhi, the author of the *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*.<sup>37</sup> In Yamāri’s understanding, Prajñākaragupta is criticizing their interpretations.

As I have noted in another paper,<sup>38</sup> in his *vr̥tti* on PV II 4d–5a, Devendrabuddhi explains that although cognition itself is known by itself, its validity is determined by means of the future cognition of *arthakriyā*.

[31] PVP D5a3–7, P5b5–6a2: ‘o na gal te khyod cag gi tshad ma nyid ji ltar grub pa yin zhe na / kho bo cag gi ni **rang las rang gi ngo bor rtogs** / (PV II 4d) rang rig pa las tshad ma zhes bya ba’i shes pa de’i shes pa yod pa nyid grub pa yin gyi / tshad ma nyid ni ma yin no // gal te shes pa yod pa nyid las tha dad pa med pa’i phyir tshad ma nyid kyang bzung ba nyid yin no zhe na / bden te / mngon sum de ni char skyes pa ma yin pa’i phyir / de yang bzung ba nyid ni yin mod kyi / ‘on kyang bzung ba’i rnam pa gang yin pa dag la yang nges pa skyed par byed pa de la / ‘jug par byed pa’i phyir tshad ma nyid du ‘dod kyi / gzhan du ni ma yin no // mthong ba las khyad par med na yang / rnam pa gang

<sup>37</sup> According to Dr. Hiroko Matsuoka’s comment, most of the references to ‘*ṭīkā*’ in Yamāri’s commentary are to Dharmottara’s *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (PVinṬ). Although I cannot completely rule out the possibility that the ‘*ṭīkā*’ mentioned here is also Dharmottara’s PVinṬ, I understand it as Śākyabuddhi’s *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* (PVṬ), because the interpretation of PV II 4d is at issue here. No direct explanation of the word “*vyavahāreṇa*” of PV II 5a can be found in Dharmottara’s PVinṬ.

<sup>38</sup> See Inami 1993.

*don du gnyer ba dang / goms pa dang skabs la sogs pa nges pa'i rgyu yod na  
de nges pa yin gyi / gzhan chod pa ni ma yin no // des na shes pa yod pa nyid  
dmigs pa na tshad ma nyid bzung du zin kyang ma bzung ba dang 'dra ba yin  
te / nges pa med pa'i phyir ro // 'o na ji ltar tshad ma nyid nges par bya zhe  
na / tha snyad kyis ni tshad ma nyid (PV II 5a) dus phyis 'byung ba can  
gyi don byed pa'i yul can gyi shes pas so //*

[Question:] So how is validity [of cognition] established for you [Buddhists]? [Answer:] For us, **[cognition] itself is known by itself.** (= PV II 4d.) Through self-cognition (*rang rig pa*, \**svasaṃvedana*), the existence (*sattā*) of that cognition, which will be regarded as *pramāṇa*, is known, but its validity is not known. [Objection:] Because the validity of a cognition is not separate from the cognition's existence, [its] validity is also necessarily grasped when the cognition is grasped. [Answer:] Yes, that is true. Since perception does not partially arise, [when it is grasped] its validity is also surely grasped. However, only when the perception produces a decision about the grasped form [of the object] does the cognition cause the cognizer to act upon the object. Therefore, in that case, the cognition is regarded as a *pramāṇa*. Otherwise, it is not [regarded as a *pramāṇa*]. Even if all aspects of an object are directly known without any difference, when there are decision factors such as desire, repeated experience, circumstances, etc. with respect to a certain aspect, a decision arises for it. But not for other [aspects]. Therefore, when the existence of cognition is known, [its] validity is also known, but it is no better than unknown, because there is no decision [regarding it] at that time. [Question:] So how is validity determined? [Answer:] **Validity is [determined] through action.** (PV II 5a.) Namely, [the validity of a present cognition is determined] by the future cognition which has *arthakriyā* as its object.

Although the validity of valid cognition is known by means of the cognition itself since validity is not distinguished from the cognition, it is no better than unknown when it is not determined.<sup>39</sup> If it is determined by some factor, the cognition can cause the cognizer to act upon the object. But, if there is no factor of determination at the time of a cognition in the present, determining its validity will be caused by the cognition of its future effect.

<sup>39</sup> Prajñākaragupta criticizes the view that the validity of a cognition is not distinguished from the cognition itself. See PVA<sup>S</sup> 25,14–17; PVA<sup>O</sup> 64,11–16; PVA<sup>W</sup> 10,1–6.

It is clear that Devendrabuddhi is interpreting the word “*vyavahāreṇa*” in PV II 5a as “by means of the future cognition of *arthakriyā*” (*dus phyis ’byung ba can gyi don byed pa’i yul can gyi shes pas* = \**uttarakālabhāvinārthakriyāvīṣayena jñānena*). He never mentions conventional validity. He seems to believe that validity is truly determined.<sup>40</sup>

In his *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*, Śākyabuddhi explains how the validity of perception is established. He classifies human actions based on perception into two types: 1) perception in which the object has never been experienced before, and 2) perception in which the object has been repeatedly experienced before.

[32] PVT<sub>5</sub> D72a6–b2, P87a7–b3: *mngon sum gyi rten can gyi ’jug pa ni nram par gnyis te dang po nyid dang goms pa can no // de la goms pa dang ldan pa gang yin pa de la shin tu goms pa gsal ba can gyi mngon sum skyes pa na ji lta ba bzhin du goms pa’i nram par ’khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan spangs pa can nyid gyis yongs su bcad nas skye ba dang / de lta bur ba’i phyis ’byung ba’i nges pa skyed par byed pa’i phyir de la skyes bu ’jug par byed do // de’i phyir de la rang nyid kyi tshad ma nges par byed pa’i phyir phyis kyi tshad ma ’jug pa la ltos pa med pa can yin pa’i phyir **don yongs su bcad nas** zhes bya ba’i tshig mi ’thad pa ma yin no // mngon sum thams cad ni gzhan la tshad ma nges par gzhang pa ma yin no // dang po nyid kyis ’jug pa gang yin pa de la yang rgyu mtshan nges par gzung ba med pa na the tshom nyid kyi sngo nas ’jug par byed do //*

Human actions based on perception can be divided into two cases: 1) the case in which the object has not been experienced before, and 2) the case in which the object has been repeatedly experienced before. Between these, in the case of human action toward an object that has been experienced before, perception, which has been repeatedly experienced before and hence has clearness, occurs. Then, the perception can produce a subsequent decision that is the same as the decision which has been repeatedly experienced as being caused by the judgement that the perception is free from any factors of error. The person therefore acts with regard to the object based on the perception. Hence, in this case, the expression “after determining the object” (PVP D1a4–5, P2a5) is not inappropriate, since the perception is determined to be *pramāṇa* by itself, without recourse to later *pramāṇas*. All perceptions are not extrinsically determined to be *pramāṇa*. On the other hand, in the case of an object that has not been experienced before, when any factors of

<sup>40</sup> See Dunne 2004: 385–386.

error are not known, the perceiver acts with regard to the object on the basis of suspicion.

[33] PVT<sub>5</sub> D72b3–5, P87b5–88b1: *gang kho na nges pa'i sngo nas 'jug par 'gyur ba de nyid rtog pa sngon du song ba can ma yin no // de ltar na 'jug par byed pa la don la the tshom za ba dang don nges pa dang rgyu rnam pa gnyis yin no // ldog pa yang don med pa la the tshom za ba dang / don med par nges pa gnyis kho na yin no // de la dang po nyid kyi rgyu gnyis kyis 'jug par 'gyur ba gang yin pa dang phyis bshad pa gnyis kyis ldog par 'gyur ba gang yin pa de ni rtog pa sngon du song ba can yin par 'jug rten dag brjod do // gal te nges pa nyid kyi sngo nas 'jug par byed par 'gyur ba ngo mtshar yin na / 'o na ni zhing pa la sogs pa ni nga la sogs pa la 'jug par byed pa 'gal bar 'gyur te de dag la ma 'ongs pa'i 'bru la sogs pa 'grub pa la nges par byed pa'i tshad ma yod pa ma yin no //*

Not only those who act based on a decision are wise. There are two factors in affirmative action: the suspicion that there may be an object, and the decision that there is an object. Negative action also has two factors: the suspicion that there may be no object, and the decision that there is no object. And those who act affirmatively according to the first two factors and negatively according to the second two factors are called the wise in the world. If one were called wise based on the decision alone, then farmers, for example, would not act to undertake cultivation. For them, there is no *pramāṇa* for the fruit they will surely bear in the future.<sup>41</sup>

In the first case, the perception alone does not produce a determination of its validity. Then, suspicion or doubt about the object motivates the person to act toward it. If they obtain its effect, they understand the validity of the preceding cognition. In this case, the validity is determined extrinsically. On the other hand, in the second case, the perception produces a determination about the validity of the cognition. Then, the person acts toward the object without any doubt. No other cognition is required. In this case, the validity is determined intrinsically.

Śākyabuddhi thus explains that in the case of an object which has not been experienced before, the validity of its perception is determined by means of

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<sup>41</sup> See Eltschinger 2007: 140–141.

the future cognition of *arthakriyā*. He does not discuss conventional validity at all.<sup>42</sup>

Yamāri's remark that it is Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi who are being criticized here by Prajñākaragupta seems to be accurate.

## 4.2. Criticism of Arcaṭa's theory

Next, I examine Prajñākaragupta's criticism of Arcaṭa.<sup>43</sup> First, Prajñākaragupta takes up the following question:

[34] PVA<sup>S</sup> 26,10–17; PVA<sup>O</sup> 67,10–68,7; PVA<sup>W</sup> 14,1–10: *nanv arthakriyā-prāpakatvāt pramāṇam / pramāṇam ca kim arthakriyājñāpakam atha kārakam / na tāvat kārakatvāt pramāṇam / kāraṇam hi tadā syāt / atha jñāpakatvāt pramāṇam ucyate / tad apy ayuktam /*

*jñāpakam na tad arthasya kriyāsamdehabhāvataḥ / kādācitkāarthakriyeti tasyā jñāpakatā kutaḥ // 200 //*

*sādhana jñānam antareṇāpi arthakriyopalabdhā / tat katham tat kāraṇam arthakriyāyāḥ / tad antareṇāpi bhāve na\* tat kāraṇam syāt kāryasya / nāpi jñāpakam, dr̥ṣṭe 'py arthe kadācid arthakriyābhāvāt / na ca taj jñānam apramāṇam, arthāśūnyatvāt / ataḥ kārakatvajñāpakatvābhāve katham pramāṇam prāpakam arthakriyāyāḥ / (\*bhāve na PVA<sup>W</sup>, PVA<sup>MsB</sup>; bhāvinā PVA<sup>S</sup>, bhāvi na PVA<sup>O</sup>.)*

[Question:] [You say that some cognition (*sādhana jñāna* = C1) is regarded as a *pramāṇa* because it causes one to obtain *arthakriyā*. [However, what

<sup>42</sup> Cf. PVT<sub>5</sub> D78b7–79a3, P95b7–96a4: *de yang gzung ba nyid ni yin mod kyi zhes bya ba ni tshad ma nyid de / shes pa cha med pa nyid kyi phyir rang rig par 'gyur ba na / thams cad kyi bdag nyid du 'gyur ba zhes bya ba'i don to // 'on kyang gzung du zin kyang ji ltar nyams su myong bzhin du nges pa ni ma yi no // de bas na de la mngon sum ni tshad ma nyid ma yin no // tshad ma'i phyis 'byung ba can gyi nges pa skyed ba'i phyir mngon sum ni gzung ba'i rnam pa dag la tshad ma nyid yin no // 'on kyang gzung ba'i rnam pa dag la zhes bya ba la sogs pas de nyid ston pa'o // gal te gzung bar mtshungs pa yin na 'ga' zhig la nges pa'i rgyu yang ci zhig yin zhe na mthong ba la khyad par med na yang zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te / don du gnyer ba ni de mngon par 'dod pa nyid do // goms pa ni yang dang yang du mthong ba'o // skabs ni gnas skabs so // sogs pa'i sgras ni der 'khrul pa med pa'i don gzhan nye ba dang der 'phrod pa'i yul dang dus la sogs pa gzung ngo // tha snyad kyis ni tshad ma nyid // (=PV II 5a) 'jug pa las sngar zhes bya bar rtogs par bya'o //*

<sup>43</sup> Discussions about Prajñākaragupta's criticism of Arcaṭa can also be found in other places. See, for example, Ono 1995, n. 66.



do you mean?] Is *pramāṇa* regarded as an informative cause of *arthakriyā* or as a productive cause of *arthakriyā*? [First of all,] it is incorrect to say that it is *pramāṇa* because it is a productive cause of *arthakriyā*. For, if it were a productive cause, it would necessarily exist when the *arthakriyā* exists. Next, if you say that it is *pramāṇa* because it is an informative cause of *arthakriyā*, this is also incorrect.

It is not an informative cause of *arthakriyā*, because doubt about *arthakriyā* occurs. *Arthakriyā* is not always there, so why is [a cognition] an informative cause of it? (v. 200)

*Arthakriyā* is perceived without the cognition of *sādhana*. How then can it be the cause of *arthakriyā*? If [the effect] exists without it, then it cannot be the cause of the effect. Nor is it an informative cause. For even if an object (*artha*) is perceived, sometimes there is no *arthakriyā*. But that cognition is not *apramāṇa*, for it is not devoid of an object. Therefore, since it can be neither a productive cause nor an informative cause, how can it be a *pramāṇa* that makes one acquire *arthakriyā*?

The question presented here is as follows: You say that some cognition (*sādhanajñāna* = C1) is regarded as a *pramāṇa* because it causes one to obtain *arthakriyā*. However, what do you mean by this? Is it an informative cause (*jñāpaka*) of *arthakriyā* or a productive cause (*kāraka*) of *arthakriyā*? First, it cannot be a productive cause, because *arthakriyā* can be seen without C1; nor is it an informative cause, because sometimes C1 causes doubt. Therefore, why do you say that C1 causes one to obtain *arthakriyā*?

After posing this question, Prajñākaragupta refers to someone's response to it.

[35] PVA<sup>S</sup> 26,18–21; PVA<sup>O</sup> 68,8–13; PVA<sup>W</sup> 14,11–15: *atrocyate* —

*upeye nāma saṁdehas tāvatā na pramā na sā /  
niścitatvād upāyasya pramāsau kiṁ na tāvatā // 201 //*

*na khalūpeyasamdehapijñāhīrṣā, sarvatropāyaniścayamātreṇa vṛtteḥ / tata  
upāyaniścaye sati kṛṣṭvalādivat prāmāṇikāḥ pravartantām /*

[Someone's answer:] Someone responds to this as follows:

Certainly, there may be doubt about the object of acquisition (*upeya*). But that alone does not make [the cognition of *sādhana*] not a valid cognition. Since it has been determined that it is the means of acquisition (*upāya*), how can that alone make it not a valid cognition? (v. 201)

In fact, [when we act,] we never desire to abandon our doubts about the object of acquisition. In any case, it is only the decision to be the

means of acquisition that causes the action. Therefore, if there is a determination that it is a means of acquisition, those based on *pramāṇa* should act, as in the case of a farmer, etc. [who has doubts about the harvest, but takes action with regard to the seed because the seed is the means of acquisition of the harvest].

The response is as follows: Regarding the goal (*upeya*), a doubt or suspicion may occur. However, this is not sufficient grounds to insist that C1 is not a valid means of cognition. Only by ascertainment of the means (*upāya*) is C1 regarded as a valid means of cognition. Nobody wants to dispel doubts or suspicion about a goal, because people act toward anything only when ascertaining that it is a means. For example, even though a farmer is uncertain whether he will surely obtain crops in the future, he sows seeds, because seeds have been determined to be the means for crops.

According to Jayanta, the response mentioned here as “*upeye nāma (...)*” has been accepted by a certain person.

[36] J D88b4–5, P103b5: *gcig gis 'dod pa'i lan ni / 'bras la the tshom yod ces te // zhes bya ba yin no //*

The answer accepted by a certain person is mentioned here as “*upeye nāma (...)*”

In contrast, Yamāri attributes the response to Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa.

[37] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 60b6 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D275a7–b1, P332a1–3): *atrocyata iti bhaṭṭārcaṭa-matam / na pramā na sā / pramāṇam eva sādhanajñānam ity arthaḥ / nanv arthakriyāsaṃdehāt katham sādhanajñānam pramāṇam? ity āha—niścitat-vād iti / vivṛṇoti—na khalūpeyetyādi /*

Saying “*atrocyate*,” Prajñākaragupta mentions Bhaṭṭārcaṭa’s theory. The phrase “*na pramā na sā*” [in v. 201] means that the cognition of *sādhana* is nothing but a *pramāṇa*. [Objection:] Since there is doubt about *arthakriyā*, why can the cognition of *sādhana* be regarded as a *pramāṇa*? [Arcaṭa’s answer:] [Mentioning Arcaṭa’s answer, Prajñākaragupta] says “*niścitat-vād*.” The words “*na khalūpeya-*” and [those] thereafter are a commentary on the verse.

A similar view is found in Arcaṭa’s *Hetubinduṭīkā*.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>44</sup> See Ono 1994, n. 13.

[38] HBT<sub>A</sub> 2,3–9: *prekṣāvattāṃ pravṛttiḥ prayojanārthināṃ tadupāye tad-bhāvanīscayāt / yathā kṛṣṭvalādīnāṃ sasyādyupāye bījādāv abijādivivekenā-vadhr̥tabījādibhāvānām / anyathā hy anīscitopāyānām upeyārthanām pravṛttau prekṣāvattaiḥ hīyeta / upeye tu [bhāvini pramā]ṇavyāpārāsambhavād anīscaye 'pi vivecitopāyāḥ pratibandhavaikalyayor asambhave “yogyam etad vivakṣitaṃ kāryaṃ niṣpādayitum” iti sambhāvanayā pravṛttau prekṣāvattāto\* na hīyeran / (\*-vattāto HBT<sub>A</sub>; -vattām ato Funayama 1995, Noriyama 1998.)*

Thoughtful men act on the means of attainment in pursuit of their ends by determining its being the means of attainment. For example, a farmer acts with regard to a seed, etc., which is the means of attainment of a harvest, etc., by determining its being a seed, etc., as distinguished from other things that are not a seed, etc. Otherwise, when people act in pursuit of the object of acquisition without determining the means of acquisition, they would give up being thinking [people]. On the other hand, since the object of acquisition is in the future and there is no *pramāṇa* functioning on it, even without a decision [regarding the object of acquisition], people act by determining the means of acquisition and imagining that if there will no obstruction or lack thereof, this will achieve the expected result. In this case they do not give up being thinking [people].

Here, Arcaṭa insists that thinking persons, even if they have doubts about *upeya*, act on the basis of their ascertainment of *upāya*. Arcaṭa then presents the same example of the farmer mentioned by Prajñākaragupta.<sup>45</sup> It should also be noted that the same example is also used in Śākyabuddhi's PVT, as seen above ([33]). However, Śākyabuddhi uses *kṛṣṭvalādi* as an example of an action based on doubt about *arthakriyā* (= *upeya*), not as an example of an action based on the ascertainment of the means (*upāya*). Presumably, Prajñākaragupta is referring to Arcaṭa's view, as Yamāri points out.

Prajñākaragupta criticizes Arcaṭa's answer as follows:

[39] PVA<sup>S</sup> 26,22–24; PVA<sup>O</sup> 68,13–17; PVA<sup>W</sup> 14,16–16,3: *tad asat / yataḥ upeyārthitayā sarvaḥ pravartananivartane / karoti puruṣas tasya saṃdehaś cet kathaṃ pramā // 202 //*  
*yadartham iṣyate pramāṇaṃ tatropaye saṃdehāt pramāṇam iti kaiṣā vāco-yuktiḥ /*

<sup>45</sup> On the passage of HBT<sub>A</sub> quoted here, see Funayama 1995 and Noriyama 1998.

[Prajñākaragupta's response:] This is not correct. For:

People all have positive and negative actions in pursuit of an object of acquisition (*upeya*). If there is doubt about it, how can the [cognition of *sādhana*] be a valid cognition? (v. 202)

Since there is doubt about the object of acquisition for which *pramāṇa* is desired, what is the justification for calling this "*pramāṇa*"?

Prajñākaragupta states: If people wish to obtain some *upeya*, they undertake affirmative or negative actions. If the *upeya* is doubted, the cognition of *upāya* will not motivate any person to act. How can such a cognition be regarded as valid?

Prajñākaragupta never admits that doubts can motivate people to take action. Only after ascertaining that *arthakriyā* (= *upeya*) will be obtained do people take action. Our activities are caused only by ascertainment, although this is just a mistaken belief in truth.

### 4.3. Criticism of Dharmottara's theory

#### 4.3.1. Question to be answered

It is well known that Prajñākaragupta sometimes refers to and severely criticizes the view that may be attributed to Dharmottara. Such a case can be found in his commentary on PV II 4d–5a.

Prajñākaragupta takes up the following problem:

[40] PVA<sup>S</sup> 28,31–29,2; PVA<sup>O</sup> 75,1–4; PVA<sup>W</sup> 26,5–8: *nanu yāvat pratyakṣaṃ na bhavati sambandhasādhakaṃ na tāvad anumānam / pratyakṣeṇa hi sambandhagrahaṇe 'numānam prāmāṇyam sādhayati / pramāṇam sat pratyakṣam sambandhagrahaṇe samartham itītaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ /*

[Objection:] [You say that a cognition is determined as a *pramāṇa* through an inference based on the inevitable relations. But] there is no inference unless there is a perception that establishes the inevitable relations. For when the relation is grasped by perception, inference can establish [a cognition] to be a *pramāṇa*. But only when the perception is determined as a *pramāṇa* through inference does it have the capacity to grasp relations. Thus, a fallacy of mutual dependence would occur.

As Prajñākaragupta argues, if someone insists that the validity of perception is determined by inference indicating the future *arthakriyā*, this leads to the fallacy of mutual dependence. This is because inference can establish the

validity of a perception only if that relation is established by perception. But a perception can establish that relation only if the perception is valid.

#### 4.3.2. Answer attributed to Dharmottara

Prajñākaragupta describes someone's response to this problem as follows:

[41] PVA<sup>S</sup> 29,3–7; PVA<sup>O</sup> 75,5–12; PVA<sup>W</sup> 26,9–15: *atha nānumānena prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate, api tv arthakriyānubhavana, sa ca svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa-prasiddhaḥ, tatra nārthakriyājñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ sat pramāṇatāṃ pūrvasya grhṇāti, nāpi liṅgabhūtaṃ sad anumāpayati, pratyakṣeṇa prāmāṇyasya grahaṇābhāvād atitavāc ca tadvyakteḥ / na hi vyaktiṃ vinā sāmānyaṃ mānavam pratyetur śakyam, abhāvāt sāmānyasya / tasmāt pramāṇatāyāṃ saṃdehamātram / sa cārthakriyāsaṃbandhaḥ saṃdigdhaḥ / arthakriyānirbhāsāt tatra saṃdeho vyāvartata eva /*

[Someone's answer:] Some person might say, "It is not through inference that the validity (*prāmāṇya*) [of a cognition] is established, but through the direct experience of *arthakriyā*. And it (the direct experience of *arthakriyā*) is established by the *svasaṃvedana* perception." [But this view is not correct.] In that case, the [later] cognition of *arthakriyā*, being a perception, does not grasp that the previous cognition was a *pramāṇa*. Nor does [the cognition of *arthakriyā*] serve as an inferential mark (*liṅga*) to make one infer [that the previous cognition is a *pramāṇa*], because validity[, being the universal,] cannot be grasped by [any] perception, and because the individual, that is, the previous cognition, is in the past. The universal of validity cannot be known without the individual [of the previous cognition]. There is no universal [apart from the individual]. Therefore, there is only doubt about its validity. And its relation to *arthakriyā* is doubtful. The appearance of *arthakriyā* only removes the doubt about it. [It cannot bring about an ascertainment of the previous cognition's validity.]

This respondent first refers to another view in which the validity of C1 is established not by inference, but by the direct experience of *arthakriyā* (C2), and the validity of C2 is established by *svasaṃvedana* perception. This view is similar to Devendrabuddhi's. In criticizing this view, the respondent points out that the validity of C1 cannot be established by the cognition of *arthakriyā* (C2). According to this respondent, if C2 is admitted as perception, it never grasps C1's validity because C1 is in the past. Even if C2 is admitted as the cognition of a mark (*liṅga*), it cannot enable the inference of C1's validity

because validity as a universal (*sāmānya*) has not been grasped by any earlier perception.

Accordingly, the respondent concludes that doubt only exists regarding C1's validity and that through the cognition in which *arthakriyā* appears (C2), that doubt is dissipated. Namely, he insists that it is not the ascertainment of C1's validity but a dispelling of the doubt about C1's validity that is caused by C2.

Yamāri explains this respondent's view as follows<sup>46</sup>:

[42] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 63b2–5 (n.e. in Tib.): *itaretarāśrayadoṣaparihāram āśaṅkate—athetyādi / sa cety arthakriyānubhavaḥ / atra dharmottaradūṣaṇam—tatretyādi / (...)* *upasaṃharati—tasmād* iti / *nanv arthakriyāsambandhaś cet siddhaḥ, kutaḥ prāmāṇyasaṃśayaḥ? avisaṃvāditvaṃ hi prāmāṇyam ity āha—sa cārtheti / sthita eva tarhi saṃdeha ity āha—arthakriyeti / tatreti pramāṇatāyām / evaṃ dūre saṃdehaḥ saṃnidhau nivartata ityādi yat kiñcit saṃdehanivṛttikāraṇam upalakṣaṇīyam / saṃdehanivṛtṭyā ca pravṛttir ity abhiprāyaḥ /*

Prajñākaragupta posits a theory that excludes the fallacy of mutual dependence by saying, “*atha*” and so on. The words “*sa ca (...)*” mean “[And] the direct experience of *arthakriyā* is (...).” [After that, Prajñākaragupta] states Dharmottara's criticism against this view by saying “*tatra*” and so on. (...) Summarizing the above, he states, “*tasmāt*.” [Objection:] If its relation to *arthakriyā* is established, how can there be any doubt about its validity? For validity is nothing but

<sup>46</sup> It should be noted that the Tibetan translation of Yamāri's commentary preserved in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka contains no equivalent for this part of the Sanskrit text. Y<sup>Tib</sup> D280a5–6, P337b3–4: *thams cad du* (= PVA<sup>S</sup> 28,28; PVA<sup>O</sup> 74,11: *sarvathā*) *zhes bya ba ni / rnam pa gsum ka ltar yang / sgrub par byed pa'i shes pa'am / sgrub par byed pa'i ##* [n.e. in Tib.] *## the tshom ldog par byed* (= PVA<sup>S</sup> 29,12; PVA<sup>O</sup> 76,3–4: *nivartayet saṃdehaṃ*) *pa yin du chug na / rang gi dus nyid du 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i don to //* Here, a large portion is missing from the Tibetan text. It breaks off and begins again in the middle of a sentence. It seems that an omission was made in an early stage of the transmission of the Tibetan text, and that the text continued to be passed down with this significant lacuna. As a result, Yamāri's commentary on PVA<sup>S</sup> 28,28–29,12 (PVA<sup>O</sup> 74,11–76,3) is unfortunately not available in the Tibetan translation with the currently known sources. However, the discovery of the Sanskrit manuscript has made it possible for us to read Yamāri's explanation of the passage in which Prajñākaragupta criticizes Dharmottara's view.

non-deceptiveness. [Dharmottara's answer:] [Prajñākaragupta presents Dharmottara's answer] by saying "*sa cārtha-*" and so on. [Objection:] Then, the doubt would continue as it is. [Dharmottara's answer:] [Prajñākaragupta presents Dharmottara's answer] by saying "*arthakriyā-*." The word "*tatra*" means "about its validity." Similarly, it is also implied here that even trivial things can be the cause of the removal of doubt, as in the case that a doubt that was from the distance can be removed in the vicinity. And it is also intended [by Dharmottara] that the removal of doubt brings about action.

Here, Yamāri clearly attributes this view to Dharmottara.<sup>47</sup> Dharmottara's view is mentioned and criticized by Prajñākaragupta in the last part of the commentary on PV II 4d–5a.

The following should also be noted: In the last part of this passage, Yamāri explains another viewpoint of the respondent, whereby the removal of action brings about action. According to this viewpoint, the respondent explains that it is the exclusion of doubt, not the ascertainment of validity, that causes one to act.

#### 4.3.3. The same understanding in Dharmottara's works

A similar view is found in works by Dharmottara.

[43] PVinT<sub>Dh</sub> D11b5–6; P12b2–3 (see Steinkellner and Krasser 1989: (19),3–8): *gzhan las ni phyis 'byung ba'i the tshom sel ba 'ba' zhig tu zad do // 'di ltar shes pa phyi ma gang yin pa des ni shes pa snga ma 'dzin pa ma yin no // rtags kyang ma yin te / de skyes pa tsam gyis the tshom sel ba'i phyir dang / khyab pa dran pa med pa'i phyir ro //* [Cf. TR 10\*,31–11\*,2: *kevalam samśayaḥ parato dhvaṃsate / na ca paraṃ pratyakṣaṃ sat pūrvasya prāmāṇyaṃ grhṇāti / na vā tasmin arthe liṅgam, tanmātrāt samśayadhvaṃse 'nyadādy(vyāpty?)anusaraṇābhāvāt /*]

It is only that the doubt disappears through another [cognition] that arises later. That is, [the validity of the preceding cognition is not ascertained by the later cognition, because] the preceding cognition cannot be grasped by the later cognition. Nor does the later cognition become an inferential mark for the inference of [the validity of the preceding cognition]. This is because the doubt is just removed by

<sup>47</sup> Yamāri's reference to Dharmottara in this passage has only recently become clear. See fn. 42.

arising the [later cognition], and because there is no recollection of pervasion (*vyāpti*).

[44] LPPar (51),9–14 [D235b7–236a2; P252b1–2.]: *gang gi phyir tshad ma la the tshom yod kyang don du gnyer ba snang ba'i rang bzhin la snang ba dang ldan pa'i tshad ma las rab tu 'jug pa de'i phyir phan tshun rten pa'i nyes pa yod pa ma yin no // don la the tshom yod pa las kyang rtog pa dang ldan pa 'jug pa'i phyir don la the tshom za ba las ldog par ji ltar 'gyur / de'i phyir thams cad kha na ma tho ba med do //*

A person who wants to acquire [an object], even if he has doubt about the validity of a cognition, acts toward the object that is appearing [in the cognition] on the basis of the cognition that has the appearance of the object. Hence, there is no fault of mutual dependence. Since even prudent persons act on the basis of present doubts about an object, how will [one who wants to acquire an object] not take action on the basis of the doubts about the object? Therefore, everything is blameless.<sup>48</sup>

Dharmottara insists that since the later cognition of *arthakriyā* (C2) can neither grasp the preceding cognition of *sādhana* (C1), nor be a mark of C1's validity, C2 never brings about the ascertainment of the validity of C1. He therefore concludes that C2 only dispels the doubt about *arthakriyā*. Dharmottara also refers to the mutual dependence in his argument. As Yamāri points out, Prajñākaragupta seems to mention Dharmottara's view in order to criticize it.

It should be noted that Dharmottara also considers doubt about *arthakriyā* to motivate persons to undertake actions. In this regard, his view is similar to Śākyabuddhi's. However, Śākyabuddhi insists that through the later cognition of *arthakriyā* (C2), the validity of the preceding cognition (C1) can be established (see [32] and [33]), whereas Dharmottara rejects this view and insists that C2 can only dispel the doubt of *arthakriyā*.

#### 4.3.4. Prajñākaragupta's criticism

Prajñākaragupta criticizes Dharmottara's view as follows:

[45] PVA<sup>S</sup> 29,8–9; PVA<sup>O</sup> 75,14–16; PVA<sup>W</sup> 26,16–18: *tad apy asat / yataḥ saṃdehamātravyāvṛtṭiyā na hi kaścīt pravartate / pratyakṣān niścayād vāpi dṛśyate vṛttir arthinām // 212 //*

<sup>48</sup> See Krasser 1991: II, 116. My understanding of this passage is slightly different from Krasser's.



That is not correct either. For:

Through the elimination of mere doubt, no one will act. It is experienced that those who seek [something] act based on perception or on the basis of determinate cognition [i.e., inference].

First, Prajñākaragupta points out that nobody takes actions in order to dispel doubt in general. If someone wants a particular object, they take action on the basis of perception or inference. Yamāri's commentary on this is as follows:

[46] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 63b5–7 (n.e. in Tib.): *etad dharmottaramataṃ dūṣayati—tad apy asad iti / ayam abhiprāyaḥ—saṃdehaniṣṭtiḥ prasajyarūpā vā syāt, prayudāsarūpā vā / tatra na tāvat prasajyarūpā pravartikā, yasmāt saṃdehamātravyāvṛtṭyā na kaścit pravartate / yadi hi niṣṭtiḥ pravartikā syāt, kiṃ pramāṇānveśaṇena? gāḍhanidrādāv api vāpramāṇaniṣṭteḥ sadbhāvāt pravṛttiprasaṅgaḥ / na cābhāvaḥ kasyacit kāraṇam / tasmān na prasajyarūpā pravartikā / kutas tarhi pravṛtṭiḥ? ity āśaṅkāṃ pratikṣīpan pramāṇadr̥ṣṭam āha—pratyakṣād āsāditapāṭavāt / apāṭave tu niścayād anumānāt / pramāṇam udāsīnam / saṃdehamātravyāvṛtṭyā tu pravṛttir\* ity alaṅkāram ity arthaḥ / [\*pravṛttir Corr.; pratītir Y<sup>Skt</sup> (pratīr Ms).]*

[Prajñākaragupta] criticizes this view of Dharmottara by saying “*tad apy asat*.” The following is intended: The negation of doubt (*saṃdehaniṣṭti*) [as stated by Dharmottara] has 1) *prasajya*[*pratiṣedha*] as its nature, or 2) *prayudāsa* as its nature. Of these, 1) [the negation of doubt] which has *prasajya*[*pratiṣedha*] as its nature does not bring about action. For, by the negation of doubt in general, no one will act. For, if such negation brings about action, then there is no need for the pursuit of *pramāṇa*. Otherwise, since even for a person who is in shallow sleep, etc., there is non-existence of the doubt that it is not *pramāṇa*, he would act. Also, non-existence cannot be a cause for anything. Therefore, 1) [the negation of doubt] which has *prasajya*[*pratiṣedha*] as its nature does not bring about action. [Question:] Then, how can there be action? [Prajñākaragupta's answer:] By saying, “*pratyakṣāt*,” [Prajñākaragupta] rejects such a question and explains that [the validity of perception] is known through *pramāṇa*. The word “*pratyakṣāt*” means ‘by the perception that has acquired clarity [through repeated experience].’ On the other hand, if it does not have clarity, [validity is known] by determinate cognition, namely, by inference. The understanding that “One is unconcerned about a cognition's being *pramāṇa*. Only by the removal of doubt, does he act.” is unacceptable to worldly people.

Dharmottara mentions the word “*saṃdehanivṛtti*” (denial of doubt). However, should this denial be understood as 1) *prasajyapraṭiṣedha*, or as 2) *paryudāsa*? If the first alternative is taken, the following fault would occur: Due to the mere absence of doubt, nobody will take any action. If absence of doubt could motivate, a person who is lightly sleeping would act, because such a person has no doubt. Absence (*abhāva*) cannot be the cause of anything. Therefore, the first alternative *prasajyapraṭiṣedha* is untenable.

Then, why do people act? Prajñākaragupta answers: If perception has already obtained a sharpness through repeated experiences, then perception (C1) will directly motivate a person to take action. Otherwise, inference occurring after the perception will motivate persons. (See [14].)

Prajñākaragupta continues:

[47] PVA<sup>S</sup> 29,10; PVA<sup>O</sup> 75,17–18; PVA<sup>W</sup> 26,19–20:

*sa evārthakriyābhāsaḥ pratyakṣam iti cen matam /  
pratyakṣād eva mānatvapratipattir itīṣyatām // 213 //*

If you think that the very appearance of *arthakriyā*, which is perception, [excludes the doubt about the validity of a cognition and causes one to act], then you should accept that it is known to be *pramāṇa* on the basis of perception. (v. 213)

If you think that the denial of doubt means the appearance of *arthakriyā*, that is, perception, then you should admit that validity is understood by means of perception.

[48] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 63b7–64a2 (n.e. in Tib.): *paryudāsapakṣam āśaṅkate—sa eveti, yady api sādhanapratyakṣam udāsīnam, tathāpy arthakriyānirbhāsam eva pratyakṣam saṃdehaparyudastam pravartakam iti prakaraṇāt / codyānurūpam uttaram āha—pratyakṣād eveti / yadi tad arthakriyānirbhāsam pratyakṣam apravartakam api pravartakam itīṣyate, tadā tata evārthakriyānirbhāsapratyakṣāt prāmāṇyapratītir apīṣyatām sādhanapratyakṣasya / tyajyatām avasāyamātrena svataḥprāmāṇyam iti / tathā hi sādhanapratyakṣam svayam udāsīnam apravartakam apramāṇam eva prāptam, pramāṇam ceṣyate / tad avaśyaṃ pravartakābhimatena samarpitaprāmāṇyam ity āpatitam / atha bhāvitayā sādhanajñānakāle ‘sambhavat katham sādhanajñānasyāprāmāṇyāvaharaṇāya samartham? bhāvitvād eva tarhi pravartakam api katham? iti samānam ity arthaḥ /*

[Next,] by saying, “*sa eva*,” [Prajñākaragupta] assumes 2) the *prayudāsa* view. This part should be understood from the context as follows:

Even if the perception of *sādhana* is merely neutral, the perception in which *arthakriyā* is appearing excludes doubt and causes [one] to take action. In response to this objection, [Prajñākaragupta] states his answer by saying “*pratyakṣād eva.*” If it is accepted that [being absent at the time of the perception of *sādhana*,] the perception in which *arthakriyā* is appearing does not cause one to act but does cause one to act [because it excludes doubt], then it should also be accepted that the validity of the perception of *sādhana* is understood by the very perception in which *arthakriyā* is appearing. And then, [the acceptance] that the validity [of the perception of *sādhana*] is intrinsically determined solely by the judgment should be discarded. Namely, the perception of *sādhana*, which is neutral in and of itself and does not cause action, would not be a *pramāṇa*. But it is accepted as a *pramāṇa* [when the perception of *arthakriyā* occurs]. This would be nothing but the cognition in which the validity is thrown in by [another cognition] that is regarded as a motivator. [Objection:] Since the perception in which *arthakriyā* appears is in the future, it does not exist at the time of the perception of *sādhana*. How can it remove the invalidity of the perception of *sādhana*? [Hence, it is correct to say that there is action due to the removal of the doubt.] [Answer:] Then, the same is true of how it can cause action because it is in the future. This is intended here [by Prajñākaragupta].

As Yamāri explains: On the other hand, if the second alternative *paryudāsa* is taken, the following fault will occur: If you insist that the perception of *arthakriyā* (C2) removes doubt and motivates persons to act, you must admit that the validity of the cognition of *sādhana* (C1) is understood through C2. In that case, C1 must just be neutral (*udāsīna*) in and of itself and will be made valid by C2 later. Therefore, C1 would not be a motivator.

Here, the opponent raises the following objection:

[49] PVA<sup>S</sup> 29,11; PVA<sup>O</sup> 76,1–2; PVA<sup>W</sup> 26,21–22:

*pratyakṣād anumānād vā saṃdeho 'pi nivartate /  
viruddhasyopalabdher na vinānyasya nivartanam // 214 //*

[Objection:] Doubt is dispelled by means of perception or inference. Without cognizing something (A) that contradicts another thing (B), it (B) cannot be negated. (v. 214)<sup>49</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Y<sup>Skt</sup> 64a2–3 (n.e. in Tib.): *tad evaṃ saṃśayaniṣṛtṭeḥ prasajyaparyudāsabhede dūṣaṇam abhidhāyādhunā saṃśayaniṣṛttir eva nāstīti pratipādayitum vikalpayati—pratyakṣād ityādi / kasmāt punaḥ pratyakṣānumāne eva virodhinī saṃśayasya? ity āha—*

The opponent responds: Doubt is dispelled by means of perception or inference. If validity is not cognized, doubt or invalidity cannot be negated.

In addressing this objection, Prajñākaragupta points out that doubt is dispelled by neither perception nor inference. First, he explains that doubt cannot be dispelled by perception, as follows:

[50] PVA<sup>S</sup> 29,12–13; PVA<sup>O</sup> 76,3–6; PVA<sup>W</sup> 28,1–4:

*yadi pratyakṣabhāvāt sā tadā nāma nivartayet /  
saṁdehaṁ tadabhāvo 'stu tadaiva katham anyadā // 215 //*

*tatsaṁdehanivṛtṭyā ca nāsty evātra prayojanam /  
pravartanārthaṁ seṣyeta pravṛtṭiḥ sā ca sādhitā // 216 //*

[Prajñākaragupta's answer:] If, by the presence of perception, the [cognition in which *arthakriyā* is appearing] removes doubt at that very time, then the non-existence of the [doubt] would be only at that time. How is it at another time? (v. 215)

And [at the time of the perception of *arthakriyā*,] there is no use in removing doubt about the [validity] of this [cognition of *sādhana*]. The [removal of doubt] may be required in order to act, but the action has already been completed [at that time]. (v. 216)<sup>50</sup>

If the perception of *arthakriyā* (C2) occurring later could dispel doubt, the absence of doubt would be made only at the time of C2. How can it be made at another time?

Regarding the cognition of *sādhana* (C1), there is no use dispelling the doubt about its validity. In order to act based on C1, the doubt about C1's validity needs to be dispelled by C2. However, at the time of C2, the action

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*viruddhasyeti / yasmān na viruddhasya prāmāṇyāder upalambham antareṇānyasyā-  
prāmāṇyāder nivartanam, tasmāt pratyakṣād anumānād vā nivartate saṁdehaḥ /*

<sup>50</sup> Y<sup>Skt</sup> 64a3–5 (Cf. Y<sup>Tib</sup> D280a6–b1, P337b4–6): *tatra prathamavikalpaṁ dūṣayati—yadi pratyakṣeti, sārthakriyānirbhāsabuddhiḥ saṁdehaṁ nivartayed ity atrāpi sambadhyate / katham? pratyakṣabhāvād iti / yadi tadā nāma# nivartayet saṁdehaṁ svakāla ity arthaḥ / atas tasya saṁśayasyābhāvo 'stu tadaivārthakriyānirbhāsakāle, katham anyadā pravṛttivāñchākāle? na khalv agnir anyadā, anyadā śītaṁ nivartayed ity arthaḥ / prasaṅgāt saṁśayanivṛtter vaiyarthyam apīdānīm darśayati—tatsaṁdehetyādi / tasyaṁ pramāṇatāyāṁ saṁdehas tatsaṁdehaḥ, tasya nivṛtṭyā / atra sādhanajñāne / saṁśayanivṛtṭiḥ sā ca sādhiteti anantaram eva niścayadvāreṇa / # From the middle of 63a7 to this point, the Tibetan translation has no equivalent text.*

has already been concluded. Therefore, it is not appropriate to state that doubt is dispelled by perception.

Next, Prajñākaragupta explains that doubt cannot be dispelled by inference, as follows:

[51] PVA<sup>S</sup> 29,14–15; PVA<sup>O</sup> 76,7–10; PVA<sup>W</sup> 28,5–8:

*sarvasya cārthasaṃbandho na jñānasyākṣavīkṣitaḥ /*  
*sāmānyena ca saṃbandham anumānaṃ vyavasyati // 217 //*

*na cāparā pramāstīti kutaḥ saṃdehavicchidaḥ // 218 //*

*tata uktam—prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇeti /*

The relation of any cognition to its [acquired] object is not known by the senses. Inference, on the other hand, determines its relation [to the object of acquisition] by its commonality [with the examples]. [But that inference, too, is not a correct means of cognition, since it is based on another cognition of relation.] (v. 217)

And there is no *pramāṇa* except [perception and inference]. Therefore, the doubt [as to the validity of cognition] cannot be removed [by any means]. (v. 218)

Hence, [Dharmakīrti] said, “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*” (PV II 5a).

In every cognition of *sādhana*, the relation to its object, namely *arthakriyā*, cannot be checked through perception. However, inference leads an individual to judge the relation between the present cognition (C1) and *arthakriyā* (A) based on similarity to limited instances that have been checked before. Such inferences cannot be recognized as valid in reality. Therefore, C1’s validity can never be understood by means of inference. Thus, it is not appropriate to posit that doubt is dispelled by inference.

In addition, there is no *pramāṇa* other than perception and inference. Therefore, what means are there for removing doubt? Why can the validity of C1 be established by dispelling doubt? This is why Dharmakīrti said, “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*” (PV II 5a). Namely, validity as non-deceptiveness of cognition cannot be truly determined by any means. It is just conventional. Dharmakīrti thus said that validity is conventional.

Commenting on this passage of PVA, Yamāri supposes the following objection of the opponent: “It is seen that a preceding cognition becomes a valid means of cognition when doubt is removed. For example, when someone sees a charcoal fire which has no smoke, he may suspect that it

might be the red fruits of Guñjā. However, afterwards, if he sees smoke rising from a leaf that has fallen on the fire, he will understand the preceding perception as a valid means of cognition.” Yamāri’s answer to this objection is as follows: “This is not correct, because in that case, inference should be admitted as a valid means of cognition. The preceding cognition, whose elucidating function is obscured by suspicion, cannot be a means of valid cognition.”<sup>51</sup>

Yamāri explains the last part of the passage [51] as follows:

[52] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 64b1 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D280b6–7, P338a5–6): *tad evaṃ na saṃvyavahārataḥ paramārthato vā dharmottarapakṣo yukta iti pratipādyā pūrvoktam evopasaṃharati—tata uktam ityādi / vyavahāreṇa yathoktena vyavasthāpyate, na tu tattvenety arthaḥ /*

After explaining above that Dharmottara’s theory is incorrect from the worldly point of view and from the point of view of the ultimate truth, [Prajñākaragupta] summarizes what was said before by saying “*tata uktam*” and so on. The phrase “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*” means that validity is established by our convention as explained before, not by the truth.

Here, Yamāri summarizes: Dharmottara’s assertion is neither right from the viewpoint of conventional truth, nor from the viewpoint of ultimate truth.<sup>52</sup> The validity of cognition can be established only through our convention in the manner explained by Prajñākaragupta.

<sup>51</sup> Y<sup>Skt</sup> 64a5–b1 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D280b1–6, P337b6–338a5): *dvitīyavikalpaṃ dūṣayati—sarvasya ceti / sarvasya jñānasyeti sambandhaḥ / kasyacit punar arthasambandho ‘kṣavikṣita ity abhipretam atra / na punar etad yuhyate, ayojanātmakatvāt pratyakṣasya / nanu ya evārthakriyāsambandho ‘kṣavikṣitaḥ, tam evānumānaṃ pratyēṣyatīty āha—sāmānyena ceti / drṣṭāntasādhāraṇena rūpeṇa / tato nānakṣavikṣita\*sambandham anumānaṃ vyavasyati / pratyakṣapūrvatābhāvāt, anumānaṃ katham pramā? tato ‘numānād apy arthakriyāsambandhāpratīter na saṃsayanivṛttiḥ / anyatra tarhi saṃsayanivṛttir bhaviṣyatīty āha—na cāpareti pratyakṣānumānavyatiriktā / vicchida iti vyāpty-arthaṃ bahuvacanaṃ pañcamī vā / kutaḥ saṃdehavicchedāt prāmāṇyaṃ pūrvasyeti hṛdistham / athāṅgārāvaśeṣacitrabhānudarśane ‘pi guñjāsaṃdehe ca patrādīpātād dhūma-darśinaḥ saṃsayanivṛtttau pūrvasya prāmāṇyabodho drṣṭa eva / na, tatrānumānasyaiva prāmāṇyāt, na pūrvasya saṃsayākṛāntapradarśanavyāpārasya / (\*nānakṣavikṣita- Corr.; nānakṣavikṣita- Y<sup>Skt</sup>.)*

<sup>52</sup> As for Yamāri’s references to Dharmottara in the commentary PVA *ad* PV II 4d–5a,

#### 4.4. Yamāri's supplemental argument

In the closing part of the commentary on PV II 4d–5a, Yamāri gives the following supplemental explanation:

[53] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 64b1–3 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D280b7–281a4, P338a6–b2): *nanu tattvena pramāṇaniṣedhasādhikā yuktayaḥ, pramāṇam apramāṇam vā? satyam / pramāṇam eva, kevalam vyāvahārikam / tarhi vyāvahārikam vyāvahārikeṇa bādhyata iti kārthasaṅgatiḥ? satyam, abhyupagamavirodhasya vivakṣitatvāt / parasparam pratibandha eva bādhārthaḥ / yena hy arthakriyāsambandhāt prāmāṇyam abhyupagatam, anyathātiprasaṅgāt / tasyārthasambandhāniścaye 'pi prāmāṇyavyavahārasvīkāra iti viruddham / sambandhaniścayaś ca tadvyavahārakāraṇam iti vyaktam iyaṁ kāraṇānupalabdhiḥ, kiṁ tu tadabhyupagamenaiḥ / tataḥ parasparam pratibandhān niṣedhyasya pramāṇasya niṣedhakasya ca na prāmāṇyavyavahāraḥvyasanena kiṁcit /*

[Objection:] Are [your] various reasonings that argue that *pramāṇa* is denied in truth regarded as *pramāṇa* or as not *pramāṇa*? [Answer:] Certainly, there is that problem. They are none other than *pramāṇa*, but [they too] are merely conventional. [Objection:] In that case, how can the statement “the conventional is rejected by the conventional” be correct? [Answer:] Certainly it is so. But it is correct because a conflict with acceptance (*abhyupagamavirodha*) is intended [here by Prajñākaragupta]. Mutual obstruction is meant by this ‘rejection.’ For it is accepted that the validity of a cognition is based on its relation to *arthakriyā*. Otherwise, it would be over-applied. [But] even though its relation to the object (= *arthakriyā*) is not determined, it is admitted [that it can] be treated as valid. Therefore, this would conflict with the acceptance. Moreover, since the determination of the relation is the cause of treating it as *pramāṇa*, this [absence of such determination] is clearly a non-apprehension of the cause[, which leads to the consequence that it cannot be treated as *pramāṇa*. But this would conflict with the acceptance of its being a *pramāṇa*. Hence, since these two acceptances are incompatible with each other, there is no point in clinging to the treatment as *pramāṇa*, either for the *pramāṇa* being denied or for the *pramāṇa* denying it.

Yamāri supposes the following objection from an opponent: “Are your logical arguments that lead to negating the real validity of *pramāṇas* regarded as valid?” He answers this objection as follows: “They are also regarded as valid in the conventional sense.” Opponent: “How can one conventional

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only this passage is mentioned by Motoi Ono. See Ono 1994, n.17; do 1995, n.22.

thing be negated by another conventional thing?" Yamāri: "That is right. Prajñākaragupta intends to point out that a conflict with acceptance (*abhy-upagamavirodha*) would occur."

According to Yamāri, the following two acceptances exist:

**Acceptance A:** "The validity of cognition is based on the relation between the cognition and *arthakriyā*."

**Acceptance B:** "Although the relation cannot be ascertained, the cognition is accepted as valid."

Prajñākaragupta points out only that A and B are incompatible with each other. He does not intend to select one of them, nor to say that his own argument is absolute. Ultimately, neither the negated nor the negator should be treated as valid.<sup>53</sup>

Yamāri concludes:

[54] Y<sup>Skt</sup> 64b3–4 (= Y<sup>Tib</sup> D281a4–5, P338b2–3): *etac ca paraprāpaṇīyā\*-pekṣayā dūṣaṇam / svarūpavedane tu parāpekṣābhāvāt tanmātrādhigatyaiiva kṛtārtham pratyakṣaṃ sakalapramāṇaprameyanirdhūtikṣamam / ata eva sva-rūpasya svato gatir ity apy uktam / (\*-prāpaṇīyā- Corr.; -prāmāṇyā- Ms. Cf. Y<sup>Tib</sup> D281a4, P338b2: thob par bya ba ....)*

The above refutation is against the validity of a cognition that relies on the other thing, i.e., the object to be obtained. The validity of the cognition of cognition itself is not denied, because it does not rely on anything else. Rather, the *svasaṃvedana* perception, which achieves its purpose by understanding only itself, can negate all *pramāṇas* and *premeyas*. Hence it is also stated [by Dharmakīrti] that "*svarūpasya svato gatiḥ*" (PV II 4d).

This refutation is made because such validity requires something other than the cognition itself: it must rely on the object to be obtained. In contrast, if a cognition is cognized by itself, nothing other than the cognition is required, and consequently, the cognition is successfully completed in and of itself. Only such cognition, that is, the *svasaṃvedana* perception, is not refuted, and

<sup>53</sup> The eliminator–eliminated relationship (*bādhyabādhakabhāva*) is still within the range of *bhedavāda* and accordingly, is regarded as conventional. Cf. JNĀ (SSŚ IV) 437,4–5: *bādhyabādhakabhāvasya sāmṛtasyopapādanāt / bhāṣye tadvyāpyasatkhyāter*



can negate all *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*. This is why Dharmakīrti said, “*sva-rūpasya svato gatiḥ*.”

## 5. Prajñākaragupta’s influence on later Buddhists

### 5.1. Manorathanandin’s PVV ad PV II 4d–5a

Manorathanandin explains Dharmakīrti’s PV II 4d–5a in two ways.<sup>54</sup> His first explanation is as follows:

[55] PVV<sub>M</sub> 6,16–20: (...) *yadi svarūpamārtam svato gamyate na prāmāṇyam, kathan tarhi tad avagamyam ity āha / prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇārthakriyājñānena / yasya sādhanajñānasya tādātmyād anubhūte ’pi prāmāṇye sāsāṅkā vyavahartāro ’nabhyāsavaśād anutpannānurūpaniścayaḥ tatrārthakriyājñānena prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ / anyatra tu vibhramaśaṅkāsaṅkocād utpattāo eva svarūpasya prāmāṇyasya svato gatiḥ ity uktam //*

[Question:] If cognition itself is known by itself, but the validity of the cognition is not, how then can the validity be understood? [Answer:] The validity of a cognition is understood through action, i.e., through the cognition of *arthakriyā*. The validity of the cognition of *sāddhana* is directly experienced because it is in a relationship of essential identity with the cognition. But, for worldly people who have not repeatedly experienced [the object] before and accordingly have doubt about its validity, the determinate cognition has not arisen. In such a case, the validity of the cognition is determined by the [subsequent] cognition of *arthakriyā*. However, with respect to any other cognition, the validity, which is the cognition itself, is known by itself at the time the cognition arises, since the doubt of error is diminished. The above is stated here by Dharmakīrti.

Here, Manorathanandin interprets the meaning of the word “*vyavahāreṇa*” as “*arthakriyājñānena*” (through the cognition of *arthakriyā*). He explains that in the case of an unrepeated experience, the validity of the cognition is determined by means of the subsequent cognition of *arthakriyā*, but in other cases, validity is understood by the cognition itself without any other cognition, as it was stated by Dharmakīrti in PV II 4d. It is clear that this explanation is essentially based on the interpretation of Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi.

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*virodhasya prasāddhanāt //*

<sup>54</sup> On PVV<sub>M</sub> ad PV II 4d–5a, see Inami 1992.

Manorathanandin, who was not satisfied with only providing the above explanation, gave a second one as follows:<sup>55</sup>

[56] PVV<sub>M</sub> 6,20–7,14: *athavā (...). kathan tarhi tadvyavasthety āha / prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa / sāmvyavahārikasyedaṃ pramāṇasya lakṣaṇaṃ, samvyavahāraś ca bhāvibhūtarūpādikṣaṇānām ekatvena samvādaviṣayo 'navagītaḥ sarvasya / sādhyasādhanayor ekavyaktidarśane samastataj-jāṭiyatathātvavyavasthānaṃ samvādam avadhārayanti vyavahartāraḥ / tadanurodhāt prāmāṇyam vyavasthāpyate / tattoatas tu svasamvedanamātram apravṛttiniṣṭtikam //*

Or, this can be explained as follows: (...) [Objection:] Then, how is the validity established? [Answer:] Answering this, Dharmakīrti said, “*prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa*” (PV II 5a). [The meaning of the phrase is as follows:] This is the defining characteristic of conventional *pramāṇa*. The worldly act of consistency (*samvāda*) based on treating future and past moments of color, etc. as identical is not rejected by all worldly people. Knowing *sādhyā* and *sādhana* in a single object, worldly people determine the consistency that establishes that all things of the same kind are the same. In accordance with such [a worldly act], the truth [of cognition] is determined. But in truth, there is only self-cognition, which brings neither positive nor negative action.

Not much comment is necessary regarding this explanation. This second interpretation is nothing but Prajñākaragupta's. Manorathanandin first explains PV II 4d–5a based on the interpretation of Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, and then based on the interpretation of Prajñākaragupta. Although the first interpretation is criticized by Prajñākaragupta, Manorathanandin does not exclude it from his explanation. Instead, he combines the two explanations by using the term “*athavā*.”

## 5.2. Ravigupta's PVV *ad* PV II 5a

Ravigupta, who is believed to have been a direct pupil of Prajñākaragupta, explains the meaning of the word “*vyavahāreṇa*” in PV II 5a as follows:

[57] R D301b5–302a1, P147b3–7: *tshad ma tha snyad las yin no zhes pa la tha snyad du grub pa'i rjes su dpag pa'i stobs kyis nges par shes pas mngon*

<sup>55</sup> Vibh p. 6, n. 9: *svarūpasya svato gatih / prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇety asya vyākhyāntaram āha /*

par 'dod pa'i don byed pa'i (pa'i Corr.; pa ni DP) sgrub par byed pa nyid du 'jug cing goms pa phul du byung ba'i tshe / rjes su dpag pa med par yang shes pa 'jug pa'i phyir mngon sum yang tshad mar brjod do // (...). yang na **tha snyad** ni don byed pa'i shes pas tshad mar rtogs pa'o // yang na 'dis tha snyad 'dogs par byed pas **tha snyad** ni rjes su dpag pa ste / des na tshad ma'o // 'di ltar de lta bu'i shes pa ni slu ba med pa nyid du shes pa'o //

The phrase “*prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*” can be explained as follows: Through inference that is established [to be a valid means of cognition] in our conventional world, a person determines that an object will cause the expected effect and acts toward it. [In this case, being a motivator, inference is regarded as a *pramāṇa*.] On the other hand, in the case of absolutely repeated perception, the perception of the object can directly motivate the person without inference. Therefore, perception is said to be a *pramāṇa*. Or [the phrase can be explained in another way:] [The validity of cognition is] understood through “*vyavahāra*,” namely, through the cognition of *arthakriyā*. Or [the phrase can be explained in yet another way:] By “*vyavahāra*,” which means the instrument of our activity, namely, inference, the validity [of cognition] is [understood]. Namely, it is understood that such cognition is non-deceptive.

Ravigupta gives three different interpretations here:

1. *vyavahāreṇa* = “by means of the inference that is established as valid only in our conventional world” (*tha snyad du grub pa'i rjes su dpag pa'i stobs kyis*, \**vyavahāraprasiddhānumānabalena*). When a person perceives an object, he determines through inference that is established only in our conventional world that it will cause the expected effect, and thus he acts toward that object. In this case, being a motivator, inference is regarded as a *pramāṇa*. On the other hand, in the case of repeated perception, the perception of an object can directly motivate a person without inference. Perception is therefore regarded as a *pramāṇa*.
2. *vyavahāreṇa* = “by means of the cognition of *arthakriyā*” (*don byed pa'i shes pas*, \**arthakriyājñānena*). The validity of a cognition (C1) is understood by means of the cognition of *arthakriyā* (C2).
3. *vyavahāreṇa* = “by the instrument (\**karaṇa*) of our activity, namely by inference” (\**anumānena*). C1 is understood as valid by means of inference, which is an instrument of our activity in daily life.

The first interpretation is based on Prajñākaragupta; the second is derived from Devendrabuddhi (and Śākyabuddhi). The origin of the third

interpretation is unclear. Ravigupta may have been thinking of inference being a motivator (*pravartaka*), which is explained by Prajñākaragupta.

## 6. Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of PV II 4d–5a and Dharmakīrti's account at the end of PVI I

Is Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of PV II 4d–5a unique? Is it far from Dharmakīrti's intention? In the final part of the first chapter of the *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*, Dharmakīrti states:

[58] PVI I 43,12–44,6: so 'pi kathaṃ sarvajñānānāṃ viśayaṃ vyatirecayann upaplavetarayoḥ pramāṇetaratām brūyāt, viśeṣābhāvāt / upaplavavāsanāvīsandhidoṣād aprabuddhasyāpy anāśvāsikaṃ vyavahāram utpaśyann ekam apramāṇam ācakṣīta, aparam ā saṃsāram aviśliṣṭānubandhaṃ dr̥ḍhāvāsanatvād iha vyavahārāvisaṃvādāpekṣayā pramāṇam / sāṃvyavahārikasya caitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam, atrāpi pare mūḍhā visaṃvādayanti lokam iti / cintāmayīm eva tu prajñām anuśīlayanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikapramāṇam abhimukhikurvanti / tad api leśataḥ sūcitam eveti //

[Objection:] How can one, who denies the existence of [an external] object of all cognitions, say that [a cognition which is] erroneous [about its object] is not *pramāṇa* and the other is *pramāṇa*? This is because there is no difference between cognitions that have no object. [Answer:] Seeing that since a certain cognition has the error of inconsistency due to the potential influence of an erroneous cognition, action [based on that cognition] is unreliable even for fools, one can say that it is not *pramāṇa*. On the other hand, the other [kind of cognition], having a firm potential influence, is regarded as consistent during *saṃsāra*[, that is, before the attainment of enlightenment], and therefore is considered *pramāṇa* in this [conventional] world on the basis of it not being deceptive with regard to actions. And [it should be added,] this (being a *pramāṇa* on the basis of not deceiving), mentioned as the nature of *pramāṇas*, is only that of conventional *pramāṇas*. Since even regarding the [nature of a conventional *pramāṇa*], some other persons in their stupidity are deceiving the worldly people, [it is explained in our treatises on *pramāṇa*.] [As for the ultimate *pramāṇa*, on the other hand,] those who meditate on the wisdom gained through thought will manifest the ultimate *pramāṇa*,

which is without error, without defilement, and without turning away.  
I have explained a little about that as well.<sup>56</sup>

Here, Dharmakīrti first explains that cognition's being *pramāṇa*, that is, its validity, is determined on the basis of its non-deceptiveness, even if there is no external object. Next, he notes that this non-deceptiveness is only a defining characteristic of conventional *pramāṇas*. And he also states that even if it is conventional, since some people misunderstand and explain it erroneously, he explains the nature of this conventional *pramāṇa* in his treatise in order to correct this misunderstanding. Finally, he concludes by saying that cognition in enlightenment is the ultimate *pramāṇa*, for which he gives a short explanation.

The flow of Dharmakīrti's argument at the end of PVin I is similar to that of PV II 4d–5c (*svarūpasya svato gatiḥ // prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa; śāstram mohanivartanam / ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*) that is understood by Prajñākaragupta. It is indeed possible to understand PV II 4d–5c along these lines. Prajñākaragupta seems to understand that Dharmakīrti had given a similar explanation in PV II 4d–5c as he gave in this description at the end of PVin I.<sup>57</sup>

As is well known, in his PVSV, Dharmakīrti mentions conventional validity:

<sup>56</sup> On the PVin passage I quote here, see Wakahara 1988, Inami 1989, etc.

<sup>57</sup> It should be noted that Kamalaśīla also mentions conventional validity in his *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. TSP 949,11–13 (ad TS 2980–2981): (...) *atha yogācāraṃ prati codyate, tatrāpīdam prakṛtānupayogi / tathāhi—sāṃvyavahārikasyedam pramāṇasya lakṣaṇam, pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam iti / (...)*. Kamalaśīla clearly states here that for Dharmakīrti's definition of *pramāṇa* as a non-deceptive cognition is defining the conventional *pramāṇa*. However, it is not clear whether Kamalaśīla, who is not referring to PV II 4d–5a here, understands PV II 4d–5a as describing this. In another passage in the same work, he states the following: TSP 976,10–15 (ad TS 3097): *na hy anubhūtam ity eva[m] sarvātmanā niścayo jāyate kāraṇāntarāpekṣa-toān niścayotpatter iti bahudhā pratipāditam, tena gṛhītam api jñānasya svasaṃvido 'rthapramāṇasāmarthyam bhrāntikāraṇasyāpramāṇasārūpyānabhyāsādeḥ sadbhāvān niścayānutpatter aniścitam ity ucyate / niścayānubhavayor bhedāt / tataś ca samāropavy-avacchedena parataḥ prāmāṇyam iṣṭam ity adoṣaḥ / yathoktam—svarūpasya svato gatiḥ prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇeti / tathātva iti prāmāṇye //* According to this passage, Kamalaśīla seems to understand that in PV II 4d–5a, the following is being explained: "The validity of cognition, which is cognition itself, is known by self-cognition, but it is not determined at that time. When determinate knowledge occurs, it is

[59] PVSV 51,3–5: *sarveṣāṃ viplave 'pi pramāṇatadābhāsavyavasthā, ā āśrayaparāvṛtter arthakriyāyogyābhimatasamvādāt / mithyātve 'pi praśamā-nulūlatvān mātṛsaṃjñādivat /*

Even if all our cognitions are [in truth] erroneous, it is possible to separate *pramāṇas* or not. Until the grounds are converted, [i.e., until enlightenment is attained,] some cognitions are regarded as *pramāṇas* by not deceiving us with regard to their objects expected to be able to bring about *arthakriyā*. For even if they are erroneous, they contribute to the cessation [of evil passions]. Just as imagining [a woman to be one's] mother, for example, [contributes to the suppression of one's lust for her, even though it is erroneous].

Before enlightenment, all of our cognitions are erroneous. However, some cognitions can be regarded as *pramāṇas* based on their non-deceptiveness. Although they are in truth erroneous, they can contribute to the cessation of evil passions.

## 7. Concluding Remarks

The above examination can be summarized as follows:

1. Prajñākaragupta understands that in PV II 4d–5a, Dharmakīrti explains that from the viewpoint of the ultimate truth, there is only self-cognition (*svasamvedana*), and that a cognition's validity based on its non-deceptiveness is merely a conventional type of validity.
2. According to Prajñākaragupta, a cognition's validity is based on its being a motivator (*pravartaka*). In reality, cognition which is just a self-cognition does not cause any actions. However, in our conventional world, some cognitions motivate us to act toward their objects. When we perceive as yet unexperienced objects, we act toward their causal efficacies based on inference. On the other hand, in the case of experienced objects, perception of them causes our actions directly. Therefore, these are admitted as *pramāṇas*.

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determined by it." Although Kamalaśīla admits that cognition's validity as based on its non-deceptiveness, which was defined by Dharmakīrti in PV II 1a–b<sup>1</sup>, is just conventional, he does not seem to understand that this conventional validity was intended by Dharmakīrti in PV II 4d–5a.

3. Moreover, a cognition's non-deceptiveness is determined by our erroneous belief that the cognized object is identical to the object to be obtained after the action. This is because of our erroneous judgement that the two objects belong to the same continuum, or have been produced from the same causal complex, or are inherent in the same substance. Or it is because of an inference based on causality or essential identity that is conventionally established.
4. In his explanation of PV II 4d–5a, Prajñākaragupta criticizes his predecessors' understanding of the passage. According to Yamāri's sub-commentary, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, and Dharmottara are being criticized by Prajñākaragupta. In fact, the theories he criticizes can be found in their works.
5. Prajñākaragupta's understanding of PV II 4d–5a had an influence on later Buddhists. For example, Manorathanandin and Ravigupta give explanations of Dharmakīrti based on Prajñākaragupta's understanding.
6. In the last part of PVin I, Dharmakīrti explained that the validity of cognition based on its non-deceptiveness is just conventional and that only the cognition in enlightenment is a true *pramāṇa*. Prajñākaragupta seems to understand that Dharmakīrti's explanation in PV II 4d–5c was similar to the one he gave in PVin I.

## References and Abbreviations

### Primary Sources

- AKVy *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (Yaśomitra). Ed. U. Wogiwara, *Sphutārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* by Yaśomitra. Tokyo 1932–1935.
- J *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā* (Jayanta). Tibetan translation. D4222, P5720.
- JNĀ *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī* (Jñānaśrīmitra). Ed. A. Thakur, *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalīḥ*. Patna 1st ed. 1959; 2nd ed. 1987.
- TR *Tarkarahasya* (author unknown). Ed. H. Yaita. In: *Three Sanskrit Texts from the Buddhist Pramāṇa-Tradition*. Narita 2005.
- TS; TSP *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita); *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla). Ed. S.D. Shastri, *Tattvasaṃgraha of ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*. 2 vols. Varanasi 1st ed. 1968; 2nd ed. 1981.

- DhP *Dharmottarapradīpa* (Durvekamiśra). In: Ed. D. Malvania, *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāya-binduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]*. Vol. 2. Patna 1955.
- NKC *Nyāyakumudacandra* (Prabhācandra). In: Ed. M.K. Shastri, *Nyāyakumudacandra*. Benares 1938–1941.
- NBT<sub>Dh</sub> *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (Dharmottara). See DhP.
- NBhū *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña). Ed. Yogindrānanda, *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam Nyāyabhūṣaṇam*. Vārāṇasī 1968.
- PV II *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti), the second chapter (*Pramāṇasiddhi*). Critical Sanskrit edition of the second chapter of *Pramāṇavārttika*. Ed. M. Inami. (Not published.)
- PVA<sup>O</sup> *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta). Ed. M. Ono, *Prajñākaraguptas Erklärung der Definition gültiger Erkenntnis (Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra zu Pramāṇavārttika II 1–7), Teil I Sanskrit-Text und Materialien*. Vienna 2000.
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- PVT<sub>S</sub> *Pramāṇavārttikāṭīkā* (Śākyabuddhi). Tibetan translation. D4220, P5718.
- PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi). Tibetan translation. D4217, P5717.
- PVV<sub>M</sub> *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin). Ed. R. Sāṅkrtyāyana, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin. The Journal of the Vihāra and Orissa Research Society* Vols. XXIV, XXV, XXVI. 1938–40.
- Y<sup>Skt</sup> *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā* (Yamāri) on PVA (*ad* PV II 1–7). Sanskrit text, which is being critically edited based on the Sanskrit manuscript.
- Y<sup>Tib</sup> *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā* (Yamāri). Tibetan translation. D4226, P5723.
- R *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Ravigupta). Tibetan translation. D4224, P5726.
- RNĀ *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī* (Ratnakīrti). Ed. A. Thakur, *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī*. 2nd ed. Patna 1975.
- LPPar *Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā* (Dharmottara). Tibetan translation. Ed. H. Krasser. In Krasser 1991: I, 22–124 [(1)–(52)].
- Vibh *Vibhūticandra's notes on PVV<sub>M</sub>*. See PVV<sub>M</sub>.
- SVT *Siddhiviniśchayaṭīkā* (Anantavīrya). *Siddhiviniśchayatika of Shri Anantavīrya, the Commentary on Siddhiviniśchaya and its Vṛtti of Bhatta Akalanka Deva*. Ed. with 'Aloka' and Introduction etc. by M.K. Jain. 2 Vols. Varanasi 1959.
- SSŚ *Sākārasiddhiśāstra* (Jñānaśrīmitra). JNĀ 2nd ed.: 367–513.



HBT<sub>A</sub> *Hetubinduṭīkā* (Arcaṭa). Eds. S. Sanghavi and Jambuvijayaji, *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*. Baroda 1949.

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# Buddhist Proof of the Self-Luminous Nature of a Cognition\*

K O B A Y A S H I H i s a y a s u

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## 0. Introduction

A cognition cognizes itself, as a lamp illuminates itself. A lamp is a model example that Buddhist logicians, such as Dharmakīrti (ca. 7<sup>th</sup> c.), cite to illustrate their theory of ‘self-cognition’ (*svasamvedana*). It is generally accepted that a lamp has a self-revealing character. In order to illustrate that a cognition does not cognize itself, however, counterexamples are adduced: the blade of a sword cannot cut itself; the tip of a finger cannot touch itself; a man cannot mount on his own shoulders.<sup>1</sup> These counterexamples, which show that nothing can act on itself, are given by realists, such as Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, who hold that a cognition is illuminated by another cognition.

As long as Buddhist logicians advocate the theory that a cognition has a self-luminous character, they have to accept the task of showing that there is no harm in saying that a cognition cognizes itself. For the realists say

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\* This paper is originally based on my presentation at the 13<sup>th</sup> World Sanskrit Conference held in Edinburgh, 2006. Seventeen years later, I had the opportunity to present once again the renewed version of this paper during the *Ślokavārttika* reading sessions at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA), Vienna, March 13–24, 2023. I would like to thank the participants for their valuable feedback, especially John Taber, who also corrected the English of this paper. I am grateful to Birgit Kellner, Patrick McAllister and Hiroko Matsuoka for hosting me for four weeks as an IKGA Visiting Fellow, during which I also had the opportunity to revise with the IKGA members my critical edition and translation of the PVA used in this paper and in Kobayashi 2023. I would also like to thank Eli Franco for attending and contributing to the lively discussions at the PVA reading sessions held at the IKGA prior to the *Ślokavārttika* ones, as well as for his kind hospitality. It is a real pleasure for me to dedicate this paper to him, one of the pioneers of Prajñākaragupta studies, on this occasion.

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Jacob 1925: 3–4. For Buddhist sources, see Yao 2005: 52; Kataoka

that the action on itself is contradictory (*svātmani kriyāvirodhaḥ*), namely, what cognizes cannot at the same time be what is to be cognized. Prajñākaragupta (ca. 8<sup>th</sup>–9<sup>th</sup> c.) is one of the Buddhist logicians who attempted the task mentioned above. In commenting on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* III k. 329 he tries to show that what is said of the blade of a sword and the like is not true of a cognition.

This paper will show how Prajñākaragupta brings about a solution to the problem of *svātmani kriyāvirodhaḥ*, that there is a contradiction in a thing acting on itself, to account for the self-luminous nature of a cognition.

## 1. A lamp and a cognition

At *Pramāṇavārttika* III k. 327 Dharmakīrti says:

PV III k. 327: *nānyo 'nubhāvyas tenāsti tasya nānubhavo 'paraḥ / tasyāpi tulyacodyatvāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate //<sup>2</sup>*

There is no object distinct from [the cognition] that is to be perceived by that [i.e., the cognition]. [Similarly] there is no other [cognition] which perceives that [i.e., the cognition], since the [perception of the cognition] also invites the same criticism [as that of the object]. [It is the case that] the very same cognition shines by itself.

According to Dharmakīrti's view a cognition requires neither an object to be cognized distinct from the cognition nor another cognition to reveal itself. What leads to this, according to him, is a cognition's feature that it shines by itself (*svayaṃ prakāśate*).

Dharmakīrti takes a lamp as an example to illustrate the *svasaṃvedana* theory as follows:

PV III k. 329: *prakāśamānas tādātmyāt svarūpasya prakāśakaḥ / yathā prakāśo 'bhīmatas tathā dhīr ātmavedinī //*

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2017: 209, n.50.

<sup>2</sup> There are some textual problems in this verse, which are discussed in Kobayashi (forthcoming). According to Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1938, the manuscript preserved in the Shalu monastery seems to offer the following reading: *nānyo 'nubhāvyas buddhyāsti tasya nānubhavo 'paraḥ / tasyāpi tulyacodyatvāt tat svayaṃ tat prakāśate // This verse is found in PVin I also with some modifications. See PVin I k. 38 (35,8–9): *nānyo**

It is assumed that a lamp (*prakāśa*), carrying out the activity of illuminating (*prakāśamāna*) because of being in essence that [which shines] (*tādātmyāt*), illuminates itself. In the same manner, it is [assumed] that a cognition cognizes itself.

Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of this verse shall be discussed later. Let us consider here two brief comments, by Devendrabuddhi (ca. 7<sup>th</sup> c.) and Manorathanandin (ca. 11<sup>th</sup> c.).

Devendrabuddhi, the earliest of the commentators on Dharmakīrti's works, says the following:

PVP (D221b1–3; P259b6–8): *sgron ma yang bdag nyid gsal bar byed pa la sgron ma gzhan la bltos pa* (P; *ltos pa* D) *med cing bdag la don dam par gsal bar byed pa ma yin no* // 'on *kyang gsal bar byed pa'i bdag nyid du skyes par gyur pa na bdag nyid gsal bar byed pa zhes brjod do* // (P; *brjod de* D) *de bzhin du mngon sum gyis* (P; *gyi* D) *myong bar rang bzhin gyis gsal bar byed pa yin pa'i phyir / blo bdag nyid gsal bar byed pa yin no* //

When a lamp illuminates itself, it does not depend on another lamp. And although it is in reality not the case that [the lamp] acts on itself, it is said that [the lamp] illuminates itself when it arises with the essence of shining. In the same manner, [it is said that] a cognition illuminates itself because the cognition, being a perception, is in essence what shines."

Manorathanandin comments as follows:

PVV 219,5–7: *yathā prakāśas tādātmyāt prakāśātmakatvāt paranirapekṣaḥ prakāśamānaḥ svarūpasya prakāśako 'bhimataḥ tathā dhīḥ paranirapekṣā prakāśātmanotpannā prakāśamānā 'tmavedinīti upacārād ucyate* /

For example, a lamp is considered as the illuminator of itself when it shines independently of others because of being in essence what shines (*tādātmyāt=prakāśātmakatvāt*). Similarly, it is metaphorically said that a cognition cognizes itself (*ātmavedin*), when, arising with the essence of shining independently of others, it shines.

Several points are to be noted. To begin with, according to these commentators one can explain the situation expressed by 'A lamp illuminates itself' in two ways: (1) The lamp has the action of illuminating itself; (2)

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'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo 'paraḥ / grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayam saiva

it has the essence of shining or that of illuminating itself. They argue that it is reasonable to accept the latter analysis of the situation.<sup>3</sup> This point is especially important in understanding Prajñākaragupta's arguments about the theory of *svasaṃvedana*. In addition, as Manorathanandin clearly points out, the expression 'A cognition cognizes itself' is a metaphorical one (*upacāra*). This, an important point to stress, suggests that under the assumption that a cognition is self-luminous, 'cognizing something' should not be taken in a literal sense.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, according to the commentators, the illumination of a lamp is carried out 'independently of others' (*paranirapekṣā*). This point is closely related to the first one.

In short, the points made by them are as follows:

**Expression A:** 'A lamp illuminates the lamp itself'

means that a lamp arises as what consists in shining without depending on others.

**Expression B:** 'A cognition cognizes the cognition itself'

means that a cognition arises as what consists in shining without depending on others.

## 2. Prajñākaragupta's view

As said above, Prajñākaragupta also had to meet the objection that as the blade of a sword cannot cut itself, a cognition cannot cognize itself. In order to rebut such an objection, he analyzes the situation in which one sees a pot illuminated by a lamp through the visual organ. Now let us consider his arguments.<sup>5</sup>

First of all, Prajñākaragupta says the following:

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*prakāśate //*

<sup>3</sup> Mokṣākaragupta (ca. 11<sup>th</sup>–13<sup>th</sup> c.) is of the same opinion on this point. TBh 16,12–14: *yathā pradīpa ātmānaṃ prakāśayati tathā jñānaṃ api jadapadārthavilakṣaṇaṃ svahetor eva prakāśasvabhāvaṃ upajāyamānaṃ svasaṃvedanaṃ vyavasthāpyate //* See Kajiyama 1966: 48.

<sup>4</sup> It is to be noted that Helārāja (ca. 10<sup>th</sup> c.), a grammarian and an important commentator of the *Vākyapadīya*, also states the following: Prakāśa on VP 3.1.109: *upalambhātmakatvāt svayaṃ prakāśata iti svasaṃvedanaṃ jñānaṃ ucyate / na tv ātmānaṃ artham iva prakāśayatīti na svātmāny asya kaścid vyāpārah //*

<sup>5</sup> The arguments are criticized by Bhāsarvajña (ca. 10<sup>th</sup> c.). See NBhū 137–139. (PVA<sub>S</sub>



PVA<sub>K</sub> 166,21–167,1 (PVA<sub>S</sub> 353,20–22)<sup>6</sup>: *yadi ghaṭaḥ pradīpena bāhyātmanā prakāśyate, pradīpo 'pi tathābhūtenāpareṇeti na paryanuyogaḥ / na ca ghaṭo 'pi pradīpena prakāśyate, api tu tathābhūtasyaiva tata utpattiḥ /*

One should not aggressively ask: If [you say that] the pot is illuminated by the lamp which is in essence external to it, [why not say that] the lamp is also [illuminated] by another [lamp] which is external to it in a like manner?<sup>7</sup> For (ca) even the pot is not illuminated by the lamp; rather, it is the case that the very [pot] that is of such a nature arises from that [i.e., the lamp]<sup>8</sup> (*tathābhūtasyaiva tata utpattiḥ*).

The point to note here is that Prajñākaragupta denies that the pot is illuminated by the lamp which is external to or distinct from the former, arguing that the very pot that is of such a nature arises from the lamp. In their commentaries Jayanta and Yamāri do not explain what is meant by the phrase *tathābhūta*, 'of such a nature,' in the statement *tathābhūtasyaiva tata utpattiḥ*, which is a question to be considered later. Suffice it to say here that by saying *tata utpattiḥ*, '[The pot] arises from that [lamp],' Prajñākaragupta intends to imply that there obtains a kind of causal relation between the pot which is considered to be 'of such a nature' and the lamp.

Let us next take up Prajñākaragupta's argument against the view that the lamp is illuminated by the visual organ. He says:

PVA<sub>K</sub> 167,2–4 (PVA<sub>S</sub> 353,22–24): *atha pradīpo 'py apareṇa cakṣurādinā prakāśyate / na / cakṣurādeḥ sakalaghaṭādisādhāraṇatvāt / yathā cakṣuṣi saty api pradīpam apekṣate prakāśakam ghaṭas tathā pradīpo 'pi syāt /*

353,21–22=NBhū 138,9–10; PVA<sub>S</sub> 353,27–32=NBhū 138,15–139,5). For his criticism, see Matilal 1986: 156, Yamakami 1999.

<sup>6</sup> The Sanskrit text of the PVA used in this paper is based on the author's critical edition (Kobayashi 2023: 165–168); see the same paper for detailed notes, including critical apparatus.

<sup>7</sup> For example, Kumārila (ca. 7<sup>th</sup> c.) raises the following objection. ŚV Śūnyavāda 184–185 (also cited in TS 2012–2013): *vyāpṛtaṃ cārthasaṃvittau jñānaṃ nātmānam ṛcchati / tena prakāśakatve 'pi bodhāyānyat pratikṣyate // idṛśaṃ vā prakāśatvaṃ tasyārthānubhavātmaṃ / na cātmānubhavo 'sty asyety ātmano na prakāśakam //*

<sup>8</sup> Y (D256a7; P344a7–8): *de las ni sgron ma las so (P; sgron ma'o D) //*

[Objection] The lamp is also illuminated by another thing such as the visual organ.<sup>9</sup>

[Answer] This is not correct, for such a thing as the visual organ is common to all things such as a pot[, so that it cannot be the decisive factor for the accomplishment of the illumination of the lamp]. It must be assumed that just as the pot requires the lamp as its illuminator even if the visual organ is present, so also does the lamp [require the lamp as its illuminator even if the visual organ is present].

According to Prajñākaragupta the illuminator of the lamp is different from the visual organ. Even if the visual organ is present, the lamp cannot be illuminated without the lamp as its illuminator, just as even if the visual organ is present, the pot cannot be illuminated without the lamp as its illuminator. It goes without saying that, for Prajñākaragupta, the illuminator of the lamp is the lamp itself, that is, the lamp which is required to illuminate the lamp in question is the very same lamp.

However, the question arises: Even if the lamp is present, how can we see the pot without the visual organ? Therefore Prajñākaragupta considers the following two expressions: ‘The pot is revealed by the lamp’ and ‘The pot is revealed by the visual organ.’ He says:

PVA<sub>K</sub> 167,5–9 (PVA<sub>S</sub> 353,24–27): *atha ghaṭa utpadyata eva tathā, prakāśanam tu tasya cakṣurādibhiḥ / evaṃ tarhi /*

*aprakāśe ’pi bāhye ’rthe yathā dīpāt prakāśanam /  
vyapadeśasya viśayaś cakṣurāder apīśyatām //629//*

*yathā tatas tathābhūtarūpotpattāu api pradīpāt pradīpābhivyakto ghaṭa iti  
vyapadeśaḥ / tathā cakṣurādīkāḍ api tathotpattyaiva vyapadeśaḥ /*

[Objection] It is certain that the pot arises [from the lamp] in that manner. But it is by things such as the visual organ that the [pot] is illuminated.

[Answer] If so, then:

The following has to be admitted: Even if an external object is devoid of shining, its illumination by the lamp becomes

<sup>9</sup> Cf. ŚV Śūnyavāda 66ab: *grāhyatvaṃ tu yadā teṣāṃ tadākṣaṃ grāhakaṃ matam /*; 186–187ab (also cited in TS 2014–2015ab): *sati prakāśakatve ca vyavasthā dṛśyate yathā / rūpāḍau cakṣurādīnāṃ tathātrāpi bhaviṣyati // prakāśakatvaṃ bāhye ’rthe śaktyabhāvāt tu*

the object of verbal expression; similarly, the illumination of the pot by such a thing as the visual organ also becomes the object of verbal expression. (629)

For example, even if, from the [lamp], the [pot] arises as something which is of such a nature (*tathābhūtarūpotpatti*), one has the verbal expression ‘The pot is revealed by the lamp’ on the basis of the lamp. In the same manner, precisely on the grounds that the pot, as something which is of such a nature, arises from such a thing as the visual organ, one also has the verbal expression ‘The pot is revealed by such a thing as the visual organ.’

We have to note that Prajñākaragupta says that in the situation expressed by ‘The pot is revealed by the lamp’ the pot arises, as something which is of such a nature, from the lamp; and that in the situation expressed by ‘The pot is revealed by the visual organ’ the pot arises, as something which is of such a nature, from the visual organ. In addition, we have also to note that Prajñākaragupta here uses the term *abhivṛkta* ‘be revealed,’ from which it is clear that he speaks of the cause for seeing the pot.

What is meant by the phrase *tathābhūtarūpotpatti* / *tathotpattyā* ‘. . . arises, as something which is of such a nature’? According to Yamāri, the phrase *tathābhūtarūpotpatti* here means ‘arising as something which is of the essential nature of shining’ (*gsal ba’i rang bzhin du skye ba, \*prakāśarūpotpatti*).<sup>10</sup> In this connection we may be reminded of the comments on PV III 329 by Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin: the former has stated that the lamp is said to illuminate itself when it arises with the essence of shining; the latter has stated that a cognition is said to cognize itself when it arises with the essence of shining (*prakāśātmanotpannā*). It is likely that Prajñākaragupta considers that the pot arises as something which has the essence of shining, just as a lamp. Thus, it is safe to say that the pot being seen implies its arising as something of the essential nature of shining. Accordingly, the following both hold:

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*nātmani /*

<sup>10</sup> Y (D256b1-2; P344b1-2): *mi gsal ba’i phyi rol yang mig dang sgron ma la sogs pa las gsal ba’i rang bzhin du skye ba’i phyir sgron mas gsal bar byed do // zhes brjod pa ji lta ba bzhin du / mig las kyang shes pa gsal pa’i rang bzhin nyid skye pa yin no zhes ‘dod par bya’i / (D; bya’o // P) don dam par ni gzhan gyis gsal ba ‘ga’ yang yod pa ma yin no zhes*

**Expression C:** ‘A pot is illuminated by a lamp’

means that a pot arises as what consists in shining, from a lamp;

**Expression D:** ‘A pot is illuminated/cognized by the visual organ’

means that a pot arises as what consists in shining, from the visual organ.

A question is posed. What illuminates the pot is both the lamp and the visual organ, while what illuminates the lamp is the visual organ only. What accounts for this difference?<sup>11</sup> To this question Prajñākaragupta gives the following answer:

PVA<sub>K</sub> 167,13–14 (PVA<sub>S</sub> 353,30–31): *atyantam aśaktasya dvayam aparasyaikam anyasya naikam apīti vastusvabhāva eṣa iti kaivātra kṣatīḥ /*

One which is absolutely incapable of illuminating has two illuminators for it; another has one; the other has none. What accounts for this difference is the essence of things (*vastusvabhāva*). Therefore, there is no harm in assuming this.

We have to note that Prajñākaragupta introduces here the concept of power (*śakti*) and that of the essence of things (*vastusvabhāva*). According to him, things are classified into three: some are absolutely incapable of illuminating; some are capable of illuminating others but incapable of illuminating or cognizing themselves; others are capable of illuminating themselves. Yamāri says that a pot and a lamp come under the first and second groups, respectively, and that a cognition comes under the third group.<sup>12</sup> The point made by Prajñākaragupta here is clear: How things really are is determined by the essence of the things; a cognition has an innate power of illuminating itself.

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*dgongs pa'o //*

<sup>11</sup> PVA<sub>K</sub> 167,10 (PVA<sub>S</sub> 353,27): *atha dvayam api prakāśakam ghaṭādeḥ, pradīpādes tv ekam eva /* Cf. NBhū 138,15: *atha ghaṭasya dvayam prakāśakam pradīpāś cakṣuś ca, pradīpasya tu cakṣur eveti /*

<sup>12</sup> Y (D256b3; P344b3–4): (P; ins. *gal te D*) ‘*ga’ zhig la zhes bya ba sgron ma la ni gsal byed gcig yin la / gzhan dag la zhes bya ba bum pa la ni gnyis yin la / gzhan pa dag la ni zhes bya ba* (; *shes bya ba P, shes par bya ba D*) *shes pa la ni gcig* (corr. *gcig*; n.e. *gcig D, P*) *kyang med na’o* (P; *yang na’o D*) // Jayanta also says that a cognition comes under the third group. However, he does not refer to the first and second groups.

Still a question remains to be answered. Granted that a cognition has the essential nature of illuminating itself, is it not a contradiction to say that a cognition illuminates itself? In order to answer this question, Prajñākara-gupta goes on to say:

PVA<sub>K</sub> 167,15–168,5 (PVA<sub>S</sub> 353,31–354,3): *atha svātmani kriyāvirodha ity ucyate /*

*yadā svarūpan tat tasya tadā kaiva virodhitā /  
svarūpeṇa virodhe hi sarva eva pralīyate //631//<sup>13</sup>*

*na hi svenaiva rūpeṇa kasyacid virodhaḥ / tathā cet, na kiṃcid bhavet svena rūpeṇeti sakalam astamīgataṃ bhavet / chedas tu punar viśiṣṭotpādanam, na ca tenaiva tasyotpādanam / ayam evārthaḥ svātmani kriyāvirodha iti / svapra-kāśarūpaṃ tu tasya svarūpam, na tenaiva virudhyate /*

[Objection] It is said that the action on itself is contradictory.

[Answer] [To this objection we answer as follows:]

When the [cognition] has for its essential nature that [i.e., being self-luminous], then what contradiction could one assume [between the cognition and its being self-luminous]? For, if a contradiction [could be assumed between a thing] and its essential nature, everything in this world would collapse. (631)

Indeed, nothing can be contradicted by its own essential nature. Otherwise, it would follow that nothing can exist with its own essential nature and hence everything in this world would collapse.

But, [turning to the question of whether a thing can act on itself,] the act of cutting [performed by a blade] consists in producing (*utpādana*) a certain effect in something other than [the blade] and not in the [blade] producing the effect in itself.<sup>14</sup> This is precisely what is meant by the statement *svātmani kriyāvirodhaḥ*. But the essence of the cognition lies

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J (D124b3; P141b6): *gzhan dag ni shes pa'i'o //*

<sup>13</sup> This verse is quoted by Vādirāja Sūri (ca. 11<sup>th</sup> c.). See NVinV I 216,18–19.

<sup>14</sup> The similar argument is set forth by Śāntarakṣita (ca. 8<sup>th</sup> c.). TS 2006–2007 (Saccone 2018: 176,13–15; 20–22): *syān matir dantidāhyāder yathāsiḥvalanādayaḥ / atādrūpye 'pi kurvanti chedadāhādy adas tathā // tad idaṃ viśamaṃ yasmāt te tathotpattihetavaḥ / santas tathāvidhāḥ siddhā na jñānaṃ janakaṃ tathā //* See also Saccone 2018: 260–261; 108, n.259.

in being self-luminous, and this essence cannot be contradictory to that [i.e., the cognition].

There are two points to be noted: One is that Prajñākaragupta considers an action (*kriyā*) to consist in producing (*utpādana*) a certain effect; the other is that he points out that there is no contradiction between a thing and its own essential nature.

Consider the situation expressed by 'The blade of a sword cuts off Devadatta's head.' Obviously, the act of cutting brings about separation in what is different from the agent of the act. It is a contradiction to say that the separation is brought about in the agent. If cognition were a specific type of action, therefore, the same difficulty would come up. But on the assumption that a cognition arises with the essential nature of cognizing itself since there is no contradiction between the cognition and such an essential nature of it, the difficulty will be cleared away. We have to recall in this connection that according to Manorathanandin the expression 'cognizing something' is simply a metaphorical one and that Prajñākaragupta has stated that whatever is cognized arises with the essential nature of shining.

All these things make clear the following: On the *svasaṃvedana* theory a cognitive event, when it is seen from the viewpoint of its essential nature, cannot be taken to involve any act, so that the problem of *svātmani kriyāvirodhaḥ* does not develop.

### 3. Conclusion

When in a dark room, one cannot see anything without light. But if somebody turns on the light, then he can see the pot in the room. It can be said that our mind is comparable to the room where the light is always on.

Dharmakīrti, as Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin understand him, holds that a cognition arises as what consists in shining without depending on others, as a lamp. Prajñākaragupta goes a step further. He looks at the self-luminous nature of a cognition from a new angle, considering how it is to be explained from the point of view of what is illuminated. According to him, it cannot be the case that a pot is illuminated by a lamp but that a pot is revealed by a lamp. And when it is said that a pot is revealed by a lamp, the pot arises with the essence of shining by virtue of the lamp. In his view, the same is true of a cognition of blue. When it is said that blue is cognized

by a cognition, the blue arises with the essence of shining by virtue of the cognition, which is possible only through the non-distinction between the blue and the cognition.

As shown, in the *svasaṃvedana* theory, 'cognizing *x*' should not be regarded as a kind of act; rather, it is to be considered to refer to a cognitive event in which the *x* arises with the essence of shining. In other words, a cognition has the essence of shining. On this assumption, the difficulty of *svātmani kriyāvirodhaḥ* does not come up. How can being self-luminous avoid the problem of *svātmani kriyāvirodhaḥ*? To this question, the answer given by Buddhist logicians is: Seeing is arising.

## Abbreviations

- J *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraṭīkā* (Jayanta). D4222, P5720.
- NBhū *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (Bhāsarvajña). Ed. Yogindrānanda, *Śrīmad-ācārya-Bhāsarvajña-praṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam Nyāyabhūṣaṇam*. Vārāṇasī 1968.
- NVinV *Nyāyaviniścayaavivarāṇa* (Vādirāja Sūri). Ed. M. K. Jain, *Nyāya Viniścaya Vivarāṇa of Śrī Vādirāja Sūri, the Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalankadeva's Nyāya Viniścaya*. 2 vols. Banaras 1944/1954.
- Prakāśa *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* (Helārāja). Ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer, *Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari with the Commentary of Helārāja*. Kāṇḍa III. Part 1. Poona 1963.
- PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti). In: Ed. Y. Miyasaka, "Pramāṇavārttikakārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan)." *Acta Indologica* 2 (1971/1972): 1–206.
- PVA/PVA<sub>S</sub> *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (Prajñākaragupta). Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta. (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam)*. Patna 1953. Reprint, 2010.
- PVA<sub>K</sub> See Kobayashi 2023: 165–168.
- PVin I *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (Dharmakīrti), Chapter 1 (*pratyakṣa*). Ed. E. Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapters 1 and 2 Critically edited*. Beijing/-Vienna 2007.
- PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi). Tibetan translation. D4217, P5717 (b).
- PVV *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (Manorathanandin). Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, "Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin." *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society* 24/26 (1938/1940): 349–384.
- ŚV *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila). Ed. S. D. Śāstrī, *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Varanasi 1978.

- TBh *Tarkabhāṣā* (Mokṣākaragupta). In: Ed. H. R. R. Iyengar, *Tarkabhāṣā and Vāda-sthāna of Mokṣākaragupta and Jitāripāda*. Mysore 1952.
- TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* (Śāntarakṣita). Ed. S. D. Shastri, *Ācāryaśrīśāntarakṣitaviracitaḥ Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ: Śrī Kamalaśīlākṛtapañjikopetaḥ*. Vārāṇasī 1968.
- Y *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā* (Yamāri). Tibetan translation. D4226, P5723.

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## On a Series of Five Ablatives in *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter 5\*

H O R S T L A S I C

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The *apoha* theory, which gives an account of how words refer to what they refer to and what it is that they refer to, belongs to the core of the so-called Buddhist epistemological tradition. This theory was introduced into the intellectual discourse by Dignāga, a Buddhist philosopher who lived in the sixth or maybe fifth<sup>1</sup> century. The earliest treatment of this topic is found in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, whose fifth chapter consists in a discussion of *apoha*. This work is lost in its original language, Sanskrit, and transmitted only in two Tibetan translations. This fact, as well as the fact that the topic of *apoha* is intrinsically difficult and the circumstance that the opposing theories dealt with by Dignāga are not well known, explains why scholars have a hard time understanding the *apoha* chapter. That Dharmakīrti and other members of the epistemological tradition reworked the *apoha* theory heavily also contributes to the difficulties.

This situation was drastically improved by the publication of Pind's book *Dignāga's Philosophy of Language* (2015), which contains, in addition to other useful things, an English translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s fifth chapter and a partial restoration of its Sanskrit text. Apart from the Tibetan translations and quotations in generally available Sanskrit works, Pind was also able to use the Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary as a basis for his restoration. The importance of Pind's book for the study of Dignāga's *apoha* theory cannot be overestimated. One thing, however, I wish Pind had provided would have been a detailed analysis of the structure of Dignāga's *apoha* chapter and a presentation of this structure by means of a chart or a flow diagram, or similar. Such a presentation would help researchers to navigate through the text, understand how the arguments are related to each other,

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<sup>1</sup> For a recent discussion of Dignāga's dates, cf. Deleanu 2019.

which hierarchical position a certain statement has, and so on. Even if such a presentation were not correct in every detail, it would at least show Pind's understanding. What we need is a map that helps us find the way in the difficult terrain of the *apoha* chapter.

On occasion, Pind does give us some information about the structure. When discussing a prose fragment from another work by Dignāga, he says:

"It seems, however, to belong in the same context as PSV V 11d that ends the first section of PSV V." (Pind 2015: intro xiii)

Three pages later, he gives another piece of information:

"... Dignāga does not attempt to present or justify in any detail his own view on the subject of *apoha* in the first part of the chapter, which is primarily devoted to criticizing doctrines that Dignāga rejects as untenable. In fact, crucial statements about *anyāpoha* are only presented at PSV V 34–50, the final third of PSV V." (Pind 2015: intro xvi)

And immediately after this, Pind adds:

"The fifth chapter starts by presenting the thesis that verbal knowledge does not differ from inference, ... Dignāga continues immediately thereafter by criticizing in some detail views he rejects as untenable." (Pind 2015: intro xvi)

I will attempt here to present the information about the structure of the *apoha*-chapter that one can gain from these and some further statements in Pind's introduction. In the table below, pertinent information by Pind about the location of the respective text unit is added in square brackets.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. "first section" (Pind 2015, Introduction xiii) ["PSV V 1–11 (+12–13)" (Pind 2015, Introduction xvii)]             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1.1. presentation of "the thesis that verbal knowledge does not differ from inference" ["The fifth chapter starts by" (Pind 2015, Introduction xvi)]</li> <li>1.2. analysis and rejection of "four theories of denotation" (Pind 2015, Introduction xvii) / detailed critique of "views he rejects as untenable" (Pind 2015, Introduction xvi) ["immediately thereafter" (Pind 2015, Introduction xvi)]</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. (second section)</li> </ol> |
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- 2.(1.) “Dignāga addresses the semantics of compounds in the light of the general *apoha* thesis” (Pind 2015, Introduction xvi) [“immediately after the first central section PSV V 1–13” (Pind 2015, Introduction xvi–xvii)]
- ? explanation “that exclusion of other referents is caused by conflict or opposition (*virodha*) between properties occurring in a tree of categories and the terms that denote them” (Pind 2015, Introduction xvii–xviii) [“PSV V 25–30” (Pind 2015, Introduction xvii)]
- ? “crucial statements about *anyāpoha*” (Pind 2015, Introduction xvi) [“PSV V 34–50” (Pind 2015, Introduction xvi)]

Thus we have a first section (1) that is divided into two parts. The first part (1.1.) contains Dignāga’s opening thesis; the second part (1.2.) consists in the rejection of four theories of denotation. As a next step, one would assume that the first section is followed by a second section. However, Pind is conspicuously silent on this point. He talks about a “first section” (Pind 2015, Introduction xiii) and a “first central section” (Pind 2015, Introduction xvii). Moreover, he declares that the “first part of PSV V 1–11 (+12–13)<sup>2</sup> ... is a well-defined and independent section of the chapter” (Pind 2015, Introduction xvii). However, Pind does not mention a second or third section, nor does he mention anywhere how many sections he considers the *apoha* chapter to consist of in total. And actually, Pind calls the beginning part of the *apoha* chapter “a well-defined and independent section” in contrast to—it seems—the remaining part of the chapter. He writes:

“In general the order of presentation of the philosophical issues discussed in the chapter does not appear to be well organized as many of the subjects under discussion appear to be addressed haphazardly.”  
(Pind 2015, Introduction xvi)

Should we understand that at the beginning of the *apoha* chapter, there is one coherent section, and that the remainder of the chapter consists of a conglomeration of discussions that are only vaguely or maybe not at all related to each other?

It would be interesting to see whether Jinendrabuddhi, the commentator on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, would agree with this analysis, or whether his own analysis led him to find more order and cohesion in the *apoha* chapter than

<sup>2</sup> I understand this as meaning that the first part consists in PSV V 1–11 (+12–13).

Pind suggests. If Jinendrabuddhi did discover more order and cohesion, there would still remain the question whether all or, if not all, which parts of Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation are acceptable for the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* from a historical perspective, or which are representative of later developments. While it is very likely that we will encounter interpretations of both kinds, nonetheless, the results of such investigations would prove helpful for our understanding both of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* itself and its position in the development of Indian philosophy.

I would now like to present one example of Jinendrabuddhi explaining the relationship between certain arguments, and how his explanation can help us in our investigation of the structure of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s *apoha* chapter. The discussion we are dealing with is the one referred to in the table above as point 1.2.: the "analysis and rejection of four theories of denotation."

The skeleton of Dignāga's "analysis and rejection" consists of five elliptical sentences. Each is construed following an identical pattern. By adding the omitted parts, each sentence can be described as consisting of five components.

	NEGATION	SUBJECT	PREDICATE	OBJECT	JUSTIFICATION
1	<i>na</i>	<i>jātiśabdaḥ</i>	<i>vācakaḥ</i>	<i>bhedānām</i>	<i>ānantyāt</i> (5.2a–b <sub>1</sub> )
2	<i>na</i>	<i>jātiśabdaḥ</i>	<i>vācakaḥ</i>	<i>bhedānām</i>	<i>vyabhicārataḥ</i> (2b <sub>2</sub> )
3	<i>na</i>	<i>jātiśabdaḥ</i>	<i>vācakaḥ</i>	<i>yogajātyoḥ</i>	<i>bhedārthair aprthak- śruteḥ</i> (2cd)
4	<i>na</i>	<i>jātiśabdaḥ</i>	<i>vācakaḥ</i>	<i>tadvataḥ</i>	<i>asvatāntratvāt</i> (4a)
5	<i>na</i>	<i>jātiśabdaḥ</i>	<i>vācakaḥ</i>	<i>tadvataḥ</i>	<i>upacārāt</i> (4b <sub>1</sub> )

Three of these components remain unchanged in all five sentences: One is the negation "*na*"; the second is the subject with the content "a general term" (*jātiśabdaḥ*); the third is the predicate "denotes" (*vācakaḥ*). The content of the other two components changes. One is the direct object of the predicate and states what the respective theory considers denoted by a general term. The last component consists in a noun in the ablative case.

The first two sentences refer to the same theory of denotation, the theory asserting that general terms denote all their related particulars. Dignāga gives two reasons why this assertion is untenable. The third sentence refers to two theories of denotation, one asserting that general terms denote mere

general properties, the other asserting that general terms denote the mere connection with a general property, with Dignāga stating a single reason to refute both. The fourth sentence refers to the theory that general terms denote the possessor of the respective general property, and Dignāga states one reason why this theory is not tenable.

The structure of this discussion can be presented as follows:

- 1.2. analysis and rejection of four theories of denotation
  - 1.2.1. rejection of the *bheda* position by the reasons “*ānantyāt*” and “*vyabhi-cārataḥ*”
  - 1.2.2. rejection of the *jātimātra* position and the *jātiyogamātra* position by the reason “*bhedārthair aprthakśruteḥ*”
  - 1.2.3. rejection of the *tadvat* position by the reason “*asvatantratvāt*”

Thus the discussion of the four theories of denotation splits into three branches. The first deals with the *bheda* position, the second with the *jātimātra* and *jātiyogamātra* positions, and the third with the *tadvat* position.

I should mention here that it is possible, and for the final analysis desirable, to zoom in further and introduce sub- and sub-sub-branches, and so on. However, we will leave this task for a later point and move on to discuss the last of the five sentences listed above.

Whereas all five sentences have a same surface appearance in terms of parts of speech and grammatical endings, syntactically the fifth sentence is construed differently from the others. In sentences one to four, the words in the ablative case—*ānantyāt* and so on—are used to give the reason why the various assertions are not tenable. In contrast to this, the task of the ablative in the fifth sentence is to state the reason by which the proponet of the *tadvat* position may try to justify his assertion. One can paraphrase the first sentence in the following way: “The assertion that general terms denote their related particulars is not tenable. The reason for this is that the particulars are infinite.” Sentences two, three, and four can be paraphrased using the same pattern. Sentence five, however, must be paraphrased as follows: “The assertion that general terms are able to denote the possessors of the respective general properties on account of metaphorical usage is not tenable.” The reason why this assertion is not tenable is not mentioned in the fifth sentence, but it is provided by Dignāga later in his prose commentary.

Jinendrabuddhi connects his discussion on PS(V) 5.4a and that on 5.4b (corresponding to our sentences four and five) with the following:

*ihedam uktam—jātiśabdena tadvato 'bhidhānam iti. tadvati ca śabdasya matublopād abhedopacārād vā vṛttiḥ. tatra matuppakṣe śuklādivad abhidhānam sambhavatīti sati vācyatve doṣa uktaḥ. abhedopacāre tu tasyaiva samāropitasya sattārūpasyābhidhānād vācyatvam eva tadvato na sambhavatīti ...* (PST 196b7–197a2)

At this [point in the discussion,] the [following] has been stated [to be the position of the opponent], namely, that a general term (*jātiśabdena*) denotes the possessor of the [related general property] (*tadvato 'bhidhānam*). And a word (*śabdasya*) is used (*vṛttiḥ*) with respect to the possessor of that [general property] (*tadvati*) on account of the elision of a possessiv suffix (*matublopāt*) or on account of the ascription of non-difference (*abhedopacārāt*).

As for these [two positions] (*tatra*), on the position [involving an elided] possessive suffix (*matuppakṣe*), it is possible (*sambhavati*) that [a general term] denotes (*abhidhānam*) [the possessor of the respective general property], as in the case of 'white' and so on[, which illustrates that a word for a color can denote the possessor of this color]. Given that in this case, [the possessor of the general property] is potentially expressible (*sati vācyatve*), [Dignāga] presented (*uktaḥ*) [in PS 5.4a] the fault (*doṣaḥ*) [of this approach].

But if [one holds the position of] the ascription of non-difference, it is not even possible that the possessor of the [general property 'existent'] (*tadvataḥ*) can be expressed (*vācyatvam eva ... na sambhavati*) [by the general term 'existent' in a strict sense], because [the general term 'existent'] denotes (*abhidhānāt*) nothing but the nature of existence that is superimposed (*tasyaiva samāropitasya sattārūpasya*).

Here Jinendrabuddhi identifies as the background of Dignāga's discussion two explanations of how a word denoting a property can also denote the possessor of that property. As for the applicability of these two explanations, he points out—as I understand it—that in the current context, the first explanation is valid, at least up to a point, whereas the second is wrong from the start.

It is interesting to note that the *matublopa* and *abhedopacāra* explanations occur as a pair<sup>3</sup> also in the *Kāśikāvivaraṇapañcikā*, also known as *Nyāsa*, whose author is most likely the same as that of the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. Here are some examples.

*khaṇḍakāṇaśabdāv atra ... guṇe vartitvā paścān matublopād abhedopacārād vā tadvati dravye vartet[e]* (KVP II 45,32–46,26)

After the words *khaṇḍa* and *kāṇa* are used for the quality ..., they are afterwards used for the substance that has the [respective quality] by *matublopa* or *abhedopacāra*.

*tac śyāmatvam uktvā śyāmaśabdo devadattāyām abhedopacārān matublopād vā vartat[e]* (KVP II 72,31–72,20)

After denoting this blackness [that resembles the blackness of a knife], the word *śyāma* is used for Devadattā by *abhedopacāra* or *matublopa*.

*guṇaśabdās tu kecit matublopād abhedopacārād vā tadvati dravye vartamānā guṇam ādhārānugataṃ gamayanti, yathā - śuklaḥ paṭaḥ, lohitaḥ kambala iti* (KVP II 108,30–109,26)

Some words for qualities make a quality known as being located in a substrate by being used for a substance that has this [quality] by *matublopa* or *abhedopacāra*, as [in the expressions] ‘white cloth’ [and] ‘red blanket.’

*sa punar yaḥ prāḡ guṇam abhidhāya paścān matublopād abhedopacārād vā tadvad dravyam abhidhatte sa veditavyaḥ* (KVP III 338,23–24)

[Here] again, such a [word] that after first denoting a quality later denotes, by *matublopa* or *abhedopacāra*, a substance that has this [quality] is to be understood.

These passages illustrate that Jinendrabuddhi, at least when writing the *Kāśikāvivaraṇapañcikā*, if indeed he was the author, in principle accepts *matublopa* and *abhedopacāra* as handy tools for explaining how a word for a quality denotes the possessor of this quality, and makes frequent use of them, without necessarily having to decide exclusively for one of them in each case.

<sup>3</sup> On the respective scopes of application of *matublopa* and *abhedopacāra* in such context, see PST I 123,16–124,2, where Jinendrabuddhi comments on *tena matublopād abhedopacārād vā gr̥hyate* from PS I 10,18.

Including PS 5.4b in our schema, we can now modify point 1.2.3. and expand it as follows:

- 1.2.3. discussion of the *tadvat* position
- 1.2.3.1. rejection of the *tadvat* position by the reason “*asvatantratvāt*”
- 1.2.3.2. rejection that the *tadvat* position can be accounted for by *upacāra*

While Jinedrabuddhi introduces the term *abhedopacāra*, Dignāga talks less specifically about “metaphorical usage” (*upacāra*) at this point. Why metaphorical usage cannot be used to defend the *tadvat* position is discussed by Dignāga in verses 4b–7ab, plus the *vṛtti*. Dignāga brings forth two main arguments. The first is to the effect that words, when used metaphorically, by definition do not denote their actual referent. The second argument is that metaphorical usage depends on similarity and that there cannot be any similarity between general properties and the possessors of those respective general properties. Dignāga backs up this claim with two further arguments, which branch into further sub-arguments. Leaving aside the sub-arguments, this discussion can be presented thus:

- 1.2.3.2. rejection that the *tadvat* position can be accounted for by *upacāra*
- 1.2.3.2.1. because words, when used metaphorically, do not denote their actual referent
- 1.2.3.2.2. because similarity is impossible
- 1.2.3.2.2.1. because similarity cannot be accounted for by a transformation of notion
- 1.2.3.2.2.2. because similarity cannot be accounted for by influence of a quality

After discussing the *tadvat* position, Dignāga states that the same arguments he has brought forward against this position can also be held against the positions previously discussed, this meaning the *bheda*, *jātimātra* and *jātiyogamātra* positions. The arguments referred to by Dignāga are those concerning the *tadvat* position when accounted for by *upacāra*. Given the fact that Dignāga thus views the *bheda*, *jātimātra* and *jātiyogamātra* positions at this point under the aspect of the *upacāra* account, it seems helpful to highlight that his earlier discussion of these three positions, at the very beginning, concerned only the non-metaphorical use of general terms.



To fill this further information into our chart, it would be possible to simply add some remarks about the consideration of metaphorical and non-metaphorical use.

- 1.2. analysis and rejection of four theories of denotation
  - 1.2.1. **rejection of the *bheda* position by the reasons “*ānanyāt*” and “*vyabhi-cārataḥ*” under the assumption of non-metaphorical use**
  - 1.2.2. **rejection of the *jātimātra* position and of the *jātiyogamātra* position by the reason “*bhedārthair aprthakśruteḥ*” under the assumption of non-metaphorical use**
  - 1.2.3. **discussion of the *tadvat* position**
    - 1.2.3.1. rejection of the *tadvat* position by the reason “*asvatantratvāt*” under the assumption of non-metaphorical use
    - 1.2.3.2. rejection of the *tadvat* position under the assumption of metaphorical use
  - 1.2.4. explanation that the arguments presented in 1.2.3.2 can also be held against the first three theories of denotation under the assumption of metaphorical use

This presentation emphasizes the four theories by assigning them hierarchically prominent positions in the table. Alternatively, one could put more emphasis on the bifurcation created by the distinction between metaphorical and non-metaphorical use:

- 1.2. analysis and rejection of four theories of denotation
  - 1.2.1. **under the assumption of non-metaphorical use**
    - 1.2.1.1. rejection of the *bheda* position by the reasons “*ānanyāt*” and “*vyabhi-cārataḥ*”
    - 1.2.1.2. rejection of the *jātimātra* position and of the *jātiyogamātra* position by the reason “*bhedārthair aprthakśruteḥ*”
    - 1.2.1.3. rejection of the *tadvat* position by the reason “*asvatantratvāt*”
  - 1.2.2. **under the assumption of metaphorical use**
    - 1.2.2.1. rejection that the *tadvat* position can be accounted for by *upacāra*
      - 1.2.2.1.1. because words, when used metaphorically, do not denote their proper referent
      - 1.2.2.1.2. because similarity is impossible
        - 1.2.2.1.2.1. because similarity cannot be accounted for by a shift of notion
        - 1.2.2.1.2.2. because similarity cannot be accounted for by the influence of a quality
    - 1.2.2.2. rejection of the *bheda*, *jātimātra* and *jātiyogamātra* positions

When presented thus, the whole discussion of the four theories of denotation owes its main structure to the split caused by considering metaphorical and *non*-metaphorical use. I consider this presentation preferable to the first. This is because the bifurcation created by considering the metaphorical and *non*-metaphorical use is less obvious than the fact that there are four theories of denotation being dealt with. Highlighting this bifurcation as an important structural element, instead of hiding it by distributing the respective pieces of information as additions to several branches, may therefore be of greater help to the reader. A further advantage of this presentation is that it also reflects the split between the two syntactic constructions that we saw between sentences one to four on one hand and sentence five on the other. Under this presentation, the last branch (1.2.2.2.) is also structurally better connected, compared to its counterpart (1.2.4.) in the previous presentation.

In view of the outcome of this investigation of a short passage from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s *apoha* chapter, I consider it worthwhile to continue along these lines. A special place in my future research activities will therefore involve the question of how Jinendrabuddhi understands the structure of the *apoha* chapter, and how his structure-related explanations can contribute to our understanding of Dignāga's text.

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# Ravigupta's Analysis of Liberation in His Commentary on *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.190\*

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## 1. Introduction

As is well known, Dharmakīrti discusses the topic of the Buddha as a protector (*tāyin*) in the latter half of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV 2), where he examines each of the Four Nobles' Truths<sup>1</sup> in turn.<sup>2</sup> In this paper, we will focus on v. 190, which is located at the beginning of the section on the truth of cessation (*nirodhasatya*), together with the commentaries, Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (PVA) and Ravigupta's *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* (PVV(R)).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> I adopt the translation "Nobles' Truths" for "*āryasatya*" following Pecchia (2015: 6–7).

<sup>2</sup> As for the structure of PV 2, see Inami and Tillemans 1986.

<sup>3</sup> On Manorathanandin's commentary with the same title, see Pecchia (1995: 134–135). Pecchia (1995: 181–187) also provides a detailed description of PV 2.190 with much information about commentaries and relevant passages.

Ravigupta (ca. 780–840) is likely a direct pupil of Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810)<sup>4</sup> and normally follows Prajñākaragupta's interpretation. He often reuses the text of the PVA at length and summarizes its contents skillfully. Ravigupta follows this pattern in his commentary on PV 2.190 as well. Interestingly, however, in the middle of his commentary, he inserts a rather lengthy excursus on liberation (*mokṣa*). The cessation of suffering is essentially liberation itself, so it is quite appropriate that he discusses this issue here. We will analyze the contents of this excursus after briefly consulting PV 2.190 together with Prajñākaragupta's commentary.

Before we begin, let us outline the concept of an Arhat's final moment of mind (*caramacitta*) and its cognition by an omniscient being (*sarvajñajñāna*), which plays an important role in Ravigupta's discussion. According to Abhidharma traditions, a practitioner becomes an Arhat and attains liberation with remainder (*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) upon having destroyed all kinds of defilements. Finally, when his body ceases to exist, he attains liberation without remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*), or perfect liberation (*parinirvāṇa*), after which he will never be reborn again. At that time, his mental continuum (*cittasantāna*), i.e., the succession of moments of mind, also comes to an end. These traditions also recognize the Buddha's cognition of other minds (*paracittajñāna*), including an Arhat's final moment of mind.<sup>5</sup>

In the context in question, an Arhat's final moment of mind is taken up by the non-Buddhist opponent as an example of something that lacks causal efficacy. In Dharmakīrti's system, a real existing entity (*vastu*) is defined as having causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*),<sup>6</sup> but an opponent points out

<sup>4</sup> On the chronology of Prajñākaragupta and Ravigupta, see Ono (1996). According to Ono, the Ravigupta who was a commentator on the PV is the same as the Ravigupta whom Bhaṭṭa Jayanta refers to in his *Nyāyamañjarī*. Tani (2000: 438–476) also identifies him as the Ravi who appears at the end of Jñānaśrīmitra's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya*.

<sup>5</sup> For detailed information on relevant sources on an Arhat's final moment of mind and the cognition of others' minds in the Abhidharma literature such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh), see Steinkellner (1979: 90–91, fn. 324–329) and Schmithausen (1979). On this topic, see also AKBh 12,1–3 as pointed out by Inami (1986: 19, fn. 23). For a helpful overview of the understanding of liberation in the Abhidharma doctrine, see Kato (1982).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. PVin 2 79,3–4: *arthakriyāśaktīlakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ*.

the undesirable consequence that an Arhat's final moment of mind would not exist because it does not produce the subsequent mind in the next life<sup>7</sup> and thus does not have causal efficacy. The Buddhist responds by pointing out that the final moment of mind *does* have causal efficacy as the object of cognition of an omniscient being.

## 2. Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* on PV 2.190

We will first look at Dharmakīrti's PV 2.190 with Prajñākaragupta's commentary to provide the background for Ravigupta's excursus. Prajñākaragupta's commentary on this section is in line with the PV itself and does not contain significant original discussion.

PVA 136,20–137,6 (Ms62b5–63a4): *evaṃ tāvāt caturākāram āryasatyam vyākhyātam*<sup>8</sup> *samudayalakṣaṇam. idānīm tad duḥkham nirodhasaṃbhavīti nirodhasatyam caturākāram āha—*

*tad anātyantikam hetoḥ pratibandhādisaṃbhavāt /  
saṃsāritvād anirmokṣo neṣṭatvād aprasiddhitaḥ // PV 2.190 //*

*nirodhataḥ śāntataḥ praṇītato niḥsaraṇataś<sup>9</sup> ceti catvāra ākārāḥ. nirodha eva nāstīti vādinam prati nirodhata ity<sup>10</sup> ucyate. muktānām api rāgādisaṃbhava iti parair abhyupagamyate, tatpratīṣedhena śāntataḥ. ataḥ paro 'pi saṃbhavati mokṣa iti<sup>11</sup> pratikṣepeṇa praṇītata ity ākārāḥ. mukto 'pi punar amukto bhavati—*

<sup>7</sup> An Arhat's final moment of mind is also described in this way in PV 2.45–46. PV 2.45cd: *tad yad apy arhataś cittam asaṃdhānam kuto matam //* (see Franco 1997: 208; Inami 1998: 11). There, the following inference attributed to the Cārvāka is at issue in the context of the proof of rebirth: every cognition at death (i.e., every final cognition in life) does not link to another cognition (i.e., does not produce a first cognition in a subsequent life), because it is a cognition at death, just like the last cognition of an Arhat. PVV(M)<sub>S</sub> 26,12–13: *marāṇacittatvāc cittāntarāpratisaṃdhānam arhaccaramacittavat....* For more information, see Franco (1997: 115–118); Inami (1986: 7–8) and Inami (1998).

<sup>8</sup> -*satyam vyākhyātam* S; -*satya*<*m*>(*m*) *ākhyātam* | Ms.

<sup>9</sup> *niḥsaraṇa-* Ms; *niḥsaraṇa-* S.

<sup>10</sup> *nirodhata ity* Ms ('gog pa nyid do zhes T); *nirodhatā hy* S. Cf. Pecchia 1995: 134, fn. c.

<sup>11</sup> *mokṣa iti* Ms (*thar pa yod do zhes* T); *mokṣatāti* S.

*ti nirasyaitat niḥsaraṇata iti caturtha ākāraḥ. tatra*<sup>12</sup> *prathama ākāra ity*<sup>13</sup> *anātyantikam nātyantaṃ bhavati, nirudhyate 'pi.*

*na ca saṃsāritvād asaṃbhavo mokṣasya doṣaḥ, iṣṭatvāt. na hi saṃsāriṇaḥ*<sup>14</sup> *kasyacit mokṣo 'sti. yo hi baddhaḥ, na*<sup>15</sup> *tasya mokṣo 'sti, tat-svabhāvatvāt. muktasyāpi na*<sup>16</sup> *bandhaḥ, sadā tasya muktasvabhāvatvāt. kevalam*<sup>17</sup> *cittasantānasyāpariśuddhasya sataḥ sāmāgrīviśeṣataḥ paro bhāgo viśuddha utpadyate. tatra parasya*<sup>18</sup> *pariśuddhasya saṃsāritaivaśiddhā. na ca saṃsārī paramārthataḥ kaścid asti, kṣaṇānām asaṃsaraṇāt, santānasya ca paramārthato 'bhāvāt. tataḥ saṃsāritvād ity asiddho hetuḥ. na cāpi muktā vidyate, yasya mokṣaḥ.*

In this way, so far, the Nobles' Truth that has four aspects (*ākāra*) and has the character of an origin (*samudaya*) has been explained. Now, [Dharmakīrti] states the truth of cessation (*nirōdhasatya*) with four aspects, according to which the suffering [described above] can cease:

**The [suffering]<sup>19</sup> is non-eternal (*anātyantika*) because an impediment etc.<sup>20</sup> to [its] cause can occur. [An opponent says,] since [a living being]<sup>21</sup> is transmigrating (*saṃsāritvāt*), there is no liberation [for them] (*anirmokṣa*). [This is] not [a problem for us], because [the fact that there is no liberation for a living being who is transmigrating] is**

<sup>12</sup> *tatra* Ms (*de la T*); *tat* S.

<sup>13</sup> *ity* Ms; *-tāty* S.

<sup>14</sup> *saṃsāriṇaḥ* corr.; n.e. Ms, S, T. Cf. PVAN 182v4: *na hi saṃsāriṇaḥ ityādinā. ...*

<sup>15</sup> *na* corr.; *na hi* Ms, S.

<sup>16</sup> *<na>* Ms (*ma yin te T*); n.e. S. Cf. S 137, fn. 2.

<sup>17</sup> *kevalam* corr. ('on kyang... 'ba' zhig go T); *kevala-* S. Cf. PVAN 182v4: *kevalm ity-ādinā. ...*

<sup>18</sup> *tatra parasya* corr. (*de la phyi ma T*); *tatra pare(?)asya* Ms, *tadapāsyā* S.

<sup>19</sup> The word "*tad*" clearly means "suffering" from its context, and the commentaries support this. PVAN 182v2: *tad duḥkham. ...*; PVP D81b5, P93b7: *ji skad du bshad pa'i rgyu dang rang bzhin gyi sdug bsngal de dang / de ni. ...*; PVV(M)<sub>P</sub> 134,1: *tad etad yathoktakāraṇasvabhāvam duḥkham. ...*

<sup>20</sup> According to the commentaries, the word "*ādi*" refers to the incompleteness of assisting causes. PVAN 182v2: *ādiśabdena saḥakāriṇivaikalyam*; PVV(M)<sub>P</sub> 134,3: *ādiśabdād avidyādeḥ saḥakāriṇo vaikalyasambhavāt*. As for PVP and PVV(R), see fn. 26.

<sup>21</sup> I added "a living being" as the subject of the argument according to Pecchia (2015: 169). To be precise, however, the subject of transmigration (*saṃsārin*) is the



accepted [by us] (*iṣṭatvāt*) [and] because [the state of transmigrating (*saṃsāritva*)] is not established (*aprasiddhataḥ*). (PV 2.190)

These are the four aspects [of the truth of cessation]: “as cessation (*nirodhataḥ*),” “as being calmed (*śāntataḥ*),” “as sublimity (*praṇītataḥ*),” and “as the escape (*niḥsaraṇataḥ*).” “As cessation” is stated for a person who declares that cessation itself does not exist. “As being calmed” is [conveyed] by denying that even those who are liberated (*mukta*) can have desire, etc., as others accept. The aspect “as sublimity” is [conveyed] by rejecting that liberation could be even better than this. The fourth aspect “as the escape” is [conveyed] by rejecting that even those who are liberated become unliberated again. Considering (*iti*) the first of these aspects, [Dharmakīrti] stated, “[suffering is] **non-eternal** (*anātyantika*).” [“Non-eternal”] means “not eternal” (*nātyantam*) and also “to be stopped (*niruddhyate*).”

Moreover, it is **not** a problem [for us] that, **since** [a living being] is **transmigrating** (*saṃsāritvāt*), there would be **no liberation** [for them], **because this is accepted [by us] (*iṣṭatvāt*)**. For, there is no liberation for any transmigrating being. That is, if one is in bondage (*baddha*), there is no liberation for that one, because [being in bondage] is their nature. There is also no bondage (*bandha*) for a liberated being (*mukta*), because being liberated is always their nature. It is simply the case (*kevalam*) that the mental continuum (*cittasantāna*) has not yet become pure, but a later pure part (*bhāga*) [will] occur in it due to a particular [causal] complex (*sāmagrīviśeṣa*). In that case, the state of transmigrating (*saṃsāritā*) itself is **not established** in the later pure [part].<sup>22</sup>

From an ultimate point of view (*paramārthataḥ*), however, there is not any transmigrating being (*saṃsārin*), because the momentary phases (*kṣaṇa*) do not transmigrate and because the continuum ultimately does not exist. Therefore, the logical reason “**since [a living being]**

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five aggregates (*skandha*) that constitute a living being. Cf. PV 2.146c: *duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ*. Jayanta and Yamāri also indicate this. PVAṬ D335b1–3, P393b8–394a3: ‘*dus byas pa can\** gyi phung po’i ngo bo gang yin pa de rgyu tshang ba la sogs pa dang ldan pa ma yin nam / ji ltar ‘di ‘gog pa yin / ‘gog pa yin na (na P; no D) ji ltar ‘khor ba pa yin snyam du sems pa ni ‘*khor phyir* zhes bya ba’o // (\* “‘*dus byas pa can*” is probably a mistranslation of “*saṃsārin*,” as Matsuoka suggests); PVAN 182v3: *nanu yat saṃsāri skandharūpaṃ tad dhetusākalyādimad iti katham asya nirodhaḥ? nirodhe vā katham saṃsāri? ity āśaṅkate— saṃsāritvād iti*.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. PVAṬ D128a1, P151a3: *phyi ma dag pa’i cha ni...*

is transmigrating” is **not established**. Neither is there any agent of liberation (*mokṭr*), for whom there would be liberation.<sup>23</sup>

After presenting a short introduction to the section of the truth of cessation and quoting PV 2.190, Prajñākaragupta first explains the four aspects (*ākāra*) of the truth of cessation according to the system of the sixteen aspects of the Four Nobles’ Truths.<sup>24</sup> In this explanation, he gives the specific counterarguments implied in relation to each of the aspects. Then, in relation to the first of these, *nirodhataḥ*, he literally annotates the statement found in PV 2.190a, “the [suffering] is non-eternal (*tad anātyantikaṃ*).” Incidentally, Prajñākaragupta does not comment at all on the reason given by Dharmakīrti, “because an impediment etc. to [its] cause can occur (*hetoḥ pratibandhādīsaṃbhavāt*).”

Next, Prajñākaragupta annotates PV 2.190cd, where the following supposed counterargument is the subject of consideration:

There is no liberation for a living being, because it is transmigrating.


Here, the opponent, assuming the same subject for transmigration and liberation, objects that the conflicting natures of transmigration and liberation cannot reside in the same entity. In response, Dharmakīrti criticizes this opponent’s argument depending on the two reasons: *iṣṭatvāt* and *aprasiddhitaḥ*. The commentators’ interpretations differ slightly in terms of how to interpret each of the two reasons and how to relate them to the subject, but we will not go into these details here. According to Prajñākaragupta, at least, these two reasons point to two separate faults in the opponent’s argument.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>23</sup> This last passage is translated in Pecchia (2015: 185–186) as well.

<sup>24</sup> The system of the sixteen aspects of the Four Nobles’ Truths is taught in the *Abhidharmakośa* and other texts, but the direct source of Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation has not yet been identified. For related information, see e.g. Eltschinger (2010: 30, fn. 8).

<sup>25</sup> Devendrabuddhi has a similar idea to that of Prajñākaragupta. PVP D82a5, P 94a7–8: *de bas na grub pa la sgrub pa yin pa’i phyir skyon yod pa ma yin no // ma grub phyir yang* (yang corr. [cf. PVT D130a2, P160a4]; nang P) / *skyon yod pa ma* (ma corr.; na P) *yin no // (ma grub phyir... yin no // P; n.e. D)*. Manorathanandin, on the other hand, seems to understand the second reason to be a supplementary reason to the first, and the translations of Vetter (1984: 92) and Pecchia (2015: 135) seem to follow this understanding.

Here Prajñākaragupta employs the Buddhist term “mental continuum (*cittasantāna*)” to describe the manner of existence of a living being. He recognizes the *cittasantāna* as a continuum of momentary cognitions, which he assumes to have two parts, i.e., the contaminated and the pure (*pariśuddha*/*viśuddha*). The former part is contaminated by defilements and has not yet become pure (*apariśuddha*), but the subsequent pure part will arise when the defilements are removed and the preparation for liberation is completed. The situation immediately before the pure part occurs is called its particular causal complex (*sāmagrīviśeṣa*). In such a case, the state of transmigrating (*saṃsāritā*) belongs to the previous contaminated part and the state of being liberated belongs to the later pure part. These properties indeed qualify the same continuum, but not the same part of it; accordingly, they are successfully established despite their incompatibility. This can be illustrated as follows:



The second reason “*aprasiddhitāḥ*” is introduced to show the fault of the reason in the opponent’s argument, “because it is transmigrating (*saṃsāritvāt*)”: the proving property is not established (*asiddha*) in the subject concerned. This is firstly explained based on the *cittasantāna*-model described above. That is, the state of transmigrating (*saṃsāritva*) is not established in the later pure part. The Buddhist recognizes liberation strictly in this later part, so this should be the subject of the argument if one would deny liberation.

Prajñākaragupta further advances the argument on the level of ultimate truth (*pramāṛthataḥ*), where the continuum, which is in fact conceptually conceived, is dismissed and only momentary cognitions are accepted as real entities. In that case, there is no connection between the preceding and following moments and the passage of time is never recognized, so the idea of transmigration, which presupposes the passage of time, will not hold. Therefore, the reason to the opponent's argument, the state of transmigrating is not established anywhere. The concept of liberation is also impossible in such circumstances.

### 3. Ravigupta's *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* on PV 2.190

Ravigupta writes his commentary basically reusing the text of the PVA explained above, but he inserts a rather long excursus on liberation between the commentary on v. 190ab and that on v. 190cd.<sup>26</sup> This excursus can be divided into two parts: an opponent's counterargument and Ravigupta's response to it. These will be discussed in turn in the following sections.

#### 3.1. Opponent's Counterargument

The whole of the opponent's counterargument is presented first as follows:

PVV (R) D370b6–371a2, P231a3–7: 'o na gal te shes pa'i rgyun chad pa nyid  
thar pa ste / me bzhin du mya ngan las 'da' par 'dod na / 'o na ni tha ma'i sems  
yod pa nyid du mi 'gyur te / don byed pa dang bral ba'i phyir ro // 'on te thams  
cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes skyed par nus pa tha ma'i sems la yod na ni / 'o na tha

<sup>26</sup> PVV(R) D370b2–5, P230b4–231a1 corresponds to PVA 136,20–137,1, which comments on v. 190a, and R (D371b3–6, P232a3–6) corresponds to PVA 137,1–6, which comments on v. 190cd. After the commentary on v. 190a and before the excursus, Ravigupta comments on the phrase expressing the reason “*hetoh pratibandhādīsamābhavāt*” in v. 190ab, on which Prajñākaragupta does not comment. R (D370b5–6, P231a1–2): *de ci'i phyir zhe na / sdug bsngal gyi rgyu la gags byed pa la sogs pa srid pa'i phyir te / sogs pa'i sgras ni rgyu ma tshang ba la sogs pa gzung ngo // sdug bsngal gyi rgyu dang bral na sdug bsngal nyid kyang ldog par 'gyur ba'i phyir 'gog par srid pa yin no //*. The first half of this annotation is almost identical to Devendrabuddhi's commentary. PVP D81b5–6, P93b7–8: *ci'i phyir zhe na / sdug bsngal gyi rgyu la (la P; las D) gags sogs srid phyir ro // sogs pa smos pas ni ma tshang ba srid pa'i phyir ro //*.

*ma nyid du yang mi 'gyur ro // 'on te thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes la tha ma'i sems grogs byed pa tsam yin te / shes pa gzhan gyi nye bar len par mi 'gyur bas tha ma nyid yin na ni / (na ni / P; no // D) 'o na nye bar len pa'i rgyu ci yin / rigs mthun pa'o zhe na / 'dod chags dang (dang P; n.e. D) bral ba dang / thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes dag la rigs mthun pa yod pa ma yin nam / ji ltar tha ma'i sems nye bar len pa ma yin / gal te yang de la nus pa gang du yang med do zhe (zhe D; ce P) na / de'i tshe dngos po med pa nyid du 'gyur la / de med na yang de'i gong ma yang med pas snga ma snga ma med par 'gyur te / don byed pa med pa'i phyir ma yin nam zhe na /*

[An opponent says] if liberation (*thar pa*, \**mokṣa*) is in fact the annihilation of the mental continuum (*shes pa'i rgyun chad pa*, \**jñāna-santānoccheda*), which is recognized to be extinguished (*mya ngan las 'da' pa*, \**nirvāṇa*) like a fire, then [an Arhat's] final moment of mind (*tha ma'i sems*, \**caramacitta*) would not exist, because it lacks causal efficacy (\**arthakriyā*). If the final moment of mind were able to cause the cognition of an omniscient being (*thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes*, \**sarvajñajñāna*), then [it] would not be the last [moment of mind] either.

If [you say that] the final moment of mind is only an assisting cause (*gros byed pa*, \**sahakārin*) of the cognition of an omniscient being and would not be the material [cause] (*nye bar len pa*, \**upādāna*) of another cognition, so it would be the final [moment of mind], then [I would ask] what is the material cause (*nye bar len pa'i rgyu*, \**upādānakāraṇa*)?


If [you say that the material cause is] a thing of the same kind (*rigs mthun pa*, \**tulyajātīya*), then [I would reply that] the cognition of the being without desire ('*dod chags dang bral ba*, \**ṽitarāga*) [i.e., Arhat] and that of an omniscient being are of the same kind, are they not? Why would the [Arhat's] final moment of mind not be the material cause [of the cognition of the omniscient being]? [It must be so.]

If the [final moment of mind] does not have any capacity, then [it] would not be a real entity (*dngos po*, \**vastu*). If the [final moment] does not exist, then the previous [moment] would not exist either. Therefore, each prior [moment of mind] would not exist due to lacking causal efficacy.

The opponent begins his argument, assuming that liberation is the annihilation of the mental continuum (\**jñānasantānoccheda*) using the metaphor of an extinguished fire, which is frequently associated with the word *nirvāṇa*. This idea is along the same lines as the *cittasantāna*-model that was explained in the analysis of the PVA. After the pure part of the continuum has occurred (which may correspond to liberation with remainder, or *sopadiśeṣanirvāṇa*),

perfect liberation (*parinirvāṇa*),<sup>27</sup> which may correspond to liberation without remainder, or *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*)<sup>28</sup> is achieved due to the final extinction of the body, and the mental continuum is annihilated.

The opponent argues here that the final moment of mind lacks causal efficacy and is thus non-existent because it produces no result. On the other hand, if the final moment of mind had the ability to cause the cognition of an omniscient being, then it would not be the final moment of mind. The opponent further assumes the Buddhist reply that the final moment of mind is only an assisting cause (*\*sahakārin*), but not a material cause (*\*upādānakāraṇa*), for the cognition of the omniscient being, so it would in fact be the last moment of mind in that continuum. This supposed Buddhist account can be illustrated as follows:



The argument up to this point is closely related to the following discussion in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, the Svārthānumāna chapter (PVin 2):

PVin 2 79,5–8: *caramasya tarhi kṣaṇasyānupākhyatāprasaṅgaḥ. na, sattvasaṅkhyātakṣaṇāntarānupādānatālakṣaṇatvāc caramatvasya. bhavaty eva hi tasyāpi jñeyavyāpini jñāne 'ntaśaḥ sāmārthyam virūpe 'pi dhātau. dhātvantare tv anekopakāra eva syāt.*

[Objection:] In that case [i.e., if something that has the characteristic of lacking the expression of the capacity for anything is inexpressible

<sup>27</sup> The word “*parinirvāṇa*” is used by Dharmottara in the relevant context. See fn. 30.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. AKVy 39,29 on AKBh 12,1: *caramaṃ cittam iti nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇakāle.*

(*nirupākhyā*),<sup>29</sup> [then an Arhat's] final moment [of mind on the occasion of perfect liberation (*parinirvāṇa*)]<sup>30</sup> would be inexpressible.

[Dharmakīrti's answer: This is] not true, because the property of being final (*caramatva*) is characterized as not being the material cause (*upādāna*) for the [subsequent] different moment [of mind], which [would] be counted as a living being (*sattva*). For, even the [final moment of mind] has some capacity with respect to the cognition that pervades the object to be cognized [i.e., the cognition of an omniscient being] in the formless realm, while [it] would [have] various functions (*upakāra*) in the other [two] realms [i.e., the desire realm (*kāmadhātu*) and the form realm (*rūpadhātu*)].<sup>31</sup>

Here, Dharmakīrti argues two points, namely, (i) that the Arhat's final moment of mind is indeed final because it is not the material cause for another moment of mind, and (ii) that it is not non-existent because it at least has capacity with respect to the cognition of an omniscient being.<sup>32</sup>

Ravigupta's opponent, however, does not stop his argument here, but goes further to raise the question of how to distinguish between a material cause and an assisting cause. If the distinctive feature of a material cause compared to an assisting cause is supposed to be its similarity to its result (*tulyajātīyatā*),<sup>33</sup> then we must admit that there are not a few similarities even

<sup>29</sup> PVin 2 79,4: *sarvasāmarthyopākhyāvīrahalakṣaṇaṃ nirupākhyam*; PVinT<sub>5</sub> 17,13–18,1: *sarvatra sāmāthyam, tasyopākhyā vyapadeśaḥ, tayā vīraho vaikalyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ yasya, kāryakriyānimittakena vyapadeśena vikalam avastu nirupākhyam*. The meaning of the word “*nirupākhyā*” has been discussed in many studies. First of all, see Steinkellner (1979: 89, fn. 323).

<sup>30</sup> PVinT<sub>5</sub> 18,7–8: *caramasyety arhataḥ paścimo yaś cittakṣaṇaḥ parinirvāṇakāle, sa carama ucyate*.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Steinkellner (1979: 89–91); Sakai (2010: 18–19; 49–50; 69–70; 148–150); Sakai (2017: 120).

<sup>32</sup> To explain this kind of capacity, Dharmottara uses the term “assisting cause” (*sa-hakārikāraṇa*). PVinT<sub>5</sub> 18,11: *tataḥ sahakārikāraṇabhāvād vastutvam*. The unidentified Buddhist opponent appears in the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra calls it the “observed-object condition” (*ālambanapratyaya*), as we will see later. BS 15,12; 14. Cf. Steinkellner (1979: 91, fn. 328f).

<sup>33</sup> This Sanskrit wording “*tulyajātīyatā*” is corroborated by the parallel passage found in BS 15,14–15: *yadi tulyajātīyam upādānam, na muktacittasārvajñajñānayos tulyajātīyatā nāsti*. As for the concept of *tulyajātīya* in the context of *samanantara-*

between the Arhat's final moment of mind and its cognition by an omniscient being. For example, they are both cognition and have eliminated all desires. Therefore, the possibility that the former is the material cause for the latter is not excluded. Furthermore, the opponent closes his argument by pointing out the undesirable consequence that all preceding moments would not exist if the final moment of mind does not exist due to the absence of any capacity.

To summarize, Ravigupta raises the following two points as an opponent's objection to Dharmakīrti's original discussion:

- The two types of causes, i.e. material and assisting, could not be distinguished if the distinctive feature of a material cause is supposed to be the similarity to its result.
- All of the preceding moments of the continuum would be non-existent if the last moment of mind is non-existent.

Interestingly, we can find a similar argument in a passage from Maṇḍana Miśra's *Brahmasiddhi* (BS).<sup>34</sup> By comparing the above opponent's view with the discussion in BS, we can get a clearer picture of the opponent's idea. In the context of explaining that Brahman is immortal (*amṛta*) and unborn (*aja*), Maṇḍana Miśra criticizes the Buddhist theory that insists on the annihilation of the mental continuum, provisionally admitting momentary cognitions. The discussion is as follows.

BS 15,2–8: *api cābhyupagamyāpi kṣaṇikam vijñānam anādinidhanāyā eva saṃtater muktisaṃsārāv abhyupetau. sa hy antyaḥ kṣaṇaḥ kiṃcit kāryam ārabheta vā, na vā. ārambhe nāntya iti tadabhāvān nocchedaḥ. anārambhe sarvaśaktivirahād asallakṣaṇāt tasyāsattvam. tasminn asati sarve 'py anenaiva kramenāśantaḥ santāninaḥ syuḥ. tadabhāve santāna eva nāsti, kasyocchedaḥ.*

Moreover, liberation and transmigration should be approved only in the continuum that has neither beginning nor end, even if momentary cognitions are admitted. That is, the final moment [of mind] either produces some result or does not [produce any result]. If it produces [some result], then [it would] not be the final [moment of mind]. Therefore, since the [final moment of mind] does not exist, there is no annihilation [of the continuum]. If it [does not produce any result],

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*pratyaya* and *upādāna*, see Vetter (1964: 20ff.), Steinkellner (1979: 90, fn. 326), and others.

<sup>34</sup> Steinkellner (1979: 89–88, fn. 324) has already pointed out that this portion of the



the [final moment of mind would] not exist due to lacking all capacity, which is characteristic of the non-existent. If the [final moment of mind] does not exist, then all the parts of the continuum (*santānin*) would be non-existent according to this same reasoning. Since [all] the [parts of the continuum] do not exist, the continuum itself does not exist. What does the annihilation belong to?<sup>35</sup>

Maṇḍana Miśra gives two alternatives here, one in which the final moment of mind produces some result and the other in which it does not, and then argues that the annihilation of the continuum is not established in either case. If the final moment of mind produces some result, then it would not be the final moment of mind after all, and no annihilation would be established. If it does not produce any result, then it would not exist since it would lack all capacity, and likewise, all the preceding parts of the continuum would not exist either, so the continuum itself would not exist. Its annihilation is thus naturally impossible. The argument in response to this second alternative, that the non-existence of the final moment of mind would result in the non-existence of all parts of the continuum, i.e., all the moments constituting the mental continuum, seems to have some influence on the second point that Ravigupta added.

Maṇḍana Miśra continues as follows:

BS 15,8–17: *athārabhata eva kāryam antyaḥ santānāntare sārvaññe, sati hetuphalabhāve kathaṃ santānāntaram. na hetuphalabhāvād anyad ekasantater vyavasthāpakam. na hetuphalabhāvamātrād ekasantativyavasthā, api tu upādānahetuphalabhāvāt. na ca sārvaññasya jñānasya caramakṣaṇa upādānam. ālambanapratyayo hi saḥ, samanantarapratyayaś copādānam. svasantatipatitasamanantarapratyayajanyaṃ ca sārvaññam jñānam, ālambanapratyayo 'sya caramakṣaṇaḥ. yadi tulyajātīyam upādānam, na mukta-cittasārvaññajñānayos tulyajātīyatā nāsti. yo 'pi manyate—vilakṣaṇakārye santatyuccheda iti, tasya rūpajñānaprabandhe viṣayāntaravijñānān niroḍḍha-prasaṅgaḥ. kathamcit tulyatāyām aniroḍḍham ity alam atiprasaṅgena.*

[Objection by the Buddhist opponent:] The final [moment of mind] certainly produces the result in another [mental] continuum of an omniscient being.

*Brahmasiddhi* contains a discussion related to PVin 2.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Vetter 1969: 72–73.

[Maṇḍana's Answer:] How is [the continuum of the omniscient being determined to be] a different continuum [from that of the Arhat] when they share a cause-and-effect relation? [For,] there is no other way to determine [that X is in] the same continuum [as Y] than a cause-and-effect relation [between them].

[Objection]: [X] is determined to be in the same continuum [as Y] not depending on a mere cause-and-effect relation (*hetuphalabhāvamātra*), but on the basis of the relation of the material cause and [its] result (*upādhānahetuphalabhāva*). [An Arhat's] final moment [of mind] is not the material cause for [its] cognition by an omniscient being. For, the [final moment of mind] is the observed-object condition (*ālambanapratyaya*), while the material cause is a similar and immediately preceding condition (*samanantarapratyaya*). Moreover, the cognition of the omniscient being is caused by the similar and immediately preceding condition that belongs to its own continuum, [and the Arhat's] final moment [of mind] is its observed-object condition.

[Answer:] If the material cause is a thing of the same kind, it is not the case that the mind of a liberated being [i.e., Arhat] and the cognition of an omniscient being are not of the same kind, [and consequently, the former would be the material cause for the latter.] [The opponent] thinks that the continuum is annihilated when a result that has a different nature [occurs]. For him, the undesirable consequence would follow that liberation [as annihilation would be achieved] just by the cognition of different objects [e.g., auditory objects] when the cognition of visual objects continues.

[Objection]: [This is not the case because] they are similar in some way.

[Answer:] If so, there would be no liberation. The above is sufficient for [demonstrating] the over-application [of the concept of "immortal" and "unborn"].<sup>36</sup>

Maṇḍana Miśra points out the difficulty with explaining that an Arhat's final moment of mind and its cognition by an omniscient being belong to two separate continua if a causal relation is recognized as obtaining between them. In response, the Buddhist opponent tries to avoid this problem by appealing to the distinction between the material cause and the observed-object condition, i.e., the assisting cause, as Dharmakīrti does. However, in that case, it would necessarily follow that the Arhat's final moment of

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. Vetter 1969: 73.

mind would be the material cause for its cognition by the omniscient being and they would thus belong to the same continuum if the material cause is characterized by its similarity to the result, which we already discussed as the first point added by Ravigupta. Otherwise, if a different kind of result brings about the annihilation of the continuum, then any mental continuum would be annihilated just by cognizing a different kind of object than before and liberation would be easily achieved. As mentioned above, both of the points that Ravigupta adds to Dharmakīrti's discussion of this opponent's argument can be traced to Maṇḍana Miśra's BS.

### 3.2. Ravigupta's answer

Now, we get to the main topic, Ravigupta's own discussion. How does he deal with these objections raised by the opponent?

PVV(R) D371a2–4, P231a7–b1: *de ni ma yin te / sdug bsngal 'gog pa tsam nyid thar pa ste / de dag snga phyir rtog (rtog P; rtogs D) na rigs pa med par brtsad pa yin no // gal te tha ma'i sems la tha dad pa'i don byed pa med pa de lta na yang rang rig pa'i phyir ji ltar med pa yin / 'di ltar dmigs pa la yod par brjod do // 'o na zla ba gnyis su snang ba yang yod par 'gyur ro zhe na / de ltar yang 'di shes pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis yod pa'o zhes bshad par bya'o // don byed pa'i mtshan nyid yod pa yang 'dir dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid kyis don 'di nyid yin no //*

[Answer:] This is not true. Liberation is simply the mere cessation of suffering (*sdug bsngal 'gog pa tsam*, \*duḥkhanīrodhamātra). If [you] assume these two [i.e., suffering and its cessation, or transmigration and liberation] to be the prior and subsequent, then [your] objection (*brtsad pa*, \*vivāda) is unreasonable (*rigs pa med pa*, \*ayukta). Even if the final moment of mind does not have causal efficacy for anything different [from itself], it is aware of itself (*rang rig pa*, \*svasaṃvedana), so why does it not exist? For, perception (*dmigs pa*, \*upalambha) is called existence (*yod pa*, \*sattā).

[Objection:] in that case, even the moon appearing as double (*zla ba gnyis su snang ba*, \*dvyaḥbhāso candraḥ) [in a perception of patient with an eye disease] would exist.

[Answer:] Even so, it can be explained [as follows:] this [double moon] exists as the nature of the perception. The existence is [normally] characterized by causal efficacy (*don byed pa'i mtshan nyid*, \*arthakriyālakṣaṇa),

but it means here that which is characterized by perception (*dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid*, \**upalabdhilakṣaṇa*).

Ravigupta begins his response with another definition of liberation: “liberation is the mere cessation of suffering (\**duḥkhanirodhamātra*),” probably giving up the previous definition as the annihilation of the mental continuum (\**jñānasantānoccheda*). Moreover, he explains the causal efficacy of the final moment of mind not by the non-simultaneous causal relation with the cognition of an omniscient being, but by the simultaneous self-awareness of the final moment of mind itself. This idea is based on the so-called *sattopalambhavāda*, i.e., the theory claiming that “to be is to perceive/to be perceived,” which was put forward by Dharmakīrti and elaborated by Prajñākaragupta.<sup>37</sup> Based on this theory, Ravigupta argues that even the double moon observed by an eye disease patient is existent as the nature of his perception.

In that case, the existence of the final moment of mind can be asserted without appealing to the causal relationship with its cognition by an omniscient being. Consequently, Ravigupta successfully avoids the problem that we cannot distinguish between the mental continuum of the Arhat and that of the omniscient being in the case where any causal relation is recognized between them, which was raised by Ravigupta’s opponent and Maṇḍana Miśra, as we have seen.

Ravigupta has presented his own interpretation of the causal efficacy of the final moment of mind in this way, and then responds separately to the various difficulties pointed out by the opponent.

PVV(R) D371a4–6, P231b1–5: *gzhan yang ji ltar don byed pa ni rgyu yod pa de ltar bskyed par bya ba'i 'bras bu yang yod de / yang gang rgyu'i mtshan nyid can yin pas dngos po'o (po'o P; po'i D) zhes gsungs so // de bas na tha mas don byed pa med na (na D; n.e. P) rgyu dang 'bras bur 'brel pa'i yod pa ma (ma G273b2; n.e. DP) yin / gal te yang thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes skyed par tha ma'i sems la nus pa yod na / de'i tshe tha ma (ma P; ma'i D) nyid du 'gyur ba ma yin no zhes brjod pa de ni shin tu 'brel pa med pa ste / 'di ltar tha ma'i sems thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes kyi grogs byed pa ste / dper na myu gu la sa bzhin no // sa myu gu'i rgyu ni ma yin gyi / myu gu gnas na sa'i rgyun 'chad pa ma yin te / sa bon ni myu gu dang rgyud gcig pa'o // de bzhin du 'dod*

<sup>37</sup> On the theory of *sattopalambhavāda*, see Moriyama 2023.

*chags dang ma bral ba'i rgyun chad kyang thams cad mkhyen pa'i rgyun 'jug pa yin no //*

Moreover, [the opponent] said, "it is said that the effect to be produced exists just as the cause [that has] causal efficacy exists, and that a thing is a real entity (*dnogs po*, \**vastu*) by virtue of having the character of a cause. Therefore, [the last moment of mind] that has a cause-and-effect relation (*rgyu dang 'bras bur 'brel pa*, \**kāryakāraṇasambandha*) [with its cognition by an omniscient being would] not exist if the last [moment of] mind does not exert causal efficacy. On the other hand, if [an Arhat's] final moment of mind were able to cause [its] cognition by an omniscient being, then it would not be the final [moment of mind]." This [opponent's statement] is totally incoherent (*shin tu 'brel pa med pa*, \**atyantāsambaddha*). For, the final moment of mind is an assisting cause (*grogs byed pa*, \**sahakārin*) for [its] cognition by the omniscient being, like, for example, soil (*sa*, \**pṛthivī*) for a sprout (*myu gu*, \**aṅkura*). The soil is not the [direct] cause for the sprout, but the continuum of the soil is not annihilated if the sprout continues to exist. [By contrast,] the seed belongs to the same continuum as the sprout. In the same way, even if the continuum of a being that has not been freed from desire ('*dod chags dang ma bral ba*, \**avītarāga*) has been annihilated, the continuum of an omniscient being occurs.<sup>38</sup>

Ravigupta, like Dharmakīrti, argues that the final moment of mind is an assisting cause for its cognition by an omniscient being in response to the objection that the final moment of mind would not exist if it did not cause the cognition of an omniscient being, or if it does cause the cognition, then it would not be the final moment of mind. He further explains the relationship using the analogy of the soil, sprout, and seed. The soil is not the direct cause, or the material cause, for the sprout, but an assisting cause, so they belong to separate continua. On the other hand, the seed belongs to the same continuum as the sprout and is its material cause.

Ravigupta goes on:

PVV(R) D371a6–b1, P231b5–8: *gang yang shes pa yin pa'i phyir tha ma'i shes pa ni thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes kyi nye bar len par 'gyur ro zhes zer*

<sup>38</sup> This description seems to presuppose the direct attainment of liberation by eliminating desire and other defilements, rather than the gradual attainment of liberation from *sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa* to *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*. In any case, this last

*ba 'di la smras pa ni / spyir mthun pa tsam nye bar len pa nyid du 'dod na / sa yang sa'i ngo bo dang ldan pa'i phyir myu gu'i nye bar len par 'gyur ro //*

*yang na dper na rgyud gzhan gyi shes pa la dmigs nas / rjes su dpag pa'i shes pa skye ba de ni rgyud tha dad pa yin pa de bzhin du / thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes kyang 'dod chags dang ma bral ba'i sems la dmigs pa yin gyi / de'i nye bar len pa ni ma yin pa'i phyir / sdug bsngal log pa'i ngo bo nyid thar pa yin no //*

Moreover, [the opponent said,] “the final cognition [i.e., the final moment of mind] would be the material cause for the cognition of an omniscient being because it is a cognition,” to which I respond [as follows:] if whatever is generally similar (*spyir mthun pa tsam*) is recognized as the material cause, the soil would also be the material cause for the sprout, because it has the nature of the earth element [which is similar to the sprout].

In addition, for example, an inferential cognition may occur with regard to (*dmigs nas*, *\*ālambya*)<sup>39</sup> a cognition that belongs to a continuum [X], but this [inferential cognition] belongs to a different continuum [Y]. In the same way, the cognition of an omniscient being [occurs] with regard to the mind of a being that has not been freed from desire (*'dod chags dang ma bral ba'i sems*, *\*avītarāgacitta*), but does not have that as its material cause. Therefore, liberation has the opposite nature to suffering.

In the counterargument discussed earlier, the opponent characterized the material cause by its similarity to the result, which leads to the undesirable consequence that the final moment of mind would be the material cause for its cognition by an omniscient being. Ravigupta, on the other hand, points out the absurdity of defining a material cause by similarity in general. If X is allowed to be the material cause for Y just by their similarity in general, then,

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sentence requires further discussion. See fn. 40.

<sup>39</sup> I translate the phrase “...*la dmigs nas*” as “with regard to...,” mainly considering the original meaning of the Tibetan word “*dmigs*,” i.e., “to think,” “to construe in one’s mind,” etc. (see, for example, Jäschke’s Tibetan-English Dictionary). On the other hand, the assumed original Sanskrit is *ālambya*, the continuative form of the verb *ā√lamb-*, often translated as “depending on.” In this context, however, the object of *ā√lamb-* is not mere support, but rather objective support for any cognition. Therefore, the translation “with regard to” may be appropriate for the Sanskrit term as well.

for example, the soil would be the material cause for the sprout because they are similar in having the nature of the earth element.

Ravigupta also argues that the way in which an omniscient being cognizes the mind of a being that has not been freed from desire (*\*avītarāgacitta*)<sup>40</sup> is the same as the way in which one person infers the cognition that belongs to a different continuum. Furthermore, keeping in mind the definition of liberation as "the mere cessation of suffering (*\*duḥkhanirodhamātra*)" provided at the beginning of this section, he states that liberation has the opposite nature to suffering.


Ravigupta concludes the excursus with yet another interpretation of liberation.

PVV(R) D371b1–2, P231b8–232a2: *gzhan yang 'dod chags la sogs pas dben pa'i sems ni thar pa ste / rgyun chad pa ni ma yin no // 'dod chags la sogs pa nyid glo bur ba yin pa'i phyir / rnam par thar pa'i rigs kyi sems ni shes pa snga ma dang 'brel pa'i phyir 'gag par mi 'gyur ro // des na yongs su dag pa'i sems 'dod chags dang bral ba rtag tu yod pa'o //*

Furthermore, Liberation is a mind free from desire, etc. (*'dod chags la sogs pas dben pa'i sems, \*rāgādiviviktacitta*), not the annihilation of the continuum. Since desire, etc. are accidental (*glo bur ba, \*āgantuka*), the mind that belongs to the liberated class is connected to the previous cognition, so there would be no cessation. Therefore, the pure (*yongs su dag pa, \*pariśuddha*) mind that is without desire always exists.

Here, Ravigupta presents another definition of liberation: "Liberation is a mind free from desire, etc. (*\*rāgādiviviktacitta*)," and clearly rejects the definition as the annihilation of the mental continuum. He also states that defilements such as desire are only accidental, and that the pure mind always exists. This can be illustrated as follows:

<sup>40</sup> It should be noted that Ravigupta exclusively mentions the relation between the mind of a being that has not been freed from desire (*\*avītarāga*) and its cognition by an omniscient being in his response, while the relation between a being without desire (*\*vītarāga, mukta*), i.e. an Arhat, and its cognition is discussed in the opponent's counterargument and the parallel passage from BS. That may reflect the change in the view of liberation as discussed in fn. 38.



Behind this explanation of liberation lies the so-called *prabhāsvaracitta* theory, which Dharmakīrti mentions in PV 2.208.<sup>41</sup> The nature of the mind is always pure and luminous, whereas the defilements like desire are only accidental.

#### 4. Conclusion

In conclusion, let me briefly summarize the contents of Ravigupta's excursus. The opponent began his counterargument with the definition of liberation as "the annihilation of the mental continuum (\**cittasantānoccheda*)," and discussed the issue of the causal relation between an Arhat's final moment of mind and its cognition by an omniscient being. It is clear that the opponent's argument is based on Dharmakīrti's statement in PVin 2 79,5-8, where he makes the following two points:

- The Arhat's final moment of mind is safely final because it is not the material cause for another moment of mind.
- The Arhat's final moment of mind is not non-existent because it has the capacity to cause its cognition by an omniscient being

According to this line of reasoning, the distinction between the two kinds of causes, the material cause (*upādānakārana*) and the assisting cause (*sahakārin*), or observed-object condition (*ālambanapratyaya*), plays an important role. Criticizing these claims, the opponent in Ravigupta's commentary adds the following two objections, with similar ideas put forward in the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra:

- These two kinds of causes could not be distinguished if the distinctive feature of a material cause were the similarity to its result.

<sup>41</sup> PV 2.208: *prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ* / (This mind is luminous



- All preceding moments of mind would be non-existent if the final moment of mind is non-existent.

Ravigupta's response offers an alternative definition of liberation as "the mere cessation of suffering (\**duḥkhanirodhamātra*)."

He also adopts an original method for explaining the causal efficacy of the final moment of mind owing to the self-awareness of itself, which is based on Prajñākaragupta's *sattopalambhavāda*. In this way, he avoids the difficulties involved in appealing to causal relations in his argument. In addition, as a supplement to Dharmakīrti's argument, Ravigupta reiterates that the final moment of mind is only the assisting cause for its cognition by an omniscient being and points out the absurdity of characterizing a material cause by similarity to its result in general. At the end of the excursus, he presents yet another definition of liberation, "a mind free from desire, etc. (\**rāgādiviviktacitta*)," which is based on the theory of *prabhāsvāracitta* that is presented in PV 2.208, and completely dismisses the definition of liberation as the cessation of the mental continuum.

As we have seen above, Ravigupta's excursus provides these three definitions of liberation:

- (1) the annihilation of the mental continuum (\**cittasantānoccheda*)
- (2) the mere cessation of suffering (\**duḥkhanirodhamātra*)
- (3) a mind free from desire, etc. (\**rāgādiviviktacitta*)

Although (1) is expressed as a premise in the opponent's argument, which probably derives from the Abhidharma tradition, Dharmakīrti seems to accept it, at least in PVin 2 79,5–8. Ravigupta, on the other hand, goes on to (2) and then (3), discarding (1) altogether. This sort of change in the view of liberation can be observed in several other discussions by Dharmakīrti's successors<sup>42</sup> and requires further investigation.

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by its nature; the defilements are accidental). Cf. Vetter 1984:108.

<sup>42</sup> For example, Inami (1998: 18–21) cites and elaborates on PVV(R) and PVAṬ on PV 2.45–46, Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* vv. 1916–1917 with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, Ratnakīrti's *Sarvajñasiddhi*, and Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*, along with overview by Go rams pa and rGyal tshab rje. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla imply that this kind of understanding comes from the Mahāyāna tradition.

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# The Reliability of Yogic Perception for Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta and Jñānaśrīmitra\*

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## 0. Introduction

Within Dharmakīrti's theory of perception and the larger framework of Buddhist epistemology, yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*), which had its origins in the Buddhist tradition of meditative practice, is analyzed as part of the inquiry into the validity of our cognitive experience. Since the first study by Ernst Steinkellner (1978) on this specific form of cognition, it has been examined by a number of modern scholars from various viewpoints.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, there are still some points needing further investigation. Among them, and what I will explore in this paper, is the problem of the reliability of this type of religious experience.

Regarding reliability, we may first recall the definition of *pramāṇa* given by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) II.1: "A means of valid cognition is a cognition that does not belie [its promise]" (*pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam*).<sup>2</sup> As suggested by the term '*a-visaṃvāda*,' which literally means "not belying

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<sup>1</sup> See Iwata (1987), Woo (2003), Funayama (2005), Dunne (2006), Eltschinger (2009), Franco (2011), and others. Of those studies, Iwata (1987) and Franco (2011) focus on Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of yogic perception in particular.

<sup>2</sup> The translation is borrowed from Franco 2022: 439.

its promise,” if a cognition leads one to successful action toward an object one desires, that cognition is said to be non-belying, in other words, it is reliable. To be more precise, the reliability of an initial cognition ( $C_1$ ) of an object is determined by the subsequent cognition ( $C_2$ ) of that object’s causal efficacy/purposeful action (*arthakriyā*). For example, one’s sensory perception of fire is established as reliable only when there occurs another perception of seeing the fire burning something.<sup>3</sup> However, this *avisamvāda* is not applied to yogic perception, because in meditative practice the perception itself is assumed to be the goal to be attained. It is not the case that yogic perception leads the *yogin* to further meditative practice for an object that he/she wishes to attain in the future.

What then establishes the reliability of yogic perception? For this point, as Franco (2011) has suggested, a variant reading of PV III 286, *pramāṇasaṃvādi* for *pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi*, might help us. If this variant reading is taken into consideration, we see that the reliability of yogic perception requires a previous *pramāṇa* establishing the trueness of the object. For example, since the four nobles’ truths (*caturāryasatya*) are predetermined as being true through inference, yogic perception that arises from meditative practice on these truths is concluded to be a reliable cognition. We see here an inseparable relationship between yogic perception’s reliability and its being consistent with other means of valid cognition.<sup>4</sup> However, a closer look at the textual material associated with this verse reveals a complex intellectual-historical development from Dharmakīrti through Prajñākaragupta to Jñānaśrimitra.

<sup>3</sup> There are several possible translations of *avisamvāda*, for instance, “non-belying,” “trustworthy,” “reliable,” or “non-deceptive,” but these are all applicable to a person or his/her words in a primary sense. As an acceptable word for applying to “cognition,” here I would also choose “reliable.” Thus, I will use expressions such as “a cognition is reliable with respect to its object.” However, as we will see below, the word *avisamvāda* also implies “without inconsistency with [other *pramāṇa*].” In such cases, I also use the translation “consistent with” on occasion. For recent studies on Dharmakīrti’s and Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of *avisamvāda* in PV II 1 and its commentary, see Inami 2022, Franco 2022.

<sup>4</sup> As we will see below, the term *avisamvāda* became an important concept in Buddhist epistemology after Dignāga’s discussion on the similarity between inference and the words of authoritative person in PS II 5ab. Dharmakīrti offers two interpretations of the term, namely, (1) being undeniable by perception and inference with respect to all objects within the verifiable domain (PV I 215, and PVSV thereon), and

The aim of this paper is to sketch their interpretations of *avisamvāda* / *saṃvāda* and to clarify their differences and interconnections.

## 1. Dharmakīrti's explanation of yogic perception and its reliability

Let us start with Dharmakīrti's account of yogic perception in PV III 281–285.<sup>5</sup> The points can be summarized as follows:

(2) being true with respect to the primary human purpose and the means thereof (PV I 217, and PVSV thereon). Of the two, the second interpretation is the basis for Dharmakīrti's subsequent discussion in PV II, where the Buddha who teaches the four nobles' truths is taken to be the "means of valid cognition." Cf. Wakahara 1985, Kataoka 2002.

<sup>5</sup> PV III 281–285:

*prāḡ uktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanāmayam |*  
*vidhūtakalpanājālaṃ spaṣṭam evāvabhāṣate || 281 ||*

*kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ |*  
*abhūtaṃ api paśyanti purato 'vasthitāṃ iva || 282 ||*

*na vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsitā |*  
*svapne 'pi smaryate smārttaṃ na ca tad tādrgarthavat || 283 ||*

*aśubhāpṛthivīkrtsnādy abhūtaṃ api varṇyate |*  
*spaṣṭabhaṃ nirvikalpaṃ ca bhāvanābalanīrmitam || 284 ||*

*tasmād bhūtaṃ abhūtaṃ vā yad yad evābhībhāvyate |*  
*bhāvanāpariṇiṣpattaṭ tat sphuṭākālpadhīphalam || 285 ||*

The cognition of *yogins* has already been explained. For them, the [cognition], which is free from the web of conceptual cognition, appears vividly indeed inasmuch as it arises due to meditative practice. (281)

Those afflicted by madness due to desire, sorrow or fear, and by [terrifying] dreams about thieves, etc., see also unreal [things] as if they were right before [their eyes]. (282)

The [cognition] that is connected with conceptual cognition does not have a vivid appearance of an object. Even in a dream, too, there is recollection, but this [recollection] does not have such an object (i.e., an object having a vivid appearance). (283)

[Objects] like impure things and the entire earth [in the air], albeit unreal, are also taught [in the Buddhist tradition] to have vivid appearances and to be non-conceptual, inasmuch as they are formed by meditation. (284)

- The process of the Buddha's attainment of the wisdom of the four nobles' truths (*caturāryasatya*), which has already been explained in the previous chapter (*Pramāṇasiddhi*), shows a model of yogic perception that is caused by repeated meditative practice (*bhāvanā*). Since this type of cognition has a vivid appearance of an object, it is said to be non-conceptual. In contrast, a conceptual cognition like a dream does not have such a vivid appearance of an object.
- Cognitions that arise from meditation (*bhāvanā*) and have vivid appearances of objects also include hallucinations caused by desire, etc., and Buddhist practitioners' cognitions of unreal objects such as impure objects and the entire earth in the air.

In this context, to distinguish yogic perception from other meditative cognitions of unreal objects, Dharmakīrti states the following verse:

*tatra pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi (or pramāṇasaṃvādi) yat prāñnirñitavastuvat |*  
*tad bhāvanājaṃ pratyakṣaṃ iṣṭaṃ śeṣā upaplavāḥ || 286 ||*

Tib. (Miyasaka 1971/72: 81):

*de la sngar bshad dngos po bzhin || slu ba med can gang yin de ||*  
*bsgoms byung mngon sum tshad mar 'dod || lhag ma nye bar bslang ba*  
*yin ||*

PVP (Devendrabuddhi) D211b4–5/P248a4–5: *de la* (D; de P) *bsgoms pa'i*  
*'bras bu'i shes pa de dag la | mi slu ba ni gang yin de* (PV<sub>Mi</sub>; te DP) |  
*sgom 'byung mngon sum tshad mar 'dod || ci dang 'dra bar zhe na |*  
*sngar dpyad dngos po bzhin | sngar bden pa dpyad pa'i skabs su tshad*  
*ma'i dngos po yang dag par bstan pa bzhin no || lhag ma nye bar bslad*  
*pa yin || dper na zad par sa la sogs pa lta bu 'o ||*

PVV<sub>M</sub> (Manorathanandin) 204,9–12: *tatra bhāvanābalabhāviṣu spaṣṭānir-*  
*vikalpeṣu yat saṃvādi upadarśitārthaprāpakam tad bhāvanājam*  
*pratyakṣam pramāṇam iṣṭam. kim ivety āha—prāk prathamapari-*  
*cchede nirñitam vastu satyacatuṣṭayam tasminn iva. (...)*

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Therefore, regardless of whether [the object] is true or untrue, whatever is meditated upon deeply results in a vivid and non-conceptual cognition [at the end] when the meditation is completed. (285)

The translation is basically from Moriyama (2023). For other translations, see Tosaki 1979: 376–380, Dunne 2006: 516, Eltschinger 2009: 192–195, Franco 2011: 83.



Dunne 2006: 516: Among these a meditatively induced perception that is trustworthy is considered to be reliable (*pramāṇa*), as is the case with [direct awareness of the Noble Truths'] realities that were previously examined. The remaining [cognition of this type] are mistaken.

Eltschinger 2009: 195: Among these [vivid and non-conceptual cognitions that result from cultivation, we] accept as a means of valid cognition [only] that perception which, born of cultivation, is reliable, just like [the one that is related to] the matter (*vastu*) [we] determined above [in chapter two]. All the remaining [cognitions] are [mere] delusions.

Franco 2011: 84: Among these [non-conceptual awarenesses resulting from meditation], the [awareness] that corresponds to/is in agreement with a means of knowledge, as in the case of the object/subject matter determined above, is accepted as perception arisen from meditation. The others are [mere] confusions.

According to the Tibetan translation and the two commentaries by Devendra-buddhi and Manorathanandin, the verse defines yogic perception as a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) that is non-belying, i.e., reliable (*saṃvādin=avisamvādin, slu ba med can*).

However, there is a variant reading in *pāda* a of the verse, namely, *pramāṇasaṃvādi* for *pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi*. Although the difference involves only one small point, namely, the presence or absence of an *anusvāra*, the difference in meaning is significant. If one follows the variant reading, the main structure of the verse should be analyzed as defining 'meditative perception' with the characteristic of "being consistent with a means of valid cognition" (*pramāṇasaṃvāditva*). In Franco's long footnote (fn. 28), the two readings are compared and it is concluded that the variant is preferable. Although he offers several arguments regarding the interpretation of this verse, his main claim can be summarized in three points: first, the manuscript of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (MsB) and the quotation of the verse in Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (NBhū 172,5) support the variant reading; second, in Prajñākaragupta's explanation of the verse, his "gloss *avisamvādasambhavi* (PVA 327,32) probably corresponds to the compound as a whole," and "the word *pramāṇa* does not appear in the commentary and there is no other equivalent to it"; third, according to Ono's index (Ono 1996), Dharmakīrti's other usages of *saṃvādin* support the variant, and "it seems therefore that Dharmakīrti

does not use the terms *saṃvāda/in* in the meaning of ‘trustworthy, non-belying’ (*avisaṃvāda/in*).’’

Regarding Franco’s first point, the NBhū’s reading should be corrected to *pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi* based on the manuscript reading (Ms 39b.8, Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñāna Mandira, Pāṭaṇa, No. 10919).<sup>6</sup> The second point will be discussed below in the next section. Here I would like to focus on the third point. Franco calls our attention to the following verses of Dharmakīrti in which the term *saṃvādin* appears in a compound with *pramāṇa*:

PV I 314–315:

*yasya pramāṇasaṃvādi vacanaṃ so ’rthavid yadi |*  
*na hy atyantaparokṣeṣu pramāṇasyāsti sambhavaḥ || 314 ||*

*yasya pramāṇasaṃvādi vacanaṃ tatkr̥taṃ vacaḥ |*  
*sa āgama iti prāptaṃ nirarthatā ’pauruṣeyatā || 315 ||*

Eltschinger *et al.* 2012: 34–35, 37: If [you hold that] that one knows the meaning [of the Vedic words] whose [explanatory] statements are consistent with valid cognition, [we would reply that this is not the case,] for there can be no valid cognition of transcendent [things]. (PV I. 314)

[From all this] it follows that a [Vedic] statement that has been sanctioned by a [person] whose statements are [otherwise] consistent with valid cognitions is scripture. [In that case] the [Veda’s] authorlessness [turns out to be] useless. (PV I. 315)

As Franco (2011: 85, fn. 28) points out, there are several cases, not only here, where Dharmakīrti uses the word *saṃvāda/saṃvādin* in compound with *pramāṇa* as its antecedent. In light of these examples, Franco’s opinion is persuasive that also this case should be understood as a compound.<sup>7</sup> In

<sup>6</sup> Dr. Tyler Neill kindly informed me that the second Devanāgarī manuscript of NBhū (Bhāṇḍārkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune, No. “625 of 1875–76,” 115a2) also supports this reading *pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi*. In addition, Bhāsarvajña’s explanation also supports the reading. Cf. NBhū 171.20–172.2: *tatra kāmādyupaplutānām abhūtabhāvanātaḥ spaṣṭam api jñānaṃ viśaṃvāditvān na pramāṇam. yoginām tu bhūtabhāvanātaḥ caturāryasatyaparalokādīdarśanam avisaṃvāditvāt pramāṇam. tad evoktam*—PV III 285–286.

<sup>7</sup> It is also noteworthy that Franco rejects the interpretation that the verse aims to

addition, the fact that the meter of the verse is in a standard form (*pathyā*) when read as a compound may reinforce Franco's opinion.<sup>8</sup>

There is, however, at least one uncertainty regarding the reading *pramāṇa-saṃvādi*: In all other instances, Dharmakīrti uses the compound *pramāṇa-saṃvādin* to qualify "speech" (*vacana*). There is no case of it qualifying "cognition" (*jñāna*) except for here.<sup>9</sup> If this compound is indeed the correct reading here, we need an explanation as to why he used it to describe yogic perception.

Before answering this question, however, it would probably be useful to look at Dharmakīrti's description of yogic perception in his other work, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PVin), where he modifies the arguments in his earlier work slightly.

PVin I.28:

*bhāvanābalataḥ spaṣṭaṃ bhayādāv iva bhāsate |  
yaj jñānam avisamvādi tat pratyakṣam akalpakam || 28 ||*

explain yogic perception as being "non-erroneous" (*abhrānta*). Cf. Franco 2011: 86: "The use of the term *pramāṇasaṃvādin* may be a bit surprising at first sight because one might expect that after arguing that awareness of yogis is free from conceptual construction, Dharmakīrti would continue to argue for the second characteristic of perception, namely, *abhrāntatva*. Such an expectation, however, would be anachronistic. While writing the PV, Dharmakīrti did not yet change, perhaps could not yet bring himself to change, Dignāga's definition of perception. Thus, the trustfulness of a yogic perception is grounded in the fact that the object of meditation concurs with a similar object that has been previously established, notably by the Buddhist āgama."

<sup>8</sup> In the case of reading: *pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi*, the meter is *ma-vipulā*. Cf. Franco 2011: 85, fn. 28.

<sup>9</sup> See also Ratnakīrti's proof of *sarvasarvajña*, in which *pramāṇasaṃvādi* is related to *vacana*. SS 31.13–17: *yat pramāṇasaṃvādinīścītārthavacanam tat sāksāt paramparayā [vā] tadarthasāksātkārijñānapūrvakam. yataḥ dahano dāhaka iti vacanam. pramāṇasaṃvādinīścītārthavacanam cedam—kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā* (corr.; *sarvajñasaṃskārā* ed.) *ity arthataḥ kāryahetuḥ*. Cf. Bühnemann 1980: 88–89, Wakahara 1985: 65. On *pramāṇasaṃvādinīścītārthavacana*, my earlier translation "[t]he utterance of objects that are ascertained to be non-belying by [ordinary] means of valid cognition" (Moriyama 2014: 84) should be corrected to "the speech that is consistent with means of valid cognition and that is about objects ascertained [by means of valid cognition]." I

*yoginām api śrutamayena jñānenārthān gṛhītvā yuktacintāmayena vyava-  
sthāpya bhāvayatām tanniṣpattau yat spaṣṭāvabhāsi bhayādāv iva tad avikalpa-  
kam avitathaviṣayaṃ pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣam, āryasatyadarśanavad yathā nir-  
ñītam asmābhiḥ pramāṇavārttike.*

The cognition that appears vividly by the force of meditation,  
as in the case of fear etc., is perception that is non-conceptual  
and reliable. (28)

Having grasped objects through a cognition based on listening [to the Buddha's teaching], and having ascertained [those objects] through a cognition based on reasonable thinking, *yogins* meditate upon [those objects]. Even for them, [a cognition] that appears vividly at the stage of perfection [of meditation] occurs, as in the case of [an ordinary person having a vivid image] of fear, etc. The cognition [that appears vividly for *yogins*] is perception that is non-conceptual and is also a valid cognition with a true object, like the perception of [four] nobles' truths, as ascertained by us in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.<sup>10</sup>

This verse summarizes so many elements of yogic perception that it is difficult to understand without Dharmakīrti's auto-commentary. For example, although the subject of the verse is simply called 'meditative cognition,' the auto-commentary describes it as the final stage of a *yogin's* meditative cognition after preliminary stages of listening to and thinking about the Buddha's teaching. Furthermore, in the verse, there is an ambiguous relationship between the three words "non-conceptual" (*akalpaka*), "reliable" (*avisamvādin*), and "perception" (*pratyakṣa*), qualified by the relational clause, but as is clear from the auto-commentary, the combinations are "perception that is non-conceptual" and "*pramāṇa* that has true objects." For our present concern, it is noteworthy that the term *avisamvādin* is explained as "having a true object" (*avitathaviṣaya*), namely, having an object that has been

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plan to reconsider the meaning of this proof in the future by taking other materials such as TR 41\*, 15–19 into consideration.

<sup>10</sup> This translation basically follows Eltschinger 2009: 192, 198. Eltschinger translates the last part as follows: "The [cognition] ... appears vividly as in such cases of fear [or sorrow, and hence is] non-conceptual [but which also] has a true object [because it bears upon an object that has been formerly ascertained by *pramāṇas*], this is [also] the *pramāṇa* perception."

predetermined as being true through a *pramāṇa* during the stage of rational inquiry into the Buddha's teaching.<sup>11</sup>

The above discussion offers two possible scenarios. According to the first, *saṃvādin* in the PV means the same as *avisamvādin* in the PVin: "having true objects that are predetermined by *pramāṇa*, i.e., inference," and thus there is no crucial difference between the two texts.<sup>12</sup> According to the second scenario, which accepts the reading *pramāṇasaṃvādin*, only the PV describes a yogic perception as being consistent with other *pramāṇas*, and thus the expressions in the two texts must be considered in isolation. If this second case is accepted, it is unclear why Dharmakīrti chose the word *pramāṇasaṃvādin* to define yogic perception, since, as mentioned above, he otherwise uses it to qualify speech. This makes sense if it is only the *yogin's* words that are being considered, a possibility that is almost out of the question in Dharmakīrti's argument. However, as we will see in the next section, Prajñākara Gupta and his followers consider this possibility in their examination of whether the Buddha's omniscience can be seen as a kind of yogic perception.

<sup>11</sup> According to Dharmottara, by the paraphrase *avitathaviṣayatva*, Dharmakīrti intends to show that the term *avisamvādin* in the verse means "being non-erroneous," namely, the second qualifier of perception. Cf. PVinT D 117b7–118a1, P 135b8–136a2: *phyin ci ma log pa ste* (D; *ste om. P*) *bden pa'i yul can gang yin pa'o* || *'dis ni tshig le'ur byas pa las gang zhig slu ba med pa can gyi sgrar brjod pa ma 'khrul pa nyid brjod pa yin no* || *des na bsgoms pa las gsal bar snang ba nyid yin la* | *des na rnam par mi rtog pa yin zhing tshad ma'i yul bsgoms pas kyang 'khrul pa med pa nyid ni rnal 'byor pa'i mngon sum du bstan pa yin te* | *mngon sum gzhan bzhin no* || *mngon sum gzhan yang 'di lta bur gyur pa kho na yin no* || "[The word *avitathaviṣayam* means] "having true objects." By this, what is said by the expression *yaj... avisamvādi* in the verse explains "being non-erroneous" (*abhrānta*). Therefore, since a cognition has a vivid appearance because of the meditation, it is non-conceptual. Moreover, it is also non-erroneous because of meditation on the object of a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇaviṣaya*). The cognition is taught as yogic perception, like other perception. Other perceptions should be likewise (i.e., non-conceptual and non-erroneous)."

<sup>12</sup> By using Kamalaśīla's expression, we can understand this *saṃvādin=avisamvādin* in the sense of "having an object that is well established by *pramāṇa*" (*pramāṇa-prasiddhārthaviṣayatva*). Cf. TSP (*ad* TS 3443) 1084, 21f.: *sphuṭapratibhāsitvenā-vikalpatayā pramāṇaprasiddhārthaviṣayatvenāvisamvāditayā cakṣurādijñānavat pratyakṣapramāṇam etat (=śūnyādijñānam)*; McClintock 2010: 228.

## 2. Prajñākaragupta's explanation of yogic perception and its reliability

In the Sāṅkṛtyāyana edition of the PVA, Prajñākaragupta adds a long argument on yogic perception and the omniscience of the Buddha immediately after the verse 286 in question, beginning with the following passage, which looks like a paraphrase of the verse:

PVA 327.32–33: *yat khalu bhāvanābalabhāvitve 'py avisamvādasambhavi prāgnirñitavastu paralokacaturāryasatyādikam tadviṣayam eva pratyakṣam, na tu kāmādiviṣayam.*

Indeed, [yogic] perception is nothing other than [cognition] that has as its object an entity that has already been established [by other *pramāṇas*], such as other worlds [in transmigration] and the four nobles' truths, and that is possible to be reliable, even though [the entity] arises through the force of meditation. On the other hand, [yogic perception] does not have objects of desire, etc., as its object.<sup>13</sup>

There are certainly several expressions used in this passage that would lead one to expect a connection to v. 286. But as Franco points out, we should pay attention to the absence of any term corresponding to *pramāṇa*. If we understand *avisamvādasambhavi* as a gloss of *pramāṇasamvādi*, the passage would support the reading *pramāṇasamvādi*. Moreover, since the relational clause is used as a description of the “object” of yogic perception, again as Franco points out, we may assume that Prajñākaragupta has understood *-vat* as a possessive suffix, not as an analogical suffix. So understood, the passage would certainly be an explanation of the verse, but there still remain some problems. One of the most puzzling is that other worlds (*paraloka*) in transmigration, which are inaccessible through ordinary perception and inference,<sup>14</sup> are mentioned here as an object of yogic perception. As far as Dharmakīrti's verses in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter (PV II) are concerned, there is no passage supporting the perception of other worlds by *yogins*, not even by the Buddha. In contrast, Prajñākaragupta's commentary provides an extensive argument for the Buddha's omniscience that covers all existences in transmigration and the connections of various deeds and their results.<sup>15</sup> How can we explain this difference?

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Franco 2011: 85, fn. 28, Moriyama 2023: 116.

<sup>14</sup> PVA<sub>O</sub> 77.11: *pratyakṣādipramāṇena paraloko na gamyate* | (220ab)

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, PVA *ad* PV 136–137.

An important key for understanding the passage and the subsequent long discussion related to the Buddha's omniscience (PVA 327,32–331,9) is the insertion of the phrase "*ity antaraślokaḥ*." Although the phrase is not printed in Sāṅkrtyāyana's edition, it is found in the PVA manuscript (MsB) and the Tibetan translation. What is *antaraśloka*? In his discussion of such an intermediate verse (*antaraśloka*, *Eingeschobener Vers*) in Dharmakīrti's PVin, Tilmann Vetter states that the verse contains its author's independent thought and thus requires no further commentary or explanation.<sup>16</sup> This characteristic is also applicable to the case of Prajñākaragupta's commentary.<sup>17</sup> For instance, PV III 3, which distinguishes between *śvalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* from the viewpoint of the capability of purposeful action (*arthakriyāsāmārthya*), is considered an *antaraśloka* by Prajñākaragupta. Following this verse, Prajñākaragupta presents his own extensive argument on the ascertainment of a causal relation and its impossibility. The same is true in the discussion after PV III 286, where Prajñākaragupta develops his own ideas on the Buddha's omniscience as yogic perception in detail, especially from the viewpoint of how to distinguish the Buddha from other, heretical, teachers. Accordingly, it is probably best to separate Prajñākaragupta's argument from the problem of how to read Dharmakīrti's verse in question.<sup>18</sup>

What, then, did Prajñākaragupta explain in the text following the verse? Among the several arguments he presents, the key point consists in a

<sup>16</sup> Vetter 1966:7. On *antaraśloka*, Mimaki (1980) provides a detailed examination and concludes that it is impossible to find a common principle among the various ways the expression is used in different texts.

<sup>17</sup> The following verses are marked as intermediate verses: PV II 215–216 (PVA 146.25–28), PV III 3 (PVA 175.11–12), PV III 215–217 (PVA 288.31–289.4), PVA III (Prajñākara's verses) 614–615 (PVA 344.3–4), PV III 316 (PVA 347.12–13), PV III 528cd–529ab (PVA 459.24–25), PV III 532 (PVA 460.26–27), PV IV 61 (PVA 507.29–30), PV IV 99–101 (PVA 526.3–8), PVA IV (Prajñākara's verses) 176–179 (PVA 531.10–14). Cf. Mimaki 1980.

<sup>18</sup> Of course, we should not overlook the fact that among Prajñākaragupta's followers, Ravigupta did comment on this verse. Unfortunately, however, his commentary lacks any glosses on *pāda* a of PV III 286, and therefore, it is unclear which reading he supports. Cf. PVR D 111a6–b1, P 134b1–3: *de la ste, goms pa'i bdag nyid kyī shes pa dag gi nang nas, shes pa gang zhig tshad ma yin pa—de la rjes su dpag pas dgag par mi nus pa de ni sngar le'u gnyis par 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi'i dngos po rnam par dpyad pa ste | shes pa gang la de gzung bar yod pa—de nyid goms pa'i stobs las skyes*

discussion on the Buddha's omniscience as being distinguished from the knowledge of other, heretical, teachers, as follows<sup>19</sup>:

PVA 328.10:

*tāthāgate hi vacasi pramāsaṃvāda īkṣyate |  
pramāṇabādhā tv anyeṣāṃ ato draṣṭā tathāgataḥ || 532 ||*

In the Buddha's words, indeed, one observes [their] consistency with [our] valid cognition (*pramāsaṃvāda*). [In the words] of others (i.e., heretical authorities), on the other hand, there is refutation through [our]

*pa'i shes pa mngon sum gyi tshad mar 'dod la | lhag ma zad par sa la sogs par snang ba ni bslad pa yin no ||* "Among these, namely, among cognitions that has meditation as its nature, a certain cognition is a means of valid cognition. Of them, [cognition] that is undeniable by inference is **the cognition in which the entities ascertained previously** in the second chapter (i.e., PV II), namely, the four nobles' truths, **exist** as its object. Only such [cognition] is accepted as **the perception as a valid cognition that arises by the power of meditation**. The others like [cognition] with the appearance of the entire earth [in the air] **are delusions**." According to this explanation, the term *prāṇinirṇītavastuvāt* seems to be understood with the possessive suffix *-vāt* for denoting a cognition of an object that is undeniable by inference. Since there is no word corresponding to the term *saṃvādin* in this Tibetan translation, the text is still uncertain. To understand the passage smoothly, for example, the correction of *gang zhig tshad mas 'thad pa* (\**yat pramāṇasaṃvādi*) for *gang zhig tshad ma* seems suitable, but I would leave it open. However, if we pay attention to the phrase "undeniable by inference" (*rjes su dpag pas dgag par mi nus pa*), it seems more likely that he keeps the variant *pramāṇasaṃvādi* in mind, though not decisive. That Ravigupta probably supports the variant is also known from the following part. Cf. PVR D 111b1–2, P 134b3–4: '*o na gal te zad par sa la sogs pa rnal 'byor pas mthong na ci ste* (corr.; *ste | DP*) *mi bden par 'gyur zhe na | rnal 'byor pa la snang ba tsam gyis* (D; *gyi P*) *bden pa ma yin te | 'on kyang 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi lta bur tshad ma dang ldan pa yin no || tshad mas dpyad na zad par sa la sogs pa gnas pa ma yin pa'i phyir* (corr.; *phyir | DP*) *mi bden pa yin no ||* "[Objection:] If [objects] like the entire earth [in the air] are observed by a *yogin*, why would [those objects] be untrue? [Those objects would be also true.][Reply:] It is not the case that [those objects] are true merely because they appear to the *yogin*'s [cognition]. Rather, [true objects] are based on the means of valid cognition (\**prāmaṇika*), like the four nobles' truths. Since[objects] like the entire earth [in the air] do not remain after [their] examination [by means of valid cognition], they are untrue." The term *tshad ma dang ldan pa* (\**prāmaṇika*) seems to be related to *pramāṇasaṃvādin* in some manners.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Moriyama 2023: 117, 119.



valid cognition. Therefore, [only] the Buddha is the seer [of the truth]. (v. 532)

PVA 328.19: *tasmāt param pratipādayatā śakyapariccheda evetaraiḥ pratipādayitavyaḥ.*

Therefore, [first of all,] nothing but an [object] verifiable (*śakyapariccheda*) by other people [like us] should be taught by one who teaches another person.

Unlike the words of heretical teachers, the Buddha's words have objects that withstand verification through our perception and inference. By qualifying the Buddha's words with the term *pramāṇasaṃvāda*, Prajñākaragupta explains that the Buddha's wisdom of true nature, like selflessness (*nairātyma*), namely, the Buddha's firm and consistent cognition of all aspects of entities, is known from his words, as follows<sup>20</sup> :

PVA 329.4–6:

*bhāvanābalato jñānam bāhyānām api bhāvi cet |  
tad etad iṣyate 'smābhiḥ sarvākāraṇaṃ tu tāyinaṃ || 550 ||*

*sthiraṃ avyākulaṃ bhāvanairātmyādipravedanam | (Ci' TR 41\*, 9)  
rāgādīvyākulatvān na tīrthyānām vedanaṃ tathā || 551 ||*

*evambhūtāc ca vacasas tatkartur jñānavadgaṭiḥ |  
parisuddhaṃ vaco nāsti parisuddhavidam vinā || 552 || (Ci' TR 41\*, 11–12)*

[Objection:] The cognition [that arises] by the force of meditation will occur even for others (*bāhya*, i.e., non-Buddhists). [Reply:] We accept this [meditative cognition that is common to others]. However, [the cognition] endowed with all aspects (*ākāra*) [of all entities] (i.e., omniscience) [occurs only] to protectors (*tāyins*, i.e., *buddhas*). (v. 550)

[That is,] the firm (*sthira*) and confusion-free (*avyākula*) cognition of selflessness, etc., of [all] entities [occurs to protectors]. The cognition of heretics is not the same because [they] are confused due to desire, etc. (v. 551)

Moreover, from such words [of a speaker], one understands the speaker has the knowledge [of what he/she speaks]. Without the knowledge

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Moriyama 2023: 122–123.

that is purified [by means of valid cognition], no speech that is purified [by means of valid cognition] occurs.<sup>21</sup> (v. 552)

There is a great difference between the Buddha's wisdom and those of heretics, even though they both have cognitions arising from meditation. Unlike the meditative cognitions of heretics, the Buddha's wisdom of selflessness, etc., is qualified by three conditions, namely, "free from confusion" (*avyākula*), "firm" (*sthira*), and "having all aspects [of entities]" (*sarvākāra*). Of these three conditions, the last two correspond to the last two of three conditions that Dharmakīrti uses to describe the Buddha's wisdom, namely, "true" (*tattva*), "firm" (*sthira*), and "without reminder" (*aśeṣa*). According to Prajñākaragupta, such wisdom of the Buddha corresponds to "auspicious cognition" (*praśastajñāna*), "cognition that will never return" (*apunarāvṛttijñāna*), and "cognition of all aspects [of entities]" (*sarvākārajñāna*), respectively.<sup>22</sup> Thus, if we follow Prajñākaragupta's interpretation, the cognition of all aspects of entities (*sarvākārajñāna*) as a kind of omniscience falls within the scope of this discussion, which allows us to read PV III 286 as a description of how we can affirm the Buddha's omniscience by verifying his words through our perception and inference.

In this connection, it may be useful to recall Prajñākaragupta's term "one who knows all true natures that are purified (i.e., determined) by means of valid cognition" (*pramāṇapariśuddhasakalatattvajña*), which he uses to describe the Buddha's special cognition. Since I have already discussed this concept on another occasion, I will not repeat it here in all details.<sup>23</sup> The point of the term is that it presupposes the second criterion used by Dharmakīrti for explaining the reliability of scriptures. As is well known, when commenting on Dignāga's passage on the similarity between inference and scripture (the words of an authoritative person, *āptavāda*), Dharmakīrti offers two

<sup>21</sup> As Yamāri's commentary shows, the term *pariśuddha* in this verse means "consistent with the means of valid cognition" (*tshad mas 'thad pa, \*pramāṇasaṃvādin*), namely, "[whose object is] determined by *pramāṇa*." Cf. Y D 237a4–5, P 320a1–2: *tshad mas 'thad pa'i* (P; *de ltar 'gyur ba'i* D) *don gsungs pa'i tshig las de byed de, de tshig byed pa po mkhyen pa dang ldan par rtogs so* ||

<sup>22</sup> Cf. PVA 164,26–29. This interpretation presupposes that the verb  $\sqrt{\text{gam}}$  means "to apprehend" (*bodhārthatvād gamer*, PV II 280).

<sup>23</sup> Moriyama 2011, 2014: 86–88. See also Wakahara 1985.

interpretations of the “reliability” (*avisaṃvāda*) of scriptures: (1) if a scripture teaches things that are undeniable through perception and the two sorts of inference, the scripture is reliable even with respect to objects beyond the senses; (2) if a scripture establishes what is to be abandoned and what is to be obtained, together with the means thereof, it is reliable with respect to the primary purpose of human beings.<sup>24</sup>

Of the two, in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, Dharmakīrti applies the second interpretation to the Buddha’s wisdom, stating that one who tells the truths of what is to be abandoned and what is to be obtained, together with the means thereof, should be sought as the ‘means of valid cognition’ (*pramāṇa*).<sup>25</sup> In contrast, Prajñākaragupta explains that the meaning of the Buddha’s being *pramāṇa* is that he is not only the one who knows the primary human purpose (*pradhānapuruṣārthajñā*), but also the one who knows all true natures that are purified by means of valid cognition (*pramāṇapariśuddhasakalatattvajñā*). This means that Prajñākaragupta again describes the Buddha’s wisdom in line with the first interpretation of *avisaṃvāda*, which Dharmakīrti neglects in PV II. In other words, what Prajñākaragupta has done here is to overlap the Buddha as the one who knows the four nobles’ truths with the Buddha as the one who knows everything that is verifiable by us through our means of valid cognition, and beyond that, to depict the Buddha as knowing extrasensory matters like other worlds (*paraloka*). While the teachings about other worlds in transmigration are not verifiable to us, if all verifiable matters are correct, then we should also rely on his teachings on extrasensory matters, as his wisdom thereof can be presupposed.

A similar trend can be seen in Prajñākaragupta’s discussion of verse 286, where he presents an extended understanding of the verse as applicable to the Buddha’s omniscience. From his viewpoint, it is fully understandable to qualify the *yogin*’s cognition, especially the Buddha’s wisdom, with the

<sup>24</sup> PV I 215: *pratyakṣānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam | drṣṭādrṣṭārthayor asyāvisaṃvādas tadarthayoḥ ||*; PVSV 109.3–4: *seyam śakyaparicchedāśeṣaviśayaviśuddhir avisaṃvādaḥ*; PV I 217: *heyopādeyatattoṣya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ | pradhānārthāvisaṃvādād anumānam paratra vā ||*; PVSV 109.15: *heyopādeyatadupāyānām tadupadiṣṭānām avai-parītyam avisaṃvādaḥ. yathā caturṇām āryasatyānām vakṣyamāṇanītyā. Cf. Tillemans 1999: 27f.*

<sup>25</sup> Cf. PV II 32: *heyopādeyatattoṣya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ | yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ ||*. Cf. Moriyama 2014: 256.

term “being consistent with *pramāṇa*” (*pramāṇasaṃvādin*) in order to suggest the possibility that this wisdom covers even objects beyond the senses, such as other worlds. If the Buddha’s teaching is concluded as being correct with respect to objects verifiable by our perception and inference, we can distinguish his wisdom from the cognitions of heretics, which are unreliable although they are also meditative cognitions. In addition, the reliability of the Buddha’s wisdom about all verifiable objects enables one to believe in the reliability of his wisdom even about objects beyond the senses, such as other worlds. In this manner, the meaning of Prajñākaragupta’s passage that we looked at in the beginning of this section is now clear. Moreover, it may be a bit clearer that the variant reading of *pramāṇasaṃvādi* reflects Prajñākaragupta’s independent opinion.

### 3. Jñānaśrīmitra’s explanation of yogic perception and its reliability

#### 3.1 Reliability of yogic perception regarding properties of entities (*vastudharma*)

The last material we will examine here regarding the problem of PV III 286 is found in Jñānaśrīmitra’s *Yoginirṇaya*. At the beginning of this treatise, the subject is presented in the form of the following proof formula<sup>26</sup>:

YN 323, 3–5: *yad yad bhāvvyate tat tad bhāvanāprakarsaparyante sphuṭābhaṇi sambhavati, yathā kāmukasya kāmīnyākāraḥ. bhāvvyante ca paramapuruṣārthinā kṣaṇikatvanairātmyādayo vastudharmā iti.*

[Pervasion:] Whatever is the object of meditation has its vivid appearance in the final stage of meditation, like the image for the love-sick person of [their] lover.

[The reason’s attribution to the subject:] The properties of entities (*vastudharma*), such as impermanence and selflessness, are the objects meditated upon by one who seeks the primary purpose of human beings.

The appearances of objects that are reflected in the mind through meditation and imagination eventually become vivid appearances through repeated meditation and imagination. This is a modification of PV III 285, which states that such meditative cognition is non-conceptual but does not mention

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Steinkellner 1978: 130, Moriyama 2021: 250.

any distinction as to whether the object is true or untrue.<sup>27</sup> Since the above formula does not explain the cognition's being necessarily consistent (*saṃvādanīyama*) with the true object, the cognition's being valid cognition (*prāmāṇya*) is not concluded.<sup>28</sup> To this, the Buddhist might claim that since an entity (*vastu*) as the object of meditation is predetermined to be true by inference, there is no possibility for the meditative cognition to deviate from that entity, and thus, in the same manner, a yogic perception that arises from the meditative cognition does not deviate from that entity. However, even if the meditative cognition has as its object an entity that has been determined by inference, the cognition's consistency with the same entity is denied because the entity has already perished when the cognition occurs. It is precisely in this context that PV III 286 (with the reading *pramāṇam saṃvādi*) is cited, followed by this explanation<sup>29</sup>:

YN 324, 4–12: *yat punar astaṅgate 'pi<sup>30</sup> vastuny ākārāntarabhāji vāsthirākāratayā<sup>31</sup> bhāvanājasya<sup>32</sup> nirālambanatvam āpaditaṃ sarvasya, tad api vastubhāvanāpakṣe śobhate, na vastudharmabhāvanāpakṣe. vastudharmāś ca kṣaṇikatvādayaḥ saṃsāravairāgyāt sphuṭībhāvabhājo bhāvayitum upakrāntāḥ.*

*athaikatra pramāṇapariśuddhe 'pi bhāvanājanitavaiśadyasya vastuni viśaṃvādasamdarśanād anyatrāpi ka āśvāsaḥ, pramāṇapariśuddhim antareṇāśvāsa-hetor anyasyābhāvāt,<sup>33</sup> tasyāś ca saṃvādanīyatāv asāmarthyāt.*

*tan na, sthirāsthiraviśayatvena viśeṣāt. asthiraṃ hi vastu pradhvaṃsa-vikārabhyāṃ grasyata iti na saṃvādaḥ. vastudharmāś tu kṣaṇikatvādayo na kadācid vicchidyanta iti tadviśayaḥ sphuṭībhāvaḥ sarvadā sālambana eva.*

[Objection:] However, even though an entity (*vastu*) has already perished or has another form (i.e., has changed), [the fallacy] that all cognitions that arise from meditation have no objective support, inasmuch as they have unstable forms, fits the position [that accepts] meditation

<sup>27</sup> See previous fn. 5.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. YN 323, 5–7.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Moriyama 2021: 254. However, some modifications to the previous (Japanese) translation are made in the following translation.

<sup>30</sup> Read *astaṅgate 'pi*; *astaṃ gate 'pi* Thakur ed.

<sup>31</sup> Read *vāsthirākāratayā*; *vā sthirākāratayā* Thakur ed.

<sup>32</sup> Corr. *bhāvanājasya*; *bhāvanā, yasya* Thakur ed., Ms (in Franco 2008).

<sup>33</sup> Corr. *anyasyābhāvāt*; *apy asyābhāvāt* Thakur ed., Ms (in Franco 2008).

on entities (*vastubhāvanā*), but not the position [that accepts] meditation on the properties of entities (*vastudharmabhāvanā*). And [precisely] properties of entities like impermanence, which will appear vividly after one no longer desires transmigration, are [now] commenced [to be meditated upon].

[Objection:] Even if one (i.e., property) is purified by means of valid cognition, how can there be confidence in the other (i.e., entity), since it can be seen that the vivid cognition [that arises] due to meditation is inconsistent with the entity? For there is no other ground for confidence than the purification by means of valid cognition (*pramāṇapariśuddhi*), and it is not capable [to guarantee] that [the cognition] is necessarily consistent [with the entity].

[Reply:] That's not true, because [two meditative cognitions] are distinguished by whether it has a firm object or not. For there is no consistency [of a meditative cognition with an entity] because an unstable entity is destroyed through perishing and changing. On the other hand, since properties of entities such as momentariness are never interrupted, the vivid appearance that has that [property of momentariness] as its object always has the objective support (*sālabhāna*).

Here, Jñānaśrīmitra uses the term “consistent” (*saṃvāda*) in the sense of “having an objective support” (*sālabhāna*). By introducing a new aspect to yogic perception, namely, whether the object of this perception is an entity (*vastu*) that changes and perishes from moment to moment, or is a property (*vastudharma*) that neither changes nor perishes, he argues that yogic perception is consistent with properties of entities such as momentariness, but not with unstable entities. And since the property is predetermined to be true by inference, yogic cognition arising from the meditation on the property is said to have objective support.

Interestingly, Jñānaśrīmitra introduces an objection here, claiming that one should have no confidence in yogic perception because its object, namely, the entity (*vastu*), is not determined to be true through the purification by means of valid cognition, even though its property (*vastudharma*) is purified in this way. This objection reminds us of Prajñākaragupta's discussion mentioned in the previous section. That is, the Buddha knows all true natures (*tattva*) like impermanence, which are purified (i.e., determined) by means of valid cognition, but this does not mean that he knows extrasensory matters like *paraloka*. But Prajñākaragupta, following Dharmakīrti's first interpretation

of *avisamvāda*, holds that the purification of all true natures guarantees the Buddha's knowledge of extrasensory matters. This position seems to be criticized by the present objection in YN, if the term *vastu* implies such extrasensory matters. To this, Jñānaśrīmitra avoids a direct response and argues that the object of yogic perception should be limited to the properties of entities, which serve the ultimate purpose of human beings. This would suggest, in other words, that Jñānaśrīmitra may have been aware of the possibility of the reading *pramāṇasaṃvādi* with respect to PV III 286, but rejected it and regarded yogic perception as valid cognition inasmuch as it is consistent with properties of entities.<sup>34</sup>

### 3.2 The reliability of yogic perception regarding past, present, and future entities

The above view, however, does not exhaust Jñānaśrīmitra's thoughts on the reliability of yogic perception in the YN. In another part, where he discusses the Buddha as *sarvasarvajña*, i.e., one who knows everything whatsoever, he considers the topic of the Buddha's cognition of past and future entities, but not their properties. On the status of this kind of omniscience, Jñānaśrīmitra first points out that neither Dharmakīrti nor Prajñākaragupta necessarily regard it as indispensable, because cessation of suffering is established only through meditation on impermanence, etc., and teaching for the sake of others is also performed through meditation. However, this does not imply that Jñānaśrīmitra himself rejects the necessity of *sarvasarvajña*. He states:

YN 330.13–17: *yadi punas tadavasthāprāptau nirāvaraṇāntaḥkaraṇasya kārūṇyātīśayāt sarvākāraparārthaprārthanaparayatā sakalagocaracāriṇi cetasi ciravirūḍhotsāhasya tādr̥gupāyaviśeṣādhiḡamo bhaviṣyati, yam anuṭiṣṭhataḥ pratiparamāṇu sarvavastuviśayaṃ yathādeśakālaṃ pratyavasthānukāri sphuṭataraṃ jñānam udīyāt, tadā na tāvad vastuvyabhicārakṛtaṃ viśamvāditvaṃ, nāpi nirālambanatvaṃ, vastūnām eva pratibhāsanāt.*

<sup>34</sup> It is quite clear that defining the object of yogic perception as universal properties like momentariness is contradictory to the definition that the object of perception is particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*). On the problem of the object of yogic perception, I gave a presentation at the 6th International Dharmakīrti Conference, held in Seoul in 2022, titled "Dharmakīrti and Jñānaśrīmitra on the Object of Yogic Perception," which will be published in the near future.

If, on the other hand, when one who has removed obstructions of the internal organ attains this state (i.e., the perfection of meditation on impermanence, etc.)—since a clearer cognition covering all objects, including each atom, and imitating each state [of those objects] in accordance with their time and place occurs for one who does this—the apprehension of such special means (*upāyaviśeṣa*) will occur to that same one who makes long-lasting efforts for cognition that acts toward all domains [of entities] (i.e., omniscience) due to special compassion, by devoting himself to searching for the benefit of others in all aspects, then, [his cognition] is free from the unreliability (*viśaṃvāditva*) caused by deviation from so many entities and is free from ‘having no objective support’ (*nirālambanatva*), because only entities appear [to that cognition].<sup>35</sup>

As clearly stated here, Jñānaśrīmitra accepts the possibility of *sarvasarvajña*, one who knows all entities, including each individual atom, in the way that those entities are, have been, or will be. Even if an entity is past and no longer exists, a *sarvasarvajña* knows it as it was in the past, and even if it is in the future, he knows it as it will be in the future. The important point is that the ‘objective support’ is not defined here based on both causality (*utpatti*) and similarity (*sārūpya*), but based on similarity alone.<sup>36</sup> Unlike our everyday cognition, whose reliability is due to both its causal connection and similarity to external entities, the cognition of the omniscient being is said to be reliable simply because it has mental images similar to those entities, generated through meditation. Jñānaśrīmitra’s example for this type of cognition is a true dream (*satyasvapna*) by a divine force, through which one can foresee an object without actually seeing it.<sup>37</sup>

However, can we say that such ‘past,’ ‘present,’ and ‘future’ entities presented to people as true by the omniscient being to whom those entities appear without causal connection, exist in such a way that they fulfill people’s purposeful actions? Jñānaśrīmitra’s reply is given by appealing

<sup>35</sup> Cf. Moriyama 2011: 335.

<sup>36</sup> Jñānaśrīmitra defines ‘objective support’ (*ālambana*) from the ultimate viewpoint as follows (YN 330, 25–26): *tattvatas tu yad eva yatra pratibhāsate, tad eva tasyālambanam ucyate*.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. YN 331, 5–10.



to the notion of *adhyavasāya* that takes a mental image as an ‘object’ with a temporal and spatial differentiation:

YN 332.1–4: *yady api ca vartamāne ‘pi jñānākārasyaiva sphuraṇam, tathā-pi vartamānatayaivādhyavasāyas tatra. evaṃ dūrāsannādibhede ‘pi vedī-tavyam. tatra yathādhyavasāyaprāptau niyamena saṃvādāt prāmāṇyam, anyadā viparyayaḥ, yathā svapnakāmīnyādau.*

Even if only the mental image [of the object] appears clearly with respect to the object in the present, then in that case [the mental image is] interpreted as a “present one.” On the difference between remote and near, too, one should understand it likewise. Since the [cognition] is necessarily reliable with respect to the obtainment [of the object] as it is interpreted, [the cognition] is a valid cognition. Otherwise, it is contrary, like [the cognition] of a lover in a dream.

While the Buddha’s meditative cognition is itself non-temporal, *adhyavasāya* takes the role of creating the distinction of time, and by doing so, the reliability of the Buddha’s cognitions of past, present, and future entities are justified through one’s successful action based on his teachings.

As one soon notices, this explanation is parallel to the explanation of the reliability of inference<sup>38</sup>. Even if a mental image of fire-ness appears in the conceptual cognition of the one who is inferring, due to *adhyavasāya*, the mental image is interpreted as an ‘object’ (*artha*) and one undertakes an action towards it. Thus, inference is said to be a reliable cognition with respect to the object that one intends. The same is true for the Buddha’s cognitions of past and future entities, whose reliability is ascertained by one’s successful action based on his teachings.

#### 4. Conclusion

In the above, we have examined how the reliability or consistency (*avisamvāda/samvāda*) of yogic perception was discussed by the Buddhist *pramāṇa-vādins* Dharmakīrti, Prajñākaragupta, and Jñānaśrīmitra, especially focusing on the variants of PV III 286. From this examination, we may conclude three different meanings for the *avisamvāda/samvāda* of a cognition as follows:

<sup>38</sup> PVin II 46,7–8: *svapratibhāse ‘narthe ‘rthādhyavasāyena pravartanād bhrāntir apy artha-sambandhena tadavyabhicārāt pramāṇam.* For a detailed analysis of this passage, see

- α) Non-belying with respect to the object being intended;
- β) Consistent with an object that was previously determined through another means of valid cognition;
- γ) Consistent with our means of valid cognition (i.e., perception and inference).

Of the three, α) is the best-known meaning of *avisamvāda*. It is explained with the notion of “purposeful action” (*arthakriyā*). In an ordinary cognition, regardless of whether it is through perception or inference, its validity is equal to its being non-belying with respect to the object that one intends to obtain. Similarly, the reliability of the cognition of a *yogin* who perceives every particular entities (*sarvasarvajña*) is explained by relying on this type of *avisamvāda*/*samvāda*. As Jñānaśrīmitra argues, when an omniscient being perceives past and future entities through the power of meditation, that perception’s reliability is understood by the evidence that people can attain those entities as they have been indicated by the omniscient being, namely, at a certain time and place. It is due to the function of *adhyavasāya* that a mental image that appears in the omniscient being’s meditative cognition is interpreted as a past or future entity as people believe it to be. Therefore, any entity taught by the omniscient being certainly exists as fitting into the purposeful actions of people.

The second meaning β) is found in Dharmakīrti’s account of yogic perception, where a perception’s reliability is explained by its consistency with an object determined to be true through a *pramāṇa* in a preliminary stage before meditation. Dharmakīrti does not discuss the nature of such objects, but Jñānaśrīmitra offers the clear explanation that such objects should be the properties of entities (*vastudharma*) such as impermanence, which neither changes nor perishes.

Lastly, γ) is required in cases where one needs verification of an omniscient being’s words in order to differentiate them from heretical teachings. The idea originally comes from Dharmakīrti’s first interpretation of *avisamvāda* regarding a reliable person’s words. Since the words of such a person are consistent with our perceptions and inferences and with respect to all that is verifiable, it is concluded that the words of this person are possibly also consistent with objects beyond the senses, like *paraloka*. By

relying on this argument, Prajñākaragupta uses the expression “cognition that is purified (i.e., determined) [by *pramāṇa*]” as the cause of “words that are purified [by *pramāṇa*].” In this case, yogic perception can be understood as a cognition that is consistent with means of valid cognition (*pramāṇasaṃvādin*) as the variant reading of PV III 286 shows. However, this makes sense specifically in the lineage of Prajñākaragupta, who attempted to demonstrate the intersection between the Buddha’s omniscience and yogic perception.

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As mentioned above, this paper was inspired by a footnote in an article by Professor Eli Franco on yogic perception (Franco 2011). I deeply admire the scholarship of Professor Franco, my “Doktorvater.” He was able to weave a wide range of knowledge about Indian philosophy into that single footnote, presenting thereby several particularly innovative ideas. I hope this modest response can be seen as compensation for the many scholarly favors he has long bestowed on me.

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- PS II *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga), Chapter II (=Svārthānumāna).
- PV<sub>Mi</sub> *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti). See Miyasaka 1971/72.
- PV I *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti), Chapter I (=Svārthānumāna). See PVSV.
- PV III *Pramāṇavārttika*, Chapter III (=Pratyakṣa). Sanskrit text in Tosaki 1979.

- PVA *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*. Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta: Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam*. Patna 1953.
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- PVP *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (Devendrabuddhi). Tibetan translation. D 4217/P 5717.
- PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasaṃvṛtti* (Dharmakīrti). Ed. R. Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti*. Rome 1960.
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- SS *Sarvajñasiddhi* (Ratnakīrti). In: Ed. A. Thakur, *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalīḥ*. Patna 1975. Second revised edition. 1–31.
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- TR *Tarkarāhasya*. Ed. H. Yaita, *Three Sanskrit Texts from the Buddhist Pramāṇa-Tradition*. Narita 2005.
- TS/TSP *Tattvasaṅgraha* (Śāntarakṣita)/*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla). Ed. S. D. Shastri, *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*. 2 vols. Varanasi 1968. Reprint 1981–1982.
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Prajñākaragupta's Interpretation of  
Dharmakīrti's Two Definitions of *pramāṇa*  
A Reconsideration Based on the Newly Discovered Sanskrit  
Manuscript of Yamāri's Commentary\*

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**0. Introduction**

At the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (=PV), Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) provides a general view of *pramāṇa* (valid cognition/means of valid cognition). Dharmakīrti's commentators have regarded this passage (PV II 1–7) as presenting his definition of *pramāṇa* and have attempted to explain its meaning. Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810) too, based on his distinctive view that the Buddha-Bhagavat is the true/primary *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇabhūta*),<sup>1</sup> which gives rise to a more profound and complete kind of knowledge than the two conventional *pramāṇas* of perception and inference, has given his own interpretation of this “definition

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\* This paper which has been read at the occasion of the Workshop “Prajñākaragupta and Yamāri” (hosted by Prof. Eli Franco in Leipzig at 28. June–1. July 2019) is the revised and enlarged English version of a paper that was presented at the 64<sup>th</sup> conference of the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies held at Matsue from 31 August to 1 September 2013 (Japanese proceedings of the conference have been already published; cf. Ono 2014). I have also written in Japanese an overview of commentators' interpretations of Dharmakīrti's definition of *pramāṇa* (cf. Ono 2012: 166–178), which also contains a description of Prajñākaragupta's interpretation. The present paper aims at deepening my view shown in these two previous Japanese articles by using the newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript of Yamāri's commentary. I would like to express my deep gratitude to the China Tibetology Research Center, Prof. Eli Franco and his team (Dr. Junjie Chu and Dr. Hiroko Matsuoka) for kindly providing me the provisional critical edition of the Sanskrit manuscript of Yamāri's commentary. I am also grateful to Prof. John Taber, who kindly corrected my English and gave me many valuable suggestions.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Iwata 2000; Iwata 2001; Ono 2013; Ono 2020.

of *pramāṇa*.” That he regarded the so-called two definitions of *pramāṇa* (PV II 1a and 5c) as definitions of “conventional *pramāṇa*” (*sāṃvṛtyavahārikapramāṇa*)<sup>2</sup> and “ultimate *pramāṇa*” (*pāramārthikapramāṇa*), respectively, is well known and has been repeatedly mentioned by Tibetan commentators and modern scholars alike.<sup>3</sup> In my opinion, however, the significance of Prajñākara-gupta’s interpretation has yet to be completely clarified. This paper aims at reconsidering Prajñākara-gupta’s interpretation and his justification of it by investigating the relevant passages of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (=PVA) with the help of the newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript of Yamāri’s commentary (=PVAN).

### 1. Dharmakīrti’s “Definition of *pramāṇa*”

In PV II 1–7,<sup>4</sup> *pramāṇa* seems to be defined by two statements: “A *pramāṇa* is non-belying/reliable cognition (1ab’: *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam*)” and “Or [a *pramāṇa* is] that which reveals an unknown object (5c: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*).” As we shall see in more detail later, commentators such as Devendra-buddhi (ca. 630–690) have regarded both statements together as a defi-

<sup>2</sup> As to the English translation of the word “*sāṃvṛtyavahārika*,” see Franco 2022: 131 n.1.

<sup>3</sup> The bibliography of this paper includes only a selection of such studies.

<sup>4</sup> PV II 1–7: *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ | avisamvādanam śābde ‘py abhiprāyanivedanāt || vaktṛvyāpāraviśayo yo ‘rtho buddhau prakāśate | prāmāṇyam tatra śābdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam || grhītagrahaṇān neṣṭam sāmṛtām dhīpramāṇatā | pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyopādeyavastuni || viśayākārabhedāc ca dhiyo ‘dhigama-bhedaḥ | bhāvād evāsya tadbhāve svarūpasya svato gatiḥ || prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa śāstraṃ mohaniavartanam | ajñātārthaprakāśo vā svarūpādhigateḥ param || prāptam sāmānyavijñānam avijñāte svalakṣaṇe | yaj jñānam ity abhiprāyāt svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ || tadvat pramāṇam bhagavān abhūtavinivṛttaye | bhūtoktiḥ sādhanāpekṣā tato yuktā pramāṇatā ||*

English translation: *Pramāṇa* is non-belying cognition (1ab’). [Its property] “non-belying” consists in the fulfillment of a [human] purpose (*arthakriyāsthiti*). Also in verbal [cognitions] [there is the property “non-belying”] since it makes known [the speaker’s] intention. With regard to the object which appears as the domain of the speaker’s action in the hearer’s awareness, verbal cognition [can be] a *pramāṇa*. [Its character as a *pramāṇa*], however, is not based upon a [real] object itself. The conventional cognition is not regarded as a *pramāṇa* since it grasps [merely] what has already been grasped. Cognition is a *pramāṇa*, insofar as it is what is most important for [human] activities towards things to be avoided or obtained,



dition of *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇalakṣaṇa*).<sup>5</sup> This "definition" can be summarized as follows:

A *pramāṇa* is a non-belying cognition (*pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam* 1ab'; the first definition). [The fact that this cognition is] non-belying consists in the fulfillment of [human] purpose (*arthakriyāsthiti*). Or (*vā*), [a *pramāṇa* is] that which reveals an unknown object (*ajñātārthaprakāśa* 5c; the second definition).

However, if this passage taken as a whole is the definition of *pramāṇa*, the reason why the definition consists of two statements with the disjunctive particle (*vā*) needs to be explained. Ordinarily, a definition should give the meaning of the definiendum/concept to be defined unambiguously.<sup>6</sup>

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and insofar as a cognition's understanding is different on the basis of different appearances of the object, since this [understanding] exists [only] when these [appearances of the object] exist. The own-nature [of the cognition] is known by itself. Validity, [however,] is [known] by means of behaviour (*vyavahāra*). Academic activity (*śāstra*) dispels ignorance (1'b–5b). Or [a *pramāṇa* is] that which reveals an unknown object (5c). [It is not the case that a] cognition of a universal arising after a cognition of a particular would be [a *pramāṇa*]. For, it is intended [by 5c] that a cognition regarding an unknown particular [object] is [a *pramāṇa*], since people examine [only] the particular [by *pramāṇas*] (5d–6). The Bhagavat is a *pramāṇa* like that (*pramāṇa* as knowledge)/endowed with these [two definitions] (*tadvat*). The expression "*bhūta*" serves to exclude those who have not become (*abhūta*) (a *pramāṇa*, like Īśvara and the Veda). Therefore, that [the Bhagavat] is a *pramāṇa* is appropriate in depending on the proof (7).] Cf. Katsura 1984: 219–220; van Bijlert 1989: 115–180; Franco 1997: 54, note 21; Inami 2023 in this volume.: 54, note 21.

<sup>5</sup> The Sanskrit word "*lakṣaṇa*" also means "property/characteristic." Thus, in this paper, the word "definition," which is an English equivalent of Sanskrit word "*lakṣaṇa*," means the so-called intensional definition which gives the meaning of the thing by specifying properties of the thing to be defined, i.e., necessary and sufficient conditions.

<sup>6</sup> The intention of Dharmakīrti himself is not obvious, and therefore scholars have hitherto presented various interpretations. Among such interpretations, Franco 1997 (Chapter two) and Krasser 2001 are, in my opinion, most important. Both articles have, while attempting to clarify Dharmakīrti's own intention, dealt with the issue thoroughly. The present paper, however, will not concern itself with Dharmakīrti's own intention.

There seem to be some different ways to interpret these defining statements.<sup>7</sup> First, it is not impossible to assume the particle *vā*, which has normally a disjunctive meaning, to have a conjunctive meaning, and to interpret these statements together as a definition consisting of two defining properties. However, this interpretation cannot be easily defended,<sup>8</sup> and in fact it does not seem to have been held by Indian commentators.<sup>9</sup> Only the three following alternatives actually existed in the Indian commentarial tradition: 1) both definitions are independent definitions stating necessary and sufficient conditions; 2) only one of the definitions states both necessary and sufficient conditions, while the other states merely a necessary condition and therefore is dependent on, or derivable from, the other; 3) the two definitions have distinct definienda which are defined accordingly. To sum up in advance, among the commentators I shall mention below, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi hold the first position and Dharmottara holds the second alternative, whereas Prajñākaragupta comes down in the middle of the second and the third positions.

## 2. Views of Devendrabuddhi and of Dharmottara

Before focusing on Prajñākaragupta's interpretation, this section will provide a brief outline of the contrasting interpretations of preceding commentators.

### 2.1. Devendrabuddhi's Interpretation

It is Devendrabuddhi who first considered the above-mentioned two statements as definitions (*lakṣaṇa*) of *pramāṇa*. In commenting on PV II 1ab', however, he still does not designate the statement "non-belying cognition (*avisaṃvādi jñānam*)" as a definition<sup>10</sup>. In the commentary on PV II 5c,

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Inami 2023 in this volume: 5.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Franco 1997: 47, 12–18, note 4.

<sup>9</sup> Mokṣākaragupta (12<sup>th</sup> cent.) and later Tibetan scholars eventually proposed definitions of *pramāṇa* in which Dharmakīrti's first and second defining characteristics are combined (cf. Ono 2012: 173–175). Nonetheless, that does not mean that they interpreted the particle *vā* in PV II 5a as have a conjunctive meaning. Regarding Manoranthanandin's statement, see footnote 17 of this paper.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. PVP (P)1b1–2a3, (D)1b1–3. In Śākyabuddhi's (ca. 660–720) commentary on this

however, Devendrabuddhi calls the two statements a definition for the first time and explains their relationship as follows:<sup>11</sup>

Thus, in this way, one definition of *pramāṇa*, “non-belying,” has been explained. **“Or, that which reveals an unknown object”** (PV II 5c) is another, the second definition. [It means:] **Or** the cognition **which reveals**, i.e., clearly manifests, **an object**, i.e., a real thing (*\*vastutattoa*), which is [still] **unknown** by the cognizer, is a *pramāṇa*. Only on the basis of [the property] “non-belying” with regard to the fulfillment of [a human] purpose can [a cognition] be recognized as such [i.e., a *pramāṇa*]

passage, however, the expressions “definition” (*lakṣaṇa*) and “universal definition” (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) can be found (cf. PVT (P)87a2–3, (D)72a2–3: *tshad ma slu med can shes pa zhes bya ba ni mi slu ba can nyid dang shes pa nyid mtshan gzhi rjes su bstan nas tshad ma nyid ni mtshan nyid brjod pa'o || tshad ma nyid de yang gal te spyi'i mtshan nyid (\*sāmānyalakṣaṇa) yin pa de lta bas na slu bar byed pas na slu ba zhes bya ba la sogs pas de 'chad par byed do*). Further, Manorathanandin, in commenting on the statement “*pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam* (PV I 1ab'),” introduces it as follows: “Then, [Dharmakīrti], who wishes to explain the verse of dedication to the Bhagavat written by the teacher (i.e., Dignāga) at the time of undertaking this treatise [i.e., the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*], states the first universal definition of *pramāṇa* [as follows]: “**Pramāṇa is non-belying cognition**” (cf. PVV(M) 3,10–11: ...*tacchāstrārambhasamaye tadācāryakṛtabhagavannamaskāraślokaṃ vyākhyātukāmaḥ prathamam pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam āha—pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam*; cf. Inami 1992a: 65). The expression “the first universal definition of *pramāṇa* (*prathamam pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam*)” corresponds to Śākyabuddhi's designation of PV II 5c as “the second universal definition” (*\*dvitīyam sāmānyalakṣaṇam*; cf. footnote 11 in this paper).

<sup>11</sup> PVP (P)6b1–3, (D)5b5–7: *de bas na de ltar tshad ma'i mtshan nyid mi slu ba gcig cig bshad do | mi shes don gyi gsal byed kyang ||* (PV II 5c) *gzhan mtshan nyid gnyis pa yin no || rtogs pa po'i mi shes pa'i don gyi dngos po'i de kho na nyid kyi gsal bar byed pa ste | mngon par gsal bar byed pa'i shes pa yang tshad ma yin no || don byed par mi slu ba nyid kyi phyir de dang de rtogs par bya'o || don smos pas ni zla ba gnyis la sogs par snang ba tshad ma nyid ma yin par bshad de | mi shes pa de bzung (D : gzung P) du zin kyang de'i don ma yin pa'i phyir ro ||*; cf. van Bijlert 1989: 151–152. My tentative Sanskrit reconstruction of the underlining portion is as follows: *tad evam avisaṃvādi pramāṇalakṣaṇam ekam uktam. ajñātārthaprakāśo vānyad dvitīyam lakṣaṇam. pratipattrajñātasāyārthasya vastutattvasya prakāśakam abhivyañjakam jñānam vā pramāṇam. arthakriyāvisaṃvādād eva tat tad avagantavyam* (cf. Franco 1997: 47–48, n. 6).

which reveals an unknown object].<sup>12</sup> For (*\*hi*), it is explained by the word “**object**” that [a cognition] appearing as double moon, etc., is not a *pramāṇa*, since, even if [this cognition] grasps an unknown [object], it does not have a [real] thing [as object].

At first, judging just from the first two sentences of this passage, it seems that Devendrabuddhi regards the two definitions as being independent from each other.<sup>13</sup> He, therefore, needs to show that the second definition, “That which reveals an unknown object,” expresses the necessary and sufficient conditions of a *pramāṇa*. After admitting that a *pramāṇa* needs to be, as defined in the first definition, non-belying with regard to the fulfillment of a

<sup>12</sup> Cf. PVT (D)79a7–b1, (P)97b3: *de dang de zhes bya ba ni mi shes pa'i don gsal bar byed pa'i mtshan nyid can gyi tshad ma nyid do*. Incidentally, van Bijlert's interpretation of “*de dang de*” is different from Śākyabuddhi's explanation and should be reconsidered (cf. van Bijlert 1989: 151).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Franco 1997: 47,21–23; Nishizawa 2007: (336). Śākyabuddhi designates, along with the first definition (cf. footnote 10), also the second definition as a “universal definition” (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). The expression “*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*” may relate to Śākyabuddhi's view that both definitions are independent. He explains as follows: “[The expression] “**another, the second definition**” means, in ordinary usage, that “this is one, whereas that is another, the second kind.” [In this case, however, it means] rather that “there is no other [definition].” Just the pervasion is indicated by this [first definition], [and] **another, the second definition** does not need to be made, so that another definition should occur regarding objects which are not pervaded by the [first definition]. For, only this [first definition] pervades both *pramāṇas* (i.e., perception and inference) entirely. In this way, it is [implicitly] said that this is the second general definition (*\*evam etad dvitīyaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇam ity uktam bhavati.*) (cf. PVT (D)79a5–6; (P)96a8–b1: *gzhan mtshan nyid gnyis pa zhes bya ba ni 'jig rten gyi rjod par byed pas 'di ni gcig yin la | 'di ni gzhan rnam pa gnyis pa yin no zhes bya ba smos pa yin no || yang na gzhan med pa zhes bya ba 'dis khyab pa nyid ston te | gzhan mtshan nyid gnyis pa yang byar yod pa ma yin te | gang la 'dis ma khyab pa'i yul la mtshan nyid gzhan 'jug par 'gyur ro || 'di nyid kyis tshad ma gnyis la khyab pa nyid kyi phyir ro || de skad 'di ni spyi'i mtshan nyid gnyis pa yin no zhes bstan par 'gyur ro ||*; Nishizawa 2007: 274). This portion is not entirely clear for me. In my opinion, however, Śākyabuddhi seems to assert in this portion, by using the expression “*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*,” that both definitions are *de facto* the same and are independent from each other. Dreyfus' interpretation of this portion of Śākyabuddhi's commentary, I believe, should be reconsidered (cf. Dreyfus 1991: 269).

purpose, he suggests that the word "object/thing (*artha*)" in the second definition can exclude belying cognitions such as the cognition of an illusion (e.g., a mirage) from the domain of *pramāṇa*. Since Devendrabuddhi interprets the word "*artha*" as "real thing" (*\*vastutattva*) in this passage and a "real thing" is, according to Dharmakīrti, characterized by the possibility of fulfilling a purpose,<sup>14</sup> his assertion seems plausible.

How should we think about Devendrabuddhi's explanation of the word "*artha*"? Insofar as he understands that the property "non-belying" is implied by this word and therefore can be deduced from the second definition, he appears to believe that the second definition is more fundamental than the first. At the same time, one can assume, just as Yamāri did, that for Devendrabuddhi the second definition is dependent on the first definition (*pūrvalakṣaṇāpekṣatā*), since Devendrabuddhi admits that the fact that the object of cognition is a real thing is recognized through the property "non-belying." He says, "Only on the basis of the property "non-belying" can a cognition be recognized as such, i.e., *pramāṇa* which reveals an unknown object."<sup>15</sup>

However, to begin with, Devendrabuddhi, considering the two statements to be independent definitions, does not seem to want to assert the dependence of one definition on the other, or the superiority of one to the other, unlike Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, as we shall see below. The reason he explains the second definition in the above way is just to show that it excludes the cognition of an illusion from the domain of *pramāṇa*. Devendrabuddhi seems to think, rather, that the two definitions have in effect the same meaning insofar as they are independent definitions of one and the same concept; therefore the first definition can be derived from the second

<sup>14</sup> Cf. NB I 15: *arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād eva vastunaḥ*.

<sup>15</sup> Yamāri has really understood Devendrabuddhi's view in this way and criticized it. See footnote 41 in this paper.

definition and vice versa.<sup>16</sup> I think that is all what Devendrabuddhi wishes to say in this passage.<sup>17</sup>

## 2.2. Dharmottara's Position

Although Dharmottara (ca. 740–800) did not write a commentary on the PV and so did not have a proper opportunity to explain Dharmakīrti's "definition" of *pramāṇa* at the beginning of the PV, we can, as already pointed out,<sup>18</sup> infer what his position was on this issue from his commentary on the word "correct cognition" (*samyagjñāna*) which occurs in the beginning of Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu*. There, he replaces the word "*samyagjñāna*" (i.e., *pramāṇa*) with the expression "non-belying cognition" (*avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānam*), and further, in describing the general characteristics of correct cognition, deduces the property "having an unknown object" (*anadhigataviśaya*) from the property "non-belying" (*avisaṃvādaka*) step by step.<sup>19</sup> Based on

<sup>16</sup> As is indicated by Franco, it seems to remain a problem how the first definition is able to exclude conceptual cognition from being a *pramāṇa* (cf. Franco 1997: 48,5–9), since Devendrabuddhi did not provide an argument to deduce the second definition from the first definition. In my opinion, he may simply think that the first definition is supplemented by PV II 3ab', which states that "**the conceptual [cognition] is not regarded [as a *pramāṇa*] since it grasps [merely] what has already been grasped** (PV II 3ab': *grhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṃ sāmṃṛtaṃ*)."

<sup>17</sup> Manorathanandin's explanation in the last line of his commentary on PV II 5c: "Therefore, it should be known that both of the two definitions necessarily depend on each other" (cf. PVV(M) 8,14: *tasmād ubhayam api parasparasāpekṣam eva lakṣaṇaṃ boddhavyam*) seems, at a first glance, to mean that each of the two definitions is by itself incomplete and therefore needs the other, but it may also be interpreted to mean that each definition is derivable from the other. Anyway, just from this statement one cannot conclude that Manorathanandin interprets the particle "*vā*" as having a conjunctive (cf. Inami 1992b: 28, n. 42; Franco 1997: 53–54).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Franco 1997: 51,8–52,25; Kimura 1997: (6).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. NBT 17,1–19,4: *avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānaṃ samyagjñānam. loke ca pūrvam upadarśitam arthaṃ prāpayan saṃvādaka ucyate. tadvaj jñānam api svayaṃ pradarśitam arthaṃ prāpayat saṃvādakaṃ ucyate. pradarśite cārthe pravartakatvaṃ eva prāpakatvaṃ, nānyat. tathā hi—na jñānaṃ janayad arthaṃ prāpayati, api tv arthe puruṣaṃ pravartayat prāpayaty artham. pravartakatvaṃ api pravṛttiṣayapradarśakatvaṃ eva. na hi puruṣaṃ haṭhāt pravartayituṃ śaknoti jñānam. ata eva cārthādhigatir eva pramāṇa-phalam. adhigate cārthe pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ prāpitaś cārthaḥ. tathā ca sati arthādhigamāt*

this, we can recognize, as Franco suggests, that Dharmottara *de facto* regards the first definition as a definition of *pramāṇa* and the second definition as being included in or implied by the first definition.<sup>20</sup> Note that in this case Dharmottara, in contrast to Prajñākaragupta as we shall see next, talks only about the “conventional” *pramāṇas*, i.e., perception and inference.

### 3. Prajñākaragupta's Interpretation

#### 3.1. Introduction of the *Pramāṇavārttikālankāra* and the First Definition

Taking what was said above into consideration, in the following I shall investigate Prajñākaragupta's interpretation. At first, regarding the first definition, we should pay attention to the context in which Prajñākaragupta introduces his explanation of this definition. Between two *maṅgalaśloka*s and the explanation of the PV II 1ab', i.e., the first definition of *pramāṇa*, Prajñākaragupta gives his general introduction to the entire PVA as follows:<sup>21</sup>

In this [treatise], an expression of praise of [the Bhagavat] is [placed] at the beginning of the treatise, since the Bhagavat is the true *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇabhūta*)<sup>22</sup> due to his perfection in cause and effect. For [the Bhagavat is] the purpose of the treatise. Indeed, just the Bhagavat as *pramāṇabhūta* is to be established in this [treatise] (A). Among them, “cause” is perfection in intention and practice with reference to the conventional (*sāṃvṛtyavahārika*) *pramāṇas* (B). Intention [means that the Bhagavat] is one who seeks the well-being of the world. Practice [means that the Bhagavat] is a teacher, because he teaches all people. (... omit

*samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāpāraḥ. ata eva cānadhigataviṣayaṃ pramāṇam. yenaiva hi jñānena prathamam adhigato 'rthaḥ, tenaiva pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ, prāpitaś cārthaḥ. tatraiva cārthe kim anyena jñānenādhikaṃ kāryam, ato 'dhigataviṣayaṃ apramāṇam.*

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Franco 1997: 52,6–25.

<sup>21</sup> PVA<sub>O</sub> 1,10–2,8: *atra bhagavato hetuphalasampattyā pramāṇabhūtatvena stotrābhidhānaṃ śāstrādaḥ, śāstrārthatoāt. bhagavān eva hi pramāṇabhūto 'smin prasādhyaṭe* (A). *tatra hetur āśayaprayogasamprat sāṃvṛtyavahārikapramāṇāpekṣayā* (B). *āśayo jagaddhitaṣītā. prayogo jagacchāsanāc chāstrtvam. (... omit ...) evamabhūtaṃ bhagavantaṃ praṇamya pramāṇasiddhir vidhīyate. pramāṇādhitō hi prameyādhigamaḥ, bhagavān eva ca pramāṇam, pramāṇalakṣaṇasadbhāvāt* (C). *pramīyate 'neneti pramāṇam. tatra sāmānyena pramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ nirdiśati. pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam.*

<sup>22</sup> In my opinion the word “*pramāṇabhūta*” used in the PVA should be translated into “true *pramāṇa*.” Cf. Ono 2013; Ono 2020.

...) After saluting such a Bhagavat, [I will] direct myself towards establishing [the nature of] *pramāṇa*. For the understanding of the object to be cognized depends on a *pramāṇa*. And only the Bhagavat is *pramāṇa*, because the definition of *pramāṇa* really applies [to him] (C). [A person] by whom [something] is validly/correctly cognized is *pramāṇa*.<sup>23</sup>

With regard to this, [Dharmakīrti] indicates the definition of *pramāṇa* in general (*sāmānyena*): “***Pramāṇa* is non-belying cognition**” (PV II 1ab’).

As is already indicated, this introduction is the so-called “adaptive reuse” of the beginning portion of Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (=PSV).<sup>24</sup> By adding some statements (the underlined sentences in the above translation), Prajñākaragupta has modified Dignāga’s original description into the introduction of his own work. The main purpose of his modification is to introduce the term “*pramāṇabhūta*,” which Dignāga has used in the *maṅgalaśloka* of the PSV as an epithet of the Bhagavat, as a central concept of his philosophy.<sup>25</sup>

First, in order to clarify the purpose of composing his treatise, he inserts, after Dignāga’s first statement “In this [treatise], an expression of praise of [the Bhagavat] is [placed] at the beginning of the treatise, since the Bhagavat is the true *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇabhūta*) due to his perfection in cause and effect,” passage (A) “For [the Bhagavat is] the purpose of the treatise. Indeed, just the Bhagavat as *pramāṇabhūta* is to be established in this [treatise].” In contrast to Dignāga who has stated in the *maṅgala* verse of the PS and its running commentary that the purpose of the treatise is to establish *pramāṇa* as knowledge,<sup>26</sup> Prajñākaragupta declares that his purpose in composing the PVA is to establish that the Bhagavat is the true *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇabhūta*).

Next, immediately after quoting Dignāga’s statement “Among them, ‘cause’ is perfection in intention and practice,” he adds that his perfection in

<sup>23</sup> This is the usual etymological explanation of the word “*pramāṇa*.” In this case, however, the word “*anena*” is regarded as referring to the Bhagavat.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. PVAo 1,10–2,6; p.1, footnote 11–12, p.3, footnote 3–5 ; Ono 2020: 352–353.

<sup>25</sup> Dharmakīrti, of course, gives his interpretation of this term in PV II 7’b–c’ (*abhūtaviniṣṭhāy bhūtoktiḥ*). There is, however, no use of the term “*pramāṇabhūta*” in Dharmakīrti’s own works (cf. Ono 2013; Ono 2020: 350).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. PS Maṅgala: *pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaṣṭhāya prāṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine |*



cause is (B) “with reference to the conventional (*sāṃvṛtyavahārika*) *pramāṇas*.” The term “conventional *pramāṇas*” was originally used by Dharmakīrti at the end of the first chapter of his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* for perception and inference, in contrast to the ultimate *pramāṇa* (*pāramārthikapramāṇa*), e.g., yogic cognition<sup>27</sup>. His perfection in cause which depends on the conventional *pramāṇas* should, therefore, be the perfection of the Bhagavat as ultimate *pramāṇa*.<sup>28</sup> In any case, it is worth noting that the word “*sāṃvṛtyavahārikapramāṇa*,” one of the terms of the dichotomy “conventional *pramāṇa* and ultimate *pramāṇa*,” which Prajñākaragupta will mention later when explaining the second definition of *pramāṇa*, is already found in this initial passage.

Further, in the last underlined passage (C) above, which leads directly to the explanation of the first definition of *pramāṇa*, Prajñākaragupta states his view that the Bhagavat is the true/primary *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇabhūta*) as follows: “Only (*eva*)<sup>29</sup> the Bhagavat is *pramāṇa*, because the definition of *pramāṇa* is really applied [to him] (C).” Then he begins his explanation of the first

*pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasrtād ihaikataḥ ||* ; PSV I 10–12: *evaṅguṇaṃ śāstāraṃ praṇamya pramāṇasiddhyai svaprakaraṇebhyo nyāyamukhādibhya iha samāhṛtya pramāṇasamuccayaḥ kariṣyate parapramāṇapratishedhāya svapramāṇaguṇodbhāvanāya ca, yasmāt pramāṇayattā prameyapratipattir bahavaś cātra vipratipannāḥ*; Hattori 1968: 23–24, 73–79.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. PVin I 44,2–6: *sāṃvṛtyavahārikasya caitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam. atrāpi pare mūḍhā viśaṃvādayanti lokam iti. cintāmayīm eva tu prajñām anuśīlayanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikapramāṇam abhimukhīkurvanti. tad api leśataḥ sūcitam eveti.* [= Thus, this property of a conventional *pramāṇa* has been explained. Stupid people of other schools deceive the world also regarding this. On the other hand, those who exercise the wisdom gained by contemplating the truth turn their face towards the ultimate *pramāṇa* which is free from confusion, pure and free from mischief. The latter too has been partially but certainly suggested.] ; Vetter 1966: 100–101.

<sup>28</sup> In the PVA, the Bhagavat is sometimes called *pāramārthikapramāṇa* (cf. PVA 67,12–13: *bhagavān eva ca paramārthataḥ kāryakāraṇabhāve pāramārthikaṃ pramāṇaṃ vyāpyanvayavyatirekagrahaṇād iti pratipāditam*; cf. also PVAo 78,1ff.). Yamāri's explanation of this expression (cf. PVAN 16b5–7), however, is still not clear to me.

<sup>29</sup> Yamāri explains the function of the particle *eva* in this sentence as follows: PVAN 19b1–3: *nanu pratyakṣānumānaṃ pramāṇam, bhagavatas tu prāmāṇyam eva kiṅkṛtam? tatrāpi anyayogavyavaccheda iti dūrotsāritam etad ity āha—pramāṇa-lakṣaṇasadbhāvād iti. etenāyogavyavacchedo vyaktaḥ. anyayogavyavacchedo 'pi na pratyakṣādyapekṣayā, api tu pratipattur abhiprāyopasthāpitavedeśvarādyapekṣayā.*

definition of *pramāṇa* by stating “With regard to this, [Dharmakīrti] indicates the definition of *pramāṇa* in general (*sāmānyena*).”

Thus, it is clear that in this introduction of the PVA Prajñākaragupta considers the Bhagavat as the true *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇabhūta*) which is more fundamental as knowledge than the two conventional *pramāṇas*. In implicitly equating *pramāṇabhūta* with the *pāramārthikapramāṇa*, Prajñākaragupta then interprets the first definition of *pramāṇa* as a common definition which is applied to all *pramāṇas* in common, i.e., to both *sāṃvayavahārikapramāṇa* and *pāramārthikapramāṇa*.<sup>30</sup>

*yathā puruṣadvayaprastāve 'yam eva paṇḍita iti dvitīyāpekṣa eva vyavahārah, na sarvānyapaṇḍitanīṣedhanam. astu vā pratyakṣādyapekṣayaivānyayogavyavacchedaḥ, sātīśayaṃ tu prāmāṇyaṃ vivoakṣitam iti na doṣaḥ. yathā pārtha eva dhanurdhara iti sātīśayadhānurdharyavivakṣayā vyavahārah. tatra yadāyogavyavacchedaḥ, tadā bhagavān eva cety evakāro bhinnakramaḥ, pramāṇam ity asmāt puro vaktavyaḥ. yadā tv anyayogavyavacchedaḥ, tadā yathāvasthita eva. [= “[Objection:] Is it not the case that perception and inference are *pramāṇas*? How is it shown that the Bhagavat is really a *pramāṇa*? Also in this case, the [possibility of] the exclusion of the connection with others (*anyayogavyavaccheda*) is completely rejected. [Prajñākaragupta] replied: “Because the definition of *pramāṇa* is really applied [to him].” By this [statement], it is clear that [the word “only”] excludes the non-connection (*ayogavyavaccheda*). Even if it excludes the connection with others, [the exclusion] is not with regard to the perception, etc., but with regard to the Veda, Īśvara, etc., which are arbitrarily imagined by those who maintain [their authority]. For example, when two persons are concerned, the expression “he alone is intelligent” is merely with regard to the second [person], [but] does not prevent all other [people] from being intelligent. Or the exclusion of the connection with others could be only with regard to perception, etc. There is, however, no fault because the excellent [i.e., ultimate] validity [of the Bhagavat] is intended [here]. For example, the expression “only Pārtha is an archer” (*pārtha eva dhanurdharaḥ*) intends that [Pārtha is] an excellent archer. Among these [interpretations], if [the word “only”] excludes the non-connection, then the word “only” in the sentence “And only the Bhagavat” is out of order (*bhinnakrama*), [and] the [word] “*pramāṇa*” should be stated before this [word “*eva*”]. If, however, it excludes the connection of others, then [the word “only” should] remain just as it stands.”]*

<sup>30</sup> Yamāri comments on Prajñākaragupta’s statement “With regard to this, [Dharmakīrti] indicates the definition of *pramāṇa* in general” (*tatra sāmānyena pramāṇalakṣaṇaṃ nirdīśati*), which introduces the first definition of *pramāṇa*, as follows: “[The expression] ‘in general’ means [generally] for [both] the essential (*tātparyārtha*) and the literal (*akṣarārtha*) [*pramāṇas*]. The meaning is

### 3.2. Prajñākaragupta's Interpretation of the Second Definition

I shall next examine Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of PV II 5c, i.e., the second definition of *pramāṇa*. In introducing PV II 5c Prajñākaragupta first states as follows:

**Or [a *pramāṇa* is] that which reveals an unknown object** (PV II 5c). Or rather (*atha vā*), this is the [very] definition of *pramāṇa*. [The means] by which [something] is revealed is **that which reveals** [something]. A *pramāṇa* is a cognition which reveals **an unknown object**. A conventional cognition (i.e., conceptual cognition), however, does not reveal an unknown object. For nothing which is an unknown object is revealed [by a conventional cognition], since visible form etc., which have already been grasped separately [by the first perception], are conceptualized by this [conceptual cognition]. Nevertheless, it is ordinarily said that this (conventional cognition) is the same [as the cognition which reveals an unknown object], since one does not deliberate upon his/her cognition. [Objection:] Isn't it the case that if, without [the property] "non-belying," that which reveals an unknown object is a *pramāṇa*, it would follow that [a cognition] presenting a double moon, etc., too, would be a *pramāṇa*? [Reply:] No, because

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that it is indicated as common to the essential [*pramāṇa*, namely the Bhagavat], which is distinct by virtue of its special status, as well as the two literal, conventional *pramāṇas* [namely perception and inference]." (PVAN 20a5–6: *sāmānyeneti tātparyākṣarārthayoḥ, tātparyārthasya cāvasthābhedaabhinnasya, akṣarārthayoḥ ca vyāvahārikapramāṇayoḥ sādharmaṇatayopalakṣitam ity arthaḥ*). Further, Yamāri concludes his commentary on Prajñākaragupta's explanation of PV II 1 (PVAo 2,10–12,11) with the following statement: "Thus, in this way, it is established that 'non-belying' indeed (*eva*) is the general definition of both the two conventional *pramāṇas* and the ultimate *pramāṇa*, i.e., the Bhagavat, who is to be established" (PVAN 31a2: *tad evam avisamvādatvam eva samvyavahārikapramāṇayoḥ pāramārthikapramāṇasya ca bhagavataḥ sādhyasya sāmānyam lakṣaṇam iti sthitam*; cf. Inami 2022: 38 n.2). Yamāri, therefore, thinks that the first definition is applied to both the conventional *pramāṇas* and the ultimate *pramāṇa*. Further, Prajñākaragupta, in commenting on Dharmakīrti's statement "*tadvat pramāṇam bhagavān*" (PV II 7a), states: "*tathāgato hi bhagavān tadvān*" (PVAo 84,1), and Yamāri interprets this "*tadvān*" as "*ubhayalakṣaṇavān*" (PVAN 67b7). For Prajñākaragupta and Yamāri, the Bhagavat is a *pramāṇa* which is endowed with two defining characters of *pramāṇa*.

[there is] the expression “*artha*” [in this second definition]. For, this [appearance of a double moon] is not a real thing (*artha*).<sup>31</sup>

First of all, it is worth noting that Prajñākaragupta, unlike Devendrabuddhi, interprets the word “*vā*” in PV II 5c as “*atha vā*.” As is well known, the expression “*atha vā*” is often used to introduce a better alternative than the previous one and can be rendered by the English expression “or rather.”<sup>32</sup> From Prajñākaragupta’s explanation, it can be understood that the expression “*atha vā*” is used in this meaning also in this context.<sup>33</sup> Thus, Prajñākaragupta implies at the beginning of his explanation of PV II 5c that the second definition is superior to the previous one.<sup>34</sup>

Why is, then, the second definition better than the first? Prajñākaragupta at first indicates that only the second definition can exclude conceptual cognition from the domain of *pramāṇa* (but not the first definition). Further, to the objection that, if merely a cognition revealing an unknown object is a *pramāṇa*, whether it is non-belying or not, then the cognition of an

<sup>31</sup> PVA<sub>O</sub> 78,9–16: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā* (PV II 5c). *atha vedam pramāṇalakṣaṇam. prakāśyate ’neneti prakāśaḥ. ajñātasyārthasya prakāśakaṃ jñānam pramāṇam. sām-vṛtam tu jñānam ajñātasyārthasya na prakāśakaḥ. na hi kaścīd ajñāto ’rthaḥ prakāśyate, grhītānām eva rūpādīnām anena prthag vikalanāt. pratītyaparāmarśāt tu tad ekam iti vyavahriyate. nanu yady avisaṃvādanam antareṇājñātaprakāśanaṃ pramāṇam, dvicandrādyākārasyāpi pramāṇatāprasāṅgaḥ. na, arthagrahaṇāt. asau hi nārthaḥ.*

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Speijer 1886: 333–334.

<sup>33</sup> Incidentally, the corresponding portion in Ravigupta’s commentary is as follows: “[Dharmakīrti] said: “**Or, that which reveals an unknown object.**” Or rather (’on kyang), the definition of *pramāṇa* is this [expression] “**that which reveals an unknown object**” (cf. PVV(R) (P)150a1, (D)303b4: *mi shes don gyi gsal* (D: *gsal bar P*) *byed pa ’ang* | *zhes smras so* || ’on kyang tshad ma’i mtshan nyid ni | *ma shes don gyi gsal byed* ’di yin te). The Sanskrit equivalent of this Tibetan “’on kyang” is, assuming that Ravigupta follows Prajñākaragupta as usual also in this case, “*atha vā*.” In any case, this Tibetan translation supports the interpretation of the word “*atha vā*” as “or rather.”

<sup>34</sup> Cf. PVAN 65a3–5: *lakṣaṇāntaram āha—ajñātārthaprakāśo veti. avayavyādivikalpasyāpi tarhi prāmānyaprasaṅgaḥ. na hy avayavī jñātaḥ prathamajñānenety āha—sām-vṛtam tv iti. sām-vṛtavaiśayatvāt sām-vṛtam. atha vā saṃvriyate vastusvarūpam aneneti saṃvṛtiḥ vikalpaḥ. svārthiko ’ṇ* (Pāṇ 5.4.38). *vikalpamātravacano ’py avayavyādiviśaya evopāttaḥ, sāmānyaviśayasya cintayīṣyamānatvāt. prthag iti grhītānām ity anena sambandhaḥ. pratītyaparāmarśāt tv iti. idaṃ tāvad rūpamātram paśyāmi, tatsaṃsrṣṭāś*

illusion like a double moon, too, would be *pramāṇa*, hence there would be an over-extension (*ativyāpti*) of the second definition<sup>35</sup>—to this objection Prajñākaragupta replies, just like Devendrabuddhi, that there is no such problem since the word “*artha*” in the second definition serves to exclude an unreal thing as the object of a *pramāṇa*.<sup>36</sup>

Note that this argument definitely serves different purposes for Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta. While Devendrabuddhi aims to ascertain

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*ca rasādayaḥ pūrvam anubhūtaḥ, na cātra paraḥ kaścit samvedyata iti yadi svapratītiṃ parāmr̥ṣet, na syād evaikabuddhiḥ, anādivitathavikalpābhyāsavāsanāvaśāt tu bhūtaṃ āvṛtyābhūtakhyātirūpo vyavahāra eṣa ity arthaḥ.* [= [Dharmakīrti] has stated another definition [of *pramāṇa*,] “**Or rather, [a *pramāṇa* is] that which reveals an unknown object.**” (Objection:) “Then it follows that the conceptual cognition of a whole (*avayavin*), etc., would be a *pramāṇa*. For a whole is not known by the first cognition [i.e., the perception].” (Reply:) [Prajñākaragupta] has stated: “**Conventional [cognition] (i.e., conceptual cognition), however.**” [Conceptual cognition is called] conventional because it has something concealed/obscured as its object. Or, [The cognition] by which the nature of real things is concealed/obscured is conventional cognition, i.e., the conceptual cognition. [According to Pāṇ 5.4.38,] “The *A*-suffix [in the word “*sāmṛta*”] is pleonastic.” [The word *sāmṛta*], although it expresses a conceptual cognition in general, is [here] used only as having a whole, etc., as its object, since [the cognition] having the universal as its object will be considered [later]. [The word] “**separately**” is connected with the [word] “**which are already grasped.**” [Prajñākaragupta has said,] “**since one does not deliberate upon his/her cognition.**” What he means is: If one could reflect upon his/her cognition [of something like a “pot” in the following way,] “I now see only this visible form, but the taste, etc., that are joined with this [visible form in a cognition that allegedly presents *one* thing] have been previously experienced [by me], and in this [cognition] (*atra*) nothing else [which could be the whole] is experienced,” then it would not even be a single cognition [let alone, a single object]. Rather, due to a beginningless impression [resulting from] the repetition of a false conceptual cognition, there is this verbal activity/manner of speaking and acting (*vyavahāra*) [about a “pot”], which has the nature of the appearance of something unreal as a result of obscuring what is real.]

<sup>35</sup> Cf. PVAN 65a6: *paro 'visamvādilakṣaṇānapekṣaṇe 'tivyāptir lakṣaṇadoṣa ity āha—nanv ityādi.* [= The opponent, [believing that] if [this definition] does not depend on the [previous] definition “non-belying,” then there would be the fault of definition [known as] over-extension (*ativyāpti*), has stated: “**Isn't it the case that...?**” etc.]

<sup>36</sup> Cf. PVAN 65a6: *uttaram—na, artheti. ajñātārthaprakāśa ity arthagrahaṇavyavachchedyam evety arthaḥ, anarthatvāt. tad evāha—asau hīti candradvayākāraḥ. tato*

through this argument that the second definition is *independent* from the first, Prajñākaragupta intends to say that the second definition is *better* than the first. The second definition is, according to Prajñākaragupta, better than the first because it excludes both conceptual cognitions and belying cognitions such as the cognition of an illusion.

However, such an interpretation of the word “*artha*” arouses the suspicion that the defining property “*arthatva*” is not really different from the defining property “*avisaṃvādi*,” since it appears to be deduced from the latter:

[Objection:] Isn’t the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing known only because it is non-belying (*avisaṃvādād eva*)? And therefore only “a cognition that is non-belying” is the definition [of *pramāṇa*]. How, therefore, [could the second definition] be a different definition [from the first definition, “non-belying cognition”]? [Reply:] No, because [a property] which is [only] implicitly indicated is not a definition.

A [property] which is understood by the implication of something [explicitly] mentioned is not a definition. If that were the case, other properties such as “being real” (*vastutva*) [could] be the meaning of the definition (*lakṣaṇārtha*, i.e., the defining property). (223)

For, a definition is only that which is obtained directly. Even that by which the definition [can be] realized, however, is not a definition, since it is only a possibility. Otherwise, properties such as “being real” would [also] be [defining properties]. [Objection:] The property “being real” is of no use in this case either directly or indirectly. Non-belying, however, serves to make known the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing. [Reply:] This is true. Even so, [however, only] by the expression “**an unknown object**,” can a cognition grasping an [already] grasped [object] be excluded, [but] not by the expression “**non-belying**,” since “non-belying” [can be] applied even to the [cognition grasping an already grasped object]. At the same time, the fact that [the object of

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*nātiprasaṅga ity abhiprāyaḥ*. [= [Prajñākaragupta] replies to [this objection]: “**No**, [because there is the expression] *artha*.” What he means is that [the cognition which is not a *pramāṇa*] is definitely excluded by the expression *artha* in [the second definition,] “**that which reveals an unknown object**,” because [the appearance of a double moon] is not a real thing (*artha*). [Prajñākaragupta] has explained this very [fact as follows:] “**For this**,” [that is,] the appearance of a double moon. [His] intention is that, therefore, there is no over-extension [of the definition].]

cognition] is a real thing is not understood from [the cognition's being] non-belying, because it is not established that conceptually existing things (*saṃvṛtīsat*) are real, even though [conceptual cognitions] are non-belying. [Question:] Then how is the fact of being real recognized? [Reply:] We should think that it is by deliberation (*parāmarśa*).<sup>37</sup>

According to Prajñākaragupta, the property “non-belying” (*avisaṃvāda*) is certainly implied by the property “being real thing” (*arthatva*), i.e., “revealing real thing.” Based on this reason, however, it cannot be thought that the second definition is deduced from the first definition.<sup>38</sup> To begin with, the second definition, “that which reveals an unknown object,” can exclude the cognition grasping an already grasped object while the first definition alone

<sup>37</sup> PVA<sub>O</sub> 79,1–14: *nanv arthatvam avisaṃvādād eva jñāyate. tataś cāvisaṃvādi jñānam iti tad eva lakṣaṇam iti katham lakṣaṇāntaram. na, sāmāthyākṣiptasyālakṣaṇatvāt. ukta-sāmāthyato yasya pratītiḥ tan na lakṣaṇam | tathānyasyāpi vastutvaprabhṛter lakṣaṇārthatā || 223 || lakṣaṇam hi yad upāttaṃ sākṣāt, tad eva. yena tu tallakṣaṇam sādhyate, tad api sambhavitvamātrena na lakṣaṇam. anyathā vastutvādikam api bhavet. athāpi syāt—na vastutvam tatropayogi sākṣād anyathā vā. avisaṃvādas tūpayogy arthatvajñāpane. satyam etat. tathāpi ajñātārthagrahaṇena grhītagrāhipratyayaḥ śakyah parihartum, nāvisaṃvādigrahaṇena, tatrāpy avisaṃvādagrahaṇāt. na cāvisaṃvādenārthatvagatīḥ, avisaṃvāde 'pi saṃvṛtīsatām arthatvasyāsiddheḥ. katham tarhy arthatvagatīḥ. parāmarśād iti mantavyam (cf. Franco 1997: 48–49).*

<sup>38</sup> Cf. PVAN 65a6–b1: *yadi nāmaivam atiprasaṅgaparihārah, tathāpi naital lakṣaṇam pūrvalakṣaṇānapekṣam, avisaṃvāditvam antareṇārthatvasyāsiddher ity āha paraḥ—nanv arthatvam ityādi. lakṣaṇāntaram pūrvalakṣaṇād iti draṣṭavyam. neti pūrvapakṣanīṣedhaḥ. sāmāthyākṣiptasyāvisaṃvāditvasya. ajñātārthaprakāśa ity anenoktasyārthasya sāmāthyam, yady avisaṃvāditvam nāpekṣyet, tadārthatvam apratītam lakṣaṇam eva na bhaved iti. tasmāt pratītiḥ. yasyety avisaṃvāditvasya. tad ity avisaṃvāditvam. yadi sāmāthyapratītam lakṣaṇam syāt, tadā ko doṣaḥ? ity āha—tatheti, sāmāthyapratītāvisaṃvāditvavat. yena tv ity avisaṃvāditvena. [= The opponent, [thinking that] even if the over-extension [of the definition] is avoided in this way, this definition is still not independent of the previous definition; for the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing is not established without the property “non-belying,” says: “Isn't the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing,” etc. [The expression:] “different definition” should be taken to mean: [different] from the previous definition. [The expression] “no” negates the opponent's position. [A property] “which is [only] implicitly indicated,” i.e., “non-belying” [is not a definition]. “The implication” is of something which is “[explicitly] mentioned” by the [phrase,] “that which reveals an unknown object.” That is to say (iti), if [the*

cannot.<sup>39</sup> The second problem is the relationship between two properties, i.e., “non-belying” and “being real thing,” i.e., “revealing real thing.” As is also indicated by Devendrabuddhi’s interpretation discussed above, “non-belying” is deduced from “being real thing,” since that which is a real thing (*vastu* in this case) is by its definition “non-belying.” There is, on the other hand, cognition which is “non-belying” but does not reveal a “real thing,” e.g., a conceptual cognition (*saṃvṛtisat*). For example, conceptual cognitions apprehending external objects or “a whole” (*avayavin*) are non-belying in the ordinary world, but they do not establish that external objects or “wholes” are real things.<sup>40</sup>

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property] “non-belying” were not relied on, then the [object of cognition] being a real thing, insofar as it is unknown, would not be a definition at all. Due to this [implication], “**the understanding**” [occurs]. [The word] “**of which**” means “of the property ‘non-belying.’” “**The**” [also] means the property “non-belying.” [To the question,] “If that which is recognized by implication could be the definition, then what is the fault?,” [Prajñākaragupta] replies, “**If that were the case,**” [i.e.,] “as in the case of the property ‘non-belying,’ which is recognized by implication.” “**By which...however**” means “by the property ‘non-belying.’”]

<sup>39</sup> Cf. PVAN 65b1–2: *sambhavitvamātrenāvisaṃvāditvam alakṣaṇaṃ vastutvādivad ity asahamānaḥ para āha—athāpi syād iti. satyam etad ity arthatvajñāpane ‘visaṃvāda upayogīty etat satyam. tathāpīty arthatvajñāpane ‘visaṃvādasyopayogitve ‘pi nāvisaṃvādigrahaṇena grhītagrāhī pratyayaḥ śakyah parihartum. ata eva etallakṣaṇāpekṣaṃ pūrvalakṣaṇam uktam—grhītagrahaṇān neṣṭam ityādinā. tatrāpīti grhītagrāhīni. [= The opponent, who does not accept [the view] that the property “non-belying” is, as a mere possibility, not the definition, just like [other properties] such as “being real,” states: “**The property ‘being real.’**” [Prajñākaragupta replies:] “**This is true.**” [Namely,] this [view] that the property “non-belying” serves to make known the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing is true. “**Even so,**” i.e., even if the property “non-belying” serves to make known the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing, **the cognition grasping an [already] grasped [object] cannot be excluded by the expression “non-belying.”** Precisely because of this reason, it is mentioned [by Dharmakīrti] through [statements] such as “[a conceptual cognition is] not regarded [as a *pramāṇa*] since it grasps [merely] what has already been grasped” (PV II 3a) that the previous (i.e., the first) definition is dependent on this [second] definition. “**Even to**” means “even to the [cognition] grasping an already grasped [object].”*

<sup>40</sup> Cf. PVAN 65b2–4: *nanv etad api lakṣaṇaṃ pūrvalakṣaṇāpekṣam eva, arthatvasyāvi-saṃvādāt pratītiṣvīkārād ity āsaṅkyāha—na cāvisaṃvādeneti. etallakṣaṇakāle saty*



Based on this reasoning, the property “being a real thing” is not communicated by the property “non-belying,” therefore the former is not derived from the latter. If Devendrabuddhi's statement “only on the basis of the property ‘non-belying’ can a cognition be recognized as such, i.e., a *pramāṇa* which reveals an unknown object” meant, as suggested by Yamāri, that the fact that the object of cognition is a real thing can be known only on the basis of [its being] “non-belying” (*arthatvam avisaṃvādād eva jñātavyam*) and therefore the second definition is dependent on the first definition (*pūrvalakṣaṇāpekṣatā*), then Devendrabuddhi's view should be rejected.<sup>41</sup> Yamāri explains this situation as follows:<sup>42</sup>

*apy avisaṃvāde nāvisaṃvādenārthatvagatiḥ. sann apy avisaṃvāda udāsīna ity arthaḥ. yady evam, sāmṛtajñānasya katham na prāmāṇyam? koṣṭhaśuddhyā hi tatrā-visaṃvādabhāva eva śaraṇam ity āśankya pūrvoktam eva smārayati—sāmṛtisatām iti. arthagrahaṇavyavacchedyam eva tad apīty arthaḥ. na hi bahirartho 'vayavyādir upapadyate.* [= After questioning, “Isn't this [second] definition, also, definitely dependent on the previous definition, since it is accepted that the recognition of the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing is due to the [cognition's being] non-belying?,” [Prajñākaragupta] states: “**At the same time...by [the cognition's being] non-belying.**” When this [second] definition [applies], even if the [the cognition] is non-belying, “**the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing is not understood from [the cognition's being] non-belying.**” What this means is that, even when non-belying exists, it is neutral (*udāsīna*) [in regard to whether the object of cognition is a real thing or not]. After raising the doubt: “If things are this way, how is the conventional cognition not a *pramāṇa*? For just the existence of ‘non-belying’ in that [cognition] is completely the refuge/justification (*koṣṭhaśuddhyā*),” [Prajñākaragupta] reminds [us] just of what was previously mentioned: “**the conceptual existences.**” It means that this [refuge] too is definitely excluded by the expression “**object.**” For an external thing such as a whole is not logically acceptable.]

<sup>41</sup> Cf. PVAN 65b6: *yathā ca vṛttikārasyaṇvīsaṃvādenārthatvam icchato doṣaḥ pūrvalakṣaṇāpekṣatālakṣaṇaḥ, tathā nāsmākam ity api vaidarbhyeṇa darśitam.* [= Moreover, [with this statement he implicitly shows] that we do not make the same mistake as the commentator [i.e., Devendrabuddhi], who believes that the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing [is known] by the [cognition's being] “non-belying”—[namely, the mistake] which consists in the [second definition] being dependent on the previous [i.e., first] definition.] However, this interpretation of Yamāri does not seem to be true to Devendrabuddhi's intention. See footnote 15 in this paper.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. PVAN 65b5: *tato 'rthatvam avisaṃvādād eva jñātavyam iti nirastam. ato 'sya na*

Thus, [Devendrabuddhi's claim] that the fact that [the object of cognition] is a real thing can only be known on the basis of [the cognition's being] "non-belying" (cf. PVAo 79,1) is refuted. The point is: for this reason, the [second definition] does not depend on the previous [, i.e., first] definition, whereas the previous [definition] depends on this [second] definition.

Thus, it is established that the second definition is superior to the first definition<sup>43</sup>. In this case, the second definition is the true definition and the first definition can be only deduced from the second. One can notice that this is just the contrary of Dharmottara's position, who, as shown above, defined correct cognition (*śamyagjñāna*), i.e., *pramāṇa*, as a "non-belying" cognition and deduced the second definition of the PV from this definition. In this matter, too, Prajñākaragupta's view is, as usual, the complete opposite of Dharmottara's.

However, another problem may come up for this interpretation. First of all, as long as a correct cognition is defined as "non-belying," it can be empirically verified on the basis of the fulfillment of a purpose whether the cognition in question is a *pramāṇa* or not, since the property "non-belying" consists in the non-belying cognition fulfilling a human purpose (*aviśaṃvādanam arthakriyāsthitiḥ*). If, on the other hand, "that which reveals an unknown object" is the definition of *pramāṇa*, the fact that the object of cognition is a real thing is a necessary condition of *pramāṇa*. The fact that the object is a real thing, however, which is not deduced from the property "non-belying," does not seem to be empirically verifiable. In the last line of the above passage, in response to the question how the fact of being real thing is recognized (*katham tarhi arthavagatiḥ*), Prajñākaragupta simply replies that "we should think that it is by deliberation (*parāmarśād iti mantavyam*)."<sup>44</sup> However, as is explained by Yamāri, can the deliberation of ordinary people really apprehend the fact that the object of cognition is a real thing?<sup>44</sup>

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*pūrvalakṣaṇāpekṣatā. pūrvasya tv etallakṣaṇāpekṣateti bhāvaḥ.*

<sup>43</sup> Cf. Iwata 2000: 8a11–14.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. PVAN 65b4–5: *yady aviśaṃvāda udāsīna etallakṣaṇakāle, katham tarhi? iti. uttaram—parāmarśād iti śarīrasvāsthyaparāmarśāt. abhyāsato hi paṭudhiyas timirāśu-bhramaṇamiddhādyupahativiraham ākalayato jhaṭity eva sambhavī purahprakāśini kalaśādaḥ bahirarthapratyayo nirastavibhramāśaṅkaḥ. śaśāṅkadvaye tu naivam, upahater eva*

### 3.3. The Definitions of *Pāramārthikapramāṇa* and *Sāṃvṛtyavahārikapramāṇa*

The well-known dichotomy of *pāramārthikapramāṇalakṣaṇa* and *sāṃvṛtyavahārikapramāṇalakṣaṇa*, which I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, has been, in my opinion, presented by Prajñākaragupta in order to solve this problem:

Or rather, in this [definition], ultimate [truth] (*paramārtha*) is meant by the word “*artha*.” It means that [the phrase] “**that which reveals an unknown object**” [should be interpreted as] “that which reveals ultimate [truth].” And ultimate [truth] consists in [the cognition’s] having a non-dual nature (*advaitarūpatā*). [And] a *pramāṇa* is that which reveals this [ultimate truth]. Regarding that [second definition], [Dharmakīrti] has stated: “**The own-nature is known by itself**” (PV II 4d), whereas he said: “**Validity is [ascertained] by means of behaviour**” (PV II 5a) [with regard to the first definition]. In this case, this (i.e., “that which reveals an unknown object”) is the definition of the ultimate *pramāṇa*, whereas the previous one (i.e., “non-belying”) is [the definition] of conventional [*pramāṇas*].<sup>45,46</sup>

*nīścayāt*. [= [One might ask,] “If the property “non-belying” is neutral [as to whether the object of the cognition is a real thing] when this [second] definition [applies], “**how is then**” [the fact of being real recognized]?” [Prajñākaragupta] replies: “**by deliberation**.” Namely, **by deliberation** of [people] having healthy body. For those who observe [things] on the basis of clear wisdom through often repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) without damages resulting from eye floaters, quick turning, sleepiness, etc., the recognition that the pot, etc., appearing in front are external things can occur immediately without suspecting that it is an illusion. In the case of the double moon, on the other hand, it is not so, since the damage [of eyes] is definitely ascertained.]

<sup>45</sup> PVA<sub>O</sub> 79,15–19: *atha vārthasābdenātra paramārtha ucyate. ajñātārthaprakāśa iti paramārthaprakāśa ity arthaḥ. paramārthas cādvaitarūpatā. tatprakāśanam eva pramāṇam. tathā ca pratyapādi—svarūpasya svato gatir iti. uktaṃ ca—prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇeti. tatra pāramārthikapramāṇalakṣaṇam etat, pūrvam tu sāṃvṛtyavahārikasya* (cf. Franco 1997: 50).

<sup>46</sup> Cf. TSP 784,14–15: *tathā hi—sāṃvṛtyavahārikasyedaṃ pramāṇasya lakṣaṇam pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam iti*; PVAN 66a2: *tad evaṃ pūrvalakṣaṇānapekṣatām pratipādyātrāsamtuṣyaṃ bhāṣyakāro viśayabhedapakṣāśrayeṇa lakṣaṇadvaitam saphalayann āha—atha veti. pūrvapramāṇalakṣaṇam samvṛtāv, anyat tu paramārtha ity arthaḥ.*

If the word “a real thing (*artha*)” in the second definition means the object of a *pramāṇa* in general, how can ordinary people recognize that a certain object is real and therefore that the cognition of this object is a *pramāṇa*? In response to this question, Prajñākaragupta replies that the word “the real thing (*artha*)” in the second definition, in truth, means ultimate reality (*paramārtha*), i.e., non-duality, which is the object of only the Bhagavat, i.e., the ultimate *pramāṇa* (*pāramārthikapramāṇa* or *pramāṇabhūta*). It goes without saying that the Bhagavat recognizes the reality of objects.

Prajñākaragupta further quotes two *pādas* of the PV, i.e., “the own-nature is known by itself” (PV II 4d) and “validity is [ascertained] by means of behaviour” (PV II 5a),<sup>47</sup> and relates these two *pādas* to the second definition and the first definition, respectively. His mentioning of PV II 4d and PV II 5a in this context seems somewhat abrupt, and, as far as I know, no previous studies as well as traditional commentaries including Yamāri’s have hitherto provided a persuasive explanation of why he mentions them.<sup>48</sup>

Here, in my opinion, we should recall the fact that both Prajñākaragupta and Yamāri have previously considered these two *pādas* as relating to *pāramārthikapramāṇya* and *sāṃvyaavahārikapramāṇya*, respectively.<sup>49</sup> Prajñākaragupta’s purpose in quoting these two *pādas* is, in short, to justify his idea that the second definition is the definition of the *pāramārthikapramāṇa*.

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[= Thus, after explaining in this way that [this definition, i.e., PV II 5c] does not depend on the previous one (i.e., PV II 1a), [nonetheless] unsatisfied with this [explanation], the author of commentary (i.e., Prajñākaragupta) has stated “rather” in order to make the two definitions meaningful by adopting the position that [the two definitions] have different objects [as definienda]. It means that the former definition of *pramāṇa* is with regard to conventional things, whereas the latter [i.e., the second definition] pertains to ultimate truth.]

<sup>47</sup> With regard to Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of PV II 4d–5a in detail, see Inami 2023 in this volume.

<sup>48</sup> Franco does not translate this portion and is silent about the meaning of it (cf. Franco 1987: 50,17).

<sup>49</sup> Prajñākaragupta says that the phrase, “**validity is [ascertained] by means of behaviour,**” is related to conventional validity (cf. PVAo 65,4–5: *prāmāṇyaṃ vyavahāreṇa*. *sāṃvyaavahārikam etad iti pratipāditam*; also PVAo 65,10: *sāṃvyaavahārikam prāmāṇyam pratipādayatā...*). Yamāri also explains this part of the PVA as follows: “After having previously explained ultimate validity [with:] ‘**the own-nature is known by itself,**’ those who explain conventional validity [by:] ‘**the validity is**

The Bhagavat as *pāramārthikapramāṇa*, since his *prāmāṇya* is intrinsic—as shown by PV II 4d—can be seen as defined by the second definition, which does not imply empirical verification.<sup>50</sup> The conventional *pramāṇas*, on the other hand, whose *prāmāṇya* is extrinsic—as shown in the PV II 5a—should be defined by the first definition, which includes the element of empirical verification.

Thus, the second definition, “that which reveals an unknown object,” is regarded as the definition of the *pāramārthikapramāṇa*, whereas “non-belying” serves as a definition of *sāṃvayavahārikapramāṇa*. This is the final answer of Prajñākaragupta. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that, also in this final interpretation, Prajñākaragupta probably maintains the view that the first definition can be deduced from the second definition. The first definition, therefore, still states a necessary condition of the *pāramārthikapramāṇa*. This is consistent with Yamāri's explanation of the introductory portion of the first definition<sup>51</sup> and with the concluding statement of his commentary explaining the superiority of the second definition as well.<sup>52</sup>

In other words, Prajñākaragupta's statement that the second definition is the definition of the *pāramārthikapramāṇa* should be interpreted to mean that

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[ascertained] by means of behaviour'...” (PVAN 60a2: *pūrvam svarūpasya svato gatiḥ* (PV II 4d) *iti pāramārthikam prāmāṇyam pratipādyā prāmāṇyam vyavahāreṇa* (PV II 5a) *iti sāṃvayavahārikam prāmāṇyam pratipādayatā*...). Cf. Dreyfus 1991: 28,5–12.

<sup>50</sup> In a different context, Yamāri states that also for the Veda, whose validity is intrinsic, the definition of “non-belying” is meaningless (PVAN 51a3–4: *tad evam avisamvādāditve pramāṇalakṣaṇa ukte, parihṛte cāvyāptyatīvvyāptidoṣe, tallakṣaṇayogāc ca bhagavān eva paralokādīpramāṇam iti tātparye darśite, vedād eva tatsiddhir alaṃ bhagavatety asmin vāde svataḥprāmāṇyāc ca vedasya saṃvāditvalakṣaṇavaiyarthiyodbhāvanapare prabandhe niraste, punaḥ saṃvāditvalakṣaṇasyaiva svasamayāpekṣayātivvyāptim āpādayann āha—yadi tarhītyādi*).

<sup>51</sup> Cf. footnote 30.

<sup>52</sup> Yamāri states that the Bhagavat is endowed with both characters of *pramāṇa*, i.e., “non-belying” and “that which reveals an unknown object.” Cf. PVAN 66a1–2: *etac ca lakṣaṇadvayaṃ bhagavato 'py akṣūṇam, yathopadarśitasvargāpavargamārgaprāpanāt, hariharādibhir adṛṣṭasya tattvasya drṣṭeś cety...* [= And these two definitions are also not missing for the Bhagavat, insofar as he makes [people] obtain the way to the heaven and emancipation in the way instructed and observes the truth which is not seen by Viṣṇu and Śiva, etc. ...]

the second definition, insofar as it implies the first definition, is the definition of the *pāramārthikapramāṇa*.<sup>53</sup>

#### 4. Conclusion

As is examined above, Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of the definition of *pramāṇa* is not simple. His famous interpretation that the first definition pertains to the conventional *pramāṇas* whereas the second definition pertains to the ultimate *pramāṇa* is certainly his unique interpretation. It is, however, not everything which Prajñākaragupta wished to say regarding this issue. He also suggests that the second definition is superior to the first on the level of *sāṃvyaṇāhārikapramāṇa*. After further investigation he reaches his final interpretation mentioned above. His final interpretation is not merely an afterthought, but a conclusion he reaches after thoroughly reflecting on the meaning of the two definitions.

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<sup>53</sup> When explaining Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's definition of *pramāṇa*, Sa skya paṇḍita (1182–1251) states in his *Tshad ma rigs gter* that Prajñākaragupta regards the combination of both the first definition “non-belying” and the second definition “that which reveals an unknown object” as a definition of conventional *pramāṇa* (*sāṃvyaṇāhārikapramāṇa*), whereas the ultimate *pramāṇa* is defined only by the second definition. Kimura and Nishizawa, however, when discussing Prajñākaragupta's interpretation, have expressed the suspicion that the view of Sa Paṇ, which in fact follows that of gTsang nag pa (12<sup>th</sup> cent.), is incorrect (cf. Kimura 1996: 33; Nishizawa 2007, (341)). In my opinion, however, the understanding of Tibetan scholars cannot be so easily rejected; for we have seen that Prajñākaragupta believes that the second definition implies the first definition on the ordinary level, whereas the second definition does not need to be verified by the first definition on the ultimate level. This problem should be further examined.

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Dharmakīrti's *Analysis of Relations*\*  
Dharmakīrti's *Sambandhaparīkṣā*  
and Devendrabuddhi's *Sambandhaparīkṣāvṛtti*<sup>1</sup>

P a r i m a l G . P A T I L  
H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y , C a m b r i d g e , M a .

**Preface**

This “teaching translation” and commentary is intended for philosophers who do not know (and are likely never to know) classical Sanskrit. It is not an English reconstruction or literal translation that students of Sanskrit can use to (easily) read the original. Nevertheless, the translation is supposed to be accurate: I do not want to get Dharmakīrti or Devendrabuddhi wrong. I trust that those who know classical Sanskrit will be able to understand the translation choices that I have made (and I believe I can defend). I do not expect everyone to agree with these choices, however, and errors

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\* Eli Franco has given me many gifts, including the gifts of his friendship, mentorship, and scholarship. He has taught me how to think with Sanskrit philosophical texts, and not just about them; to think critically about everything; and to keep pushing myself to do better. I am forever in his debt. I very much hope that some of what I have learned from him is evident in my contribution to this volume in his honor. I trust that he will expose my errors, forgive my ignorance, and continue to push me in our shared quest to understand.

<sup>1</sup> Versions of both texts have been translated before. The critical edition, which I have translated here, has been both edited and translated by Ernst Steinkellner in Steinkellner 2022a and Steinkellner 2022b. A discussion of the critical edition, its manuscript history, and important secondary scholarship on both can be found in the helpful Introduction to Steinkellner 2022a: vii–xxxiii. It goes without saying that this translation is indebted to his work and the pioneering work in Frauwallner 1934 and Frauwallner 1932/1933. My own work has also benefitted from critical comments and questions by Johanne Donovan, Jungju Seo, and Dmitry Trynkov who kindly read through this translation with me in the spring of 2023. Nilanjan Das used an earlier version of the translation in a graduate course in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto I am also grateful to audiences at the 2023 Pacific APA and UCLA.

in translation, interpretation, or both, should be pointed out so they can be corrected. Although this translation is designed to be “readable,” it is a translation of a text that was composed in classical Sanskrit well-over a thousand years ago. Its readability should be compared with the readability of well-translated texts of Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, or Kant. It is also worth noting that texts such as the *Analysis* were designed to be taught, and not simply to be read on their own. While very different from texts composed in contemporary English, I hope that students of philosophy will benefit from doing philosophy with Dharmakīrti’s *Analysis of Relations* (SP) and Devendrabuddhi’s *Commentary* (SPV).<sup>2</sup> In the notes to the translation, which are intended to be the minimum necessary for a student of Euro-American philosophy to understand the text, I have pointed to passages in Dharmakīrti’s other work that I have found to be helpful, even though the contexts are often very different. In the notes to my explanations, I have tried to point to some relevant secondary material. Neither sets of notes are intended to be exhaustive. I hope they are helpful, nevertheless.<sup>3</sup>

## **Part 1. Verses 1–6: In no interpretation of $aRb$ is $R$ fundamental**

### **1.1 Unsuccessful Reductionist Accounts**

#### **A. In $aRb$ , $R$ is just $b$ ’s being dependent upon $a$**

#### **Verse 1**

In order to reject a relation’s being a real thing, he says, it is “a dependence upon something else.”

*It is generally accepted that a relation is a dependence upon something else.*

*How can something that is complete in its existence be dependent upon something else? Therefore, for no existing thing can this be what a relation actually is. (SP 1)*

<sup>2</sup> For those who are new to the SP and SPV, Dharmakīrti’s (c. 550–650 CE) text is just the numbered verses SP 1–25. The prose is Devendrabuddhi’s (c. 630–690 CE) commentary. For an accessible introduction to Dharmakīrti’s work see Dunne 2004, Eltschinger 2010, and Tillemans 2020. For editions and translations of the SP, see Steinkellner 2022a, the edition translated here, and Steinkellner 2022b, which is his “trial translation” of both the SP and SPV.

<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed discussion of Dharmakīrti’s arguments and an assessment of

A dependence upon something else is a requiring of something else.<sup>4</sup> This is what a relation is.

This may be of something that is complete in its existence or something that is incomplete in its existence.<sup>5</sup> There cannot be a real relation for something that is incomplete in its existence, since that thing would have the nature of an absence. Even if the relatum were *something that is complete in its existence, how can it be dependent upon something else?*<sup>6</sup> It cannot be. And so, that is not a relation.

“Even something complete in its existence is in some way incomplete.”

If this were shown to be so, it does not follow that there could be a dependence on something else too. This is because problems with an existing thing that is complete or incomplete in its existence cannot be overcome. And it is not case that that one thing can be both complete and incomplete. Because of this, neither what is complete nor the other can be dependent upon something else. *Therefore, for no existing thing can this be what a relation actually is* i.e., be metaphysically real. What is conceptually constructed is not rejected, since it is not a real thing.

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his view, see Patil, *forthcoming*.

<sup>4</sup> For more on dependence (*pāratantryam*), and concepts that are often related to it, such as assistance (*upa+√kr*), property (*dharma* or *upādhi*)/property-possessor (*dharmin*), and capacity (*śakti*), see SP and/or SPV ad SP 1, 4, 9, 19, 21. For some of the contexts in which Dharmakīrti discusses the relationships between these concepts, see PVSV 37.10–37.11 ad PV 1.67, PV 1.75 ad PVSV 43.19–43.28. These passages are translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 86–87, 94–95. Cf. SP 19, where Devendrabuddhi provides a helpful explanation of some of this.

<sup>5</sup> As Steinkellner notes, this line is quoted in NBhūṣ 503.13. I mention this here, while not mentioning other references to non-Buddhist texts, because I find Bhāsarvajña's discussion particularly helpful. For a list of parallel passages in work by other Sanskrit philosophers see Steinkellner 2022a.

<sup>6</sup> For a helpful discussion of this general idea see PVSV 24.25–25.13 ad PV 1.40–1.42, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 29–34. Also see the long “digression” at HB9.1–23.03, which is translated in Steinkellner 2022b: 12–32 and referred to in the notes to SP 25. The issues discussed in these passages outline the ontology and metaphysics that underlies almost all of Dharmakīrti's arguments in this text. For an excellent discussion of this see Inami 2020, where he explains what I take to be Dharmakīrti's “trope-theoretic” ontology and metaphysics. For more on this see Patil, *forthcoming*.

**Explanation:** In  $aRb$  i.e., “ $a$  is related to  $b$ ” or “ $a$  and  $b$  stand in relation  $R$ ,” where  $a$  is neither numerically identical to nor a part of  $b$ ,  $R$  is simply  $b$ ’s (for example, an “effect”) being in some way dependent upon  $a$  (for example, its “cause”). Dharmakīrti takes this to mean that  $b$  is in some way in need of  $a$ , in the sense that  $b$  cannot be  $b$ , without  $a$ . Assuming  $b$ ,  $b$  must be either complete or incomplete in its existence, which is to say that  $b$  must be either ontologically independent or ontologically dependent. If  $b$  is ontologically independent (i.e., ontologically dependent only on its parts), Dharmakīrti argues that it cannot be, by definition, dependent upon  $a$ . If  $b$  is ontologically dependent on something other than its parts, such as  $a$ , then  $b$  cannot exist without  $a$ . Without  $a$ ,  $b$  would be an *absence*, which, for Dharmakīrti, is not a real thing and so it cannot stand in a real relation to  $a$ .

Suppose  $b$  can be  $b$  while also being incomplete in some way. Dharmakīrti argues that this is impossible, since  $b$  cannot be both incomplete i.e., ontologically dependent and complete i.e., ontologically independent. Moreover, even if this could be so, since he has already shown that whether complete or incomplete,  $b$  cannot be dependent upon anything else, an object  $b$  that is both complete and incomplete cannot be dependent upon anything else either.

Note: In SP 1,  $R$  is assumed to be dyadic and, it seems, non-symmetric, since Dharmakīrti only discusses  $b$ ’s relation to  $a$  and not  $a$ ’s relation to  $b$ . While this does not entail that  $R$  is non-symmetric, it is suggestive, though it is not clear if  $R$  is also asymmetric. What kind of “dependence” does Dharmakīrti have in mind, metaphysical/ontological, conceptual, both? In SP 1, it seems to be metaphysical/ontological dependency? One reason to think so is because of the last line, where both Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi seems to be speaking of  $b$  as if  $b$  needs to be metaphysically real for it to be dependent, ontologically vs conceptually, upon  $a$ .

## **B. In $aRb$ , $R$ is a merging of the intrinsic natures of $a$ and $b$**

### **Verse 2**

*It is generally accepted that a relation is a merging of intrinsic natures. But how could this be if there are two? And so, there cannot be a real relation between things of different natures. (SP 2)*

*It is generally accepted that a relation is a merging of intrinsic natures, and not a dependence upon something else.*<sup>7</sup>

This is not so. *If there are two* refers to the two relata. {...}<sup>8</sup> *This* refers to a merging of their intrinsic natures, which is defined as their intrinsic natures being of a singular nature. *But how could this be?* There is no way this can be. Even if they were singular, how could there be a relation, since two relata would not exist? A relation has to be dyadic.<sup>9</sup>

"It is not the case that their being of a singular nature is what merging is. Rather, it is their not being separate."

Okay. What is the argument? Since not being separate is simply the absence of a gap, that cannot be what a real relation is. Moreover, if a relation is the absence of a gap, why not accept that a relation is the presence of a gap? The reason is that in both cases the intrinsic natures of the two relata would have to be non-different. Even coming into contact<sup>10</sup> etc. should not be spoken of as bringing objects together without any gap. This is because, if so, a relation would not be defined as a merging of two intrinsic natures.

<sup>7</sup> For a related discussion, see PVSV 116.28–119.07 ad PV 1.234–1.237, which is translated in Eltschinger 2007, which I also refer to below.

<sup>8</sup> See Steinkellner 2022a: 12, 40, where he indicates that approximately 10 "letters" are badly faded or missing.

<sup>9</sup> For a discussion of "merging" or "fusion" see PVSV 113.23–113.25 ad PV 1.227cd, PVSV 115.24–116.2 ad PV 1.231cd, For a discussion, see Eltschinger 2007: 248 n.146, Eltschinger 2007: 259 and Eltschinger and Ratié 2013: 69–99. Both passages are also translated in Steinkellner 2022: xviii. Also see PVSV 147.8–9 as discussed in Eltschinger and Ratié 2013: 98 n.151 and 103 n.174, where passages from the PVSVṬ and PVT are discussed. For other uses of "dyadic" (*dviṣṭha*) see HBT: 8. For more on "two" and numbers, see below.

<sup>10</sup> See AKBh ad AK 1.43cd, where "coming into contact" (*prāpti*) is defined as "arising or coming together without a gap" (*nirantarotpatti*). Discussed in this passage is the question of whether two things e.g., atoms or sense faculties and the objects they put us in touch with can be in contact without touching (*aprāptaviṣaya*) each other. It is this "touching" type of relation that the word "contact" (*prāpti*) seems to be referring to in SP 2. I would like to thank Jungju Seo for reminding me of this passage. Also see the discussion in NBh 87.16–88.14 ad NS 2.1.52–2.1.54, which is also noted in Steinkellner 2022b: 2 n.1. Cf. the discussion at SP 25.

*And so, there cannot be a real relation between things of different natures because, if different, it would be superimposed by the imagination.*<sup>11</sup>

**Explanation:** In  $aRb$ , where  $a$  is neither numerically identical to  $b$  nor a part of  $b$ ,  $R$  is simply a merging or coming together of  $a$  and  $b$ . More specifically,  $R$  is a fusion of the intrinsic natures of  $a$  and  $b$  i.e., a fusion of what makes  $a$  uniquely  $a$  and  $b$  uniquely  $b$ . Given that relations have to be dyadic, Dharmakīrti argues that this proposal is incoherent. The *fusion* of two numerically distinct things implies that the two things are actually one i.e., that they have a single intrinsic nature. But two numerically distinct things cannot have identical intrinsic natures and be numerically distinct. So, either there are two unfused numerically distinct things that are not standing in a dyadic relation or there is only one thing, the intrinsic nature of which may be the result of fusion but which, nevertheless, is numerically one and so not standing in a dyadic relation.

The commentary considers a modified version of this proposal, according to which  $R$  is simply  $a$  and  $b$  not being separate from one another.  $R$  is the absence of  $a$  and  $b$  being separate. In response, it is said that an absence is not a real thing and so a real relation cannot be an absence. Furthermore, Devendrabuddhi argues, it doesn't help to suggest that there is a way for  $a$  and  $b$  to be related to each without touching one another, but also without a gap between them. If this were possible, there might be a way for  $a$  and  $b$  to be related without being of a single nature. However, this wouldn't save the "merging of intrinsic natures" view, since this proposal would render an appeal to merging irrelevant.<sup>12</sup>

### C. In $aRb$ , $R$ is just $b$ 's reliance upon $a$

#### Verse 3

*It is generally accepted that a relation is reliance on another. How can something that does not exist rely on something else? And furthermore, an*

<sup>11</sup> See PVSV 24.25–25.13 ad PV 1.42, which I referred to above, where Dharmakīrti discusses "fusion" and whether things can mix their natures. For a translation see Eltschinger et al. 2018: 30ff. Cf. PVSV 115.24–116.2 ad PV 1.237cd and PVSV 118.27 as noted by Steinkellner 2022: xxii n.36.

<sup>12</sup> See PVSV 113.23–113.25 ad PV 1.227 & PVSV 118.27–119.1 ad PV 1.236, translated



*existing thing does not want for anything. How can it rely on something else? (SP 3)*

Now he says, *It is generally accepted that a relation is reliance on another*, and not a merging of natures. In this case too, if one relatum e.g., *b*, is the other that relies upon *a* via reliance, it relies on it only in so far as it's a relying thing that exists at that time or does not exist at that time. If it does not exist at that time, *how can something that does not exist rely on something else?*

Reliance is not itself a property of an existing thing the nature of which is not yet complete. So, what is this relation and what is standing in it? *And furthermore, an existing thing does not want for anything* i.e., its nature does not rely upon anything else.<sup>13</sup> *How can it rely on something else*, in reliance upon which there could be a relation?<sup>14</sup> The rest is said to be like dependence on something else in SP 1.<sup>15</sup>

**Explanation:** *aRb* is just *b*'s reliance upon *a*, which is to say that it is *b*'s standing in need of *a*, which is different from it. In such a relation, the relatum *b* relies upon *a* and the relatum *a* is relied upon by *b*. Dharmakīrti's argument focuses on *b*, which he says must either exist or not. If it doesn't exist, he argues that it cannot stand in need of anything. If it already exists, that is, if it exists without *a*, it doesn't make sense to say that it stands in need of *a*. If *b* is supposed to exist only in reliance upon *a*, then the arguments in SP 1 are said

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in Eltschinger 2007.

<sup>13</sup> I am following Steinkellner's recommendation to emend "*sarvasvabhāvasvabhāvā-napekṣo*" to "*sarvabhāvasvabhāvānapekṣo*." For a related context in which "reliance" is drawn upon see PVSV 146.12–148.24 ad PV 276–279.

<sup>14</sup> For another place where Dharmakīrti draws upon the idea of "reliance" (*apa+√īkṣ*), see PVSV 22.22–23.13 ad PV 1.25=PVin 2.58. In this passage, the "reliance" in question is a reliance on space and time, which are also said to "assist" a thing being present when and where it is. Also see PV 2.179. When both contexts are compared it becomes clear that for Dharmakīrti the relata *a* and *b* include a wide range of "things" including fire and smoke, which are material, as well as things like suffering, which is not. For a discussion of this see Steinkellner 2013, Part 1: 54–61. For a translation of PVSV ad PV 1.25 see Gillon and Hayes 2008 and Eltschinger 2021: 100, who also refers to PV 2.179.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. PVSV 119.3 ad PV 1.237 as noted by Steinkellner 2022: xxii n.36.

to apply. Moreover, “reliance on something else” is not a real property that things which are existentially incomplete can have. So what is it and what kind of thing can stand in it? There is nothing that it could be and nothing that could have it. So, for all of these reasons, neither a non-existing thing nor an existing thing can stand in a “reliance on another” relation that is taken to be a property of it.

Devendrabuddhi relates this view and the arguments against it to the view discussed in SP 1, that a relation is “dependence on something else.” In both views, relations are taken to be dyadic. And in arguing against both views, Devendrabuddhi relies on the idea that to exist, *a* (or *b* or *R*) must be “complete in its existence,” which is to say that in so far as *b* is *b* intrinsically, it is ontologically self-sufficient. It does not stand in need of anything else to be *b*.

Note: In SP 3, *R* is not reducible to *a* and *b* but rather to a property of *a* or *b*, which is to say that *a* and *b*’s standing in relation *R* is fixed by a property of *a* or *b*, namely, the property of reliance. This view is therefore different from the view in SP 1, where *R* is reduced to *a* and *b* themselves. In SP 3, the reduction seems to be a form of weak reduction.

#### D. In *aRb*, *a* and *b* are related to a third thing, *R*

##### Verse 4

*Suppose that because two things are related to the same thing there is a relation between them. What then is the relation between those two and that one thing? Furthermore, there would be a regress. And so, there is no sense to such a relation. (SP 4)*

The problem from SP 3 does not apply *because two things* i.e., the two relata *are related to the same thing*. Suppose i.e., suppose it is accepted that there is a relation between them because they are related i.e., caused to be so, by one real thing i.e., either a distinct thing e.g., a relation such as contact, which is called a “property,” or something that is not distinct e.g., an unexpressed property.<sup>16</sup> If this is so, then, on the view that it is not a distinct thing it

<sup>16</sup> I am following Steinkellner’s recommendation to emend the text to “*avācyena vā*” from “*avācyena*.” See Steinkellner 2022a line 5.

could only be imagined that there are two relata, and so there wouldn't be a real relation between them. Another reason is that even if there were a real relation, the two relata would always be related and, therefore, they would be a unity. This is because even a real unexpressed thing has to be, logically, either a distinct thing or something that is not distinct. On the view that it is not distinct, there is neither a real relation nor relata.

Now suppose there is a real relation that is either a distinct thing or the other. In that case, *what then is the relation between those two and that one thing?* What relates the two relata with that one thing? There is nothing. Just as, because of the problem just stated, there is no relation between the two relata, so too, there is no relation between the two relata and it. Otherwise, what is the argument against there being a relation between the two relata all by themselves?

Moreover, if it is accepted that there is a relation because two things are related to the same thing, then it must be that that relation and each of the two relata are also related to one thing. By provisionally accepting that there is that relation, they would again have to be related to one thing, and *furthermore there would be a regress*. And therefore, a relation to one thing can never be established. If there is no relation, *there can be no sense to such a relation* anywhere. Given the regress, there can't be the idea that a relation applies to real things.

Suppose that in some cases there can be a relation without there being a relation to the same thing. If so, then even the first two relata need not be related because they are related to one thing. If the relation is between two things all by themselves, the problem has been explained already. The idea of other properties such as 'not being separate etc.' is also rejected by this.

**Explanation:** In SP 3, Dharmakīrti rejected the view that in  $aRb$ ,  $R$  is weakly reducible to  $a$  and  $b$ . In SP 4, he considers and rejects the view that  $R$  is a real thing that is not reducible to  $a$  and  $b$ .  $R$  is taken to be an ontological primitive, either a real relation such as contact (which Dharmakīrti discusses below in SP 22–24) or what he calls an "unexpressed" (and let us say, relational) property that they both share.

As Devendrabuddhi explains the argument, whether interpreted as a real relation or shared relational property,  $R$  has to be either distinct from  $a$  and  $b$  or not distinct. If it is not distinct, then it is strongly reducible to and,

therefore, identical with  $a$  and  $b$ . And so, there would be no real relation to speak of, nor would  $a$  and  $b$  be related in any real sense. If somehow  $R$ , which is not distinct from  $a$  and  $b$ , were to relate  $a$  and  $b$ ,  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $R$  would constitute a unity, which wouldn't tell us anything about relatedness or relations. If  $R$  is distinct and not reducible, the question becomes how  $R$  itself is on either interpretation related to  $a$  and  $b$ . This is Dharmakīrti's version of the famous "Bradley Regress" against external relations.<sup>17</sup>

Suppose there is a way to avoid the regress and still claim that  $R$  is a distinct real thing. In this case,  $R$  is supposed to relate  $a$  and  $b$ , but not itself be related to  $a$  or  $b$ . Devendrabuddhi argues that  $a$  and  $b$  could not be related in such a case since, regardless of what is supposed, they would have to be related somehow to whatever it is that accounts for the relation between them. Devendrabuddhi concludes that any distinct entity that is postulated to account for  $aRb$  can be rejected by the same argument.

**D1. In  $aRb$ ,  $a$ ,  $R$ , and  $b$  are not related:  $aRb$  is merely conceptual**

**Verse 5**

*Furthermore, the two real relatedness and the thing that is different from them all exist in and of themselves. And so, those things are not connected together by themselves. It is conceptual construction that brings them together. (SP 5)*

And since this is so, the idea that there is real relation that does this isn't any better. Therefore, he says, *Furthermore, the two real relatedness* i.e., the two that are taken to be related, *and the thing that is different from them* i.e., the thing that is called a relation, *all* i.e., the things just stated, *exist in and of themselves* i.e., exist in and of their respective intrinsic natures. *And so* i.e., therefore, *those things are not connected together* i.e., they are not related by themselves i.e., in and of their intrinsic natures.

"If so, how come things are said to be brought together by this or that relation."

There aren't any relations. Rather, *conceptual construction brings them together*, even though they *are not connected together*. And this too comes about

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<sup>17</sup> See Bradley 1926 and Perovic 2017. The connection with Bradley was noticed long ago by Stcherbatsky 1993: 246.

while making them appear for some reason as if they have come together because of something else.<sup>18</sup>

**Explanation:** If  $a$ ,  $R$ , and  $b$ , are numerically distinct and not related to each other, in  $aRb$  something has to make it as if they are so related. In what sense could they come to be so related? Dharmakīrti argues that there is something that can make it appear as if there are two different relata,  $a$  and  $b$ , which are in some way dependent on an entity  $R$  that is different from each of them. What is it? It is conceptual construction, a kind of imaginative fictionalization.<sup>19</sup>

## D2. In $aRb$ , $a$ , $R$ , and $b$ are not distinct: Difference is conceptual

### Verse 6

*Words that convey events and event-makers are used by those who accept this very thing to bring about an awareness of a difference between things.*

(SP 6)

*Words that convey events and event-makers* i.e., that denote events and event-makers *are used by those* i.e., people, *who accept this very thing* i.e., conceptual construction. They designate that this is to be called an “event,” this is to be called an “event-maker,” *to bring about an awareness of a difference between things* i.e., to bring about the awareness of the exclusion of others, which just is what the difference between those things is. The relation of event and event-makers, however, is not real {...}.<sup>20</sup>

**Explanation:** “Event-Makers” refers to the different functional roles that words have in a sentence. For example, in the sentence, “Devadatta cuts

<sup>18</sup> For parallels, also cited in Steinkellner, see: PVSV 147.8–147.9 ad PV 1.227, which is translated and discussed in Eltschinger and Ratié 2013a: 98 n.151 and Eltschinger and Ratié 2013b: 107–108 n.197. Also see PVSV 34.26 ad PV 1.64, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 62–66, and PVSV 151.26–151.28 ad PV 1.286. Following Steinkellner, I am reading “*upadarśayanti*” instead of the printed, “*upadarśanti*.” See Steinkellner 2022a: 15 line 9.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. SP 7, 11–12, 14–15.

<sup>20</sup> According to Steinkellner, three illegible letters follow. See Steinkellner 2022a: 16

the tree with an axe,” the Event in question is cutting. The Agent is Devadatta. The Patient is the tree. The Instrument is the axe. In an active sentence with a transitive verb, the Event-Makers, Devadatta, tree, and axe are “different from” each other and, more importantly, from the Event itself. Dharmakīrti argues that relations between an Event and “its” Event-Makers or between Event makers themselves are conceptually constructed. The *different from* / *difference between* relation is an ontological fiction, though it may be useful nevertheless. Just how and why this is the case is not discussed here. Devendrabuddhi connects this discussion to Dharmakīrti’s (in)famous theory of exclusion.<sup>21</sup>

## **Part 2. Verses 7–11ab. In *aRb*, *R* must be dyadic**

### **E. In *aRb*, *R* cannot be a causal relation**

#### **Verse 7**

*How could even an effect-cause relation which is located in two things be thought to exist, since its two relata cannot exist together? Without it existing in two things, how could it relate them? (SP 7)*

“It is, then, an effect-cause relation that can be proven to be a real relation.”

This is not so, since *how could even an effect-cause relation* be a real relation? That is to say, it simply cannot *be thought to exist*. How could it exist? It is *located in two things*. How is that a reason, *since its two relata* i.e., the effect and cause *cannot exist together*? That is to say, whenever the cause is, the effect is not, or, whenever it is, the cause is not, since it is impossible for effect and cause to be simultaneous. Since non-momentary things do not even exist, there can be neither a relation of effect and cause nor one of co-existence between them. And so, even the examples cited in debates about the existence of non-momentary things are not tenable here. For this reason,

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line 7. Although not a close parallel, see the discussion of difference at PVSV 38–39 ad PV 1.68–1.70, and the translation and notes in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 75–81. More specifically, see PVSV 32.12–32.15 ad PV 1.63 and PVSVT 153.10–11, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 61–62 and 62 n.180 and the more extensive n.181.

<sup>21</sup> See Eltschinger et al. 2018 and the references contained therein.

the two relata cannot be real things that co-exist.<sup>22</sup> If they could, there could be a relation that exists in the present between the two relata. But *without it* i.e., one thing, *existing in two things, how could it relate them?* It simply could not. The relation that appears in our mind is created by our imagination.

**Explanation:** In  $aRb$ ,  $R$  cannot be causation. Dharmakīrti argues that causal relations are such that for  $R$  to be a causal relation,  $a$  and  $b$  have to be numerically distinct;  $a$  and  $b$  cannot exist simultaneously; and yet  $R$  must be located in both  $a$  and  $b$  simultaneously in order to relate one to the other. Given this,  $R$  cannot exist, since  $a$  and  $b$ , though numerically distinct, cannot exist at the same time.

In his commentary, Devendrabuddhi considers whether, if  $a$  and  $b$  were to exist at the same time, they could stand in some relation  $R$ . To set this up, he first explains that  $a$  and  $b$  are like all existing things, momentary. Assuming that in causation the relata  $a$  and  $b$  do not exist at the same time, there cannot be a single momentary relation  $R$  between a momentary  $a$  at  $t_a$  and a momentary  $b$  at a different time,  $t_b$ . Moreover, for  $a$  to be a cause at  $t_a$  and also at  $t_b$  such that it could stand in relation  $R$  to  $b$  at  $t_b$ ,  $a$  would have to persist, which it cannot. Devendrabuddhi then argues that there cannot even be a relation  $R$  between  $a$  at  $t_n$  and  $b$  at  $t_n$ . His argument is that there is no single entity that can be in two numerically distinct locations,  $a$  and  $b$ , at the same time. To say that  $R$  is such an entity begs the question. He concludes, therefore, that there is no real entity  $R$  and that the “ $R$ ” that we take there to be is one that we merely imagine and conceptually construct.

Note: In SP 7–11ab,  $aRb$  is interpreted as if  $a$ ,  $b$ , and  $R$  are numerically distinct.

#### F. Transference: In $aRb$ , $R$ cannot be sequential

##### Verse 8

*A real relation is something that exists in one relatum at a time, sequentially, without needing the other one. But it cannot be located in just one relatum, since it could exist even if the other were absent. (SP 8)*

<sup>22</sup> Following Steinkellner 2022a: 17 line 9, I am reading “*ato*” instead of the printed “*yato*.”

“A real relation exists sequentially, in the cause and then the effect.”

This is not so. That is to say: *Something called a real relation exists, even if sequentially, in one relatum at a time* i.e., in one of the relata, either cause or effect, *without needing the other one*. Independent of the effect, it could exist in the cause. Independent of the cause, it could exist in the effect. And so, something could exist in both, in sequence. But it is not the case that something that exists in both relata in sequence is a relation that the two stand in. Something that does not need the other relatum is *located in just one relatum*. It is not a relation for that other one. This is because what exists sequentially in an effect and a cause *could exist even if the other were absent* i.e., because the thing called a relation could exist even though the effect and cause do not exist at the same time.

**Explanation:** In  $aRb$ ,  $R$  is located in  $a$  at  $t_a$  and then in  $b$  at  $t_b$ . As in contemporary “transference theories,”<sup>23</sup>  $R$  seems to be a quantity of some kind that is transferred from  $a$  to  $b$  in sequence. This view is supposed to account for how an entity  $R$  could exist in both relata. Dharmakīrti argues that such an entity is not a relation, since to be a relation  $R$  cannot be monadic like a relational property might be. If  $R$  is not dyadic, it is not a relation. Handoff theories do not provide an account of real relations since  $R$  is never located in both relata at once.

**F1. In  $aRb$ ,  $R$  cannot start in  $a$  and then also be in  $b$**

### Verse 9

*Suppose that after depending upon one of the two, it comes to exist in the other, since what it depends on is the assisting factor. But how can something that does not exist assist? (SP 9)*

“This is not a problem. *Suppose that after depending upon one* i.e., the effect or cause, *of the two* i.e., the effect or cause, *it* i.e., a relation, *comes to exist in sequence in the other* i.e., the effect or cause. And so, in virtue of needing them, it is accepted that it is actually located in two things.”

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<sup>23</sup> For an excellent contemporary discussion of causation, including transference theories, see Paul et. al 2013.



If this is so, what assists it, which is what it currently depends upon, must exist. Why? *Since* i.e., it is because, *what it depends upon* i.e., not the other one, *is the assisting factor*.

“Suppose the assisting factor is what it currently depends upon.”

*But*, if this is so, *how can something that does not exist assist?* When the cause exists, what is called the “effect” does not exist. When the effect exists, what is called the “cause” does not exist. Neither can really assist then, since it does not have the capacity to do so.<sup>24</sup>

**Explanation:** In  $aRb$ , where  $R$  is transferred from  $a$  to  $b$  (or  $b$  to  $a$ ) in sequence,  $R$  first depends on  $a$ , before it transfers to  $b$ , in which it will then exist or, more precisely, also exist. For  $R$  to be transferred to  $b$  in this way requires the assistance of  $a$ , on which  $R$  has to depend for this kind of transfer to take place.  $R$  can be said to be located in both  $a$  and  $b$ , since  $R$  needs both  $a$  and  $b$  for the transfer from  $a$  to  $b$  to be successful.  $R$  depends upon  $a$  to help it exist in  $b$ . Dharmakīrti's argument is that for  $a$  (which only exists at  $t_a$ ) to help  $R$  exist in  $b$  at  $t_b$ ,  $a$  must exist while it is helping  $R$  to exist in  $b$  at  $t_b$ . Since in  $aRb$  it is assumed that  $a$  and  $b$  do not occur at the same time, this is not possible. At  $t_a$ , it is possible for  $a$  to help  $R$ , since  $R$  depends upon it. But,  $R$  needs help to exist in  $b$  at  $t_b$  at which point  $a$  no longer exists.

**G. In  $aRb$ ,  $R$  cannot be a property that is located in both  $a$  and  $b$**

#### Verse 10

*Suppose that a pair of things are effect and cause because they are related to a single thing. If so, that would apply to a pair of horns, one which is on the right and one which is on the left, because they are related to the property, 'being two' etc. (SP 10)*

Moreover, *suppose that a pair of things are effect and cause* i.e., two things taken to be effect and cause, *because they are related to a single thing*, which is the reason. If so, *that* i.e., being an effect and cause *would also apply to a pair of*

<sup>24</sup> For a discussion of assisting factors see PVSV 29.11–31.05 ad PV 1.52cd–1.55, which is translated in Eltschinger et. al 2018: 46–51. Cf. PVSVT 132.25–133.26, which is translated in Eltschinger et. al 2018: 145–147. Also see my earlier references under SP 1.

horns, one which is on the right and one which is on the left, because they are related to the property, 'being two' etc., i.e., a number.<sup>25</sup> But this is not accepted. This is also not the case for a property different from this, because by the word "etc." what is conveyed is that they might be connected to properties such as being of lesser extent, being of greater extent, being a horn, etc.

**Explanation:** In  $aRb$ , suppose that a causal relation,  $R$ , is a dyadic property that is co-located in both  $a$  and  $b$ . A cause  $a$  is related to its effect  $b$  because  $a$  and  $b$  both share dyadic property  $R$ . Dharmakīrti argues that according to this view  $a$  and  $b$  would be causally related even if they share a property  $R$  such as being of a pair or being two in number, which is also shared by my left and right shoes, or being Bessie's horn, which is shared by the left and right horns on Bessie's head.<sup>26</sup> Since the proposed view entails absurd consequences such as these, Dharmakīrti rejects it.

Note: Dyadic properties are a type of multiply instanced property or universal, which Buddhist philosophers reject.

**H. In  $aRb$ ,  $R$  has to be founded in  $a$  and  $b$ .  $R$  cannot be monadic**

#### Verse 11ab

*A relation has to be located in two things. It has no defining characteristic other than this. (SP 11ab)*

"It is not that there is a relation because they are related to any one thing or the other."

What then?

"It is to the one thing defined as a relation."

<sup>25</sup> See PVSV 25.04 ad PV 1.42, which is translated in Eltschinger et. al 2018: 33–34, where the discussion is not horns and whether they "possess" the universal 'being a horn,' but why sculpted representations of planetary deities, even though they may possess the same "necklace," are not the same deity.

<sup>26</sup> According to Vaiśeṣika philosophers, numbers, such as the number two (*dviṭva*), as well as contact/conjunction (*saṃyoga*, see SP 19, 22) and separation/disjunction (*viyoga*, see SP 23), are properties that have to be located in two numerically distinct things. See, for example, Halbfass 1992: 122 and Frauwallner 1953: Part 2: 213.

This is not so. *A relation is a real thing that has to be located in two things. It, namely, a real relation has no possible defining characteristic other than this i.e., being a thing that connects two things. As a result of this, a difference from numbers etc. can be established.*

**Explanation:** In  $aRb$ ,  $R$  is not just any entity, such as the properties referred to in SP 10. Rather, it is a relation,  $R$ , which is a special type of entity that has to be located in two things,  $a$  and  $b$ , at the same time.  $R$ 's being dyadic in this way is its defining feature. But as Dharmakīrti discussed earlier, there is no (good) reason to think there is such an entity.

### Part 3. Verses 11cd–19, Causation

I. In  $aRb$ , if  $R$  is a causal relation,  $R$  is just a pattern of presence and absence

#### Verse 11cd & 12

*Suppose that an effect-cause relation is an association qualified by presence and absence. (SP 11cd)*

*Why couldn't an effect-cause relation be just the two qualifying features of that association? If you say, because they are "different," well, that word depends upon the user. (SP 12)*

When something,  $a$ , is present, something else,  $b$ , is present. When that something,  $a$ , is absent, that something else,  $b$ , is absent. There are two presences when the two things exist and two absences when the two things do not exist.

*"Suppose that an effect-cause relation, and not all relations, is an association qualified by presence and absence. A qualifying feature is a distinguishing feature of that association i.e., relation (11cd)."*<sup>27</sup>

*Why then couldn't an effect-cause relation be just the two qualifying features of that association i.e., presence and absence, as a result of which there could be*

<sup>27</sup> The word "qualifying feature" (*upādhi*) is often translated as "property," "additional property," or "added feature" etc., and this seems to be the way the term is generally used by Dharmakīrti and his commentators. See, for example, PVSV ad PV 1.52ab–1.53cd and PVT and PVSVT, where both Śākyabuddhi and Kaṇvakagomin gloss the term with "characteristic" or, as I have translated it here,

the conceptual construction of a relation which does not really exist or have a real result?

*If you say, because they are “different,”* which is to say, “it may be that: ‘When something, *a*, exists, something, *b*, is present. When that something, *a*, does not exist, that something, *b*, is absent’ refers to many things. But an effect-cause relation is conveyed by one word, which directly conveys a single entity. And it is not tenable that it could directly convey the many things referred to. And so, it cannot be accepted that an effect-cause relation is presence and absence.”

*Well, that word depends upon the user* i.e., a person.<sup>28</sup> And so, since it depends on the user, they will give it meaning in accordance with how they use it. Therefore, it simply can’t be denied that one word can actually convey more than one thing (SP 12).<sup>29</sup>

**Explanation:** If, in *aRb*, *R* is a causal relation, *R* is simply a regular pattern—the presence of *b* when *a* is present and the absence of *b* when *a* is absent. This pattern of *a* and *b*’s joint presence and joint absence, which will be explained in greater detail in what follows, is causation. In SP 11cd, Dharmakīrti simply introduces the view in the voice of an opponent who suggests that it is not plausible. Dharmakīrti does not develop the view in any detail. Rather, he simply asks his “reader” to consider it.

In SP 12, Dharmakīrti responds to the proposal by suggesting that this regular pattern of presence and absence is the basis for our mental and

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“distinguishing feature” (*viśeṣaṇa*). Devendrabuddhi elsewhere glosses the term with “defining feature” (*lakṣaṇam*). See, for example, Eltschinger et al. 2018: 46 n.88 and 2018: 144–147, where a relevant passage from Kaṇṇakagomin is translated. Given this, the phrase may be more accurately translated as, “an association that is qualified/distinguished/defined by presence and absence” or “a combination which has the qualifying/distinguishing/defining features of presence and absence.” The idea that causation is a pattern of presence and absence is mentioned in a number of places in Dharmakīrti’s work, including PVSV ad PV 1.267, PV 4.246cd, and HB 4.10–4.11. See the notes to SP 13 for secondary material in which many of the relevant passages are translated and commented upon.

<sup>28</sup> For a clear statement of this idea see PVSV 32.24–32.25 ad PV 1.60, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 56 and 56 n.148.

<sup>29</sup> See PVSV 66.26–69.08 ad PV 1.142 where a similar issue is discussed.

conceptual construction of what we (mis)take to be a real causal relation. There is no such relation beyond a regular pattern of co-presence and co-absence. Dharmakīrti also considers the objection that such regularity cannot be what causation is, since “causal relation” refers to a single thing, while the described regularity clearly involves more than one thing, namely, a pair of absences and a pair of presences, and may also apply to a variety of situations. Dharmakīrti dismisses the objection by arguing that a single word can refer to more than one thing, since it is obvious that people often use the same word to correctly refer to multiple things.

## J. The Pattern, and its epistemology

### Verse 13

*A person sees one thing a at  $t_1$  given that, at  $t_2$ , they see a thing b which was not seen previously. When they fail to see a, they do not see b. Even without others telling them so, they conclude that b is an effect of a. (SP 13)*

It is tenable, therefore, that an effect-cause relation is just this presence and absence.<sup>30</sup> This is because *a person sees one thing a at  $t_1$  i.e., the thing assumed to be a cause, given that, at  $t_2$ , they see a thing called “an effect,” which was not seen previously*, even though the conditions for it being seen had been met. In seeing this *b at  $t_2$ , they had seen a at  $t_1$ . When i.e., given that they fail to see a at  $t_3$ , they do not see b i.e., the thing assumed to be the effect, at  $t_4$ .*<sup>31</sup> *They conclude that b is an effect i.e., they realize that b comes from that a, even without others telling them so i.e., even without someone saying, “this comes from that.”*<sup>32</sup>

<sup>30</sup> As Inami 1999: 134, Eltschinger 2021: 103, and Franco 2020 remind us, it is critical to keep in mind that the “presence and absence” model of causation sits alongside what I refer to as a “growth” model of causation. Both the “presence and absence (*bhāva*, *abhāva*)” [*a* and then *b*] and “growth/transformation (*vikāra*/*vikrīyā*)” [*a* grows or transforms into *b*] models are, in my view, part of a single theory, in the sense that Dharmakīrti’s view is supposed to account for both. A clear example of these two models sitting alongside each other is PV 2.181, which is translated in Inami 1999: 134 n.12 and also Eltschinger 2021.

<sup>31</sup> In PVSV 22.02–22.03 ad PV 1.28, which is also referred to below. See Inami 1999: 135 and Franco 2020: 81.

<sup>32</sup> For a well-known, and early discussion of this idea see AKBh 461.08–461.09 and AKV 1190.22–1190.24, which is discussed and translated in Franco 2020: 87 and 87

It is pointless to say that they draw this conclusion because of a convention. That is to say: Even if there were this convention, nothing other than presence and absence is cognized. Because of this, when there is a cognition “*x*,” there is a cognition of a *y* which has *x* as its content. It is like “whiteness” i.e., “*x*,” from the white color i.e., *y*, that is cognized when cognizing a white cloth. And a person cognizes “causation” i.e., “*x*,” upon cognizing presence and absence i.e., *y*. And so, the content of the cognition, “causation” i.e., *x*, is presence and absence i.e., *y*.<sup>33</sup> There is nothing more.

“It may be that presence and absence are a way of proving it, and that something distinct i.e., an effect-cause relation, is what is proven.”

If it is distinct, why is its nature not specified?

“Okay, its nature is that it is a produced-producer relation.”

So, is it distinct because it has a different name, on the basis of which this is asserted? As an explanation, “produced-producer relation,” “generated-generator relation,” and “effect-cause relation” and the like are just synonyms.<sup>34</sup>

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n.16. A great deal has been written about SP 13, and the ideas contained therein. See, for example, Gillon and Hayes 1991, Inami 1999, Lasic 1999 and 2003, Taber 2003, Watanabe 2004, Dunne 2004, Gillon and Hayes 2008, Gillon 2009, Steinkellner 2013, and Franco 2020, and the many references contained therein. My own early (and inadequate) attempt is Patil 2010. For Dharmakīrti’s discussion in his other works, of particular relevance is PVSV 22.02–22.03 ad PV 1.28, PVSV ad PV 1.34, PV 2.182–184, HB 4.8–4.11, VN 4.2–4.3, and VN 4.3–4.10. Inami 1999 translates a number of these passages. As Franco 2020 nicely points out, there are many other passages/contexts in Dharmakīrti’s work that are relevant to his discussion of causation. See, for example, the examples discussed by Dharmakīrti in PV 2.25 (and Manorathanandin’s PVV on this verse) and the many others mentioned in Franco 2020 and his earlier discussion in Franco 2012. For a translation of PV 2, see Nagatomi 1957. For translations of the AKBh see Pruden 1988–1990, HB see Gokhale 1997 and Steinkellner 2022, and VN see Gokhale 1993.

<sup>33</sup> Issues related to both the ontology and epistemology of properties, their possessors, and possession are discussed in many places in Dharmakīrti’s work. See Eltschinger et al. 2018 for Dharmakīrti’s discussion of these issues in the context of his discussion of exclusion.

<sup>34</sup> For a related discussion see VN 6ff, which is translated in Gokhale 1993: 15ff. Cf. PVSV 22.02–22.03 ad PV 1.145, as noted by Steinkellner 2022: xxii n.36, which is translated in Frauwallner 1933.

**Explanation:** SP 13 is translated as Devendrabuddhi interprets it. In his commentary, Devendrabuddhi is clear that the “one thing” that the person sees at  $t_1$  is  $a$  and also that what “was not seen previously” is  $b$ . The first line of SP 13 may also be translated as follows, however: *A person, seeing one thing  $a$  at  $t_1$ , which was not seen previously at  $t_0$ , sees a single thing  $b$  at  $t_2$ .* The difference between these translations has to do with whether the phrase, “which was not seen previously” modifies  $a$  or  $b$ , which has no bearing on the view itself. As translated, the view is that a person who did not see  $b$  at  $t_0$ , upon seeing  $a$  at  $t_1$ , sees  $b$  at  $t_2$ , which had not been seen previously. The alternative is that a person who did not see  $a$  at  $t_0$ , upon seeing  $b$  at  $t_1$ , which had not been seen previously, sees  $b$  at  $t_2$ . Devendrabuddhi's interpretation appears to be influenced by Dharmakīrti's parallel discussion in some of his other work.

In SP 13, Dharmakīrti (famously) describes the pattern of  $a$  and  $b$ 's perceived presence and absence that he argues accounts for our realization that  $b$  is the effect of  $a$ . According to Dharmakīrti, we perceive presence, through sense perception, and absence through a type of perception he calls “non-perception.” Non-perception of  $a$ , however, is understood to be the perception of what is other than  $a$ . It is our knowledge source for the “absence” of objects that would have been perceived had they been present.<sup>35</sup>

As stated in SP 13, the pattern of perceived presence and absence is underspecified. What follows is a more complete description based on parallel passages in Dharmakīrti's other work.<sup>36</sup> The following five-step

<sup>35</sup> For a discussion of “non-perception” see Kellner 1999, Kellner 2003, and Dunne 2004.

<sup>36</sup> See Inami 1999, Lasic 2013, and Steinkellner 2020 for helpful, and insightful, discussions of this procedure. As is clear from the passages they cite, Dharmakīrti describes this process in many places, and in slightly different ways. See, for example, PVS 22.02–22.03=PVin33.33–34.02, HB 4.08–4.11, VN4.02–4.03, and VN4.03–4.10, all of which are cited, translated, and analyzed in Inami 1999: 135–138 and Steinkellner 2020. These passages show that Dharmakīrti tinkered with his description of the procedure at various points of his career. What is important is to notice that in this other work, Dharmakīrti adds the phrase “even though the conditions for them being perceived had been met” (the “perceptibility condition”) to Step 1; qualifies Step 2, with an “other things condition;” and qualifies Step 4 with an “exclusivity condition” expressed in the phrases “just  $a$ ” (4.1a) and

sequence of non-perception and perception may be what Dharmakīrti had in mind.<sup>37</sup>

1. Non-Perception of  $a$  and  $b$  at  $t_0$ , even though the conditions for them being perceived had been met i.e., if  $a$  and/or  $b$  had been present they would have been perceived.<sup>38</sup>
  - 1.1 Dharmakīrti does not state this as explicitly as I have. Moreover, he often refers only to  $b$ , as he does in SP 13, or only to  $a$ , as he seems to do in other descriptions.
  - 1.2 A “perceptibility condition” is assumed in all five steps, namely, that  $a$  and/or  $b$  would have been perceived had they been present. Notice that this adds a counterfactual element to the procedure.
2. Perception of  $a$  at  $t_1$  (in addition to everything else that was present at  $t_0$  and nothing else that was not present at  $t_0$ ).<sup>39</sup>
  - 2.1 An “other [relevant] things” condition is added to this step in some descriptions of the procedure such that at  $t_1$  it is the perception of  $a$  and other things. Although there is disagreement about just what these “other things” are, it is clear that they are newly seen in Step 2, along with  $a$ . Although in SP 13,  $a$  is naturally taken to be a token e.g., fire,

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“even though other causes of  $b$ ” (4.1b). He thus qualifies both the “positive concomitance” or co-presence part of the process, Steps 2–3, and the “negative concomitance” or co-absence part of the process, Steps 4–5. See Gillon 1991 for critical analysis of this procedure. Gillon’s analysis is discussed in Lasic 1999: 239–241 and, more recently Steinkellner 2015 and Steinkellner 2020, where Steinkellner reviews and revises his earlier views, engages critically and constructively with previous scholarship, especially Gillon 1991, and retranslates many of the relevant passages. Also see Franco’s analysis of Steinkellner’s view in Franco 2020. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage with all of the relevant work in a more substantive way. I do so in Patil, *forthcoming*.

<sup>37</sup> For a helpful set of tables see Inami 1999: 136–140. For a useful chart see Lasic 1999: 238.

<sup>38</sup> See Lasic 1999: 233, where he takes  $t_0$  as I do i.e., as a locus where neither smoke nor fire is present. For more on the “perceptibility condition,” see my earlier note.

<sup>39</sup> See the famous passage at PVS22.02–22.03 ad PV 1.34, referred to above and below. Unlike in SP 13, in this passage, Dharmakīrti specifies that the “ $a$ ” that we perceive is not a single token but either a collection of token-constituting tropes or a collection of tokens. Again, what is relevant is that  $a$  is the future relatum, however it is understood. Cf. Lasic 1999: 237 and, for a different view, Steinkellner



it could be a bundle of token-constituting tropes or even a collection of causally relevant tokens such as fire, fuel, oxygen, etc. Regardless, it is the token *a*; bundle/collection/set *A*; or most salient member of *A*, *a*, that later will be identified and labeled as the relatum that is perceived.

3. Perception of *b* at  $t_2$  (in addition to everything else that was present at  $t_1$  and nothing else that was not present at  $t_1$ )
4. Non-Perception of *a* at  $t_3$  (and nothing else that was not present at  $t_2$ , along with the perception of everything else at  $t_2$ ).  
 4.1 An "exclusivity condition" is added to this step in some descriptions of the procedure, such that there is (4.1a) the non-Perception of *just a* (however it is to be understood) among everything else that was present in  $2^{40}$  or (4.1b) the non-Perception of *a* or the most salient *a*, even though all of the other "other things" (i.e., everything in *A* other than "the most salient *a*") are seen. Dharmakīrti refers to these other things as "other causes."
5. Non-Perception of *b* at  $t_4$  (and nothing else that was not present at  $t_3$ , along with the perception of everything else at  $t_3$ ).

Given this sequence of non-perception and perception, we conclude that *b* is an "effect" of *a*. Perception and non-perception are sources of knowledge for the pattern of co-presence, in step 2 and step 3, and co-absence in step 4 and step 5, that Dharmakīrti argues constitutes causation and warrants our use of the terms "effect," "cause," and "causation" (but not causal relation). On the basis of this sequence of perceptions and non-perceptions, Dharmakīrti argues that a person will realize that *a* is a cause, *b* is an effect, and *b* is caused by *a*, even without anyone teaching this to them i.e., even if they do not know the words, "cause," "effect," and "causation." Even if it were well known and fixed by convention that this pattern of presence and absence is such that *a* is to be called a "cause," *b* an "effect," and the pattern, "causation," Devendrabuddhi adds that there would be nothing distinct to name other than the pattern itself. There aren't any causes, effects, or causal relations as such.

Devendrabuddhi's example of perceiving "whiteness" is supposed to illustrate the following principle: Our perception of a possessor of a property-

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2020.

<sup>40</sup> The "just *a*" qualification (i.e., the "exclusivity" condition) is included in the procedure at PVSV 22.02–22.03 ad PV 1.34. The significance of has been discussed clearly in Steinkellner 2015 and Steinkellner 2020: 432.

*F* e.g., white colored fabric, constitutes our perception of its property-*F* e.g., “whiteness.” Devendrabuddhi’s point is that there isn’t a distinct property, “whiteness” for us to perceive. There is just the white of the white colored fabric. Similarly, perceiving a specified pattern of presence and absence constitutes “causation.” There isn’t a distinct relation, causation, for us to perceive. All there is is the pattern.<sup>41</sup>

One might think that as a source of knowledge perception is just how we come to know a real causal relation, just like by perceiving a white colored fabric we come to know its whiteness. Devendrabuddhi’s response is that this simply amounts to naming what has already been known. Perception is not a source of knowledge for a real relation, causation, or a real property, whiteness, even though we apply the labels “causation” and “whiteness” to what we perceive. What we have knowledge of is a pattern and a piece of white cloth. Convenient labels such as “cause,” “effect,” or “causation” are not sources of knowledge for what they purport to be labels of. That there can be distinct names or descriptions for what we perceive does not mean that we have perceived distinct things as, for example, when those distinct names or descriptions are synonyms.<sup>42</sup>

**K. In *aRb*, calling *b* an “effect” and *a* a “cause” is merely a convenience**

#### Verse 14

*Since it is impossible to conceive of an effect without both seeing and failing to see, even words such as “effect” etc. are used for this out of convenience.*  
(SP 14)

*Since it is impossible to conceive of an effect without both seeing and failing to see presence and absence i.e., because an object *x* is made evident to us via the object *y* that possesses it, is the reason why even words such as “effect” etc. are*

<sup>41</sup> See PVS29.01–31.01 ad PV 1.50–1.55, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 45–51 and PVS 34.17–35.17 ad PV 1.64, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 62–66, for a related discussion of properties and their possessors and the words we use to refer to each.

<sup>42</sup> See PVS 24.24–26.01 ad PV 1.40–1.42 translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018 and referred to above.

*used for this out of convenience* to refer to presence and absence: People should not utter long strings of words for every single word.<sup>43</sup>

**Explanation:** According to Dharmakīrti, our conception of an effect is based on seeing *b* when *a* is present and failing to see *b* when *a* is absent. As Dharmakīrti explains in SP 13, this pattern of presence and absence is also what the word, “causation” refers to. In SP 14, Devendrabuddhi explains this further by picking up on his example of perceiving the white color of a piece of white cloth. In that example, the intentional object, “whiteness,” which appears to us, is made evident by the white color of the piece of cloth we are perceiving. The white colored cloth, which is all that there is, is the basis for the intentional object, “whiteness.” There isn’t a real thing, whiteness, for us to cognize. There is just the white colored cloth.<sup>44</sup> In SP 14, the intentional object is “being an effect.” It is made evident to us by the pattern of presence and absence that is evident to us by seeing *b* and failing to see *a* under certain conditions. This pattern, *y*, is all that there is. It is the only possible basis for the intentional object “being an effect,” *x*, that appears to us. It is this pattern that is, more specifically, said to “possesses” the intentional object, in the sense that it is the reduction base for, or that which grounds, our concept, “effect.” In SP 14, Dharmakīrti also explains that we use words like “effect” and “cause,” rather than long phrases such as “presence of *b* when *a* is present and absence of *b* when *a* is absent,” only out of convenience. Causal language, though reducible to these patterns of presence and absence, is of nothing more than a pattern. There are no real causes, effects, or causation as such.

<sup>43</sup> For a somewhat related discussion see PVSV 67.01–69.09 ad PV 1.142. Cf. PV 4.28 as noted by Steinkellner 2022: xxii n.36, where Dharmakīrti makes this same point. For Dharmakīrti’s account of why words do not refer to real features of the world, see his discussion of why words in the plural and singular do not always refer to plural and singular things at PV 1.65–1.67. See too his discussion at PVSV 36.09–36.12 ad PV 1.66, where he explains that the referential capacity of language is due, almost entirely, to our interests. Both texts are translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 62–74. Also see Inami 2020: 171.

<sup>44</sup> For a related discussion about properties and their possessors see PVSV ad PV 1.60, PVSV 35.07–35.09 ad PV 1.65, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 56 and 63–66. Also see PVin 2.32ab, where a similar issue is considered in the context of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of non-perception.

**L. In *aRb*, calling *b* an “effect” and *a* a “cause” is based on convention**

**Verse 15**

*Even the cognition, “b is the effect of a,” which is explained on the basis of b’s presence when a is present, is said to have a convention as its content. It is like the cognition, “cow,” from dewlap etc. (SP 15)*

“Causation is nothing other than co-presence and co-absence. It is not distinct. If this is so, how can presence and absence establish it?”

*On the basis of b’s presence when a is present is the Reason for the cognition, “b is an effect of a.” That is, the cognition of an effect is of b’s presence when a is present, which is the Reason. That which is explained i.e., the cognition, “this is the effect of that, that is the cause of this,” is said to have a convention as its content i.e., this explanation states that it has a convention regarding “effect” and “cause” as its content. There is no a distinct thing. How can this be? It is like the cognition, “cow,” from dewlap etc. i.e., it is just like the content of our ordinary use of the word “cow” is made evident by the following inference: This is a cow, because it has a dewlap etc.<sup>45</sup>*

**Explanation:** In SP 13, Dharmakīrti explained that our awareness that *b* is an effect of *a* is just an awareness of a perceived pattern in *a* and *b*’s presence and absence. In SP 14, he further explains that referring to *b* as an “effect” and *a* as a “cause” is simply due to convenience. In SP 15, Dharmakīrti builds on this analysis and explains that the phrase, “*b* is an effect *a*,” refers to this joint pattern of presence and absence because someone taught us that that is how we label and speak about such a pattern. Referring to the pattern in this way is a convention, a convenience. It is, he says, like the convention to use the word, “cow,” to label an animal that has a dewlap, horn, and tail. In his commentary, Devendrabuddhi adds that our knowledge of this convention is inferential: We know that an animal that I am seeing (Site) is to be called a “cow” (Target) because of seeing a dewlap, horns, and a tail (Reason). Similarly, we come to know that *a* is to be called, “cause” and *b* is to be called, “effect” through an inferential process that is based on perceiving

<sup>45</sup> Dharmakīrti mentions this example at PVSV 4.23–4.24 ad PV 1.3 (among other places in his work). The example is translated and discussed in Gillon and Hayes 2008.

a pattern of presence and absence and being taught the labels “cause” and “effect.” In the same way, we refer to the realization that *b* comes from *a* (see SP 13) by applying the label “causation” to what is nothing more than the pattern that we came to be aware of.

### M. *aRb* is a Pattern of Qualified Presence and Absence

#### Verse 16

*a is present when b is about to arise and only when a is present is b about to arise.*

*Being an effect or cause is accepted on the basis of both perception and non-perception. (SP 16)*

“Suppose the following: If presence and absence constitute being an effect or cause, something’s just being a cause or something’s just being an effect should require that both presence and absence apply to each of them. If not, how could presence itself be a cause or an effect? And if both *a* and *b* are present or both *a* and *b* are absent, there isn’t a presence and absence that applies to each of them that could constitute something being an effect or cause. However, it could be so for an effect-cause relation.”

This is not right. Even if they apply to both things, it is the presence and absence of the first, the cause, which is qualified by the presence and absence of the second. It is the presence and absence of the second, the effect, which is qualified by the presence and absence of the first. That is to say, *a is present* i.e., what is taken to be the cause is present, *when b is about to arise* i.e., only when *b* has the property of coming to be. The restriction “only” applies here too. It is through this that negative concomitance is implied.<sup>46</sup> *And only when a*, i.e., what is taken to be the cause *is present is* what is taken to be the effect i.e., *b about to arise*. This constitutes being an effect.<sup>47</sup> And so, *being an effect or*

<sup>46</sup> The idea that “only” (*eva*) applies to the cause is clear in PVSV 19.06–19.08 ad PV 1.267, which I refer to below. The relevant lines are translated in Inami 1999: 134. Also see PVSV 136.17–136.18 ad PV 1.261cd, which is translated in Frauwallner 1933.

<sup>47</sup> See PVSV 141.04 ad PV 1.267, which makes a similar point, and PVSV 19.06–19.08 ad PV 1.28, which makes this point for a cause. For translations see Gillon and Hayes 2008 and Inami 1999: 134.

*cause is accepted on the basis of both perception and non-perception.*<sup>48</sup> It is because of this that such presence and absence is causation. There is nothing else.<sup>49</sup>

**Explanation:** In SP 16, Devendrabuddhi considers an objection to Dharmakīrti's view. An opponent argues that Dharmakīrti's view must be that causes and effects are nothing but a pattern of both presence and absence. After all, it can't be the case that a pattern of presence *or* absence alone constitutes something's being a cause or being an effect. Both are necessary. The opponent asks, "How can this be?" How can it be that if *a* and *b* are both present or both absent, the presence and absence that constitutes them being a cause or effect applies? If both are present, how can they be also absent. If both are absent, how can they be also present. If they can't be both present and absent, they cannot be causes or effects. The opponent concludes by claiming that this line of argument doesn't apply to a single effect-cause relation, since such a relation is present in both relata. It is not constituted by presence and absence.

In responding to this objection, Devendrabuddhi explains that the opponent has misunderstood the view. When stated more precisely, Dharmakīrti's view is that the presence of *a*, the cause, is qualified by the presence of *b*, the effect, and the absence of the cause *a* is qualified by the absence of the effect *b*. Similarly, the presence of the effect *b* is qualified by the presence of the cause *a* and the absence of the effect *b* is qualified by the absence of the cause *a*. This is just what it means to say that effects and causes are constituted by both presence and absence: the presence of *a* qualified by the presence of *b* and the absence of *a* qualified by the absence of *b* constitutes *a*'s being a cause of *b*.

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<sup>48</sup> This is repeated in many places in Dharmakīrti's work. See, for example, PVSV 24.3–24.5 ad PV 1.38, PVSV 141.03 ad PV 1.267, PV 4.246cd, HB 4.2, HB 4.19–11, and VN 3.19–4.2. As Steinkellner too notes, PVSV 19.06–19.08 ad PV 1.28 may be a model for Dharmakīrti's discussion here. Also see PVSVṬ: 97.29ff. For a translation of PV 1.38 see Gillon and Hayes 2008, for the HB see Gokhale 1997 and Steinkellner 2022, and for the VN see Gokhale 1993. For a translation of many of these specific passages also see Inami 1999.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Steinkellner 2013, Part II: 158ff for a discussion of issues around the translation of *kāryakāraṇabhāva* as "causality" or "relationship between cause and effect." I have translated it here as, "*being an effect or cause*" i.e., being in a causal relation.

In SP 16, Dharmakīrti himself further qualifies the pattern of presence and absence that he described previously. He explains that not only is *a* present when *b* is about to arise but that it is *only when a* is present that *b* is about to arise. Devendrabuddhi explains that Dharmakīrti intends to extend “only” to *b* too so that the pattern is as follows: only when *a* is present is *b* about to arise and when *a* is present it is only *b* that is about to arise. The unique cause of *b* is *a* and the unique effect of *a* is *b*. On Dharmakīrti's view, there can be neither multiple causes of a single effect nor multiple effects of a single cause. The reason for the former is that it would undermine his theory of causal inferences.<sup>50</sup> The reason for the latter is that it would undermine his arguments in the first part of the SP.

For Dharmakīrti, causation is a conjunction of a Pattern of Presence: (Presence of *a* @ *t*<sub>1</sub>) qualified by the (Presence of *b* @ *t*<sub>2</sub>) and a Pattern of Absence: (Absence of *a* @ *t*<sub>3</sub>) qualified by the (Absence of *b* @ *t*<sub>4</sub>). It is these two patterns that are, strictly speaking, the reduction base for *R*. With the addition of “only” we learn that it is *only when a* is present that *b* is about to arise and also that when *a* is present it is *only b* that is about to arise.

#### N. In *aRb*, *R* itself is conceptually constructed

##### Verse 17

*Conceptual awareness-events have a false object: they make objects appear as if they are connected.*

*Their object, such as effect and cause, is real only to a certain extent. (SP 17)*

Therefore, *their object is real only to a certain extent*. ‘Only to a certain extent’ refers to presence and absence. Just these two are the reality i.e., actuality of the object that is real only to a certain extent. It is an object of *conceptual awareness-events*. They have an object that is real only to a certain extent.<sup>51</sup> *Their object, such as effect and cause, is based on only what is of that extent.*

<sup>50</sup> See Franco 2020, where he makes a similar observation.

<sup>51</sup> Following Steinkellner 2022a: 27 line 5, I am reading “*etāvanmātratattvārthā etāvanmātrabījāḥ*” instead of the printed, “*etāvanmātratattvārthāḥ, kiṃ. etāvanmātrabījāḥ*.”

They *make objects*, which are not related, *appear as if they are connected* i.e., as if they are related. And on account of such connecting, they *have a false object*.<sup>52</sup>

**Explanation:** The joint pattern of presence and absence that we label with words such as “effect” and “cause” is real. When we perceive this pattern, we have knowledge of it. “Cause” and “effect,” however, are just conventional names for two salient things, *a* and *b*, which are present and absent in the perceived pattern.<sup>53</sup> The causes and effects that we take there to be are the intentional objects of conceptual awareness-events in which objects *a* and *b* appear to be causally related. Since the causal relation that *a* and *b* appear to stand in is unreal, however, conceptual awareness-events are said to have a “false object.” Unlike “causes” and “effects,” which are names for salient features in perceived patterns of perceived presence and absence, causal relations do not exist. Patterns of presence and absence exist. Causes and effects exist as conceptualized intentional objects. Causal relations, however, do not, and so they cannot be reduced. What can be reduced to the pattern of presence and absence is the “comes from” in, “*a comes from b*.” And it is to this that we give the name “causation.” When interpreted in this way, we are warranted in using the term. If taken to be a dyadic relation, we are not.

## O. R is impossible

### Verse 18

*If different, how can it connect? If non-different, what then is a causal relation? If a distinct thing exists, how could the two relata, which are not connected, be connected? (SP 18)*

“Do they, conceptual awareness-events, make a relation that does not exist appear, as a result of which they have a false object?”

Yes, that is right. To explain: There are two conceptual possibilities here. The object that is being related, such as an effect or cause, is either different or non-different. *If different, how can it connect?* i.e., suppose it is different.

<sup>52</sup> For a useful discussion of how this works see PVSV ad PV 1.75d, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 86–93. It is in this passage that the word, “false object (*mithyārtha*)” is also used.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. SP 13, where I first mention “salience.”



That simply cannot be, since it is fixed by its own intrinsic nature.<sup>54</sup> *If non-different, what then is a causal relation?* i.e., suppose it is non-different. That simply cannot be, since there wouldn't be something different from the cause that is not already produced and yet to be produced.<sup>55</sup> Again, how can two things connect?

"Suppose the following: It is not the case that, on its own, one thing, which is either different or non-different, stands in a relation. What then? It is because it is related to something called a relation."

In this case too, *if a distinct thing* i.e., the thing called a relation *exists* i.e., is in existence, *how could the two relate* i.e., what is taken to be the effect and cause, *which are not connected, be connected?* They simply cannot be. That very thing that is called a relation has to be different. But if it exists, its intrinsic nature cannot be combined with anything else. So, how can there be a real relation?

**Explanation:** When we see that Devadatta is taller than Yajñadatta, we might think that we see Devadatta, Yajñadatta, and a taller than relation that they stand in. However, according to Devendrabuddhi, one of these things is "false."<sup>56</sup> While Devadatta and Yajñadatta are perceived, the taller than relation that appears to us is an error. There is no such relation for us to see. The relation is "false" in the sense that we are not warranted in taking Devadatta and Yajñadatta to be standing in such a relation. What appears to us as a (dyadic) taller than relation is nothing more than an unwarranted fiction that we imagine or fabricate.

In SP 18, Dharmakīrti considers whether it is possible to maintain that two things, *a* and *b*, can stand in a relation at all. He argues that if *a* and *b* are different from each other, each of them must exist in and of itself. Each of them is what it is in virtue of its distinct intrinsic nature, which is just

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<sup>54</sup> See PVSV 24.24–25.15 ad PV 1.40–1.42, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 30–31, which I also referred to earlier.

<sup>55</sup> See PVSV ad PV 1.236–1.237, which was referred to under SP 2.

<sup>56</sup> See Dharmakīrti's famous statement at PVSV 2.22–3.1 ad PV 1, which is translated in Gillon and Hayes 1991. Also see Stcherbatsky 1993: 246 and 248 and Steinkellner 2013, Part II, n.36 and Steinkellner 2022: xv–xvi.

a unique collection of the property-particulars or tropes that constitutes it. Both *a* and *b* are distinct bundles of unique tropes.<sup>57</sup>

As such, if *a* is different from *b*, and unrelated to it, there is no way for it become related to *b*. For if *a* were to be related to *b*, it would need to acquire a property or trope in virtue of which it could stand in a relation with *b*, in which case it would be no longer be the same *a* that was distinct from *b*. If *a* were non-different from *b*, *a* and *b* would be numerically identical and there wouldn't be any question of *b* being something that is not already produced and yet to be produced. That is, there would be no question of *b* being an effect. As a result, it is incoherent to suppose that *a* and *b* could stand in an effect-cause relation.

In SP 18, Dharmakīrti also considers the possibility that *a* and *b* can stand in a relation to each other by each of them standing in a relation to a distinct thing, *R*. His response is the same. Either *R* is different from *a* and *b*, in which case neither can be related to it or *R* is non-different from *a* and *b*, in which case it cannot account for *a* and *b* being related.

#### **Part 4. Verses 19–25 Against Inherence and Contact**

**P. In *aRb*, Inherence, Contact, etc. are not good candidates for *R***

**P1. In *aRb*, *R* is not Inherence: Properties and Property Possessors**

##### **Verse 19**

*Something that is in contact, something that is inhered in and the like are all taken into account by this. This is because one does not assist the other and there are no such relata. (SP 19)*

*Something that is in contact, something that is inhered in and the like.* From the words, “and the like,” possessed and possessor etc. is also understood.<sup>58</sup> *They are all taken into account by this* i.e., in the text immediately prior to this, which refutes relations in general. That is to say, there are actually no real relations of contact etc.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>57</sup> See the notes to SP 1. Cf. SP 2.

<sup>58</sup> See PVSV 28.10–31.05 ad PV 1.52–1.55, which is translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 46–51, where Dharmakīrti also refers to the relation between “possessor and possessed.”

<sup>59</sup> Dharmakīrti discusses Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika views of relations in a number of

Now, something that is inhered in cannot be the relatum of a relation, just like the property, 'whiteness,' cannot inhere in a piece of cloth. *This is because one does not assist the other* and vice versa, which is to say, they do exist as produced and producer. This is one reason.<sup>60</sup> *And there are no such relata* i.e., relata of inherence, that exist without being assisted or an assistant. To explain: A thing, *y*, that is assisted by something *x* depends upon that something *x*. And there is a relation *z* between that *y*, that depends on *x*, and that *x* that depends on it. But this is not the case for the color white, *y*, and a piece of cloth, *x*, since their intrinsic natures are fixed.

There also cannot be a container-contained relation between things that are not effect and cause. And if these, *y* and *x*, were effect and cause, a problem would arise. This is because, even if there were causal relations, the

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places in his work, though most often in the context of how, according to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers, properties of the self are located in it. It may be that here too Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi are using the term "etc." to refer to the six types of relations discussed by Uddyotakara in NV 28.19–29.01. For a discussion of this see Preisendanz 1989: 162 n.91. In this context, PV 2.229–2.235, Dharmakīrti also explicitly connects (in the voice of an objector) relations such as inherence (*samavāya*) to the idea of "assisting" (*upa+√kr*). See, for example, PV 2.230. These verses are discussed in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 222–242. In PV 2.63–2.68 a group of Materialist philosophers try and show that the relation between the material/physical and the mental is a container-contained (*ādhārādheya*) or locus-locatee (*āśrayāśrayi*) relation. For a translation of PV 2.63–2.72, where this is discussed, see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013: 20–12 n.83. Also see the related discussion in Franco 1994 and 1997. Cf. PVSV 70.16–70.06 ad PV 1.144 for a discussion of the container-contained relation, where Dharmakīrti presents his well-known example of a Jujube and the bowl in which it is contained. This passage is translated in Frauwallner 1933. For a complete translation of PV 2, see Nagatomi 1957. Cf. See my note to SP 1, and also below.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. PVSV 113.14–114.04 ad PV 1.227 in the context of a discussion of relations between words and what words refer to. Also see the discussion at PVSV ad PV 1.75d, where the example of predicating blue of a lotus is discussed. The point here is that for some *F* e.g., 'blue' or 'being a lotus' to be rightly considered a property of some property-possessor *a* e.g., a lotus, *a* must "assist" *F*, if, as is supposed, properties depend on their possessors. Such assistance and dependence is itself dependent upon a producer-produced relation between *a* and *F*, with *a* being the "cause" of "*F*." This passage provides a clear example of how Dharmakīrti relates "property-possessor," "property," "assistant," and "producer-produced." His point is that it is incoherent to maintain that there is an ontological difference

conceptual construction of the relation would be an error because the color white and the piece of cloth exist in a relation of container and contained.<sup>61</sup> To explain: There is no generally accepted relation of container and contained between them. But if there were a container-contained relation that is defined in terms of a producer and what is produced, there would not be an inherence relation between a generic-property and what possesses it, as neither is assisted by nor an assistant of the other.<sup>62</sup>

**Explanation:** In SP 19, Dharmakīrti argues that his analysis of cause and effect relations also applies to relations of contact, inherence, and possession. Since no dyadic relations are real, a relatum that is said “to be in contact with” something else; “to inhere in” something; or “to possess or be possessed by” something, is not actually a relatum at all. Dharmakīrti argues that real relata that stand in real relations have to mutually support, assist, or somehow stand in relation to one another, which the proposed relata cannot do. Why? Mutual support, mutual assistance, and standing in can only be relations like the dependence relations or dyadic relations that Dharmakīrti already argued against.

In his commentary, Devendrabuddhi explains the argument by returning to his earlier example of whiteness and piece of white cloth. For two relata to stand in a dyadic relation with one another they must, at the very least, “assist

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grounding our use of terms such as “property-possessor” and “property.” For a translation, see Eltschinger et al. 2018: 94–94 and the related notes.

<sup>61</sup> For more on the white cloth example see Eltschinger et al. 2018: 60 n.175, who refers to Haag 2005: 28–30 (which I have not been able to consult) and PVSVT 151.20–152.08.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. my earlier note. Also see my earlier reference to PV 1.142, which is translated in Frauwallner 1933: 67–68 and, again, Eltschinger et al. 2018: 44–52. For an interesting discussion of related issues, see PVSVT 132.25–133.226, which is quoted and translated in Eltschinger et al. 2018: 145–147. As Steinkellner 2022: 29 notes, the discussion of parts and wholes is also found in HBT 8.20–8.24. For a discussion of Dharmakīrti’s views on constitution and causation as it relates to parts and wholes, see PV 2.100–102, HB9.13–10.04 and VN 6.19–7.04, where he discusses pots, and HB 9.10.19–11.09 where he discusses sense perception. For an excellent discussion of this and other issues see Inami 2020, where these passages are discussed and translated. For a translation of the HB see Gokhale 1997 and Steinkellner 2022. For the VN see Gokhale 1993.

one another." The white color of a piece of cloth and the piece of white cloth, however, do not assist one another, since the white color of the piece of cloth is intrinsic to it. Intrinsic properties are neither assisted by, possessed by, nor dependent upon their so-called property bearers. Assistance, like causation, requires that one thing, usually a property-possessor or "cause" present at  $t_1$ , provides assistance to something else, usually a property or "effect" at  $t_2$ . As a trope in a bundle of tropes, however, a property is merely a constituent of the bundle. It is not assisted by the bundle and so it cannot be an effect that inheres in it as its cause.

A contained-container relation is also not a plausible model for inherence, since it too has to be a producer-produced relation. One reason for thinking so is that advocates of inherence claim that (at least some) effects inhere in their causes. However, the relation between properties and their possessors cannot be shown, even conceptually, to be an effect-cause relation via the five step procedure outlined in SP 13. One reason is that properties and their possessors are not ordinarily diachronic. Furthermore, modelling inherence on a container-contained relation is not plausible, since we don't generally think of properties and their possessors as standing in such a relation. And if advocates of inherence want to push this idea, they will have to give up on the idea that generic properties, like being white, inhere in their possessors, like a piece of cloth. Instead, they will have to say either that they are contained in them, which they are unwilling to do, or that they are caused by them, which isn't possible since neither one assists the other.

## **P2. In $aRb$ , $R$ is not Inherence: Wholes and Parts**

### **Verse 20**

*For even if an effect,  $b$ , is produced by some cause,  $a$ , that it inheres in, the inhered in cause could not exist at that time. That  $b$  is not due to that  $a$ , since that would lead to extremely unwanted consequences. (SP 20)*

"Suppose the following: A relatum,  $a$ , which is something that is inhered in, generates something  $b$ , called "an effect," which takes the form of a whole.<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Cf. PV 2.84–88 for a discussion parts and wholes. For a translation, see Nagatomi 1957.

It is not the case, therefore, that this *b* does not stand in that relation to *a* because there is no assistance.”

*For even if an effect, b, is produced by some cause, a, that it inheres in in that way i.e., if this is provisionally accepted, the inhered in cause could not exist at that time...*<sup>64</sup> This is because there cannot be inherence between the two, since, at the time of being produced, what is produced is not complete; when the effect is complete, the cause has disappeared; and even if it has not disappeared, the two things that are connected do not exist as assisted and assistant.

Alternatively, suppose there is relatum *a* that it, *b*, inheres in. But *that b is not due to that a* i.e., due to *a* producing it, which is the reason. Why? It is *because that would lead to extremely unwanted consequences* i.e., there would be the unwanted consequence that since even a potter etc. produces a pot, he would stand in that relation to it.

**Explanation:** In SP 20, Dharmakīrti builds on his argument against the view that inherence is a real relation. According to proponents of the view, wholes inhere in their parts. For example, when a potter joins two pre-made parts of a pot together at *t*<sub>1</sub> to create a large pot at *t*<sub>2</sub>, the two pre-made parts are the inhered in cause in which the whole pot, the effect, inheres.

Against this, Dharmakīrti draws upon his view that in order for there to be a causal relation between a cause and an effect, the relation must be located in both relata at the same time. He argues that this is not possible for an inhered in cause and the effect that is supposed to inhere in it. As Devendrabuddhi explains: (1) At *t*<sub>1</sub>, *e* is being produced but is not yet produced. As a result, at *t*<sub>1</sub>, there is no *e* for *c* to stand in a relation with. (2) At *t*<sub>2</sub>, *e* has been produced but there is no *c* to stand in relation with it. (3) Even if, somehow, both *e* and *c* are present at a time *t*, they have been defined in such a way that they cannot stand in an assisted-assistant relation and so they cannot be effect and cause.

He then considers the possibility that, nevertheless, *e* inheres in *c*. As an example, he considers a pot that is taken by his opponent to inhere in the bits of clay that constitute it. This cannot be right he argues since, if this were so, the pot could not be said to be an effect of the cause in which it inheres,

<sup>64</sup> Cf. PV 2.63–72. For a translation, see Nagatomi 1957. For a discussion of Dharmakīrti on “inhered in cause,” see Eltschinger et al. 2018: 20–24, which was also referred to above. Also see PV 3.149–151, where the issue of inherence and temporality is discussed.

namely, clay. Why? While the pot may inhere in clay, it is clear that the pot is made by a potter, which is to say that the potter too is a cause of it. But if the potter too is a cause, and the effect, pot, inheres in its cause, then, the pot should also inhere in the potter, which is absurd, even for the opponent.

### Verse 21

*If there could be a relation, even when the two do not assist in inherence or something else, everything would stand in an inherence relation with everything else. (SP 21)*

Suppose the problem from SP 20 does not apply. If so, *there could be* i.e., you could accept that there is *a relation even when the two* i.e., the two that stand in a relation of inherence *do not assist* each other; and when those two relata do not assist *in inherence*, because it is eternal; and even if, in some cases, the two do not assist in inherence *or something else*. Thus, *everything* i.e., all of the things that are unrelated to each other and constitute our world *would stand in an inherence relation with everything else*. But this is not so. Therefore, whether there is or isn't such assistance, there isn't a relation of inherence. And no other kind is possible either. By this, two things standing in a contact relation is also rejected.<sup>65</sup>

**Explanation:** SP 21 is also directed against inherence being a real relation. However, as interpreted by Devendrabuddhi, the argument is wider in scope. Devendrabuddhi considers the possibility that two relata can stand in a real relation without needing to assist each other or the relation they are assumed to stand in it. Standing in a relation requires nothing more than the presence of relata and a relation. At the very least, it doesn't require that the relata assist each other or the relation itself. Devendrabuddhi argues that, if this were so, everything would (or at least could) be related to everything else. In Dharmakīrti's more restricted version, where the real relation being considered is inherence, he concludes that everything would (or at least could) inhere in everything else. Why? If two things could stand in a relation without needing to assist each other to stand in it and/or without assisting the relation to stand them in it, relationality would be automatic, unrestricted, or pervasive, which it is not. Devendrabuddhi concludes his commentary on

<sup>65</sup> See the passages related to inherence in my earlier note.

SP 21 by suggesting that this same line of argument applies to the relation, contact.

In addition to the relata, *a* and *b*, and the relation, *R*, Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi both suggest that something else is needed to account for how *a*, *R*, and *b* come together. If nothing else is needed, everything could be related to everything. And yet, the proponent of dyadic relations has suggested nothing of the sort. There are no candidate “assisting” factors.

### P3. In *aRb*, *R* is not Contact

#### Verse 22

*Even if there comes to be contact, it is not thereby accepted that two relata stand in a contact relation.*

*This is because there would be the unwanted consequence that actions etc. would be in contact. Furthermore, being fixed has been rejected. (SP 22)*

And furthermore, since contact is an effect, if the two relata stand in a contact relation because they bring it about, then *even if there comes to be contact* in that way, *it is not thereby* i.e., because of the reason that contact comes to be, *accepted that two relata stand in a contact relation*. Why? The reason is that there would be the unwanted consequence that actions etc. would have to be in contact. If, because there comes to be contact at a time *t*, a relatum is of a contact relation, even an action would have to be the relatum of a contact relation. To explain: Contact is produced either by the action of one of the two relata or by the action of both. From the word *etc.*, it has to be acknowledged that that contact itself would have to be the relatum of a contact relation, since it too is accepted as being produced by contact.

“It is not because contact is produced that two things are in contact. What then? It is because they cause it to be fixed between them.”

This is not the case. *Moreover, being fixed has been rejected* i.e., a fixing relation between what is located, *R*, and loci, *a* and *b*, is not any different from a produced-producer relation. And so it has been rejected in Dharmakīrti’s *Commentary on the Compendium of the Sources of Knowledge* (PV).<sup>66</sup>

<sup>66</sup> See PVSV 71.11–72.02 ad PV 1.145, which is translated in Frauwallner 1933: 69–71, as noted by Steinkellner 2022: xxii n.36. The context of this passage is Dharmakīrti’s arguments that tokens/particulars cannot ground types/ univer-



**Explanation:** Devendrabuddhi's analysis of SP 22 seems to be as follows: If  $a$  and  $b$  come to be in contact at  $t_1$ ,  $a$  and  $b$  are causes of the contact relation  $R$  that they come to stand in. After all, contact is assumed to be an effect of them coming together. Something, such as the action of one or both of them coming together, must bring them together. For this action to push one or both of them together, however, it must come into contact with one or both of them itself. So, in order for  $a$  and  $b$  to be in contact, an action has to be in contact with  $a$  and/or  $b$ . And so, it too too has to stand in a contact relation. To explain contact in terms of contact is circular. Another possibility considered by the opponent is that the two relata,  $a$  and  $b$ , can stand in a relation  $R$ , not because they produce it, but rather because they cause it to be "fixed" between them. The idea seems to be that  $a$  and  $b$  somehow make it so that they stand in  $R$ . They fix it, if you will, so that they stand in  $R$ , but without producing it. According to Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi, however, the proposed fixing relation is no different than the effect-cause relation that has been rejected already.

### Verse 23

*What is unfit for being the locus of a relation such as contact becomes fit. The reason is that something that has the nature of being permanently fit is incompatible with it lacking it. (SP 23)*

### Verse 24

*Therefore, what is conveyed by separation, contact, or motion is something that has the nature of "being semantically fit for it." What is the point of something distinct such as motion etc.? (SP 24)*

"If without contact relations and the like, there could be awareness of contact and the like, the nature of two disconnected relata would also be the nature

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sals, either because they *cause* them or because they *ground* them by fixing (*sthitih*) types/universals in them. In other contexts e.g., PV 2.63–64, the term "fixing" has the sense of "continuity," "continued existence," or "maintenance" and refers both to continuity itself and what makes some entity continue in its existence. In the passage referred to, and the surrounding discussion, the point is that there isn't a property that a property-possessor has that accounts for its continuity. For a translation of PV 2 see Nagatomi 1957.

of two connected relata. And in the same way, the nature of two connected relata would be the nature of two disconnected ones and two which are fixed and not fixed. So why isn't there awareness of contact and the like? And there isn't such awareness. Therefore, contact, separation, and action are the basis for awareness of contact and the like."<sup>67</sup>

This is not correct, because of the same counterargument. For you too, why isn't there contact and the like for disconnected etc. things which are of the same nature?

"Without the action that produces them, there isn't contact or separation."

Even if this were so, why isn't there this action or the causes of it? Because of this, the answer is not a good one. Therefore, you should just say the following: *What is previously unfit* i.e., something that is by its nature separate, later becomes fit to be the basis for a relation such as contact. What is the reason? It is because, *what has the nature of being fit* i.e., fit for contact and the like, and permanently so, *is incompatible with it lacking it* i.e., its being unfit for contact and the like is incompatible. I too said just this to reject relations such as contact. (SP 23)

Therefore, *what is conveyed by separation, contact, or motion*, that is, by the words, "separation," "contact," or "motion," *is something* i.e., a thing *that has the nature of "being semantically fit for it."*<sup>68</sup> This is what is referred to by the words. In this case, *what is the point of something distinct such as motion* being

<sup>67</sup> For a related discussion, see VN 6.1–6.08, where Dharmakīrti explains that the conceptual content of our awareness-events and our words do not always correspond to real things or have real things as their basis. This issue is discussed in a number of places in Dharmakīrti's work, see, for example, PVSV 37.11 ad PV 1.67, where Dharmakīrti responds to an objector who argues that the use of a word is occasioned by the real things to which it refers. This is the famous passage where Dharmakīrti discusses how and why a plural masculine word can refer to a wife and how a singular word can refer to six cities. For a translation of this passage and surrounding text see Eltschinger et. al. 2018: 68ff. The passage is also translated in Inami 2020. For a translation of the VN see Gokhale 1993.

<sup>68</sup> For a relevant discussion, see PV 4.124–4.128, which is translated in Tillemans 2000: 185–186, where the issue of "semantic fitness" and, more generally, the fitness of a word to apply to something is discussed. I have tentatively chosen to read the text as printed and not follow the recommendation to read "*tad yogyatāvācyah*" at Steinkellner 2022a: 34 line 1. I would rather emend Steinkellner 2022a: 34 line 3 to read, "*tadyogyatāśabdavācyah*."

imagined. There is absolutely no point. From the word *etc.*, what is conveyed is relations such as contact, separation from, greater than, lesser than, etc. (SP 24)

**Explanation:** If, as Dharmakīrti argues, there aren't any relations, what are we aware of when we see that two things are in contact with each other? If there are no contact relations, why don't we ever take two things, when they are disconnected, to be in contact, and those same two things, when they are connected, to be separate? After all, the two relata should be the same i.e., have the same intrinsic natures regardless of whether they are "connected" or "separate." In SP 23, Devendrabuddhi responds to this worry by arguing that it applies equally well to the opponent's own position. He asks, how can the opponent explain that two pairs of identical things are such that one pair is in contact while another pair is not? The opponent responds by arguing that, on their view, the pair that is in contact is in contact because the members of one pair were brought into contact by some action or event. They may have been pushed together, for example. According to Devendrabuddhi, this response is inadequate, since it begs similar questions: Why were the two pushed together when they were? Which pairs can be pushed together and why? What is needed for the action of pushing to put two things in contact? The problem, according to Devendrabuddhi, is that the opponent has not adequately explained how and why we are aware of contact when we are.

Devendrabuddhi now provides an explanation. He first suggests that two things that are not in contact but come to be in contact later are things that are "fit to be in contact." It can't be the case, however, that these two things are fit to be in contact intrinsically. If that were so, they would be in contact already. If they are not intrinsically fit to be in contact, however, they should never be in contact, because in order to stand in a contact relation they would have to change in such a way that they become fit to do so. As a result, they would no longer be what they were. Such considerations suggest that there cannot be a real relation of contact such that two distinct relata that are fit to be in contact can come to stand in it.

In SP 24, Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi explain what they mean by "fit to be in contact." To be fit, according to them, is to be semantically fit, such that something can be spoken of as being in contact even though there are no such relations. The two "relata" that are taken to stand in a contact

relation are merely fit to be spoken of as standing in such a relation. There are no real relations of contact, separation, greater than, or lesser than. Rather, there are only suitable labels for suitable situations.

**Q.** In *aRb*, *a* and *b* are unrelated, intrinsically. *R* is nominal

**Verse 25**

*The reason is that even if they exist it is not generally accepted that there is a relation of “standing in.” So, it is correct that things that arise at each and every moment have a distinct intrinsic nature. (SP 25)*

Why? *The reason is that even if* i.e., if it is imagined that *they* i.e., motion etc. exist, *it is not generally accepted that there is a relation of “standing in.”* That is, it is because all such relations were rejected with the words, “dependence upon something else etc.” in SP 1. The reason is that it is not established that a relatum *x* stands in a relation with an action, or contact or separation. Why then is a name based on them? There is no relatum *x* that stands in a relation with actions and the like that are located in some other *y*. It like this for these pretenses too since, in the same way, there isn’t motion etc. based on a relation with actions etc. So i.e., therefore, *things that arise at each and every moment* i.e., existing things, *have a distinct intrinsic nature*, due to the various conditions that are the basis for their continuous arising etc.<sup>69</sup> It is thus *correct* to say that they are “in contact,” “separate,” or “moving.” This is because for things with stable unitary natures, a relation with contact and the like cannot be established.<sup>70</sup> Therefore, in reality, there are no real relations defined as contact etc. And so, it is the intrinsic nature of all existing things to be unrelated.

Peace.

**Explanation:** In SP 25, Dharmakīrti argues that even if motion, or relations of contact or separation are supposed to be real, there isn’t a “standing in”

<sup>69</sup> For a helpful discussion of this, and related issues, see the long “digression” in HB 9.1–23.03, which is translated in Steinkellner: 2022c: 12–32 and which I also referred to above in my note to SP 1.

<sup>70</sup> I have tentatively chosen to retain the printed “*sasthiraikasvabhāvānām*” at Steinkellner 2022a: 35 line 10 instead of reading “*na sthiraikasvabhāvānām*” as proposed

relation such that two relata could *stand in* a relation of motion, contact, or separation. In SP 24 and SP 25, Dharmakīrti applies this insight specifically to motion e.g., the movement of some  $x$  from point  $a$  to  $b$ . Suppose that  $x$  is a ball that is in motion on a pool table. In such a case, the ball  $x$  is in contact with a part of the table  $a$  at  $t_1$ , separated from that part at  $t_2$ , and in contact with a different part  $b$  at  $t_3$ . This is just what it means for that ball to be in motion. Coming into contact with a part of the table, being separated from that part of the table, and coming into contact with another part of the table are assumed to be due to some action or event e.g., the ball being hit by a cue ball at  $t_0$ . On this view, to explain motion, we need an object  $x$ , an action that puts  $x$  in contact with and separates it from points  $a$  and  $b$ , and the relations, contact and separation. As Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi have argued, however, contact and separation are not real relations. Similarly, there isn't motion either. Strictly speaking, since  $x$  is wholly distinct in  $a$  and  $b$ . There is no "it" that is in motion. Similarly,  $x$  is not in contact with or separate from  $a$  and  $b$ , since there are no such dyadic relations either. "Motion," like "causation," is just a label for a pattern of momentary entities.

The Commentary on The Examination of Relations is complete. It is the composition of the teacher, Devendrabuddhi.

{...}<sup>71</sup>

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in Steinkellner 2022a: Preface.

<sup>71</sup> The following line, which ends the text, is not clear to me: *krauddha(?)anvitasya pustakam*.

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# Meditation and Knowledge in Indian Buddhist Epistemology\*

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## 1. Introduction

Eli Franco's scholarship has expanded in different directions, but for me Eli Franco has always been the author of *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, a study on a section of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, the second chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* with Prajñākaragupta's commentary on it. This book has shaped and inspired my work on Dharmakīrti for years. In Eli's honour and as a token of gratitude, I shall discuss how Dharmakīrti's discourse on knowledge and liberation—which is prominent in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*—relates to Buddhist notions of meditation practice and its consequences.

The issue of how Buddhist philosophical thinking relates to insights deriving from meditation and other types of spiritual practices has been more recently debated by Lambert Schmithausen and Eli Franco,<sup>1</sup> who, with regard to “the arising of philosophical theories from spiritual practice” has stated:

In the final analysis, one cannot avoid the conclusion that certain philosophical theories arose from meditative experiences and certain others did not, and that the origin of still others cannot be determined, in which case it seems preferable to suspend judgment.<sup>2</sup>

As shown by the debate on this issue, the discussion on the relationship between philosophy and meditation in South Asian Buddhism is quite

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<sup>1</sup> Schmithausen 2014, Franco 2009 and 2018.

<sup>2</sup> Franco 2009: 126 and Franco 2018: 125.

complex and needs an equally nuanced approach. Martin Adam has addressed this relationship with regard to Kamalaśīla (8<sup>th</sup> century),<sup>3</sup> looking in particular at his account of meditation in the three *Bhāvanākramas*. Kamalaśīla composed the *Bhāvanākramas* after the Tibetan king Khri srong lde btsan asked him to explain his position against the view of the Chan master Heshang Mohoyen.<sup>4</sup> The two opposing views, as well known, formed the matter of a crucial debate held at bSam yas towards the end of the 8<sup>th</sup> century. Adam has shown that, in the *Bhāvanākramas* (where *bhāvanā*, ‘mental cultivation’ or ‘meditation,’ is the key concept to be explained), Kamalaśīla aims to demonstrate that meditation contributes to knowledge<sup>5</sup> and has “a key role in the discovery of truth.”<sup>6</sup> Adam’s discussion is a reply to Tom Tillemans’ presentation of the bSam yas debate<sup>7</sup> “as one based upon an opposition between analysis and meditation,” which suggests “a dichotomy that Kamalaśīla himself did not accept.”<sup>8</sup> According to Adam, the main issue debated by Kamalaśīla and Heshang Mohoyen was “explaining how it is that the practices they endorsed could actually function to produce the sought after state,”<sup>9</sup> which is non-conceptual. In this regard, the point made by Kamalaśīla is that some types of conceptual activities help the mind to gradually achieve a non-conceptual gnosis; therefore, philosophical analysis and non-conceptual gnosis (namely, the result of meditation and not meditation itself) can be continuous. The transition between the two is explained by using two traditional ways of framing *bhāvanā*, namely the division of *bhāvanā* in two types of meditation, *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, and the attainment of three types of knowledge, namely the insights that result from learning, reflection, and mental cultivation, respectively (*śrutamayī prajñā*, *cintāmayī prajñā*, and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See BEB, vol. Two, *sub voce*, and McClintock 2022.

<sup>4</sup> See Keira 2004: 7.

<sup>5</sup> Adam 2016: 352.

<sup>6</sup> Adam 2016: 354.

<sup>7</sup> Tillemans 2013, reprinted with a few revisions as chapter 10 in Tillemans 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Adam 2016: 351.

<sup>9</sup> Adam 2016: 355.

<sup>10</sup> Adam 2016: 356–357. See below, sections 3.1 to 3.2.

Since, according to Tillemans, Kamalaśīla's philosophy on meditation and yogic knowledge was largely dependent on Dharmakīrti's thought, at least some of Tillemans's observations on Kamalaśīla's position can be extended to Dharmakīrti. Although Adam's general line of argumentation may apply to Dharmakīrti, it cannot help with the details of Dharmakīrti's view because it is specifically based on the *Bhāvanākramas*. So, we still need to examine Dharmakīrti's texts and see what they say about the relationship between philosophy and meditation. This paper discusses two related aspects: the role of philosophy and meditation in the acquisition of soteriologically valuable knowledge and the primacy of the one over the other. In particular, I am motivated by two claims of Tillemans, namely that meditative understanding depends upon philosophical thinking and, thus, cannot contribute to achieve a kind of knowledge that is "*distinct from or over and above the contributions of philosophical thinking*";<sup>11</sup> and that "*all the epistemic weight is once again on philosophical thinking and yogic perception adds no new discoveries of truths.*"<sup>12</sup>

Since the notion of meditation is key here, I begin with a few remarks on this subject, in the conviction that discussions concerning meditation might not always be guaranteed to start from shared understanding of its nature, function, and results. The aim here is to show how different the idea of what meditation is and does can be, and, nevertheless, how persistent certain features are across various Buddhist environments.

## 2. On the notion of meditation, a polyvalent term

Nowadays, 'meditation' not only means contemplation and reflection, but also stands for an umbrella term used to describe *a variety of practices that concern the cultivation of the mind* and that in one way or another derive from Asian traditions. Meditation has become a firmly established subject of study in the humanities as well as in psychology and biomedical research. Although it is by no means a Buddhist specialty, it is often associated with Buddhism and practices that are characterized by keywords such as 'insight meditation' and 'mindfulness,' and derive from Theravāda traditions as well

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<sup>11</sup> Tillemans 2013: 298.

<sup>12</sup> Tillemans 2013: 299.

as East Asian Chan schools and the Tibetan Dzogchen tradition.<sup>13</sup> More recently Karen O'Brien-Kop and Suzanne Newcombe have aptly discussed the challenges of defining meditation and yoga.<sup>14</sup> With reference to yoga they have pointed out "the need to engage in a constant critical reflection on the meaning of the terms that we employ as scholars," also observing that,

contemporary definitions often eclipse historical definitions and can lead to anachronistic, misinformed or simply skewed understandings of the past discussions of yoga as recorded in textual sources.<sup>15</sup>

The same can be stated with regard to meditation, with the additional problem that, unlike yoga, this is a purely English (and thus Western) term that translates a variety of words and related concepts in different Asian languages. For example, the Sanskrit terms *dhyāna*, *śamādhi*, and *bhāvanā* or their cognate words in Pali are often translated as 'meditation,' but each of them has specific technical meanings.<sup>16</sup> A unitary meaning of 'meditation' within the Buddhist realm should account for the diversity of regions, cultural contexts and historical periods covered by the term 'Buddhism'—which is indeed impossible. Meditation has thus become an extremely polyvalent word that denotes a wide variety of practices.

In the case of historical Buddhist traditions from Asia, meditation can be said to indicate methods for the cultivation of the mind that are linked to a Buddhist soteriological discourse, and not, as several forms of meditation in the modern West, to health or wellness issues. Although it is quite difficult to pinpoint what was practised where, when and by whom, as noted by Florin Deleanu, "What remains sure is that scripture upon scripture, treatise after treatise extols meditation as the quintessential method for attaining *nirvāṇa*."<sup>17</sup> The centrality of meditation is reiterated across early Buddhist texts, where, as more recently argued by Giuliano Giustarini, "form and contents are combined not only to preserve and transmit but also to enact the teachings of the Buddha, viz., to develop the contemplative factors illustrated

<sup>13</sup> Cousins 1996, Gethin 2011 and 2015, Husgafvel 2020.

<sup>14</sup> O'Brien-Kop and Newcombe 2020.

<sup>15</sup> O'Brien-Kop and Newcombe 2020: 5.

<sup>16</sup> For some details, see Gethin 2004: 201f. and Deleanu 2020: 81f.

<sup>17</sup> Deleanu 2020: 80.

in the texts.”<sup>18</sup> The important role of meditative practices is evidenced by various sources from Central Asia, from the meditation manual found by Dieter Schlingloff in Kizil (one of the sites of the kingdom of Kuča, which flourished from early centuries of the Common Era to circa 650),<sup>19</sup> to the ubiquitous presence of meditation caves in the Kuča monasteries—which according to Angela Howard and Giuseppe Vignato also suggests the development of a “visual language of meditation” that alludes to or records meditative states.<sup>20</sup> The paintings from some caves in Toyuq display Mahāyāna methods of visualization and pre-Mahāyāna meditations on bodily impurity (or *aśubhābhāvanā*), showing, as argued by Nobuyoshi Yamabe, a process of continuity between the two types of practices and paths to liberation.<sup>21</sup> Early Chinese texts present accounts of meditative visions linked to past karma and the meditator’s degree of purity, which results from rituals of repentance.<sup>22</sup> In their writings on meditation, Zhiyi (538–597) and his Tiantai School focus on the two practices of calmness (Sanskrit *śamatha*, Chinese *zhi* 止) and insight (Sanskrit *vipaśyanā*, Chinese *guan* 觀), namely meditative methods widely mentioned in the Nikāyas as well as in Mahāyāna sources<sup>23</sup> and explained in Chinese doctrinal treatises from South Asia, too.<sup>24</sup> Zhiyi considers the two methods complementary to the point that he calls meditation *zhiguan* 止觀, which is formed by the Chinese terms for *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*,<sup>25</sup> rather than *chan* 禪, the standard Chinese translation of *jhāna/dhyāna*. However, Zhiyi’s approach was reshaped in the later Chan movement, resulting in the disappearance of both meditative practices in Chinese Buddhism.<sup>26</sup>

Turning to present-day Tibetan monasteries, in her biobehavioural model for the study of monastic debate, Marieke van Vugt considers formal debate

<sup>18</sup> Giustarini 2023: 255.

<sup>19</sup> Schlingloff 2006.

<sup>20</sup> Howard and Vignato 2014, Howard 2007, and Howard 2015.

<sup>21</sup> Yamabe 2009.

<sup>22</sup> Greene 2021: 124f.

<sup>23</sup> See n. 30 below.

<sup>24</sup> Greene 2021: 124.

<sup>25</sup> Poceski 2020: 10–13. The subject of Zhiyi’s first work, however, is *dhyāna pāramitā* (see Bianchi 2022).

<sup>26</sup> See Poceski 2020.

“an embodied and social form of analytical meditation,” whose “practice is thought to result in new insights into the nature of reality.”<sup>27</sup> Assuming that the monks are informed of the fact that their debates are studied as a form of meditation, van Vugt’s understanding of monastic debate appears to both fit the emic perspective and be a useful heuristic tool. However, in view of George Dreyfus’s explanation of monastic debate as ‘dialectical practice,’<sup>28</sup> van Vugt’s understanding can hardly be applied to Tibetan monastic debate in general. It may rather apply only to specific traditions or time periods and selectively correspond to the semantics of Tibetan terms such as *sgom*, which typically indicates meditative practices.

Van Vugt’s study also describes individual analytic meditation as a reasoning-based form of sitting meditation in which “the practitioner contemplates a passage of text or an idea in their minds.” This form of meditation is “sometimes alternated with resting meditation without any particular object of focus.”<sup>29</sup> In this connection, the two methods of *vīpaśyanā* and *śamatha* (or *vīpaśsanā* and *samatha* in Pali) respectively come to mind. However, South Asian formal meditation practices attested in traditional Pali and Sanskrit sources are hardly based on reasoning and eventually serve the purpose of training the mind to perceive things in a non-conceptual and non-discursive way (which corresponds to the way through which Gautama became awakened and, thus, liberated from suffering).<sup>30</sup> As remarked by Rupert Gethin, exegetical literature explains *vīpaśsanā*, in particular, as a method for developing insight by directing “the perfect mindfulness, stillness, and lucidity that has been cultivated in the *jhānas*—especially the fourth *jhāna*—to the contemplation ... of ‘reality’—reality in the sense of the ways things are, or, perhaps better, the way things work.”<sup>31</sup> The analytical dimension that characterizes *vīpaśsanā* is thus different from conceptual analysis. Kamalaśīla explains *vīpaśyanā* along these lines as he equates *vīpaśyanā* with *bhūtapratyavekṣā*, “discernment of reality,” which is

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<sup>27</sup> Van Vugt et al. 2019: 238f.

<sup>28</sup> Dreyfus 2008: 45; see also Dreyfus 2003 and Samuels 2021.

<sup>29</sup> Van Vugt et al. 2019: 238.

<sup>30</sup> See, for example, Cousins 1984, Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 182–192, 200, and Gethin 2004.

<sup>31</sup> Gethin 2004: 215.



not a kind of correct analysis, but discerning “the selflessness of persons and *dharma*s.”<sup>32</sup>

### 3. The philosopher Dharmakīrti and the Buddhist meditative tradition

The Buddhist monastic institutions where meditative practices were performed and taught were also home to philosophical studies and debates. As shown by the use of the Sanskrit terms *ācārya* and *yogācāra*,<sup>33</sup> there was a clear division of labour between philosophers and specialists of meditation in Buddhist South Asia. Such a division of labour is also confirmed by the fact that, in pre-400 CE China, the names of foreign *chan* masters differed from those of the foreign translators of Indian texts.<sup>34</sup> It might thus be considered a truism that the authors of Buddhist philosophical writings from South Asia were not meditation practitioners. In fact, so far, we cannot prove if this was the case or not, but the implication in either case need not be that the epistemic consequences of meditative practices were not part of philosophical views. So, the question remains whether and how South Asian Buddhist philosophical texts refer to such practices and what role they ascribe to philosophy vis-à-vis the cultivation of the mind through meditation.

#### 3.1. The yogin’s perception and how to attain it

In the case of Dharmakīrti, it is easy to identify parts of his oeuvre that show his consideration of meditation and its results. The most evident topic is perhaps the yogin’s perception, *yogipratyakṣa*, namely the special perception that characterizes those whose life is devoted to practices that change one’s mental state and eventually lead to liberation. Precisely because of meditation practices, the yogin’s cognitive faculties differ from those of ordinary beings and have to be distinguished from other modes of direct perception. So, four modes of perception are accounted for in the logico-epistemological tradition: perceptual awareness depending on external sense faculties (*indriyapratyakṣa*), that depending on the mind—which includes

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<sup>32</sup> Adam 2016: 359.

<sup>33</sup> On *ācārya* see for example Kane 1942; on *yogācāra* see Silk 2000.

<sup>34</sup> Greene 2021: 29–33.

mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) and self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*)—and perceptual awareness as perception of the *yogin* (*yogipratyakṣa*).<sup>35</sup>

A typical example of yogic perception is the Buddha's knowledge of the four Truths. Precisely because this was a central point in the wider philosophical debate, it is unlikely—as I have observed elsewhere—that Dharmakīrti's few remarks on yogic perception in his *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* or *Nyāyabindu* (or Dignāga's few words in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, for that matter) betray only a superficial interest in the matter.<sup>36</sup> In fact, the verses of *Pramāṇavārttika* III.281–286 are partially rearranged in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I, 27.7–28.8, where they are accompanied by a description of the yogin's perception as the result of an epistemic process.<sup>37</sup> Adopting Abhidharma and Yogācāra concepts, Dharmakīrti explains this process as the subsequent attainment of three types of knowledge, namely the insights resulting from learning, reflection, and mental cultivation (*śrutamayī prajñā*, *cintāmayī prajñā*, and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*). These represent a temporal progression on the soteriological path as they are linked to the realization of the four Truths.<sup>38</sup> In commenting on *Pramāṇavārttika* II.208, where Dharmakīrti speaks of the natural luminosity of the mind and the arising of mental defilements only in connection with false views, Prajñākara Gupta and Manorathanandin observe that mental defilements do not appear again once the mind has attained the insights from learning and reflection, and even more so when the mind has radically transformed and the path, as viewing selflessness, has become natural for the mind (which refers to Dharmakīrti's statements in *Pramāṇavārttika* II.205).<sup>39</sup> Moreover, Dharmakīrti explains in *Pramāṇavārttika* II.199–201 that the path to liberation is ultimately concerned with and leads to the abandonment of a belief in a self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*). This is a complex belief

<sup>35</sup> See *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I.4ab and 6, and for references to some points of discussion Pecchia 2020: 775–777.

<sup>36</sup> Pecchia 2020: 773f. and 777.

<sup>37</sup> *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I, 27.9–12; see Pecchia 2020: 778f. and 791f. with references therein.

<sup>38</sup> *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 334.13–335.6 (on *Abhidharmakośa* VI.5) explains in detail the three insights referred to by Dharmakīrti especially at *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I, 27.9–12. For remarks and further references, see Dunne 2006: 507–510, Eltschinger 2009: 176ff. and 198f., Eltschinger 2014: 318–324, and Pecchia 2015: 236f.

<sup>39</sup> Pecchia 2015: 148f. and 236–238.

that is innate (*sahajā*) as well as conceptually produced (*ābhisamāskārikā*);<sup>40</sup> therefore, its eradication requires two types of paths, or spiritual trainings, namely the *darśanamārga*, ‘path of insight,’ and the *bhāvanāmārga*, ‘path of mental cultivation.’<sup>41</sup>

### 3.2. Three different insights (*prajñās*) and their different functions

Dharmakīrti’s remarks concerning the yogin’s vision of the Truths and how to attain it are anything but original and closely follow the Abhidharma tradition concerning the Bodhisattva’s path. Each of the three insights, *prajñās*, mentioned by Dharmakīrti and the tradition he draws upon has a specific function and is associated to a different practice that applies to a different type of object. The first two insights concern texts and concepts; they require intellectual activity and result in the acquisition of two distinct, though related, kinds of knowledge that respectively help the practitioner come to be acquainted with the Buddhist discourse on liberation and rationally understand its points, which can be logically proved. The third insight is instead linked to *bhāvanā*, which typically indicates mental cultivation through meditative practices. Its contents correspond to any of the objects of such practices—from the breath and bodily parts to feelings—and are not intellectual contents.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, they require a kind of activity that is mental and yet radically different from the intellectual one. *Bhāvanā* serves the purpose of developing an ability that addresses the distorted views of the ordinary mind (rather than the abilities of learning doctrinal notions and reasoning on them) and has the fundamental function of enabling the yogin to eventually attain liberation, namely a mental state free from the mistaken views that characterize the ordinary mind.

Although cultivation of all three insights is crucial for attaining liberation, one would somehow expect from Dharmakīrti special attention to the insight

<sup>40</sup> Pecchia 2015: 140–143 and 207f. As explained at p. 208, fn. 100, my understanding of *ābhisamāskārikā* draws upon Schmithausen’s remark on the different meanings of *abhisamāskāra* as being all related to *saṃskāra* and expressing endeavour or deliberate goal-oriented action (please note that the reference there to Schmithausen *Ālaya*: 156 should be changed to Schmithausen 1987: 156).

<sup>41</sup> Pecchia 2020: 779f. and references therein.

<sup>42</sup> In connection with Yogācāra sources on the *prajñās*, Eltschinger (2014: 319) instead

deriving from reflection. Indeed, at the end of *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I, Dharmakīrti mentions separately this type of knowledge in connection with the valid means of cognition and vis-à-vis the achievement of the ultimate knowledge that characterizes the liberated ones. He says:

And this nature of the conventional means of valid cognition has been explained. Even in this regard others who are confused make the world go astray. But those who practice the insight resulting from reflection realize the ultimate cognition, which is devoid of error and immaculate, which does not vanish.<sup>43</sup>

These remarks show how Dharmakīrti—as observed by Vincent Eltschinger—takes up the task of refuting misconceptions regarding the conventional means of valid cognition because such misconceptions cause people to fail in their pursuit of liberation—which makes epistemology “a necessary science.”<sup>44</sup> This specific role makes epistemology, as a theoretical enterprise, the presupposition for engaging in the right path. The insight from reflection may be considered as including the results of epistemology, namely the application of the valid means of cognition in reasoning on matters of mental defilements and their antidotes. However, in view of the passages considered above, this insight is not considered by Dharmakīrti the ultimate type of knowledge that enables the Buddhist practitioner to achieve liberation.<sup>45</sup> Rather, it is a necessary step towards the mental cultivation (*bhāvanā*) for achieving another insight, which is the ultimate one.

### 3.3. A training in thinking ‘out of one’s own box’

Dharmakīrti repeatedly explains that the distortions of the ordinary mind are generated by the view of a self. One cannot simply abandon such distortions

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speaks of the “yogin’s intensive cultivation of salvific intellectual contents.”

<sup>43</sup> *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I, 44.2–5: *sāṃvṛtyavahārikasya caitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam, atrāpi pare mūḍhā viśaṃvādayanti lokam iti. cintāmayīm eva tu prajñām anuśīlayanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikapramāṇam abhimukhikurvanti*. See Krasser 2004: 142f., Eltschinger 2014: 170f. and 317, n. 247; for the second part only, Pecchia 2015: 237, n. 241.

<sup>44</sup> Eltschinger 2014: 171.

<sup>45</sup> This does not seem to be Eltschinger’s view since he writes that the traditional

by convincing oneself of something else because, no matter how ‘good’ or ‘right’ another conviction is, its conceptual nature makes it a distorted way of cognizing things that is based on one’s conceptual representations of them. Dharmakīrti formulates this idea highlighting different related aspects. In *Pramāṇavārttika* II.174cd, for example, he states:

And since the objects [of attachment and so on] are conceptually represented, the objects are not the restricting factors.<sup>46</sup>

So, the burden of forming a judgement in relation to an object of perception rests only with the subject. In *Pramāṇavārttika* I, 32.3–12 (on I.58) Dharmakīrti focuses on conceptual habit and describes how an object is conceptualized in the mind of an agent of cognition.<sup>47</sup> He refers to the concepts of a corpse, a beloved woman, and food (*kuṇāpakāminībhakṣyavikalpāḥ*), which correspond to how an ascetic, a man, and a dog, respectively conceptualize the same visible form of the dead body of a woman. The mention of the ascetic together with the dog is not accidental; in fact, it indicates a meditation setting where an ascetic contemplates the loathsome in a cemetery (*aśubhābhāvanā*), to which dogs are associated as necrophagous animals. Dharmakīrti uses this example to illustrate not only the subjectivity of conceptual representations and their loose relation to the object, but also the role of individual habits in the process of conceptualization. He states:

Experience [of an object] generates ascertaining cognitions according to [one’s] conceptual habit, ... sharpness of mind, the habit (*abhyāsa*) due to the mental impressions left by a [previous ascertainment], context, and so forth are the causes that contribute to the arising of the ascertainment of a distinct feature from an experience.<sup>48</sup>

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sequence of insights is regarded by Dharmakīrti “as a self-sufficient means for securing enlightenment once the wrong notions spread and argued for by the outsiders have been discarded.” (Eltschinger 2014: 172).

<sup>46</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* II.174cd: *vikalpyaviśayaivāc ca viśayā na niyāmakāḥ* ||.

<sup>47</sup> The passage is translated in Pecchia 2020: 790f. and discussed at pp. 782–788, which I summarize in the present paragraph.

<sup>48</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* I, 32.5–8: *anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsaṃ niścayapratyayān janayati | ... buddhipātavaṃ tadvāsanābhyāsaḥ prakaraṇam ityādayo ’nubhavād bhedanīśayo-tpattisahakāriṇaḥ*.

If the subjectivity of conceptualization entails diversity in the concepts generated by different agents who react to a specific event, the agent's different conditions may generate different individuals' conceptual reactions to a similar event. In mentioning an ascetic and a man, Dharmakīrti's example also alludes to two sides of the coin: the mind of a man who views the corpse of a woman as a beloved woman for whom he feels attachment and the mind of a man who is an ascetic and views the corpse of a woman as a corpse, and thus something loathsome. While the man repeats previous representations determined by his attachment to the woman, the ascetic who practices the contemplations in the cemetery has trained the mind to see the corpse of a woman as such, going beyond his previous ways of conceptualizing the perception of a woman. So, the example of a corpse, a beloved woman, and food also shows that concepts *need not* flow from conceptual streams that have stabilised through repetition of the same conceptual response to similar events, and the contemplations on the loathsome, as other meditative practices, are indeed a training in thinking 'out of one's own box.'

### 3.4. From concepts to non-conceptual cognition through mental cultivation

Since concepts do not correspond naturally to objects of cognition, but in fact, have a quite tenuous relationship with their referents, it is not banal that an ascetic in front of a corpse is able to cognize it as a corpse. Nevertheless, the ascetic's concept, as a concept, is in principle not superior to other concepts. Therefore, the final focus of meditative training is the conceptualizing habit itself. Since this reinforces the conceptually produced belief in a self and innate belief in a self (which are forms of conceptualization underlining any other type of concept), liberation cannot be attained by deconstructing the two types of beliefs, but (as we have seen above, at p. 674) by eradicating them through the *darśana-* and *bhāvanā-mārga*. The special training provided by meditative practices serves not only the purpose of changing habitual conceptual processes and reducing the conceptual activity itself, but, in the final stage, it also makes the conceptual activity cease completely. Now, although a training in thinking out of one's box is needed, non-conceptual insights cannot eventually be generated by what they are not, namely concepts. Meditative practices will then consist in training the mind to stop

imposing subject-based ideas, enabling the mind to function cognitively at a non-conceptual level.

This more general goal is articulated by Dharmakīrti in different ways and with reference to different aspects and modes of meditation, as indicated by the term *abhyāsa*. For example, in illustrating the features of the Buddha as a teacher, Dharmakīrti says: 'For the one who repeatedly practices the means in their manifold aspects and for a long time, the virtues and faults become very clear.'<sup>49</sup> In his long explanation of the Buddha as one who seeks the benefit of the world, he states: 'That [i.e., compassion] arises from repeated practice;<sup>50</sup> and, 'compassion etc. arise from repeated practice and continue to grow spontaneously.'<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, with regard to the path, he says that 'through the practice of it the basis is transmuted,' and becomes of the nature of the path.<sup>52</sup> Especially the latter statement makes it clear that the function of meditation is to radically transform how the mind works—where its radical transformation concerns its very operative mode and results in meditative states becoming the normal condition of the mind. The point is that the mind can become of the same nature as the qualities that have been cultivated, which include specific mental qualities such as compassion and sound ways of seeing things, which finally correspond to the Truths.

It is thus not only worthy but also necessary to engage in mental cultivation for the follower of the Buddhist *dharma* who wants the results of philosophical analysis to be meaningful. What the yogin knows at the end of the path, when his cognitive abilities have been radically transformed, may or may not be different from what he knew during the path. The difference is that he now knows it with a different mind—a mind that does not obscure the objects of its cognition with its own concepts. Meditative practice is then a training for the mind to think out of its box and, in the long term,

<sup>49</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* II.136: *bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ kālena bahunāsyā ca | gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra guṇadoṣāḥ prakāśatām ||*. See Eltschinger 2005: 404f.

<sup>50</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* II.34ab': *abhyāsāt sā ||*. See Franco 1997: 95 and 159.

<sup>51</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* II.124cd: *abhyāsajāḥ pravartante svarasena kṛpādayaḥ ||*.

<sup>52</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* II.205'ab: *tadabhyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate*. The next verse says: *sātmīye 'pi doṣabhāvaś cen mārgavan nāvibhūtvataḥ*. "But you may say that faults arise in the same way as the path does, even though the latter is the natural state. No! [—we reply—] owing to the absence of power [to do so]." See Pecchia 2015: 170f. and 219–226.

to become autonomous from thinking itself, from any kind of belief, even from the “right” ones.

Both philosophical thinking and yogic cognition lead to knowledge that the tradition calls *prajñā*, but the two resulting *prajñās* are certainly not of the same nature and do not work in the same way. The former is relevant to the final aim of the path because it corresponds to the ordinary function of the mind, through which we can discern, distinguish, and make decisions concerning the path. But if the results of this mode of the mind were more important than those of the meditation-based mode, why should one engage in the latter at all? And why should a Buddhist philosopher like Dharmakīrti refer to it in his crucial explanations of how the ordinary mind works? Especially as a philosopher, he could have framed the matter to the advantage of a philosophical understanding and explain yogic epistemic attainments as a “vivid presentation” of what philosophers already know.<sup>53</sup> But Dharmakīrti does not offer any statement to this effect. Quite on the contrary, based on the doctrinal schema of Abhidharmic tradition, he explains how the ordinary mind functions and shows what the results of meditation are, indeed providing a rational motivation, and not a faith-based one, for the adoption of the Buddhist Yogācāra path. Philosophy does not discover, but proves the Truths, as Dharmakīrti does in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika*. A philosophical understanding of the nature of our problem, namely suffering, and its solution serves the purpose of helping anyone who wants to find a solution to the problem of suffering to do so in an efficacious way by addressing the right issues and with the appropriate means.

If this makes philosophy a worthy enterprise, it does not exempt the follower of the Buddhist *dharma* from going through the *bhāvanāmārga*, the path based on the cultivation of the mind by means of meditative practices—a path that neither consists in philosophical understanding nor aims at such an understanding, but is rather made for attaining the special type

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<sup>53</sup> This interpretation is given as a possibility in Tillemans 2013: 299: “One could of course just bite the bullet and agree that the yogic perception promoted by Kamalaśīla and Dharmakīrti is nothing more than a vivid presentation of conclusions reached by prior correct rational analysis.”



of knowledge that characterizes the yogin.<sup>54</sup> The yogin's achievement is measured by its being non-conceptual. If this were not the case, no matter how vivid or correct his understanding could be, his mind would keep acting according to its conceptual box. The continuity between philosophical analysis and non-conceptual cognition (namely, the result of meditation and not meditation itself) suggested by the progression of the three *prajñās* does not entail that their epistemic achievement is of the same nature, but that they all cooperate toward the final achievement, the *pāramārthikapramāṇa*, the ultimate knowledge.<sup>55</sup> As observed by Franco,

Like nature and nurture, spiritual practice and philosophical theory are never found to exist in separation. ... Even the purest meditative experience is culturally and linguistically bound, and is engrossed in a tradition.<sup>56</sup>

If the importance of meditation in Asian Buddhist traditions is today widely acknowledged, the discussion of its role vis-à-vis philosophy involves a variety of aspects that makes it highly complex. The diverse ways of understanding the term meditation in ancient times as well as today add complexity to the discussion, especially insofar as one downplays the distinction between the conceptual and the non-conceptual (as is the case of considering Tibetan philosophical debate a kind of meditation). Yet, considering that the Buddhist *dharma* has its foundations in an ascetic tradition, one would rather agree, *mutatis mutandis*, with Augustine's saying: *Si enim comprehendis non est Deus*—'If you comprehend, it is not God' (*Sermo* 117). And Dharmakīrti would agree as well.

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<sup>54</sup> If and how yogic perception adds new discoveries of truths is a matter that I will explore in a future paper.

<sup>55</sup> See n. 43 above.

<sup>56</sup> Franco 2018: 125f.

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# Haughty Bitterness or Altruistic Concerns?

## On Dharmakīrti's Alleged Motives for Writing the *Pramāṇavārttika*\*

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### The “haughty bitterness” of the *Pramāṇavārttika*'s introductory stanza

The *Pramāṇavārttika* begins with an invocation to the Buddha followed by an introductory stanza. The latter has been read as meaning something along these lines:

Most people, being attached to unrefined [things and] lacking the intelligence required [in order to understand this treatise], not only have no interest at all in excellent discourses but even hate [their author], being covered with the stains of envy—so I do not even entertain the thought of helping others (*paropakāra*). [Nevertheless, my] mind's passion for excellent discourses has long been nourished by their study, so it yearns [to compose] this [treatise].<sup>1</sup>

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\* I owe Eli Franco my first postdoctoral position, which enabled me to pursue my research for four years in Leipzig while working on a DFG project, and I am immensely grateful to this remarkably gifted, learned and versatile scholar for his support and kindness, as well as for what probably cemented our friendship from the start, namely, his genuine love for debate (which I experienced from our very first encounter—a spirited exchange during my PhD viva in the Sorbonne's beautiful amphithéâtre Liard!). What follows is but a modest token of my affection and admiration—I hope that he will forgive my mistakes and ignorance. Many thanks are also due to Vincent Eltschinger for carefully reading a draft of this paper and correcting a shameful number of lingering typos.

<sup>1</sup> *prāyaḥ prākṛtasaktir apratibalaprajño janaḥ kevalaṃ nānarthy eva subhāṣitaiḥ parigato vi-dveṣṭy apīrṣyāmalaiḥ | tenāyaṃ na paropakāra iti naś cintāpi cetaś ciraṃ sūktābhyāsavi-vardhitavyasanam ity atrānubaddhasprham ||*

This, at least, is how modern historians and philologists have read the verse,<sup>2</sup> adducing it as evidence that Dharmakīrti experienced a deep intellectual solitude and that, while being acutely aware of his own achievements, he felt frustrated that none of his pupils could rise to the task of understanding him. According to Erich Frauwallner, the stanza expresses “a profound disappointment and bitterness”;<sup>3</sup> Richard Hayes and Brendan Gillon depict it as “sardonic”<sup>4</sup> while Raffaele Torella highlights its “bitterly haughty tone.”<sup>5</sup> Vincent Eltschinger quotes it to illustrate “a bitterness that has become legendary,”<sup>6</sup> and Helmut Krasser points out that in it Dharmakīrti “bitterly complains” about people’s hostility to his work.<sup>7</sup> Eli Franco has aptly summed up the way in which the verse is understood nowadays as a “famously bitter introductory verse.”<sup>8</sup> And as already pointed out by Stcherbatsky,<sup>9</sup> from Ānandavardhana<sup>10</sup> to Bu ston and Tāranātha,<sup>11</sup> Indian

<sup>2</sup> Mentions and translations of it are found e.g. in Stcherbatsky 1932, pp. 35–36; Frauwallner 1954, pp. 150–151; Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964, p. 5; Torella 1992, n. 2, pp. 337–338; Hayes and Gillon 1994, p. 14; Eltschinger 2007, p. 64, n. 99; Balcerowicz 2008, pp. 68–70; Krasser 2012, p. 585; Steinkellner 2013, vol. I, p. 3; Franco 2018, p. 260; Matsuoka forthcoming (with the translation in Hayes and Gillon 1994). The only significant divergence as to the overall understanding of the stanza has to do with the way the negative particle should be construed in *tenāyaṃ na paropakāra iti naś cintāpi*: some (for instance Frauwallner 1954, p. 151) read it along with *cintā* (in which case the passage means “so I do *not* even entertain the thought of helping others...”), others understand it as belonging inside the *iti* clause (“so although I am aware/I fear that this will *not* be helpful to others...”). The latter interpretation is found e.g. in Steinkellner 2013, p. 3 and Franco 2018, p. 260 (this also seems to be the understanding e.g. in Vetter 1964, p. 63).

<sup>3</sup> Frauwallner 1954, p. 150 (“eine tiefe Enttäuschung und Verbitterung”).

<sup>4</sup> Hayes and Gillon 1994, p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Torella 1992, p. 327.

<sup>6</sup> Eltschinger 2007, p. 64 (“une amertume devenue légendaire”).

<sup>7</sup> Krasser 2012, p. 585.

<sup>8</sup> Franco 2018, p. 260.

<sup>9</sup> Stcherbatsky 1932, p. 36.

<sup>10</sup> See below, n. 53.

<sup>11</sup> See e.g. Chimpa, Chattopadhyaya and Chattopadhyaya 1990, pp. 238, where the verse to be discussed below is said to have been composed after only a few of

and Tibetan traditions, too, had depicted him as embittered by the lack of positive response to his works, yet proudly convinced of their great value. These sources also quote another famous verse, found at the end of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and seemingly echoing the introductory one:

Even someone enjoying the power of a great intelligence cannot fathom the depth of my thought; even those devoting considerable energy [to its study] cannot see the essence of its highest truth. Having found no other suitable vessel (*pratigrāhaka*) in the world, it will end up decaying in my body, just as the ocean's water [for which no receptacle is fit besides the ocean itself].<sup>12</sup>

The ancient commentaries on the *Pramāṇavārttika* do not comment on the closing stanza,<sup>13</sup> and they understand the introductory verse in a strikingly different way—or rather, in two strikingly different ways.

Dharmakīrti's learned readers understood him and, jealous of his intelligence, tied his works to the tail of a dog; Dharmakīrti allegedly responded by noting that as wandering dogs, his works would travel everywhere. Cf. Straube 2009, p. 471.

<sup>12</sup> PV 4.286: *anadhyavasitāvagāhanam analpadhīśaktināpy adṛṣṭaparamārthasāram ad-hikābhīyogair api | matam mama jagaty alabdhasadrśapratigrāhakaṃ prayāsyati payonidheḥ paya iva svadehe jarām* || Cf. more or less similar translations in Stcherbatsky 1932, p. 36; Frauwallner 1954, p. 151; Eltschinger 2007, p. 64, n. 99; Shulman 2016, p. 421. Note, however, that the verse has been read in a more elaborate way by Abhinavagupta, and Straube 2009, p. 481, attempts a rather different translation based on the poetician's remarks. On Abhinavagupta's understanding see also Ingalls et al. 1990, pp. 630–631, Bansat-Boudon 2016, pp. 71–72, and below, n. 13 and 58.

<sup>13</sup> Prajñākaragupta alludes to it, however. See what is marked as verses 620–621 (in fact a single verse) in PVA, p. 648: *saṃkṣepataḥ kṛtam idaṃ parabodhasiddhyai vaktuṃ punaḥ subahu sādhu ca śakyam atra | ratnākarād adhigatasya hi ratnarāśeḥ prauḍhaḥ pratigrāhakaḥ asti na tena bhāṣyam* || “[I] have produced this brief [explanation] so as to make others understand [Dharmakīrti's thought], but one could say much more about it, and [one could say it] better, too; for there is no other vessel (*pratigrāhakaḥ*) skilled [enough to bear] the heap of gems acquired from the repository of gems [that is the ocean of Dharmakīrti's thought]—hence this commentary.” Cf. Abhinavagupta's remarks in DhĀL, p. 490, to the effect that the image of the ocean (traditionally depicted as a receptacle of riches) suggests an extraordinary treasure (e.g. *paramam yad arthatattvam kaustubhādibhyo'py uttamam* . . . “[‘The essence of its highest truth’ really means] the ultimate essence of reality, which is even more

### The “artificial and implausible” interpretations in Śākyabuddhi’s and Kaṇakagomin’s commentaries

What these commentaries have to say on the introductory stanza has not attracted much attention so far. A few scholars have noted in passing that Kaṇakagomin, following Śākyabuddhi, provides two distinct interpretations;<sup>14</sup> but in secondary sources, most allusions to the traditional understanding of the verse are restricted to the first interpretation laid down by Kaṇakagomin—or rather, to a part of it, as will be seen below. Erich Frauwallner was aware of the existence of a second interpretation in Kaṇakagomin’s commentary, but he dismissed the second one without even explaining it on the grounds that it is evidently “artificial and implausible.”<sup>15</sup> Satkari Mookerjee and Hojun Nagasaki only offer a very partial view of what actually goes on in the commentaries, and they explain that Dharmakīrti wrote his work “for his own satisfaction” while ignoring the fact that the commentaries deny or at least greatly downplay this point.<sup>16</sup> Hayes and Gillon allude to a plurality of interpretations in Kaṇakagomin’s text but do not explain in what ways they differ, and their understanding of the second one is highly problematic, as will be seen below. Martin Straube, for his part, seems to be aware of the gap between the understanding of the verse adopted in modern sources and that of the ancient commentaries (and perhaps also of the fact that the latter has not been accurately reported so far) since he refrains from providing a translation of the verse on the grounds that the commentaries need further study.<sup>17</sup>

It is this gap that the present article attempts to fill by providing an English translation of Kaṇakagomin’s explanations, obviously borrowed from Śākyabuddhi’s.<sup>18</sup> Many readers will probably find—as do I—that Frauwallner was perfectly right in considering the second interpretation

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precious than the *kaustubha* [jewel]...”).

<sup>14</sup> Hayes and Gillon 1994, pp. 14–15; Katsura 1994; Straube 2009, p. 480, n. 26; Steinkellner 2013, vol. II, n. 2.

<sup>15</sup> Frauwallner 1954, p. 151, n. 16 (“gekünstelt und unwahrscheinlich”).

<sup>16</sup> Mookerjee and Nagasaki 1964, p. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Straube 2009, p. 480, n. 26.

<sup>18</sup> Katsura 1994 is a Japanese translation of the entire passage in Kaṇakagomin’s



forced and implausible. It seems to me, however, that the reason why the Austrian scholar discarded it is precisely what makes it so interesting. For this outlandish reading had as its goal to establish that Dharmakīrti, far from being bitter and haughty, wrote his work out of sheer altruism and compassion. In contrast, as far as the word-by-word gloss is concerned, the first interpretation mentioned by Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin comes quite close to that of modern historians; as we will see, however, in fact it is also aimed at showing that, contrary to what one might conclude from a superficial reading of the stanza, Dharmakīrti did write the *Pramāṇavārttika* for the sake of others. That commentators were thus prepared to have a verse say the opposite of what it seems to vigorously proclaim is a measure of how shocking Dharmakīrti's attitude must have been to his coreligionists: Buddhist readers expected a treatise to be written with a purely altruistic goal in mind. The bitter accents of the verse were admittedly useful to some of his commentators: Yamāri took advantage of them to dismiss Devendrabuddhi's authority by arguing that the master was specifically disappointed with his disciple.<sup>19</sup> But many of Dharmakīrti's Buddhist intellectual heirs must have deemed unacceptable his assertion that he had composed the *Pramāṇavārttika* for himself, most people being hopelessly incapable of seeing its value. As will be seen below, the sarcasms of non-Buddhist authors finding Dharmakīrti quite self-centered for a proponent of a religion advocating selflessness may have played a role in the commentators' attitude—all the more since even members of non-Buddhist traditions such as the Nyāya<sup>20</sup> and Mīmāṃsā<sup>21</sup> claimed to write their own treatises out of compassion. At any rate, Dharmakīrti's Buddhist readers must have felt an unbearable discrepancy between the tone of this opening stanza and that of Dignāga's benedictory verse in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, since the latter (commented

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commentary. As I do not read Japanese I was not able to check how its author understands and assesses the two interpretations provided; I have made ample use, however, of the philological notes in the article (see Appendix).

<sup>19</sup> See Matsuoka forthcoming; the paper rightly points out that Yamāri must have been aware of the interpretations of the introductory verse found in Śākyabuddhi's and Karṇakagomin's works.

<sup>20</sup> See e.g. Pakṣilasvāmin, NBh, pp. 96–97; Biardeau 1964, p. 121.

<sup>21</sup> See e.g. Śālikanātha, VMV, p. 376; Ratié forthcoming, n. 68.

upon at length in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*) depicts the Buddha as "seeking the benefit of all" (*jagaddhitaṣin*) and as being the true teacher (*śāstr*) precisely because he teaches all.<sup>22</sup>

**The first interpretation: Dharmakīrti claims that he has no hope of helping others—but so as to indirectly incite others to better themselves**

Karṇakagomin's first explanation of the verse (which is almost identical to Śākyabuddhi's)<sup>23</sup> runs as follows (the Sanskrit text is given below, Appendix, §B):

In this [verse, Dharmakīrti] refers to the four kinds of flaws in those who study [treatises] (*śrotr*), [namely]: bad insight (*kuprajñatva*), ignorance (*ajñatva*), lack of interest (*anarthitva*), and bias (*amādhyaṣṭhya*). The word *prāya* ["most,"] ending in *-a* [and understood as an adjective qualifying *janah*],<sup>24</sup> indicates a multitude, [and so] *prāyo janah* [means] "most people." [They are] "attached to unrefined [things]" (*prākṛtasakti*); because [this compound] makes [us] understand that<sup>25</sup> [they] are attached to the unrefined treatises [of those] outside [the Buddhist fold] (*bahihśāstra*), it is a non-appositional possessive compound [i.e. we should understand that most people "have an attachment to these unrefined treatises"]; alternatively, [it may be read as] being appositional, [i.e. as meaning that] they "have an attachment *that is* unrefined"—and [even in the latter case, their] attachment [can be said to be] unrefined [precisely] because it bears on [something] unrefined. This refers to the flaw of bad insight in those whose study. [The next compound,] "lacking the intelligence required" (*apratibalaprajñā*), is [to be] construed with "most people." [These people] "lack the intelligence required," that is,] their

<sup>22</sup> See e.g. Franco 1997, pp. 15ff.

<sup>23</sup> That is, apart from two sentences on the meaning and grammatical status of *prāyaḥ* (PVSVT, p. 3: *prāyaśabdo'kārānto bāhulyavacanah*, and *ibid.*: *anye tu prāyaḥ°... iti vyācakṣate*), which are not found in the Tibetan translation of Śākyabuddhi's commentary. Manorathanandin briefly mentions Karṇakagomin's two explanations for this word (see below, n. 36: *prāyo bhūyān bāhulyena vā*).

<sup>24</sup> Karṇakagomin is about to offer an alternative interpretation whereby the word *prāyaḥ* is understood as an indeclinable word with an instrumental sense.

<sup>25</sup> On this notion of *gamakatva* in grammatical discussions on compounds see Joshi 1968, pp. vi-vii.

intelligence is no match (*apratibala*) [inasmuch as] it is incapable of grasping the treatise. This refers to [the flaw of] ignorance.<sup>26</sup> “Not only” do they have “no interest at all in excellent discourses,” but “they even hate” the [person] who utters these [discourses], “covered” as they are “with the stains of envy.” This means that they are both uninterested and hateful; and it respectively refers to [the flaws characterized as] lack of interest and bias. Here too, [both] must be construed with “most people.” Others, however, explain that the word *prāyaḥ*, although it ends in -s, is an indeclinable word and inherently conveys the sense of the instrumental in *bāhulyena*, [which means “ordinarily,” “in general.”] People are “covered with the stains of envy”; “envy” is the resentment resulting from the thought of someone else’s accomplishment. [The stain of envy is to be understood as] the stain *that is* envy, because [it is envy itself] that stains the mind; [Dharmakīrti uses] the plural [in “the stains of envy”] with reference to the various individuals. [The word] “hence” (*tena*) [means that Dharmakīrti] wanted to undertake [the composition of] “this,” [namely,] the work entitled [*Pramāṇa*]*vārttika*, for the reason thus [stated so far, that is, the flaws in those who study]. [The compound *paropakāra*, “helping others,” literally means] “the help of others.” [Here] the affix *ghaṇ* [used to produce the substantive *upakāra* from *upakṛ-* (“to help”)] indicates the action [of helping] in the sense that one is helped by this [– that is to say, “the help of others” really means “that by which others are helped”];<sup>27</sup> alternatively, [the compound] *paropakāra* [may be understood as] “that which helps others” in accordance with [Pāṇini’s aphorism]<sup>28</sup> “[the affix] *aṇ* [is used] when there is a direct complement [in a compound].”<sup>29</sup> [At this point Dharmakīrti says:] “I do not even entertain the thought that [this work may] help others.” How then did he [come to] undertake the composition of the treatise? He answers this [question] with the passage

<sup>26</sup> This distinction between the defects of “bad insight” (*kuprajñatva*) understood as the belief in wrong (i.e. here non-Buddhist) views and “ignorance” (*ajñatva*) defined as a deficient insight (*prajñā*) may have to do with the discussion found in AKBh on AK 3.29, which distinguishes *kuprajñā* and *avidyā* (see La Vallée Poussin 1926, pp. 89ff.).

<sup>27</sup> Just as the substantive *roga*, “disease,” means “that by which one is afflicted” (see Pāṇini 3.3.16).

<sup>28</sup> Pāṇini 3.2.1.

<sup>29</sup> I.e., *paropakāra* means something like “other-helper” just as the compound *kumbhakāra* means “pot-maker.”

beginning with *cetaś cīram*, [which means the following: my] mind has a “passion”—[i.e.] an attachment, an obsession—that has “long been nourished”—[i.e., nourished] for a long time “by the study of excellent discourses”; “so”—[that is,] for this reason—it “yearns for this,” [i.e.] it has become eager to compose this *Vārttika*. This, [at least,] is how some explain [this verse].

At first sight, the interpretation provided here is not substantially different from that adopted by modern scholars. Granted, Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin consider that Dharmakīrti’s depiction of “most people” affords him an opportunity to enumerate four specific flaws that prevent them from understanding the importance and interest of his endeavour—an enumeration that is certainly not glaringly manifest from the sole verse and that many modern studies do not mention at all. The commentators also make clear that the “unrefined” things to which people are allegedly attached are the treatises of non-Buddhists—a point that, again, might not seem entirely evident from the verse itself. Nonetheless, just as historians today, in this first interpretation, Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin understand the stanza as meaning—at least at its most obvious and superficial level—that Dharmakīrti did *not* even entertain the hope of being helpful to anybody else by writing his work (in this reading the particle *na* is construed with *naś cintāpi*), and that he was rather driven to compose it by his personal passion for good works, a passion fostered by his long study of such works (which they understand to be Buddhist, as opposed to their “unrefined” counterparts).

Yet there are several elements that should make us wary of reading this first interpretation as more or less equivalent to that of modern scholars. First of all, Karṇakagomin (following Śākyabuddhi) understands the words *tenāyam* as meaning something like “hence this [work]”: according to him, this is Dharmakīrti’s way of indicating that the first part of the verse—read as the enumeration of the flaws preventing people from understanding a sound philosophical work—is his actual reason for *writing* the treatise. So the stanza is to be understood as follows:

Most people, being attached to unrefined [treatises by outsiders, and] lacking the intelligence required [in order to understand this treatise], not only have no interest at all in excellent discourses but even hate [their author], being covered with the stains of envy. *Hence this [work].* I do not even entertain the thought that [it may] help others;

[nevertheless, my] mind's passion for excellent discourses has long been nourished by their study, so it yearns [to compose] this [*Vārttika*].

This might sound like a gross misunderstanding: given the word order and overall meaning of the stanza, doesn't the first part of it rather provide the reason why Dharmakīrti *dispairs* of helping anybody with his work? But Karṇakagomin had in fact already made clear before this passage that this is not quite how the stanza is to be read.

Thus, while discussing the meaning of the initial invocation to the Buddha, Karṇakagomin had already presented Dharmakīrti as going out of his way to write such an invocation because, although the latter is not an absolute requirement so as to reach the completion of a work, he had in mind "the benefit of others" (*pārārthya*) and strove to "preserve a worthy tradition" (*sadācārānupālana*)<sup>30</sup> —a remark that may well have been meant to defuse from the start any interpretation of the next verse involving Dharmakīrti's intellectual pride or egoism, or suggesting his being somehow isolated within his own Buddhist tradition. Karṇakagomin then added, as an introduction to the verse under scrutiny (see Appendix, §A for the Sanskrit text):

Indeed, there are definitely some wise [people] who [can] grasp the treatise entitled [*Pramāṇa*]*vārttika*; nonetheless, despite being of help [to others, this treatise] is as good as [if it were] not [so] due to the plethora of flaws in those who study it. With this in mind, [Dharmakīrti] formulates the second verse that begins [with the words] *prāyaḥ prākṛta*°... [He does so] while pointing out that the cause for [his] undertaking this treatise is that his thought has been stimulated by his study of excellent discourses, and in order to convey the following in a roundabout way

<sup>30</sup> PVSVT, p. 1: *yady api hi śāstrārambhe namaskāraślokopanyāsam antareṇa kāyavāñ-manobhir iṣṭadevatānamaskāraḥkaraṇena puṇyopacayād avighnena śāstrasya parisamāptir bhavati, tathāpi vyākhyātṛśrotṛṇāṃ stutipuraḥsarayā pravṛtṭiyā puṇyātīśayotpādāt pārārthyaṃ sadācārānupālanaṃ cālocya viśiṣṭadevatāpūjāślokaṃ upanyastavān ācāryaḥ*. "For even though one [may] complete a treatise without obstacles if one does not formulate a verse of salutation at its beginning, [simply] by accumulating merit while [privately] saluting one's chosen deity with one's body, speech and mind, the master did formulate a verse of adoration to his chosen deity, having considered that [this] is beneficial to others—since if the activity of those who explain or study [the text] begins with a praise, additional merit will ensue [for them]—, and that it preserves a worthy tradition."

(*vakrokti*): “the flaw[s]<sup>31</sup> that cause [others] to stray away from the great meaning [of this work] must be abandoned.”

Here, Karṇakagomin (again, following Śākyabuddhi’s virtually identical commentary) emphasizes that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is actually helpful to others. It may *appear* not to be so, but only due to the flaws that mar the understanding of its readers. Besides, Dharmakīrti says that he was prompted to write by his study of sound discourses. This enables the commentators to claim that Dharmakīrti really wrote the *Pramāṇavārttika* for other people’s sake rather than his own: by pointing out that the study of good treatises sharpened his desire to practice philosophy, Dharmakīrti, according to Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, is showing how studying good treatises has improved his own mind; he is thus indirectly inciting readers to get rid of their own flaws, and this is his way of suggesting that they too should study the *Pramāṇavārttika* so as to better themselves.

The counterintuitive aspect of this reading is justified by presenting the injunction to eliminate the flaws and study the *Pramāṇavārttika* as “conveyed in a roundabout way” (*vakrokti*). In Karṇakagomin’s time, the compound *vakrokti* (literally, “crooked speech”) was used in a broad sense to designate the ability of poetic discourse to convey a more subtle meaning beyond the obvious one.<sup>32</sup> What is implied here is that, although the verse is correctly read, at a basic level, as having Dharmakīrti say that he has no hope of helping others, in fact his words should not be understood in this elementary sense, because they have a more subtle, and altruistic, import. Perhaps those who came up with this interpretation were taking advantage of Dharmakīrti’s reputation as a poet;<sup>33</sup> perhaps this reputation of his was enhanced by their commentarial tactic. At any rate, as noted by Hiroko

<sup>31</sup> Karṇakagomin is about to specify that this flaw is “of four kinds.”

<sup>32</sup> Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin for instance use it in this broad sense (and not so as to designate the specific figure of speech called *vakrokti*, which is described in later sources as resting on the playful misinterpretation of someone’s speech by an interlocutor). See e.g. De 1960, vol. I, p. 84 and vol. II, p. 48–52; Bronner and McCrea 2001, p. 458, n. 13.

<sup>33</sup> On the latter and the *muktaka* stanzas traditionally ascribed to Dharmakīrti see Straube 2009; cf. Bansat-Boudon 2016, pp. 66–73, and Shulman 2016, pp. 421–422.

Matsuoka,<sup>34</sup> this tactic was adopted by Manorathanandin and summed up as follows in his introduction to the stanza:

[Dharmakīrti], while not seeing [how] the treatise might help others given the plethora of flaws in those who study, [and] while showing that his own reason for undertaking the treatise was only that his mind had been disposed [to it] by his study of excellent discourses, states [the following stanza] in order to incite in a roundabout way (*vakrokti*) those who study to engage in the treatise by getting rid of this flawed state.<sup>35</sup>

Again, having provided a summarized version of Kaṇvakagomin's first interpretation,<sup>36</sup> he concludes:

<sup>34</sup> Matsuoka forthcoming.

<sup>35</sup> PVV, p. 2: *śrotrdoṣabāhulyāc chāstreṇa paropakāram apaśyan sūktābhyāsabhāvitacittatām evātmanaḥ śāstrārambhakāraṇaṃ darśayan vakroktiyā doṣatāpanayanena śāstre śrotṛṇ pravartayitum āha. [\*śrotṛṇ corr.; śrotṛṇ Ed.]*

<sup>36</sup> PVV, pp. 2–3: *prāyo bhūyān bāhulyena vā janaḥ prākṛteṣu bahiḥśāstreṣu saktir abhiṣvaṅgo yasya sa prākṛtasaktir anena kuprajñatvaṃ śrotrdoṣa uktāḥ. apratibalā śāstrārthagrahaṇaṃ praty aśaktā prajñā yasyāsāv apratibalaprajñāḥ. anenājñatvaṃ uktam. kevalaṃ nānarthy eva subhāṣitaiḥ kintu subhāṣitābhidhāyinaṃ īrṣyā para-sampattau cetaso vyāroṣaḥ saiva malaś cittamalinīkaraṇāt. taiḥ parigato yuktaḥ san vidveṣṭy api. īrṣyāmalaḥ iti vyaktyapekṣayā bahuvacanam. anena yathākramam anarhitvaṃ amādhyasthyaṃ cokaṃ. tena śrotrdoṣakalāpenāyam āripsito vārttikākhyo granthaḥ. param upakarotīti paropakāra iti no'smākaṃ cintāpi nāsti. kathaṃ tarhi śāstrakarāṇe pravṛttir ity āha cetaś ciraṃ dīrghakālaṃ sūktasyābhyāseṇa vivardhitavyasanaṃ vistāritābhiṣvaṅgam iti hetor atra vārttikakarāṇe'nubaddhasprhaṃ jātābhilāṣam. "[The word] *prāyaḥ* [means] 'most' or 'in general.' [Most] people are 'attached to'—[i.e.] have an intense affection for—'unrefined' [things, i.e.,] the treatises of outsiders. This refers to the flaw in those who study that is [characterized as] bad insight. They 'lack the intelligence required,' [that is,] their intelligence is no match [inasmuch as] it is incapable of grasping the meaning of the treatise. This refers to [the flaw of] ignorance. 'Not only do they have no interest at all in excellent discourses,' but 'they even hate' the [person] who utters these [discourses], 'covered' as they are 'with the stains of envy'—[that is,] since they have these [stains]. 'Envy' is the resentment resulting from the thought of someone else's accomplishment. [The stain of envy literally means] the stain that is envy, because [it is envy itself] that stains the mind; [Dharmakīrti uses] the plural [in 'the stains of envy'] with reference to the various individuals. This respectively refers to [the flaws that are] the lack of interest and bias. [The word]*

This [stanza], by making those who study realize that they have all these flaws—[viz.] bad insight and so on—, prompts them to engage in the treatise by getting rid of these defects.<sup>37</sup>

As noticed by Matsuoka,<sup>38</sup> this interpretation was adopted by Kamalaśīla as well. He alludes to it while pointing out that writing only for oneself makes no sense, and while trying to dispel (again!) the suspicion that Dharmakīrti might have thought otherwise. He remarks in this respect that even though Dharmakīrti discusses at length what a correct “inference for oneself” is, this does not mean that he thought that writing a treatise might be a selfish enterprise:

[Admittedly,] the master [Dharmakīrti] says in the *Nyāyabindu* that “because one understands thus all by oneself, the inferential formulation of this [understanding] also belongs to [the category of] inference for oneself”,<sup>39</sup> however, he did not [say this] while having in mind an external formulation, but only with respect to an internal discursive [thought], since an inference for oneself [only] consists in thought, [as opposed to actual speech]. As for what [Dharmakīrti] says [in the stanza] beginning with “Most people, being attached to unrefined...”—its point, [conveyed] in a roundabout way (*vakrokti*), is also to transform others, whose minds are afflicted by the stains of envy and so on, into suitable vessels [for his teaching]; so enough with this digression.<sup>40</sup>

‘hence’ [means that Dharmakīrti] wanted to undertake [the composition of] this work entitled [*Pramāṇa*] *vārttika* because of this series of flaws in those who study. [The compound] *paropakāra* [means] that one helps others; [Dharmakīrti says] ‘I do not even entertain the thought that [this work may] help others.’ How then did he undertake the composition of the treatise? He answers this [question by saying the following: my] mind has a ‘passion’—[i.e.] an intense attachment—that has ‘long been nourished’—[i.e.,] fostered for a long time—‘by the study of excellent discourses’; for this reason it ‘yearns for this,’ [i.e.,] it has become eager to compose this *Vārttika*.”

<sup>37</sup> PVV, p. 3: *etena kuprajñatādidoṣajātam ātmano bodhitāḥ śrotāras tatparihāreṇa śāstre pravartitā eva bhavanti*.

<sup>38</sup> See Matsuoka forthcoming.

<sup>39</sup> NB 2.44 (with *pratītir* instead of *vyavacchedapratītir* and *svārthānumāne’py* instead of *svārthe’py anumāne*).

<sup>40</sup> TSP, p. 8: *yat punar uktam ācāryeṇa nyāyabindau svayam apy evaṃ pratipattir bha-*



### The second interpretation: Dharmakīrti is only concerned with Dignāga's legacy and writes out of compassion for others

Śākyabuddhi's and Karṇakagomin's commentaries remain virtually identical as they both proceed to present an alternative understanding of the verse. This shows that diverging interpretations of the *Pramāṇavārttika* must have appeared early on<sup>41</sup> – and that this verse in particular must have already been deemed problematic at that early stage. This second explanation is conspicuously absent from Manorathanandin's commentary; it is nonetheless found in Vibhūticandra's notes at the end of the manuscript of Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti*.<sup>42</sup> It is rarely mentioned in secondary sources, and inadequately summed up in the few studies of my knowledge that refer to it. As in the first interpretation, its goal is obviously to rescue Dharmakīrti from any accusation of haughty selfishness. But its tactic is strikingly different, as it no longer strives to detect an oblique meaning in the stanza. It purports that the verse is perfectly straightforward and that in it, Dharmakīrti explicitly presents his altruistic concerns and compassion as the sole motives for his composition of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. How is such a commentarial prowess achieved?

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*vatīti svārthānumāne'py asyāḥ prayoga iti na tad bahirbhūtaṃ prayogam adhikṛtya, kiṃ tarhy antarjalpātmakam eva, svārthānumānasya jñānātmakatvāt. yac ca prāyaḥ prākṛtasaktir\* ityādikam uktam tad api vakroktya pareṣāṃ īrṣyādimalopahatacetasāṃ bhājanīkaraṇārtham ity alaṃ bahunā. [\*prākṛtasaktir corr.; prākṛtaśaktiḥ Ed. (despite nn. 4–5).]*

<sup>41</sup> As already noted in Steinkellner 1980, p. 286, n. 16. Katsura 1994, p. 37, n. 30, claims, on the basis of the opposition *eke/anye*, that the second interpretation is evidently the one favoured by Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, so that Steinkellner 1980, p. 287 (=286?), n. 16, should be reexamined, presumably because it does not mention any preference on the commentators' part (I thank Hiroko Matsuoka for helping me with the Japanese in this note). I doubt whether the opposition *eke/anye* can be seen as unassailable evidence for the commentators' leaning here, and Thieme 1956, p. 15, adduced by Katsura in support of his thesis, only mentions the common (yet by no means universal) *kecit/apare* opposition in the *Kāśikā* and related texts; Katsura's hypothesis is nonetheless quite likely. In any case, what is most striking in this regard is that by Śākyabuddhi's time, competing interpretations were already circulating.

<sup>42</sup> See p. 515 in PVV Ed. The text had already been identified in Steinkellner 1980, p.

The passage (the Sanskrit text of which is given in Appendix, §C) starts as follows:

Others, however, [understand this] in a different way. [According to them, the stanza] beginning with *prāyaḥ* is [in fact] a response to this question: why does the master Dharmakīrti produce a commentary of the *vārttika* type on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, rather than an *independent* treatise? [And] here is the overall meaning of the verse: my mind yearns [to compose] a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, out of concern (*cintā*) and compassion (*karuṇā*). [These] concern and compassion stem from the fact that the treatise composed by the master Dignāga is [only] of little help; and that it is [only] of little help is due to the flaw[s] in those who study [it].

The new interpretation emphasizes from the start that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is not an independent treatise but a commentary – and it claims that what it comments on is Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Although it is often assumed nowadays that this was a matter of consensus among traditional sources, there was in fact a debate between commentators as to what the *Pramāṇavārttika* commented upon.<sup>43</sup> Much was at stake in this controversy, including the issue of the order in which the chapters of the work were to be read;<sup>44</sup> but in this particular instance, claiming that it was a commentary on Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* had the additional advantage of enabling a reading of the verse according to which Dharmakīrti, rather than bemoaning his own intellectual loneliness for want of any worthy reader, selflessly worries about other people’s fate—that is, more specifically, Dignāga’s posterity, and the welfare of Dignāga’s readers. He has such a concern because, precisely due to the flaws that plague those who study, Dignāga’s work has turned out to be of little help (*alpopakāra*). It is not the case that, as claimed by Hayes and Gillon, in this interpretation Dharmakīrti “is compassionately writing his *Pramāṇavārttika* as an exposition that can provide some trifling aid (*alpopakāritva*) in explaining Dignāga’s theories”:<sup>45</sup> however bold this

286, n. 16; cf. Katsura 1994, p. 37, n. 30.

<sup>43</sup> See Ono 1997, Franco 2018, Chu in the present volume and Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming.

<sup>44</sup> See Franco 2018.

<sup>45</sup> Hayes and Gillon 1994, p. 15.

attribution to Dharmakīrti of selfless motives, at no time does it ascribe to him the humble statement that his own work only provides “a trifling aid,” what is said to be of little help here being Dignāga’s work, not Dharmakīrti’s. It is to make up for the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*’s limited soteriological impact that Dharmakīrti sets out to write the *Pramāṇavārttika*; and we are thus warned from the outset that he is exclusively driven by this “concern”—this is how the word *cintā* is now understood—and even “compassion” (the latter point is not easy to grasp, since the word *karuṇā* is absent from the stanza, but the commentators will shortly present a solution for this problem). The text goes on:

As for the meaning of each word, it is explained [as follows]. [The word] *prāyaḥ* [means] “in general”; it is to be construed with “people, being attached to [things that are] *prākṛta*.” In ordinary [parlance, people] call *prākṛta* someone vile whose origin is impure; in the same way, [the stanza says that people in general] are attached to—[i.e.,] attracted to—the treatises of outsiders as well as the criticisms, formulated by opponents, of the treatises [containing] the teachings of the master [Dignāga—and these treatises and criticisms] are “impure” (*prākṛta*) since they have an impure (*duṣṭa*) origin, given that they have as their source a perverted knowledge. But why are [people] attached to these impure [treatises and criticisms]? As an [answer to this question the stanza] says “[and] lacking the intelligence required”: [it is] for this reason [that people,] taking what is in fact a bad discourse for an excellent one, become attached to these impure [discourses]. And precisely because they lack the intelligence required, they are incapable of understanding correctly by themselves the excellent discourses of the master [Dignāga, so that,] taking them to be faulty, they “have no interest” in the excellent discourses of the master. Moreover, they harbour hatred towards the master; this is what [the passage] beginning with “[not] only” says. [This passage is to be understood thus:] not only do [people] have no interest in the “excellent discourses” of the master but, being “covered with the stains of envy,” they “even hate” the master Dignāga.

Dharmakīrti is not complaining that he is misunderstood and even hated; he is not deploring his being ignored and persecuted. He only worries because Dignāga’s legacy is met with indifference and hostility.

Those who came up with this interpretation also seem to have realized that the depiction of most people as being attached to *prākṛta*, “unrefined” or

“vulgar” things, could be read as the contemptuous assertion that people lack the intellectual subtlety required to understand Dharmakīrti’s work. Hence their insistence here that *prākṛta* actually indicates an impurity rather than a lack of finesse: they argue this is not about intellectual refinement, the issue being that most people have their minds *polluted* by religious doctrines that oppose Buddhism. Hayes and Gillon take the passage as meaning that people are “so addicted to such vulgar pursuits as political science (*nītiśāstra*) that they could not avail themselves of truly learned treatises.”<sup>46</sup> It seems impossible, however, to read the compound *ācāryanītiśāstradūṣaṇāni* in this way—first, because the word *dūṣaṇa* (“refutation,” “critique”) would remain unexplained, and also because, as will be seen below, the expression *ācāryanīti* recurs as the text unequivocally refers to Dignāga’s teachings. The “impure” things to which most people are attached therefore have little to do with political science; and as made clear by Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, they are to be identified not just with treatises expounding non-Buddhist tenets in general, but more specifically, with the non-Buddhists’ works that target Dignāga’s thought. The commentators may have had in mind for instance Uddyotakara’s *Nyāyavārttika* or Kumābila’s *Ślokavārttika*—and it is against such attacks that, according to them, Dharmakīrti sets out to defend Dignāga.

The explanation goes on:

[The compound] “who had an intense passion for the study of excellent discourses” (*sūktābhyāsavivardhitavyasana*) qualifies (*kiṃbhūta*) [Dignāga. It] is definitely to be construed [thus as qualifying Dignāga as the object of the verb “hate”], although [the latter] is distant [from it in the stanza], in accordance with the rule “[there may be] a connection of *x* with *y* even when *y* is far.”<sup>47</sup> [So it is] the master Dignāga [who] is described as having a “passion” for the study of “excellent”—[i.e.] beautiful—discourses, [namely], the venerable [Buddha]’s teachings; [here] “nourished” [simply means] “intense,” [and this intense passion] is exclusively devoted to that [scriptural study]. With this, [Dharmakīrti] expresses the fact that the master Dignāga has acquired [both] merit and knowledge; for those who have an intense passion

<sup>46</sup> Hayes and Gillon 1994, p. 14.

<sup>47</sup> I do not know the source of this half-verse; it is often quoted, with some variants, in Buddhist and non-Buddhist literature (see e.g. NBh, p. 46; YD, p. 23; HBT, p. 131; NBhūṣ, p. 461; *Bhāmatī*, p. 718; etc.).

for the study of excellent discourses necessarily acquire [both] merit and knowledge. Precisely because [people], “lacking the intelligence required,” have no interest in the excellent discourses of the master and are attached to the impure [treatises of outsiders,] “this” (*ayam*), [that is to say,] the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, is [said] not [to be] *paropakāra*. [In this compound, the word] *upakāra* [means] the act of helping, [the affix] *ghañ* indicating an action;<sup>48</sup> [and] considering that there is not a great amount of help from the [*Pramāṇasamuccaya*]—[here the word] *para* [means] “in great quantity” (*utkr̥ṣṭa*)—, it is not “of great help”—but it is definitely of some help, [even though it only helps] a little, and this [little help] is clearly suggested by the word *prāyaḥ* [meaning “in general” while allowing for exceptions]. The word *iti* has a causal sense [here, i.e., *iti naś cintāpi* means] “for this reason, I have a ‘concern’ (*cintā*).” [This concern] takes the following form: “Even though this treatise [by Dignāga] is of great import, it has turned out not to help many—so how could I considerably improve its usefulness?” Besides, due to the word “also” (*api*), [one must understand that he] also [feels] compassion, which takes the form of a desire to rid [people] of pain [and may be expressed] thus: “Any hatred for the master [Dignāga], who is as good as a *bodhisattva*, [must be] a cause of evil, however minute [it may be]; therefore I will bring about great respect for the master by correctly explaining the master’s teaching (*ācāryanīti*), and as a result, I will lead people away from this cause of evil.” The second word *iti* [that appears in] “so (*iti*) it yearns [to compose] this” expresses the fact that these concern and compassion are the causes [prompting him to write]. Therefore [one should understand] that [Dharmakīrti’s] “mind” “yearns” for “this,” [i.e. it yearns] to compose the *Pramāṇavārttika*, which is a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*; “long” [means that his mind] has continuously desired [to compose this] for a long time.

Dharmakīrti’s assertion that his passion for sound discourses has been fostered by their long study could be taken as a conceited reference to his own erudition. The commentary therefore insists on having the compound sing Dignāga’s praise rather than his own. Besides, this second interpretation leaves no room for the possibility that this passion might be about philosophical discussions, and heightened by the in-depth study of *pramāṇa* literature: it is exclusively the Buddha’s words that Dignāga has busied himself studying,

<sup>48</sup> Although the Sanskrit word here is *bhāva* (Tib. *ngo bo*), I take it in its grammatical sense, i.e. as referring to the action denoted by a verb (see e.g. Kahrs 2013).

and his scriptural passion has granted him both merit and knowledge. Due to people's flaws, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is nonetheless misunderstood and ignored. Dignāga's *magnum opus* is now taken to be the subject of the sentence *ayaṃ na paropakāraḥ*; and the compound *paropakāra* is no longer understood as "a help for others," but as "a great help." However unlikely, this new analysis has the advantage of not ruling out the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*'s helpfulness to some people: Dharmakīrti, instead of claiming that his *own* treatise will help *nobody*, is worrying that Dignāga's work *only helps a few* (among whom Dharmakīrti himself is likely to be counted, this being probably taken as Dharmakīrti's grateful way of acknowledging his debt towards Dignāga). And this is what Dharmakīrti sets out to change as he hopes to make the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* accessible—and therefore useful—to many.

One particularly problematic aspect of this interpretation, from a purely syntactic point of view, is the presence of the particle *api* in the stanza. It is now incomprehensible, since it can no longer be construed with the negation ("I do not *even* entertain the hope that...") or read as indicating a concessive clause ("*although* I think that it will not be helpful..."). So here, Śākyabuddhi and Kaṇvakagomin use one of the oldest tricks in the bag of South Asian commentators when they need to force into a text something that is blatantly absent from it: they assert that the particle *api* is simply here to suggest, *besides* Dharmakīrti's explicit "concern" (*cintā*), another motive that remains otherwise entirely implicit in the stanza—namely, compassion (*karuṇā*). Killing two birds with this rather heavy stone, they explain away the presence of the particle while having Dharmakīrti assert that compassion is his true motive for composing the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

According to this second interpretation, the stanza thus means something like this:

In general, people, being attached to impure [non-Buddhist treatises and criticisms of Dignāga], and lacking the intelligence required [in order to understand Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*], not only have no interest at all in [his] excellent discourses but even hate [him, although he] had an intense passion for the study of [the Buddha's] excellent discourses, because [they are] covered with the stains of envy. Therefore I am concerned that this [*Pramāṇasamuccaya*] is not of great help, and [I] also [feel compassion towards people in general]; so [my] mind has been yearning to compose this [commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*] for a long time.

### Dharmakīrti's "haughtiness" according to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta

The two interpretations examined above spectacularly differ from the reading of Dharmakīrti's stanza that is common nowadays; and the second one seems far-fetched to say the least. It is unlikely, however, that the tendency to read Dharmakīrti's verse as bitter and haughty only appeared in the relatively recent times of Bu ston and Tāranātha: far more plausible is the supposition that this understanding circulated early on, and that the interpretations reported in Śākyabuddhi's and Karṇakagomin's commentaries were produced as a reaction to such a reading.

I could find no contemporary source explicitly discussing this, but it is certainly no coincidence that Utpaladeva, a tenth-century Śaiva nondualist who was profoundly influenced by Dharmakīrti and often discussed his *Pramāṇavārttika*,<sup>49</sup> introduces his *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* treatise while insisting that for his part, he is writing exclusively out of a desire to help others (*paropakāra*) and for the sake of "people" (*jana*),<sup>50</sup> the commentaries on this introductory verse also explain how in fact compassion—supposedly the cardinal virtue of Buddhism—can only make sense in a Śaiva nondualistic system.<sup>51</sup> The beginning of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* treatise sounds like a direct response to Dharmakīrti, one emphasizing that, whereas the great Buddhist master had no intention to help others and no interest in compassion, Utpaladeva's goal in writing his work is purely altruistic and compassionate.

Besides, in the ninth century, Ānandavardhana ascribes to Dharmakīrti a verse depicting a woman so perfectly beautiful that she is doomed to

<sup>49</sup> On the considerable impact of the Dharmakīrtian tradition on Utpaladeva's thought, see in particular Torella 1992. Although Utpaladeva is said to seldom quote his opponents and to prefer allusive paraphrases, newly discovered fragments of his *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* contain quotations of Dharmakīrti, including at least one from the PV (see Ratié 2021, pp. 32–33 and 170–174).

<sup>50</sup> See the commentaries on the words *janasyāpy upakāram icchan* ("and wishing to help people") in ĪPK 1.1.1; Abhinavagupta, evidently drawing on Utpaladeva's lost *Vivṛti* thereon, discusses *paropakāra* in the ĪPVV *ad loc.* (see e.g. ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 33, translated in Ratié 2009, p. 357).

<sup>51</sup> See Ratié 2009.

solitude,<sup>52</sup> and the poetician argues that Dharmakīrti thus intended to suggest his own intellectual loneliness as a misunderstood genius. As evidence for this attribution, Ānandavardhana only quotes the last verse of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, making no mention of the introductory one. Yet some of his remarks with respect to the stanza depicting the beautiful woman seem to echo the introductory stanza:

... Once its [literal sense] is subordinated, this sentence reveals the lament of someone who, [being] puffed up with pride in his unique qualities and having triggered the fever of envious people (*samatsarajana*) due to the greatness of his genius, sees that no one else knows his own excellence.<sup>53</sup>

Ānandavardhana explains the reference to the “mental fever” (*cintājvara*) induced by the woman’s beauty in the hearts of “people” (*jana*) as an allusion to the feverish jealousy brought about in people by Dharmakīrti’s brilliance. It is striking, however, that the closing verse of the *Pramāṇavārttika*<sup>54</sup> says nothing at all about people being jealous. Given this silence, it seems very likely that Ānandavardhana also knew the introductory verse, and that the words *samatsarajana* at least alluded to it. It is also clear that Ānandavardhana did not take this jealousy to be about Dignāga; and while evidently finding that Dharmakīrti’s pride (*avalepa*) is justified by his genius, he did not mince his words about his being “puffed up” (*ādhmāta*) with it.

Abhinavagupta’s position on this seems to be somewhat different from Ānandavardhana’s:

<sup>52</sup> *lāvanyadraviṇavyayo na gaṇitaḥ kleśo mahān arjitaḥ svacchandam carato janasya hṛdaye cintājvaro nirmitaḥ | eṣāpi svayam eva tulyaramaṇābhāvād varākī hatā ko’rthaś cetasi vedhasā vinihitas tanvyās tanuṃ tanvatā ||* “[He] spared no expense of beauty. [He] went to great pains. [He] induced a mental fever in the hearts of people who [used to] act of their own will. As for her—poor her—, she is miserable, entirely on her own, as no lover could [ever] be her equal. What goal did the Creator have in mind when he fashioned the body of this delicate beauty?” This translation is much indebted to the (far more elegant) one in Shulman 2016, p. 421.

<sup>53</sup> DhvĀ ad 3.40, p. 489: ... *anena vākyena guṇībhūtātmanā niḥsāmānyaguṇāvalepād dhmātasya nijamahimotkarṣajanitasamatsarajanajvarasya viśeṣajñam ātmano na kañcid evāparam paśyataḥ paridevitam etad iti prakāśyate*. This translation largely follows Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan 1990, p. 625.

<sup>54</sup> Quoted above, n. 12.



As for the latter [stanza, i.e. the one closing the *Pramāṇavārttika*],<sup>55</sup> one must consider that it rests on the heroic *rasa*. [This is the case] because [the stanza] rouses heroic resolve (*utsāha*) [to understand Dharmakīrti's thought],<sup>56</sup> since [this thought] is a source of tremendous respect for the people who study it and since it can [only] be grasped with [such great] effort. [It] also [rests on the heroic *rasa*] because [the stanza specifically] has to do with dharmic heroism, since [the stanza's speaker] highlights, [while talking] about himself (*svātmani*),<sup>57</sup> that [the thought in question] has a benevolent (*kuśala*) author; [he does this by conveying that he] has produced [a thought] that, being thus particularly worthy of being used, [must] help the few people who are fit for it. Otherwise, what would be achieved [in this stanza] with a mere lament? If [one argues that] this is just [Dharmakīrti] lamenting his having undertaken [to write a treatise] without thinking it through first (*aprekṣāpūrvakāritva*)—then what would be the point, since [such a lament] could be neither for his sake nor for someone else's? So enough with this digression.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Cf. *Bālapriyā*, p. 490: *anadhyavasitetyādiślokaśya vīrarase'pi viśrāntim āha parasya cetyādi*.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Bālapriyā*, p. 491, which understands it as “the heroic resolve to understand [Dharmakīrti's] thought” (*matagrahaṇiṣayakotsāhety arthaḥ*), and takes Dharmakīrti's *mata* (i.e., the subject of the sentence in the stanza under scrutiny) as the implicit subject of the *iti* clause (*matam iti śeṣaḥ*) and as the complement of the first compounds (*matasyeti śeṣaḥ*).

<sup>57</sup> I take *svātmani* to refer here to the person speaking in the first person in the stanza, i.e., Dharmakīrti. The *Bālapriyā* does not comment on this *svātmani*, but glosses (p. 490) the one that appears in the previous sentence (regarding the verse on the beautiful woman), the construction of which is somewhat parallel: *svātmanīti vaktā dharmakīrtir atra svātmaśabdārthaḥ*. “In ‘*svātmani*,’ the word ‘oneself’ refers to the speaker [in the stanza, namely,] in this [case], Dharmakīrti.” Bansat-Boudon 2016, which provides a partial translation of this passage pp. 71–72, offers a very different interpretation of *svātmani* in both cases, construing it with *viśrānti*. While any aesthetic experience is ultimately some kind of *svātmani viśrāntiḥ* according to Abhinavagupta, I do not think that this is what is being discussed here, the point being rather that the author of both stanzas is talking about himself (again, in the sequel of the passage quoted here, *ātmani* can only refer to the author of the stanza).

<sup>58</sup> DhĀL ad 3.40, pp. 490–491: *parasya ca śrotrījanasyātyādarāspadatayā prayatnagrāhyatayā cotsāhajananena, evaṃbhūtam atyantopādeyaṃ sat katipayasamucitajanā-nugrāhakaṃ kṛtam iti ca\* svātmani kuśalakāritāpradarśanayā dharmavīrasparśanena vīrarase viśrāntir iti mantavyam. anyathā paridevitamātreṇa kiṃ kṛtam syāt. aprekṣā-*

The passage is difficult and the translation provided here is merely tentative,<sup>59</sup> but as far as I understand it, it explains that the verse pertains to the heroic *rasa* for two reasons. First, it induces in its readers “heroic resolve” (*utsāha*), that is, the mundane feeling corresponding, on the plane of aesthetic experience, to the heroic *rasa*. It does so by pointing out the excellence and extreme difficulty of Dharmakīrti’s thought, thus challenging skilled readers to undertake the noble and arduous task of studying it. So, while Dharmakīrti ostentatiously complains about being misunderstood, he is in fact inspiring worthy students to become a suitable vessel for his teachings. And according to Abhinavagupta, a second reason for classifying the stanza under the *vīrarasa* category is that it shows the author to be benevolent (*kuśala*), so that it can be said to pertain to dharmic heroism (*dharmavīra*). This, of course, is a rather fitting label for a verse whose author is named after the glory of *dharmā*; but this assertion as to Dharmakīrti’s benevolence is quite surprising, given that the stanza itself makes no mention whatsoever of such good intentions.<sup>60</sup> It rather sounds like an expression of bitter disappointment with others, and it also seems to assert that nobody will ever understand Dharmakīrti’s thought—at least in his lifetime, since it depicts Dharmakīrti’s philosophical findings as doomed to age within the confines of their author’s body. Abhinavagupta’s point seems to be, however, that such a benevolence is not explicitly stated but *suggested*: the stanza is seemingly about Dharmakīrti complaining that he is misunderstood, but by

*pūrvakāritvam\* ātmany āveditaṃ cet, kiṃ tataḥ svārthaparārthāsambhavād ity alaṃ bahunā. [\*iti ca J1, J2; iti Ed. \*aprekṣāpūrvakāritvam J1, J2; aprekṣāpūrvakāritvam Ed.]*

<sup>59</sup> It differs in several respects from that offered in Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan 1990, p. 631 (p. 632, n. 11, its authors acknowledge the difficulty of the passage and highlight its “awkward” syntax—a problem that may be solved, at least in part, by adopting the *ca* found in manuscripts). The passage is also quoted in Bansat-Boudon 2016, pp. 71–72, but there it is cut after *parasya ca* until *svātmani kuśalakāritā°*, so that the translation only provides a very partial overview of what goes on in the text.

<sup>60</sup> One might therefore be tempted to read *kuśala* as simply meaning here, as it often does, “skilled” or “competent;” but this would fail to explain how the fact that Dharmakīrti is a *kuśala* author constitutes the very reason why the stanza specifically pertains to the *dharmavīra* category. Nor would it take into account the main point of the *iti* clause, namely, the fact that Dharmakīrti’s thought must be *anugrahaka*.

highlighting the excellence of his thought, he leads people to understand that, although this thought has not helped anybody else so far, it must be helpful (presumably after Dharmakīrti's death) to others, be it a few outstanding minds. So despite appearances, the stanza is not an expression of self-pity: it is about inciting others to study his work, and it is even about suggesting that his goal is really to help others (or at least, some remarkably gifted others).

What is striking about this analysis is that Abhinavagupta's comment focuses on the issue of *paropakāra*. The latter is at the heart of the introductory stanza of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, while the closing stanza makes no explicit mention of it. Abhinavagupta is also careful to specify that the others that Dharmakīrti's thought has not helped yet are not just anybody, but rather constitute a select audience of skilled people who are "fit" for it. It is as though Abhinavagupta were thus using the tactics found in Śākyabuddhi and Kaṇvakagomin's first interpretation of the introductory stanza to explain the closing one: he seems to be arguing that one must read beyond the last stanza's obvious meaning, since it is in fact an indirect way of inciting others to read his treatise, a way that ultimately betrays his benevolence.

This should not lead us to suspect, however, that contrary to Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta saw Dharmakīrti as a selfless *bodhisattva* who felt neither pride nor haughtiness. In fact, Abhinavagupta specifies in his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* that the heroic *rasa* must involve some measure of bitterness:

Thus all *rasas* consist in bliss. Nonetheless some, on account of the objects that colour them, have a touch of bitterness (*kaṭukiman*), as [is the case] of the heroic [*rasa*]; for [the latter] has as its very essence such [things] as the endurance of torments.<sup>61</sup>

Besides, shortly before this point in the *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana had examined the objection that the "rasa of the appeased" (*śāntarasa*) might just be the heroic *rasa* when the religious element in it (i.e., *dharmavīra*) is predominant. He had rejected this identification on the grounds that "it is not acceptable to include it in the heroic [*rasa*], since the latter rests on one's

<sup>61</sup> *Abhinavabhārati* (as edited in Gnoli 1985, p. 17): *ity ānandarūpatā sarvarasānām, kiṃ tūparañjakaviṣayaśāt keśām api kaṭukimnāsti sparśo vīrasyeva, sa hi kleśasahiṣṇutādi-prāṇa eva*. This translation closely follows Gnoli 1985, p. 73.

being full of an erroneous sense of self (*abhimāna*),”<sup>62</sup> adding that “particular states of mind such as the heroic [*rasa*] of compassion (*dayā*) are [in fact] a variety of the *rasa* of the appeased, because they are free in all respects of egoity (*ahaṅkāra*)—whereas when [they are] not [entirely free of egoity], they are a variety of the heroic [*rasa*].”<sup>63</sup> Abhinavagupta had pointed out in this respect that the heroic *rasa* always involves egoity, contrary to the *śāntarasa*, because “heroic resolve (*utsāha*) has as its essence such [thoughts] as ‘I, who am such [and such]...’”<sup>64</sup> He had also quoted Bharata saying that there are only three varieties of heroic *rasa*, pertaining respectively to generosity (*dāna*), religion (*dharma*), and war (*yuddha*), so as to make clear that the heroism of compassion (considered a form of *śāntarasa*) is not to be confused with dharmic heroism.<sup>65</sup> In other words, when, a few pages later, Abhinavagupta depicts the closing stanza of the *Pramāṇavārttika* as pertaining to dharmic heroism, this is also his way of emphasizing that, however admirable, Dharmakīrti is certainly not to be seen as embodying compassionate detachment—and that his verses definitely exude the strong sense of self at the basis of the heroic *rasa*.

### Beginning a treatise after Dharmakīrti: a trend of self-centered humility?

Of course, the interpretations provided by Śākyabuddhi and Kaṇvakagomin for the *Pramāṇavārttika*’s initial verse should also be understood in the context of a war that was being waged in the introductions of treatises at the time, where many authors claimed to write so as to salvage people from the

<sup>62</sup> DhvĀ ad 3.26, p. 393: *na ca vīre tasyāntarbhāvaḥ kartuṃ yuktaḥ, tasyābhimāna-mayatvena vyavasthāpanāt*. Cf. Masson and Patwardhan 1969, p. 96; Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan 1990, p. 524.

<sup>63</sup> DhvĀ ad 3.26, p. 394: *dayāvīrādīnāṃ ca cittavṛttiviśeṣāṇāṃ sarvākāram ahaṅkārarahita-toena śāntarasaprabhedatvam, itarathā tu vīraprabhedatvam...*

<sup>64</sup> DhvĀL, p. 393: *utsāho hy aham evaṃvidha ity evaṃprāṇa ity arthaḥ*. According to Masson and Patwardhan 1969, p. 133 and 137, n. 2, in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, Abhinavagupta takes a strikingly different position on this issue; see, however, Gerow 1994, pp. 202-203 and p. 205, n. 191, for a more convincing reading that does not involve such a contradiction.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.; see Masson and Patwardhan 1969, pp. 101–102; Ingalls, Masson and Patwardhan 1990, p. 524.

mistaken views propagated in rival religious traditions. The history of this war—which, to my knowledge, remains largely unwritten —<sup>66</sup> is far beyond the scope of this essay, but it might not be out of place to note in conclusion that after Dharmakīrti, while some Buddhist philosophers insisted in their introductions that they had composed their works out of compassion for those not clever enough to understand Dharmakīrti’s thought by themselves,<sup>67</sup> some authors chose to overtly declare writing for *selfish* reasons (just as Dharmakīrti)—but, it seems, as an indirect statement of humility; as a *vakrokti*, as it were, reversing a self-centered motive into the assertion of one’s imperfection and need for knowledge. Thus in the eighth century, Arcaṭa for instance points out in the introduction to his commentary on the *Hetubindu* that being dull-witted (*jaḍadhī*), he has nothing in common with the great luminary that is Dharmakīrti; he then adds, as an excuse so to speak for writing a commentary on one of his works: “still, there are some who are even more weak-minded than me; it is for their sake, and also for mine, that [I] am going to explain this *Hetubindu*.”<sup>68</sup> Kamalaśīla seems eager to present an even more modest introduction to his commentary on Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattvasaṅgraha*:

<sup>66</sup> Nonetheless see e.g. Balcerowicz 2008, which highlights several interesting connections between the introductions of Buddhist and Jaina works, and Eltschinger 2015, which edits and translates all the *maṅgala* verses in Śāṅkaranandana’s works (pp. 330ff) and highlights at times their “martial overtones” (p. 335). See also Franco and Preisendanz forthcoming on Prajñākaragupta’s assertion, in the opening verse of the PVA, that he is writing “out of compassion for the people who have been deluded by bad logicians” (*kutarkasaṃbhrāntajanānukampayā*): Yamāri explains that *kutarka*, which he understands as a *bahuvrīhi*, refers to Uddyotakara, Kumārila and so on—which shows, as pointed out by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, his awareness that the verse echoes Uddyotakara’s claim, in the initial verse of the NV, to write so as to “eliminate the ignorance [produced by] bad logicians” (*kutārkikājñānanivṛtti*), whom Naiyāyika commentators of course designate as Buddhists.

<sup>67</sup> Even in cases where the text is not a commentary on a work by Dharmakīrti: Mokṣākaragupta for instance claims in the introductory verse of the TBh that he is writing it “so that pupils of little intelligence can study Dharmakīrti’s thought” (... *śiśūnām alpamedhasām | dharmakīrtimataṃ śrutyai*...).

<sup>68</sup> HBT, v. 4: *tathāpi mandamatayaḥ santi matto’pi ke cana | teṣāṃ kṛte mayāpy eṣa hetu-bindur vibhajyate ||*

[People] like me, of dull intellect (*jaḍadhī*), are incapable of ever saying something new; and what path is there anywhere that has not been repeatedly trodden, day after day, by clever [ones]? Nonetheless, as I long to acquire merit, being devoted to the pursuit of my own benefit (*svārtha*), my mind endeavours to study the truths [gathered in Śāntarākṣita's work] so as to induce the production of merit.<sup>69</sup>

This assertion that Kamalaśīla is only writing for his own sake is probably to be taken with a grain of salt, since as mentioned above, a few pages later, he himself explains that Dharmakīrti's claim to be writing solely for selfish reasons is just an indirect way of inciting others to study his work.<sup>70</sup>

It is also worth mentioning in this respect that according to Piotr Balcerowicz, the Jain Akalaṅka is responding to "his arch-enemy" Dharmakīrti, and specifically, to the introductory stanza of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, when he depicts his goal, at the beginning of his *Laghīyastraya*, as "the apprehension of his own self" (*svātmopalabdhi*).<sup>71</sup> The Jain commentator Prabhācandra endeavours to mitigate the assertion, which might appear to be far too self-centered, by explaining that here, *sva*- really means "all people" (*sakalajana*)!<sup>72</sup> According to Balcerowicz, "Akalaṅka's departure from Jaina practice of selfless teaching in favour of pursuance of his own goal was influenced by the personal and bitter aspect of Dharmakīrti's statements that opened way to verbalise personal feelings."<sup>73</sup> One wonders, however, whether Akalaṅka—if he is indeed alluding to Dharmakīrti's attitude here, which seems far from certain<sup>74</sup>—is not trying to transform (as Buddhist authors do) what could

<sup>69</sup> TSP, v. 2 : *vaktuṃ vastu na mādrśā jaḍadhiyo'pūrovaṃ kadācit kṣamāḥ kṣuṇṇo vā bahudhā budhair ahar ahaḥ ko'sau na panthā kvacit | kintu svārthaparasya me matir iyaṃ punyodayākāṅkṣiṇas tattvābhyāsam imam śubhodayaphalaṃ kartuṃ samabhyudyatā ||* Cf. McClintock 2010, p. 92, n. 249.

<sup>70</sup> See above, n. 40 . I thank Hiroko Matsuoka for pointing out to me that Yamāri for instance similarly composed an introductory stanza explaining that his commentary on the PVA, however useless to intelligent people, is to help "me and [people] like me" (*bdag gam bdag dang 'dra ba*).

<sup>71</sup> LT, v. 1, p. 2.

<sup>72</sup> See NKC, p. 4 and Balcerowicz 2008, p. 68, n. 78.

<sup>73</sup> Balcerowicz 2008, p. 70.

<sup>74</sup> Balcerowicz 2008 repeatedly asserts that *svātmopalabdhaye* is the goal for Aka-

be perceived as a selfish concern into a manifestation of greater humility (the author is in need of bettering himself before he can even think of helping others).

Finally, Abhinavagupta takes an interesting position in this regard. As seen above, his Śaiva predecessor Utpaladeva had claimed to write his *magnum opus* exclusively so as to help others, i.e. all people, in an introductory verse that was most certainly meant as an ironical response to the *Pramāṇavārttika*'s initial stanza. At the beginning of one of his two commentaries on Utpaladeva's treatise, however, Abhinavagupta manages to conflate both attitudes—Utpaladeva's ostentatious altruism, as well as the self-centered humility of the Dharmakīrtian heirs—in one single verse:

May this [commentary of mine] be helpful to all those of little intelligence; or to just one [person] endowed with considerable acumen—or, [if it can]not [help] anybody else, may it be helpful to me!<sup>75</sup>

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laṅka's *composition* of the treatise, but as far as I can see, the verse in question only mentions it as the goal for his paying homage (*namo namaḥ*) to the *tīrthanākaras*, which is a rather different issue.

<sup>75</sup> ĪPV, vol. I, v. 6, p. 4: *sarvatrālpamatau yadvā kutrāpi sumahādhiyi | na vānyatrāpi tu svātmany eṣā syād upakāriṇī ||*

**Appendix: An annotated edition of Kaṇakagomin's commentary on the introductory verse of the *Pramāṇavārttika*<sup>76</sup>**

§A. *santy eva hi santo'sya*<sup>77</sup> *vārttikākhyasya śāstrasya grahitāras tathāpi śrotr-  
doṣabāhulyena sann apy upakāro'sann iveti kṛtvā*<sup>78</sup> *sūktābhyāśabhāvitacittatvam  
eva śāstrārambhe kāraṇaṃ darśayan, ayam*<sup>79</sup> *mahārthabhramṣe hetudoṣas tyaktuṃ  
yukta ity etac ca vakroktiyā kathayitum dvitīyaṃ ślokaṃ āha prāyaḥ prākṛtetyādi.*

§B. *atra caturvidhaḥ śrotrdoṣa udbhāvitah, kuprajñatvam ajñatvam anarthi-  
tvam*<sup>80</sup> *amādhyasthyaṃ ca. prāyaśabdo'kārānto bāhulyavacanah,*<sup>81</sup> *prāyo jano  
bhūyān janah. prākṛtasaktiḥ prākṛtāni bahiḥśāstrāni tatra saktir yasyeti gamaka-  
tvād vyadhikaraṇo bahuvr̥thiḥ. prākṛtā vā saktir yasyeti samānādhikaraṇa eva.  
prākṛtavaiṣayatvāc ca saktiḥ prākṛtā. anena kuprajñatvam śrotrdoṣa uktaḥ. apratibalā  
śāstragrahaṇaṃ praty aśaktā*<sup>82</sup> *prajñā yasya so'pratibalaprajñah prāyo jana*

<sup>76</sup> Ms. 2a1–2b5; Ed. PVSVT pp. 2(l. 25)–4(l. 27). The parallel passage starts in Tib. P 3b, l. 2 and Tib. D 3a, l. 3.

<sup>77</sup> *santy eva hi santo'sya* Ed., cf. Tib. (. . . 'di . . . mkhas pa dag kyang yod pa kho na yin); . . . . . Ms. (illegible from the facsimile). N. 1 in Ed. about a “missing portion . . . found in the margin in a different hand” does not concern these words but a previous passage (from *pratyekabuddha*° to *vidyate eva*); number 1 after *santo*[*'sya* only indicates the end of the line in the Ms.

<sup>78</sup> *sann apy upakāro'sann iveti kṛtvā* conj.; *santam apy upakāram asantam iva kṛtvā* Ms., Ed.; *santam apy upakāram asantam iti kṛtvā* conj. Katsura 1994, n. 18. The Tib. parallel passage, *phan pa yod bzhin du yang med pa skad du byas nas*, indeed suggests *iti kṛtvā*, as noted by Katsura; but if one adopts the *iti* clause thus suggested, in Sanskrit the accusative inside the clause no longer makes sense. I assume that the nominative may have been wrongly corrected into an accusative after the loss of *iti*, and that the corruption into *iva kṛtvā* was facilitated by an original *iveti kṛtvā*; it should be noted, however, that the Tib. parallel passage as preserved in P and D does not support *iva*.

<sup>79</sup> *ayam* conj.; *ayam ca* Ms., Ed.; the Tib. parallel passage has no equivalent for this *ca*.

<sup>80</sup> *anarthitvam* Ms., Ed.; in Tib. (P) *don du gnyer ba nyid* should be corrected into *don du mi gnyer ba nyid* in accordance with Tib. D (see Katsura 1994, n. 21).

<sup>81</sup> *prāyaśabdo'kārānto bāhulyavacanah* Ms., with *avagraha* added here for standardized spelling; *prāyaśabdo okārānto bāhulyavacanah* Ed.; *prāyaśabdo'kārānto [bāhulya-  
vacanah]* corr. in Katsura 1994, n. 22; om. Tib.

<sup>82</sup> *aśaktā* corr. Ed., cf. Tib. (*mi nus pa'i*); *asaktā* Ms.



*iti sambandhaḥ. anenāññatvam uktam. subhāṣitair nānarthy eva kevalam,*<sup>83</sup> kintu subhāṣitābhidhāyinaṃ *vidveṣṭy apīrṣyāmalaiḥ parigataḥ* san. *anarthī ca vidveṣṭi cety arthaḥ. etena yathākramam anarthitvam amādhyasthyaṃ cōktam. atrāpi prāyo jana iti sambandhanīyam. anye tu prāyaḥśabdaḥ sakārānto'py*<sup>84</sup> *asti nipātaḥ, sa ca bāhulyenety asmiṃś trītyārthe svabhāvād vartata iti vyācakṣate.*<sup>85</sup> *īrṣyā* parasampattau cetaso vyāroṣaḥ, saiva malaś cittamalinīkaraṇāt. *vyaktibhedād bahuvacanam. yata evaṃ tena kāraṇenāyam āripsito vārttikākhyo granthaḥ. paro-pakāraḥ* pareṣāṃ upakāraḥ. *upakriyate'neneti karaṇe ghañ, parān vopakarotīti paropakāraḥ karmaṇy aṇ. paropakāra iti no'smākaṃ cintāpi nāsti. katham tarhi śāstraracanāyāṃ pravṛttir ity āha cetaś ciraṃ* ityādi. *ciraṃ dīrghakālaṃ sūktā-bhyāsenā vivardhitam vyasanam* saktis tatparatā, *sūktābhyāsavivardhitam vyasanam yasya cetasaś*<sup>86</sup> *tat tathoktam. iti hetor atra vārttikaracanāyāṃ anu-baddhasprham jātābhilāṣaṃ ceta iti. evam eke vyācakṣate.*

§C. <sup>87</sup> *anye tv anyathā.*<sup>88</sup> *kasmād ayam ācāryadharmakīrtir*<sup>89</sup> *vārttikanyāyena pramāṇasamuccayavyākhyāṃ karoti*<sup>90</sup> *na punaḥ svatantram eva śāstram ity as-min praśnāvasare*<sup>91</sup> *prāha prāya* ityādi. *asya ślokaśyāyaṃ samāsārthaḥ.*<sup>92</sup> *cinta-yā karuṇayā ca me pramāṇasamuccayavyākhyāyāṃ ceto jātābhilāṣam iti. cintā*

<sup>83</sup> *subhāṣitair nānarthy eva kevalam* conj., cf. Tib. (*legs par bshad pa don du mi gnyer ba kho nar ma zad*); *subhāṣitair nānarthy eva* Ms., Ed.

<sup>84</sup> *prāyaḥśabdaḥ sakārānto'py* Ms. (with standardized sandhi here for *prāyaśśabdas sakārānto'py*); *prāyaḥśabdasyā(?sa)kārānto'py* Ed.; *prāyaḥśabdasya sakārānto'py* corr. Katsura 1994, n. 25.

<sup>85</sup> *anye tu... iti vyācakṣate* om. Tib.

<sup>86</sup> *cetasas* Ms., Ed.; no equivalent in Tib. (see Katsura 1994, n. 29).

<sup>87</sup> The Sanskrit fragment of Śākyabuddhi's commentary starts here in PVV App., p. 515.

<sup>88</sup> *anye tv anyathā* Ms., Ed.; a... *thā* PVV App.

<sup>89</sup> *ācāryadharmakīrtir* Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (*slob dpon chos gyi grags pa*); om. PVV App.

<sup>90</sup> *pramāṇasamuccayavyākhyāṃ karoti* Ms., Ed.; *pramāṇasamuccayaṃ vyācakṣte* PVV App. Tib. *tshad ma kun las btus pa 'chad par byed* could translate both.

<sup>91</sup> *ity asmin praśnāvasare* Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (*zhes 'dri ba'i skabs 'dir*); *iti praśne* PVV App.

<sup>92</sup> *asya ślokaśyāyaṃ samāsārthaḥ* Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (*tshigs su bcad pa 'di'i btus pa'i don*); *ayam arthaḥ* PVV App.

karuṇā cācāryadignāgaracitaśāstrasyālpopakāritvena,<sup>93</sup> alpopakāritvaṃ ca<sup>94</sup> śrotr-  
janāparādhena.<sup>95</sup>

padārthas tūcyate. **prāya** iti<sup>96</sup> bāhulyena **prākṛtasaktir jana** iti sambandhaḥ.  
prākṛta<sup>97</sup> ucyate loka nīco<sup>98</sup> yasya duṣṭo'nvayaḥ.<sup>99</sup> evaṃ<sup>100</sup> tīrthikaśāstrāṇi  
parapraṇītāni cācāryanītiśāstradūṣaṇāni<sup>101</sup> viparyastajñānaprabhavatvād duṣṭā-  
nvayāny atah<sup>102</sup> prākṛtāni, teṣu saktir anurāgo yasya sa tathoktaḥ.<sup>103</sup> kasmāt  
punaḥ prākṛtasaktir<sup>104</sup> ity āhāpratibalaprajña<sup>105</sup> iti. ato'sau durbhāṣitam  
api subhāṣitam iti grhītva<sup>106</sup> prākṛte sajjate.<sup>107</sup> apratibalaprajñatvād eva  
cācāryasubhāṣitāni svayaṃ yathāvad avaboddhum akṣamo<sup>108</sup> doṣavattvena<sup>109</sup>

<sup>93</sup> iti. cintā karuṇā cācārya° Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (zhes bya ba... sems pa dang snying rje dag ni slob dpon ...); om. PVV App.

<sup>94</sup> alpopakāritvaṃ ca Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (phan pa chung ba yang); tac ca PVV App.

<sup>95</sup> śrotr° Ms., cf. Tib. (nyan pa po'i), corr. Katsura 1994, n. 34, PVV App.; śrātr° Ed.

<sup>96</sup> iti Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (zhes bya ba); om. PVV App.

<sup>97</sup> prākṛta Ms., Ed., PVV App. Tib. P and D phal cher zhes bya ba ni should be corrected in to phal pa zhes bya ba ni.

<sup>98</sup> jana iti sambandhaḥ. prākṛta ucyate loka nīco Ms., Ed.; jñānānīco(?) PVV App.

<sup>99</sup> yasya duṣṭo'nvayaḥ Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (gang zhig rgyu ngan pa las byung ba yin no); duṣṭānvayaḥ PVV App., corr. Katsura 1994, n. 35.

<sup>100</sup> evaṃ Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (de bzhin du); om. PVV App.

<sup>101</sup> cācāryanītiśāstradūṣaṇāni Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (dang... slob dpon gyi lugs kyi bstan bcos sun 'byin pa rnam kyang); ācāryanītidūṣaṇāni PVV App.

<sup>102</sup> duṣṭānvayāny atah Ms., corr. Katsura 1994, n. 36, cf. Tib. (rgyu ngan pa las byung ba yin no, de'i phyir); duṣṭānvayāny ataś ca PVV App.; duṣṭānvayād yataḥ Ed. One might even suspect an original reading such as duṣṭānvayāni yāny atah here.

<sup>103</sup> sa tathoktaḥ Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (de la de skad ces bya'o); om. PVV App.

<sup>104</sup> kasmāt punaḥ prākṛtasaktir Ed. (silent corr.), cf. Tib. (yang ci'i phyir phal pa la chags); kasmāt punaḥ prāyaḥ prākṛtasaktir Ms.; kutaḥ prākṛtasaktir PVV App.

<sup>105</sup> āhāpratibalaprajña Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (shes rab rtsal med pas na zhes bya ba smos te); āha pratibalaprajña PVV App.

<sup>106</sup> iti grhītva Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (zhes bya bar gzung nas); kṛtvā PVV App.

<sup>107</sup> prākṛte sajjate Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (phal pa la chags par byed do); tyajate PVV App.

<sup>108</sup> avaboddhum akṣamo Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (khong du chud par mi nus pas); boddhum akṣamo PVV App.

<sup>109</sup> doṣavattvena Ms., Ed., PVV App.; om. Tib. (as noted in Katsura 1994, n. 37).

grhītvā tair ācāryasubhāṣitair **anarthī**. ācārye ca vidveṣavān bhavatīty āha kevalam ityādi. na kevalam anarthī **subhāṣitair** ācāryīyair **api tu vidveṣṭy apīrṣyāmalaiḥ parigataḥ** sann ācāryadignāgam.<sup>110</sup> kimbhūtam?<sup>111</sup> **sūktābhyāsavivardhitavyasanam**. vyavahitenāpi<sup>112</sup> sambandho bhavaty eva,<sup>113</sup> yena yasyābhisambandho dūrasthasyāpi tena sa iti nyāyāt.<sup>114</sup> śobhanam uktaṃ **sūktam** bhagavatpravacanam<sup>115</sup> **tatrābhyāsaḥ tatra vivardhitam vyasanam** tatraivātyartham<sup>116</sup> āsaktatvaṃ yasyācāryadignāgasya sa tathoktaḥ.<sup>117</sup> anenācāryadignāgasyopacitapuṇyajñānatvam<sup>118</sup> āha, upacitapuṇyajñānā eva hi sūktābhyāsavivardhitavyasanā bhavanti.<sup>119</sup> **yenāpratibalaprajñā** ācāryasubhāṣitair anarthī<sup>120</sup> prākṛtasaktiś ca **tena** kāraṇenāyam pramāṇasamuccayo<sup>121</sup> na

<sup>110</sup> ācāryadignāgam Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po la); dignāgam PVV App.

<sup>111</sup> PVV App. reads it as kim bhūtam.

<sup>112</sup> vyavahitenāpi Ms., Ed.; vyavahitānām api PVV App.

<sup>113</sup> bhavaty eva Ms., Ed. (Tib. has kho na); 'sti PVV App.

<sup>114</sup> yena yasyābhisambandho dūrasthasyāpi tena sa iti nyāyāt Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (lugs las gang zhig gang dang 'brel pa ni ring na 'dug kyang de dang der zhes 'byung ba'i phyir ro); om. PVV App.

<sup>115</sup> bhagavatpravacanam Ms., Ed.; om. PVV App., Tib.

<sup>116</sup> tatraivātyartham Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (which has no equivalent of ca); tatraiva cātyartham PVV App.

<sup>117</sup> yasyācāryadignāgasya sa tathoktaḥ Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po gang la... de la de skad ces bya'o); om. PVV App.

<sup>118</sup> anenācāryadignāgasyopacitapuṇyajñānatvam Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. ('dis ni slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po bsod nams dang ye shes bsags pa nyid yin par); anenopacitapuṇyajñānatvam PVV App.

<sup>119</sup> upacitapuṇyajñānā eva hi sūktābhyāsavivardhitavyasanā bhavanti Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (bsod nams dang ye shes bsags pa dag kho na legs par bshad pa la goms pas lhur len pa bskyed par 'gyur ro); tasyaiva tathātvāt PVV App.

<sup>120</sup> **yenāpratibalaprajñā** ācāryasubhāṣitair anarthī Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (gang gi phyir shes rab kyi mthu med pas slob dpon gyis legs par bshad pa dag don du mi gnyer zhing); yenānarthī PVV App.

<sup>121</sup> prākṛtasaktiś ca **tena** kāraṇenāyam pramāṇasamuccayo Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (phal pa la chags pa de'i phyir tshad ma kun nas bsodus pa 'di); prākṛtasaktiś tena kāraṇena samuccayo PVV App.

**paropakārah.** upakaraṇam upakāro bhāve ghañ.<sup>122</sup> para utkrṣṭa upakāro nāsmād bhavatīti kṛtvā na paropakāro'lpas tūpakāro'sty eva<sup>123</sup> sa ca prāyaśābdena sūcita eva.<sup>124</sup> **itiśabdo** hetau, asmād dhetor asmākaṃ **cintā**<sup>125</sup> mahārtham apīdaṃ śāstraṃ na bahūnām upakāraṃ jātaṃ<sup>126</sup> tat katham asyātyartham sāphalyaṃ<sup>127</sup> kuryām ity evamākārā. ācārye ca bodhisattvakalpe<sup>128</sup> vidveṣaḥ svalpo'py<sup>129</sup> anarthahetur ato'ham ācāryanīter aviparītaprakāśanenācārye<sup>130</sup> bahumānam utpādya tato<sup>131</sup> 'narthahetor janam<sup>132</sup> nivartayīṣyāmītyevamduḥkhaṃyogecchākārā karuṇāpy apiśabdāt. **ity**<sup>133</sup> **atrānubaddhasprham** iti dvitīyenetiśabdena<sup>134</sup> cintākaruṇayor hetutvam āha. ity ābhyāṃ<sup>135</sup> cintākaruṇābhyāṃ **cetaś ciraṃ**

<sup>122</sup> upakaraṇam upakāro bhāve ghañ Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (phan pa ni phan pa ste ngo bo yin no); om. PVV App.

<sup>123</sup> para utkrṣṭa upakāro nāsmād bhavatīti kṛtvā na paropakāro'lpas tūpakāro'sty eva Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. ('dis phan pa mchog dam par mi 'gyur bas na mchog tu phan pa min pa'o. phan pa cung zad ni yod pa kho na te); param utkrṣṭam. anyopakāro'sty eva PVV App.

<sup>124</sup> sa ca prāyaśābdena sūcita eva corr. Katsura 1994, n. 40, cf. Tib. (de ni phal cher zhes bya bas bstan pa yin no); sa ca prāyaśābdena sūcita eva Ms., Ed.; prāyaśābdaśūcitāḥ PVV App.

<sup>125</sup> **itiśabdo** hetau, asmād dhetor asmākaṃ **cintā** Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (des na zhes bya ba'i sgra ni rgyu yin pa ste, rgyu des na bdag gyis... sems pa'ang yin no); itir hetau, iti hetor nāsmākaṃ **cintā** PVV App. Katsura 1994, n. 41, conjectures **no**'smākaṃ instead of asmākaṃ.

<sup>126</sup> **jātaṃ** Ms., Ed.; om. PVV App.

<sup>127</sup> asyātyartham sāphalyaṃ Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. ('di shin tu 'bras bu dang bcas par); asyārthasāphalyaṃ PVV App.

<sup>128</sup> ca bodhisattvakalpe Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (byang chub sems dpa' dang 'dra ba la); om. PVV App.

<sup>129</sup> svalpo'py Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (cung zad cig); anyo'py PVV App.

<sup>130</sup> 'ham ācāryanīter aviparīta° Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (bdag gyis slob dpon gyi lugs phyin ci ma log par, with logs par in Tib. P corrected into log par, found in Tib. D); mahān ācāryanītena viparītārtha° PVV App.

<sup>131</sup> **tato** Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (de las); om. PVV App.

<sup>132</sup> **janam** has no equivalent in the Tib., as noted in Katsura 1994, n. 43.

<sup>133</sup> **ity** Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. (phyir); om. PVV App.

<sup>134</sup> **dvitīyenetiśabdena** corr., cf. Tib. (phyir zhes bya ba'i sgra gnyis pas ni); dvitīyenetiśabdena Ed., PVV App.

<sup>135</sup> **ābhyāṃ** Ms., Ed., cf. Tib. ('di gnyis); om. PVV App.

*dirghakālam atra*<sup>136</sup> *pramāṇasamuccayavyākhyābhūtapramāṇavārttikaracanāyām*<sup>137</sup> *anubaddhasprham* *santānena pravṛtteccham iti.*

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- YD *Yuktidīpikā*. Ed. A. Wezler and Sh. Motegi, *Yuktidīpikā. The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Stuttgart 1998.



# Dharmakīrti's Attempt to Escape Universals

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## 1. Introduction

Eli Franco is one of the leading Dharmakīrti scholars of his generation. His 1997 study of the second chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*,<sup>1</sup> is a major landmark in the field. Of equal importance is his later (2014) annotated translation of the first sixty-three stanzas of *Pramāṇavārttika* III, *Dharmakīrti on the Duality of the Object*,<sup>2</sup> co-authored with M. Notake. What I have appreciated most about Eli's scholarship is that it focuses, with a high degree of philological rigor and sophistication, on themes in Dharmakīrti's work that are of enduring philosophical interest. In *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth* it was the problem of, not just the possibility of continued existence after death but, more broadly, the nature of consciousness and its relation to the physical, living organism. In *Dharmakīrti on the Duality of the Object* and an earlier essay, "Universals as Objects of Knowledge,"<sup>3</sup> Eli tackles Dharmakīrti's treatment of universals. Having previously devoted an article to exploring some of the fine points of Dharmakīrti's arguments about cognition or consciousness, as I understood them based on Eli's presentation in *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*,<sup>4</sup> I would like, in this tribute to Eli's distinguished, diverse, and prolific career—for he has, of course, advanced our knowledge in many areas of Indian philosophy besides Buddhist epistemology—offer a contribution to our understanding of Dharmakīrti's critique of universals. This time, however, I will not be discussing Eli's work directly but shall be adding new material to what Eli and M. Notake have already provided in their 2014 publication. Namely, I shall present an exposition and analysis of Dharmakīrti's (attempted)

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<sup>1</sup> Franco 1997.

<sup>2</sup> Franco/Notake 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Franco 2012.

<sup>4</sup> Taber 2003.

refutation of universals in a crucial passage of the Apoha Section of the first chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika*, PVSV 45,20–57,7 (covering PV 1.92–109), followed by an—unabashedly and unapologetically—philosophical assessment of Dharmakīrti's position, albeit a very basic one limited to suggesting obvious lines of criticism.

There are three passages in the *Pramāṇavārttika* where universals become the focus of Dharmakīrti's attention. The first, PV(SV) 1.92–185, constitutes the latter two-thirds of what can be called the Apoha Section of the chapter, which begins with PV 1.40, where Dharmakīrti presents at length and defends his version of the Apohavāda. To be sure, prior to PV 1.92 (i.e., from PV 1.40 to 1.91), where he has given an account of how conceptual cognitions (*vikalpa*, *vikalpajñāna*) are concerned with exclusions (*apohas*)—that is to say, how they have exclusions as their *viṣaya*—he makes comments and gives arguments dismissive of universals in passing<sup>5</sup>—and of course, he is essentially offering an explanation of how we can have an awareness of general properties that renders universals superfluous. But with his opponent's suggestion, PVSV 45,29–30 (ad PV 1.92), that, since particulars cannot be expressed by words, it is a universal (*sāmānya*) that is expressed by them,<sup>6</sup> Dharmakīrti is off to the races, so to speak, on a sustained, systematic refutation of universals. From that point until the end of the Apoha Section (PV 1.185) he is, certainly, as much concerned to refute the existence of universals—and not just as the meanings of words, but *überhaupt*—as he is to show that *apohas* are what words express by virtue of (arbitrary) linguistic conventions. In fact, I shall show in what follows that these two concerns are inextricably linked. In the final third of the Section, PV(SV) 1.143–185, his purpose becomes entirely negative. In an extraordinary *tour de force* he shows the incoherence of nearly every way of thinking about universals ever entertained by Realist (specifically, Brahmin and Jain) philosophers.

<sup>5</sup> E.g., PVSV 24,25–25,12; 34,25–35,14; 39,11–14; 39,17–40,3; 41,12–42,8. The latter two passages are the most substantive.

<sup>6</sup> PVSV 45,29–30: *sāmānyam tarhi vyatiriktam avyatiriktam vā vyāpi śabdair abhidhīyate / tan na vyavahārakālābhāvadoṣaḥ* /. “[Objection:] Then it is a pervasive universal, whether distinct or not distinct [from individuals], that is signified by words, hence there is not the problem of [the meaning] not existing at the time of the use [of the word].” Eltschinger et al. forthcoming.

The second passage where Dharmakīrti refutes universals is PV 3.11–50, which is covered in Franco/Notake 2014. Here, he is primarily concerned with defining the universal ontologically, taking as his point of departure Dignāga's statement, PS(V) 1.2, that there are two *pramāṇas* because there are two knowables, the particular characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal characteristic (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*). In PV 3.3 he famously distinguishes the universal characteristic from the *svalakṣaṇa* on grounds that the latter is capable of causal efficacy (*arthakriyāsamartha*) while the former is not, christening the *svalakṣaṇa* as “absolutely existent” (*paramārthasat*) and the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as “conventionally existent” (*saṃvṛtisat*). He also distinguishes the universal characteristic from what we are presented with in illusory cognitions, such as the floating hairs seen by someone with an ocular condition (PV 3.7–10), and from non-existences (*abhāva*).<sup>7</sup> What he is mainly concerned to show, however, is that the universal characteristic is not a *real* universal, i.e., a universal which is a *vastu*. Starting with PV 3.10 Dharmakīrti launches into an extensive refutation of the existence of real universals. A central point is that the universal characteristic cannot be something real—it is, rather, only an exclusion (*apoha*)—because it is what is expressed by words.<sup>8</sup> The discussion of PV 3.11–50 is every bit as rich and profound as PV(SV) 1.92–142, but more difficult to interpret because it is not accompanied by Dharmakīrti's own commentary.

A third place where universals come up in the *Pramāṇavārttika* is PV 3.145–173. There, Dharmakīrti is chiefly concerned with showing that a universal does not present itself distinctly in a perceptual awareness as a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of a particular, as part of his defense of Dignāga's statement that perception is devoid of conceptual construction.<sup>9</sup> The discussion also covers the question of how one could perceive that a qualifier is related to something qualified by it (i.e., a particular), which leads into a short digression on

<sup>7</sup> Its distinction from non-existences is nuanced. At PV 3.27 Dharmakīrti says that, although a universal is “without nature,” a non-existence does not for that reason count as a universal. Earlier, however, at PV 3.7cd, he has said that *abhāvas* are *not* disqualified as universals for the same reason the things that appear in illusory cognitions are, namely because they (the illusory things) are not considered objects (*artha*). This implies that universal *are* “objects.” Cf. Franco 2012.

<sup>8</sup> PV 3.11a: *tad avastv abhidheyatvāt*.

<sup>9</sup> PS 1.3c: *kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣam*.

the Vaiśeṣika notion of inherence (*samavāya*) (PV 3.149–153). It addresses as well the question whether a distinct universal can be *inferred* from the occurrence of cognitions of qualified entities (PV 3.154–160).<sup>10</sup> It culminates in another short presentation of the Apohavāda as an alternative explanation of cognitions of common properties (PV 3.161–173).<sup>11</sup>

All three passages overlap to an extent, yet each contains arguments not found in the other two. A comprehensive exposition of Dharmakīrti's critique of universals would have to take all three passages into account.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, the discussion in PV 1 that I shall be presenting is perhaps the most important of the three for the following reasons. (1) It is Dharmakīrti's initial assault against universals. (2) It is the longest of the three passages. (3) It is the most ambitious, in the sense that it appears intended as a complete and decisive refutation. (4) It develops key ideas that are presupposed or referenced in the other discussions, e.g. the claim that distinct entities are regarded as the same due to their having the same effects. In my presentation I shall often cite a translation of PV(SV) 1.92–142 which is currently being carried out by a team of scholars—Vincent Eltschinger, Michael Torsten Much, Isabelle Ratié, and myself—as the second part of a three-part translation of the so-called Apoha Section of PV 1, namely, PV(SV) 1.40–185.<sup>13</sup> The first part, *Dharmakīrti's Theory of Exclusion (apoha), Part I: On Concealing*, which covered PV(SV) 1.40–91, was published in 2018.<sup>14</sup> My understanding of the passages I will be citing is greatly indebted to discussions I have had with

<sup>10</sup> This part of the passage, however, remains rather obscure to me. I am following Manorathanandin's suggestion as to what inference, specifically, Dharmakīrti has in mind.

<sup>11</sup> These verses have been recently translated by McAllister 2019: 320–323.

<sup>12</sup> There is also a short passage in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter (PV 2.92–102) where the Apohavāda is brought in to explain how certain words (e.g., “conjunction” [*saṃyoga*], words for numbers and words for qualities) can be meaningful without referring to things that actually exist. It does not, specifically, attack universals. See Meindersma 1991.

<sup>13</sup> Eltschinger et al. forthcoming. The translation is a work in progress; minor revisions of the passages I will be excerpting are still possible. This second part of the translation of the Apoha Section has been funded by a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities: Federal Award ID no. RQ-266060-19, Scholarly Editions and Translations.

<sup>14</sup> Eltschinger et al. 2018, also supported by a grant from NEH.

my learned collaborators as we have worked together on this translation. I cannot, however, claim that the broader interpretation of PV(SV) 1.92–142 I shall be offering—even primarily as a critique of universals—is shared by anyone besides myself; for there are many things Dharmakīrti is doing in PV 1 besides refuting universals; it is a masterpiece of almost inexhaustible meaning that can be viewed from different perspectives. In my presentation, I shall stay as close to the text as possible. This will perhaps result in an essay that is less easy to read, but it will allow other scholars to check my statements against the evidence on which they are based, which I believe is necessary at this early stage in the development of Dharmakīrti Studies.

Although Dharmakīrti's discussions of universals are always justified in their contexts as relevant to the investigation of a specific question—What is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*? (PV 3.11–50); Is perception truly without conceptual construction? (PV 3.145–173); How can the terms for the reason (*hetu*) and the property to be proved (*sādhya*) of an inference involving an “essence-reason” (*svabhāvahetu*) refer to the same thing without the inference becoming a *petitio principii*? (PV[SV] 1.40–185)—we might still ask, more generally, what broader, systematic reasons lie behind his opposition to the existence of universals? His negative preoccupation with them seems to go well beyond the immediate concerns that trigger his discussions. Indeed, the refutation of universals seems to have been almost an obsession for Dharmakīrti. I can address this question only very briefly here, due to limitations of space.

One reason, clearly, is that universals, which are claimed by their proponents to be eternal, offend against the fundamental Buddhist theorem of the impermanence of entities. It is well known that Dharmakīrti worked out a rigorous proof of impermanence, which can be seen as central to his “system,” in that it grounds his rejection of an eternal Veda as well as a self.<sup>15</sup> Both of the latter are also the targets of separate critiques. Nevertheless, universals are hard to give up; they come in handy. Even some of Dharmakīrti's

<sup>15</sup> See Steinkellner 1968/69. PV 1 concludes with the following stanza, PV 1.340: *vedaprāmāṇyaṃ kasyacit karṭṛvādaḥ snāne dharmecchā jātivādāvalepaḥ / santāpārambhaḥ pāpahānāya ceti dhvastaprajñāne pañca līṅgāni jāḍye //*. “[Believing in the] authority of the Veda, claiming something [permanent] to be an agent, seeking merit in ablutions, taking pride in one's caste, and undertaking penance to remove sin, these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of discrimination.” Translation Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012.

co-religionists thought that the postulation of a “homogeneous character” (*sabhāgatā*) was necessary in order to explain similarities at least among living beings.<sup>16</sup> Thus, not content with attempting to do away with universals just by means of a general, *a priori* proof of impermanence,<sup>17</sup> Dharmakīrti attacked them on more specific grounds at every opportunity.

Another reason for the rejection of universals, however, may have been the fact that, for Dharmakīrti, conceptual awareness is the very essence of ignorance, which is the first link in the Twelfefold Chain of Dependent Origination. On the most basic level Dharmakīrti understands ignorance as “incorrect cognition” (*mithyājñāna*).<sup>18</sup> Conceptual awareness or conceptual-ity is incorrect cognition, specifically, in that it obscures the radical diversity of the empirical world.<sup>19</sup> It “conceals” the absolutely distinct nature of individuals by superimposing its own “non-distinct” or unified appearance (*abhinnapratibhāsa*) onto them. Dharmakīrti in fact, at PVSV 38,17–39,1 (on PV 1.68–70), identifies conceptual awareness as the “concealing” (*saṃvṛti*) that is primarily responsible for the presentation of a world that exists only

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<sup>16</sup> Namely, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas. See Jaini 2001: 245–246; Eltschinger 2000: 63–73.

<sup>17</sup> I refer to it as an *a priori* proof because the crucial premise that something truly exists only if it has causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*) would appear to be an *a priori* judgment.

<sup>18</sup> See Eltschinger 2014: 248–254,

<sup>19</sup> At the same time, Dharmakīrti also identifies the incorrect cognition that is ignorance as the “false view of self” (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*), especially in PV 2. Eltschinger (2014: 266–267) notes the *prima facie* incompatibility of these two conceptions. In the course of his study (to the end of Chapter Four) he attempts to show how they can be reconciled.



“conventionally” (*saṃvṛtisat*).<sup>20,21</sup> The first step toward recovering a more accurate, unbiased apprehension of the world is to see that the common natures that conceptual awarenesses present are not real, but in fact are based on the distinct natures of perceived particulars. Realist philosophers, however, have insisted that the common natures ascertained in conceptual awareness are real; they are universals. Thus, in order to overcome the concealing

<sup>20</sup> Or, more precisely, in a concealed way. See, e.g., PVSV 38,17–39,1: *buddhiḥ khalu tadanyaavyatirekiṇaḥ padārthān āśrityotpadyamānā vikalpikā svavāsanāprakṛtiṃ anuvidadhatī bhinnam eṣāṃ rūpaṃ tirodhāya pratibhāsam abhinnam ātmīyam adhyasya tān saṃsrjantī sandarśayati / sā caikasādhyaśādanatayā anyavivekināṃ bhāvānāṃ tad-vikalpavāsanānyās ca prakṛtir yad evam eṣā pratibhāti tadudbhavā / sā ceyam saṃvṛtiḥ saṃvriyate 'nayā svarūpeṇa pararūpam iti / te ca tayā saṃvṛtabhedāḥ svayam bhedinō 'py abhedina iva kenacid rūpeṇa pratibhānti / tad eṣāṃ buddhipratibhāsam anurundhānaiḥ buddhiparivartinām eva bhāvānām ākāraviśeṣaparigrahād bahir iva pari-sphuratāṃ sāmānyam ity ucyate /* “A conceptual cognition indeed arises based on [certain] things that are distinct from [entities] other than them; true to the nature of its own mental impression, it obscures their distinct nature, ascribes its own common appearance [to them] and presents [them by] unifying them. And such is the nature of the entities that differ from others by having the same effect and means, and of the mental impression of this concept, that this [cognition] arising from them appears in this way [i.e., superimposing its own nature on another nature]. And it is this [very cognition that is called] ‘concealing’ in that it conceals another nature with its own nature [i.e., with its own appearance]. And these [entities] whose differences are concealed by it, although themselves distinct [from each other], appear in a certain form as [if they were] not distinct. [To be sure,] those [people] who adhere to the appearance in the cognition speak of that [single form] as a [real] universal [but in reality this universal belongs] only to those entities which occur in the cognition [and yet] manifest themselves as if external because they have a particular aspect [which derives from a particular experience].” Translation Eltschinger et al. 2018: 76–77.

<sup>21</sup> On the crucial role common natures play in forming a “picture” of the world, consider Valberg 1992: 46: “... Someone who has a picture of the world, of a reality he views as external, must view this reality in terms of kinds, or types, or categories. These are produced by his picture of the world. The kinds in question need not be of the sorts provided by our picture of the world (natural kinds, artefact kinds, etc.). But the picture he has must provide him with some kinds or other—that is, it provides him with some ways or other of thinking about (organizing) that which he views as external. Otherwise what he has will not be a picture of the world.”

tendency of conceptuality, one must be absolutely clear that universals do not exist; the common natures presented in conceptual cognitions are generated by a psychological process triggered by the perceptual engagement with particulars. The refutation of the existence of universals thus serves the fundamental soteriological interests of Dharmakīrti's philosophy.<sup>22</sup>

## 2. Universals are not the meanings of words

Dharmakīrti has concluded the first part of his discussion of *apoha*, from PV 1.40–91, by arguing that the object of a conceptual cognition—what we might call the subject of predication, a single property-bearer (*dharmīn*) possessing multiple properties—is not a real thing (*vastu*) but merely an “aspect” or “appearance” (*ākāra*, *pratibhāsa*) in the conceptual cognition itself. If it were a real thing, then the features we usually ascribe to the subject of predication, namely, (1) that it is diverse in nature—i.e., it has *multiple* properties, so that different expressions can be used coreferentially in regard to it—(2) that it has a nature in common with or is the “same” as other things—e.g., insofar as it is judged to be a cow, which is the same as other cows—and (3) that it is one thing and its properties are other things, i.e., there is a distinction between the property-bearer and its properties—all of these features would immediately become problematic. For a real thing, according to Dharmakīrti, is *one*, i.e., it is totally cohesive in nature, without parts; it is *distinct*, i.e., it is not the same as, nor does it have anything in common with, other things; and it is *not a different thing* from the properties that are predicated of it. Given, then, that the object of a conceptual awareness is not a real thing, when logicians say that what is cognized in inference, the *pramāṇa* that consists in a conceptual awareness, is “an individual qualified by a universal” (*bhedāḥ sāmānyasaṃśṛṣṭaḥ*),<sup>23</sup> they are not talking about a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), “for the [particular] cannot be grasped at all as (*ākāra*) [being] the same [as other things] or divided [into different properties], etc. [...]. That nature [i.e., the particular] is distinct from everything [else]. There is no word or

<sup>22</sup> Which have been brought out clearly and persuasively for the first time in Eltschinger 2014.

<sup>23</sup> PV 1.89cd: *bhedāḥ sāmānyasaṃśṛṣṭo grāhyo nātra svalakṣaṇam* /. The commentators say that the view that an individual qualified by a universal is cognized in an inferential cognition is held “by Dignāga et al.” and cite the statement, *bhedāḥ*

conceptual thought that can make that [unique particular] known in that way, because [words and conceptual thought] function only by means of the universal."<sup>24</sup> Rather, as Dharmakīrti just explained, PVSV 44,1–12,<sup>25</sup> it is the aspect or appearance of the conceptual cognition itself that is grasped in a conceptual cognition as a property-bearer endowed with various properties; that appearance, however, is erroneously presented as if it were something external.

This prompts a question from Dharmakīrti's interlocutor: Why, indeed, don't words refer to particulars? This question in turn precipitates a long investigation into the reference of words, which provides Dharmakīrti the occasion to present and defend his view that they refer to *apohas*. Indeed, prior to this point in the Apoha Section of PV 1, from PV(SV) 1.40 to 91, Dharmakīrti has been mainly concerned with how conceptual awarenesses (*vikalpa*) make known exclusions; now, from PV(SV) 1.92 to 142 he will focus on how exclusions are made known by words. Intimately connected with this project is a sustained, wide-ranging critique of universals, which represent the main alternative to *apohas* as the referents of words. In the remainder of the Apoha Section, from PV(SV) 1.143 to 185, as mentioned above, Dharmakīrti will attack the specific theories of universals put forward by other philosophers. Thus, this passage, from PV 1.92 to 185—we shall be focusing, however, on the initial eighteen verses, PV 1.92–109—is perhaps the most important critical discussion of universals to be found in Dharmakīrti's writings. By analyzing it, we will gain insight into why Dharmakīrti did not just reject universals but even seemed to have harbored a positive hostility towards them.

The reason why particulars cannot be the meanings of words is fairly simple. Assuming that the meanings of words are established by convention—Dharmakīrti will later in PV 1 refute at length the idea that there is a

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*sāmānyasaṃsr̥ṣṭaḥ pratīyate* (PVSVṬ 193,11; PVV 320,14–15), which however is not to be found in Dignāga's extant writings. We do, however, find in *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* 2.5cd the assertion, *anumeyo hi dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī* (reconstructed by Pind 2015: II.219), which is taken up by Kumārila, ŚV *Anumānapariccheda* 27–48ab.

<sup>24</sup> *samānabhinnādyaḥkārair na tad grāhyaṃ kathamcana / [...] tadrūpaṃ sarvato bhinnam tathā tatpratipādikā / na śrutiḥ kalpanā vāsti sāmānyenaiva vṛttitah //* PV 1.90ab–91.

<sup>25</sup> Eltschinger et al. 2018: 95–97. Cf. PVSV 38,23–39,4; Eltschinger et al. 2018: 77–79.

beginningless relation between word and meaning—whatever is assigned as the meaning of a word must be able to endure from the time the assignment is made to a later time when the word is used. Particulars, however, are impermanent; moreover, they are restricted to a single location.<sup>26</sup> If a particular were presented as the meaning of a word when the convention is made, the same word could not be used to refer to it later, or to other particulars.<sup>27</sup>

But why, then, could not universals, which are *not* restricted to one time and one place, and which extend to other individuals, be what words refer to? Because, Dharmakīrti explains, language serves practical ends. We use language primarily to communicate with each other about things we want to accomplish. Now, one can't accomplish anything with a universal! Being permanent, a universal is without causal efficacy.<sup>28</sup> When making a linguistic convention, or adopting an existing one, a speaker desires to direct the attention of his interlocutor towards something that accomplishes a result:

Expressive [words] are joined with meanings [by a speaker, even when endorsing established usage, with the intention], “May a person, made aware of causally efficacious [things by my statement], act in order to realize that [causal efficacy].” (PV 1.93)<sup>29</sup>

Therefore, words are not employed to talk about universals, and universals are not assigned by conventions as the meanings of words.<sup>30</sup>

Nor is an individual, which of course does have causal efficacy, somehow indicated *via* a universal or genus, which is the proper meaning of a word.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>26</sup> PVSV 45,28: *tasya deśakālavayaktibhedāskandanāt* /. “For that [particular] does not extend to another time, place, or individual.” Translations of PVSV are from Eltschinger et al. forthcoming unless otherwise noted.

<sup>27</sup> PVSV 45,24–29.

<sup>28</sup> See, e.g., PVSV 41,12–42,3; Eltschinger et al. 2018: 85–87.

<sup>29</sup> PV 1.93: *api pravarteta pumān vijñāyārthakriyākṣamān / tatsādhanāyety artheṣu saṃyojyante 'bhidhāyakāḥ* /. See PVSV 46,2–9 for Dharmakīrti's explanation of the stanza.

<sup>30</sup> PV 1.94ab': *tatrānarthakriyāyogyā jātiḥ* [...] /. “That being the case, a genus which is incapable of causal efficacy, is not suitable [as the meaning of a word].”

<sup>31</sup> Dharmakīrti uses both expressions *sāmānya* and *jāti*. He tends to employ *sāmānya* when presenting the realist position and *jāti* when speaking from his own stand-

When a word is uttered in a practical context, Dharmakīrti points out with a rare dash of humor, one acts toward what it expresses, not something else related to what it expresses.

When someone says, "Cut the stick," no one would [ever] cut the man holding the stick! Nor is it the case[, as the opponent would have it,] that because [activities like carrying or milking] are impossible [for a genus], one acts toward the individual [in spite of the fact that words really refer to genera].<sup>32</sup> For in this way one would be talking nonsense: one does not act towards one thing because of another, for example, when told to milk a bull [one does not turn around and milk a cow]!<sup>33</sup>

Dharmakīrti, moreover, argues in the continuation of this passage that there is in fact no necessary relation between genus and individual, so that when one is expressed, the other would always be brought to mind.<sup>34</sup> Among the points he makes in support of this claim—his argumentation here becomes rather intricate—is that there can be no relation between genus and individual because there is no "mutual assistance" between them, "because one does not give rise to the other."<sup>35</sup> Here, he is presupposing that a relation of dependence between a thing and its substratum must be reducible to

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point.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. NBh 130,12–131,2 (ad NS 2.2.62), which cites various kinds of figurative employment (*upacāra*) to explain how a word denoting a genus (*jāti*) could be used to refer to an individual. NBh 131,1–2: *tatrāyaṃ saḥacaraṇād yogād vā jātiśabdo vyaktau prayujyata iti* /. "In that case, a word for a genus is employed for an individual due to association or connection."

<sup>33</sup> PVSV 46,14–17: *na hi kaścid daṇḍaṃ chindhīty ukte daṇḍinaṃ chinatti / nāpy asam-bhavād vyaktau pravṛttiḥ / evaṃ hy asambaddhapralāpī syāt / na tato 'nyatra pravṛttir balīvardadohacodanāvat* /.

<sup>34</sup> PVSV 46,19–30. This is in response to the opponent's suggesting that, perhaps, "stick" cannot be used to refer to a man with a stick, because of the lack of a necessary connection between them. PVSV 46,19: *anīyatasambandhatvāt tatra neti cet* /. "Objection: Since [the stick] is not necessarily related [to the man], there is no [activity] towards the [man when one hears the word 'stick']." Dharmakīrti answers, nor is there one between a genus and an individual. PVSV 46,19–20: *tat tulyaṃ jātāv api*. He then proceeds to show why.

<sup>35</sup> PVSV 46,28–29: *anyonyam ajanyaajanakatvenānupakārāt* /.

a causal relation of some kind.<sup>36</sup> Genera, of course, are considered to be unchanging, hence, they cannot be caused. We shall see that he develops this point more fully later.

Unwilling to give up the idea that a genus is somehow involved in the meaning of a word, the opponent proposes that it is the individual *possessed* of the genus that is expressed by words. To be sure, it is individuals that are causally efficacious, but being infinite, one could never learn a convention that assigns a word to all the individuals it can be used to express.<sup>37</sup> It seems, however, that a fixed relation could be established between a word and a

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<sup>36</sup> See PVSV 53,19–20: *kim ca / kāryaś ca tāsāṃ prāpto 'sau jananaṃ yad upakriyā /* (PV 1.106cd). “Moreover [if a universal depended on individuals insofar as they assist it], that [universal] would turn out to be their result, since assisting is [nothing but] bringing about.”

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Locke 1995: 326–327: “[...] It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name. For the signification and use of words depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them, it is necessary, in the application of names to things, that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things, and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea. But it is beyond the power of human capacity to frame and retain distinct ideas of all the particular things we meet with: every bird and beast men saw, every tree and plant that affected the senses, could not find a place in the most capacious understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory, that some generals have been able to call every soldier in their army by his proper name, we may easily find a reason why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that flies over their heads; much less to call every leaf of plants or grain of sand that came in their way by a peculiar name.”

genus; so let it be individuals insofar as they “possess” that genus, i.e., are qualified by it,<sup>38</sup> that are expressed by a word.<sup>39</sup>

The problem with this proposal—the so-called *tadvat* or *jātimat* theory that had already been criticized by Dignāga in the fifth chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*<sup>40</sup>—is that the individual qualified by a genus, in the end, is still an individual. Thus, the meaning of a word would, according to this theory, consist of an infinite class of individuals, and the fact that it is impossible to learn a relation between a word and infinitely many individuals would count against it. If one held that it would be necessary only to learn a relation, established by a convention, between a word and a single universal, which in turn would make one aware of the many individuals that possess it, then it would once again be implied, problematically, that from a word that expresses one thing (the genus) one would become aware of something else (the individual possessing it), moreover, that there *can* be a relation between a genus and an individual.<sup>41</sup>

At this point, with the theory that words express universals beginning to look untenable for a variety of reasons, Dharmakīrti introduces a different idea, with a question:

<sup>38</sup> Dharmakīrti implies that possessing a genus is equivalent to being qualified by a genus at PVSV 47,8–9: *evam satīdam ānanyam tadvaty api samānam / jātyāpi viśiṣṭā vyaktaya eva vaktavyā iti [...]* / “That being the case, this infinity is the same for what possesses the [genus], too. For even though they are qualified by a genus, individuals indeed are what is to be expressed [...].” The view that a word can be used to refer to an individual qualified by a genus (*jātiviśiṣṭa*) can be understood as the Nyāya position—see, e.g., NBh 130,2–4 (ad NS 2.2.61), in rejection of the view that a word refers to an individual *alone*—provided one keeps in mind that the word can *also* be used to refer to the configuration (*ākṛti*) and to the genus (*jāti*), depending on one’s intention (NS 2.2.66).

<sup>39</sup> PVSV 46,30–47,8.

<sup>40</sup> PS 5.4a: *tadvato nāsvatantratvāt* /. “[A word is] not [expressive] of what possesses that [genus], because it would not be independent [in expressing the thing meant].” See the entire discussion, PS(V) 5.4–8; Pind 2015: I.5,6–10,7. See Taber 2021: 184–186.

<sup>41</sup> PVSV 47,8–13.

Why isn't [a convention] made with respect to the common difference of [those things, i.e., many individuals] which cause that [effect], from [things] which do not cause it? (PV 1.95ab) <sup>42</sup>

For, as already pointed out, language guides us in the fulfilling of practical ends; hence, the most salient feature of the things that words refer to will be their causal properties. It seems plausible to believe that words, then, sort things according to the effects they have. What is common to many individuals, which allows them to be expressed by a single word, may not be some positive, real universal that they are all related to or which constitutes their essence, but a difference they share from other things that do not produce those effects. Although one might suspect that the adherent of this view will also have a problem explaining how this "common difference" (*bhedasāmya*, PV 1.95b) is related to the individuals of which it is the common difference,<sup>43</sup> it at least avoids postulating what is obviously another entity (*arthāntara*-) besides individuals.<sup>44</sup> As Dharmakīrti will later argue, this difference is not a "real thing" (*vastu*).<sup>45</sup>

Moreover, it is the difference of things that stands out, not their sameness.

A word is spoken [insofar as one thinks,] "[The hearer] should indeed act by avoiding what is other than that [which is intended]." And how [could] this [hearer do that] if by this [word] there were not an exclusion of this [thing that is meant] from those [other things]?<sup>46</sup> (PV 1.96)

If, when directing someone to carry out an action, I did not exclude things, he would not know what to do. Uttering a sentence such as, "Bring

<sup>42</sup> PV 1.95ab: *tatkāriṇām atatkāribhedasāmye na kiṃ kṛtaḥ* /.

<sup>43</sup> In other words, it is not clear that the *tadvat*-problem goes away. See ŚV *Apoha* 120–122; Kataoka/Taber 2021: 127–130. Dharmakīrti, however, addressed it earlier from the standpoint of the Apohavāda: the exclusion and the thing excluded are the same. See PV(SV) 1.64; Eltschinger et al. 2018: 62–63.

<sup>44</sup> PVSV 47,19–48,8.

<sup>45</sup> At PV(SV) 1.128 Dharmakīrti demonstrates the unreality of an *apoha*, a "difference" (*bheda*), by showing that it can be neither the same as nor different from the individual. If it were a nature (*rūpa*), it would have to be one or the other. Cf. Dunne 2004: 126–130.

<sup>46</sup> PV 1.96: *tadanyaparihāreṇa pravarteteti ca dhvaniḥ / ucyate tena tebhyo 'syāvvyavacchede katham ca saḥ* //.



fire," "activity towards [both] that [thing which is desired, namely, fire,] and another [which is not, namely, anything else,] would be enjoined, and the mentioning of its name [i.e., 'fire'] would be useless."<sup>47</sup> Dharmakīrti develops this point more fully later, PVSV 61,12–62,15, when responding to the objection regarding words such as "knowable" (*jñeya*).<sup>48</sup> The speaker, when using words, "deflects" (*vinivṛt*) the listener away from something while directing him towards something else. Otherwise, there would be no point in saying anything. If it did not matter how one brings water, whether with a pot or in one's cupped hands, one would just say, "Bring water," not, "Bring water with a pot." If it did not matter what is brought, whether water or some other substance, one would just say, "Bring!" And if one didn't care whether the hearer does anything or not, the speaker simply would not say anything.<sup>49</sup> Thus, even words like "knowable" serve to direct our attention towards things by ruling out other things.<sup>50</sup> "Hence, if [words] did not signify the exclusion of others, they would not be expressive at all due to their failure to express one [thing to the exclusion of all others]. Therefore, an exclusion must necessarily be expressed by a word. And since that [exclusion] is the same in things which are other than that [which does not have the same effect], it has the property of a genus, too."<sup>51</sup> That is to say, it is one thing extended over many; however, it is not an entity unto

<sup>47</sup> PVSV 48,12–13: *tatrānyatra ca pravṛtṭyanujñāyāṃ tannāmagrahaṇavaiyarthīyāt /*

<sup>48</sup> See PVSV 61,8–11. Kumārila raises the problem that the Apohavāda cannot cover words like *jñeya* and *prameya* in ŚV *Apoha* 144–146. Since there is nothing that is not knowable, cognizable, etc., there would not be something to be excluded (*apohya*) in their case.

<sup>49</sup> PVSV 61,16–26.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Soames 2003: 261: "Wittgenstein and the positivists held that all necessary truths are analytic, and that meaning was the source of necessity. For Wittgenstein, the basis of this view lay in his contention that for a sentence to *say* anything, for it to provide any information, is for its truth to *exclude* certain possible states that the world could be in. Since necessary truths exclude nothing, they say nothing; and since they say nothing about the way the world is, the way the world is makes no contribution to their being true. Hence, their truth must be due to their meaning alone."

<sup>51</sup> PVSV 48,13–16: [...] *ekacodanānādarād avacanam eva syād anyavyāvṛtṭyanabhidhāne / tasmād avaśyaṃ śabdena vyavacchedaś codanīyaḥ / sa cābhinnas tadanyeṣv iti jātīdharmo 'py asti /*

itself that is either identical or distinct from the individuals that fall under it. “Rejecting that [exclusion], which has to be admitted, has to be expressed, and which achieves the purpose of a genus [by extending over many things] and postulating another entity[, namely, a genus]—this is really just obstinate attachment to a non-entity, since that is not possible in the way it is imagined[, namely, as eternal, all-pervasive, etc.]”<sup>52</sup>

Thus, exclusions take over the role that universals are usually thought to play as the objects of cognitions arising from words. And even though, according to the Apohavāda, a verbal cognition does not apprehend a real thing,<sup>53</sup> it can still guide us reliably in action. That is to say, it can still “agree” with what it (erroneously or misleadingly) represents, due to the fact that it arises from it—like a cognition that mistakes the gleam of a jewel for a jewel, which nevertheless prompts one to successfully get the jewel.<sup>54</sup>

### 3. Universals are not the cause of “single cognitions”

There are, however, other things that universals are invoked in order to explain—in particular, the *thought* that something is the same as something else. When I see a cow or a tree, I naturally apprehend it as the same thing as another cow or tree. Indian realist philosophers, in fact, cited this type of cognition as the main evidence for the existence of universals. As Kumāṛila, for instance, puts it,

A cognition which has the nature of exclusion and inclusion arises in regard to all things, and that does not come about without [the thing] having a two-fold nature.<sup>55</sup>

When I see a cow, I cognize it both as an individual and as a type of thing, a type that is exemplified by this and other cows. This cognition of a type—referred to by both Kumāṛila and Dharmakīrti as “a single

<sup>52</sup> PVSV 48,16–18: *tan niyatābhyupagamaṃ niyatacodanaṃ jātyarthaprasādhanaṃ ca parityajyārthāntarakalpanaṃ kevalam anarthanirbandha eva / yathākalpanam asyāyogāt /*.

<sup>53</sup> PVSV 48,28: *avastugrāhī ca vyāvṛttivādināṃ śābdaḥ pratyayaḥ /*. “And according to the advocates of exclusion a verbal cognition does not apprehend something real.”

<sup>54</sup> PVSV 49,1–7.

<sup>55</sup> ŚV Ākr̥ti 5: *sarvavastuṣu buddhiś ca vyāvṛtṭyanugamātmikā / jāyate dvyātmatvena vinā sā ca na sīdhyati //*.

cognition" (*ekā dhīḥ, ekapratyaya, ekabuddhi*), i.e. a cognition with the same "form" or "appearance" (*ākāra, pratibhāsa*) for multiple individuals<sup>56</sup>—is best explained, in accordance with the fundamental Mīmāṃsā tendency to take cognitions at face value, simply as a cognition of the sort of thing it represents, namely, *a type*, i.e., a common nature, a universal.<sup>57</sup> According to the Indian realists, then, universals are immediately presented in perceptual experience.

Dharmakīrti's opponent begins to bring in this perspective by alleging that, if there were no real universals but only unreal *apohas*, then "because of the absence of something common, one would not recognize naturally distinct things [in the form], 'This is indeed that.'"<sup>58</sup> Dharmakīrti responds, "There is no such problem, because"

seeing things that, although [mutually] distinct, bring about this and that causal effect such as a [certain] cognition, [and] joining them together with words that refer to their separation from [things] other than them, [a person] can recognize [them] even when he sees a dissimilar [individual of the same type]. (PV 1.98–99ab)<sup>59</sup>

That is to say, it is by grouping individuals together on the basis of their difference from others that do not have the same effect or effects—Dharmakīrti mentions the effect of "a [certain] cognition"; we shall come back to this—and assigning this difference as the meaning of a word—say, "cow"—that we recognize one individual as *the same* as another individual, even though they

<sup>56</sup> Sometimes, however, "unified cognition" seems a more apt translation. It does not present a specific thing, but something non-specific that can relate to multiple individuals.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. NKand 315,2–4: *anugatākārabuddhivedyāni dravyatvādīni vyāvṛttibuddhivedyāś ca dravyādivyaktayaḥ tasmād eṣāṃ dravyatvādīnāṃ lakṣaṇabhedāt pratītibhedād dravya-guṇakarmabhyaḥ padārthāntaram* /. "Substancehood, etc., are to be known by a cognition with an inclusive aspect, individual substances, etc., are to be known by cognitions of exclusion. Therefore, because substancehood, etc., have a different characteristic, i.e., [they are known by] a different cognition, they are a different kind of thing from a substance, etc."

<sup>58</sup> PVSV 49,13–15: *anvayinaḥ kasyacid arthasyābhāvāt prakṛtibhinneṣu artheṣu tad evedam iti pratyabhijñānaṃ na syāt* /

<sup>59</sup> PVSV 49,15–18: *naṣṭa doṣaḥ / yasmāt / jñānādyarthakriyāṃ tāṃ tāṃ dṛṣṭvā bhede 'pi kurvataḥ / arthāṃś tadanyaviśeṣaviśayair dhvanibhiḥ saha // saṃyojya pratyabhijñānaṃ kuryād apy anyadarśane* / (PV 1.98–99ab).

are in themselves quite distinct from each other. There is no one thing—a universal—that all individuals have in common that accounts for their perceived sameness. A universal possessed by distinct individuals would, rather, be apprehended as something that is “here” in relation to each of those individuals. It would not account for the recognition, “This is that one.”<sup>60</sup>

Dharmakīrti will proceed to defend this idea through PV(SV) 1.113ab, but his defense is also interwoven with a sustained critique of the realist alternative. It is the realist, he argues, who is unable to account for a “single cognition.” Such a cognition could not arise from a universal alone, he points out, because one would then not also be aware of any individual; that is to say, one would not cognize an individual that possesses the universal, or something that is both individual and universal in nature, as realists such as Kumārila wish to maintain. And in that case, one would not *act* towards an individual that one apprehends as being a certain type.<sup>61</sup>

Nor could individuals and a universal produce a cognition of an individual of a certain type somehow *together*.<sup>62</sup> First of all, there is still the danger that the oneness of the universal would obliterate the diversity of the individuals (PV[SV] 1.102). Second, one could not hold that multiple distinct individuals produce a cognition of one thing somehow collectively while *depending* on a single universal;<sup>63</sup> for it is our experience that one thing, i.e., a single type, is cognized even when this or that individual is absent. That is to say, the individual causal contributions of individual cows to the arising

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<sup>60</sup> PVSV 49,19–27.

<sup>61</sup> PVSV 51,15–52,3.

<sup>62</sup> PV 1.101cd: *ekavastusahāyāś ced vyaktayo jñānakāraṇam* //. “Objection: It is insofar as they are accompanied by something that is one [namely, a universal,] that individuals are the cause of a cognition [of something possessing a universal].” That is to say, “Individuals *are* the cause [of that cognition] as its object-support, but not alone. Rather, when there is one thing that cooperates with them (*sahakārin*) [in producing the cognition], then they are apprehended together with that” (PVSV 52,5–7: *bhavanti vyaktayas tasyāḷambanabhāvena kāraṇam na tu kevalāḥ / yadā punar āsām ekaṃ sahakāryaṃ asti tadā tatsahitā grhyante iti* /).

<sup>63</sup> PV 1.103ab: *anekam api yady ekaṃ apekṣyābhinnabuddhikṭ* / [...]. “If [our opponent should claim that] in spite of being many, [individuals] cause a common (*abhinna*) cognition by depending on one thing [...].”

of a general cognition of a cow are difficult to establish.<sup>64</sup> Here, the argument becomes somewhat difficult to follow as Dharmakīrti sets aside an appeal to the example of diverse colors producing a cognition of their (variegated?) collection: one or another color may be missing, the opponent points out, but the cognition of their collection, which we are nevertheless confident is the effect of the individual colors, still arises.<sup>65</sup> "Therefore," he concludes after arguing that this example does not apply to the case of individuals and the cognition of a universal, "individuals simply being incapable [of producing] that [cognition of a universal], they would not be apprehended by it."<sup>66</sup> In other words, we could never be aware of a universal together with an individual or individuals (PV[SV] 1.103–105ab).

Third, a universal would not be able to produce a cognition of one thing insofar as *it* is dependent on this or that individual (PV[SV] 1.105cd–106). Here, Dharmakīrti comes back to the point that a relation between individual and universal cannot be defined; for the individual would have to somehow "serve" or "assist" (*upaKR*) the universal in order for there to be a relation. Yet the universal *ex hypothesi* is something permanent that cannot receive assistance from anything: "Nothing can be said to 'assist' that which retains its nature unchanged as [it was] before."<sup>67</sup> Dharmakīrti goes on to consider whether one could get around this by postulating that the assistance is something *other* than the thing assisted, but one is then faced with the equally difficult challenge of explaining how the assistance and the thing assisted are related (PVSV 53,22–54,5).

In summary, a universal could not possibly play any role in the production of a single cognition, whether by itself or in cooperation with one or multiple individuals on which it is dependent or which are dependent on it.

In the course of the difficult passage that extends from PV 1.99cd to 107ab Dharmakīrti emphasizes that the general aspect that appears in a cognition of multiple individuals is *illusory* insofar as it is mistaken as really belonging to them. The cognition that apprehends one thing in diverse individuals is a "distortion" (*viPLU*):

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<sup>64</sup> PVSV 52,16–20.

<sup>65</sup> PVSV 52,20–23.

<sup>66</sup> PVSV 53,5–6: *tasmād asamarthā eva vyaktayas tatreti na tena grhyeran /*.

<sup>67</sup> PVSV 53,21–22: *na hy anatiśayam ātmānam asya pūrvavad bibhrataḥ kaścid upakārako*

Even though these [particulars] do not appear in it [—for they are distinct—this cognition] causes people to act [towards them] due to the error of interpreting [its non-distinct aspect as the particular]. But the aspect that appears in that [cognition] is not *in* the objects—except for a common difference—for (*ca*) it is unreal. [And] inasmuch as this is what (*tam eva*) it apprehends, this [cognition] is *ipso facto* distorted [...].<sup>68</sup>

The opponent, however, naturally resists this characterization: the cognition with a “non-distinct,” i.e., common, aspect with respect to distinct individuals is *not* a distortion *precisely because there really is a non-distinct universal in those individuals*.<sup>69</sup> In reply, Dharmakīrti reiterates an idea he had articulated in the first part of the Apoha Section, that in fact nothing like a universal ever presents itself perceptually.<sup>70</sup>

Isn’t it the case that, even should [a universal] exist, its appearance in the [cognition] remains [perceptually] unnoticed? For that [cognition] manifests itself presenting color and shape, and a universal is not

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*nāma.*

<sup>68</sup> PVSV 55,2–5: *atatpratibhāsiny apy adhyavasāyavibhramād vyavahārayati lokam / sa tu tasyām pratibhāsamāna ākāro nārtheṣv asti / anyatra bhedād abhedinaḥ / sa cārūpaḥ / tam evaiṣā gr̥hṇatī tathā viplavate [...]*/. The debate with the opponent about the erroneous nature of conceptual awareness is thoroughly presented at PVSV 50,1–51,15 (ad PV 1.98–99ab).

<sup>69</sup> PVSV 55,6–8: *api ca / vastusāmānyavādino ‘pi hi bhinnā eva vyaktayaḥ / katham tāsū abhinnākārā buddhir iti tulyam codyam / na tulyam tatrābhinnasya sāmānyasya sadbhāvāvāt /* “Moreover, for the realist, too, individuals are certainly just as distinct, [so] how can their cognition have a non-distinct aspect? Thus, the objection [raised above, with 1.107ab] is the same [for him as well]. [Opponent:] It is not the same, because there really is a non-distinct (*abhinna*) universal in those [individuals].”

<sup>70</sup> See, e.g., PVSV 39,20–23: *na hīmā vyaktayaḥ parasparam anvāviśanti / bhedābhāvena sāmānyasyaivābhāvaprasaṅgāt / anyac ca na tābhyo vyatiriktaṁ kiṃcit tathā buddhau pratibhāty apratibhāsamānaṁ ca katham ātmanā ‘nyaṁ grāhayed vyapadeśayed vā /* “Indeed, these individuals do not merge with each other, because [if they did, there would be no difference between them any longer, and] it would follow that the universal itself would not exist due to this absence of a difference. But something other, that is, something distinct from those [individuals], does not appear in cognition in that way [i.e., as distinct]. And if [it is assumed to exist but] does not appear [perceptually], how could it, in itself, cause another [i.e., its possessor,] to be grasped or designated [as an individual of that type]?” Translation Eltschinger

like that. And distinct from that there is no non-distinct aspect [of which we are aware]. Even for him who holds the universal to be the configuration (*ākṛti*), since this [configuration] would not be separate [from the particular], it would not occur in another thing any more than the particular does; so, because [individuals] are [only] different, any non-distinct appearance is impossible.<sup>71</sup>

Coming back later to this matter of the cognition with a “non-distinct” aspect, i.e., a conceptual cognition, being a distortion, at PVSV 61,1–8 (ad PV 1.120–121), he reiterates even more vividly that such a cognition is not based on a distinct perception of a real universal.

*It is by force of error that the conceptual cognition that arises from the [word] and cognizes that [difference] seems to apprehend a single real thing. It is, however, not the case that a single [real] thing is perceptible in those [particulars], the perceiving or not perceiving of which would allow this [cognizing subject] to make a distinction between tree and non-tree, even though [what] he perceives [is just mutually] distinct [trees]. [First,] because that [single real thing, i.e., treeness] is not apprehended distinctly from the appearance of the branches, etc. [of an individual tree], unlike the stick in the case of a man holding a stick, and one cannot notice what is not apprehended separately from another. [And second,] because even the shape seen in one [individual] cannot be perceived in another. [Hence,] if what possesses that [shape] is a tree and what does not possess it is not a tree, [then] only a single individual would be a tree.<sup>72</sup>*

This is no doubt intended as a direct contradiction of the realist claim that universals unmistakably present themselves in our perceptual cognitions of

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et al. 2018: 81–82.

<sup>71</sup> PVSV 55,8–13: *nanu tatra tasyābhāsaḥ sato 'pi na lakṣyate / sā hi varṇasaṃsthānapratibhāsavatī vibhāvvyate / na cedṛśaṃ sāmānyam / na ca tato vyatiriktaḥ kaścīd abhinna ākāro 'sti / ākr̥tisāmānyavādino 'pi viśeṣavat tasyāvyatirekāḍ arthāntare 'vṛttir iti bhedaṇ nābhinnapratibhāso yujyate /*

<sup>72</sup> PVSV 61,1–8: *taṃ tasyāḥ pratipadyamānā buddhir vikalpikā bhrāntivaśād evaikaavastugrahiṇīva pratibhātī / na punar ekaṃ vastu tatra dṛśyam asti yasya darśanādarśanābhyāṃ bhinnadarśane 'py eṣa vṛkṣāvṛkṣāvibhāgaṃ kurvīta / tasya śākhādipratibhāsavibhāgena daṇḍavad daṇḍīny agraṇāt / agrhītasya cāparavivibhāgenānupalakṣaṇāt / ākr̥ter apy ekaṭra dṛṣṭyā anyatra draṣṭum aśakyatvāt / tadatadvato vṛkṣāvṛkṣatve vyaktir ekaiva*

individuals.<sup>73</sup> The universal treeness simply does not appear distinctly in the way a stick does when one apprehends a man with a stick—we cannot “pick it out,” so to speak, and on that basis tell a tree from non-tree. If, on the other hand, one considered the universal to be the configuration of the tree—which one might reasonably hold to be common to all trees—certainly that does present itself noticeably. Dharmakīrti, however, insists that the configuration of a tree is not distinct from the individual tree. Thus, it could not extend over many individuals; it is not really a common feature.<sup>74</sup>

How, then, could distinct things give rise to the cognition of one thing without any involvement of a universal? Could they somehow do so by themselves—unaccompanied and unassisted by some other entity that that really is one? At one point in his debate with the realist over the alleged role of a universal, Dharmakīrti asks the following question: “Why would those [individuals] assist that one thing [namely, a universal], not simply a single cognition?”<sup>75</sup> He elaborates:

This entire attempt [of yours to prove a universal is made] on the assumption that it is contradictory for distinct things to assist [in the arising of] one thing. [But] if[, as you have just said,] those individuals,

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*vṛkṣaḥ syāt* /. Cf. PVSV 39,20–23, n. 70, above. See also PV 3.48–49: *kathamcid api vijñāne tadrūpānavabhāsataḥ / yadi nāmendriyāṇāṃ syād draṣṭā bhāseta tadvapuh / rūpavattvān na jātīnāṃ kevalānām adarśanāt / vyaktigrahe ca tacchabdarūpād anyan na drśyate* //. “Because the form of a [universal] does not appear in a cognition in any way whatsoever, [the universal does not exist]. [You might say that the senses, too, do not appear in a cognition. However,] if there were [a person] who [could] see the senses, their material form would appear [in his cognition] because they do have form. [But this is] not [the case] for universals because they are not perceived [at any time] alone [without individuals]. And when the individual is apprehended, anything other than its name and form is not apprehended.” Translation Franco/Notake 2014: 127. Cf. also PV 3.145–148.

<sup>73</sup> See Kumāṛila’s statement above, which is developed more fully by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, Kataoka 2010: 199(82),2–196(85),7. Jayanta concludes with the *kārikā* (196[85],6–7): *prathamākṣanipāte ‘pi tulyatvam avagamyate / nānātvam cety sāmānyabhedau dvāv api vāstavau* //. “Even upon the first contact of the sense faculty, sameness and diversity are comprehended. Therefore, both universal and individual are real.”

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Kumāṛila’s rejection of configuration (*saṃsthāna*) as a universal, ŚV *Vana* 16–25.

<sup>75</sup> PV 1.106ab: *tad ekam upakuryus tāḥ katham ekāṃ dhiyaṃ ca na* /.



even though they are distinct, assist that one [thing] which is a universal [in the arising of a unified cognition], what offence, then, has been done to them by [that] cognition, so that they do not assist it [directly]? What is the use here of that goitre of a universal?<sup>76</sup>

In other words, if you think individuals can *assist* (or be assisted by) a universal in producing a cognition of one thing, why don't you consider that they could directly produce such a cognition themselves?

It seems that the idea that this is possible was already in circulation among Buddhist thinkers before Dharmakīrti, for Kumābila refutes a very similar proposal in the *Ākṛtīvāda* chapter of his *Ślokavārttika*.<sup>77</sup>

To the opponent, the answer to this question is obvious. A cognition of distinct individuals simply cannot “have a non-distinct appearance” (*abhinnapratibhāsa*), i.e., it cannot present something that is the same for all the individuals: “We do not say that many [things] do not have a single effect, but rather that a cognition of distinct things cannot have a non-distinct appearance if it takes on their [dissimilar] aspects.”<sup>78</sup> Dharmakīrti, then, is confronted with a challenge. How can a cognition that arises from distinct individuals apprehend those individuals as non-distinct, i.e., as the same? He offers what appear to be two responses to this challenge. First, he says that distinct particulars *as such* do not appear in that cognition of a common nature, even though it arises from them. Rather—harking back to the notion that a “single cognition” is a cognitive distortion—he says that such a cognition presents an *unreal* common aspect which it superimposes on the particulars, thereby causing the cognizer to take them erroneously to be, not distinct, but the same. This is how I understand PVSV 54,20–55,6:

But particulars do not appear in [cognitions] that apprehend a universal! [First,] because these [cognitions] occur even when those [particulars] are absent; [second,] because in their own [sensory] cognition [particulars] appear with an aspect that is different [from a general one]; and

<sup>76</sup> PVSV 53,14–17: *bhinnānām hy arthānām ekārthopakriyā virodhinīti sarvo 'yam ārambhaḥ / tāś ced vyaktayo bhinnā apy ekaṃ sāmānyam upakurvanti kaḥ punar āsāṃ vijñānenāparādhaḥ kṛto yat tan nopakurvanti / kim antargaḍunā sāmānyena /*

<sup>77</sup> ŚV *Ākṛti* 12–17. See Taber 2017: 250–251.

<sup>78</sup> PVSV 54,18–20: *na brūmo 'nekam ekakāryakṛṇ na bhavatīti / kim tarhi / bhinneṣu artheṣu arpitataḍākārā buddhir abhinnapratibhāsini syāt /*

[finally,] because a single [thing] cannot have multiple aspects [namely, one that is unique and another that is general,] for that would lead to absurd consequences. Therefore, this [cognition of a universal] will not appear as non-distinct if it apprehends distinct objects while arising from them. [Yet] even though these [particulars] do not appear in it, [this cognition] causes people to act [towards them] due to the error of interpreting [its non-distinct aspect as the particular]. But the aspect that appears in that [cognition] is not *in* the objects—except for a common difference—for (*ca*) it is unreal. [And] inasmuch as this is what (*tam eva*) it apprehends, this [cognition] is *ipso facto* distorted—this was said before.<sup>79</sup>

But then, starting at PV 1.107cd, Dharmakīrti appears to shift gears, so to speak, by abandoning what has been a presupposition of his entire discussion up to this point, namely that a single cognition apprehends distinct individuals as *the same*. What he suggests, instead, is that it apprehends them merely *as similar*, specifically, as similar *insofar as they are perceived as having the same effect*.

Or else, let

The cognitions [of individuals each] have a distinct appearance, because they are apprehended [only] as similar. (PV 1.107cd)<sup>80</sup>

The opponent, however, immediately asks:

[But] if these [individuals] are similar, how can they be apprehended by distinct cognitions? (PV 1.108ab')<sup>81</sup>

That is to say, similarity would seem to imply some sameness. How can we apprehend individuals as similar without noticing something they have in common? To which Dharmakīrti replies,

<sup>79</sup> PVSV 54,20–55,6: *na vai sāmānyagrāhiṇīṣu svalakṣaṇapratibhāsaḥ tadabhāve 'pi tāsāṃ bhāvād ākāraṇtarena ca svajñāne pratibhāsanād anekākārāyogād ekasyātiprasaṅgāc ca / tasmān neyaṃ bhinnārthagrāhiṇy abhinnā pratibhāti tadudbhavā / atatpratibhāsiṇy apy adhyavasāyavibhramād vyavahārayati lokam / sa tu tasyāṃ pratibhāsamāna ākāro nārtheṣv asti / anyatra bhedaḥ abhedinaḥ / sa cārūpaḥ / tam evaiṣa grhṇantī tathā viplavata ity uktam prak /*

<sup>80</sup> PVSV 55,13–14: *athavāstu / pratibhāso dhiyāṃ bhinnāḥ samānā iti tadgrahāt /* (PV 1.107cd).

<sup>81</sup> PV 1.108ab': *kathaṃ tā bhinnadhīgrāhyāḥ samāś ced [...]*.

[Their] similarity [consists in] having the same effect. (PV 1.108b'c')<sup>82</sup>

What is this "same effect"? Most immediately, the effect of a particular is the perceptual cognition it causes. A perceptual cognition is, in most cases, the first manifestation of a thing's causal efficacy. So, Dharmakīrti would appear to be saying that individuals of the same type—e.g., individual trees or individual cows—are apprehended, *not* as *the same*, but at least *as similar*, due to their producing the same kind of cognition.

But now the opponent objects: individuals of the same type actually do not cause identical perceptual cognitions.

Isn't the cognition the effect of those [individuals]? That, however, differs <sup>PVSV</sup> with each entity <sup>PVSV</sup>. (PV 1.108c'd)<sup>83</sup>

The experiential cognition caused by one cow, say a brindled cow (*śābaleya*), will be, in certain respects, different from the experiential cognition caused by another cow, say a black one (*bāhuleya*). So how can different individual cows be said to have the same effect?<sup>84</sup>

Dharmakīrti now explains that, although the individual perceptual cognitions caused by individuals of the same type may vary, those cognitions in turn produce a "unitary judgment" (*ekapratyavamarśa*). Insofar as they cause that unitary judgment, "which imputes sameness" (*abhedāvaskandin*), they appear to be the same,<sup>85</sup> so that the individuals that cause those experiences

<sup>82</sup> PV 1.108b'c': [...] *ekakāryatā / sādṛśyam* [...].

<sup>83</sup> PVS 56,10–11: [...] *nanu dhīḥ kāryaṃ tāsāṃ sā ca vibhidyate* // (PV 1.108c'd) *prati-bhāvam* /.

<sup>84</sup> According to Dunne (2004: 120), the experiential cognitions would *have* to be different, otherwise Dharmakīrti would "contradict his ontology of particulars: if he says that two images, which are mental particulars, are the same, then how can he say that all particulars are unique?"

<sup>85</sup> PVS 57,1–3: *tad api pratidravyaṃ bhidyamānam api prakṛtyaikapratyavamarśasyā-bhedāvaskandino hetur bhavad abhinnaṃ khyāti* /. "And that [effect], too, [namely, the perceptual or experiential cognition,] though it differs for each thing, appears to be the same (*abhinna*) insofar as it by nature causes a unitary judgment which imputes sameness (*abhedāvaskandin*)."

appear in turn to have “the same difference”<sup>86</sup> from individuals that do not give rise to such experiences, and so they, too, appear to be the same.<sup>87</sup>

Inasmuch as it is the cause of a unitary judgment (*ekapratyavamarśa*), the cognition does not differ (*abhedin*). [And] inasmuch as they are the cause of [that] single cognition, the individuals do not differ, either. (PV 1.109)<sup>88</sup>

What is this *ekapratyavamarśa*, however? Dharmakīrti does not really explain it, nor do his commentators give us much help. A thorough account of it, based on an assessment of the available evidence, would require another article. My suggestion, given the present state of my knowledge of the PVSV, based mainly on the four occurrences of the term in the text together with Karṇakagomin’s glosses, is that it is a very rudimentary kind of judgment of identity, of the form, “This is that.”

Dharmakīrti’s initial use of the term occurs earlier in PV 1.73:

Certain [things], even though they are different [from each other], are determined by nature to accomplish one [and the same] purpose, such as a unitary judgment or the [direct] cognition of an object, like the sense organs, etc.<sup>89</sup>

He explains in his *Svavṛtti*:

<sup>86</sup> PVSV 56,19–57,1: *sa tv eṣāṃ abhinno bheda ity ucyate jñānādeḥ kasyacid ekasya karaṇāt / atatkārisvabhāvavivēkaḥ* /. “This, however, is what we call their [i.e., the individuals’] common (*abhinna*) difference, since they produce a certain [effect] which is the same, such as a [certain type of perceptual] cognition[, their difference consisting just in their] distinction from what does not produce that [effect].”

<sup>87</sup> PVSV 57,3–6: *tathābhūtapratyavamarśahetor abhedāvabhāsino jñānāder arthasya hetuṭvād vyaktayo ‘pi saṃsrṣṭākāraṃ svabhāvabhedaparamārthaṃ svabhāvata ekaṃ pratyayaṃ janayanti [...]*/. “Since they cause an effect such as a [perceptual] cognition, which appears as identical insofar as it [in turn] causes that sort of [unitary] judgment, the individuals also [indirectly] produce a single cognition (*ekaṃ pratyayam*); [this cognition] presents them as merged, [although] it ultimately relies on (*-paramārtha*) the difference of their natures [...].”

<sup>88</sup> PV 1.109: *ekapratyavamarśasya hetuṭvād dhīr abhedinī / ekadhīhetubhāvena vyaktīnām apy abhinnatā* //.

<sup>89</sup> PV 1.73: *ekapratyavamarśārthajñānādyekārthasādhane / bhede ‘pi niyatāḥ kecit svabhāvenendriyādivat* //. Translation Eltschinger et al. 2018: 84.

[...] Particulars such as *śiṃśapā*[, *khadira* and *nyagrodha* trees], even though they are not connected with each other, bring about by nature a recognition having the same aspect, or, according to [specific causes and] conditions, another purpose that can be realized by wood, such as burning or a house.<sup>90</sup>

An *ekapratyavamarśa*, it would seem, is the recognition that something is the same as something else. It would appear, however, that it is somehow more basic than the judgment that identifies something as, say, a “cow”; it might even be “pre-reflective.” Although conceptual in nature, it does not itself involve the application of a concept. Rather, it is a stage in the psychological process that gives rise to concepts. It accompanies the experiences of particulars, from which concepts such as “cow” are formed insofar as it allows the latter experiences to present themselves as *the same experience*.

Here, then, is the story of the origin of a “single cognition,” the idea that one thing is the same, i.e., the *same kind* of thing, as another, that Dharmakīrti seems to be working out in PV(SV) 1.107cd–109: The experiential (i.e., perceptual) cognitions of two cows, as opposed to, say, the experiential cognition of a cow and the experiential cognition of a horse, tend to give rise to a simple, naïve awareness—which, however, is a “judgment”—that the things they present are “the same”—perhaps because the cows, though not really identical in appearance, nevertheless appear *less different* than a cow and a horse; in fact, to most non-cow herders they will look very much the same!<sup>91</sup> This judgment of identity, it should be emphasized, is not the

<sup>90</sup> PVSV 41,3–5: [...] *evaṃ śiṃśapādayo 'pi bhedaḥ parasparānavaye 'pi prakṛtyai-vaikam ekākāraṃ pratyabhijñānaṃ janayanty anyāṃ vā yathāpratyayaṃ dahanagrḥādīkāṃ kṣāṣṭhasādhyāṃ arthakriyāṃ /*. Translation Eltschinger et al. 2018: 85. The expression *ekākāra*, “having the same aspect,” is reminiscent of the expression *abhinnaḥ pratibhāsa*, “having a non-distinct appearance,” which Dharmakīrti uses together with *buddhi/dhī*. It enables a judgment of identity, of the form, “[This is] just that,” i.e., this is the *same kind* of thing as that. See PVSV 55,15–16: *naiva tāsṃ abhinnaḥ pratibhāso 'sti samānā iti grahāt / na hy ekasmin pratibhāse samānā iti yuktam / kiṃ tarhi / tad eveti /*. “There certainly isn’t any non-distinct appearance in those [cognitions of individuals], because they are apprehended as similar. If there is a single appearance one cannot say they are similar, but only [this is] ‘just that.’”

<sup>91</sup> One is reminded of Locke’s account of the formation of “general ideas” by

ascertainment of any real identity of the cows. It is, rather, fundamentally just a thought, perhaps even a mere impression, caused by perceptions of similar-appearing things, not a true knowing. Retroactively, however, it makes the individual, distinct experiences that cause it seem to be *the same experience*. Then, due to the fact that distinct entities such as cows appear to have the common effect of producing the same experience—which, again, renders them at least *less different* from each other than other entities that do not have that effect—they appear to be *the same thing*.<sup>92</sup>

In this way, Dharmakīrti has given an account of the arising of the cognition of one thing in regard to many individuals that realist philosophers believe requires a universal, *without* invoking any universals, basing himself instead solely on experiences of particulars. Previously, he had shown that it is implausible to suggest that universals are the referents of words and much more reasonable to hold that exclusions are. And in passing he has pointed out that, contrary to what Indian realist philosophers believe, nothing like a universal presents itself distinctly in perceptual experience—in the same way a stick does when one apprehends “a man with a stick.”

Finally, he has made the point very forcefully at the very beginning of the Apoha Section, PVSV 24,24–25,7, that a universal could be neither the same as nor different from the individuals that supposedly instantiate it. By implication, insofar as a universal would lack a determinate nature, it could not be real. His argument is as follows. If individuals of the same type had a “common nature” that they are identical with, then it would not “belong” to them, because they would not exist as individuals; for “there would be just that [one thing], because [only] the common [nature] would exist but nothing different that would be distinct from it.”<sup>93</sup> If, on the other hand, it were distinct from those individuals, then, although they would be connected with

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abstraction. In forming the idea “horse” one subtracts all those features that are “peculiar” to each individual and retains “only what is common to all.” See Locke 1995: 328–329 (III.iii.6–9). Cf. Eltschinger 2014: 261.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Dunne 2004: 119–125.

<sup>93</sup> PVSV 24,25–25,2: *yad apy eṣām abhinnaṃ ātmabhūtaṃ rūpaṃ na tat teṣām / tadānīṃ teṣām abhāvāt / tad eva hi syād abhinnaṃ bhāvāt / tadvyatiriktasya bhinnasya cābhāvāt / tasyaiva ca punar bhedavirodhāt /*. “Even their common nature, which they are identical with[, in fact can]not [be said to be] theirs, because then they would not exist. For there would be just that [one thing], because [only] the common [nature]

it, it would not be their nature, precisely because it is different from them.<sup>94</sup> That a universal is neither identical nor distinct from individuals is also at the heart of Dharmakīrti's refutation of universals in PV 3.11–50.<sup>95</sup>

Thus, taking all of these arguments together, it would seem that Dharmakīrti has pretty convincingly refuted the existence of universals.

#### 4. Guidelines for a philosophical assessment of Dharmakīrti's critique of universals

Or has he?

As a critique of universals Dharmakīrti's presentation in PV(SV) 1.40–109 breaks down into two parts. First, there are arguments directed against universals themselves, or against any role they might play either as the meanings of words or as the objects of conceptual awarenesses. Second, there is Dharmakīrti's own, alternative account of meanings as *apohas* and of the common natures reflected on in conceptual awarenesses as *apohas*.<sup>96</sup> The

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would exist but nothing different that would be distinct from it, and also because this very [nature] would be incompatible with [any kind of] diversity." Translation Eltschinger et al. 2018: 31. Cf. PVSV 39,20–21; Eltschinger et al. 2018: 81.

<sup>94</sup> PVSV 25,3–4: *arthāntaram apy anekasambandhe 'pi na tat teṣāṃ sāmānyam atadrūpa-toāt /*. "Nor [as the Vaiśeṣikas maintain] is another entity [that is, something completely different from the particulars] the universal of these [particulars], even though [it has] a connection with many [of them], because it does not have the [same] nature as these[, precisely insofar as it is *different* from them]." Translation Eltschinger et al. 2018: 32–33.

<sup>95</sup> Where the aim of the argument is to show that a universal is "essenceless" (*niḥsvabhāva*), hence not a "real thing" (*vastu*). See PV 3.25–27ab; Franco/Notake 2014: 80–85 and 3.41–50; Franco/Notake 2014: 116–129.

<sup>96</sup> One is reminded, again, of the statement Locke makes at the beginning of his critique of innate ideas: "It is an established opinion among some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, *koinai 'énnoiai*, characters, as it were, stamped upon the mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions, and may arrive at certainty without any such original notions or principles" (Locke 1995: 12). Locke develops

first component of his critique is rather difficult to evaluate, since it involves intricate metaphysical arguments, the premises or presuppositions of which would require further philosophical investigation. Should we accept, for instance, Dharmakīrti's assumption, which of course ultimately stems from the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence, that a relation between entities can exist only insofar as one *produces* or *gives rise to* the other,<sup>97</sup> which rules out the possibility that there could be *any* relation between a universal—which of course *ex hypothesi* is something permanent—and an individual? Should we, for another example, accept the assumption that a universal must be *either* the same as *or* different from the individuals to which it belongs, and that there is no third alternative, i.e., either *both* the same as *and* different from, or else *neither* (completely) the same as *nor* (completely) different from? The last alternative, in particular, is one that other Indian philosophers took seriously but Dharmakīrti seems not even to consider. Clearly, the pursuit of these sorts of difficult questions is likely to lead us down endlessly branching rabbit holes—which might be appropriate for an inquiry into the basic principles of metaphysics, but not when we are just trying to size up Dharmakīrti's refutation of universals.

I believe that a more fruitful examination of Dharmakīrti's critique of universals, therefore, will focus on the second component of his critique. Has Dharmakīrti really provided us with a defensible alternative account of the meanings of general terms and our conceptual awareness of common natures? In this case, I believe that we can formulate several questions which have a better chance of being given determinate answers. Some of these questions, in fact, were raised by Indian realist philosophers responding to Dharmakīrti's proposals.

- 1) Is it true that we consider things to be the same due to their having the same effect(s)?

We have seen that fundamental to Dharmakīrti's account of the origin of unified cognitions is the premise that we regard things as being of the same

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his own account of the formation of "general ideas" and general terms in Book III of his *Essay*. The best refutation of a questionable postulate is often to provide another, more plausible explanation of the phenomenon the postulate is introduced to explain.

<sup>97</sup> See above n. 35.



type insofar as they are *other* than things that do not have their effects. Setting aside for the moment the question whether this premise surreptitiously imports types or properties—doesn't it, for instance, appeal to the notion of "the same effect"?—one can still ask: Is this in fact how we recognize things as being of the same type? In order to see two animals as "cows," do we have to observe that they can both be milked, or have some other causal property (e.g., they cause a certain kind of perceptual cognition) that sets them apart from non-cows? Conversely, if two animals can be milked—for instance, a cow, and a buffalo—do we *ipso facto* see them as the same type? It would seem that having the same effects is neither necessary nor sufficient for things to be of the same type. Even the example Dharmakīrti famously gives to illustrate his principle, namely, different herbs are considered the same insofar as they alleviate fever, can be seen as contradicting it. The plants may be considered the same *from that perspective*, or under that description (they are "anti-pyretic" herbs), but Dharmakīrti mentions, in formulating his example, that they are *different plants*, i.e., *different species* of plant.<sup>98</sup> Thus, having the same effect does not, on a more basic level, make them the same type of thing. One may ask, then, what is it that does? Is it, on that more basic level, having the same effect as well? But which effect? Dharmakīrti wants to emphasize the capacity to produce a similar kind of perceptual—presumably, visual—cognition. That would appear to amount to saying that things are of the same type if they *look* the same, or at least look similar. But it seems that a realist could seize on this and insist, "This is precisely what we say: the common nature of cows, or any other two things of the same type, is given immediately in perceptual experience!"

<sup>98</sup> PVSV 41,7–11: *jvarādiśamane kāścīt saha pratyekam eva vā / dr̥ṣṭā yathā vauśadhayo nānātve 'pi na cāparāḥ* // (PV 1.74) *yathā guḍūcīvyaktyādayaḥ saha pratyekam vā jvarādiśamanalakṣaṇam ekaṁ kāryaṁ kurvanti / na ca tatra sāmānyam apekṣante / bhede 'pi tatprakṛtīvāt* /. "Or else, to give another example (*yathā*), one observes that in spite of [their] diversity, certain plants and not others [are capable], whether individually or collectively, of alleviating fever, etc. (PV 1.74) Or else, to give another example: Individual *guḍūcī* plants and so forth cause, whether individually or collectively, one [and the same] effect consisting in alleviating fever, etc., but they do not depend in this regard on [any] universal [such as planthood], because they possess this nature [of calming fever] in spite of [their] being different." Translation Eltschinger et al. 2018: 85.

Some of these objections were, in fact, voiced by Brahmanical authors in their critiques of Dharmakīrti's version of the Apohavāda.<sup>99</sup> A thorough treatment of Dharmakīrti's Apohavāda in its historical context would have to take all such criticisms into consideration.

- 2) Does postulation of an *ekapratyavamarśa* generate a regress? And what is an *ekapratyavamarśa*, anyway?

Assuming that the "unitary judgment" that perceptual experiences of particulars supposedly generate, which causes us to regard those experiences as the same, is the sort of cognition I have described, namely, the most rudimentary awareness of something as being a certain type, a recollection of the form, "This is that," *without* the application of a more specific concept such as "horse" or "cow"—for, indeed, if I understand Dharmakīrti correctly, this judgment is meant to *explain* the formation of concepts such as "horse" and "cow"<sup>100</sup>—then the question still arises, how does one know that it is *the same* unitary judgments that accompany the somewhat diverse perceptual experiences of particulars of that type? After all, as John Dunne has pointed out, those judgments, like the experiences that evoke them, would be particulars, hence they, too, would have distinct natures.<sup>101</sup> If the unitary judgments are the same due to having the same effects, then we obviously fall into a regress, especially if the effect in question is another *ekapratyavamarśa*! The

<sup>99</sup> See, e.g., NBhūṣ 257,21–259,13; NKand 318,5–12.

<sup>100</sup> Note, however, that Kaṇvakagomin, commenting on PVSV 41,3–5, construes the expression *ekākāraṃ pratyabhijñānam*, which glosses *ekapratyavamarśa* in PV 1.73a, as a cognition with the content "Tree." PVSVṬ 178,11–12: *śiṃśapādaya iti śiṃśapākhadiranyagrodhādayaḥ parasparānanvaye 'pi / vṛkṣatvasāmānyavirahe 'pi vṛkṣa ity ekākāraṃ pratyabhijñānam janayanti /* " 'Such as a *śiṃśapā*, etc.,' i.e., a *śiṃśapā*, *khadira*, *nyagrodha*, etc. 'Even though they are not connected with each other,' i.e., lack the universal treeness, 'they produce a recognition with the same aspect,' [namely,] 'Tree.' " According to my understanding of Dharmakīrti's theory, this is a mistaken interpretation.

<sup>101</sup> Dunne 2004: 322–323. Cf. TSP 325,20–27 (opponent's objection): *tathā hi yo 'sau pratyavamarśapratyayas tasyāpi svalakṣaṇabhedenā bhidyamānatvād ekatvam asiddham /* "Specifically, the sameness of that judgment-cognition is not proven, because it differs by virtue of the difference of [being] a particular."

tenth-century Nyāya author Bhāsarvajña explicitly raises this problem.<sup>102</sup> It is anticipated already by Kamalaśīla, TSP 325,20–27 (on TS 1036–37), who proposes that a regress is avoided by the fact that the sameness of the judgments is based, not on their having the same effect(s), but on their having the same content; it is self-evident that they all ascertain the same thing.<sup>103</sup>

Perhaps a more serious concern about the *ekapratyavamarśa*, however, is that, when Dharmakīrti mentions it, we are just not sure what he is referring to. The *ekapratyavamarśa* does not correspond to any noticeable moment of our perceptual engagement with the world; it cannot be “cashed out” phenomenologically, so to speak—unless what Dharmakīrti means is the initial, innocent awareness of a common or inclusive nature of particulars that the Indian realist philosophers cite as the main evidence for accepting the existence of real universals.

### 3) Can the Apohavādin provide an alternative account of the formation of general concepts without tacitly appealing to universals?

We have seen that Dharmakīrti believes that we regard particulars that are in themselves quite distinct from each other as the same type of thing due to their having the same causal properties.<sup>104</sup> While having the same effect(s) is the basis for excluding them from other things, i.e., “singling them out,”<sup>105</sup> and it is only this difference from others that Dharmakīrti wants to say is “the same” for them—for a difference is not something real—it certainly looks as if that difference is derived from a positive fact about those particulars, namely,

<sup>102</sup> NBhūṣ 260,28–261,1.

<sup>103</sup> Which is, perhaps, the *identity* of the particular being experienced with other particulars of the same type? TSP 325,23–25: *naitad asti / na hi pratyavamarśapratyayaśyaikakāryatayaikatvam ucyate / kiṃ tarhi ekārthādhyaśāyitayā tena nānavasthā bhaviṣyati / svata eva sarveṣāṃ pratyavamarśapratyayānām ekārthādhyaśāyitvasya siddhatvāt* /. “This is not the case, for the judgment-cognition is not said to be the same due to having the same effect, but rather due to involving the ascertainment of the same thing. Therefore, there will not be a regress; for the fact that all the judgment-cognitions ascertain the same thing is established of itself.”

<sup>104</sup> Usually he talks about particulars being the same type by virtue of having the same effects, but occasionally he also says that we regard them as the same based on their having the same causes. See, e.g., PVSV 68,24–69,2.

<sup>105</sup> Eltschinger's felicitous expression, Eltschinger 2014: 260.

that they have certain effects that other things do not have. And that would appear to be a property that they all share, i.e., a universal. It is, indeed, possible that we might discover that Dharmakīrti's theory invokes other properties once it is formulated in a more formal way. This is not an issue that I've found raised by Dharmakīrti's Brahmin critics, as I continue to study them. Nevertheless, a similar problem was brought up by Kumāṛila against Dignāga's version of the Apohavāda.<sup>106</sup> Granted that at least one of the purposes of Dharmakīrti's theory of *apoha* is to provide an alternative account of concept formation that would allow us to dispense with universals—that is to say, it is an integral part of a comprehensive critique of universals—it would be a serious defect of it if it had recourse to (real) universals. If “having the same effect(s)” is to be analyzed in turn as a difference, an *apoha*, instead of a real property, then we would clearly fall into another regress.<sup>107</sup> Whether it would constitute a “vicious” regress for the theory is difficult to say. Perhaps one should interpret the theory as proposing that there are *apohas* “all the way down”? In making such a suggestion, of course, one would be venturing well beyond anything Dharmakīrti himself says.

The above points hardly suffice as a *critique* of Dharmakīrti's refutation of universals. I offer them here only as starting points for a comprehensive philosophical assessment or as lines of critical investigation to be explored.

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<sup>106</sup> At ŚV *Apoha* 71–72 Kumāṛila maintains that in order for all cows to be included and all non-cows—i.e., horses, etc.—to be excluded by the word “cow” there must be “continuity of the same property” (*ekadharmānvaya*, 72b) for all cows and all non-cows, respectively. See Kataoka/Taber 2021: 98. See also ŚV *Apoha* 76–77.

<sup>107</sup> To be explicit: If the property “having the same effect(s)” were not a real property, but just the exclusion from things that do not have the same effect(s), one could still ask: are they excluded from them insofar as they have a certain effect or effects those other things do not have? If so, the problem would repeat itself at the next level. Thus, it seems that if things have the same effect(s) only insofar as they are different from things that do not have the same effect(s), we would fall into another regress.

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# On the Alternative Definitions of *niyoga* in Prajñākaragupta's Criticism of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā\*

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## Introduction

In the latter half of the first chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV), Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660)<sup>1</sup> criticizes the Mīmāṃsā apologetics of Vedic authority based on its “authorless nature” (*apauruṣayatva*). He demonstrates that the Veda cannot convey the meaning of its statements to the listener insofar as it has no author.<sup>2</sup> In the third to the last chapter of his *Tattvasaṃgraha*, the Śrutiparīkṣā, Śāntarakṣita expounds this argument. Within the Mīmāṃsā school, at the time of Śāntarakṣita (the middle of the 8th century), two sub-schools—namely, Kumārila (ca. 560–620<sup>3</sup>)’s school (Bhāṭṭa) and Prabhākara’s school (Prābhākara)—were disputing how the Veda works, taking its authorless nature for granted. The Veda is a ritual corpus that describes each scene of sacrifice with three kinds of statements: injunction (*vidhī*) of ritual action, formula (*mantra*) to be uttered during the ritual, and explanatory passage

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Frauwallner 1961; Franco 2015–2018.

<sup>2</sup> See Eltschinger, Krasser, and Taber 2012.

<sup>3</sup> See Yoshimizu 2022: 5–8, footnote 1, and appendix. In the Aveṣṭi section (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.3.3) of the *Śābarabhāṣya* (ŚBh) 580,6–581,1: *nanu janapadapurapari-rakṣaṇavṛttim anupajīvaty api kṣatriye rājaśabdām āndhrāḥ prayuñjante prayoktāraḥ* “The speakers in the Āndhra region apply their word ‘king’ to a person if he is a Kṣatriya, even if he does not earn his living by protecting a region or city,” Śābarasvāmin refers to the local people in the Āndhra region who respected a high-born but powerless Hindu *kṣatriya* calling him a king. In *Tantravārttika* (TV) 584,16–19, Kumārila refers to this parlance in South India, converting the name of the southern county at issue from Āndhra to Draviḍa. From the third to the sixth century, the Āndhra

(*arthavāda*) about the ritual's significance. Mīmāṃsā scholars prioritized injunction and held sacrifice as a complex action performed by following a set of many systematically combined injunctions.

In the Pāṇinian grammar, *vidhi* as a command was considered the principal meaning of *liṅ*, the L-suffix in the optative mood,<sup>4</sup> added to the verb of an injunction. Mīmāṃsakas insisted that the Veda "works on" human beings through injunctions, mainly through the exhortative suffixes represented by *liṅ*, added to the verb of such an injunction "*svargakāmo yajeta*" (One who desires heaven ought to hold the sacrifice). They held this injunction with the name of each sacrifice, such as the Agnihotra, to form the core of the system of injunctions, naming it "directive" (*codanā*).

Prabhākara, a younger contemporary of Kumārila, called this exhortative force "enjoinment" (*niyoga*),<sup>5</sup> claiming that the *niyoga* issued from the directive on each sacrifice is transmitted into individual injunctions of rituals, evoking the hearer's duty to carry out the whole program of the sacrifice from one ritual to another systematically.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile, Kumārila considered the cause of the sacrificial action to be of two levels of purposeful operation,

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and the Tamil regions were ruled by a tribe called Kalabhra. They patronized Buddhism and Jainism and allegedly oppressed the Brahmanical tradition rooted in South India at that time. However, they were defeated by Siṃhaviṣṇu (reign: 550/560–580/590), a king of the Pallava dynasty in Āndhra, and then by Kaḍuṅgōn (reign: 590–620), a king of the Pāṇḍya dynasty in Tamil. Therefore, Kumārila's reference to Draviḍa instead of Āndhra as the southern country dominated by a non-Brahmanical power may suggest that he wrote the *Aveṣṭi* section of the TV after the Kalabhras' defeat by Siṃhaviṣṇu, and before their defeat by Kaḍuṅgōn were known to him, namely, at the end of the sixth century. For the meaning of Śabarāsvāmin and Kumārila's reference to the southern people in this context, see Yoshimizu (forthcoming). As argued in Yoshimizu 2007: 213–219, Kumārila wrote the TV after the *Śloka-vārttika* and before the *Ṭupṭikā* and the *Bṛhatṭikā*.

<sup>4</sup> *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (A) 3.3.161: *vidhi-nimantraṇa-āmantraṇa-adhiṣṭa-sampraśna-prārthanēṣu liṅ*. "(The I-substitutes of) LIṆ are introduced [after 1.2 a verbal stem 1.91] to denote (a) a command, (b) summons, (c) invitation, (d) respectful command, (e) deliberation and (f) request." (transl. by Katre 1989)

<sup>5</sup> Following Stern (1988: 26ff.) translating *niyojya* and *nikyokṛ* as "the person enjoined" and "enjoiner," I translate *niyoga* as "en-joinment," which etymologically corresponds to *ni-yoga*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Yoshimizu 1997: Erster Teil, II. Hierarchische Struktur des Opfergefüges.



the exhortative operation of a directive and the nature of human activities. He calls the former the “verbal force of actualization” (*abhidhābhāvanā*) and the latter the “intentional force of actualization” (*arthātmabhāvanā*).<sup>7</sup> For both Prabhākara and Kumārila, the Veda is an active lawgiver rather than an eternally static testimony because it urges human beings to follow the religious norms (*dharma*s) it reveals.

There are almost no extant Mīmāṃsā works of exegesis compiled in Śāntarakṣita’s time, that is, roughly between Maṇḍanamiśra (ca. 660–720) and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (later half of the ninth century).<sup>8</sup> We have only scarce materials recorded by contemporary Mīmāṃsakas about the theories of *vidhi*. However, in the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkārabhāṣya* (PVA) on the second chapter of the PV, Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810)<sup>9</sup> digresses at length about Mīmāṃsā theories of *vidhi* and refutes them, speaking first on *niyoga*, then on *bhāvanā*. This digression, which amounts to 38 pages in Ono’s edition (PVA<sub>O</sub>), and Yamāri’s commentary thereon, provide valuable materials for early medieval Mīmāṃsā philosophy. The present paper elucidates the alternative definitions of *niyoga* collected and criticized by Prajñākaragupta and also evaluates them in comparison with Prabhākara’s own theory of *niyoga* in his *Bṛhatī*. Before that, let us summarize how Prajñākaragupta criticizes the notion of *niyoga* before introducing alternative definitions.

First, Prajñākaragupta quotes the opponent’s explanation of the term *niyoga*:

PVA<sub>O</sub> 14,15–15,2: *nanu niyogo vākyārthaḥ, niyukto 'ham iti pratīteḥ. tato niyogād eva nāsitum samarthaḥ. ko 'yaṃ niyogo nāma. niśabdo niḥśeṣārtho yogārtho yuktiḥ. niravaśeṣo yogo niyogaḥ. niravaśeṣatvam ayogasya manāg apy abhāvāt. avaśyakartavyatā hi niyogaḥ. niyogaprāmāṇikā hi niyogapratipattimātrataḥ pravartante.*

<sup>7</sup> TV 378,20–21: *abhidhābhāvanām āhur anyām eva liṅādayaḥ / arthātmabhāvanā tv anyā sarvākhyaṭeṣu gamyate //*

<sup>8</sup> An exception is that Umbeka, whom Kamalaśīla mentions as “Uvveyaka” (*Tat-tvasaṃgrahapañjikā* [TSP] 982,18; Thrasher 1993: 158, n. 57), wrote a commentary, *Ṭikā*, on the *Bhāvanāvivēka* (BhV), Maṇḍanamiśra’s early work. For the Prabhākara theory of *niyoga* discussed by Bhaṭṭajayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*, see Yoshimizu 2020–21.

<sup>9</sup> Ono 2000: xi. Franco (2019) proposes that Prajñākaragupta’s *terminus ante quem* should be assumed later than 810.

[Opponent:] The meaning of a sentence (i.e., a Vedic injunction) is enjoinderment (*niyoga*) because one [who has heard a Vedic injunction] understands, “I am enjoined.” Just because of this enjoinderment, one cannot remain inactive. What is this enjoinderment? The part *ni* [of the word *niyoga*] means “no room,” and the meaning of *yoga* is commitment. Enjoinderment (*niyoga*) is the commitment with no room. [The enjoined person] has no room [for non-commitment] because non-commitment is not possible even in the slightest degree [once the person heard the Vedic injunction]. This is because *niyoga* is something to be carried out by all means. In fact, those who hold *niyoga* to be a means of valid knowledge begin to act simply because of cognizing the enjoinderment.

The explanation of the word “*niyoga*” as “*niravaśeṣo yogah*” is very peculiar because *ni* of “*niyoga*” and *nir* of “*niravaśeṣa*” are different.<sup>10</sup> And we find no correspondence in Prabhākara’s *Bṛhatī* (Bṛh). Following the regular use of the verb *ni-√yuj* to express, for example, “binding an ox to a yoke,” Prabhākara uses *ni-√yuj* to state that the Veda enjoins the hearer to perform an action, which is termed “scope (*viśaya*) of *niyoga*” expressed in the locative.<sup>11</sup> However, disregarding the opponent’s peculiar explanation of the term *niyoga*, Prajñākaragupta begins to criticize the theory of *niyoga* under two schemes, practical and ontological.

First, from a practical perspective, he asks his opponent why one who has heard a Vedic injunction begins to hold a sacrifice following the enjoinderment

<sup>10</sup> According to Yamāri, the Nyāya teacher Trilocana found fault with this idiosyncratic explanation of the term “*niyoga*” as quoted by Prajñākaragupta. To defend Prajñākaragupta, Yamāri replies that he merely revived the explanation adopted by ancient people (*cirantanas*), but Yamāri does not adduce any grammatical or Mīmāṃsā testimony of this etymology in PVAN 34b1: *atra trilocanena yad uktam—nirvacanaṃ yady avaśyāśrayaṇīyam, niyujyate niyojyo ‘neneti niyoga iti kiṃ nāśrīyate? iti tad asaṅgataṃ eva, cirantanair evam eva nirvacanasya kṛtatvāt, bhāṣyakṛtāpi tathai-otthāpitatvāt. ko doṣo bhāṣyakṛtaḥ?* “Trilocana remarks on this (definition of *niyoga*) as follows: ‘If one should resort to etymological explanation (*nirvacana*), why is *niyoga* not defined as that by which the enjoined person is enjoined?’ This (remark) is only misleading because ancient people etymologically explained [the word *niyoga*] only in this way and Prajñākaragupta merely restored this way of explanation. Why is Prajñākaragupta responsible [for this unusual explanation]?” See footnote 115.

<sup>11</sup> For example, see Bṛh, pt. 1, 38,10–39,5: *yasminn ayaṃ puruṣo niyujyate sa tad*(i.e.,

(*niyoga*).<sup>12</sup> Is it simply because one has been enjoined by the injunction, or for fear that one will incur suffering if one ignores the injunction, or because the injunction promises a special reward to those who follow it? He rejects the first assumption holding it to ignore the actuality of human activities: no one with discretion would ever begin an action simply because of being enjoined (15,9–16). He also rejects the second assumption: because there is no means to know what misfortune one would suffer from in the posthumous life if one neglects the sacrifice, one has no reason to fear the result of one's negligence (15,16–16,9). Therefore, only the third assumption remains. However, this utilitarian view disables the Vedic injunction's binding power. In such a case, one would spontaneously begin to act without being compelled if one recognized the advantage of doing so (16,10–14).

After criticizing the concept of *niyoga* from a practical perspective, Prajñākaragupta proceeds to criticize it from another angle, which may be called an ontological scheme. Considering that *niyoga* cannot exist as an independent entity like a piece of cloth, he assumes *niyoga* to be a property (*dharma*) possessed by a certain substrate (*dharmin*). He points out that there are only three alternatives for this substrate: the enjoined person (*niyojya*), the scope (*viṣaya*) of the enjoinder, or the enjoiner (*niyojaka*) who directs the person to perform the action (16,15–17,4: v. 38). Among these three, *niyoga* cannot belong to the enjoined person (*niyojya*) nor the enjoiner (*niyojaka*) because both substrates have already been “accomplished” (*siddha/pariniṣpanna*). Insofar as they have “already been accomplished,” it is impossible for them to change their state through the issue and execution of *niyoga* (17,5–21; 26,13–18). *Niyoga* cannot also belong to its scope (*viṣaya*), that is, the concrete action prescribed by the injunction, because this action has “not been accomplished” by the time of the issuing of *niyoga*. In this case, being a property belonging to this non-existent substrate, *niyoga* would have to be non-existent, like “a hare's horn” (18,1–20,14). We may say that Prajñākaragupta's second scheme to criticize *niyoga* can be reduced to a temporal dilemma that leads to absurdity, regardless of whether or not its substrate has already been accomplished.<sup>13</sup>

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38,10: *niyogasya*)*viṣayaḥ*.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Yoshimizu 1989.

<sup>13</sup> Before beginning to criticize the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga*, Prajñākaragupta has already applied a similar dilemma in PVA<sub>O</sub> 14,7–13, commenting on

# 1. Is *niyoga* a sort of duty (*kārya*), incitement (*preraṇā*), or something else?

## 1.1. Eleven alternative definitions of *niyoga*

After criticizing *niyoga* according to the second scheme, Prajñākaragupta presents the alternative definitions of *niyoga* maintained by contemporaneous Prābhākara scholars. Yamāri remarks that these definitions are adopted by “old Mīmāṃsakas” (*jaraṇmīmāṃsaka*).<sup>14</sup> At the beginning of this presentation, Prajñākaragupta asserts that the first alternative, *niyoga* as a “pure duty”

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*Pramāṇavārttika* 2.2 that denies the real existence of the object evoked within consciousness by a statement including the Vedic injunction. PVA<sub>O</sub> 14,7–8: *yaś ca buddhāv arthaḥ pratibhāti, na sa evārthaḥ* [Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s emendation: *sa eva sadārthaḥ*\*]. *anyathā sakalasamīhitārthasiddher na kaścid anuṣṭhānārthī bhavet*. “Moreover, the referent that appears in the cognition [of the listener of the statement] is not a [real] referent. If it is not so (i.e., if it were a real object), no one would intend to act because the desired referent has entirely been accomplished”; PVA<sub>O</sub> 14,9–13: *anuṣṭheyatayaiva tasyārthasya pratipādanān naivam iti cet, sa tarhi tadā svarūpeṇa nāstīti na tasya pratipattiḥ. anyapratipattau saṃbandhābhāvāt saṃdeha eva. tatas ca yo ’rthaḥ pratīyate, sa siddha eva, na tadarthī pravartate. yadarthī ca na sa pratipanna iti nārthatattvanibandhanaṃ prāmāṇyam*. “The opponent may retort: [Opponent:] because [the Vedic injunction] makes [the listener] cognize its referent only as that which is to be carried out, it is not the case that [for one who has heard the Vedic injunction, the referent has already been entirely accomplished]\*\*. [Proponent:] We reply: in that case, since [the referent] does not, as such (*svārūpeṇa*), exist at that time [that is, at the hearing of the injunction], its [valid] cognition does not occur. If one [who has heard the injunction] cognizes something else [i.e., a subjective image (*vikalpārūḍhārtha*)], it would necessarily be open to doubt owing to the absence of an [inseparable] relationship [between the subjective image and the objective referent]\*\*\*. Therefore, [if] the referent that is cognized [by the hearing of the Vedic injunction] has already been accomplished, then one who desires it would not begin to act; moreover, [if one begins to act] aiming at the referent, it would not have been cognized [by hearing the injunction]. Therefore, [as Dharmakīrti states in *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.2,] the validity of a statement itself does not pertain to what the object really is [but to the speaker’s intention].”

\* Cf. Ono 2000: 14, n. 4: “de ñid ni don dam pa T 7a8 (*vgl.* sa eva sadārthaḥ Se).”

\*\* PVAN 34a5–6: *naivam iti. na sakalasamīhitārthasiddhiḥ*.

\*\*\* PVAN 34a6: *na vikalpārūḍhārthasya tādātmyam, nāpi tadutpattiḥ, bhāvitoḽ eva svargādeḥ*.

<sup>14</sup> PVAN 42a3: *samprati jaraṇmīmāṃsakamatāny āsṛitya punaḥ dūṣayituṃ vikalpayati*.

(*śuddhakārya*), was proclaimed by others (v. 83b: *kīrtitaḥ paraiḥ*). The reference to the advocates by the appellation “other” (*para*) is repeatedly found in similar expressions in some of the remaining definitions.<sup>15</sup>

In the *Nyāyakaṇikā* (NK), his commentary on Maṇḍanamiśra’s *Vidhiviveka* (VV), Vācaspatimiśra calls a Prābhākara scholar quoted by Maṇḍanamiśra “old Prābhākara” (*jaratprābhākara*) in comparison with Śālikanātha (an approximate contemporary of Bhaṭṭajayanta<sup>16</sup>). Yamāri also might have used the appellation “old Mīmāṃsaka” in comparison with Śālikanātha to refer to the Prābhākara scholars known to Prajñākaragupta; but I have no further evidence at present. Later, in section 3 of this paper, we will discuss the relation between these eleven alternative definitions of *niyoga* and the scholar called “old Prābhākara” by Vācaspatimiśra compared to Śālikanātha.

After enumerating eleven definitions for *niyoga* (vv. 83–86), Prajñākaragupta briefly explains each as follows in PVA<sub>O</sub> 29–31:

(1) Pure duty (PVA<sub>O</sub> 29,1: *śuddhakārya*)

*pratyayārtho niyogaś ca yataḥ śuddhaḥ pratīyate /  
kāryarūpaś ca tenātra śuddhaṃ kāryam asau mataḥ*<sup>17</sup> // (v. 87)

Because enjoinderment (*niyoga*) is cognized as the pure meaning of the verbal suffix [in the optative, etc.] and as something to be done, here [in the Vedic injunction], this [*niyoga*] is held to be a pure duty.

*viśeṣaṇaṃ tu yat tasya kiṃcid anyat pratīyate /  
pratyayārtho na tad yuktam dhātvarthaḥ svargakāmatat* // (v. 88)

Whatever other [than a pure duty] may be cognized as a qualifier of that (i.e., *niyoga*), that cannot be the verbal suffix’s meaning.<sup>18</sup> [In

<sup>15</sup> PVA<sub>O</sub>, vv. 84d: *ucyate paraiḥ*; 85d: *paraiḥ*; 86d: *pakṣāḥ paraiḥ kṛtāḥ*.

<sup>16</sup> See Yoshimizu 2020–21: footnote 5.

<sup>17</sup> PVAN 42a4: *tatra juhuyād iti liṅgartho niyogaś ca pratīyate svasiddhyai preraṇākṣepāt, kāryarūpaś cānuṣṭheyatvāt. sa ca śuddha upādhyasaṃsrṣṭaḥ*. “Among them, whereas the meaning of the optative ending in ‘one should make an offering’ is cognized as enjoinderment for the sake of its own accomplishment because of requiring incitement, it is also [cognized] as a certain duty because of its necessity for performing. In this case, that (i.e., enjoinderment) is purely [a sense of duty] without being associated with a qualifier.”

<sup>18</sup> PVAN 42a5: *svargakāmo yajatīti dhātvarthādipratīṭāva api na liṅarthapratīṭir iti liṅaḥ sa evārthaḥ*. “Even if the meaning of a verbal root, etc., is cognized in ‘one who desires

the injunction “*svargakāmo yajeta,*”] the meaning of the verbal root [is not the meaning of the optative ending] in the same manner that one who desires heaven [is not].

*prerakatvaṃ tu yat tasya viśeṣaṇam iheṣyate /  
tasyāpratyayavācya tvāc chuddhe kārye niyogatā //* (v. 89)

Here (in this injunction), it may be assumed that incitement is a qualifier of that (i.e., *niyoga*).<sup>19</sup> However, because this [incitement] is not directly denoted by the verbal suffix [but cognized through its direct meaning, a duty],<sup>20</sup> the essence of enjoinder lies in pure duty.

(2) Pure incitement (PVA<sub>O</sub> 29,8: *śuddhapreranā*)

*preranaiva niyogo 'tra śuddhā sarvatra gamyate /  
nāprerito yataḥ kaścin niyuktaṃ svam prabudhyate //* (v. 90)

In all of these cases, one understands enjoinder as only pure incitement because no one considers oneself enjoined [to act] without being incited.

(3) Duty associated with incitement (PVA<sub>O</sub> 29,11: *prerāṇasaṃgatakārya*)

*mamedam kāryam ity<sup>21</sup> evaṃ jñātaṃ pūrvam yadā bhavet /  
svasiddhau prerakaṃ tat syād anyathā tan na sidhyati //* (v. 91)

When one understands in advance, “This is my duty,” it (i.e., the duty) incites [one to carry it out] for the sake of its accomplishment. Otherwise, it would not be accomplished.

(4) Incitement associated with a duty (PVA<sub>O</sub> 29,14: *kāryasaṃgatapreranā*)

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heaven holds a sacrifice,’ the meaning of the optative ending is not cognized. Therefore, only that (i.e., pure duty) is the meaning of the optative ending.”

<sup>19</sup> PVAN 42a5: *na ca dhātvarthasvargakāmau bhinnāv upādhiḥ apekṣya mā bhūc chuddha-tvaḥsatih, svarūpabhūtaṃ tu prerakatvaṃ apekṣya kasmān na?* “The purity [of duty] should not be damaged by relying on the meaning of the verbal root and one who desires heaven as two different qualifiers. However, because incitement is its nature, why [the pure duty] cannot rely on it [as a qualifier]?”

<sup>20</sup> PVAN 42a5–6: *sāmarthyāyātāṃ tan na pratyayārthaḥ.* “That (i.e., incitement) depends on the operation [of the optative ending] but is not the meaning of the verbal ending [in the optative].”

<sup>21</sup> PVAN 42a6: *“atha viparyayaḥ”* (v. 83d) *prerāṇasaṃgatakāryam ity aparāḥ. asya vyākhyānam—“mamedam” ityādislokaḥ.*

*preryate puruṣo*<sup>22</sup> *naiva kāryeṇeha vinā kvacit /*  
*tataś ca preraṇā proktā niyogaḥ kāryasaṅgatā //* (v. 92)

In this [hearing of the Vedic injunction], no person would be incited without [being aware of] a duty to perform a certain [action]. Therefore, enjoinder is said to be the incitement associated with a duty.

(5) Metaphorical application (PVA<sub>O</sub> 29,17: *upacāra*) of incitement to a duty

*preraṇāvīṣayaḥ kāryaṃ na tu tat prerakaṃ svataḥ /*  
*vyāpāras tu pramāṇasya prameya*<sup>23</sup> *upacaryate //* (v. 93)

Duty is the scope of incitement but does not incite [the listener] by itself. However, the operation of the means of knowledge (i.e., incitement) is metaphorically applied to the object of knowledge (i.e., duty).<sup>24</sup>

(6) <sup>25</sup> Connection (PVA<sub>O</sub> 30,1: *sambandha*) of incitement and a duty

<sup>22</sup> PVAN 42a6–7: “*kāryasaṅgatā preraṇe*”(v. 83cd)*ty anyo vikalpaḥ ... pūrvakasya vyākhyānam—“preryate puruṣa” ityādi.*

<sup>23</sup> For the metaphorical application (*upacāra*) of some qualities of fire to those of a boy expressed in the locative on the basis of similarity, see Raja 1977: 247, footnote 1, which is quoted from Sthiramati’s *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya* (TVBh), 17,21–22: *agnigūṇasyaiva ... māṇavakagūṇe ... sādṛśyād upacāro yuktaḥ.*

<sup>24</sup> Among vv. 83–86 that enumerates alternative definitions of *niyoga*, Yamāri classifies metaphorical application, the fifth alternative, into two kinds according to whether the primary form of *niyoga* is thought to be *kārya* or *preraṇā* in its nature, to which the other form is metaphorically applied. The metaphorical application of *preraṇā* to *kārya* derives from v. 84ab, *prādhānyāt kāryarūpatvaṃ niyogasya kim iṣyate*, “Because of its being the primary form, could *niyoga* be accepted as a duty?” In contrast, the metaphorical application of *kārya* to *preraṇā* derives from v. 84cd, *kim vā prerakatā tasya prādhānyād ucyate paraiḥ*, “Or, could other people say *niyoga* to be accepted as incitement because of its being the primary form?” Yamāri counts the former type (i.e., metaphorical application of *preraṇā* to *kārya*) as the fifth alternative (PVAN 42a7: *prādhānyād* [v. 84a] *ityādinārdhena pañcamo vikalpaḥ*), and the latter (i.e., that of *kārya* to *preraṇā*) as the sixth (PVAN 42b1: *kim ve* [v. 84c] *tyādinā ṣaṣṭho vikalpaḥ*). He also holds PVA<sub>O</sub>, v. 93 to be the explanation of the first subdivision of metaphorical application (PVAN 42a7: *asya* [i.e., *pañcamo vikalpaḥ*] *vyākhyānam—preraṇāvīṣaya* [v.93a] *ityādiślokaḥ*).

<sup>25</sup> Yamāri calls this “the seventh alternative” in PVAN 42b1: *kāryasye*(v. 85a)*tyādinā saptamo vikalpaḥ. asya vivaraṇam—preraṇā hī*(v. 94a)*tyādi.*

*preraṇā hi vinā kāryaṃ prerikā naiva kasyacit /  
kāryaṃ vā preraṇāṃ yogo niyogas tena saṃmataḥ* // (v. 94)  
Neither incitement would incite a person without a duty, nor  
[would] a duty [be carried out without] incitement. Therefore,  
enjoinment is considered the connection [of both].<sup>26</sup>

- (7) <sup>27</sup> Entirety (PVA<sub>O</sub> 30,4: *samudāya*) composed of a duty and incitement

*parasparāvinābhūtaṃ dvayam etat pratīyate /  
niyogaḥ samudāyo 'smāt kāryapreraṇayor mataḥ* // (v. 95)  
These two (i.e., duty and incitement) are known to be mutually  
inseparable. From this, it may be considered that enjoinment is the  
entirety of a duty and incitement.

- (8) <sup>28</sup> *Brahman* as the meaning of the Vedic sentence (PVA<sub>O</sub> 30,7: *vākyārtha*)

*siddham ekaṃ yato brahma gatam āmnāyataḥ sadā /  
siddhatvena na tat kāryaṃ prerakaṃ kuta eva tat* // (v. 96)  
Because *brahman*, which is accomplished and only one, is perpetu-  
ally known from the [Vedic] scripture,<sup>29</sup> it (i.e., the meaning of the  
Vedic scripture) is not a duty to be performed since it has already  
been accomplished. How could it incite [the listener]?

- (9) A certain machine (PVA<sub>O</sub> 30,10: *yantra*) through which one attains heaven

PVA<sub>O</sub> 30,10: *yantrārūḍhanīyogavādināṃ matam*.  
Those who state that the enjoinment pertains to a person who has  
mounted on a machine [leading to heaven] think as follows:  
*kāmī<sup>30</sup> yatraiva yaḥ kaścin niyoge sati tatra saḥ /  
viśayārūḍham ātmānaṃ manyamānaḥ pravartate* // (v. 97)

<sup>26</sup> PVAN 42b2: *tayor anyonyaṃ yogaḥ sambandho niyogaḥ*.

<sup>27</sup> Yamāri calls this “the eighth alternative” in PVAN 42b2: *niyogaḥ samudāyo 'the(v. 85c)ty aṣṭamo vikalpaḥ. asya vivṛtiḥ—paraspare(v. 95a)tyādi*.

<sup>28</sup> Yamāri calls this “the ninth alternative” in PVAN 42b3: *yad vā tadubhayāt para (v. 85d) iti navamo vikalpaḥ ... tad evācāṣṭe—siddham ekaṃ (v. 96) ityādi*. PVAN 42b3 glosses “*paraḥ*” as “*akāryapreraṇārūpam anyad eva niyogaśabdavācyaṃ*” (What is called *niyoga* is something neither duty nor incitement).

<sup>29</sup> PVAN 42b3–4: *brahma nāmādvaitaṃ caitanyarūpam. āmnāyato vedāt gataṃ pratītam*

<sup>30</sup> PVAN 42b5: *yantrārūḍhādaya (v. 86) iti yad uktaṃ tatrādimam darśayati—yantrārūḍhas tathābhīṣṭaḥ (v. 86a) kim (v. 86b) iti sambandhaḥ. vyākhyānam—kāmī(v. 97a)tyādi*.



When someone desires something (i.e., heaven)<sup>31</sup> and once an enjoinder is issued toward that (*tatra*) which [causes (*nimitta*) one to attain that thing],<sup>32</sup> that person (*saḥ*) begins to act, considering himself to have mounted on that scope [of enjoinder, i.e., the sacrifice]<sup>33</sup>.

(10) Enjoinder in the form of being enjoyed (PVA<sub>O</sub> 30,13: *bhogyarūpaniyoga*)<sup>34</sup>

*mamedam bhogyam ity evaṁ bhogyarūpaṁ pratīyate /  
mamatvena ca vijñānaṁ bhoktary eva vyavasthitam //* (v. 98)

[Hearing a Vedic injunction,] one realizes the nature of [the result] to be enjoyed in such a manner, “This is to be enjoyed by me.” The cognition of one’s own possession is established only when [one is aware of oneself as] the agent of enjoyment.

*svāmitvenābhimāno hi bhoktur yatra bhaved ayam /  
bhogyam tad eva vijñeyam tad eva svam nirucyate //* (v. 99)

Only a thing whose [future] possession<sup>35</sup> the enjoyer is convinced of (*abhimāna*) can be known as that which is to be [legitimately] enjoyed (*bhogyā*) and declared to be one’s own thing (*sva*).

*sādhyarūpatayā yena mamedam iti gamyate /  
tatprasādhyena rūpeṇa bhogyam svam vyapadiśyate //* (v. 100).

<sup>31</sup> PVAN 42b5: *yatra svarge*.

<sup>32</sup> PVAN 42b5: *tatreṭi tannimittam. yajeti niyoge sati*.

<sup>33</sup> Yamāri holds this *viśaya* as heaven. PVAN 42b5–6: *viśayaḥ kāmasya svargaḥ. tadārūḍhaḥ, ayam aham yajñī san niyamena svargaprāpta iti manyamānaḥ pravartate. tad evaṁ viśayatadārūḍhayor bhogyabhoktroḥ saṁbandho niyogaḥ ity arthaḥ*. “The scope of desire is heaven. ‘One who mounted on that (machine)’ undertakes [the sacrifice] thinking, ‘I will certainly attain heaven because here I am the sacrificer.’ That being the case, enjoinder is the relationship between the scope [of desire] and [the person] who has mounted on it, in other words, between what is to be enjoyed and one who enjoys it.”

However, according to Prabhākara’s terminology, “*viśaya*” means the scope of enjoinder, that is, the sacrificial act of offering, not the desired heaven. See footnote 11.

<sup>34</sup> PVAN 42b6: *bhogyarūpo ’tha vā sa* (i.e., *niyoga*) *kiṁ* (v. 86b) *iti dvitīyaṁ vyākhyāti. mametyādiślokatuṣṭayena* (vv. 98–101).

<sup>35</sup> PVAN 42b7: *sa ca bhoktā bhogyasvāmīrūpo vivakṣitaḥ, na ca gavām iva sukhasya svāmīti darśayati—svāmitvenetyādi*. “Moreover, this enjoyer is intended as the possessor of what is to be enjoyed, and the possessor of [future] delight is not like that of cows.

Because one realizes, “This becomes my own (*mamedam*) because it is to be accomplished [by me],” the thing concerned is called “one’s own thing to be enjoyed” (*svaṃ bhogyam*) because it is to be accomplished (*prasādhya*) by oneself.<sup>36</sup>

*siddharūpaṃ hi yad bhogyam na niyogaḥ sa tāvatā*<sup>37</sup> /  
*sādhyaṭveneha bhogyasya prerakatvān niyogatā* // (v. 101)

A thing to be enjoyed (*bhogyā*) does not function as an enjoinder if it is already accomplished (*siddharūpa*). Insofar as a thing to be enjoyed remains to be accomplished (*sādhya*), here [in the Vedic injunction], it functions as an enjoinder by inciting [the listener to begin to act].

- (11) The human being (PVA<sub>O</sub> 31,6: *puruṣa*) aware of duty<sup>38</sup>

*mamedam kāryam ity evaṃ manyate puruṣaḥ sadā* /  
*puruṣaḥ kāryaviśiṣṭatvaṃ niyogo 'sya ca vācyaṭā* // (v. 102)

If a person always thinks, “This is my duty,” what is called “enjoinder” is the fact that the person is qualified by duty. And such a person (*asya*)<sup>39</sup> is expressed [by the exhortative suffix of a Vedic injunction].

*kāryasya siddhau jātāyāṃ tadyuktaḥ puruṣaḥ tadā* /  
*bhavaṭ sādhitā ity evaṃ pumān vākyārtha ucyate* // (v. 103)

When the accomplishment of duty has occurred, the person bound to it should be [recognized] as successful (*sādhitā*). In this way, a person [qualified by duty] is called the “meaning of the Vedic sentence.”

## 1.2. Prajñākaragupta’s refutation of the alternative definitions of *niyoga*

After presenting eleven definitions, Prajñākaragupta attempts to classify them from his viewpoint using two types of tetralemma (*catuḥkoṭi*).<sup>40</sup>

This is indicated by ‘*svāmitvena*’ and so on.”

<sup>36</sup> PVAN 43a1: *tatprasādhyena bhokṛtprasādhyena viśiṣṭena*.

<sup>37</sup> PVAN 43a1: *tāvateti siddharūpatāmātreṇa*.

<sup>38</sup> PVAN 43a2: “*puruṣo vā niyogaḥ syād*” (v. 86c) *iti tṛtīyasya vyākhyānaṃ* “*mamedam kāryam*” (v. 102a) *ityādinā ślokadvayena* (vv. 102–103).

<sup>39</sup> PVAN 43a2: *asya ce*(v. 102d)*ti puruṣasya kāryaviśiṣṭasya*.

<sup>40</sup> PVA<sub>O</sub> 31,11: *sarvatra ca vākyārthe 'ṣṭaparakāro bhedaḥ*.

*Catuhkoṭi* is a logical argument that classifies the issue to one of the four alternatives: A, B, both A and B, and neither A nor B.<sup>41</sup> First, epistemologically, he presents a tetralemma asking whether *niyoga* is a means (A), an object (B), both means and object (both A and B), or neither means nor object of knowledge (neither A nor B).

The first tetralemma:

*pramāṇaṃ kiṃ niyogaḥ syāt prameyam atha vā punaḥ /  
ubhayena vihitō vā dvayarūpa eva vā //* (v. 104)

Is enjoinder a means of knowledge, an object of knowledge, something devoid of both, or something that consists of both?

With the object of knowledge (*prameya*), Prajñākaragupta may consider a duty (*kārya*) to perform the prescribed action. In contrast, with the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), he may consider incitement (*preraṇā*) by which the Vedic injunction is supposed to compel the listener. Therefore, (1) and (2) are the primary examples of groups B and A, respectively.

We may regard definitions (3) and (4) as belonging to group B and group A, respectively, because (3) and (4) entail either duty or incitement as the principal element assisted by the other.

We may also regard (5) as an example of group B. According to definition (5), the incitement by the Vedic injunction is not directly perceived but appears in human consciousness through metaphorical application to duty, which is a *prameya* brought to consciousness by the injunction and metaphorically assumed as its *pramāṇa* in consciousness.

By contrast, we may regard definitions (6) and (7) as belonging to the group of dual aspect (*dvayarūpa*) because they equally hold the two relata, duty and incitement, either to be mutually connected or to form an entirety composed of both. In (6) and (7), incitement and duty are of equal status.

Finally, definition (8) is tantamount to stating that the Veda is free from duty and incitement (*ubhayena vihitā*) because it holds the Veda's essence to be nothing other than *brahman*. Because *brahman* is permanently accom-

<sup>41</sup> In the tetralemma used by Nāgārjuna, B is nothing but the denial of A. Nāgārjuna presents the impossibility of all four cases: A, non-A, both A and non-A, and neither A nor non-A. In the present tetralemma by Prajñākaragupta, A and B are contrasting but not contradictory.

plished (*siddha*) and never changes, the meaning of the Veda at its ultimate level has nothing to do with human activities.

We can also state that the awareness of duty is an activity of the human being, whereas incitement is the activity of the Vedic injunction. Therefore, making use of Kumārila's classification of *bhāvanā* into *śabdabhāvanā* (i.e., *abhidhābhāvanā*) and *arthabhāvanā* (i.e., *arthātmabhāvanā*) (vv. 115–118), Prajñākaragupta formulates another tetralemma: definitions (1) to (8) are classified into either (A) the activity (*vyāpāra*) of a word (*śabda*), (B) the activity of a human being (*puruṣa*), both (A) and (B), or neither (A) nor (B).

The second tetralemma:

*śabdavyāpārarūpo vā vyāpārah puruṣasya vā /  
dvayavyāpārarūpo vā dvayavyāpāra eva vā* // (v. 105)<sup>42</sup>

Is [enjoinment] the activity of a word, the activity of a human being, something that consists of both activities, or something devoid of both activities?

Accordingly, the first eight alternative definitions of *niyoga* can be classified into the following four cases. The first and second cases include the alternatives in which A or B, as the main element, is assisted by B or A, respectively.

A ( <i>pramāṇa</i> , <i>śabdavyāpāra</i> )	(2) (4)
B ( <i>prameya</i> , <i>puruṣavyāpāra</i> )	(1) (3) (5)
both A and B ( <i>dvayarūpa eva</i> , <i>dvayavyāpārarūpa</i> )	(6) (7)
neither A nor B ( <i>ubhayena vihīna</i> , <i>dvayavyāpāra eva</i> )	(8)

<sup>42</sup> As Ono (2000: 89–90) presents in his appendix (Anhang), Vidyānanda, the Jain scholar, quotes Prajñākaragupta's verses of explaining the eleven alternative definitions of *niyoga* (vv. 87–103) and his two tetrallemmas (vv. 104–105) in the *Aṣṭasahasrī* (AS), *prathama pariccheda*, vv. 4–22, counting the total number of these definitions as eleven (AS 5,28: *ekādaśaprakāra*; 6,5: *ekādaśabheda*). Mikogami (1993) translates Vidyānanda's quotation of the eleven alternative definitions of *niyoga* and his criticism of them into Japanese.

Dr. Hisayasu Kobayashi kindly informed me that another Jain scholar, Prabhācandra, criticizes the theory of *niyoga* after quoting the eleven alternative definitions of *niyoga* from the PVA (v. 87, v. 90, v. 91, v. 92, v. 93, v. 94, v. 95, v. 96, v. 97, vv. 98–101, and v. 102) in the *Nyāyakumudacandra* (NKC 583,1–584,24).

Then, under this classification, Prajñākaragupta proceeds to criticize these alternative definitions of *niyoga*. However, it is not clear how to distribute them to the targets of his criticism in vv. 106–118 even resorting to Yamāri's commentary. Prajñākaragupta's ambiguity seems to have caused some confusion among his followers.<sup>43</sup>

Therefore, concerning the first eight definitions of *niyoga*, we should attempt to find a more plausible correspondence between them (vv. 87–96) and their refutation (vv. 106–118). First, regarding definition (1), Prajñākaragupta states that “pure duty” (*kārya*) cannot be *niyoga* because in that case, it is impossible to identify who is specified as “enjoined” (*niyojya*) without an external incitement. In other words, without external incitement, no one would take responsibility for performing the duty, thinking, “This is my duty.”

PVA<sub>O</sub> 31,17–32,4: *atrocyate. sarvam etad asaṃgatam. yataḥ*

Here we reply. All these are inconsistent. Because

*preraṇārahitaṃ kāryaṃ niyojyena vivarjitaṃ /*  
*niyogo naiva kasyāpi niyoga iti kīrtyate //*

<sup>43</sup> Yamāri presents two views of how the alternatives except the last three (PVAN 43a3: *anyeṣu navasu*) are refuted in PVA, vv. 106–113. First, he regards all of these verses as refuting the first definition, “pure duty” (*śuddhakārya*) (PVAN 43a3). Then, in response to the question how the remaining alternatives are criticized, he answers that Prajñākaragupta also rejected them by these same verses (PVAN 43b2). This second view is based on a verse quoted by Yamāri as a summarizing verse (PVAN 44a1: *saṅgrahaḥ*), which distributes the target of vv. 106–113 to each of the first eight alternatives as follows:

*dvābhyāṃ ādyaś caturthena navamaḥ ṣaṣṭhapañcamau /*  
*tataś caturbhir ākhyātau tṛtīyenāpare hatāḥ //* (PVAN 43b7–44a1)

The first [definition of *niyoga*, i.e., *śuddhakārya* (vv. 87–89)] is rejected by the first two verses (vv. 106–107); the ninth (i.e., definition [8], that is, *ubhayaśvabhāvavinirmukta* [v. 96]) by the fourth (v. 109); the two called the sixth and fifth (i.e., two types of definition [5], that is, *upacāra* [v. 93]) by the next four (vv. 110–113); the others (i.e., definitions [2], [3], [4], [6], and [7]) by the third (v. 108).

Yamāri paraphrases this *saṅgrahaśloka* in his words (PVAN 43b3–7). However, it is difficult to accept this forced distribution of verses 106–113 for the refutation of

*vṛttir niyogaśabdasya śuddhe kārye yadā matā /  
saṃjñāmātrān niyogatvaṃ bhavat kena nivāryate //  
yuktas tu puruṣaḥ kārye yatra naiva pratīyate /  
niyogaḥ sa kathaṃ nāma siddhātītādibodhavat //* (vv. 106–108)

If enjoinderment were a duty without incitement, it would be considered as pertaining to nobody (*kasyāpi*) because it lacks an enjoined person. If the word “enjoinderment” were to be applied to a pure duty, no one could deny that [the Vedic enjoinderment] is nothing but an enjoinderment in name only. However, if no person were aware of being enjoined (*yukta*) to duty, how could that (i.e., the duty)<sup>44</sup> be an enjoinderment in the same manner that the cognition of something accomplished or vanished [cannot be an enjoinderment]?

Regarding definition (2), he assumes that “pure incitement” (*preraṇā*), which is a property of “enjoinder” (*niyojaka*), cannot be *niyoga* because according to his second scheme, as we have expounded in the Introduction, the enjoinder is already accomplished and has nothing to be accomplished (v. 109).

*niyojakasya dharmo 'yaṃ niyogo lokasaṃmataḥ /  
tad eva kāryam iti cet siddhatvān nāsyā sādhyatā //* (v. 109)

If you say that in the world, this enjoinderment is accepted to be a property of the enjoinder and duty is nothing else besides that, [then we retort that] this (enjoinder) has nothing to be accomplished because of being accomplished.

Definition (5) claims that enjoinderment is reflexively perceived as a sense of duty in the form of “this is my duty,” whereas the incitement by the Veda is not perceived but merely metaphorically applied (*upacāra*) to it. Associating definition (2) with (5), Prajñākaragupta considers it impossible to metaphorically apply incitement to duty because the enjoinder who issues an incitement is already accomplished, whereas the action to be done as a duty is not yet accomplished (v. 110–113).

PVA<sub>O</sub> 32,7–14:

each definition.

<sup>44</sup> PVAN 43a4: *sa iti kāryam, pulliṅgatā ca niyogaśabdasānnidhyāt*. “The pronoun ‘sa’ refers to the word ‘kārya.’ It is masculine because of its proximity to the word ‘niyoga.’”

*sādhyaṭvena niyogo 'yam iti ced vyapadiśyate /  
viṣaye tasya tattvena upacārāt prakīrtanam //* (v. 110)<sup>45</sup>

If you say that this [property of the enjoiner] is called “enjoinment” because it is to be accomplished, then [you] announce it as that (i.e., enjoinment) by metaphorically applying it to its scope.

*asiddhasya ca tasyāstu katham prerakarūpatā /  
sādhyaṭvenāvbodho 'sya prerakatvaṃ yadīśyate //  
aprasiddhasya sādhyaṭvaṃ bodhaḥ siddhātmakasya ca /  
parasparaviruddhatvam ekasya katham iśyate //  
sādhyaṭvapatayā tasya pratītiḥ prerikā yadi /  
niyogatvaṃ pratīteḥ syān na niyogasya tattvataḥ //* (vv. 111–113)<sup>46</sup>

But how could that (i.e., the scope [*viṣaya*]) which is not yet accomplished (*asiddha*) have the form of an incitement? If [you say that] its (i.e., the scope's) cognition is an incitement because it is to be accomplished, [we retort: you say that the *kārya*], which is not yet accomplished, is to be accomplished whereas [the *preraṇā*], which is already accomplished, is cognized [by *upacāra*]. [But] how could the same thing have two incompatible aspects? If its (i.e., the scope's) cognition as something to be accomplished were inciting, then the cognition [of enjoinment], in fact, not the enjoinment itself, would become an enjoinment.

There is a common feature between the definitions (6) and (7). Namely, both incitement and duty form an enjoinment on an equal footing regardless of whether they are simply combined (*saṃbandha*) or bring about a third entity as their entirety (*samudāya*) to form an enjoinment. In other words, in the terminology of the first tetralemma, they say that *niyoga* consists of both a means of knowledge (*preraṇā*) and an object of knowledge (*kārya*). To reject both (6) and (7) entirely, Prajñākaragupta declares that the same thing cannot be a means of knowledge and its object (v. 114).

*niyogo yadi vākyārthaḥ pramāṇaḥ kiṃ bhaviṣyati /  
mānarūpo niyogaś cet prameyaḥ kiṃ punar bhavet //* (v. 114)

If enjoinment is the meaning of a sentence, how could it be a means of knowledge? If enjoinment is a means of knowledge, how could it be an object of knowledge?

<sup>45</sup> PVAN 43b6: *tatra* (43b6: *sādhyaṭvenetyādīślokatuṣṭaya*, i.e., vv. 110–113) *prathamāślokena* (i.e., v. 110) *pañcamasthityanuvādaḥ*.

<sup>46</sup> PVAN 43b6: *dvitīyārdhena* (the second half, i.e., vv. 112–113) *dūṣaṇam*.

Moreover, to reject (6) and (7), Prajñākaragupta also applies the second tetralemma applying *niyoga* to Kumārila's two kinds of "force of activation" (*bhāvanā*). Because incitement (*preraṇā*) is the operation of the Vedic word and the sense of duty (*kārya*) is a mental activity of a human being, the former corresponds to the verbal force of activation (*śabdabhāvanā*) and the latter to the intentional force of activation (*arthabhāvanā*).

PVA<sub>O</sub> 32,18–33,5:

*niyogaḥ puruṣasyeṣṭo vyāpāras tattvato yadi /  
vyāpāraḥ puruṣasyāsau bhāvanaivānyavācakā //* (v. 115)

*vākyavyāpārapakṣe tu bhavet sā śabdabhāvanā /  
śabdātmabhāvanām āhur anyām eva liṅādayaḥ //* (v. 116)

Suppose enjoinderment is held to be a human being's operation in reality. In that case, this operation of a human being [called *niyoga*] is nothing but "the [intentional] force of activation" in another name. However, suppose [enjoinderment] is held to be a [Vedic] sentence's operation. In that case, it is nothing but "the verbal force of activation" as [Kumārila says] "the verbal ending in the optative and so on express another kind of force of activation that is the nature of a word."<sup>47</sup>

*śabdād eva tv asau jātā puruṣaḥ kiṃ pravartate /  
śabdena prerito no cet svavyāpāre pravartate //* (v. 117)

*śabdenācoditatve 'sya katham astu pravartanam /  
śabdena codane tasya nirālambanatā dhiyaḥ //* (v. 118)

However, if it (i.e., *bhāvanā*) occurs only from Vedic words, does a human being act [simply] being incited by words?<sup>48</sup> If not,<sup>49</sup> one begins to act on one's own activity.<sup>50</sup> If [one begins to act on one's own activity] without being prompted by the [Vedic] word,<sup>51</sup> then how could it incite

<sup>47</sup> See footnote 7.

<sup>48</sup> This rhetorical question denies that a human being begins to act simply because of being enjoined by someone else, following Prajñākaragupta's first scheme. PVAN 44b2: *puruṣapravṛttir anupapannety arthaḥ*.

<sup>49</sup> PVAN 44b2: *na khalu yajeteti śabdenātmavyāpāranimittam puruṣaḥ preritaḥ, na ca tatra* (i.e., *śabdātmavyāpāra*) *pravartata iti yojanā*.

<sup>50</sup> PVAN 44b2: *puruṣasya svo vyāpāra ity arthaḥ*.

<sup>51</sup> PVAN 44b2–3: *atra vikalpadvayam—so 'pi svavyāpāre śabdena codito na vā. neti pakṣe śabdenetyādipūrvārdhena* (i.e., v. 118ab).



[one to act]? If [one begins to act] prompted by the [Vedic] word,<sup>52</sup> one's discretion becomes empty.<sup>53</sup>

Because Kumārila distinguishes these two kinds of *bhāvanā* as different in terms of their locations, namely, the exhortative word and a human being, Prajñākaragupta points out that *niyoga* cannot consist of both kinds of *bhāvanā* at the same time. If it corresponds to one kind of *bhāvanā*, it cannot correspond to the other.<sup>54</sup>

For the last three definitions—(9), (10), and (11)—, however, the tetralemmas given in verses 104–105 do not work. Prajñākaragupta does not attempt to examine which of the four cases of each tetralemma applies to them. According to these three definitions, for the successful operation of the Vedic enjoinder, a particular condition must be fulfilled on the side of the enjoined person, namely, (9) the feeling of having mounted on a certain “machine,” (10) the cognition of the legitimacy of enjoyment, and (11) the continuous awareness of one's duty. Prajñākaragupta notices that these three definitions are somehow related to one another,<sup>55</sup> but he merely sticks to the temporal dilemma used in his second scheme.

<sup>52</sup> PVAN 44b3: *śeṣapakṣe paścārdham* (i.e., v. 118cd) *nirālabhanateti*.

<sup>53</sup> PVAN 44b3: *tad*(i.e., *puruṣasya*)*vyāpārasyābhāvāt*.

<sup>54</sup> Being free from the distribution summarized in the *saṃgrahaśloka* (footnote 43), Yamāri also seems to admit that Prajñākaragupta intends to criticize alternative definitions (6) and (7) in vv. 114–118, by renaming them “the alternative in the form of the two operations” (*dvayavyāpārārūpavikalpa*) in PVAN 44b3: *tāvataivaṃ* (i.e., vv. 114–118) *dvayavyāpārārūpavikalpapratihatīḥ*. After that, Yamāri renames definition (8) “the alternative without the two operations” (*dvayavyāpāravarāhāvikalpa*), adding that there is no room for this as an alternative definition of *niyoga* because (8) does not assume human beings' activity based on Vedic injunction in PVAN 44b3–4: *dvayavyāpāravarāhāvikalpo 'pi nāśaṅkhanīyaḥ, tāvatāpi niyogārthāprāptelḥ pravṛtter abhāvād iti*.

<sup>55</sup> PVAN 44b4: *evam aṣṭau vikalpān apāśyānantaroktām anālabhanatām śeṣeṣu yantrārūḍhādiṣu triṣv iti darśayann āha—evam ityādi*. “After rejecting these eight alternatives, [Prajñākaragupta] said, ‘In the same way, [also the mounting on a machine, and so on, are the meaning of sentence equipped with failures to be mentioned]’ (PVAO 33,6: *evam yantrārūḍhādayo 'pi vākyārthā vācyadoṣāḥ*), to demonstrate that [he] will immediately state the emptiness of the remaining three [alternatives, namely,] the mounting on a machine, and so on.”

PVA<sub>O</sub> 33,7–10:

*yantrārūḍhatayā bhogyabhoktroḥ saṁbandha ucyate /  
na saṁbandho 'sti bhogyātmārūḍhaś ca na naraś tadā //* (v. 119)

The relationship between the object and the agent of enjoyment may be regarded such that [the agent] has mounted on a machine. However, at that time [of hearing the Vedic injunction], this relationship does not exist, and a human being has not mounted on what is to be enjoyed.

*pratītikāle sarvasya sādhyatvenāsvarūpatā /  
tad eva tasya rūpaṁ cen na sādhyatvasya hānitāḥ //* (v. 120)

At the time of cognition, everything does not have the nature of something to be accomplished. If you say that only that [i.e., cognition (*pratīti*)] is its nature, we answer “No,” because it has already lost the state to be accomplished [insofar as it is cognized].

Concerning the result to be enjoyed (*bhogyā*), Prajñākaragupta posits two possible perspectives: on the one hand, it has not yet been accomplished in reality; on the other hand, it has already been accomplished in cognition. From the former perspective, the result is a non-existent object (v. 119);<sup>56</sup> in the latter perspective, it has already been accomplished and cannot be accomplished anymore (v. 120).<sup>57</sup> In this criticism, Prajñākaragupta merely finds fault with these alternative definitions in terms of the temporal dilemma of his second scheme. Moreover, regarding definition (9), he does not explain

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It should be noted here that Yamāri, free from the *saṁgrahaśloka* (see footnote 43), counts the alternatives defined in vv. 87–96 and criticized in vv. 106–118 as “eight alternatives” without classifying the fifth alternative into two subtypes.

<sup>56</sup> PVAN 44b4–5: *tadeti vākyārthapratītikāle. bhogyātmanaḥ svargalakṣaṇasyābhāvāt tadā-rūḍho na puruṣaḥ. tato na saṁbandhasambhavaḥ.* “‘At that time’ (v. 119d) means when one realizes the meaning of the [Vedic] sentence. Because [at that time] the object of enjoyment that consists in heaven does not exist, the person has not mounted on it. Therefore this relationship is impossible.”

<sup>57</sup> PVAN 44b5–6: *tad eva tasya rūpaṁ ced iti vikalpārūḍhaṁ svargādeḥ. neti pūrva-pakṣaṇiṣedhaḥ. vikalpārūḍhaṁ eva rūpaṁ yadi svargasvabhāvaḥ, tadā tat siddham eveti sādhyatvahāniḥ.* “‘Only that is its nature’ (v. 120c) means that heaven has already mounted on [one’s] discernment. ‘No’ means the denial of the opponent’s position. [If you say that] the nature of heaven has already mounted on [one’s] discernment, then it has already been accomplished at that time, therefore it fails to be accomplished.”

what kind of “machine” (*yantra*) is said to make one feel as if mounting on it (v. 119ab). Thus, we may say that Prajñākaragupta has no intention to exactly investigate how these definitions came to be propounded in the Prābhākara school.

## 2. Prabhākara and his dual perspective on the fixed (*nitya*) sacrifice

### 2.1. A trace of Prabhākara’s own view in the PVA

Just before introducing the eleven alternative definitions of *niyoga*, Prajñākaragupta quotes a brief statement from his opponent. In this final argument, the opponent insists that a person eligible for a sacrifice (*adhikārin*) is distinguished from the agent (*karṭṛ*) who is actually performing the sacrifice.

PVA<sub>O</sub> 28,1–2: *athāpi na karṭṛtvenāsau preryate, kiṃ tv adhikāritvenaiva. na hy akurvan kartā bhavati, adhikāritvaṃ tu yogyatayā.*

[Opponent:] Or, [one who is enjoined (*niyojya*)] is not incited [by the Vedic injunction to perform the action] as the agent, but only as the person eligible [to perform the action] because, before performing an action, one cannot be the agent, but can be the person eligible for the action by virtue of suitability.

The opponent adduces this distinction to counter Prajñākaragupta’s criticism. Before this statement, the opponent proposed that the Vedic enjoinder is to be considered as the relation (*sambandha*) between the enjoiner (*niyojaka*) and the enjoined person (*niyojya*). Prajñākaragupta criticized this proposal stating that the Vedic injunction would fail to secure a person who feels a sense of duty to follow it because, at the time of issuing *niyoga*, the one who hears the injunction has not yet become the agent (*karṭṛ*) of the sacrifice.<sup>58</sup> Then, with the statement mentioned above, the opponent retorts that when *niyoga* issues from Vedic injunction, the enjoined person who feels obliged to hold a sacrifice is not the same as one who is actually performing the sacrifice, but one who is “suitable” (*yogyā*) to perform the sacrifice, and the latter has the eligibility (*adhikāra*) for the sacrifice.

<sup>58</sup> PVA<sub>O</sub> 27,8–14.

Prajñākaragupta rejects this statement as a mere excuse<sup>59</sup>; it is no use introducing the concept of “suitability.” When hearing a Vedic injunction, the action prescribed as the scope (*viṣaya*) of the injunction is non-existent because the listener has not yet begun the sacrifice. Because the action is non-existent, one cannot understand what kind of action one has been told to be “suitable” to perform. In this way, considering the time difference between the issue of enjoinder and the performance of an action, Prajñākaragupta insists that “suitability” is not useful for identifying the enjoined person.<sup>60</sup>

However, the distinction between the person eligible for a sacrifice (*adhikārin*) and the agent (*kartr*) of the sacrifice is the key to understanding Prabhākara’s contribution to the theory of *niyoga*. Moreover, this distinction explains why the last three among the eleven alternative definitions of *niyoga* are categorized into one group. Even before Prabhākara’s time, the Vedic enjoinder had already been called *niyoga*<sup>61</sup>; some maintained that the Veda unconditionally imposes the duty to hold a sacrifice upon the listener. In

<sup>59</sup> PVA<sub>O</sub> 28,2–5: *tad apy asat. yogyatā viṣaye kvāpi vinā na viṣayeṇa sā / viṣayātyakṣatāyām ca pratītā yogyatā katham* // (v. 81) “[Proponent:] This is also wrong. Suitability pertains to a certain scope. Without scope, there is no suitability for anything. How could suitability be understood when the scope is imperceptible?”

<sup>60</sup> Prajñākaragupta paraphrases verse 81 as follows. PVA<sub>O</sub> 28,6–8: *na khalu yogyatāviṣayaṃ svavayāpāram ajānānas tadviṣayaaviśiṣṭaṃ yogyatām svarūpato ’vagacchati. tataḥ kartrtvavad atrāpi doṣa eva*. “In fact, one who does not know which action one is suitable for is not aware of the suitability qualified by that [action] as its scope. Therefore, as in the case of the agent, there is also a fault in this view.”

Yamāri comments that Prajñākaragupta examined this last stand of the opponent with irony (*ullunṭha*) holding it untrue (*asat*). PVAN 42a3: *yathā kartrtvam asat, tathā tadviṣayaaviśiṣṭā yogyatāpy asatī vicāre caritāḥ sthitā iti sollunṭham*.

<sup>61</sup> Oberhammer, et. al. (1996: 137–139) trace the exegetic use of the term *niyoga* in the *tantrayukti*-tradition and the early Nyāya school, that is, the *Nyāyabhāṣya* and the *Nyāyavārttika* on *Nyāyasūtra* (NS) 2.1.63: *vidhir vidhāyakaḥ*. Cf. *Arthaśāstra* (AŚ) 9.7.73: *gurulāghavayogāc cāpadāṃ niyogavikalpasamuccayā bhavanti*; 74: “*anenaivopāyena nānyena*” *iti niyogaḥ*; 75: “*anena vānyena vā*” *iti vikalpaḥ*; 76: “*anenānyena ca*” *iti samuccayaḥ*. “Depending on the gravity or the triviality of the dangers, there is restriction, option, or combination. ‘Only by this strategy and none other’—that is restriction. ‘By this or by that’—that is option. ‘By this and by that’—that is combination.” (transl. by Olivelle 2013: 371); AŚ 15.1.63: *evam nānyatheti niyogaḥ*; 64: “*tasmād dharmyam arthyam cāsyopadiśet, nādharmyam anarthyam ca*” (AŚ 1.17.33)

the next section, we will argue that by distinguishing agency (*kartr̥tva*) and eligibility (*adhikāritva*), Prabhākara propounded his own theory of *niyoga* to reform this current view.

## 2.2. Controversy on *niyoga* between Prabhākara and his opponent who adheres to Bādari

In Mīmāṃsā exegesis, every Vedic sacrifice is thought to have a direction (*codanā*), a particular injunction of its eligibility (*adhikāra*), as the core of its chain of command. The fixed (*nitya*) sacrifices—that is, those to be held periodically, such as the new and full moon sacrifices (*darśapūrṇamāsau*)—have their injunction of eligibility (*adhikāra*vidhi) in the form “one who desires heaven ought to hold the sacrifice” (*svargakāmo yajeta*). The desire for heaven is compatible with the periodical fixity of these sacrifices because, insofar as one is alive, one always desires to attain heaven after death.<sup>62</sup> Prabhākara also follows this orthodox approach of setting the eligibility for the fixed sacrifice by taking its result (*phala*) into account.

Brh, pt. 5, 34,6–7: *yad idaṃ puruṣasya karmajanyaphalayogitayā karmaṇi śeṣitvaṃ sa cāyam adhikāra ity ucyate.*

A human being is superior (*śeṣin*) to the sacrifice (*karman*) because of being fit to acquire the result to be brought about through the sacrifice. This [superiority] is called “eligibility.”

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*iti.* “Restriction is saying,: ‘This way, and in no other way,’ such as: ‘Therefore, one should teach him what accords with Law and Success, never something that is contrary to Law and Success.’” (transl. by Olivelle 2013: 438).

For Kumārila’s use of the term “*niyoga*,” see Yoshimizu 1997: 47–49. In p. 49, I made a conjecture, “Im Tantravārttika und in der Ṭupṭikā hingegen taucht der von Prabhākara vorgetragene Begriff “Weisung des Veda” (*niyoga*) auf. Daher ist es möglich, daß Kumārila nach der Veröffentlichung des Śloka-vārttika bis zur Abfassung des Tantravārttika über die Niyoga-Lehre Prabhākaras indirekt Bescheid wußte.” However, I withdraw this conjecture because I modeled it after Frauwallner (1962)’s untenable hypothesis that elder Kumārila was influenced by younger Dharmakīrti in his last work, the *Brhātṭikā*. For the untenability of this hypothesis, see Yoshimizu 2022: footnote 1 and appendix.

<sup>62</sup> The desire for liberation (*mokṣa*) is out of the question in traditional Mīmāṃsā.

With the phrase “a human being is superior to the sacrifice” (*puruṣasya ... karmaṇi śeṣitvaṃ*), Prabhākara has in mind the controversy between the two ancient teachers, Bādari and Jaimini, a controversy recorded in one of the introductory sections of the third volume of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (MmS). The third volume of the MmS examines how to determine that a ritual element prescribed in an injunction is subservient (*śeṣa*) to another element (*parārtha*).<sup>63</sup>

In MmS 3.1.3 “*dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣu bādarih,*” Bādari ascribes the status of “subordinate element” (*śeṣa*), the topic of the third volume, to substances, their qualities, and preparatory acts. According to Śābarasvāmin, Bādari does not only enumerate three subordinate categories but restricts the subordinate status to these three, and claims that a Vedic sacrifice (*yāga*) is not subordinate to its result because it should be held for its own sake.<sup>64</sup> He asserts that once a fixed sacrifice is held, it is destined to bring about heaven as its result (*phala*), and claims that the sacrifice does so by itself (*svayam*) and cannot be considered a means to serve the sacrificer’s profit exclusively.<sup>65</sup> In opposition to Bādari, according to MmS 3.1.4–5 “*karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt; phalaṃ ca puruṣārthatvāt,*” Jaimini declares that a sacrifice is subordinate to its result, and the result to the person who has held the sacrifice.<sup>66</sup> Śābarasvāmin explains that this stems from Jaimini’s conviction that holding sacrifice is a tool (*upāya*) that serves for the sacrificer’s own

<sup>63</sup> Cf. MmS 3.1.1: *athātaḥ śeṣalakṣaṇam*; 3.1.2: *śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt*.

<sup>64</sup> ŚBh 660,3–4; ŚBh 661,4–5; ŚBh 661,1–3; see Yoshimizu 2020–21: footnote 22.

<sup>65</sup> ŚBh 661,3–4: *tasmims tu kṛte svayam eva tad bhavati. tasmin kṛte phalam asya bhavatīty etāvad gamyate. nāsti śabdo yāgena kriyate phalam iti*. “If it (i.e., the sacrifice) is held, that (result) occurs by itself. What is understood [from *codanā*] is that the result occurs for one who has held the sacrifice, but there are no words [in the Veda that state] that the result is brought about by means of the sacrifice.”

Paying attention to MmS 3.1.3 alone, one might consider Bādari a conservative theocrat, but this simplistic evaluation is off the mark. For Bādari’s egalitarian opinion on the caste system and his affinity to Yājñavalkya, see Yoshimizu 2021.

<sup>66</sup> MmS 3.1.4: *karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt*; 3.1.5: *phalaṃ ca puruṣārthatvāt*.

profit.<sup>67</sup> Prabhākara (as well as Jaimini and Śābarasvāmin) explicitly and repeatedly rejects Bādari's view recorded in MmS 3.1.3.<sup>68</sup>

However, during Prabhākara's time, some scholars adhered to Bādari. Prabhākara spends the entire section of the *Bṛhatī* on MmS 6.1.1–3, called “the section about one who desires heaven” (*svargakāmādhikaraṇa*), in presenting their discourse in the first half (*pūrvapakṣa*) and refuting it in detail in the last half (*uttarapakṣa*).<sup>69</sup> Focusing on the verb *yajeta*, they claimed that the person who has heard this verb is automatically obliged to carry out the sacrifice. In other words, the person eligible for a sacrifice (*adhikārin*) cannot be distinguished from the agent (*kartṛ*) of the sacrifice.

Bṛh, pt. 5, 14,1–5: *nanu ca tatrabhavantō vaiyākaraṇāḥ kecit kartāram evādhi-kṛtaṃ manyante, yo yasmin kartṛtayāvagamyaṭe sa tatrādhikṛta iti vadantaḥ. nādhikāro nāma kaścid arthāntarabhūtaḥ. ... ayam evāsau bādaripakṣaḥ.*

Some honorable people acquainted with grammar think that the person eligible [to hold a sacrifice] is nothing other than the agent [of the sacrifice]. They state that one who is recognized as the agent of an action is eligible for the action. There is no eligibility [for a sacrifice] that is different from [being the agent of the sacrifice]. ... This is precisely the view of Bādari.

Claiming that the verb “ought to hold a sacrifice” (*yajeta*) categorically enjoins the listener to take charge of the sacrifice as a duty, these scholars assign only a supplemental role to another word in the injunction, “one who desires heaven” (*svargakāmaḥ*), in identifying the person eligible for the sacrifice. They rely on Pāṇini's grammatical rule that the verbal suffix in one of the ten sorts of tenses and moods (L-suffix, *lakāra*) denotes the agent of action if used with a verb in the active or middle voice. The L-suffix is first added to a verbal root and then substituted by a personal ending (*tiṅ*) in forming a finite

<sup>67</sup> ŚBh 661,14–15: *na yāgaḥ kartavyatayā codyate, phalakāmasya tu tatsāadhanopāyatveneti.* “A sacrifice is laid down not as what is to be done [for itself], but as the means by which one who desires the result attains it.”

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Bṛh, pt. 4, 960,4–5 (on MmS 4.1.2): *nanu bādarīṇāpi viniyoga evāsāv upanyastaḥ. ata evāsau nirākṛtaḥ*; Bṛh, pt. 4, 978,2–3 (on MmS 4.1.21): *ata eva bādarer eṣā bhrāntiḥ dravyaguṇasamskāreṣv eva śeṣatvam iti*; Yoshimizu 1997: 329 and 337.

<sup>69</sup> For the entire structure of the *Svargakāmādhikaraṇa* of the Bṛh, see Yoshimizu 1997: 212–225.

verb.<sup>70</sup> They also hold that both components of the Bahuvrīhi *svargakāmaḥ*, *svarga* and *kāma*, are subordinate (*upasarjana*) to the verb *yajeta*<sup>71</sup> because they elucidate the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the agent (*karṭṛ*), whom the verbal suffix of “*yajeta*” has already designated.

According to Prabhākara’s opponent, the Bahuvrīhi noun “*svargakāmaḥ*” qualifies the agent of the act of sacrifice. As a result, desiring heaven becomes a subordinate mental rite, a rite like the “meditating on the ocean” performed at one scene of the new and full moon sacrifices.<sup>72</sup> Accordingly, one should not regard sacrifice as a means to fulfill one’s desire because desiring heaven is a mental action subordinate to the act of sacrifice. Regarding the Vedic injunction as entailing a categorical imperative, Prabhākara’s opponent concludes that the eligible person is identical to the agent of the sacrifice.

Bṛh, pt. 5, 22,4–5: *tasmāt na karṭṛto ’dhikṛtatvaṃ nāma prthag asti kiṃcit*.

[Opponent:] Therefore, there is nothing called eligibility apart from one’s being the agent [of the sacrifice].

<sup>70</sup> A 3.4.67: *kartari* [kṛt]; 69: *laḥ* [karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyah]; 77: *lasya*; 78: *tiP-tas-jhi-...-iT-vahi-mahiN*. Cf. Bṛh, pt. 5, 15,5–6: *tinābhīdhānāt saṅkhyāyāḥ prathamāyās cotpattiḥ* “[Because the agent is] denoted by a personal ending, [the subject ‘*svargakāmaḥ*’] has the grammatical number [of the verb ‘*yajeta*’] and the nominative case suffix”; Yoshimizu 1997: 169, footnote 48.

<sup>71</sup> A 1.2.43: *prathamānirdiṣṭaṃ samāsa upasarjanam*; 2.2.24: *anekam anyapadārthe*. See Bṛh, pt. 5, 7,2–8,4; Yoshimizu 1997: 349, footnote 86.

<sup>72</sup> Bṛh, pt. 5, 17,1–2: *na na saṃbadhyate, aṅgatayā ca “samudraṃ manasā dhyāyed” itivat kāmanam kartavyam prāpnoti*. “[Opponent: Even if the sacrifice is not the means for attaining heaven, the noun *svargakāmaḥ*] is related to the verb ‘*yajeta*.’ [Even without holding heaven as the result of the sacrifice,] one can desire [heaven during the sacrifice], in the same manner that one ought to meditate on the ocean in the heart as a subordinate action (cf. *Āpastambaśrautasūtra* [ĀpŚS] 4.3.1; Yoshimizu 1997: 215).”

As argued in Yoshimizu 2020–21: 98–99, in the Bṛh on MmS 3.1.3, Prabhākara’s opponent adhering to Bādari proves the “*svarga*” of “*svargakāmaḥ*” to work merely as the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the agent (*karṭṛ*) denoted by the verbal ending of the verb “*yajeta*,” without denoting the object (*karman*) to be attained by the sacrifice, unlike the “*rājan*” in “*rājapuruṣaṃ paśya*” (Look at the servant of the king!), which denotes the king as an object of seeing that qualifies the servant to be seen.



Prabhākara, as the proponent of this section, rejects this conclusion and propounds its contrary, which corresponds to the statement mentioned above as the final statement of Prajñākaragupta's opponent. Unlike a descriptive statement in the present indicative (e.g., "Devadatta cooks porridge on a pan using fuels"), the Vedic injunction has its verb "ought to hold a sacrifice" (*yajeta*) in the optative.<sup>73</sup> By virtue of this optative ending, a particular person is made eligible (*adhikṛta*) to carry out its order.

The relationship between the sacrifice and heaven cannot be empirically confirmed as a kind of causality,<sup>74</sup> nor can it exegetically be attested to by a Vedic injunction of application (*vinīyogavidhi*), which "applies" its referent as a ritual element subordinate (*śeṣa*) to something else. For example, in "he ought to hold a sacrifice employing rice grains" (*vrīhibhir yajeta*), the role of the material for the oblation is ascribed to rice grains by means of the instrumental case-suffix<sup>75</sup>; in "he cooks porridge" (*odanaṃ pacati*), the role of the object (*karman*) most desired (*īpsitatama*) by the agent is applied to porridge by means of the accusative case-suffix.<sup>76</sup> However, in the injunction of eligibility (*adhikāraavidhi*), "*svargakāmo yajeta*," there is no single word whose case suffix indicates that the sacrifice is a means to be applied for attaining heaven.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>73</sup> Brh, pt. 5, 37,3–4; see Yoshimizu 1997: 368–369.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Brh, pt. 4, 1033,8–1034,2 (on MmS 4.3.10); Yoshimizu 1997: 357, footnote 186.

<sup>75</sup> A 1.4.42: *sādhakatamaṃ karaṇam*; 2.3.18: [*karṭr-*]*karaṇayos trṭīyā*.

<sup>76</sup> A 1.4.49: *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*; 2.3.2: *karmaṇi dvitīyā*.

<sup>77</sup> Brh, pt. 3, 300,3–301,4 (on MmS 2.2.1): *kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇaṃ na vinīyogalakṣaṇasaṃbandho 'yaṃ. vinīyajakānāṃ śrutyādīnāṃ abhāvāt. ... aidamarthyāṇi ca vinīyogāva-gamyam ity uktam "śeṣaḥ parārthād" ity atra. tatra ca śrutyādīni vinīyoge kāraṇānīti*. "[Question:] Why is this relationship [between sacrifice and heaven] not characterized as 'application' (*vinīyoga*)? [Answer:] Because there is no direct expression [*śruti*, i.e., case suffix] and so forth\* that applies [the sacrifice as subordinate to heaven]. ... In [MmS 3.1.2] '[An element X] becomes subordinate as it is for the sake of another element (Y),' it is stated that X's subsidiarity to Y is made known by application, and that the direct expression [i.e., case suffix] and so on are the means of knowing the application"; Brh, pt. 3, 302,1: *tasmān na vinīyogād yāgasvargayoḥ sambandhaḥ*. "Therefore, the relationship between sacrifice and heaven cannot be known through application." Cf. Yoshimizu 1997: 239–240.

\*Six kinds of criteria for application are the topic of the third volume of the MmS.

Moreover, unlike Śabaravāmin and Kumāṛila,<sup>78</sup> Prabhākara does not consider the injunction of eligibility to prompt the listener to exert the general form of action called “force of actualization” (*bhāvanā*) that is formulated as aiming at attaining a result by means of an action. Instead of a single word, Prabhākara resorts to the syntactic connection (*ekavākyatā*) between the subject and the verb in an injunction.

Brh, pt. 5, 42,3–5: *kāmyamānatvena svargaḥ puruṣaṁ viśiṣṭīty uktam. bhāvanārthe ca niyoga ity etad apy uktam. seyaṁ niyoganiyojyaviṣayatayaika-vākyatā.*

[Proponent: “One who desires heaven” (*svargakāmaḥ*)] states that heaven qualifies the [enjoined] person insofar as it is desired. [In “ought to hold a sacrifice” (*yajeta*)], it is also stated that there is an enjoinder to perform the meaning of the verbal stem. Thus, [both these words] come to have a syntactic connection (*ekavākyatā*) when the former and the latter respectively refer to the enjoined person and the scope of the [same] enjoinder.

In the injunction “*svargakāmo yajeta*,” both the noun in the nominative “*svargakāmaḥ*” and the verb “*yajeta*” in the optative denote their meanings to the extent that they mutually correlate.<sup>79</sup> In Mīmāṃsā exegesis, the mutual correlation between two elements is made possible when one is subordinate to the other. Prabhākara refutes his opponent’s assumption that the desire for heaven is subordinate to the sacrifice, like the ritual meditation on the ocean performed at the new and full moon sacrifices, holding that it results in a circular argument.<sup>80</sup>

Brh, pt. 5, 42,8–9: *yāgaprādhānye cokto doṣaḥ. tasmāt kāmāpradhānatayai-vaikāniyogasambandhaḥ.*

Moreover, the flaw in the case wherein the sacrifice is primary has already been mentioned. Therefore, [the enjoined person and the scope] are related to the same enjoinder only in such a manner that the object of desire is primary.

<sup>78</sup> See footnote 116.

<sup>79</sup> In this context (Brh, pt. 5, 23,6; 43,2), Prabhākara uses the name of his theory of sentence meaning, “the denotation of what is correlated” (*anvitābhīdhāna*), as discussed in the Brh on MmS 1.1.24–26. Cf. Brh, pt. 1, 352,4; 386,2–3; 389,6; 392,15.

<sup>80</sup> See Brh, pt. 5, 37,4–38,3; Yoshimizu 2020–21: 100–101.

Regarding the enjoined person's consciousness, Prabhākara admits that sacrifice is regarded as the means to attain the desired result (*phala*).<sup>81</sup> To explain this hierarchical order between the sacrifice and the desired result, he adduces a simile of a minister who obediently serves a king despite earning his own benefit.

Brh, pt. 5, 36,1–3: *loke 'pi ca anyatrādhikṛto 'nyat sādhayati. rājakarmasv adhikṛto 'mātyas svārthaṃ sādhayati. tatsiddhyarthaṃ tu rājakarmani karṭṛtvam.*

In the world, too, [it is observed that] one who is eligible for an affair carries out something else—[For example,] a minister eligible for royal service earns his own profit. However, to attain [the minister's profit], he becomes an agent of royal service.

The minister earns his profit if he successfully executes his duty in the royal administration, organized to strengthen the king's political power.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>81</sup> English translation of Yoshimizu 1997: 184, footnote 89:

"Almost at the end of the Svargakāmādhikaraṇa (MmS 6.1.1–3), Prabhākara responds to an objection of the opponent who adheres to Bādari. Based on *Manusmṛti* (Mn) 2.2a: 'Being fixated on desire is not praiseworthy' (*kāmātmatā na praśastā*), the opponent asserts that the sacrificial act must not be regarded as a means to fulfill one's desire (Brh, pt. 5, 30,6–8). In reply, Prabhākara first points out that there is no direct prohibition in Dharmaśāstra against desiring heaven. After that, Prabhākara asserts that this prohibition of Mn 2.2a teaches a spiritual virtue (*ātmaguṇa*), just like the worldly prohibition of killing. See the translation of Brh, pt.5, 52,2–6 in Yoshimizu 1997: 402–404.

The prohibition 'One shall not kill' teaches that one must not kill living beings in the world. Still, it does not pertain to the ritual killing that must occur during a sacrifice, such as the Agnīṣomīya animal sacrifice in the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. Similarly, the prohibition of covetousness in Mn 2.2a does not pertain to the desire for heaven, which is distinct from all objects of worldly desire. See footnote 679 in Yoshimizu 1997: 403.

Desiring heaven is, therefore, in Prabhākara's view, a legitimate desire, and attaining heaven is a legitimate goal of man (*puruṣārtha*). Nevertheless, Prabhākara's theory of *niyoga*, which approves of attaining the result by sacrifice, should not be confused with utilitarianism because, in Prabhākara's view, concerning the causality between the sacrifice and the result, both the possibility of empirical determination and that of metaphysical justification are excluded."

<sup>82</sup> Kauṭilya advises a king to sufficiently provide his subjects with wealth in order

However, Prabhākara is not affected by utilitarianism in his theory of duty, and he never forgets Mīmāṃsā's traditional mission of promulgating Veda's absolute authority.

In contrast to the injunctions of subordinate rituals, such as the preparation of oblations, which are merely beneficial for sacrifice (*kratvartha*), the directive (*codanā*), "*svargakāmo yajeta*," reveals that sacrifice is beneficial for a human being (*puruṣārtha*).<sup>83</sup> According to Prabhākara, this revelation is possible because "*svargakāmo yajeta*" directly obliges the hearer to hold a sacrifice, but also indirectly indicates that the sacrifice is the means to attain heaven. This indirect indication is called "incorporation" (*upādāna*),<sup>84</sup> which is the function of an injunction to require (*ākṣepa*) something to be taken into account, necessarily for its enjoinder being accomplished.<sup>85</sup>

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to prevent them from becoming disloyal, namely, for the sake of the king himself, in AŚ 7.5.27–28: *kṣīṇāḥ prakṛtayo lobhaṃ lubdhā yānti virāgatām / viraktā yānty amitram vā bhartāraṃ ghnanti vā svayam // tasmāt prakṛtīnāṃ kṣayalobhavirāgakāraṇāni notpādayet, utpannāni vā sadyaḥ pratikurvīta //* "When impoverished, subjects become greedy; when they are greedy, they become disloyal; and when they are disloyal, they either go over to the enemy or kill their lord themselves." (transl. by Olivelle 2013: 290).

Śālikanātha uses a more straightforward simile of a master (*svāmin*) who takes care of his inborn slave (*garbhādāsa*) for the sake of himself in *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (PrP) 443,22–24: *ātmasiddhyartham eva niyogaḥ kāmīyāmānaphalasiddhihetutvaṃ avalambate, svāmivat. yathātmana eva saṃvidadhānas svāmī garbhādāsasyopakaroti, tathā niyogo 'pi niyojyasyeti, na prādhānyapracyutiḥ*. "The enjoinder comes to rest on being the cause to attain the result only for the sake of its own accomplishment, like a master. Just as a master takes care of his inborn slave keeping his mind only on his own interest, the enjoinder also [takes care of] the enjoinder person; therefore, the principality of the enjoinder would not be lost."

<sup>83</sup> MmS 4.1.1, "*athātaḥ kratvarthapuruṣārthayor jijnāsā*," declares that each section of the fourth Adhyāya of the MmS deals with the question of whether the ritual at issue is beneficial for a sacrifice or a human being.

<sup>84</sup> Brh, pt. 4, 968,2–3: *arthaś ca niyogasiddhiḥ tac copādānam ity uktam*. "[In fact, Śābara] states that the 'purpose' (*artha*) [in MmS 4.1.2] is the accomplishment of enjoinder, which also incorporates (*upādāna*) [a sacrificial action's being beneficial to a human being (*puruṣārtha*)]." For the context of this statement, see Yoshimizu 2020–21: section 5.3.

<sup>85</sup> Brh, pt. 4, 956,5–6: *kim upādānam nāma. niyogākṣepa upādānam*. "What is incorporation? Incorporation is the requirement of an enjoinder"; Brh, pt. 3, 456,5–6: *yatra*

Prabhākara declares that the enjoiner (*niyojaka*), the Veda as the revealed scripture without an author, has a unique prospect. One who periodically holds the Vedic sacrifice *de facto* contributes to the continuation of the Aryan tradition—in line with the scenario laid down by the Veda itself.

Brh, pt. 5, 50,2–5: *naivāśaṅkyate. aṅgatā tu kāmīnaḥ prāpnoti. aviveko 'trā-parādhyate bhavataḥ. dhātvarthāpekṣo hy aṅgāṅgibhāvo neṣyate. guṇapradhānabhāvo 'pi tadapekṣa evokto bhāṣye. niyogasiddhau tu sarvaṃ tadanugūṇam iti kena neṣyate.*

[Opponent:] It is without question [that one's desire for heaven contributes to the accomplishment of enjoinder]<sup>86</sup> because one with desire would become a subordinate [to the enjoinder]. [Proponent:] On this point, your indiscretion should be criticized. For, [when an enjoined person is regarded as a subordinate (*aṅga*)], it is not accepted that he becomes subordinate in his relation with the meaning of the verbal root [that is, the sacrificial action] (*dhātvarthāpekṣa*).<sup>87</sup> As [Śabara] stated in his commentary,<sup>88</sup> [heaven] becomes primary in its relation with that [i.e., the sacrificial action] (*tadapekṣa*) as a subordinate (*guṇa*).<sup>89</sup> However, as far as the accomplishment of an enjoinder (*niyogasiddhi*) is concerned, who would not accept that everything complies with it?

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*niyunkte tat kāryam. tatsiddhaye yad upādīyate tad upādānam.* “Duty is that which [the enjoiner] enjoins one to do; that something is incorporated for the sake of its accomplishment is called incorporation.” For the context of these statements, see Yoshimizu 1997: 321 and 265, respectively.

<sup>86</sup> *Ṛjuvimalā* (RP), pt. 5, 50,17: *niyogaṃ prati kāmīno'ṅgatā prāpnotīty ucyate na ceṣyate mīmāṃsakaiḥ*; see Brh, pt. 5, 50,2: [Proponent:] *niyogasiddhyarthatvāt kāmānāyāḥ.*

<sup>87</sup> RP, pt. 5, 50,19–20: *dhātvartham apekṣya niyojyāsyāṅgatā neṣyate dhātvarthasya pradhānatā [ca]. niyogāpekṣayā tu iṣyate eva.*

<sup>88</sup> Cf. ŚBh 1351,1–3: *iha punaḥ svargaśabdāḥ eva prīter abhidhātā. prītivacanaś cet, yāgo guṇabhūtaḥ, prītiḥ pradhānam. kutaḥ. tādarthiyāt puruṣaprayatnasya; 1352,5: tasmāt suṣṭhūktaṃ yāgo guṇabhūtaḥ, svargaḥ pradhānabhūta iti*; Yoshimizu 1997: 397, footnote 628.

<sup>89</sup> RP, pt. 5, 50,20: *nanv evaṃ svargo guṇa eva syād iti tatrāha.*

The Veda aims to secure its own preservation in this world through the “accomplishment of enjoiment” (*niyogāsiddhi*) by all means, even implying that sacrifice becomes the means to attain heaven.<sup>90</sup>

In the traditional Mīmāṃsā, the directive (*codanā*) for one who desires heaven, “*svargakāmo yajeta*,” pertains only to the sacrifices to be periodically held at a fixed (*nitya*) time—for example, the Agnihotra at every sunrise and sunset and the Darśapūrṇamāsau on every new moon and full moon day. Other elective sacrifices (*kāmyas*) cannot bring about heaven, as people hold them to fulfill various secular desires. For fixed (*nitya*) sacrifices, there is another directive: “one ought to hold a sacrifice as long as one is alive” (*yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta*). This injunction obliges every living Aryan householder to perform at least the primary offerings of the sacrifice on recurring dates, even omitting subordinate rites, to avoid neglecting the sacrifice completely (MmS 6.3.1–7). On the contrary, “*svargakāmo yajeta*” obliges one who desires heaven to complete the sacrifice without omitting its subordinate rites, because only assisted by all of them, the primary offerings can bring about the result (*phala*) of the sacrifice (MmS 6.3.8–10; 11.1.11–19).<sup>91</sup>

According to Prabhākara, the *niyoga* issued from the directive “*svargakāmo yajeta*” is transmitted into individual injunctions,<sup>92</sup> so that even subordinate rituals come in contact with the enjoiment.<sup>93</sup> As a result, the Vedic corpus

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Brh, pt. 4, 641,7–8 (on MmS 3.1.4: *karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt*): *katham phalārthatā karmaṇaḥ. kāmīno hi adhikāro yāge. sa ca phalasāadhanatām yāgyānāpādayan na sidhyatīti śaṣṭe vakṣyāmaḥ*. “[Question:] How could the sacrificial act serve [to attain] the result? [Answer:] Because the eligibility for the sacrifice pertains to one who desires [its result]. In the sixth Adhyāya (i.e., MmS 6.1.1–3), we will explain that it (i.e., eligibility) is not established without letting one know that the sacrificial act is the means to attain the result.”

<sup>91</sup> For the relationship between “*yāvajjīvaṃ yajeta*” and “*svargakāmo yajeta*,” see Yoshimizu 2020–21: sections 4 and 7.1.

<sup>92</sup> Brh, pt. 4, 655,5–6: *tathā ca dvārakalpanām antareṇa pradhānetikartavyatāsiddhir na bhavati tathā prakaraṇapramāṇa eva vakṣyāmaḥ* “We will explain in the section on the context as an exegetical criterion (i.e., MmS 3.3.11) how [the fore-offering and so on] cannot become the manner of performance of the primary rite (i.e., primary offering) without assuming the transmission (*dvāra*) [of enjoiment]”; Yoshimizu 1997: 313 and 425 “Übertragung (*dvāra*).”

<sup>93</sup> Brh, pt. 3, 324,4–5: *yuktaṃ tāvat keṣāṃcid utpattyarthatā kalpayitum, yady evambhūtānām api niyogasaṃsparśitopapadyate*. “First, it is right to assume that

configures a unifying system, or “organism,” made of many injunctions. The directive “*svargakāmo yajeta*” first secures an enjoined person (*niyojya*) by imposing a duty (*kārya*) to carry out the entire program of sacrifice on the hearer who desires heaven<sup>94</sup>; then, it indirectly indicates that the sacrifice, if entirely performed, becomes the means to attain heaven.<sup>95</sup> Through this

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only some [of the entire rituals are the scope (*viṣaya*) of enjoinder] if even those [subordinate rituals] come in contact (*saṁsparśin*) with the enjoinder [through the primary rituals]”; Brh, pt. 4, 654,1–2: *vṛhīn prokṣatīti pradhānabhūtaviṣayasam-sparśān niyogasya na niyogāntarāvagatīḥ samidādīnām iva*. “From the injunction ‘one besprinkles grains of rice,’ one does not cognize another enjoinder [other than that of the new and full moon sacrifices] because its enjoinder comes in contact with [the grains of rice] as the object of the main rituals [i.e., offering], like the [fore-offering (*prayāja*) for] fuels.\*”; see Yoshimizu 1997: 420, “berühren (*saṁsparśa*, °in).”

\*The *prayāja* for fuels as a deity is the first of the subordinate offerings of clarified butter to be performed before the main offerings of the Darśapūrṇamāsau.

<sup>94</sup> Commenting on MmS 2.1.5 “*codanā punar ārambhah*,” Prabhākara explicitly distinguishes “undertaking” (*ārambha*) from “sacrificial act” (*karman*) in Brh, pt.3, 321,5–7: *atrābhidhīyate. niyogaḥ karmaṇi puruṣaṁ niyunkta iti na saṁnyag avadhṛtaṁ bhavatā. ārambhe hi puruṣaṁ niyunkte na karmaṇi*. “[Proponent:] We answer to this (objection). Your statement that the enjoinder enjoins man to perform a sacrificial act is incorrect. For it enjoins man to the undertaking [of a sacrifice], but not to the sacrificial act.”

This distinction may be based on MmS 6.2.14: *prakramāt tu niyamyetārambhasya kriyānimittatvāt* “However, once [one has begun a sacrifice], it is obligatory to [carry it out to the end] because the undertaking is the occasion for the sacrificial act.” The term “undertaking” (*ārambha*) means the execution of the entire program of a sacrifice, integrating the sacrificial act as the main event of the sacrifice. The opponent in the section of MmS 2.1.5 asserts it to be futile that the Veda enjoins one to perform the sacrificial act because it ephemerally vanishes before its result occurs (Brh, pt.3, 319,9–320,8). With the abovementioned statement, Prabhākara retorts that what the Veda enjoins one to do to bring about the result is carrying out the entire program of a sacrifice with all details that makes the sacrifice unprecedented (*apūrva*), in other words, typologically original. Prabhākara precisely expounds the original meaning of MmS 2.1.5 using the concept of non-temporal *apūrva*, unlike Kumārila, who anthropocentrically expounded it by fully introducing the temporal *apūrva* as the disposition (*saṁskāra*) or potential (*śakti*) inherent in a human being. See Yoshimizu 1997: 89–100; 248–250; Yoshimizu 2000.

<sup>95</sup> In the special panel “History of Mīmāṃsā” organized by Elisa Freschi at the 18th

indirect indication by “*svargakāmo yajeta*,” the hearer who has intuitively felt obliged to carry out the entire program of sacrifice comes to justify his sense of duty, being aware that he will fulfill his desire to attain heaven if completing the duty.<sup>96</sup>

### 3. Groups of the Prābhākara among the alternative definitions of *niyoga*

#### 3.1. Majority and minority

Among the eleven alternative definitions of *niyoga* recorded by Prajñākara-gupta, the first eight may form a majority in that they all seem to be affected by Prabhākara’s opponent, the adherent to Bādari. In these definitions, it is taken for granted that Veda’s incitement (*preraṇā*) automatically arouses the awareness of duty (*kārya*) to perform a sacrifice in the listener’s mind without

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World Sanskrit Conference (January 12, 2023), Patrick Cummins presented his paper “Prabhākara’s Hermeneutic Deontology.” In this paper, Cummins quotes a statement of Prabhākara crucial in understanding his theory of *niyoga* regarding “*svargakāmo yajeta*” from the *Br̥hatī* on MmS 6.2.20. Based on this statement of Prabhākara himself, Cummins convincingly formulated Prabhākara’s position that one who hears “*svargakāmo yajeta*” desiring heaven first feels an obligation to hold a sacrifice and only thereafter understands that one can attain heaven through holding the sacrifice.

In my previous studies on Prabhākara’s theory of *niyoga* (Yoshimizu 1994, 1997), I did not explicitly state that, contrary to Cummin’s abovementioned formulation, Prabhākara’s position is that one first takes heaven into account as the reward of holding a sacrifice and only thereafter feels a sense of duty to undertake the sacrifice. I did not state so because that would make it impossible to distinguish the operation of Prabhākara’s *niyoga* from the hypothetical imperative entailed by Kumārila’s utilitarian theory of two kinds of *bhāvanā* (i.e., *abhidhābhāvanā* and *arthātmabhāvanā*). However, because I overlooked Prabhākara’s statement found by Cummins in the *Br̥hatī*, I must admit that my previous studies were ambiguous about the cognitive sequence between the sense of duty to hold a sacrifice and the awareness of heaven as its result, even though I elucidated a hitherto ignored view of Prabhākara, that is, his affirmation of the awareness of heaven as the result of sacrifice implied in “*svargakāmo yajeta*.” Concerning this sequence, I genuinely thank Cummins for clearing up my ambiguity and enabling us to approach Prabhākara’s deontology more closely.

<sup>96</sup> Ignoring this second stage, the Prābhākara opponent in the *Nyāyamañjarī* construes “*svarga-*” in “*svargakāmo yajeta*” as merely qualifying the enjoined person (*niyojya*). See Yoshimizu 2020–21: sections 3.5, 5.2, and 7.2.



implying that one can fulfill one's desire by the sacrifice. The difference among these eight definitions lies only in whether and to what extent the enjoiner's incitement or the enjoined person's awareness of duty decisively contributes to the enjoinder's execution,<sup>97</sup> without paying attention to Prabhākara's view that "*svargakāmo yajeta*" indirectly informs that the act of sacrifice is the means to attain heaven.

In contrast to the categorical imperative advocated by the Prābhākara majority, the last three definitions as a minority went to another extreme, being inclined towards utilitarianism: they lend importance to the enjoined person's motivation for reward. With definition (9), which metaphorically depicts the enjoined person's (*niyojya*) feelings as having mounted on a "ma-

<sup>97</sup> Even the origin of (8), which defines the ultimate meaning of the Vedic scripture as the eternal *brahman*, can be found in the concluding portion of Prabhākara's opponent's discourse in the *svargakāma* section of the Bṛh. According to this opponent, when the verb "ought to hold a sacrifice" (*yajeta*) in all injunctions of eligibility directly issues enjoinderment, the enjoined person is not restricted to those who desire the particular result (*phala*) mentioned in each injunction of eligibility. This is because each injunction of eligibility partially teaches (*bhāgaśa upadeśaḥ*) the same reality—that is, the same *brahman*. Therefore, all sacrifices must be carried out indiscriminately by everyone. Bṛh, pt. 5, 29,6–30,6: *evaṃ ca sarvaṃ sarvasyānuṣṭheyam. tathā ca vidyopadeśo 'yaṃ sarvasya sarvānuṣṭhānāt kṛtsnasiddhiḥ. tad idam uktam, sarvaṃ brahma bhāgaśa upadeśamukhena jñānato 'nuṣṭhānataś copadiśyata iti. ata eva codgāraḥ kartradhikāravādinām "asatyē vartmani sthitvā tatas satyaṃ prakāśayet" sarvopadeśānām ayam sarvānuṣṭhānārhaavidhir iti manyate. "ta ime satyāḥ kāmāḥ anṛtāpidhānāḥ" iti śruteḥ. bhāgaśo bhāgaśa upadeśo 'nṛtam abhipretam. rāgādinibandhanaś ca vyavacchedaḥ. "[Opponent:] That being the case, all people should carry out all [sacrifices]. This is because what is taught by this Vedic knowledge is that all people attain all [desires] by carrying out all [sacrifices]. It is said that one is partially taught the entire *brahman* through [Vedic] teachings in terms of knowledge and practice. Therefore, the saying 'After staying on an unreal road, one should illuminate the real'\* is caustic words of those who hold the eligibility [for a sacrifice] to be given to its agent. Concerning all [Vedic] teachings, this author thinks that they enjoin all people to carry out all sacrifices because the scripture says, 'Now, these real desires are concealed by the unreal.'\*\* With 'the unreal' [in this scripture] this and that partial teaching [of the same *brahman*] is intended. Differentiation is based on the desire, etc. [on the part of the listener]" (see Yoshimizu 1997: 219; 398, footnote 640).*

\*Cf. *Vākyapadīya* (VP) 2.238cd: *asatyē vartmani sthitvā tataḥ satyaṃ samīhate //*

\*\* *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* (ChU) 8.3.1.

chine" (*yantra*), we may imagine *ghaṭīyantra* as a "noria," a waterwheel for irrigation.<sup>98</sup> This machine has many jars (*ghaṭas*) fastened to a vertical wheel or a long belt hung on such a wheel. The enjoined person may be compared to river water or well water drawn into the jar fixed at the waterwheel's bottom or the bottom of the belt.<sup>99</sup> As the vertical wheel rotates, the jar filled with water gradually ascends from the bottom until it is emptied at the top of the vertical wheel. With this mechanical process, definition (9) may illustrate the system of a sacrifice that arouses the conviction of reward in the person who held the sacrifice. Definition (9) says that only those involved in the ritual system (compared to a waterwheel) confidently expect to attain heaven.

Definition (10), which identifies *niyoga* as the "nature of the thing to be enjoyed" (*bhogyarūpa*), admits that the result (*phala*) to be achieved in the future, seen as a *causa finalis* (final cause) among the four causes in Aristotelian thought, incites the enjoined person to hold a sacrifice. The reason why the result is to be enjoyed by the enjoined person lies in the fact that this very person has carried out the duty to hold a sacrifice (v. 100).

<sup>98</sup> The word "*yantrārūḍha*" appears in *Bhagavadgītā* (BhG) 18.61: *īśvaraḥ sarva-bhūtānāṃ hr̥ddeṣe 'rjuna tiṣṭhati / bhrāmayan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni māyayā //* "The lord of all creatures is inside their hearts and with his wizardry he revolves all the creatures mounted on his water wheel" (transl. by van Buitenen 1981: 143), but Prābhākaras do not advocate liberation through *bhakti*. In Brāhmaṇas, sacrifice is compared to a ship (*naū*) that takes the sacrificer over to heaven. Cf. *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* (ŚB) 2.3.3.15: *naūr ha vā eṣā svargyā yād agnihotrām* "The Agnihotra, truly, is the ship (that sails) heavenwards" (transl. by Eggeling 1882: 345); 4.2.5.10: *tād vai sārva evā yajñō naūḥ svargyā* "And, indeed, every sacrifice is a ship bound heavenwards" (transl. by Eggeling 1885: 311); *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa* (AB) 1.13.29: *yajño vai sutarmā nauḥ* "the ship fair crossing is the sacrifice" (transl. by Keith 1920: 117); Lévi 1966: 87–88.

<sup>99</sup> For *ghaṭīyantra*, *araghaṭṭa* or *arahaṭṭa* as a device for drawing water, see *Amarakośa* (AK) 2.10.27c and 3.5.18a; *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch* (PW) 403 and 874; Chattopadhyaya 1994: 43–48; Srivastava 2005–06: 261. Cf. *Amarapadaviṛṭti* (APV) on *ghaṭīyantra* and *salilodvāhana* in AK 2.10.27 "*ghaṭīyantram salilodvāhanam praheḥ*": *ghaṭibhiḥ kṛtam yantram ghaṭīyantram. praheḥ kūpāt. salilam udvāhyate 'neneti salilodvāhanam. kūpāt salilodvāhanasya ghaṭīyantrasya nāmanī*. "Ghaṭīyantra is a machine made with jars. 'praheḥ' means 'from a well.' [This machine is also called] *salilodvāhana* because it pumps water up from a well. These two are the names of a machine with jars pumping water up from a well."

Therefore, this definition is related to the final one, (11), which identifies *niyoga* as the person who has an awareness of duty (*kārya*). This duty is different from that which is unconditionally imposed on a person by the categorical imperative because definition (11) admits that the enjoined person will become successful (v. 103c: *sādhita*), that is, rewarded, when the duty is accomplished.

### 3.2. The “*kārya*” *vādins* in the PVA and the “old Prābhākara” in the *Vidhiviveka*

As mentioned at the beginning of section 1.1, in the *Nyāyakanikā*, Vācaspatimiśra calls a particular Prābhākara scholar quoted in Maṇḍanamiśra’s *Vidhiviveka* (VV) “old Prābhākara” (*jaratprābhākara*). Spending a significant portion of the first half (*pūrvabhāga*, VV 1),<sup>100</sup> Maṇḍanamiśra criticizes the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga*. In three verses (vv. 12–14), he summarizes several defects in this theory, the last of which, like Prajñākaragupta’s first scheme, pertains to the question of what instigates one to hold the sacrifice hearing “*svargakāmo yajeta*.”

VV 239,10 (G 61,2): *niyuktasya pravṛttiś ca na niyogaikanibandhanā* (1.14cd)

Moreover, the enjoined person does not begin to act simply because of enjoinment.

After pointing out that not all people begin to act simply being enjoined,<sup>101</sup> Maṇḍanamiśra states that one follows an enjoinment only when the enjoiner (*niyoktr*) is a reliable person (*anuvīdheya*).<sup>102</sup> “Reliable” can be said of a person who knows how to attain useful things and evade harmful things; however,

<sup>100</sup> The portion begins with the following introduction in VV 174,5–6 (G 35,7–9): *yad api darśanam—pramāṇāntarāgocaraḥ śabdāmātrālabhano niyukto ‘smṛti pratyātma-vedanīyaḥ sukhādivat aparāmṛṣṭakālatrayo liṅādīnām artho vidhir iti*. “There is also the following view: the essence of injunction is the meaning of the exhortative suffixes in the optative and so forth, which solely depends on words out of the scope of other means of knowledge and is to be reflexively experienced, like pleasure and other [feelings], in the form “I am enjoined,” and never pertains to the three temporalities [past, present, and future].”

<sup>101</sup> VV 273,4 (G 74,10–75,1)

<sup>102</sup> VV 273,4–5 (G 75,1–2). VV *anyat* corrects G *anyaniyogāt*.

the Veda is purported to have no author who issues enjoinderment.<sup>103</sup> He then successively rejects possible candidates for something reliable assumed in the theory of *niyoga*, namely, the exhortative word (*śabda*), enjoinderment (*niyoga*), the cognition of enjoinderment (*niyogajñāna*),<sup>104</sup> and the requirement of the direct meaning (*arthād ākṣepaḥ*).<sup>105</sup> Thereafter, he quotes a contemporary Prābhākara's statement:

VV 274,4–6 (G 76,8–77,2): *nanu kartavyatāvagamāt pravṛttiḥ. avagacchati ca niyukta "idaṃ mama kartavyam" iti. yas tv avagacchann apy anuṣṭheyam nānutiṣṭhati sa sattve 'py arthānarthaprāptiparihārayor ananutīṣṭhann iva na daṇḍair vāryate.*

[Opponent:] One [who has heard an enjoinderment of action] begins to act, realizing that [the ordered action] should be done [by oneself]. In fact, one who is enjoined realizes, "This is my work to do." However, if one, realizing that an action should be performed, does not perform it, such a [thoughtless] person cannot be subdued even by punishments like those who do not perform an action even [knowing] that thereby one attains useful things or evades harmful things.

Vācaspatimiśra paraphrases the intention of this opponent as follows:

NK 276,10–11 (G 76,30–31): *nanu na vyaṃ niyuktimātraṃ niyogaṃ brūmahe, api tu kartavyatām. sā ca nirapekṣā pravṛttilhetur vedād avagamyata ity āha "nanu kartavyatāvagamāt pravṛttiḥ."*

[Opponent:] We do not say that the enjoinderment [as the cause of one's activity] is mere enforcement, but [we say it is] the (duty) that [the enjoinderment] should be done. Moreover, from the Veda one becomes aware of this (duty) as the cause of activity, resorting to nothing else.

<sup>103</sup> VV 273,5–6 (G 75,3–4)

<sup>104</sup> VV 273,7–13 (G 75,4–7)

<sup>105</sup> VV 273,13–14 (G 75,7–76,7): *na cārthād ākṣepaḥ. anāptaniyogadarśanāt. kṣemyo 'yaṃ panthāḥ, gacchatu bhavān anenaiveti yathā. "Nor is the requirement of the direct meaning (i.e., enjoinderment) [reliable] because one can see the enjoinderment by an incompetent person, such as "This is a safe road [to go]. Take this very road, sir!" "*

With "arthād ākṣepaḥ," Maṇḍanamiśra may think of Prābhākara's idea that the injunction "*svargakāmo yajeta*" indirectly makes known that one can attain heaven through the sacrifice. What is promised in an injunction is not necessarily reliable because one who follows an unreliable person's advice about taking the road may

Thinking thus, [the opponent in the VV] said, “One [who has heard an enjoinder of action] begins to act, realizing that it should be done [by oneself].”

Because “one becomes aware that [the enjoinder] should be done” (*sā kartavyatā ... avagamyate*) is the same as “one feels one’s duty (*kārya*) to carry out the enjoinder,” this opponent can be said to attach greater importance to the sense of duty in oneself instead of enforcement (*niyukti*), that is, the incitement from the outside, when one undertakes an action. We may therefore say that this opponent in the VV is a precursor of those who defined *niyoga* as (1) pure duty or (3) duty associated with incitement among the eleven definitions quoted by Prajñākaragupta.

After this quotation, Maṇḍanamiśra repeats the argument: Because enjoinder itself is nothing but incitement (*pravartanāmātra*), one who has heard an injunction with the verb in the optative may understand “I am incited to do this (*pravartito 'ham atra*).”<sup>106</sup> However, one becomes aware that one should do it (*kartavyatāvagama*) only when one accepts the enjoinder as reliable (*anuvīdheya*); otherwise, one feels only incitement (*pravartanāmātrapratīteḥ*).<sup>107</sup>

Then, Maṇḍanamiśra quotes a statement of Prabhākara from the *Bṛhatī*, “Enjoinder has [a sacrifice] to be performed as its scope, but does not say [the hearer] that [the sacrifice] should be performed [by the hearer himself]” (*Bṛh*, pt. 1, 38,8–9: *kartavyatāviśayo niyogaḥ, na punaḥ kartavyatām āha*),<sup>108</sup> to point out this Prabhākara opponent’s inconsistency with Prabhākara’s thought. In the original context of the *Bṛh*, Prabhākara states that the injunction of black magic, such as the *Śyena*, makes the hearer know that he has a duty to perform the black magic if he spontaneously curses someone else to death, but it does not impose this duty on the hearer by making him desire someone’s death.<sup>109</sup> In the present context, Maṇḍanamiśra argues that, as the Veda has no reliable (*anuvīdheya*) author, one cannot have a genuine sense of duty to hold the sacrifice, and what the opponent purports

be put in danger.

<sup>106</sup> VV 274,7–8 (G 77,2–4)

<sup>107</sup> VV 274,8–9 (G 77,4–6)

<sup>108</sup> VV 274,10 (G 77, 6)

<sup>109</sup> See Yoshimizu 2020–21: 117–118.

to be the “sense of duty” one feels after hearing the Vedic injunction is nothing more than the feeling of being incited; therefore, the opponent would have to admit that the external incitement from the Veda automatically causes the hearer’s inner sense of duty, unlike Prabhākara who said, “but [enjoinment] does not say that it should be performed” (*na punaḥ kartavyatām āha*). However, disregarding the latter half of Prabhākara’s statement, the opponent defiantly retorts that the hearer has a sense of duty to perform the sacrifice simply because the enjoinment has it as its scope (*tadviśayatva*).<sup>110</sup>

Commenting on Maṇḍanamiśra’s reference to the Brh in this context, Vācaspatimiśra calls the Prābhākara opponent at issue “old Prabhākara” (*jaratprābhākara*).<sup>111</sup>

Because Maṇḍanamiśra formulates this discussion by contrasting the sense of duty (*kartavyatā*) and incitement (*pravartanā*), we can safely say that, since the time of Maṇḍanamiśra, scholars in the majority of the Prābhākara school had controversies about whether the inner sense of duty (*kārya*) or the extrinsic incitement (*pravartanā*) plays a decisive role when one carries out an enjoinment.

<sup>110</sup> VV 274,11 (G 78,1): *tadviśayatvād eva tarhi kartavyatāvagamah*. According to Vācaspatimiśra, the opponent maintains that one who received an enjoinment immediately becomes aware of its content as one’s duty because enjoinment (*viśayin*) is immediately related to its content (*viśaya*) in NK 277,14–15 (G 78,9): *viśayiṇo viśayanāntarīyakatvād iti bhāvaḥ*.

<sup>111</sup> NK 277,5–6 (G 77,21–22): *atraiva jaratprābhākaronnītārthaṃ guror vacaḥ saṅgacchata ity āha “uktaṃ ca kartavyatāviśayo niyogaḥ.”* “What is presented by the Jaratprābhākara is encountered right here by Prabhākara’s statement, ‘Enjoinment has [a sacrifice] to be performed as its scope.’ ”

Kuroda (1989: 80–81) mentions that, in a preceding section, Vācaspatimiśra states, “Now [Maṇḍanamiśra] quotes the view of an old Prābhākara” (NK 261,7 [G 69,14]: *samprati jaratprābhākaramatam upanyasyati*), introducing another passage quoted in VV 260,3–8 (G 69,3–9), which deals with the relation between enjoinment (*niyoga*) and application (*vinīyoga*). Whether these two quotations are stated by the same person or two different persons of the older generations of the Prābhākara school is yet to be investigated. As Kuroda (1989: footnote 3) remarks, Mishra (1964: 34) had already mentioned these two quotations of the Jaratprābhākara, but in the mixed-up page numbers.

### Concluding remarks: The theoretical schism in the Prābhākara school and its solution by Śālikanātha

Prajñākaragupta groups the last three definitions together (PVA<sub>O</sub> 33,6: *yantrārūḍhādayo 'pi*).<sup>112</sup> We may say that he suspected that these three were somehow formulated from a common viewpoint. However, he did not investigate this viewpoint, nor did he notice the distinction between the agent of a sacrifice (*karṭṛ*) and the enjoined person (*niyojya*) eligible for the sacrifice (*adhikārin*)—a trace of Prabhākara's own view quoted as Prajñākaragupta's opponent's final statement. Prajñākaragupta does not realize Prabhākara's intention in distinguishing between *karṭṛ* and *adhikārin* (i.e., *niyojya*). Prabhākara intended thereby to argue against his opponent, who holds the desire for heaven (*svargakāma*) to be a mental action subordinate to the act of sacrifice (*yāga*) because the Bahuvrīhi noun "*svargakāmaḥ*" merely operates to qualify the *karṭṛ* denoted by the verbal suffix (personal ending) of the verb "*yajeta*."<sup>113</sup> Prajñākaragupta is contented with mechanically applying the temporal dilemma implied in his second scheme without profoundly exploring the theory of *niyoga*.<sup>114</sup>

Let us recall Prajñākaragupta's quotation of his opponent's etymological explanation of the term *niyoga* (PVA<sub>O</sub> 14,15–15,2) adduced in the Introduction of this paper. This contemporary Prābhākara scholar idiosyncratically analyzed *niyoga* as "the commitment with no room" (*niravaśeṣo yogah*). By "no room" (*niravaśeṣa*), he means to state that non-commitment is not possible even in the slightest degree (*ayogasya manāg apy abhāva*-).<sup>115</sup> According to this opponent, one who has heard the Vedic injunction containing the verb "*yajeta*" cannot remain inactive (*na'āsituṃ samarthah*) simply because of being

<sup>112</sup> Prajñākaragupta also makes special mention of "*yantrārūḍhādayah*" when enumerating the candidates for that which is to be called *vidhi* in PVA<sub>O</sub>, v. 35c.

<sup>113</sup> See footnotes 70, 71 and 72.

<sup>114</sup> On behalf of Prajñākaragupta, Yamāri speaks in PVAN 42a6: *mateṣu bhedamātram cintyaṃ na nirvāhaḥ, sarveṣāṃ dūṣyatvāt*, "Concerning the [different] views [of *niyoga*], one should only think of [their mutual] differences, but should not accomplish [which one is the best definition] because all these are to be criticized.

<sup>115</sup> In Trilocana's remark quoted by Yamāri (see footnote 10), Trilocana expresses sarcastic amazement at Prajñākaragupta's and the contemporary Prābhākaras' lack of common sense in their etymological explanation of the term *niyoga*.

enjoined. This view that a human being can be controlled like a robot without free will that automatically starts working at the flick of a switch is divergent from Prabhākara's view of a human being.

Prajñākaragupta lived during the period of theoretical schism within the Prābhākara school. During this period, the Prābhākara school faced fierce competition with the utilitarian Bhāṭṭa school within Mīmāṃsā.<sup>116</sup> To demonstrate the uniqueness of their tenet, the majority of the Prābhākara scholars were inclined to extreme authoritarianism deviating from Prabhākara himself and concurring with Prabhākara's opponent who adhered to Bādari.<sup>117</sup> In contrast, the remaining minority became increasingly close to the Bhāṭṭa school because of their inclination to utilitarianism.

Instead of arbitrarily extracting Prabhākara's statements to his convenience, Śālikanātha wrote his commentary on Prabhākara's entire work to

<sup>116</sup> Śābarasvāmin converted the injunction, "One who desires heaven should perform the sacrifice (*svargakāmo yajeta*)," to "One should bring heaven into being (*bhāvayet svargam*) through the sacrifice (*yāgena*)."<sup>116</sup> He also defined the force of actualization (*bhāvanā*) denoted by "should bring into being," the verbal ending in the optative (*-eta* of *yajeta*), as requiring three factors: a purpose to be achieved (*sādhya*), the means of its achievement (*karaṇa*), and the manner of performance (*itikartavyatā*). See McCrea 2000: 434–435; Ollett 2013: 228–231.

Kumārila succeeded Śābara's theory of *bhāvanā* and its three factors, emphasizing that the realization of the purpose among the three factors is not forced by the Vedas but is desired in advance by the individual's voluntary will, and that one performs a sacrifice as a means to achieve one's voluntary desires (TV 383,18–384,19). He asserted that one who has discretion does not perform a profitless action, even urged one hundred times (TV 383,22–23: *na ca buddhipūrvakārī puruṣaḥ puruṣārtharahitaṁ vyāpāraṁ vacanaśātenāpy ukto 'nutiṣṭhati*), and went so far as to say that parents take care of their son expecting him to support them in old age in return (Ślokavārttika [ŚV], Ātmavāda, v. 53bcd: *api cātmaphalecchayā / putrādibharāṇe vṛttiḥ syāt*. "Moreover, [parents] may be occupied with taking care of their children, expecting their own reward"). For the context of this statement in Kumārila's criticism of the Buddhist denial of a permanent self, see Uskov 2022: chapter 4, footnote 39.

<sup>117</sup> It is to be noted that Maṇḍanamiśra's opponent in his *Bhāvanāvivēka*, who propounds a sort of the theory of *niyoga* at the end of his discourse, adheres to Bādari's view as explained by Śābarasvāmin on MmS 3.1.3 (see footnotes 64–65) with an honorific title "*bhagavān bādariḥ*" (BhV 74,1; 76,3).



put an end to the period of theoretical schism when “old Prābhākara” were predominant. He systematically restored the original position of Prabhākara by partly integrating the purposeful perspective of Kumārila’s theory of *bhāvanā* into the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga*.<sup>118</sup>

Vācaspatimiśra contrasts the “old Prābhākara” quoted by Maṇḍanamiśra with “the new ones” (*navīnās*). Kuroda (1989: 87–88) identified this as Śālikanātha expressed in honorific plural by finding out almost the same statement of this “new ones” in the *Ṛjuvimalā* (RP) on the section of the Śyena.<sup>119</sup> Vācaspatimiśra explains the view of this new Prābhākara as follows:

NK 277,10–12 (G 77,29–78,6): *etad uktaṃ bhavati, sāksān niyoga eva kartavyatayāvagamyaṃ liṅādibhyaḥ, sa tu yāgaviśayas tadanuṣṭhānam antareṇa kartavyatāyā aparyavasānāt tadanuṣṭhānam ākṣipati. so ’yam ākṣepāparanāmo-pādānavyāpāro niyogasyāsthīyata iti. tad etad apūrvātmani kāryarūpe niyoge saty upapadyate.*

[The new ones] state as follows: The verbal endings in the optative and so on directly make mere enjoinderment cognized as that which is to be done. However, this (enjoinderment), which has a sacrifice as its scope, requires [the sacrifice] to be performed because it would not be completed as something to be done if [its scope] is not performed. In this way, it is acknowledged that enjoinderment has a function of incorporation (*upādāna*), whose synonym is “requirement” (*ākṣepa*). This view would be accepted if enjoinderment were proved to be the duty that has its nature unprecedented[, namely, unknowable by any means of knowledge other than the Veda].

The requirement of the enjoinderment does not cease with the performance (*anuṣṭhāna*) of the sacrifice as its scope because, commenting on verse 28 of the second chapter of the *Vākyārthamātrikā* in the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*,<sup>120</sup>

<sup>118</sup> See Cummins 2020: 231–232; Yoshimizu 2020–21: Concluding remarks, “7.2 Jayanta’s Prābhākara opponent’s deviation from Prabhākara,” and footnotes 138–139.

<sup>119</sup> NK 277,7–10 (G 77,25–28) closely corresponds with RP, pt. 1, 37,19–22.

<sup>120</sup> PrP, 443,17–18: *ātmasiddhyanukūlasya niyojyasya prasiddhaye / kurvat svargādikam api pradhānam kāryam eva naḥ* // “For the sake of securing the enjoined person who is favorable to the accomplishment of [the enjoinderment] itself, the duty [if carried out] brings about heaven and so on; nevertheless, in our view, only the duty is

Śālikanātha presents a complete chain of the requirement that begins with a sense of duty (*kārya*), goes beyond the performance of the sacrifice, and concludes with the sacrifice being the means to attain the desire (*kāmasādhana*).<sup>121</sup> In this formulation of requirements, he adopts Prabhākara's view that the enjoinder issued from "*svargakāmo yajeta*" indirectly indicates that one can attain heaven through the sacrifice, if performed entirely, so that one desiring heaven comes to justify one's sense of duty to carry out the program of the sacrifice, the duty one intuitively felt obliged to fulfill right after hearing the injunction.<sup>122</sup>

We may say that, at the time of Prajñākaragupta, the majority of the Prabhākara school construed Prabhākara's *niyoga* as a categorical imperative

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primary."

Śālikanātha's thought may safely be said to have stemmed from the group of the "*kārya*" *vādins* rather than that of the "*preraṇā*" *vādins* because he repeatedly identifies *niyoga* with *kārya* in the second chapter of the Vākyārthamātrikā of the PrP.

<sup>121</sup> PrP 443,19–23: *yat tad apūrvam kāryam, tasya niyojyānvayaṃ vinā kāryatvānupapatteḥ, anuṣṭhānam vinā tadasambhavāt, kartrā ca vinā tadanupapatteḥ, adhikāreṇa ca vinā karttur abhāvāt, niyojyatoṃ vinā tadayogāt, akāmasādhane ca kāmīno niyogānava-gamād iti, ātmasiddhyartham eva niyogaḥ kāmyamānaphalasiddhihetutvaṃ avalambate, svāmivat.* "That which is unprecedented [by other means of knowledge than the Veda] is the duty [to perform a sacrifice]. This duty [requires an enjoined person and a sacrifice] because it would not be accomplished as a duty without being associated with an enjoined person, nor would it be so without a [sacrificial action] to be performed. No [action] would be performed without its agent. No agent would become possible without determining who is eligible [for the action]. Moreover, one with a desire would not comprehend [oneself] as being enjoined [i.e., eligible] to perform something that is not the means to attain the desire. Therefore, the [Vedic] enjoinder comes to rest on being the cause to attain the result only for the sake of its own accomplishment, like a master."

After this statement, Śālikanātha adduces the simile of a master (*svāmin*), who takes care of his inborn slave (*garbhadāsa*) for his own interest, in order to illustrate that the Vedic injunction "*svargakāmo yajeta*" aims at accomplishing its enjoinder, although it indirectly indicates that a human being can attain heaven through the sacrifice. See footnote 82.

<sup>122</sup> At the end of the Svargakāmādhikaraṇa (MmS 6.1.1–3), Śālikanātha presents a chain of the requirement that concludes with the sacrifice being the means to fulfill the desire (*kāmapāya*) in RP, pt. 5, 53,2–54,2.

based on extreme authoritarianism, ignoring his idea of the indirect indication of “*svargakāmo yajeta*”; in contrast, the remaining minority exaggerated it to a direct indication that entails a hypothetical imperative based on utilitarianism.<sup>123</sup>

### Abbreviations and Bibliography

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- AB *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa*. Ed. Th. Aufrecht, *Das Aitareyabrāhmaṇa*. Bonn 1879.
- AK *Amarakośa*. Ed. A. A. Ramanathan, *Amarakośa with the unpublished South Indian commentaries*. Three parts. Madras 1971.
- ĀpŚS *Āpastambaśrautasūtra*. Ed. R. Garbe, *The Śrauta Sūtra of Āpastamba belonging to the Taittirīya Saṃhitā with the commentary of Rudradatta*. Vol. 1. Bibliotheca Indica 92. Calcutta 1882.
- APV *Amarapadaivṛti*. See AK.
- AS *Arthaśāstra*. Ed. R. P. Kangle, *The Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra*. Part I. Reprint. Delhi 2000 (1<sup>st</sup> ed., Bombay 1969).
- AS *Aṣṭasahasrī* (Vidyānanda). Ed. D. Koṭhiyā, *Tārkika-śiromaṇi-ācārya-vidyānandakṛta Aṣṭasahasrī*. Śrīmahāvīrajī 1997.
- BhG *Bhagavadgītā*. J. A. B. van Buitnen, *The Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata*. Chicago 1981.
- BhV *Bhāvanāviveka* (Maṇḍanamiśra). Eds. V. A. R. Sastri and K. A. S. Sastri, *Bhāvanāviveka with Viśamagranthibhedika*. Annamalainagar 1952.
- Brh *Brhatī* (Prabhākara). Ed. S. K. R. Sastri, *Brhatī of Prabhākara Miśra with the Rjuvimalāpañcikā of Śālikanātha*. Madras University Sanskrit Series 3 (parts 1 and 2). Madras 1934–36. And Ed. S. S. Sastri, *Brhatī of Prabhākara Miśra with Rjuvimalāpañcikā of Śālikanātha*. Madras University Sanskrit Series 24, 25, and 26. (parts 3, 4, and 5) Madras 1962–67.
- ChU *Chāndogyopaniṣad*. In: Ed. P. Olivelle, *The early Upaniṣads: annotated text and translation*. New York/Oxford 1998.
- G *Vidhiviveka* (Maṇḍanamiśra) and *Nyāyakaṇikā* (Vācaspatimiśra). Ed. M. L. Goswami, *Vidhiviveka of Śrī Maṇḍana Miśra with the Commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspati Miśra*. Varanasi 1978.

<sup>123</sup> It may be inappropriate to simplistically judge whether ancient theories of practice, both by Prabhākara and Greek philosophers (for example, Aristotle and Sto-

- MmS *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. In: Ed. Subbāśāstrī, *Mīmāṃsādarśanam*. 6 parts. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. Poona. 1929–53.
- Mn *Manusmṛti*. Ed. P. Olivelle, *Manu's Code of Law. A Critical Edition and Translation of the Mānava-Dharmaśāstra*. Oxford/New York 2005.
- NK *Nyāyakaṇikā* (Vācaspatimiśra). In: Ed. E. M. Stern, *Vidhiviveka of Maṇḍanamiśra with its commentary Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspatimiśra and its commentaries Juṣadhvaṇkaraṇī and Svaditāṇkaraṇī of Parameśvara*. Vol. 1. Pondichéry 2023.
- NKC *Nyāyakumudacandra* (Prabhācandra). Ed. M. K. Nyayacharya, *Nyāya Kumud Chandra of Śrīmat Prabhāchandrāchārya*. Vol. II. Bombay 1941.
- NS *Nyāyasūtra*. Ed. A. Tarkatirtha, *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Calcutta 1936.
- PrP *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (Śālikanātha). Ed. A. S. Sastri, *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śālikanātha Miśra with the Nyāya-siddhi of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa*. Varanasi 1961.
- PVAN *Pramāṇavārttikālaṇkāranibandha* (Yamāri). Eds. E. Franco and H. Matsuoka, in collaboration with J. Chu and X. Li, *Yamāri's Pramāṇavārttikālaṇkāranibandha, Pramāṇasiddhi Chapter, diplomatic edition with critical notes*. In preparation. (Citations in this paper are by their locations in the manuscript.)
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- PW *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*. O. Böhtlingk und R. Roth. *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*. 7 Bde. St. Petersburg 1855–1875.
- RP *Rjuvimalāpañcikā* (Śālikanātha). See Brh.
- ŚB *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* (Mādhyandina). Ed. A. Weber, *The Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa in the Mādhyandina-Çākhā with extracts from the commentaries of Sāyaṇa, Harisvāmin and Dvivedagana*. Varanasi 1964. (1<sup>st</sup> ed., Berlin-London 1855).
- ŚBh *Śābarabhāṣya* (Śābarasvāmin). See MmS.
- ŚV *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila). Ed. D. Sastri, *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Varanasi 1978.
- TSP *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla). Ed. D. Sastri, *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the commentary Pañjikā of Śrī Kamalaśīla*. Vol. 2. Varanasi 1968.
- TV *Tantravārttika* (Kumārila). See MmS.
- TVBh *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya* (Sthiramati). In: Ed. S. Lévi, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā*. Paris 1925.
- VP *Vākyapadīya* (Bhartr̥hari). Ed. W. Rau, *Bhartr̥hari's Vākyapadīya. Die Mūlakārikās. Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XLII, 4*. Wiesbaden 1977.
- VV *Vidhiviveka* (Maṇḍanamiśra). See NK.

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icism), entail either hypothetical imperative or categorical imperative, sticking to the exclusive demarcation made by Kant at the time of European Enlightenment.

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