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MINGYUAN GAO

**THE BUDDHIST CONCEPT OF VĀSANĀ**

A GENEALOGICAL STUDY



ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN  
WIEN 2025



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GEGRÜNDET VON  
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HERAUSGEGEBEN VON  
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und MARKUS VIEHBECK

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## Preface

The present study constitutes a genealogical investigation into the development of the Buddhist concept of *vāsanā*, especially in the Abhidharma and early Yogācāra texts, based on primary sources in Sanskrit, Tibetan, classical Chinese, and Pāli. It reveals the close doctrinal connections between Abhidharma debates and Yogācāra theories. This book is a revised version of my Ph.D. dissertation, *The Buddhist Concept of Vāsanā: From Abhidharma to Yogācāra* (2019), submitted to the Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya. As I was not fully satisfied with my dissertation, I have substantially reworked its content. While my dissertation follows a chronological order, this book, employing a genealogical methodology, is structured according to the different connotations of *vāsanā*. In doing so, I seek to demonstrate that the development of a Buddhist concept may not have been linear, stemming from one single origin, but rather the result of a fusion of multiple ideas from various sources. Those who have read my dissertation will note significant revisions in this book, particularly in the sections on *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharmas* and *śrutavāsanā*.

The inspiration for this research topic is partially drawn from Changhwan Park's *Vasubandhu, Śrīlāta, and the Sautrāntika Theory of Seeds* (2014), published as part of the Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde (WSTB) series. While Park's study discusses *bīja*, the present book concentrates on *vāsanā*. I hope that my research also sheds light on the doctrinal relationship between *bīja* and *vāsanā*, which remains unclear in Park's research.

Some of the content in this book were originally published in their early versions as journal articles in *Religions of South Asia* 15.1 (2021): 5–31 (§3.3), *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 51.1 (2023): 1–23 (§4.1–4.2), and *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 73.3 (§6.2.2). I thank the editors and publishers for granting permission to include the revised version of these works in this book.

I must express my most profound gratitude to my Ph.D. supervisor, Venerable Professor Kuala Lumpur Dhammajoti. I owe my knowledge of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and Yogācāra to his teaching. I also cherish the time we spent sitting vis-à-vis every evening discussing my analysis of Buddhist texts after I had submitted my dissertation to him. He read my thesis carefully and provided many valuable comments. At the same time, his deep religious enthusiasm moved me and

taught me the mission of being a Buddhist. He is a living example of how one can be both a great scholar and a devoted Buddhist.

I also wish to express my deepest indebtedness to my host professor during my research period in Japan, Professor Nobuyoshi Yamabe. While frequently referencing his publications in my study, I have also put forward many arguments that differ from his. What I admire most is Professor Yamabe's openness to academic debate, as he has always encouraged me to express my own views, and has never hesitated to share his insights or point out my mistakes in reading the original texts. Many of the arguments presented in this book have emerged from the discussions between us. I would even say that without the guidance of Professor Yamabe, this book would not have reached its present quality.

I am much obliged to the Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai (BDK) for their generous support of my research in Japan over two years, which made both the completion of this study and the open access publication of the present book possible. I also deeply appreciate the Khyentse Foundation for generously sponsoring me with a scholarship from 2017 to 2019 while I was writing my Ph.D. dissertation.

I owe a debt of gratitude to the board members of the Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien for their useful feedbacks. I particularly thank Dr. Markus Viehbeck and Professor Klaus-Dieter Mathes for facilitating the review and publication of this book. It is a great honor for me to publish my work in the prestigious WSTB series, and I appreciate their rigorous standards and commitment to textual and doctrinal studies of Buddhism.

I am grateful to my teachers at the Centre of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, for equipping me with essential skills in reading Buddhist texts. I had the privilege of learning Theravāda Abhidhamma from Professor Y. Karunadasa, the fundamentals of reading Pāli commentaries and Japanese from late Professor Toshiichi Endo, and elementary Tibetan from Dr. G. T. Halkias. I also thank Dr. Guang Xing for his constant support and keen interest in the progress of this book.

Besides, I first developed a strong interest in Buddhist philosophy and Sanskrit, taught by Professor ZHANG Fenglei and Venerable Dr. Weishan respectively, at the School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China, where I also learned key academic methodologies in the humanities. I owe them both my sincere appreciation.

I wish to extend my warmest thanks to my dear friends, Ché Garcia and Professor Paul Swanson for kindly proofreading the English of this book. Needless to say, all remaining mistakes are my own responsibility. My sincere thanks also go to the proofreaders of my doctoral dissertation and related articles, including

Venerable Ci Yi, FOO Choi Peng, and Jack Cummins. I must take this opportunity to express my grateful thanks to WOO Bob Chung, who helped with the index pagination and pointed out some typos in the first draft of this book.

I am thankful to all those kind individuals I encountered in Hong Kong and Tokyo who have offered me selfless assistance and kindness while I was doing this research, as if they were incarnations of Bodhisattvas. Special appreciation is extended to MICHIEDA Shunsuke, whose glowing radiance of purity has reinvigorated me like a gust of fresh wind, giving me the strength to brace myself for new challenges when fatigue set in.

I must also record my heartfelt gratitude to my loving family members who have steadfastly supported me throughout my research career. While I was conducting research in Japan, my wife Tul continued working in Hong Kong to support our family, and my elderly father took on the responsibility of caring for my young son, Boonpob. They endured the *duhkha* of long separation with remarkable patience and understanding. Their selfless sacrifices not only made this study possible but also deepened our bonds in ways I never anticipated, for which I am eternally grateful.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to my beloved grandma, GAO Qihui 高其慧 (1921–2014), who passed away while I was beginning my journey in Buddhist studies. I have carried a deep sense of regret for not being by her side in her final days. If this study generates any merit (*punya*), I humbly offer all of it, as “*un bouquet de houx vert et de bruyère en fleur*,” to my grandma.



## Abbreviations and Sigla

AA	<i>Manorathapūraṇī, Buddhaghosa's Commentary on the Aṅguttara-nikāya</i> , 5 vols., ed. M. Walleser and H. Kopp, 1973–1979 (PTS).
AdsP	<i>Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā</i> , ed. Edward Conze, 1962.
ADV	<i>Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti</i> , ed. P. S. Jaini, 1959.
AH-Dh	*Dharmavijaya's * <i>Abhidharma-hṛdaya(-śāstra)</i> 阿毘曇心論, T no. 1550.
AH-U	Upaśānta's * <i>Abhidharmahṛdaya(-vṛtti?)</i> 阿毘曇心論經, T no. 1551.
AKBh	<i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</i> , ed. P. Pradhan, 1967.
AKVy	<i>Spṛhātārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā</i> , ed. Unrai Wogihara, 1932–1936.
AN	<i>Aṅguttara Nikāya</i> , ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy, 1885–1900 (PTS).
AP	<i>Apte Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary</i> , ed. Vaman Shivram Apte, 1890.
AS	<i>Abhidharmasamuccaya</i> , ed. Prahlad Pradhan, 1950.
ASBh	<i>Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya</i> , ed. N. Tatia, 1976.
AsP	<i>Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā</i> , ed. P. L. Vaidya, 1960.
AVbh	* <i>Abhidharmavibhāṣā(-śāstra)</i> 阿毘曇毘婆沙論, T no. 1546.
BHSD	<i>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary</i> , Vol. II: Dictionary, ed. F. Edgerton, 1953.
BoBh	<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi</i> .
BoBh <sub>D</sub>	<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi</i> , ed. N. Dutt, 1966.
BoBh <sub>w</sub>	<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi</i> , ed. U. Wogihara, 1930–36.
BoBh <sub>Vin</sub>	<i>Bodhisattvabhūmi-viniścaya</i> ; as in the VinSg.
CWSL	<i>Chéng wéishí lùn</i> 成唯識論, T no. 1585.
D	Derge edition (Tōhoku Catalogue) of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon.
DBhS	<i>Daśabhūmika-sūtra</i> , ed. P. L. Vaidya, 1967.
DN	<i>The Dīgha Nikāya</i> , ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter, 1976–76 (PTS).
EĀ-f	<i>Ekottarāgama-Fragmente der Gilgit-Handschrift</i> , ed. Chandrabhāl Tripāthī, 1995.
JñP	<i>Jñānaprasthāna(-śāstra)</i> 阿毘達磨發智論, T no. 1544.
KSP	<i>Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa</i> , as in <i>The Tibetan Text of the Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa of Vasubandhu with Reference to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Pratītya-samutpāda-vyākhyā</i> , ed. Gijin Muroji, 1985.
Kv	<i>Kathāvatthu</i> , ed. A. C. Taylor, 1979 (PTS).

KvA	<i>Kathāvatthupparakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā</i> , ed. N. A. Jayawickrama, 1979 (PTS).
LAS	<i>Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra</i> , ed. B. Nanjio, 1923.
Lv	<i>Lalitavistara</i> , 3 vols., ed. K. Hokazono, 1994–2019.
MAH	* <i>Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya</i> 雜阿毘曇心論, T no. 1552.
MAV	The <i>kārikā</i> portion of the <i>Madhyāntavibhāga</i> , as in the <i>Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya</i> , ed. Gadjin Nagao, 1964.
MAVBh	<i>Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya</i> , ed. Gadjin Nagao, 1964.
MAVṬ	<i>Madhyāntavibhāgaṭṭhā</i> , ed. Sylvain Lévi, 1934.
Miln	<i>Milindapañha</i> , ed. V. Trenckner, 1962 (PTS).
MN	<i>Majjhimanikāya</i> , ed. V. Trenckner and R. Charlmers, 1888–1889 (PTS).
MPPU	* <i>Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa</i> 大智度論, T no. 1509.
MSA/Bh	<i>Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra</i> , ed. Sylvain Lévi, 1907.
MSg	<i>Mahāyānasamgraha</i> , 2 vols., ed. Gadjin Nagao, 1982–1987.
MSgBh	<i>Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya</i> , D no. 4050.
MVbh	*( <i>Abhidharma</i> )- <i>mahāvibhāṣā(śāstra)</i> 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, T no. 1545.
MW	<i>A Sanskrit-English Dictionary</i> , ed. M. Monier-Williams, 1899.
N	Narthaṅ edition (Ōtani Catalogue) of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon.
Nett	<i>The Netti-pakaraṇa with Extracts from Dhammapāla's Commentary</i> , ed. E. Hardy, 1902 (PTS).
NettA	<i>Netti-aṭṭhakathā</i> , Romanized from Myanmar version by Buddhasāsana Society, 2008.
NA	* <i>Nyāyānusāra</i> (or <i>Nyāyānusāriṇī</i> ) 阿毘達磨順正理論, T no. 1562.
P	Peking edition (Ōtani Catalogue) of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon.
Peṭ	<i>Peṭakopadesa</i> , ed. A. Barua, 1949 (PTS).
PBh	<i>Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi</i> (=first chapter) in the <i>Maulī Bhūmi</i> of the <i>Yogācārabhūmi</i> .
PED	<i>The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary</i> , ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, 1921–25.
PTS	The Pali Text Society
PMBhVin	<i>Vinīscaya</i> of <i>Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi</i> and <i>Manobhūmi</i> as in the VinSg.
PratyS	<i>The Tibetan Text of the Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṃmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra</i> , ed. Paul M. Harrison, 1978.
Pug	<i>Puggalapāññati</i> , ed. Richard Morris, 1972 (PTS).
PvsP	<i>Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā</i> , ed. Takayasu Kimura, 1986–2009.
RGVV	<i>Ratnagotravibhāga</i> with its <i>Vyākhyā</i> commentary, as in <i>Ratnagotravibhāgo Mahāyānottaratantra-śāstra</i> , ed. E. H. Johnston, 1961.

SA	<i>Sāratthappakāsinī</i> ( <i>Samyuttanikāya-aṭṭhakathā</i> ), ed. F. L. Woodward, 1929–37 (PTS).
SN	<i>Samyutta Nikāya</i> , ed. Leon Feer and Mrs. Rhys Davids, 1960 (PTS).
Sn	<i>Suttanipāta</i> , ed. Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith, 1913 (PTS).
SnA	<i>Paramatthajotikā</i> ( <i>Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā</i> ), ed. Helmer Smith, 1916–18 (PTS).
SNS	<i>Samdhinirmocana-sūtra</i> , ed. Étienne Lamotte, 1935.
Sp	<i>Samantapāsādikā</i> , ed. Junjirō Takakusu and Makoto Nagai, 1975 (PTS).
ŚrBh	<i>Śrāvaka bhūmi</i> , 3 vols., ed. Śrāvaka bhūmi Study Group, The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University, 1998–2018.
ŚrMS	<i>Śrīmālādevīśiṃhanāda-nirdeśa/Śrīmālādevīśiṃhanāda-sūtra</i> , D no. 92, T no. 353.
SavBh	<i>Savitarakasavicārādhībhūmi</i> , as in <i>The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga</i> , ed. Bhattacharya, 1957.
T	Taishō edition of the Chinese Buddhist Canon.
TrK	<i>Triṃśikā Kārikā</i> , as in the <i>Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya</i> , ed. H. Buescher, 2007.
TrBh	<i>Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya</i> , ed. Hartmut Buescher, 2007.
Ud	<i>Udāna</i> , ed. P. Steinthal, 1885 (PTS).
UdA	<i>Udāna-aṭṭhakathā</i> ( <i>Paramatthadīpanī</i> ), ed. F. L. Woodward, 1977 (PTS).
VinSg	* <i>Viniścayasamgrahaṇī</i> , D no. 4038.
Vism	<i>Visuddhimagga</i> , ed. Rhys Davids, 1975 (PTS).
VSg	* <i>Vastusamgrahaṇī</i> , D no. 4039.
X	<i>Shinsan Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō</i> 卅新纂大日本續藏經.
YBh	<i>Yogācārabhūmi</i> , T no. 1579, D nos. 4035–4042.
YBh <sub>Bh</sub>	<i>The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga</i> , ed. V. Bhattacharya, 1957.
Ch.	Chinese
Pā.	Pāli
Tib.	Tibetan
Skt.	Sanskrit
em.	emended
n.	note
*	restoration, italic
<...>	emendation
[...]	addition
§	section





# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Research Questions: The Complexity of *Vāsanā*

This study aims to investigate the origins of the Buddhist concept of *vāsanā* and its doctrinal development, especially in the Abhidharma and early Yogācāra texts. A special focus will be given to the relationship between *vāsanā* and the Buddhist theory of seed (*bīja*). Although the term *vāsanā* was not of much doctrinal significance in early Buddhist texts, it gradually became an important concept since the Abhidharma period. Various Buddhist schools employed the notion, albeit with different connotations, to explicate their sectarian doctrines. Particularly in the Yogācāra school, *vāsanā* is connected with *bīja* and is essential to its theories of both karma and conditioned *dharmas*. However, interestingly enough, in Buddhist texts concerning *vāsanā*, there is not a single *dharma* as a factor of existence, or even a category of *dharmas*, that is named as *vāsanā*. In this regard, what is the nature of *vāsanā*? What do Buddhists mean when speaking of *vāsanā*?

There is a wide diversity of English translations of the Sanskrit term *vāsanā* by Buddhist scholars. Rhys Davids and Stede ([1921–25]2004, 610)<sup>1</sup> and Edgerton (1953, 478–79)<sup>2</sup> suggest the rendering of “impression”, which is also used in Schmithausen’s earlier monograph (1987, 4) on *ālayavijñāna*. Waldron (2003, 218 n. 15) adopts this translation and sometimes juxtaposes it with “predispositions” as an alternative in the Yogācāra context (*ibid.*, 136). Relying on Chinese Yogācāra texts, Lusthaus (2002, 194) translates the term as “perfumings”. Lévi (1911, 117) interprets *vāsanā* as “*imprégnation*” in his French translation of the *Mahāvānasūtrāṣṭkāra* (MSA). Schmithausen (2014, 29), in his most recent study on the Yogācāra-vijñānavāda, changes his translation to “imprints or impregnations”. In a meditative context of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh), de La Vallée Poussin (1924, 248–49) also uses “*imprégnation*”. By contrast, regarding *kleśavāsanā* in Abhidharma, the term is translated as “traces” by de La Vallée Poussin (1925, 77) and Cox (1995, 96), but by Lamotte (1974, 91) still as “impregnation”. Suzuki ([1930]1998, 438) in his study of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (LAS) explains *vāsanā* as

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<sup>1</sup> PED, s.v. “*vāsanā*.”

<sup>2</sup> BHSD, s.v. “*vāsana*.”

“perfuming impression, memory, habit-energy”. When translating the Pāli *Suttanipāta*, Bodhi (2017, 1412 n. 748; 1437 n. 993) understands the term as “habitual formations” or “habituation”. Last but not least, Stcherbatsky (1962, i 520; ii 261) translates the term in Buddhist logico-epistemological works as “Biotic Force” and interprets it as “natural capacity”.

The varied translations of the notion “*vāsanā*” may reflect its multiple connotations in different contexts. In fact, we could hardly find one proper English term that is able to express all the connotations of *vāsanā*. Since we will discuss various meanings of the notion in a number of Buddhist texts, except for quotations, this book mainly uses its original Sanskrit form “*vāsanā*” instead of translating. An English explanation of the notion in a particular context will be provided where necessary.

Pragmatically speaking, different Buddhist traditions should have contributed to the polysemy of *vāsanā*. For example, in the Northern tradition of Buddhism, *vāsanā* is frequently connected with negative notions such as defilement (*kleśa*) and karma, while in the Southern tradition, *vāsanā* is often related to merits (*puñña*) and thus can be used in a positive sense (Endo 2002, 111). As noted by Edgerton (1953, 479), sometimes, *vāsanā* is used in a neutral sense—“both good and bad”—in Mahāyāna texts that are related to the destinies of existence (*gati*).<sup>3</sup> Though this situation is not absolute<sup>4</sup>, it suggests that there could be multiple origins of the notion.

Meanwhile, even within one Buddhist school, the understanding of *vāsanā* can be equally complicated. Let us take the developed Yogācāra school for example. It is known that the karmic *vāsanā* is said to be exhausted as soon as the presenting/issuing (*phala-dāna*) of its effect of ripening (*vipāka-phala*). Otherwise, there will be endless ripening of one karmic action. However, the Yogācāras, in line with the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas, hold that the traces of defilement, known as *kleśavāsanā*, remain even when all defilements and latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) are abandoned by an Arhat. Moreover, although defilements serve as the cause of karma, *kleśavāsanā* is not explicitly connected to the production of karmic *vāsanā* in any Buddhist texts. Such doctrinal inconsistency demonstrates the complexity of the notion.

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<sup>3</sup> The example given in the BHSD is a quote from the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, “*yathāgatisaṃbandha-vāsanā-vāsitatām ca*.”

<sup>4</sup> As will be shown in §2.1, *vāsanā* used in a non-negative sense is also found in a few texts in the northern tradition, such as in the *Mahāvastu*. On the other hand, Endo (2002, 113) also notes that *kilesa-vāsanā* came to be emphasized in the Pāli commentarial literature.

It is also interesting to note that *vāsanā* is explicitly taken as a synonym for seed (*bīja*) by some Yogācāra masters as recorded in the *Chéng wéishí lùn* 成唯識論 (CWSL) (see §4.2.2). Since the Yogācāras also take latent disposition (*anuśaya*) as seed (*bīja*) of defilement, *kleśavāsanā* should have been regarded as equivalent to latent dispositions. However, according to early *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, *kleśavāsanā* cannot give rise to defilements further (see §5.3.1). In line with this understanding, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* also regards *kleśavāsanā* as Arhats' behaviors similar to the real state of defilement (*kleśa-sadbhāva-saḍṛṣṭi-ceṣṭā*)<sup>5</sup>—*vāsanā* cannot be defilements. This fact seems to be contradictory to the idea that *vāsanā* is identical to mere seed. In this connection, Yamabe (1989, 46) suggests that *bīja* and *vāsanā* cannot be absolute synonyms at the beginning. Thus, more questions should be raised as follows: If *vāsanā* was not identical to *bīja* at the outset, how did they become synonyms? If *vāsanā* is simply synonymous with *bīja*, why did the Yogācāras find it necessary to keep both of the concepts?

Furthermore, on the basis of its occurrence in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts, *vāsanā* is often accounted as being “impregnated”. This idea is expressed in Sanskrit as *vāsita* or *paribhāvita* (sometimes simply *bhāvita*). Likewise, for the Yogācāras, *bījas* in *ālayavijñāna* must be impregnated. An immediate question that arises here is how the term “*paribhāvita*” takes the same meaning as “*vāsita*”. Moreover, since *vāsanā* bears the meaning of the influence on a sentient being and is translated by some scholars as “perfumings” (Lusthaus 2002, 194), does it indicate that it is an impregnator/perfumer? If so, does *vāsanā* indicate both the aspects of an impregnated/perfumed and an impregnator/perfumer?

Although much research has been done by modern scholars on the theory of *bīja* and that of defilement, no adequate attention has been paid to the concept of *vāsanā*. On the one hand, the previous research that touched upon the issue of *vāsanā* mainly focuses on only one aspect of the concept in a certain text. On the other hand, the explanations of *vāsanā* in Buddhist dictionaries and encyclopedias are still inadequate. For example, in the Macmillan *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, Gómez (2004, 681–82) takes *vāsanā* as a way that “intentional action [(i.e. karma)] leaves traces” (i.e., *anuśaya*) whose manifested state is defilement. This understanding, or rather this misinterpretation, takes *vāsanā* as a consistent concept in the entire Buddhism and thus neglects its polysemy. In addition, the *Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism* provides a brief but panoramic explanation of the term. However, as it takes *vāsanā*

<sup>5</sup> BoBhw 404. Cf. D no. 4037, sems tsam, wi 208a2; T30, no. 1571, 574a22.

as the impregnating one which impregnates the *bījas* in *ālayavijñāna*<sup>6</sup>, it needs to be explained why *vāsanā* is also defined by the Yogācāras as *bīja*, the impregnated one.

Inspired by the above confusions and questions, this study seeks to examine different connotations of the concept of *vāsanā* in Buddhism. Instead of defining what *vāsanā* is in Buddhism, this book attempts to undertake a genealogical methodology to research into the various connotations of *vāsanā* that occurred in Buddhist texts. It will be investigated how the heterogenous concept of *vāsanā* came to be synthesized during the development of from Abhidharma to Yogācāra.

## 1.2. Etymological Analysis of *Vāsanā*

Etymologically speaking, the Sanskrit word “*vāsanā*” is derived from the Class I verb root  $\sqrt{vas}$ , which means “to dwell, live, stay”, etc.<sup>7</sup> The causative form of this verb,  $\sqrt{vās}$ —“to cause to dwell”, expresses the idea of “to infuse” or “to remain”. Accordingly, the feminine noun *vāsanā*, which is often used in Buddhist texts, indicates imprint in the sense of a distinct remaining influence of something, such as in the terms “*kleśavāsanā*” and “*karmaṇo vāsanā*”. In the cognitive context, *vāsanā* can be understood as impression, namely, what remains in mind.

*Vāsanā* can also be regarded as an action noun, which implies the very act of impregnating or leaving an influence on another object. In some Buddhist analogies that allude to perfumery, the term can be translated as “perfuming”. Monier-Williams’s *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (MW) also gives  $\sqrt{vās}$  as a Class X denominative verb, meaning “to perfume, make fragrant, scent,”<sup>8</sup> and so on. This Class X verb can be taken as the causative form of the Class I verb  $\sqrt{vas}$ , because making a scent or fragrance remain on an object amounts to perfuming that object.<sup>9</sup> At least, this Class X verb  $\sqrt{vās}$  has been considered by classical Sanskrit

<sup>6</sup> *Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism*, s.v. “*vāsanā*.”

<sup>7</sup> See MW, s.v. “ $\sqrt{vas}$ ”, 932.

<sup>8</sup> MW, s.v. “ $\sqrt{vās}$ ”, 974.

<sup>9</sup> See McHugh’s (2012, 277 n. 33) similar etymological discussion of *vāsana* and *vāsanā*. Note that *The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary* (s.vv. “*vasati*”, “*vāsa*”, “*vāsa*”, “*vāsanā*”, “*vāsita*”, “*vāseti*”), while suggesting that the Pāli words *vāsanā* and *vāsita* are derived from the causative form of *vasati* (“to live, dwell, stay”) or *vāsa* (“living”), keeps Rhys Davids’s opinion that they could be from *vāseti* (“to perfume”) or *vāsa* (“perfume”).

grammarians as a distinct root from the Class I verb  $\sqrt{\text{vas}}$ .<sup>10</sup>

On the other hand, according to Pāṇini's *Dhātupāṭha* (Śarmā 1969, 50), the present stem “*vāsa*” of the Class X verb  $\sqrt{\text{vās}}$  is defined as “*upasevāyām*”, which literally means “causing to attend on”. Such an interpretation seems to imply the Indian tradition of studying under a spiritual guru. In light of this, the word also bears the meanings such as practicing and cultivating.<sup>11</sup> In this connection, in some Buddhist texts, “*vāsanā*” is used interchangeably with “*paribhāvanā*” or even simply “*bhāvanā*”, which denotes cultivation or developing.<sup>12</sup> Sometimes, *vāsanā* and *bhāvanā* in this sense also occur in their neuter forms as “*vāsana*” and “*bhāvana*” respectively. It is arguable that the causative of “*pari-√bhū*” is taken as a synonym for “ $\sqrt{\text{vās}}$ ”—making the property of *dharma x* to develop (*pari-√bhū*) in *dharma y* is identical to causing the property of *x* to dwell ( $\sqrt{\text{vas}}$ ) in *y*.

Combining the above aspects<sup>13</sup>, we may roughly take the Buddhist term *vāsanā* either as the imprint of something (karma or *dharma*) being capable of resulting in a certain corresponding effect in one's serial continuity (*santati*), or as the dynamic process of leaving such an imprint. Grammatically speaking, *vāsana* expresses both an active sense of impregnation and a passive-objective sense of the impregnated imprint. It is in the latter sense that later Yogācāras considered *vāsanā* as a synonym for impregnated *bīja*. In fact, notwithstanding that the feminine form *vāsanā* generally bears a more abstract sense than its neuter form, Buddhists seem not to

<sup>10</sup> As shown in the MW (s.v. “ $\sqrt{\text{vās}}^2$ ”), such a use of this Class X verb can be found in the *Mahābhārata* and Kāvya literature.

<sup>11</sup> MW, s.v. “*upa-√sev*”, 210.

<sup>12</sup> Böhtlingk and Roth's *Sanskrit Wörterbuch* (s.v. “*vāsay*”) also suggests that *vāsita* expresses the same meaning as *bhāvita*, and *vāsanā* can be explained by *bhāvanā*. Nevertheless, the examples provided in the *Sanskrit Wörterbuch* are from the Sanskrit lexicons such as the *Amarakoṣa*, *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*, *Anekārthasaṃgraha*, and *Medinikoṣa*, which are much later than the Buddhist sources. As suggested by Takeuchi (1950, 86 n. 2), in Yogācāra texts, *vāsita* and (*pari-*)*bhāvita* are interchangeable because both  $\sqrt{\text{vas}}$  and  $\sqrt{\text{bhū}}$  convey the idea of existence. De La Vallée Poussin (1924, 249) remarks that *bhāvanā* is equivalent to *vāsanā* in chapter IV of the AKBh. In fact, as will be seen in §2.2, such a correlation can be found in other earlier Abhidharma texts. Additionally, McHugh (2012, 140) points out that Gaṅgādhara's *Gandhasāra* distinguishes *bhāvana* (“steeping”) from *vāsana* (“enfleurage”) in the process of Indian perfumery. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that these different meanings of the perfumery terms seemingly came to be made clear as late as the tenth century CE in the *Gandhasāra*. On the other hand, even if the semantic discrepancy could be traced back to an earlier time, the Buddhist philosophers were not so likely to clearly understand the nuance between the perfumery terms, because monastics are prohibited from using perfume.

<sup>13</sup> Referring to various explanations in dictionaries, Waldron (2003, 218 n. 15) also provides an etymological analysis of *vāsanā*. However, Waldron does not mention the possibility that the word can also be a verbal noun, which denotes the action of making the impression, namely, perfuming.

have seriously differentiated the two forms in practical use.

It should be noted that since around the fourth century, the term *vāsanā* derived from the Class I verb  $\sqrt{vas}$  and that derived from the Class X verb  $\sqrt{vās}$  could not be differentiated from each other. In other words, both the substantial sense and the dynamic sense are intended when the term “*vāsanā*” is employed. D. T. Suzuki (1998, 178) also suggests that Mahāyāna Buddhism combines the two senses of “to dwell” and “to perfume”. Accordingly, any remaining influence must be developed through the process of impregnation or perfuming. For example, according to the \**Nyāyānusāra* (NA), *vāsanā* as the traces left behind by former defilements is also regarded as a result of the impregnation of the defilements.

Another noteworthy point is that the word “*vāsanā*” is singular in most cases in Sanskrit texts, though occasionally it appears in the plural form. When the term is used in plural form, it must be used in its substantial sense of imprints.

### 1.3. Tibetan and Chinese Translations of *Vāsanā*

The Tibetan and Chinese translations of the notion may help us better understand the meanings of *vāsanā* used in the Buddhist context.

Interestingly, in the Tibetan translation, the different ideas expressed by the term are almost invariably rendered as “*bag chags*”, albeit with a few exceptions. In Tibetan, “*bag*” means a little, while “*chags pa*” means attachment or desire. The word “*bag chags*” as a whole expresses the idea of a small amount of subtle attachment that remains. Since *vāsanā* can be sometimes described as *vāsita* or *paribhāvita* (impregnated), the two Sanskrit passive participles are respectively translated into Tibetan as “*bsgos pa*” and “*yongs su bsgos pa*”.

By contrast, Xuanzang seems to be selective when translating the term into Chinese. In his translations, Xuanzang uses “習氣” (*xí qì*) to express the substantial sense of *vāsanā*, and “熏習” (*xūn xí*) to express the dynamic sense as the action of impregnation or perfuming. In fact, because of the flexibility of the part of speech in classical Chinese, the latter word “熏習” (*xūn xí*) can either function as a noun referring to “*vāsanā*” or “*paribhāvanā*” (impregnation/perfuming) or as a verb referring to “ $\sqrt{vās}$ ” or “*pari-√bhū*” (to impregnate/perfume). Literally speaking, “熏” (*xūn*) in Chinese means “perfuming” or “impregnating”; “習” (*xí*) refers to “repeated action” or “habit”; and “氣” (*qì*) indicates “air, fume, scent, reek,” etc. The

compound word “熏習” (*xūn xí*) thus can be understood as impregnating through repeated action, and “習氣” (*xí qì*) delivers the idea of habitual influence comparable to odorant air. As for *vāsita* and *paribhāvita*, Xuanzang translates them identically into Chinese as “所熏” (*suǒ xūn*).

As mentioned above, *bhāvanā*, which literally means developing or cultivation, may also express a similar meaning of *vāsanā*. Xuanzang generally translates the term *bhāvana* as “修習” (*xiū xí*), or simply “修” (*xiū*), sometimes also as “熏習” (*xūn xí*) or “熏修” (*xūn xiū*). In the AKBh (see §4.1.3), for instance, cultivation (*bhāvana*) is explicitly defined as the impregnation/perfuming in mind (*citta-vāsana*). In this context of meditation, *vāsana* is translated into Tibetan as “*sgo ba*” whereas *bhāvana* is translated as “*bsgom pa*”. Likewise, concerning the idea of cultivation, *paribhāvita* can also be translated into Tibetan as “*yongs su bsgoms pa*”.

Last but not least, “*abhyāsa*” (<*abhi-√ās*), which means repeated practice, habit, or custom, is also closely connected to the idea of *vāsanā*. The Chinese rendition of the *abhyāsa* is “串習” (*chuàn xí*), which suggests that Chinese translators clearly took *vāsanā* (習氣/熏習) as something relevant to habit or a frequently exercised action. As will be observed, except for the idea of karmic *vāsanā*, in most cases, *vāsanā* is considered to be formed by means of repeated practice. *Abhyāsa* is translated into Tibetan as “*goms pa*”. One may immediately notice here the phonetic similarity between “*goms pa*” and “*bsgom pa*”, the Tibetan rendering of *bhāvanā*, “cultivation”. Wayman (1987, 52–53) notes that the two words are seemingly regarded as synonyms by Tibetan Buddhist masters. Wayman, then, surmises that “*goms pa*” (*abhyāsa*) refers to the repeated practice of one factor of the Noble Path whereas “*bsgom pa*” (*bhāvanā*) is indeterminate. Nevertheless, it might be clearer if we consider the semantic distinction between the two words in Sanskrit Buddhist texts: Cultivation (*bhāvanā*) must be based on repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) and lead to either the Noble Path or a better existence. By contrast, *abhyāsa* itself, as a habit, can be either good or bad. Likewise, *vāsanā* habituated through repeated practice may also be both pure and impure.

#### 1.4. Various Connotations of *Vāsanā*

According to the context where *vāsanā* occurs, we may generally distinguish the following meanings of the term *vāsanā* in Buddhism:



- (1) Development/cultivation of merits. Through repeated practice, *vāsanā* as the development of merits has its imprint on one's mind (*citta*). In this sense, it is described as being impregnated (*vāsita*). For example, it is defined in a Pāli commentary, “‘what is impregnated by the previous *vāsana*’ (*pubba-vāsana-vāsita*) means the minds impregnated by the cultivation of merits (*puñña-bhāvanā*) through repeated practice (*gatapaccaṅgata-vatta*).”<sup>14</sup> According to another, simply “*vāsanā* is the cultivation of merits.”<sup>15</sup> (See §2.1)
- (2) Imprints of karma, or more precisely speaking, the remaining karmic efficacy in one's serial continuity. *Vāsanā* is also used to refer to the karmic efficacy that continues after the cause of ripening (*vipāka-hetu*) is made, being capable of producing its effect of ripening (*vipāka-phala*). This idea is sometimes used interchangeably with the Sautrāntika notion of seed (*bīja*). A clear example is found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (YBh): “Basing on *vāsanā* as cause-base, projection cause (*ākṣepa-hetu*) is designated... It is because the conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) impregnated by good and bad karma, in the desired and undesired destinies of existence (*gati*) in the triple sphere, project desired and undesired individual existence (*ātmabhāva*).”<sup>16</sup> (See §3.3.2.1) Moreover, in the *Triṃśikāvijñapti-bhāṣya* (TrBh), Sthiramati explains, “the potency (*sāmarthyā*), which has been deposited by that karma in *ālayavijñāna* for bringing forth the future individual existence, is the *karma-vāsanā*.”<sup>17</sup> (See §7.2)
- (3) Traces left behind by defilements (*kleśavāsanā*) in the Noble Ones (*ārya*) before the attainment of Buddhahood or among the Two Vehicles (*yāna*). This use can be explained in two ways. First, if the compound is read as a *tatpuruṣa*, “*kleśa-vāsanā*” means the traces or after-effects derived from (the abandoned) defilements, which suggests *vāsanā* is different from *kleśa*. For example, it is clearly described in an early *Prajñāpāramitā* text that the continuance of *vāsanā* is not defilements, but is just the bodily and vocal perturbations in Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas who have abandoned greed, hatred and delusion (see §5.3.1).<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup> SnA II ii 583: *pubbavāsanavāsitaṃ ti...gatapaccaṅgatavatta-puññabhāvanā vāsitaṃ cittaṃ*.

<sup>15</sup> NettA 219: *vāsanā puññabhāvanā*.

<sup>16</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub>, 107–8: *tatra vāsanā-hetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyākṣepa-hetuḥ prajñāpyate | ... tathā hi | śubhāśubhakarma-paribhāvitāḥ saṃskārās traidhātuke[ṣṭāniṣṭagatiṣv] iṣṭāniṣṭātātmabhāvān ākṣipanti |*

<sup>17</sup> TrBh 112: *tena karmaṇā yad anāgatātmabhāvābhiniṣṭṭaye ālaya-vijñāne sāmarthyam āhitam sā karma-vāsanā |*

<sup>18</sup> See PvsP v 126: *na subhūte vāsanānusaṃdhiḥ kleśaḥ* (Kimura: *vāsanānusaṃdhiḥ kleśaprahāṇam*) | *api nu teṣāṃ rāga-doṣa-moha-prahāṇam asti | kāya-vāg-vikārās tu pravartante* | Cf. AdsP i 149; D no.

In this context, I translate *vāsanā* as “traces” rather than “remainder” and similar terms, because a trace cannot be a component of a past entity X but is instead something distinct that suggests the past existence of X. Second, if “*kleśa-vāsanā*” is interpreted as a *karmadhāraya*, the compound is understood as *vāsanā* qua *kleśa*, namely impregnation that is defilements. This indicates that *vāsanā* constitutes a subtle type of defilements. Although this second interpretation has never been made explicit in Buddhism, it can be inferred in some *tathāgatagarbha* texts, where *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* or *avidyā-vāsanā-bhūmi* represents the most fundamental defilement that generates all defilements (see §5.5). Moreover, “*vāsanā-kleśa*” that occurs in the LAS also indicates the defilements that are *vāsanā* (see §7.3C).

- (4) Impregnation in one’s mind (*citta*) through meditative cultivation. It means through certain ways of meditation, one’s *citta* can be impregnated into a wholesome (*kuśala*) or uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) one. *Vāsanā* used in this sense is read as an action noun. For instance, the AKBh asserts, “The concentrated wholesomeness is cultivation (*bhāvanā*)... It is because of the *vāsanā* (impregnation) in *citta*. That concentrated wholesomeness exceedingly impregnates (√*vās*) the *citta*...”<sup>19</sup> (See §4.1)
- (5) Impregnation of contaminated (*sāsrava*) conditioned *dharma*s in the *ālayavijñāna*. *Vāsanā* in its dynamic sense means that a conditioned *dharma* that manifests from its seed (*bīja*) simultaneously impregnates/perfumes its own seed with the characteristics of the *dharma*. In this sense, it is related to the Buddhist principle of dependent co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*). The *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (MSg) explicitly defines *vāsanā* as “depending on the co-arising and co-perishing with that *dharma*, that which is the cause (\**nimitta*) of generating that [*dharma*]”.<sup>20</sup> This connotation of *vāsanā* is also taken by the developed Yogācāras as identical to *bīja* of *dharma*s (see §4.2.3–§4.3.1).
- (6) Impregnation of uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) *dharma*s. Concerning where uncontaminated *dharma*s arise from, Asaṅga argues that they arise from the *bīja* as *vāsanā* of hearing (*śrutavāsanā*), which is the outflow from the perfectly pure

9, shes phyin, ga 131b6: *bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba ni nyon mongs pa yang ma yin mod kyi...*; T7, no. 220, 338a4–5: 習氣相續實非煩惱.....

<sup>19</sup> AKBh 273: *samāhitam tu kuśalam bhāvanā...citta-vāsanāt | tad dhi samāhitam kuśalam atyarthaṃ cittam vāsayati |*

<sup>20</sup> MSg I.15 (Nagao 1982, 23): *chos de dang lhan cig 'byung ba dang / 'gag pa la brten nas de 'byung ba'i rgyu mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ...*

*dharmadhātu* (\**suviśuddha-dharmadhātu-niṣyanda-śrutavāsanā-bīja*). (See §6.1.2, §6.4)

- (7) Impression of memory. *Vāsanā* is also connected to one's memory (*smṛti*). It refers to something that has been perceived in the past and remains in one's mind, especially in the case of remembering the teachings of the Buddha. *Vāsanā* in this sense can be understood as the cognitive impression. For example, It is said in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya* (ASBh), “*vāsanā* is the basis, because of the appearance [similar to the memory] afterward by the force of cultivation through repeated practice, even without the recollection (*anusmṛti*) of that [object].”<sup>21</sup> (See §6.3)
- (8) Habitual propensity. *Vāsanā* in this sense usually refers to a negative habit. According to the *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya*, Pilindavatsa abandoned his habit of addressing others with an insulting word at the request of the Buddha (see §5.1.2). Moreover, the LAS also speaks of carnivorous sentient beings who are impregnated by the habit of meat-eating (see §7.3).

It will be analyzed in the following chapters that the ideas of (1) cultivation of merits and (4) meditative impregnation respectively developed into the concepts of (2) karmic imprints, and (5) impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s. The connotations of (6) impregnation of uncontaminated *dharma* and (7) impression of memory can be grouped. Connotation (8), habitual propensity, can be related to connotation (3) *kleśavāsanā*. As a result, the seven connotations can be simplified into four categories. The genealogical relationship between these different connotations can be thus drawn.

In this connection, Asaṅga's MSg I.58 enumerates three types of *vāsanā* in the *ālayavijñāna*, viz., (i) *vāsanā* of linguistic expression (\**abhilāpa-vāsanā*), (ii) *vāsanā* of self-view (\**ātmadṛṣṭi*-°), and (iii) *vāsanā* of existence-link (*bhavāṅga*-°).<sup>22</sup> In addition, as noted above, Asaṅga also speaks of *vāsanā* of hearing (*śruta*-°). In total, there are four categories of *vāsanā* specified in the MSg, which tally with what we have summarized above.

Similarly, *The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyana* 大乘起信論 (*Dàshèng qǐxìn lùn*) also distinguishes four types of \**vāsanā*:

<sup>21</sup> ASBh 98: *vāsanāśrayas tad-anusmṛtim antareṇāpi paścād abhyāsa-bhāvanā-balena pratibhāsanād...*

<sup>22</sup> See Nagao 1982, 52: *de la bag chags rnam pa gsum gyi bye brag gis rnam pa gsum ste / (1) mngon par brjod pa'i bag chags kyi bye brag dang / (2) dbag tu lta ba'i bag chags kyi bye brag dang / (3) srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags kyi bye brag gis so* // For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 174.

{1.4A} Because of the four categories regarding the meaning of the impregnation of *dharmas*, the defiled *dharmas* and the pure *dharmas* arise and continue without interruption. What are the four? First, pure *dharma*, which is called Suchness. Second, the cause of all defilements, which is called ignorance. Third, the false mind, which is called karmic consciousness. Fourth, the untrue object-domain, which is called the six sense-objects. The meaning of impregnation is like that though the clothes in the world are not fragrant, they become fragrant because of being perfumed (/impregnated) by fragrance.<sup>23</sup>

Although this treatise is very likely a Chinese composition<sup>24</sup> and its innovative interpretation of impregnation is beyond the scope of this book, the idea of the four types of impregnation is unequivocal. Taking the above two sources into consideration, four basic categories of *vāsanā* can be summarized as (i) *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharma*, (ii) *kleśavāsanā*, (iii) karmic *vāsanā*, and (iv) *śrutavāsanā* or *vāsanā* of hearing the True Teachings. The correspondences of the four categories can be illustrated below:

<Table 1>

Types of <i>vāsanā</i>	<i>Mahāyānasamgraha</i>	<i>Awakening of Faith</i>
karmic <i>vāsanā</i>	* <i>bhavāṅga-vāsanā</i>	<i>vāsanā</i> of false mind
<i>kleśavāsanā</i> or impregnation of defilements <sup>25</sup>	* <i>ātmadr̥ṣṭi-vāsanā</i>	<i>vāsanā</i> as the cause of all defilements
<i>vāsanā</i> of conditioned <i>dharmas</i>	<i>abhilāpa-vāsanā</i>	<i>vāsanā</i> of untrue objects
<i>vāsanā</i> of uncontaminated <i>dharmas</i>	<i>śruta-vāsanā</i>	<i>vāsanā</i> of pure <i>dharma</i>

The genealogical investigation of the Buddhist concept of *vāsanā* in this book also follows the above four categories. So to speak, this method of categorization is also

<sup>23</sup> T32, no. 1666, 578a14–18: 有四種法熏習義故，染法、淨法起不斷絕。云何為四？一者、淨法，名為真如。二者、一切染因，名為無明。三者、妄心，名為業識。四者、妄境界，所謂六塵。熏習義者，如世間衣服實無於香，若人以香而熏習故則有香氣。 Cf. Suzuki (1900, 84) and Hakeda's (1967, 56) English translations.

<sup>24</sup> See Mochizuki's (1946, 639–40) discussion of the debate over the origin of the treatise. Hirakawa (1979, 181–85) holds the opinion that this work is a Chinese translation. For a recent comprehensive research on this issue see Ōtake 2017.

<sup>25</sup> One may note that *kleśavāsanā* corresponds to the *vāsanā* as the cause of all *kleśas* in the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* whereas it is defined as being not able to bring forth further *kleśas* in early Mahāyāna scriptures. As it will be argued in chapter 5, the Buddhist understanding of *kleśavāsanā* underwent significant hermeneutic changes.

Abhidharmic, because the related discussion inevitably concerns the typical Abhidharmic subjects such as cause (*hetu*) and condition (*pratyaya*), intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), and subsumption (*saṃgraha*).<sup>26</sup>

## 1.5. Literature Review

Though for the time being there has not been any monograph that is dedicated to the issue of *vāsanā*, a few studies draw attention to the concept. Most of these studies concern *kleśavāsanā* and *vāsanā* as impregnation of *dharma* in the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra texts. Only a limited few studies note the idea of *vāsanā* in the senses of cultivation and impression of hearing.

### 1.5.1. *Vāsanā* in the Pāli Sources

In his study of the *Suttanipāta*, N. A. Jayawickrama (1976, 154–55), while estimating the date of the composition of the *vatthugāthā* of the *Suttanipāta*, examines the phrase “*pubbevāsanavāsita*”<sup>27</sup> and translates it as “impressed with the resultant force of their former deeds”. The main purpose of his discussion of the term *vāsana* is to demonstrate that its origin—and thus the date of the *vatthugāthā*—is not earlier than the second century BCE. According to Jayawickrama (*ibid.*, 154), “the doctrine of *vāsana* is apparently alien to early Buddhism.” He notes that the developed idea of *vāsana* can be found in the *Milindapañha* and *Visuddhimagga*, which are later examined by Toshiichi Endo (2002, 111). Moreover, some *suttas* are referred to as “*vāsanābhāgiya*” in the *Nettipakaraṇa*<sup>28</sup>. Jayawickrama then claims without further explanation that the meaning of “*vāsanā*” in the *Nettipakaraṇa* is slightly different from that in the former works, though they are fundamentally the same. Based on these discoveries, Jayawickrama (*ibid.*, 155) remarks, “all the works in which this term is employed reflecting on an accepted theory of *vāsanā*, are comparatively late.” Though Jayawickrama fails to discuss further how the notion was developed, he surmises that the concept of “*pubbevāsanavāsita*” is probably developed into a fuller theory by the time of Pāli commentaries. Indeed, clear

<sup>26</sup> See MVbh, T27, 116b20–23: 應以七事覺知阿毘達磨藏義，謂因善巧、緣善巧、自相善巧、共相善巧、攝不攝善巧、相應不相應善巧、成就不成就善巧。

<sup>27</sup> According to the PTS edition, it should be “*pubbavāsanavāsita*”.

<sup>28</sup> Also occurs in the form of *Nettipakaraṇa*.

expatiation of the term can be found only in the Pāli *Aṭṭhakathās* and *Ṭīkā*s. Nevertheless, Endo (2002, 110) notes, “the word *vāsanā* is not a common occurrence in the Pāli commentaries.” Furthermore, Jayawickrama also draws attention to two occurrences of “*vāsanā*” in the *Niddesa*. This treatise not only reiterates the phrase “*pubbavāsanavāsita*” when commenting on the part of the *vatthugāthā* of the *Suttanipāta* concerning Bāvari, but also uses the expression “*ekavāsanavāsita*”, “impressed with similar former impressions” (*ibid.*, 155).

Endo (2002, 110–13) examines most of the occurrences of the term *vāsanā* in the Pāli commentarial literature, including the *Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā* (*Paramatthajotikā*), *Visuddhimagga-aṭṭhakathā* together with *Visuddhimagga Mahāṭīkā* (*Paramatthamañjūsā*), and *Udāna-aṭṭhakathā*, and concludes, “the meaning of *vāsanā* in early sources is simply ‘a habit or disposition’ in a more positive sense. But the negative connotation of the word became more emphasized in the *Aṭṭhakathā* texts.” Furthermore, Dhammajoti (1998, 66) notes that the explanation of *vāsanā* seen in the Pāli *Udāna-aṭṭhakathā* reveals a “close affinity with the northern traditions”.

Bhikkhu Bodhi (2017, 194), in his annotated translation of the *Suttanipāta*, renders the phrase “*pubbevāsanavāsita*” as “formed past habitual formations”. Bodhi (*ibid.*, 1228) also notes that the phrase mentioned here refers to “the meritorious habitual formations of the practice of going and returning” acquired in the era of the past Buddha Kassapa. Additionally, it is also noted that the term “*vāsanābhāgiya*” occurs in the Pāli commentary on the *Suttanipāta*. Drawing on the *Manorathapūraṇī-ṭīkā*, Bodhi (*ibid.*, 1437 n. 993) explains that *vāsanā*, which denotes habituation in the expression *vāsanābhāgiya*, should be understood as “the cultivation of merits”.

### 1.5.2. On *Kleśavāsanā*

Concerning the idea of *kleśavāsanā*, some remarkable research has been done covering a wide range of texts including Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, as well as Yogācāra treatises.

Yinshun is one of the modern scholars who paid attention at earliest to *kleśavāsanā*. According to Yinshun (1985, 149), the idea of *kleśavāsanā* originates from the Mahāsāṅghikas’ esteem for the Tathāgata so as to belittle Śrāvakas who have not abandoned *vāsanā*. It gradually became popular to depreciate “Hīnayāna” and to promulgate Mahāyāna. The *vāsanā* unabandoned by Śrāvakas evolved into the concepts of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* (“abiding-ground of ignorance”) and

*jñeyāvaraṇa* (“knowable-hindrane”). As a result, an unshared hindrance abandoned only by Buddhas and Bodhisattvas came to be established. By contrast, for the Sarvāstivāda school, *vāsanā* of Arhats still manifests even though [their defilements] have been abandoned. Yinshun (1970, 137–41) argues that *kleśavāsanā*, which is defined as the smell portion of defilements (煩惱氣分), refers to the habitual propensity of defilements manifested through body and speech from beginningless time. The notion of *vāsanā* can be connected with Mahādeva’s five propositions, particularly that Arhats still possess nescience (\**ajñāna*). In this connection, Yinshun also draws attention to the explanation of *vāsanā* explained as *akliṣṭājñāna* (“non-defiled nescience”) in the NA. According to Yinshun, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, *kleśavāsanā* is incorporated with *anuśaya*. As a result, the *anuśayas* dissociated from mind (*citta-viprayuktaka*) become the impregnating-ground (習地; \**vāsanā-bhūmi*). Similar to Yinshun’s conclusion, Jikidō Takasaki (1974, 361) asserts that the *jñeyāvaraṇa* of Arhats, or *akliṣṭājñāna*, is no other than the abiding-ground of ignorance, according to the CWSL’s explanation.

Independent from Yinshun’s research, Étienne Lamotte (1974, 91–101) noted that *kleśavāsanā* was discussed at length among early Buddhist sects as well as in some Mahāyāna texts. Lamotte translated nearly all the examples of Arhats’ “impregnations” (*vāsanā*) found in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVbh) and \**Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* (MPPU). Unlike Yinshun who attributes *kleśavāsanā* solely to a Mahāsāṅghika origin, Lamotte (*ibid.*, 94) argues that the Vibhajyavādins and Mahāsāṅghikas were the first to propose that the Buddha had destroyed all “impregnations of passions” (*kleśavāsanā*) under the influence of “the ideas of the supranaturalists (*lokottaravādin*) and the docetists which deny the Buddha any historical validity.” Lamotte further notes that, according to descriptions in the Abhidharma and Mahāyāna texts, *kleśavāsanā* refers to a morally neutral potential for bodily and vocal distortions in Śrāvakas, caused by previously generated defilements. However, *kleśavāsanā* is not found at all in the Buddha, for whose enlightenment far surpasses that of the Two Vehicles. Lamotte also observes that the abandonment of *vāsanā* can either accompany or follow liberation (*vimukti*). On the one hand, the Sarvāstivāda explanation of the twofold path, namely *darśana-mārga* and *bhāvanā-mārga*, remains silent on the destruction of *vāsanā*. On the other hand, according to Mahāyānists, a Bodhisattva, though having obtained “the certainty of the non-arising of *dharma*s” (*anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*), that is, being free from defilements, still undergoes further rebirths due to his uneliminated *vāsanā*, until the final attainment of *sarvajñatā* and *sarvākārajñatā* when all *vāsanā* is eradicated.

In his study of Arhat's *ajñāna* (nescience), P. S. Jaini raises a question as to whether *akliṣṭājñāna* (non-defiled nescience) of an Arhat can be one of the *kleśavāsanās* as has been demonstrated by Lamotte. In response to this, Jaini resorts to Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* (AKVy). According to this treatise, *kleśavāsanās* are "morally indeterminate (*avyākṛta*) special thoughts (*citta-viśeṣa*)", where the potentials for special distorted behaviors reside. Moreover, *kleśavāsanā* can never be destroyed by Arhats who, at least temporarily, overcome *ajñāna*. However, *akliṣṭājñāna* is just the absence of worldly knowledge, and "can hardly be described as the source of special distortions of behavior". Therefore, Jaini ([1992] 2001, 171) concludes, "the *akliṣṭājñāna* does not fit the description of an impregnation (*vāsanā*)," but it must be *jñeyāvaraṇa* (knowable-hindrane).

KL Dhammajoti, by referring to the Chinese Abhidharma texts and their commentaries, reexamined the conclusions drawn by Lamotte and Jaini. Dhammajoti (1998, 68–73) argues that the Vaibhāṣikas also advocate that Buddha's enlightenment is perfect while that of the Two Vehicles is not. Thus, Lamotte's argument can merely demonstrate that the Vibhajyavādins and Mahāsāṅghikas hold the same view as the Sarvāstivādins. In order to refute Jaini's argument, Dhammajoti draws attention to Saṅghabhadra's articulate statement in the NA, which asserts that *akliṣṭājñāna* can be considered as a form of *vāsanā* (*ibid.*, 90). Dhammajoti (*ibid.*, 74–75) also brings into focus that the Vaibhāṣika notion of abandoning per se strictly amounts to no more re-arising. In other words, an Arhat whose *kleśavāsanā* has not been abandoned cannot be said to have abandoned/overcome all his *ajñāna*. Dhammajoti (*ibid.*, 90–91) further argues that according to Saṅghabhadra, *akliṣṭājñāna* is not identical to *vāsanā*, because *akliṣṭājñāna* is in nature a form of inferior *prajñā* which is a real *dharma*, while *vāsanā* is a mere concept, although the two terms are "intrinsically connected, being co nascent". Furthermore, Dhammajoti also points out that from the Yogācāra point of view, *akliṣṭājñāna* is equal to *jñeyāvaraṇa*, whereas for the Vaibhāṣikas, *vimokṣāvaraṇa* refers to the *akliṣṭājñāna*.

Yukari Kimura (2019) comprehensively discusses the Sarvāstivāda understanding of *kleśavāsanā* in the MVbh, and its relationship with *kleśa*, *anuśaya*, *akliṣṭājñāna*, and so on. Besides what has been noted by other scholars, Y. Kimura (2019, 72–73) notes a possible Sarvāstivāda canonical source from which the idea of *kleśavāsanā* was developed. She draws attention to the *Kṣemaka-sūtra* of the *Samyuktāgama*, which likens the unabandoned self-conceit (*māna*), will (*chanda*), and proclivities (*anuśaya*) to the remaining smell of milk on the clothes of a wet



nurse even after washing.

When investigating the notable relationship between *jñeyāvaraṇa* and *dharma-nairātmya* (selflessness of *dharma*s) and that between *kleśāvaraṇa* (defilement-hindrane) and *pudgala-nairātmya* (selflessness of the person) in Mahāyāna Buddhism, Naoya Funahashi also brings *vāsanā* into focus. According to N. Funahashi (1965, 53), in the beginning, *vāsanā* only denotes the imprint of *kleśāvaraṇa*, which refers to *akliṣṭājñāna*. But at a later time, because of the distinction between attachment to person and attachment to *dharma*s, the idea of *vāsanā* of *jñeyāvaraṇa* came into being in addition to *vāsanā* of *kleśāvaraṇa* (*ibid.*, 60). N. Funahashi then argues that in Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikākārikā* (TrK), the attachment to person and attachment to *dharma*s correspond to the grasper (*grāhaka*) and the grasped (*grāhya*) respectively. Accordingly, the abandonment of the attachment to *dharma*s is not complete, and thus the real *jñeyāvaraṇa* contains both the attachment of *dharma*s as well as its *vāsanā* (*ibid.*, 61–62). Moreover, N. Funahashi (*ibid.*, 63–64) notes that both the *Dàshèng yìzhāng* 大乘義章 and *Ratnagoṭravibhāgo Mahāyānottaratantra-śāstra* (actually its *Īyākhyā*, RGVV) understand *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* as *jñeyāvaraṇa*. This is also in agreement with what Tsongkhapa advocates—*jñeyāvaraṇa* is no other than *vāsanā*. However, such an argument seems to be incompatible with N. Funahashi's assertion that there should be *vāsanā* of *jñeyāvaraṇā*. On this point, N. Funahashi fails to provide any explanation. Finally, N. Funahashi concludes that the goal of the Mahāyānic Bodhisattva practice is not only the abandonment of *kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa*, but also the extinction of the *vāsanā* of the twofold hindrance.

Regarding the issue of the abiding/impregnating-ground of ignorance, Hakuju Ui (1959, 454–59) carefully distinguishes between the neuter *vāsana* and the feminine *vāsanā*. Ui notes that the term *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* in the ŚrMS also appears as *avidyā-vāsanā-bhūmi* in another manuscript of the *sūtra* as well as in the LAS. In this connection, J. Takasaki (1974, 359) observes that the notion of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* originated in the ŚrMS and was later adopted by the LAS. After examining the 14 instances of *vāsanā* in the RGVV, Ui (1959, 458–59) concludes that *vāsa/vāsana*, which denotes abiding, also conveys the meaning of impregnation. This conclusion is also supported by Takasaki (1989, 266). Furthermore, in his study of *tathāgatagarbha*, Takasaki (1974, 359–61) notes that while Bodhisattvas with great power have abandoned the *vāsa-bhūmi* of craving for existence (*bhava-tṛṣṇā-vāsa-bhūmi*), they have not abandoned the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. Thus, Takasaki argues that the remaining “defilement” in terms of the uncontaminated Noble Path

may correspond to the hindrance of meditative attainment (三昧障; \**samāpatty-āvaraṇa*) or the knowable-hindrance. A similar idea can be found in Dhammajoti's (2015b, 42) study on *vimokṣāvaraṇa*, which suggests that *vimokṣāvaraṇa*, *akliṣṭājñāna* and *jñeyāvaraṇa* in the MVbh all convey the same idea of a hindrance to meditative attainment (*samāpatty-āvaraṇa*). Though Dhammajoti does not explicitly associate *vāsanā* with *jñeyāvaraṇa*, he argues that the two terms are logically related. Additionally, referencing my Ph.D. dissertation, Dhammajoti (2023) recently provided a more comprehensive outline of the relationships between *akliṣṭājñāna*, *vāsanā*, and *jñeyāvaraṇa* in Abhidharma and Mahāyāna texts.

### 1.5.3. On Karmic *Vāsanā* and *Vāsanā* of Conditioned *Dharmas*

As suggested in §1.4, karmic *vāsanā* should be distinguished from the *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharmas*, but most previous studies have failed to make this distinction. This failure may stem from the ambiguity of the notion of *bīja* ("seed"), which refers to both the potency of karmic ripening and the potency of producing a certain *dharma*. Though some scholars (Waldron 2003; Park 2014) have noticed the two aspects expressed by *bīja*, the differentiation is not seen in the detailed discussion concerning *vāsanā*. Therefore, in this literature review, I cannot but examine the studies related to the two distinct ideas of *vāsanā* together. In this connection, most English and Japanese scholars only note the use of *vāsanā* in Yogācāra texts, while *vāsanā* in the Abhidharma literature is rarely discussed.

Yinshun, again, is probably the first one who drew attention to the Yogācāra idea of *vāsanā* as *bīja* in relation to Abhidharmas. Yinshun (1970, 137) suggests that the Yogācāras, while using the term in the sense of *kleśavāsanā*, adopted the idea of *vāsanā* as *bīja* from the Sautrāntikas and further applied it to all *dharmas*. Yinshun (*ibid.*, 171) claims that *vāsanā* as impregnation evolved from its original meaning of traces derived from defilements, and finally became a synonym for *bīja* at the time of Vasubandhu. On this point, however, Yinshun fails to provide any persuasive argument. He also notes that according to Saṅghabhadra, both the Darṣāntikas and Vasubandhu hold the idea of impregnation. Yinshun (*ibid.*, 172) also suggests that the Sautrāntika Sthavira's theory of \**purāṇa-anudhātu* (舊隨界), as another synonym for *bīja*, is formed because of frequent impregnation. Furthermore, Yinshun holds that latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) are impregnated by defilements.

On the various modes of impregnation maintained by the Sautrāntikas, both Yinshun (*ibid.*, 177–83) and Hiromichi Katō (1987b, 289–314) bring into focus the discussion about the Sautrāntikas' four types of impregnation recapitulated by Ji 基,

namely, (1) the inner six sense- faculties are impregnated, also known as mutual seeding between corporeal matter and mind; (2) the six consciousnesses impregnate each other; (3) [the *citta*] of an earlier moment impregnates [the *citta*] of the subsequent moment; (4) consciousness of a similar type is impregnated.<sup>29</sup> H. Katō tries hard to find out corresponding clues of the four opinions in the AKBh, *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (KSP), CWSL, and so forth, together with their commentaries. However, Yinshun takes the latter three opinions as only one idea of impregnation in the six consciousnesses. Yinshun notes that the latter three in Ji's *Shūji* 述記 are in fact taken from Asvabhāva's commentary on a verse in MSg I.23. By comparing it with Vasubandhu's commentary on the same passage, Yinshun argues that what Asvabhāva intends to express is just to prove the possibility of the impregnation in the six consciousnesses. He thus argues that Asvabhāva must have misunderstood and overinterpreted Asaṅga's MSg. In this respect, Yinshun enumerates only three modes of impregnation held by the Sautrāntikas, viz., (1) the six consciousnesses being impregnated, (2) the six [inner] sense-bases (*āyatana*) being impregnated; (3) the subtle mind (*citta*) being impregnated.

In terms of the Sautrāntika theory of "mutual impregnation" known in the East Asian Yogācāra tradition, Nobuyoshi Yamabe (2000, 144) clarifies that it was originally known as mutual seeding (*anyonyabījaka*). Yamabe (*ibid.*, 129–38) notes that the *\*Tattvasiddhi* does not take this theory into consideration, while Vasubandhu in his KSP only concerns the re-arising of thought without discussing the re-arising of physical matter. On the other hand, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (VinSg) only mentions that *bīja* is preserved in body and mind—not mutual seeding; and the *Maulī Bhūmi* speaks of the existence of seeds in the six sense faculties. Yamabe argues that the theory of mutual seeding seems to be developed within the Yogācāra tradition without the outside influence from the Sautrāntikas and so forth. According to him, mutual seeding is developed from the theory of *bījas* kept in the six sense faculties before the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*. Therefore, Yamabe (*ibid.*, 144) suggests that there is no need to regard mutual seeding as a Sautrāntika theory.

Against the recent academic contention (Kritzer 2003, 2005) that Vasubandhu

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<sup>29</sup> T43, no. 1833, 880b9–18: 經部師計總有四類：一，本經部許內六根是所熏性，如《瑜伽論》五十一末言色持種，隨彼言也，如前引矣。又《順正理》第十八云：「此舊隨界體不可說，但可說言是業煩惱所熏六處，感餘生果。」釋曰：隨界即是種子異名，新舊師別，名舊隨界。二，六識展轉而互相熏。三，前念熏後。四，類受熏。故無性《論》第二云：「且有爾所熏習異計，或說六識展轉相熏，或說前念熏於後念，或說熏識剎那種類。」

pretended to be a Sautrāntika when composing his AKBh just in order to adapt Abhidharma to the Yogācāra doctrines, Changhwan Park (2014) enunciates how Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika theory of *bīja* was developed in close connection with the Dārṣṭāntikas. One of Park's key arguments concerns *saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa* in the AKBh. Yamabe (1990, 929) has drawn attention to a passage about past karma in the *Savitarkasavicārādibhūmi* (SavBh) which writes, “*viśiṣṭā saṃskāra-santati*”. Yamabe thus suggests that this idea could be a source of the *bīja* theory in the AKBh. By contrast, Park (2014, 373–75) argues that the term that appears in the SavBh is used to account for *vāsanā*, which, however, “was never brought forward in Vasubandhu's theory of seed.” Park also highlights that *vāsanā* in the YBh only concerns the impression of functioning of past karma, whereas *bīja* in the AKBh refers to potency. However, Park does not provide any further discussion about *vāsanā* in the Abhidharma texts and the Yogācāra school. In this regard, the present study aims to probe into the concept of *vāsanā* in Buddhism.

At any rate, in the sense of karmic imprints, *vāsanā* is usually connected with the theory of *bīja*. As mentioned by H. Katō (1987a, 564), the Sautrāntika notion of *bīja* not only plays the role of the Sarvāstivādins' notion of unmanifested (*avijñapti*) karma, but also establishes the diachronic causality. Additionally, Collett Cox (1995, 95–96) notes that the *bīja* theory of Vasubandhu concerns the causal efficacy of action.

As a precursor of the *bīja* theory (Yinshun 1968; Mitomo 1980; Park, 2014; Dhammajoti 2011), Śrīlāta's theory of pursuant element (*anudhātu*) also implies the idea of impregnation. Yinshun (1970, 184–85) holds that for Śrīlāta, it is the six sense-bases (*āyatana*) that are impregnated by karma and defilements, whereas Saṅghabhadra always criticizes Śrīlāta's theory as the impregnation in *citta-caittas*, which is, in fact, the position maintained by other Dārṣṭāntikas. Kenyō Mitomo (1980, 30), however, seemingly follows Saṅghabhadra's understanding of Śrīlāta's theory and argues that the elements are impregnated in one *citta*. According to Mitomo, the six sense-bases are just the windows/entrances through which karma and defilement impregnate. Junshō Katō (1989, 256) suggests that Śrīlāta calls the totality of body and mind, namely the six sense-bases or one's serial continuity, as pursuant element. However, J. Katō further opines (*ibid.*, 259) that what is impregnated by the past *dharma* in *citta* alone is only called elements (*dhātu*). Park (2014, 190, 199) insists that the pursuant element is none other than the six sense-bases as the basis (*āśraya*), and thus is “simply a provisional designation” to indicate the karmic impregnative aspect of the six sense-bases. On the other hand,

Dhammajoti (2011, 41) finds J. Katō's discrimination between "pursuant element" and "element" unnecessary. Dhammajoti suggests that the two terms are interchangeable. In this respect, he is in line with Yinshun's standpoint that Śrīlāta advocates the impregnation at the six sense-bases. Dhammajoti (*ibid.*, 64) also claims that the pursuant element can neither be "construed as a mere concept totally devoid of any reality", nor is it "an ontological real that is distinct from the sentient serial continuity." In this respect, he should disagree with Park's viewpoint that the notion of pursuant element represents nothing but the six sense-bases.

Interestingly, some scholars question whether *vāsanā* is identical with *bīja*. This is also one of the major research questions in this book. Yinshun (1970, 128) simply claims that *bīja* and *vāsanā* came to be treated as synonyms after an intricate evolution. As a result, there is no absolute difference between them in the Mahāyāna Vijñānavāda. This may suggest that the two terms were not identical at the beginning. In this connection, Yamabe (1989) was the first who notes that in the *Manobhūmi* where various synonyms for seed are enumerated, the term *vāsanā* is not found. He thus hypothesizes that *bīja* was not an absolute synonym for *vāsanā* at the beginning and the idea of fresh impregnation of *bīja* is a relatively new theory in the Yogācāra. According to Yamabe (1989, 46–49; 2021, 473), the use of *vāsanā* in the old layer of the YBh is more limited than that of *bīja*—it only speaks of *kleśavāsanā* and *vāsanā* of karma. The former means Arhats' remaining traces derived from the abandoned defilements. Different from the *bīja* of defilements, *kleśavāsanā* does not give rise to the manifestation of defilements. Then, *vāsanā* of karma means the individual serial continuity of conditioning forces, which serve as the cause of projection (*ākṣepa*) after the perishing of the karmic cause. In this regard, he draws attention to the expressions of "*\*paribhāvita-citta*" and "*\*tad-abhyāsa-vāsanā-anuśaya*" in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (SNS). According to Yamabe, what these expressions suggest is that the latent dispositions are equalized with *vāsanā*. Moreover, since the term *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā*, which is one of the two types of appropriation (*upādāna*) of the *citta* in the SNS, is expressed as *\*parikalpitasvabhāva-abhiniveśa-vāsanā* in the *\*Pañcaviññānakāya-saṃprayukta-manobhūmi-viniścaya* (PMBhVin), *vāsanā* becomes tantamount to *bīja* as *dhātu*. Therefore, Yamabe claims that the PMBhVin is the earliest text where the theory of engendered *bīja* is established. As Yamabe's contention concerns significantly the development of the notion of *vāsanā*, a comprehensive examination of his opinions will be made in this book.

As for the Yogācāra philosophy, Kōitsu Yokoyama (1985, 177–91) brings into

focus the relationship between language and *bīja*. Yokoyama notes that in the *Maulī Bhūmi*, the expressions of “*prapañca-rati*” and “*śubhāśubha-karma*” should be the source of the notions of *vāsanā* of linguistic expression (*\*abhilāpa-vāsanā*) and *vāsanā* of karma respectively. At this stage, *vāsanā* and *bīja* are established as different causes; language and *bīja* have not been unified. Then, the authors of the SNS began to be aware of the close relationship between the language and phenomena. In this background, by combining *bīja* and *vāsanā* with the conceptual proliferation of conventional verbalization (*vyavahāra-prapañca*), the notion of *\*vyavahāra-vāsanā* is established, which serves as a precursor of the notion of *\*abhilāpa-vāsanā* in the MSg. In this way, *bījas* in *ālayavijñāna* are connected with conventional verbalization and are impregnated by the world that consists of conceptual proliferation. According to the SNS, phenomena arise from the *ālayavijñāna* sequentially. By contrast, the VinSg advocates the simultaneous mode of the arising of phenomena from *bīja*. Considering that the ineffable nature (*anabhilāpya-svabhāva*) refers to the Suchness (*tathatā*) or ultimate Truth, Yokoyama speculates that the idea of conceptual expression that is connected with phenomena must be represented by the term “*abhilāpa*”. As for the MSABh, the idea of mental speech (*manojalpa*) reflects an absolute idealistic view, and the *vāsanā* of mental concept belongs to the imagined nature. Finally, in the MSg, three types of *vāsanā* are established as *\*abhilāpa-vāsanā*, *\*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā*, and *bhavāṅga-vāsanā*. Among them, the first one is a full unification of language and *bīja*—*abhilāpa* and *vāsanā*; the second concerns the world of I and mine that is established on the *manas*; the last one refers to the *bīja* of karma as seen in the CWSL. It can be seen that Yokoyama’s arguments are based on the hypothesis that “linguistic expression” (*abhilāpa*) as language bears the same meaning as “conventional verbalization” (*vyavahāra*).

On this issue, Michio Toida (1991, 137) notes that conventional verbalization (*vyavahāra*) is not completely the same as linguistic expression (*abhilāpa*). According to him, “*abhilāpa*” refers to expression, language, and declaration; while “*vyavahāra*” means a conventional language or language activity. However, he only prudently claims that the two terms are generally used as synonyms in the YBh. Whether the two words convey the same idea in the MSg and so on is not discussed. As Toida’s examination is incomplete, it is necessary to further probe into the denotation of the two terms, especially in the MSg.

Yamabe (2017) also brings into focus the simultaneous causality between *bīja* and effect (*phala*) in the early Yogācāra. Yamabe (*ibid.*, 15) notes that in the SavBh,

a generative cause (*utpattihetu*) is defined as preceding its effect, while the supporting conditions are simultaneous with their effects. According to Yamabe (*ibid.*, 22), it is because of the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, which provides a realm for potential *bījas*, that the simultaneity between *bīja* and its manifested *dharma* becomes possible. With regard to the fact that Yamabe considers the theory of mutual seeding as belonging to Yogācāras instead of the Sautrāntikas, he seems to imply in this article that Vasubandhu's *bīja* theory in the AKBh makes use of diachronic causality because of the absence of the idea of *ālayavijñāna*. Nevertheless, it has to be questioned whether the introduction of the *ālayavijñāna* is the only reason that *bīja* is considered to concur with its manifestation. In my opinion, the idea of *vāsanā* should be taken into consideration on this issue.

Additionally, in his recent article on the Yogācāra understanding of conceptualization (*vikalpa*), Yamabe (2021, 478–81) opines that *\*vyavahāra-vāsanā* in the SNS derives from an earlier model in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh) that conceptualization plays the role of defilements (*kleśa*) and karma, namely the fundamental cause of *saṃsāra*. Since all *dharma*s can be conceptualized, conceptualization should also leave its imprints. Consequently, later Yogācāras developed the concept of “*vāsanā* of all *dharma*s”. This very interesting observation still needs to be theoretically linked with his earlier study on the simultaneous causality mentioned above. It should be noted that the model of conceptualization in the BoBh follows the successive mode of causality but the impregnated *bījas* as *vāsanā* of all *dharma*s must be simultaneous with its manifestations.

Much scholastic attention has been paid to Vasubandhu's understanding of *vāsanā*, which is a key notion in his TrK. In the glossary of important concepts of the TrBh provided by Ui (1952, 287–95), the meaning of *vāsanā* is briefly introduced in connection with its relevant notions such as seed (*bīja*), grossness (*dausṭhulya*), appropriation (*upādi*), latent dispositions (*anuśaya*), and so on. Nevertheless, the definition of the terms, by and large, seems just a summarization of the content of the TrBh and the CWSL. Ui recognizes Sthiramati's notion of *vipāka-vāsanā* as *karma-vāsanā*, and the *niṣyanda-vāsanā* as *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. In this connection, Gadjin Nagao (1982, 252) claims that *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* corresponds to *\*abhilāpa-vāsanā* and *\*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā* in the MSg, while the *karma-vāsanā* is *bhavāṅga-vāsanā*. Moreover, interpreting TrK 19 with reference to Sthiramati's commentary, Ujike (1967, 170) opines that the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* is added to the operation of *karma-vāsanā* so that karmic cause and effect can be attributed to cognitive activity. In this way, the development of consciousness (*vijñāna-pariṇāma*) considered by

Vasubandhu and Sthiramati should concern the karmic causality in the three times, the continuum of a sentient being, which is beyond the grasped-grasper relation in the present moment (*ibid.*, 170–71). Akihiro Kanabishi (2011) provides a brief examination of the notion of *vāsanā* in Sthiramati’s TrBh in relation to *upādi*. Kanabishi concludes that Sthiramati’s *vipāka-vāsanā* is tantamount to the *karma-vāsanā*, but the *niṣyanda-vāsanā* has a function similar to the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*.

Furthermore, Kanabishi also notes that the Yogācāra notion of *vāsanā* could have influenced the *Yoga Sūtra* (*ibid.*, 1226), which defines the *vāsanā* as a latent impression in the past (Kanabishi 2009, 326). In this connection, Karen O’Brien-Kop (2024, 507, 517) notes that *vāsanā* mentioned in the *Pātañjalayoasāstra* refers to “lingering, perfuming after-effects”, which along with “seeded volitions” (*bīja*) and “imprinted dispositions” (*saṃskāra*) creates a “karma substratum” (*āśraya*). Since this Sāṃkhya-Yoga text should have cited Vasubandhu’s AKBh (O’Brien-Kop 2024, 526), I will not discuss it in this book, considering that it should not have affected the formation of the Buddhist understanding of karmic *vāsanā*.

#### 1.5.4. On *Śrutavāsanā* as the Seed of Supramundane Purification

According to the CWSL, there was a debate by Indian masters over primordial *bīja* and impregnated *bīja*. As a matter of fact, this debate concerns the issue of the initial arising of pure *dharma*s. Asaṅga in his MSg proposes the idea of *śrutavāsanā*, the impression of hearing. On this issue, Reimon Yūki (1999, 247–53) draws attention to the dilemma of how pure *dharma*s can arise from defiled *bīja*. Through referring to the MSg and AS, Yūki concludes that Dharmapāla’s opinion of combining both the impregnated contaminated (*sāsrava*) *bīja* and the primordial uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) *bīja* is closer to Asaṅga’s intention. However, this opinion is opposite to the consensus held by contemporary scholars that Nanda’s theory of impregnated *bīja* represents Asaṅga’s original idea. Yūki’s primary concern seems to be that since *śrutavāsanā* can only play the role of an auxiliary condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*), there must be primordial *bīja* that serves as the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) of supramundane purification.

Shōkō Takeuchi (1950) considers *śrutavāsanā* the cause of the transformation of the basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*), and encountering a Buddha as its condition. To solve the dilemma, he suggests that the idea of *śrutavāsanā* as the uncontaminated *bīja*s that “stay together” (寄在) with defiled *ālayavijñāna* can be understood in the light of the doctrine of the two dimensions of the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*). According to Schmithausen (1987, 371), Vasubandhu’s commentary differs from



Asaṅga's understanding, as Vasubandhu holds that the *śrutavāsanā* abides in *ālayavijñāna*.

Schmithausen (1987, 78–80) suggests that Asaṅga's "*śrutavāsanā*" stems from the notion of *\*tathatālabhanapratyaya-bīja* in the PMBhVin. Yamabe (1990b) follows Schmithausen's opinion and corroborates it with the *Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* where three theories that explain *śrutavāsanā* are given. I will make a critical evaluation of Schmithausen and Yamabe's argument in §6.2.2.

Additionally, Ōta (1981) investigates *śrutavāsanā* as *bīja* of uncontaminated *dharma*s in the Chinese sources. He thus brings focus to how the Chinese Yogācāra exegetes explained *tathatālabhanapratyaya-bīja*. Yoshimura (2009, 2013) draws attention how Paramārtha and the Chinese Shèlùn 攝論 school explained *śrutavāsanā* from the perspective of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrines, and compares it with the doctrines held by the Fǎxiàng 法相 school. Aviv (2009) discusses the debate about *śrutavāsanā* in twentieth-century China.

## 1.6. Outlines of Each Chapter and Research Methodology

This book follows the four main categories outlined in the MSg to examine how different connotations of *vāsanā* emerged, evolved, and ultimately merged in Buddhist thought. For each category, the discussion begins with Abhidharma sources and ends up with Asaṅga's MSg. It will be illustrated how the Yogācāra understanding of *vāsanā* was inherited and developed from earlier Abhidharma discussions. The study then proceeds to the doctrinal synthesis of this notion in the developed Yogācāra-vijñānavāda texts.

Chapter 2 explores the use of *vāsanā* in Pāli Buddhist texts by the time of Buddhaghosa. The investigation begins with a passage in the *Suttanipāta*, which is likely the earliest occurrence of the term *vāsanā* in Buddhist scriptures. Subsequent instances where *vāsanā* is recognized as a technical term in connection with cultivating merit are examined in the *Peṭakopadesa* together with its re-written version *Nettipakaraṇa*, the *Milindapañha*, and other texts. The discussion also traces how *vāsanā* takes on the meaning of cultivation of merit.

Chapter 3 focuses on the idea of *vāsanā* that preserves karmic efficacy, following the related discussion in chapter 2. As noted in §1.5, the origins of this idea have not received sufficient attention. The investigation begins with a specific

use of *vāsanā* in the MVbh and examines how the notion became connected with the theory of karmic continuity. The discussion then turns to the Sautrāntika perspective on karmic imprint, as implied in Vasubandhu's notion of *saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* and Śrīlāta's *anudhātu*. By contrast, Saṅghabhadra, adhering to a Vaibhāṣika position, rejects the validity of the Sautrāntika theory of karmic imprint. Following that, the study examines karmic *vāsanā* as presented in the SavBh of the YBh alongside a preliminary discussion of *ākṣepaka/ākṣepa-hetu* in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ŚrBh) and BoBh. Then, karmic *vāsanā* adduced in Asaṅga's works is discussed. Finally, it is demonstrated that the concept of karmic *vāsanā* is recapitulated as *\*bhavāṅgavāsanā* in the MSg.

Chapter 4 examines *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharmas*. It begins with *vāsanā* that concerns meditative cultivation (*bhāvanā*) in Abhidharma literature. On this issue, a clear doctrinal continuity regarding meditative impregnation (*vāsanā*) can be traced from the *\*Tridharmakaśāstra* and MVbh to the *\*Miśrakābhidharma-hṛdaya* (MAH), and finally to the AKBh. In this context, different positions seen in Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika commentaries on the AKBh are also discussed. It is argued how the Sautrāntika explanation of impregnation may have influenced the Yogācāra idea of the impregnation of all conditioned *dharmas*. On the other hand, how *vāsanā* became a synonym for *bīja* during the contextual shift from meditative cultivation in Abhidharma texts to all conditioned *dharmas* in the YBh is discussed. In this regard, two similes about meditative cultivation in the *\*Tattvasiddhiśāstra* are particularly noteworthy, as the text can be seen as an exemplar of the intermediary that links *bīja* and *vāsanā*. Then, the discussion turns to the doctrinal relationship between the impregnation of conditioned *dharmas* and conceptualization (*vikalpa*). By examining *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in the SNS, I draw attention to *vāsanā*'s connection with linguistic activity and its role in the mutual causation between conceptualization and object-base (*vastu*) in the BoBh. Such correlation is also attested in various Yogācāra texts, including the MSA, *Madhyāntavibhāga* (MAV), *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* 顯揚聖教論, and MSg within the theoretical framework of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*). The chapter concludes by exploring the doctrinal connection between the three types of *vāsanā* in *ālayavijñāna*, as formulated in Asaṅga's MSg, and the idea of the threefold object-base generated by the eightfold conceptualization in the BoBh.

Chapter 5 discusses the development of the idea of *kleśavāsanā*, which is perhaps one of the earliest connotations of *vāsanā* in Buddhism. A possible canonical source of the idea and how it has been interpreted by various Buddhist schools is

discussed at the beginning. Then, Lamotte's hypothesis concerning the sectarian origins of *kleśavāsanā* is reassessed in light of relevant passages from the \**Śāriputrābhidharma* and *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya*. Since *kleśavāsanā* pertains to non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*), the chapter also explores whether this notion originated from the Mahāsāṅghikas in connection with Mahādeva's five proposals. A more detailed discussion of *kleśavāsanā* is found in the encyclopedic MVbh of the Sarvāstivāda school. By comparing Xuanzang's seventh-century translation of this treatise with an earlier Chinese translation dated to the fifth century, I seek to explain how the idea of *kleśavāsanā* was adopted by the Sarvāstivādins. In the meantime, early Mahāyāna texts also employed *kleśavāsanā* with distinctive Mahāyānic interpretations, which highlight the difference between Bodhisattvas and the Two Vehicles. Later Ābhidharmikas started to concentrate on the nature of *kleśavāsanā*. This discussion culminated in Saṅghabhadra's comprehensive analysis of *vāsanā*. In the YBh, *kleśavāsanā* came to be linked with the notions of grossness (*dausṭhulya*), knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) and selflessness of *dharma*s (*dharma-nairātmya*), and so forth. Then, attention is drawn to the notion of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* as mentioned in the ŚrMS. The idea of *kleśavāsanā* implied in this *tathāgatagarbha* scripture is analyzed together with the related passages in the RGVV and the *Dàshèng fǎjiè wúchābié lùn* 大乘法界無差別論. It is discussed how the *tathāgatagarbha* concept of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* affected the interpretation of *kleśavāsanā* and knowable-hindrance in the fully developed Yogācāra school. Knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) seems to have supplanted *kleśavāsanā* in both Sthiramati and Dharmapāla's commentaries on the TrK. The difference between the two commentators on the issue of knowable-hindrance in relation to the doctrine of the transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti/āśrayaparāvṛtti*) is also examined. In this chapter, I draw attention to the fact that the meaning expressed by the term *kleśavāsanā* varied during the development of the notion in Buddhism.

Chapter 6 deals with *śrutavāsanā* and *vāsanā* in the sense of memory impression. The first section of the chapter investigates the doctrinal origins of *śrutavāsanā*, which occurs in the MSg. In connection with *śrutavāsanā*, the Sarvāstivāda discussion on spiritual class (*gotra*) and wholesome root (*kuśalamūla*) conducive to liberation (*mokṣabhāgīya*) are examined in relation to the Yogācāra debate over the primordial *bīja* and the engendered/impregnated *bīja*. On the other hand, the idea of the seed [of cognition that] takes Suchness as its object-condition (\**tathātālambanapratyaya-bīja*) in the YBh and its connection to *śrutavāsanā* in the MSg are analyzed. The chapter then turns to *vāsanā* as an impression of memory,

with a particular attention to Asaṅga's AS and Buddhaghosa's Pāli commentary. Finally, the early Mahāyāna idea of wholesome *vāsanā* as found in the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, MPPU, and other texts is examined. In this relation, the discussion considers why Asaṅga may have preferred the term *vāsanā* over *bīja* when referring to the cause of supramundane pure *dharmas*.

Chapter 7 concentrates on the synthesis of the various connotations of *vāsanā*. It explores how the three types of *vāsanā* identified in the MSg developed as a doctrinal synthesis of the ideas of karmic *vāsanā*, *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharmas*, and *kleśavāsanā*. The discussion then focuses on the two types of *vāsanā* mentioned in Vasubandhu's TrK as *vāsanā* of karma and *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. In this context, Sthiramati's commentary further introduces two additional pairs of *vāsanā*: *vipāka-vāsanā* and *niṣyanda-vāsanā*, as well as *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* and *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*. The nuances, interconnections, and doctrinal implications of these notions are analyzed in detail. Finally, I use the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (LAS) as a case study to illustrate how these diverse connotations of *vāsanā* were integrated into later Buddhist texts.

Given the study's broad historical scope—spanning over nine centuries—and a wide range of textual sources, a relative chronology of the major scriptures discussed is provided in the Appendix.

In general, the present study is based on considerable textual evidence supplemented by relevant historical and geographical concerns while referencing previous scholastic research. I attempt to outline the development of each of the connotations of *vāsanā* in Buddhism as well as to recognize the doctrinal paradigm(s) behind the relevant discussions. Using the genealogical method, I aim to demonstrate that one Buddhist notion may have been understood in various ways in history not only across different Buddhist schools but even within a single Buddhist text. Some connotations are intrinsically correlated while some are incompatible. Sometimes, when one connotation of a concept became predominant, other connotations would come to be unavoidably explained by it. Consequently, later commentators often reinterpret historically polysemous terms as if they were self-consistent concepts.

For nearly all the citations from the original texts, I provide my own translation in order to ensure consistency in rendering. Wherever different versions in multiple Buddhist languages are available, I often draw a comparison. Nevertheless, due to space constraints, when the content of the Sanskrit original is sufficiently clear, I translate the text from Sanskrit and only provide references to the corresponding Tibetan and Chinese translations without citing all of them. Sometimes, where two

or more translations of the same text are available, especially in the Chinese Buddhist canon, I make comparisons in order to sort out the possible thread of the development of certain doctrines. Notably, Xuanzang's Chinese translation not only always correctly reflects the Sanskrit grammar, but also perfectly makes sense where the corresponding Sanskrit text and Tibetan translation are unclear or abstruse, albeit at the cost of strict literal fidelity. Moreover, given that different punctuation styles in Chinese may result in varying interpretations of the same text, I repunctuate every sentence quoted from the Chinese Buddhist Canon (Taishō edition) according to modern Chinese standards to facilitate readers who wish to examine my understanding of the Chinese texts.

## 2. *Vāsanā* as the Imprint of Practice in the Pāli Literature

This chapter discusses the early occurrences of the term *vāsanā* in the early Pāli literature and other similar uses of the term outside the Pāli tradition around the same period. In these sources, *vāsanā* denotes the imprint of practice in former lives and can be connected to the idea of cultivation (*bhāvanā*). In the post-canonical Pāli texts, *vāsanā* in this sense came to be used in the context of rebirth and is thus endowed with a karmic aspect. These early ideas about *vāsanā* may adumbrate the later sectarian development of the concept.

### 2.1. *Vāsanā* Related to Mundane Cultivation in the *Suttanipāta*

Throughout the entire four Pāli Nikāyas, the feminine noun *vāsanā* never occurs. The neutral noun *vāsana*, which occurs only once, is not used in any of the doctrinal senses that have been listed in §1.4, but only in the sense of “clothing”<sup>30</sup>, which is irrelevant to this study.

In the Chinese Āgamas, the idea of impregnation of Buddhist practice is expressed by the verb  $\sqrt{\text{pari-bhū}}$  rather than  $\sqrt{\text{vās}}$ . For example, in the Sarvāstivāda *Samyuktāgama*, the Buddha addressed to a man called “Mahā”,

{2.1A} “You have already practised respecting the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha for a long time. At the end of your life..., [because] your mind-thought-consciousness has been impregnated (*\*paribhāvita*) by proper faith, as well as by virtues (*\*sīla*), generosity (*\*dāna*), and wisdom derived from hearing (*\*śrutamayī prajñā*), your consciousness will ascend to a pleasant place, and you will be born in heaven in the future.”<sup>31</sup>

In comparison with the corresponding Pāli version of this *sūtra*, the *Mahānāma Sutta*

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<sup>30</sup> *Vāsana* that denotes clothing is derived from the Class II verb  $\sqrt{\text{vas}}$ , “to cloth” (PED, s.v. “*Vāsana*”<sup>1</sup>, 610; MW, s.v. “ $\sqrt{\text{vas}}$ ”<sup>4</sup>, 932). The only occurrence of the word *vāsana* among the four Nikāyas is found in the *Nagaropama-sutta* of the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (iv 111): *vāsana-lepana-sampanno*—“covered over by a coat of plaster” (Bodhi 2012, 1078). A more common form of the word that occurs in the Pāli Nikāyas is *vasana*. For instance, in the *Dīgha Nikāya* (i 104), *odāta-vattha-vasana*—“dressed in white clothes” (Walshe 1995, 120).

<sup>31</sup> T2, no. 99, 237c3–7: 汝已長夜修習念佛、念法、念僧，若命終時……而心意識久遠長夜正信所熏，戒、施、聞慧所熏，神識上昇，向安樂處，未來生天。

in the *Samyutta Nikāya*, the Pāli term for “being impregnated” in the quote is *paribhāvita*.<sup>32</sup> Likewise, the \**Grāmaṇī-sūtra* (伽彌尼經) in the Sarvāstivāda *Madhyamāgama*<sup>33</sup> expresses almost the same idea, although the context becomes that through practising the tenfold path of wholesome action (\**daśa-kuśala-karma-patha*), one gains white result of ripening (*vipāka*) after death and is reborn in a higher pleasant realm.<sup>34</sup> In any respect, the expression of “*paribhāvita*” seen in the Āgama/Nikāya texts must be earlier than the use of “*vāsita*” by Buddhists.

It seems safe to assert that the notion of *vāsanā* was not of any specific doctrinal significance in the early Buddhist texts. As it is clearly stated by Jayawickrama (1976, 154), “the doctrine of *vāsanā* is apparently alien to early Buddhism.” Here, what he means by “early Buddhism” must be the Buddhism prior to the final stage of the compilation of the earliest four Pāli Nikāyas. Nevertheless, such a statement does not mean the doctrine of *vāsanā* originated from outside Buddhism.

The earliest occurrences of the term *vāsana* in a relatively doctrinal sense is seen in the *Vatthugāthā* of the Pāli *Suttanipāta*. As the *Vatthugāthā* was presumably composed no earlier than the second century BCE but before the first century CE (see Appendix), the *Suttanipāta* should be the earliest extant Buddhist text and the only canonical text where the word *vāsana* is employed to denote the imprint of practice. Its context concerns a group of pupils of Bāvari, a Brahmin master of incantations (*manta*). Because he was cursed, Bāvari asked his pupils to seek the Buddha for help. The text then describes his pupils as follows:

{2.1B} All [the Brahmin pupils] have each [of their] retinues. [They] have been renowned to the world. [They] are meditators who have delighted in meditation (*jhāna*). [They] are wise men (*dhīrā*) who have been impregnated by the previous imprints [of practice] (*pubba-vāsana-vāsita*).<sup>35</sup>

Jayawickrama (*ibid.*) argues that the phrase *pubba-vāsana-vāsita*, “impregnated by

<sup>32</sup> SN v 371: ...*ḍīgharattaṃ saddhāparibhāvitaṃ cittaṃ sīlaparibhāvitaṃ cittaṃ sutaparibhāvitaṃ cittaṃ cāgaparibhāvitaṃ cittaṃ paññāparibhāvitaṃ cittaṃ*...

<sup>33</sup> See T1, no. 26, 439c23–440c14. Particularly, T1, 440c1–3: 彼心、意、識常為信所熏，為精進、多聞、布施、智慧所熏，彼因此緣此，自然昇上，生於善處。 Although the Āgama *sūtra* has a Pāli parallel–*Asibandhakaputta-sutta* (SN iv 312–14), the quoted part is not found in the Pāli text.

<sup>34</sup> See T1, no. 26, 440b21–c3: 伽彌尼！謂此十善業道，白有白報，自然昇上，必至善處……彼命終後……彼心、意、識常為信所熏，為精進、多聞、布施、智慧所熏，彼因此緣此，自然昇上，生於善處。

<sup>35</sup> Sn 194: *paccekagaṇiṇo sabbe sabbalokassa vissutā jhāyī jhānaratā dhīrā pubbavāsanavāsita* ||1009||

the previous imprints”<sup>36</sup>, may be derived from a germinal form of *pubbe kataṃ kammaṃ*, “action done in the past”. The latter expression can be found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* in its original form of “*pubbe pāpa-kammaṃ kataṃ avipakka-vipākam*”<sup>37</sup> (“the previously made evil karma whose [result of] ripening is not ripe”). The term *pubbe* here in the *sutta* context means “in the past lives”. If Jayawickrama’s opinion is correct, then the phrase *pubba-vāsana-vāsita* should imply karmic imprint. However, according to the context of the *Suttanipāta*, the term *vāsana* signifies the Brahmin pupils’ previous practices that have positive influence on their intellects. It is hard to see any implication of karma. Neither can we find any indication that the term *pubba* here specifically suggests former lives.

In his annotated translation of the *Suttanipāta*, Bhikkhu Bodhi (2017, 1228) draws attention to how the *Paramatthajotikā*, the *Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā*, interprets this passage. According to this Pāli commentary, Bāvari and his pupils went forth to the Triple Gem for refuge in one of their previous lives during the time of Buddha Kassapa. However, as Buddha Kassapa had just attained *parinibbāna* before they arrived, they could only receive some basic teachings of the Buddha, including being established in the three refuges, undertaking five precepts, observing the eightfold precept during fasting days, offering gifts, and going forth to leave household life.<sup>38</sup> Thus, the *vāsana* impregnated previously takes on the meaning that the minds (*citta*) of the pupils have been impregnated by the meritorious habitual imprint (*puñña-vāsana*) through repeated practice (*gata-paccāgata-vatta*)<sup>39</sup> about the teaching of the Buddha Kassapa in their past life. At any rate, Bāvari and his pupils failed to attain Arhathood in their past life, although they practised according to the Noble instructions, which are mainly about mundane wholesomeness. It is said that after his death in the era of the Buddha Kassapa, Bāvari enjoyed one life in heaven, before being reborn in the time of the Buddha Sakkamuni.<sup>40</sup> It can be seen that the term *vāsana* here not only refers to the imprints of the practice in accordance with the true Dharma, but also implies the idea of karma, because undertaking lay precepts and

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<sup>36</sup> Jayawickrama’s translation of the Pāli phrase is “impressed with the resultant force of their former deeds”.

<sup>37</sup> AN ii 196.

<sup>38</sup> SnA II ii 579: *saraṇattaye paṭiṭṭhātabbāṃ, pañca sīlāni samādātabbāni, aṭṭaṅgasamannāgato uposatho upavasitabbo, dānaṃ dātabbāṃ, pabbajitabban*.

<sup>39</sup> SnA II ii 583: *Pubbavāsanavāsītāti pubbe kassapassa bhagavato sāsane pabbajitvā. Gatapaccāgatavattapuññavāsanāya vāsītacittā*.

<sup>40</sup> See Bodhi 2017, 1225–26.



offering gifts are mundane wholesome actions that lead to a better rebirth. However, it must be borne in mind that this background story narrated in the *Paramatthajotikā*, attributed to Buddhaghosa, was recorded much later than the compilation of the *Vatthugātā* of the *Suttanipāta*. A similar story of Bāvari is also found in the *Manorathapūraṇī*, the *Aṅguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā* by Buddhaghosa.<sup>41</sup> It is likely that this story was intentionally related according to the Theravāda understanding of *vāsanā* as the cultivation of mundane wholesome practice, which were made clear in the *Peṭakopadesa* and *Nettipakaraṇa* (§2.2). In other words, through adding a story of Bāvari and his pupils' former life, the term *vāsana* in the *Suttanipāta* takes on the meaning of karmic imprint in the exegetical tradition. Therefore, the Pāli commentary may not lend support to our understanding of the original meaning of *vāsanā* in the *Suttanipāta*.

In my opinion, in the above-quoted passage, *vāsana-vāsita* is used in a similar sense to *bhāvana-bhāvita*, “impregnated by the [previous] cultivation [of wisdom]”. According to the *Saṅgīti Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*, there are three types cultivation (*bhāvanā*) in early Buddhism, viz., the cultivation of mental body, of mind, and of wisdom.<sup>42</sup> Because the pupils of Bāvari were not Buddhist practitioners, even though they were skillful meditators (*jhāyī*), their previous “cultivation” cannot be called *bhāvanā* in the strict Buddhist sense. Therefore, *vāsana* as a quasi-synonym for *bhāvana* is employed to suggest the intellectual practice of these Brahmin pupils.

Nonetheless, since *vāsanā* is semantically identical to *paribhāvanā* (§1.2), the pragmatic difference between the two terms in the canonical texts appears to be artificial. At least, shortly after that, later Buddhists also use *vāsanā* to refer to the Buddhist practice. Such an idea of *vāsanā* can be found in the Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādins' *Mahāvastu*<sup>43</sup>:

{2.1C} [The Buddha] causes sentient beings who are engaged in merit to settle down (*ni-√viś*) in merits; he causes the beings who are engaged in fruit to individually establish (*prati-√sthā*) with fruits; he causes the beings who are engaged in the imprint [of practice] (*vāsanā*)<sup>44</sup> to consolidate (*ava-√sthā*)

<sup>41</sup> AA i 332ff.

<sup>42</sup> DN iii 219: *Tisso bhāvanā-kāyabhāvanā, cittabhāvanā, paññābhāvanā*. See Walshe's translation and note (2012, 486, 618 n. 1052) to *kāyabhāvanā*.

<sup>43</sup> It is not certain when exactly the *Mahāvastu* was composed.

<sup>44</sup> In the English translation of the *Mahāvastu*, Jones (1949, 372) translates the word “*vāsanā*” in this context as “memories of past lives”. However, I find the term in this context more likely to be interpreted as the influence of cultivation. From the doctrinal point of view, it is hard to see how

in the imprint...<sup>45</sup>

What this paragraph intends to express is that the Buddha benefits all sentient beings according to their distinct personalities. Merits function as the preparatory efforts that are conducive to the liberation. Establishing Noble fruits can be seen as for those who aim at attaining spiritual fruits, such as Arhathood. For those who have no spiritual attainment at all, the accumulation of the imprint of mundane practice helps to result in the attainment. It is clear that the term *vāsanā* in the *Mahāvastu* is used in a positive sense and accords with the true Dharma.

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confirming memories of past lives could be as significant as gaining merit and acquiring Noble fruit. If one insists that the meaning of “*vāsanā*” in the *Mahāvastu* must refer to memory, it is also difficult to explain why such an important meaning of “*vāsanā*” is not attested in other contemporary Buddhist texts in the Indian continent. In fact, the unequivocal use of “*vāsanā*” in the sense of memory is not seen until Asaṅga’s works (§6.3). Moreover, it seems to be strange why the meaning of memory could suddenly reappear in Asaṅga’s works after centuries of “oblivion”. Therefore, I contend that the notion “*vāsanā*” in the sense of memory should have been developed as late as around the fourth century (see chapter 6). Additionally, Karashima (2012, 462 Übersetzung), by referring to the BHSD, understands the term *vāsanā* here as the impressions as a result of deeds in the past times (*Eindrücke (als Ergebnis von Taten in vergangenen Zeiten)*). Hiraoka’s (2010, vol. 2, 98) Japanese translation simply uses the traditional common rendering of *jikke* 習気, which does not contribute to a proper understanding of the term in this specific context.

<sup>45</sup> *Mahāvastu* (Senart 1882) ii 419 (Cf. Marciniak 2020, ii 499–500): ... *puṇyabhāgīyāṃ satvāṃ puṇyehi niveśayamāno, phalabhāgīyāṃ satvāṃ phalehi pratiṣṭhāpayamāno, vāsanābhāgīyāṃ satvāṃ vāsanāyāṃ avasthāpayamāno*... For an English translation see Jones (1952, 372). Exactly the same paragraph can be found in the *Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādins’ Abhisamācārikā Dharmāḥ* (see Karashima 2012, 462). A parallel text is also seen in the Chinese *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya* (T22, no. 1425, 227a26–28): 為求福眾生得建立於福, 求果眾生得建立於果, 苦惱眾生而得安隱。 It is interesting to note that in this quote from the *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya*, the part which should correspond to “*vāsanābhāgīyāṃ satvāṃ vāsanāyāṃ avasthāpayamāno*” is replaced by the expression, “[he causes] the sentient beings who have sufferings (苦, \**duḥkham*) and grief (惱, \**daurmanasya*) to acquire peace and happiness (安隱; \**kṣema/sukham*).” This significant discrepancy is most likely due to the fact that the *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya* differs from the Lokottaravādin’s texts in wording. This fact has been pointed out by Oskar von Hinüber (Karashima 2012, VIII), as he remarks, “their wording [of the Chinese translation of the *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya*] often differs from the Sanskrit text [of the *Abhisamācārikā Dharmāḥ*] in difficult places, presumably because the Chinese translation is based on the text of the *Mahāsāṅghikas*, but just not on that of the Lokottaravādins. This becomes immediately clear in places, where the Chinese translation assumes different facts from the Sanskrit text...” (*Denn oft weicht deren Wortlaut gerade an schwierigen Stellen von dem Sanskrittext ab, vermutlich deshalb, weil der chinesischen Übersetzung der Text der Mahāsāṅghikas, aber eben nicht der der Lokottaravādins zugrunde liegt. Dies wird an Stellen unmittelbar deutlich, an denen die chinesische Übersetzung von anderen Sachverhalten ausgeht als der Sanskrittext...*)

## 2.2. *Peṭakopadesa* and *Nettipakaraṇa*

Probably between the second century BCE<sup>46</sup> to the Common Era or even later, the notion of *vāsanā* started to be used among certain Buddhists for the discussion about different categories of *sūtras/suttas*. The Pāli *Peṭakopadesa*<sup>47</sup> classifies some *suttas* as “*vāsanā-bhāgiya sutta*”, which means the discourse that is connected with imprint of practice<sup>48</sup>:

{2.2A} Therein, what is the setting up of [the Buddha’s] teaching?

The discourse (*sutta*) connected with (*bhāgiya*) affliction (*saṃkilesa*), the *sutta* connected with imprint [of practice] (*vāsanā*), the *sutta* connected with penetration (*nibbedha*), the *sutta* connected with non-trainee (*asekha*); [the *sutta*] connected with both affliction and imprint, [the *sutta*] connected with both affliction and penetration, [the *sutta*] connected with affliction, penetration, and non-trainee, [and the *sutta*] connected with both imprint and penetration.<sup>49</sup>

The text then explicates the content of the notion as follows:

{2.2B} Therein, what is the discourse that is connected with imprint [of practice] (*vāsanā*)?

“The *dhammas*<sup>50</sup> that are preceded by mind (*manopubbaṅgama*), led by mind (*mano-seṭṭha*), and made by mind (*manomaya*). If one, with a purified

<sup>46</sup> Norman (1983, 108) dates the *Peṭakopadesa* to the second century BCE.

<sup>47</sup> Though the *Peṭakopadesa* and *Netti* are regarded as the pre-commentarial text and catalogued in the Burmese tradition into the *Khuddaka Nikāya*, they can also be seen as belonging to the Abhidhamma tradition (Karunadasa 2007, 2). The *Suttanipāṭa*, however, must be earlier than the *Peṭakopadesa*, because the *Suttanipāṭa*, where philosophical speculations were barred, represents “the stage prior to the formation of elaborate systems by Ābhidharmika scholars” (Nakamura 1987, 46).

<sup>48</sup> Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (1977, 36) translates the word “*vāsanā*” as “morality”, as he points out that the “contexts show the meaning to be cultivation of merit.” As will be seen later, such a comment might have been influenced by the *NettA* which remarks, “*vāsanā puññābhāvanā*.” (*NettA* 219)

<sup>49</sup> Peṭ 23: *Tattha katamaṃ sāsanaappaṭṭhānaṃ? Saṅkilesabhāgiyaṃ suttaṃ, vāsanābhāgiyaṃ suttaṃ, nibbedhabhāgiyaṃ suttaṃ, asekhabhāgiyaṃ suttaṃ, saṅkilesabhāgiyaṃ ca vāsanābhāgiyaṃ ca, saṅkilesabhāgiyaṃ ca nibbedhabhāgiyaṃ ca, saṅkilesabhāgiyaṃ ca nibbedhabhāgiyaṃ ca asekhabhāgiyaṃ ca, vāsanābhāgiyaṃ ca nibbedhabhāgiyaṃ ca.*  
Cf. Ñāṇamoli’s translation (1964, 27).

<sup>50</sup> Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli translates the word “*dhammā*” here as “ideas”. K. R. Norman (1997, 1) translates it as “mental phenomena”. However, Agostini (2010, 25) argues that the *dhammā* interpreted as mental concomitants is the Theravādins’ understanding that was formed after the first century CE.

mind, speaks or acts, happiness therefore follows him; like a shade that does not leave (*anapāyini*).<sup>51</sup> ...

Therein, what is [the discourse] connected with both affliction and imprint?

“[The rain] pours on the covered (*channa*); it does not pour on the uncovered (*vivaṭa*)<sup>52</sup>. Therefore, you open the cover, in this way it does not pour on that.”<sup>53</sup> — That “[The rain] pours on the covered” refers to affliction; that “it does not pour on the uncovered” refers to imprint.

“The darkness (*tama*) is destined to darkness, [and light (*joti*) is destined to light]”, thus to be spoken in full.<sup>54</sup> Therein, that which is darkness and that which is destined to darkness refer to affliction; that which is light and that which is destined to light refer to imprint.<sup>55</sup> ...

Therein, what is the discourse connected with imprint and penetration?

“From giving, merit increases; from abstinence (*saṃyama*), hostile action (*vera*) is not heaped up. One who is wholesome abandons the wickedness; because of the exhaustion of greed, hatred and delusion, the calming down of them (*sa-nibbuta*) [arises].”<sup>56</sup> — That “from giving, merit

<sup>51</sup> Peṭ 24: *Tattha katamaṃ vāsanābhāgiyaṃ suttaṃ?*

*Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā mano-seṭṭhā manomayā manasā ce pasannena bhāsati vā karoti vā tato naṃ sukham anveti, chāyā va anapāyini.*

See also Ñāṇamoli’s translation (1964, 29). The verse here is a quote from the *Dhammapada* 1.2. This verse is also comparable with *Udānavarga* 31.24 (Bernhard 1965, 415).

<sup>52</sup> Cf. “*anivṛta*”. In the Abhidharma and Yogācāra literature, the concept of “uncovered” denotes that which does not hinder the Noble Path.

<sup>53</sup> See *Upasatha Sutta* (Ud 56) and Vin ii 240. In this *sutta*, the Buddha compares the eight virtues of the great ocean to the *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* and concludes with the cited verse. In this context, the word “covered” (*channa*) refers to one who commits misconduct.

<sup>54</sup> See *Puggala Sutta* (SN i 209); *Tamotama Sutta* (AN ii 85); *Samyuktāgama* no. 1146 (T2, no. 99, 304c2 ff.). This *sutta* describes four types of people: (1) Those who are born in a lower class, because of their bodily, vocal, and mental misconducts, are reborn into unfortunate planes—this is metaphorically called “darkness is destined to darkness”. (2) Those who are born in a lower class, because of their bodily, vocal, and mental good conducts, are reborn into fortunate planes—this is called “darkness is destined to light”. (3) Those who are born in an upper class, because of their bodily, vocal, and mental misconducts, are reborn into unfortunate planes—this is called “light is destined to darkness”. (4) Those who are born in an upper class, because of their bodily, vocal, and mental good conducts, are reborn into fortunate planes—this is called “light is destined to light”.

<sup>55</sup> Peṭ 25: *Tattha katamaṃ saṅkilesabhāgiyaṃ ca vāsanābhāgiyaṃ ca suttaṃ?*

*Channaṃ ativassati vivaṭaṃ nātivassati*

*tasmā channaṃ vivaretha, evaṃ taṃ nātivassatī ti.*

*Channaṃ ativassatī ti saṅkilesa. Vivaṭaṃ nātivassatī ti vāsanā.*

*Tamo tamaparāyano ti vitthārena.*

*Tattha yo ca tamo yo ca tamaparāyano ayaṃ saṅkilesa. Yo ca joti yo ca jotiparāyano ayaṃ vāsanā.*

See also Ñāṇamoli’s translation (1964, 30).

<sup>56</sup> See *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (DN ii 136).

increases; from abstinence, hostile action is not heaped up” refers to imprint. That “one who is wholesome abandons the wickedness; because of the exhaustion of greed, hatred and delusion, the calming down of them [arises]” refers to penetration.<sup>57</sup>

At the beginning of the passage quoted above, the *manopubbaṅgamā* verse of the *Dhammapada* (1.2) is employed to illustrate what is called a discourse (*sutta*) connected with *vāsanā*. It suggests that *vāsanā* is related to one’s intellect and well-being.<sup>58</sup> As pointed out by Agostini (2010, 24), the original meaning of *dhammā* in the *manopubbaṅgamā* verse should be understood as action—“mental action precedes bodily and vocal actions.” Accordingly, a discourse connected with *vāsanā* appears to concern karma. Moreover, it is also clearly seen that *vāsanā* is distinguished from both affliction (*saṅkilesa*) and penetration (*nibbedha*) into the Noble Truths<sup>59</sup>. In other words, *vāsanā* is neither defilement nor wisdom. The analogy that the rain does not pour on the uncovered means that defilements do not come forth to those who observe precepts. It is taught in the context of *vinaya* affairs in both the *Uposatha Sutta* of the *Udāna* and the *Cullavagga* of the Pāli *Vinaya*. Then, the metaphor of light (*joti*) is found in the *Puggala Sutta*, according to which, bodily, vocal, and mental moral actions determine one’s rebirth in fortunate planes of existence. The last *sutta* passage in the quote is from the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*. Its context is that though the Buddha became ill after taking his last meal offered by Cunda, he still praised Cunda’s action of offering food. The Buddha told Ānanda that Cunda had accumulated the karma that is conducive to longevity (*āyu*), beauty (*vaṇṇa*), happiness (*sukha*), fame (*yaśa*), rebirth in heaven (*sagga*), and sovereignty (*ādhīpateyya*).<sup>60</sup> The *sutta* examples show that although *vāsanā* does not bring about supra-mundane wholesomeness, it either leads to a moral life through abstinence, or

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<sup>57</sup> Peṭ 28: *Tattha katamaṃ vāsanābhāgiyaṃ ca nibbedhabhāgiyaṃ ca suttaṃ?*  
*Dadato puññaṃ pavaḍḍhati, saṃyamato veraṃ na cīyati,*  
*kusalo ca jahati pāpakaṃ rāgadosamohakkhayā parinibbuto ti.*  
*Dadato puññaṃ pavaḍḍhati, saṃyamato veraṃ na cīyati ti vāsanā. Kusalo ca jahati pāpakaṃ*  
*rāgadosamohakkhayā parinibbuto ti nibbedho.*

<sup>58</sup> Note that *Dhammapada* 1.1, which is not quoted here in the *Peṭakopadesa*, shows an opposite case—suffering: *manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā, manasā ce paduṭṭhena bhāsatī vā karoti vā, tato naṃ dukkham anveti cakkam va vahato padaṃ*. For a detailed discussion, see Agostini 2010.

<sup>59</sup> The term “*nibbedhabhāgiya*” is reminiscent of the Sarvāstivāda term “*nirvedha-bhāgiya*” as one stage of spiritual development after *mokṣabhāgiya* before *darśanamārga*, or the wholesome root (*kuśalamūla*) in that stage. However, the term in the Pāli text only refers to a category of *sutta*.

<sup>60</sup> See DN ii 136.

contributes to a better rebirth through meritorious deeds such as giving. It implies that *vāsanā* is related to meritorious deeds and abstinence. In this light, *vāsanā* that contributes to one's rebirth and concerns observing precepts must have a karmic nature.

Such an understanding of *vāsanā* can satisfactorily explain the legend of Bāvari and his pupils in the *Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā*: in the time of the Buddha Kassapa, they led a moral life according to the Dharma as they observed the five precepts and practised giving and so on, but they did not get enlightened. Because of the merits gained through his wholesome practices, Bāvari was reborn in heaven before he fell down to this world and met the Buddha Sakkamuni. In this way, *vāsanā*, through the commentator's interpretation, can be regarded as being connected with the cultivation of merits. What is related to merits must also be karmic. This is why I take the legend of Bāvari seen in the Pāli commentary as a later addition (see §2.1). Further discussion on the idea of karmic *vāsanā* will be seen in the next chapter.

In the *Netti*, a rewritten version of the *Peṭakopadesa*<sup>61</sup>, the above noted features of *vāsanā* become clearer. Therein, more examples are given concerning the expression of “the discourse connected with *vāsanā*” (*vāsanābhāgiya sutta*).<sup>62</sup> The *Netti* further clarifies the notion as below:

{2.2C} Two [types of] discourses are that connected with imprint [of practice] (*vāsanā*) and that connected with penetration. [Correspondingly,] two ways of practice (*paṭipadā*) are that connected with merit and that connected with fruit. Two [kinds of] morality are that connected with restraint (*saṃvara*) and that connected with abandonment (*pahāna*). Therein, the Blessed One teaches the discourse connected with imprint for the purpose of the practice connected with merits. He who has established in the morality of restraint through that spiritual life (*brahmacariya*) becomes an observer of spiritual life (*brahmacārini*). Therein, the Blessed One teaches the discourse connected with penetration for the purpose of the practice connected with fruits. He who has been established in the morality of abandonment through that spiritual life becomes an observer of spiritual life.

Therein, what is the discourse connected with imprint? The discourse known as being connected with imprint are the speech about giving, the speech about morality, the speech about heaven (*sagga*), the disadvantage of sensuality, [and] the advantage in renunciation.

<sup>61</sup> Regarding the relationship between the *Peṭakopadesa* and the *Netti*, I follow K. R. Norman's (1983, 110) opinion. For other opinions, see Hinüber 1996, 81–82.

<sup>62</sup> See *Nett* 128ff.

... In the discourse connected with imprint, there is no understanding (*pajānanā*), Path or fruit; in the discourse connected with penetration, there is understanding, Path and fruit.<sup>63</sup>

In this passage, the concept of *vāsanā* indicates the merits of restraint and habitual moral conduct that are conducive to the spiritual life or mundane well-being before the understanding of the Noble Truths. It is interesting to note that abstinence (*saṃyama*) in the *Peṭakopadesa* is replaced in the *Netti* by the term *saṃvara*, “restraint”, which seems to be more monastic-oriented and is related to spiritual life. On the other hand, penetration (*nibbedha*) in the *Peṭakopadesa* is interpreted in the *Netti* as understanding the Noble Truths, the Path to awakening, and the attainment of Noble fruits, which are not the consequences of *vāsanā*. This perhaps reflects the hermeneutic pattern of the *Netti*, as noted by Bond (1993, 31–32), which is to address the Dhamma to both the renouncers and men in the world.

As we have noted so far, since the *Suttanipāta* uses the term *vāsanā* in the sense of imprint of practice, the *Peṭakopadesa* introduces a karmic aspect to the notion and the *Netti* further relates *vāsanā* to restraint (*saṃvara*). This is perhaps why Jayawickrama (1976, 154) remarks without elaboration that the meaning of *vāsanā* in the *Netti* and that in the *Suttanipāta* are slightly different. It will be argued in chapter 3 that the term *vāsanā* that expresses the idea of karmic imprint developed precisely from the Abhidharma discussion of restraint.

Another thing worth noting is that in another place in the *Peṭakopadesa*, *vāsanā* is also explicitly taken as a designation of *paribhāvanā*.<sup>64</sup> It is not certain if the term *vāsanā* here expresses the same meaning as in the phrase “*vāsanā-bhāgiya sutta*”. One possibility is that this *vāsanā* is not related to the idea of *vāsanā-bhāgiya sutta* but is understood in its dynamic sense as impregnation. However, this understanding

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<sup>63</sup> Nett 48–49: *Dve suttāni: vāsanābhāgiyaṃ ca nibbedhabhāgiyaṃ ca. Dve paṭipadā: puññabhāgiyā ca phalabhāgiyā ca. Dve sīlāni: saṃvarasīlaṃ ca pahānasīlaṃ ca. Tattha Bhagavā vāsanābhāgiyaṃ suttaṃ puññabhāgiyāya paṭipadāya desayati. So saṃvarasīle ṭhito tena brahmacariyena brahmacārī bhavati. Tattha Bhagavā nibbedhabhāgiyaṃ suttaṃ phalabhāgiyāya paṭipadāya desayati. So pahānasīle ṭhito tena brahmacariyena brahmacārī bhavati. Tattha katamaṃ vāsanābhāgiyaṃ suttaṃ? Vāsanābhāgiyaṃ nāma suttaṃ: dānakathā, sīlakathā, saggakathā, kāmānaṃ ādīnava, nekkhamme ānisaṃso ti.*

...*Vāsanābhāgiye sutte n’atthi pajānanā n’atthi maggo natthi phalaṃ. Nibbedhabhāgiye sutte atthi pajānanā atthi maggo atthi phalaṃ.*

Cf. Nāṇamoli 1977, 73–74.

<sup>64</sup> Peṭ 175: *Paribhāvanā vāsanāpaññattiyā paññatti.*

cannot be substantiated in other places of the treatise. Thus, the term *vāsanā* here most likely still means the imprint of repeated practice and is equated with the cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of merits and restraint, if we take *paribhāvanā* here as a synonym for *bhāvanā*. At least, it must be also in the latter sense that in the *Netti-aṭṭhakathā*, Ācariya Dhammapāla (ca. fifth century) states that *vāsanā* is understood as the cultivation of merits (*vāsanā puññabhāvanā*)<sup>65</sup>.

### 2.3. *Milindapañha*

Jayawickrama (1976, 154) also notes that the term *vāsanā/vāsana* occurs twice in the *Milindapañha*. The first occurrence is found at the beginning of the treatise in the *Bāhirakathā* portion, where the context concerns the early life of the young boy Nāgasena and his previous lives. The story starts from the time of Buddha Kassapa, when King Milinda and Nāgasena were respectively a novice and a monk. After hearing the novice make a vow to have eloquence (*paṭibhāna*) wherever he is born before attaining *nibbāna*, the monk made a similar vow. Then, the novice enjoyed a rebirth in the Tāvātimsa heaven, before he was reborn as King Milinda, 500 years after Buddha Sakkamuni's *parinibbāna*. The monk, on the other hand, who became a son of a god in the Tāvātimsa heaven, was requested to be reborn into the human world to answer the questions of the king. With such settings, it is said that the boy Nāgasena, after leaving his Brahmin teacher before meeting his Buddhist master, “with his heart being impelled (*codita-hadaya*) by his previous imprint (*pubba-vāsanā*),” has gone to a lonely place for meditation, and felt what he learned about the Vedas worthless.<sup>66</sup> The term *pubba* in this context clearly refer to Nāgasena's previous life as a monk during the time of Buddha Kassapa. Similarly, the term *vāsana* occurs again in its neutral form in Book V of the *Milindapañha*, where it states, “those whoever have intrinsically completely purified, because of the

<sup>65</sup> See NettA 219: *vāsanā puññabhāvanā, vāsanābhāge pavattaṃ vāsanābhāgiyaṃ, vāsanam bhajāpetīti vā vāsanābhāgiyaṃ*. Though the compound “*puñña-bhāvanā*” is also possible to be analyzed as a *dvandva*, i.e., “merit and cultivation”, considering that neither the *Netti* nor the *Peṭakopadesa* specifically explains the merit and cultivation as two distinct things, I accept Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's rendering of “cultivation of merits”, which reads it as a *tatpuruṣa*.

<sup>66</sup> Miln 10: *Atha kho nāgaseno dārako ācariyassa anuyogaṃ datvā pāsādā oruḃha pubbavāsanāya coditahadayo rahogato paṭisallīno attano sippassa ādimajjhāpariyosānaṃ olovento ādimhi vā majjihe vā pariyosāne vā appamattakampi sāraṃ adisvā “tucchā vata bho ime vedā, palāpā vata bho ime vedā asārā nissārā”ti vip̐paṭisārī anattamano ahoṣi*.



previously impregnated imprint (*pubbe vāsita-vāsana*), become free from conceptual proliferation (*nippapañca*) in one moment of mind.”<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, the term *pubbe* here seems not have a strong indication of past lives, but is only used in its general sense of “in the past”. In any case, considering the very similar wording at the Bāhirakathā and Book V, the two occurrences of *vāsanā/vāsana* in the *Milindapañha* should express the same idea.

Similar to the case in the *Suttanipāta*, the term *vāsanā/vāsana* in the *Milindapañha* can be understood as the imprint of former cultivation in the intellect. According to the Bāhirakathā portion, the *vāsanā* functions as a habitual propensity for learning the supra-mundane teachings, because of which the boy Nāgasena was unsatisfactory with the knowledge in the Vedas.<sup>68</sup> According to Book V, because of the accumulated imprints of former cultivation, one can attain *nirvāṇa*, the absence of conceptual proliferation. In other words, *vāsana* can even be a cause of liberation. This idea is comparable with the Sarvāstivāda notion of the stage conducive to liberation (*mokṣabhāgiya*) (see §6.1). By and large, such an understanding of *vāsanā* must be independent from the notion in the *Peṭakopadesa* and the *Netti*. It can be regarded as the direct development from the *Suttanipāta*.

It should also be noted that the two occurrences of *vāsanā/vāsana* in the *Milindapañha* are in the later added part of the treatise<sup>69</sup>, because they are not found in the corresponding Chinese versions translated during the late Han dynasty (2<sup>nd</sup>–3<sup>rd</sup> century CE, see Appendix). At the earliest, the idea of *vāsanā* must have entered into this Pāli text after the second century CE. The latest limit of the addition of this content can even be the fifth century CE, before Buddhaghosa quoted from the complete *Milindapañha*.<sup>70</sup> Therefore, it is not so likely that the earliest part of the *Milindapañha* involves the term *vāsanā*.<sup>71</sup>

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 263: *ye te sabhāvaparissuddhā pubbe vāsita-vāsana, te ekacittakkhaṇena nippapañcā honti.*

<sup>68</sup> Endo (2002, 111) suggests that *vāsanā* in the *Milindapañha* denotes a mere habit. This understanding seems to take the result of the *vāsanā* simply as Nāgasena’s going to a lonely place for meditation, since doing meditation must have been a habit of the monk. However, this interpretation cannot properly explain the case of the second occurrence of the term in the *Milindapañha*.

<sup>69</sup> See Mizuno’s (1959a, 35–37) summarization of the content in the Pāli version that is not found in the early Chinese translations.

<sup>70</sup> Norman (1983, 111, 113) clearly states that Buddhaghosa’s quotation from the *Milindapañha* is not absolutely the same as the extant Pāli version.

<sup>71</sup> Mizuno (1959a, 47–48) notes that the names of the five rivers in the Chinese version, which are the four main rivers in Northwest India and the Ganges River, are replaced in the Pāli version by the names of the five tributaries of Ganges River in Northeast India. It is not impossible that the notion came to

## 2.4. Concluding Remarks

The earliest occurrence of the term *vāsanā* in the extant Buddhist texts is in the *Suttanipāta*, where the expression “*pubba-vāsana-vāsita*” (impregnated by the previous imprint) is used in a similar sense to *\*pubba-bhāvana-bhāvita*. In that context, *vāsana* denotes the imprint of practice (perhaps particularly the non-Buddhist practice) on one’s intellect. On the other hand, the idea of being impregnated had been expressed earlier by the term *paribhāvita* in both the Pāli *Nikāyas* and the Chinese Sarvāstivāda Āgamas. In the Pāli commentary on the *Suttanipāta*, *vāsanā* is interpreted as the meritorious habitual imprint (*puñña-vāsana*) through repeated mundane practice in a previous life according to the teaching of Buddha Kassapa. This interpretation, however, should have been influenced by the later Pāli exegetical tradition.

Around the Common Era, the *Peṭakopadesa* employs the notion of *vāsanā* to refer to one category of *suttas*. In the *Peṭakopadesa*, *vāsanā* is understood as the imprint of mundane practices, including meritorious deeds and abstinence (*saṃyama*). *Vāsanā* may lead to a better rebirth and thus can be karmically efficacious, but it does not lead to awakening. Likewise, according to further explanation in the *Nettipakaraṇa*, *vāsanā* is related to the mundane cultivation of merits through wholesome deeds and restraints (*saṃvara*). The idea of karmic *vāsanā* should originate from the context of mundane cultivation and restraint. Moreover, in the *Peṭakopadesa*, *vāsanā* is defined as *paribhāvanā*.

The term *vāsanā/vāsana* is also found twice in the later part of the Pāli *Milindapañha*. This concept was likely employed by the compilers of the treatise only after the second century CE. *Vāsanā* in this treatise expresses the meaning of the imprint of former cultivation on one’s intellect. It is even regarded as a necessary condition of attaining *nirvāṇa*. This idea should have been a direct development from the *Suttanipāta*, having hardly any connection with the *Peṭakopadesa* and *Netti*.

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be employed during the later editing of this work in Northeast India.



### 3. *Vāsanā* That Preserves Karmic Efficacy

In chapter 2, we have discussed the Pāli sources which imply the idea of karmic *vāsanā*. This chapter continues to investigate how the concept of karmic *vāsanā* developed in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra works. Karma that is performed in the past still has its causal efficacy at present. However, due to the Buddhist principle of momentariness, the present karmic efficacy cannot be the same one as the cause of ripening (*vipāka-hetu*) in the past. *Vāsanā* thus refers to the karmic efficacy in one's continuity before the occurrence of the karmic effect. It should be noted that karma, especially the inexpressible transgressions (*ānantarya-karman*), projects its effect of ripening (*vipāka-phala*) while being performed only once. In this respect, *vāsanā* cannot be understood as a "habit" or "habitual energy", but as an imprint or a lasting influence. The Abhidharmic discussion of karmic *vāsanā* is examined first in comparison with the Sarvāstivāda concept of unmanifested matter (*avijñapti-rūpa*). Vasubandhu's notion of *saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa* and Śrīlāta's notion of *anudhātu* seem to reflect the idea of karmic *vāsanā*, while Saṅghabhadra gainsays these similar notions. In the Yogācāra school, karmic *vāsanā* occurs for the first time in the SavBh and is developed by Asaṅga in the MSg.

#### 3.1. *Vāsanā* in Connection with *Avijñapti* in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*

The term *vāsanā* is not found in the canonical Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma treatises at all. Among all the extant Buddhist scriptures of the northern tradition, the idea of karmic *vāsanā* is seen for the first time in the MVbh. It seems that *vāsanā* was not developed as a significant concept in the Sarvāstivāda school from the outset.

There are in total 16 places where the term *vāsanā* occurs in the MVbh. Among them, two occurrences are particularly connected with the idea of karmic imprints and the others are used in the sense of *kleśavāsanā*. The two places concerning karmic *vāsanā* in the MVbh are translated as follows:

{3.1A} According to some: the imprint (習氣; \**vāsanā*) of that [non-defined] karma is not firm, thus [the non-defined karma] does not have endowments (成就; \**samanvāgama*) of the past and future. By contrast, the imprints of wholesome and unwholesome karma are firm, thus [they] have the past and future endowments. However, it is not the case for the inferior non-defined

[karma].<sup>72</sup>

{3.1B} According to some: the imprint (\**vāsanā*) of Great Elements (大種; \**mahābhūta*) is not firm, and thus has no past and future endowment, because it is weak, inferior, and of a non-defined nature. It is to say, the imprints of wholesomeness and unwholesomeness are firm, and thus have past and future endowment. However, it is not the case for the inferior non-defined *dharma*s. Just as holding a very fragrant flower for a while, even after washing hands, the perfume (習氣; \**vāsa*) remains. It is not like holding other things such as wood or stone and so on, the scent disappears as soon as they are dropped.<sup>73</sup>

Notably, both of the arguments quoted above are attributed to some anonymous masters and was not taken as the best theory by the compilers of the MVbh. This suggest that they were developed by some non-orthodox Sarvāstivādins.

Though the two passages occur in the chapters on karma and *mahābhūta* respectively, they need to be considered together, because both of them conclude with the firmness of the *vāsanā* of wholesome and unwholesome karma. On this point, the two passages even use almost the same expression. In fact, both contexts concern the Sarvāstivāda concept of unmanifested matter (*avijñapti-rūpa*). What comes after passage {3.1A} is a discussion about the establishment of unmanifested karma in the triple sphere. It is seen that the unmanifested matter is established in terms of wholesome and unwholesome karma. On the other hand, in passage {3.1B}, it is because unmanifested karma is considered by the Vaibhāṣikas as the matter derived from the four Great Elements (*catvāri mahābhūtāny upādāya*) that the Great Elements come to be discussed in terms of wholesome and unwholesome karma. Therefore, *vāsanā* in both of the passages denote the lasting karmic efficacy in one's saṃsāric continuity.

Shortly before passage {3.1B} in the MVbh, the Vaibhāṣikas make a statement as follows: from the past Great Elements, matter in the past, future and present can be derived; from the present Great Elements, matter in the present and future can be derived; and from the future Great Elements, matter in the future can be derived. On the other hand, matter in the past and present cannot be derived from the future Great

<sup>72</sup> MVbh, T27, 638a21–24: 有說：彼業習氣不堅牢故，無成就去來世者。如善惡業習氣堅牢，則能成就去來二世，無記不爾。 This passage is in the chapter on karma of the MVbh, which was not translated in the earlier Chinese versions of the *Vibhāṣā*. Cf. Yamabe 2021, 474 n. 39.

<sup>73</sup> MVbh, T27, 685a25–b1: 有說：大種習氣不堅，故無成就去來世者，以是羸劣，無記性故。謂善惡等習氣堅牢，故有成就去來世者，劣無記法則不如是。如暫執持極香花物，雖加洗拭習氣猶隨；非如執持餘木石等，手纔放捨此氣便無。 This passage is in the chapter on *mahābhūta* of the MVbh. That chapter was not translated in the earlier Chinese versions of the *Vibhāṣā*.

Elements; nor can past matter be derived from present Great Elements.<sup>74</sup> It is known that the derived matter (*upādāya-rūpa*) consists of resistant (*sapratigha*) derived matter and the unmanifested matter. The unmanifested includes (a) the unmanifested arising together with *citta* (隨心轉無表) and (b) the unmanifested derived from the manifested (表所起無表). The latter is further divided into the wholesome *prātimokṣa*-restraint (*prātimokṣa-saṃvara*), the unwholesome non-restraint (*asaṃvara*), and the neither-restraint-nor-non-restraint (*naivasamvara-nāsamvara*) which can be either wholesome or unwholesome. Among them, the *prātimokṣa*-restraint refers to the restraint through observing precepts and undertaking vows. According to the discussion in the MVbh, it can be summarized that the resistant derived matter and the unmanifested arising together with *citta* must be simultaneous with the Great Elements. Only the unmanifested matter derived from the manifested are able to arise depending on the prior Great Elements. Therefore, what the “unmanifested matter derived from the manifested” refers to must be the *vāsanā* of manifested bodily and vocal karma, being either wholesome or unwholesome.

The unmanifested matter as the *vāsanā* of wholesome or unwholesome actions offer a possibility of the preservation of karmic force. Some modern scholars (I. Funahashi 1954, 100–102; Hirakawa [1974] 1993, 190–91)<sup>75</sup> note that the initial function of the unmanifested karma should have been the potentiality that preserves the karmic efficacy after its production before its effect of ripening (*vipāka-phala*) arises. But this idea “gradually lost its significance” (Hirakawa [1974] 1993, 195–

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<sup>74</sup> See MVbh, T27, 684b21–c8: 頗有過去大種造過去色耶？答：有，謂過去一切有對所造色、隨心轉無表、表所起無表，唯為過去大種所造。頗有過去大種造未來色耶？答：有，謂有未來表所起無表，唯為過去大種所造。頗有過去大種造現在色耶？答：有，謂有現在表所起無表，唯為過去大種所造。頗有未來大種造未來色耶？答：有，謂未來一切有對所造色、隨心轉無表及有未來表所起無表，唯為未來大種所造。頗有未來大種造過去現在色耶？答：無，謂無果先因後理故。頗有現在大種造現在色耶？答：有，謂現在一切有對所造色、隨心轉無表及有現在表所起無表，唯為現在大種所造。頗有現在大種造過去色耶？答：無，謂無果先因後理故。頗有現在大種造未來色耶？答：有，謂有未來表所起無表，唯為現在大種所造。

<sup>75</sup> Note that some other scholars such as Wogihara ([1928] 1938, 1027), S. Katō (1953, 469), Yamada (1962, 354), and so on, insist that for the orthodoxy Sarvāstivādins, *avijñapti* is not the intermediary between karma and its effect, for death would terminate the continuity of the *avijñapti*. However, Dhammajoti (2015a, 450–51) argues, “Even after the series of a non-informative karma has ended—for example when the person dies—as in the case of a past volition and informative karma, the non-informative karma too continues to be connected with the personal series (*santati*) by virtue of the continuous acquisition-series which ends only when the fruit is actualized.” As will be argued below, *avijñapti* may just matter to the next rebirth. In this way, it can be still regarded as a medium between karmic cause and effect.

96) when the Sarvāstivādins put increased emphasis on the doctrine of tri-temporal existence.

According to Dhammajoti (2015a, 438, 447–48), on the one hand, unmanifested karma functions as the path of karma (*karma-patha*) after the production of karma. On the other hand, since volition (*cetanā*) alone is karma in its strict sense, the unmanifested is just a karmic contributor—it plays the role of completing (*paripūraka*) karma rather than projecting (*ākṣepaka*) karma. Moreover, unmanifested karma is the effect of [homogeneous] outflow (*niṣyanda-phala*) of volition, the fundamental cause of karma.

In my opinion, the unmanifested matter must preserve the karmic efficacy by the end of the present life and may also play the role of the projecting karma for one's next rebirth, but it cannot continue anymore after the rebirth. Regarding this, Yamada (1962, 353–52) notes that the *\*Ārya-vasumitra-bodhisattva-saṃgrhīta* (T no. 1549, also known as the *Paripṛcchā*) and the *\*Tattvasiddhi* (T no. 1646) suggest that the unmanifested caused by not committing killing and so on leads to rebirth in heaven.<sup>76</sup> The examples given in these two treatises only concern the case of wholesome unmanifested karma produced through non-killing and so on, which belong to the *prātimokṣa*-restraints. It can be imagined that unwholesome karma can be likewise preserved by the unmanifested matter. Since some masters, as recorded in the MVbh, employ the notion of *vāsanā* to express the idea of unmanifested matter, it is arguable that *vāsanā* has the signification of contributing to karmic continuity as the unmanifested matter does.

Such an idea about the unmanifested reminds us of the idea of *vāsanā* as seen in the *Peṭakopadesa* and so on (see §2.2): *vāsanā* is meritorious actions and abstinence (*saṃyama*) or restraint (*saṃvara*) that affect one's subsequent better

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<sup>76</sup> *Paripṛcchā* or *\*Āryavasumitrabodhisattva-saṃgrhīta* (T28, no. 1549, 725b25–28): 或作是說：生天上，然後能知。習行不犯，然後生天上。問：云何習行不犯？為數數不犯，能知心不犯，從彼修行心，然後得生天上。This treatise also holds the Sarvāstivāda position that the unmanifested is a material *dharma* (T28, no. 1549, 725c5–7): 無教、心(T: 心心)不相應行，有何種別？或作是說：無教是色，心不相應行非色。或作是說：無教者是物 (*\*dharma/dravya*)，心不相應行非物。*\*Tattvasiddhi* (T32, no. 1646, 290a27–b2): 因離殺等得生天上，若無法，云何為因？問曰：不以離故生天，以善心故。答曰：不然，經中說：精進人隨壽得福多，故久受天樂。若但善心，云何能有多福？是人不能常有善心故。Note that the *\*Tattvasiddhi*, which is related to the *Dārṣṭāntikas* (Mizuno 1931, 155), considers the unmanifested as *cittaviprayukta-samskāras* (T32, no. 1646, 252 b29–c1: 心不相應行者無作業也。) According to the MVbh, the *Dārṣṭāntikas* do not recognize manifested or unmanifested karma as a real entity (T27, no. 1545, 634b23–24: 譬喻者說：表無表業無實體性。)

rebirth. As argued in §2.2, though the *Peṭakopadesa* and the *Netti* do not mention karma when discussing *vāsanā*, such a definition of *vāsanā* as the imprint of the mundane cultivation of merits must be karmic. The similarity indicates that the idea of karmic *vāsanā* must be implied in the notion of the unmanifested. The main difference between the theory of karmic *vāsanā* in the *Peṭakopadesa* and so on and the idea of unmanifested karma held by Sarvāstivādins is that, while the former only concerns wholesome deeds, the latter can be either wholesome or unwholesome. Once the notion of *vāsanā* gains the possibility of preserving karmic efficacy through the Sarvāstivāda theory of the unmanifested, the karmic *vāsanā* can be either wholesome or unwholesome.

In this light, what {3.1A} and {3.1B} intend to express is not the *vāsanā* of Great Elements and morally neutral karma, but the *vāsanā* of wholesome and unwholesome karma. The Great Elements are only non-defined, while the derived matter can be wholesome, unwholesome or non-defined. As the non-defined karma does not give rise to karmic effect, it merely has present acquisition (*prāpti*), without past and future endowment (*samanvāgama*).<sup>77</sup> Thus, the term *vāsanā* here is used in the sense of the continuance of wholesome and unwholesome karmic efficacy. The statement that *vāsanā* of the Great Elements or non-defined karma is not firm should be understood as they cannot persist. In other words, the Great Elements and non-defined karma have no *vāsanā*. Accordingly, it is not difficult to understand why some Sarvāstivādins employ the term “firm *vāsanā* of wholesome and unwholesome karma” in the context of unmanifested matter.

It must be in close connection with the above-quoted two passages from the MVbh that unmanifested karma is elaborated in a similar manner in the Hṛdaya treatises by the Gandhāra Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas. It is thus legitimate to infer that the unknown “some” masters as recorded in the quotes of the MVbh include the “western masters” of the Sarvāstivāda school. A comparison can be drawn between the description of the unmanifested karma in \*Dharmavijaya’s \**Abhiharmahṛdaya* (AH-Dh)<sup>78</sup> and the corresponding discussion in Upāśānta’s \**Abhiharmahṛdaya* (-*vṛtti*?) (AH-U) and Dharmatrāta’s MAH as below:

<sup>77</sup> For the Sarvāstivādins, *samanvāgama* is generally regarded as a synonym of *prāpti*. Some nuances between the two terms are mentioned in the MVbh (T27, 823a20–28). See Dhammajoti 2015a, 335–36.

<sup>78</sup> For the restoration of the names of the treatises and their authors, see Kudara 1982, 371.



&lt;Table 2&gt;

AH-Dh	AH-U	MAH
<p>There are other two types [of unmanifested karma than mental karma]: the bodily unmanifested and the vocal unmanifested. [Either of them] is twofold—wholesome and unwholesome, but not non-defined. Why?</p> <p>The [morally] neutral (<i>avyākṛta</i>) mind (<i>citta</i>) is weak. It cannot produce strong karma. That is to say, in different mind in a [mental] series (轉異心)<sup>79</sup>, that [unmanifested] accompanies [the defined mind] with a similar appearance [in each moment of the serial continuity]. Therefore, there are bodily unmanifested and vocal unmanifested, but there is not a non-defined one.<sup>80</sup></p>	<p>There are other two [types of unmanifested karma than mental karma]: the bodily and the vocal unmanifested. [Either of them] is twofold—wholesome and unwholesome, but not non-defined. Why?</p> <p>It is because of [its] weakness. Because the neutral mind is weak, it cannot produce strong karma. [The unmanifested] co-exists with another (i.e., a new) consciousness and follows its serial continuity, in the manner that after holding a fragrant (<i>sumana</i>) flower, even though it has been abandoned, the fragrance remains. Why? The fragrance has a potency (<i>*sāmarthya</i>) to continue to give off, unlike holding wood or stone and so on.<sup>81</sup></p>	<p>The two other [types of unmanifested] karma are the bodily unmanifested and the vocal unmanifested. [Either of them] is twofold—wholesome and unwholesome, but not non-defined. Why?</p> <p>It is because the neutral mind is weak, [whereas only] the strong (i.e., wholesome and unwholesome) mind is able to produce bodily and vocal karma. [The unmanifested] co-operates with different minds, and arises in the [mental] serial continuity. It is like holding a fragrant flower, even though it has been abandoned, the remaining scent (<i>*vāsa</i>) continues to give off, unlike holding wood or stone and so on.<sup>82</sup></p>

<sup>79</sup> In comparison with the AH-U and the MAH, the term “轉異心” (*zhuǎn yì xīn*) that appears in the AH-Dh seems to stand for “\*展轉他異心” (*zhǎnzhuǎn tāyì xīn*), i.e., “another mind in a series”.

<sup>80</sup> AH-Dh, T28, 812c21–24: 餘有二，身無教及口無教。彼二種，善、不善，無無記。所以者何？無記心羸劣，彼不能生強力業。謂轉異心中，彼相似相隨。是故身無教、口無教，無無記。Armelin’s French translation (1978, 77) of the second half of this passage is misleading. Note that Willemen (2006a, 62) reads “謂轉異心中彼相似相隨” as a further explanation of the “strong karma”: “An indeterminate thought is weak and cannot produce a forceful action, i.e. one which, even though occurring among thoughts which are different, goes on in its selfsame fashion.”

<sup>81</sup> AH-U, T28, 840a24–28: 餘有二業，謂身口無教。彼有二種，謂善不善，[無]無記。何以故？羸劣故。以無記心羸劣故，不能起強業。若與餘識俱、與彼事相續，如執須摩那華，雖復捨之猶見香隨。何以故？香勢續生故，非如執木石等。(The character in square brackets is my addition, following alternate versions shown in the *Taishō Tripiṭaka*.)

<sup>82</sup> MAH, T28, 888c11–15: 餘二業，身無作及口無作。彼二種，善、不善，[無]無記。何以故？無記心羸劣故，強力心能起身口業。餘心俱行，相續生。如手執香華，雖復捨之，餘氣續生，非如執木石等。(The character in square brackets is my addition, following the alternate version

It can be seen that the AH-U and the MAH employ the analogy of the perfume of a flower and the perfume of wood or stone, which is exactly used in {3.1B} to describe the *vāsanā* of unmanifested karma. Yinshun (1968, 699) opines that in the tradition of the Western Sarvāstivādins, the unmanifested is spoken of in the sense of *vāsanā*. The AH-Dh and the MAH even expressly maintain that the unmanifested is only metaphorically called material *dharmā*.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, it was very likely that the Buddhists who did not accept the Vaibhāṣika theory of the unmanifested matter, such as some Western Sarvāstivādins, may use the concept of karmic *vāsanā* to refer to the karmic causal efficacy in a continuity. Since the *Peṭakopadesa* is probably also a work originally composed in Gandhāra<sup>84</sup>, it seems that the similar idea about karmic *vāsanā* should have been shared by the northwest Indian Buddhists around the Gandhāra region.

According to the analysis above, we may postulate that *vāsanā* as karmic imprint must have been employed to express the idea of the continuance of karmic efficacy by some Sarvāstivādins during the time when the doctrinal focus of unmanifested matter shifted from keeping karmic efficacy to restraint. It is even arguable that the notion of *vāsanā* was a substitute for the theory of unmanifested matter, especially for those who do not accept the existence of unmanifested matter. More importantly, the theory of karmic *vāsanā* does not need to presuppose the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of tri-temporal existence. In this regard, the Yogācāras use the notion of *vāsanā* to explain the continuity of karma.

### 3.2. Karmic *Vāsanā*, Vasubandhu's "*Samtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*", Śrīlāta's "*Anudhātu*", and Saṅghabhadra's Refutation

Since *vāsanā* signifies the karmic efficacy, this idea is very close to the concept of karmic seed (*bīja*) and Vasubandhu's notion of *samtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*, "specific transformation in serial continuity". Semantically speaking, seed should represent

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shown in the *Taishō Tripiṭaka* and the Korean *Tripiṭaka*.) Cf. Dessein 1999, 154.

<sup>83</sup> AH-Dh, T28, 809c1: 十種謂色入，亦無教假色。 Cf. MAH, T28, no. 1552, 871c22: 十種謂色入，及無作假色。 See also MAH, 888c1–2: 無作亦非色，以作是色故，彼亦名色。

<sup>84</sup> As for the *Peṭakopadesa*'s close relationship with Gandhāra region, see Baums 2014, 28–34. Zacchetti (2002, 92) also hypothesizes that "the *Peṭakopadesa* was originally composed in Northern India."

the initial cause, *vāsanā* should refer to the subsequent continuing causal efficacy of the seed in one's karmic continuity, and *saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa* signifies the course of seed's gradual transforming to its fruit. However, at a later time for the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins, *vāsanā* has become a synonym for seed.

It should be noted that except the Yogācāras and Vasubandhu, the majority of those who discussed the idea of karmic seed<sup>85</sup>, including the Kāśyapīyas<sup>86</sup>, the Sarvāstivādins<sup>87</sup>, the Dārṣṭāntikas<sup>88</sup>, and Kumāralāta<sup>89</sup>, only took seed as an analogy of karmic cause instead of a technical term.

<sup>85</sup> See Park (2014, 267–320). Kragh (2006, 177, 179) draws attention to Nāgārjuna's mention of *bīja* in MMK 17.1 and argues, “Nāgārjuna must have been aware of the terminological use of the word *bīja*. Nevertheless, it still cannot be ruled out that he merely applied it in the present verse (Mmk 17.1) in a non-terminological sense.”

<sup>86</sup> MVbh, T27, 96b6–9: 或復有執：諸異熟因果若未熟，其體恒有；彼果熟已，其體便壞。如飲光部，彼作是說：猶如種子，芽若未生，其體恒有；芽生便壞。諸異熟因亦復如是。

<sup>87</sup> MVbh, T27, 97c28–98a3: 若業有種種功能得種種果者，受多處異熟。若業無種種功能不得種種果者，受少處異熟。如外種子有種種功能得種種果者，如稻、甘蔗、葡萄、藕等。無種種功能不得種種果者，如素酌迦多羅子等……Also 594a17–20: 順現法受業雖近得果，而果下劣，不名最勝；順後次受業雖去果遠，而果殊勝難盡，故名最勝。如外種子有近得果而果下劣，有去果遠而果最勝。See also Nishi's (1975, 486–95) summarization of the use of *bīja* in the MVbh. Kragh (2006, 177 n. 240) suggests that the MAH contains a passage which expresses the idea of *bīja* in a technical sense (T28, no. 1552, 888a18–19): 以業為種，彼有芽生。業差別故生差別，如種差別故芽差別。However, I still take the word “seed” in this MAH passage as a metaphor. My translation: “[if we] take karma as a seed, it (the seed) has the arising of sprout. Because of difference in karma, there is difference in birth (*\*jāti*), just as because of difference in seed, there is difference in sprout.” Note that the context here should be *karman* and *jāti*. Cf. Dessein's English translation (1999: 149): “Because of action, seed is made...Because of difference in action, what arises is different...”

<sup>88</sup> NA, T29, 535a2–14: 何謂彼宗？謂譬喻宗。故彼宗說：如外種果感赴理成，如是應知業果感赴。謂如外種，由遇別緣為親傳因，感果已滅，由此後位，遂起根、芽、莖、枝、葉等諸異相法，體雖不住而相續轉，於最後位，復遇別緣，方名為因，生於自果。如是諸業於相續中……雖彼外種，非親為因，令自果生，然由展轉。如是諸業，亦非親為，因令自果生，然由展轉力。內外因果，相續理同。外謂種根芽等，不斷名為相續；內法相續，謂前後心恒無間斷……

<sup>89</sup> It is commonly known that Kumāralāta is recognized as “the fundamental master (*\*mūlācārya*) of the Sautrāntikas” (經部本師) according to Xuanzang's record. However, many of his theories do not accord with the typical Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika doctrines (Yinshun 1968, 541). It is interesting to note that Kumāralāta claims that he is obedient to some Sarvāstivāda masters (T4, no. 201, 257a12–14: 富那、脇比丘，彌織諸論師，薩婆室婆眾，牛王正道者，是等諸論師，我等皆敬順。). Chou (2007, 363–62) points out that Kumāralāta even endorses the Sarvāstivāda tenet of tri-temporal existence. In this regard, it might be because of his theory of seed that he comes to be known as “the fundamental master of the Sautrāntikas”. Though there is no explicit evidence, this hypothesis appears to be more probable than postulating Kumāralāta to be the teacher of Śrīlāta as some scholars suggest (J. Kato 1989, 60; Chou 2007, 365), because the significant doctrinal disagreement between the two masters hardly proves their close relationship. According to Kumāralāta, the analogy of seed represents

*Vāsanā*, on the other hand, is a concept developed during the Abhidharma period. Apart from the Yogācāras, none of the aforementioned Buddhist schools and masters has associated *bīja* with *vāsanā*. Even quotes {3.1A} and {3.1B} do not allude to seed at all. It seems that the two notions of karmic *vāsanā* and *bīja* were developed individually though concerning the same issue. Among all the extant Buddhist texts, the earliest ones who explicitly bridged karmic seeds with *vāsanā* are perhaps the early Mahāyāna Yogācāras, which shall be discussed in §3.3. What is to be examined below is whether Vasubandhu had in mind the concept of karmic *vāsanā* when he used the Sautrāntika notion of *saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa* in the AKBh.

Yamabe (1990a, 931) points out that Vasubandhu’s “*saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*” is comparable with a text in the SavBh: “Among the conditioning factors, good and bad karma becomes produced and perished. By means of that cause and that condition, a specific continuity of conditioning factors (*viśiṣṭā saṃskāra-santati*) operates—That is called *vāsanā*.”<sup>90</sup> Yamabe suggests that this might be a source of the seed theory in the AKBh. Against Yamabe’s opinion, Park (2014, 373–75) argues that Vasubandhu’s theory of seed focuses on the notion of potency (*sāmarthyā/śakti*), while “such a Yogācāra concept of *vāsanā* was never brought forward in Vasubandhu’s theory of seeds.” However, Park’s conclusion is drawn without sufficient investigation into the concept of *vāsanā*. The absence of the term *vāsanā* in the context of karma in the AKBh does not necessarily indicate that Vasubandhu was unacquainted with the idea of karmic imprint. In the AKVy, Yaśomitra expressly

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the past *kleśas* and karma; and the analogy of sprout stands for the present karma. As the sprout arises only when the seed perishes, the karma in a serial continuity is neither permanent nor annihilated (See T4, no. 201, 260a28–b5: 從於過去煩惱諸業得現在身及以諸根，從今現在復造諸業，以是因緣，得未來身及以諸根。我於今者，樂說譬喻，以明斯義：譬如穀子，眾緣和合故得生芽，然此種子實不生芽，種子滅故芽便增長。子滅故不常，芽生故不斷。佛說受身亦復如是，雖復無我，業報不失。). Park (2014, 296–303) notes that Kumāralāta’s account of seed is similar to Stanza 17.8 in Nāgārjuna’s MMK. In fact, Nāgārjuna could have learned the popular theory of seed proposed by Aśvaghōṣa, who is earlier than Nāgārjuna. Park also draws attention to Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā*, which contains a verse quoted from the *Lalitavistara* expressing a similar idea (Lv 126 and *Prasannapadā* 8: *bījasya sato yathāṅkuro na ca yo bīja sa caīva aṅkuro | na ca anyu tato na caīva tad evam anuccheda aśāsvata dharmatā* ||). The idea of seed in the *Lalitavistara* should be a later addition after the third century as this stanza is entirely not found in the early fourth-century Chinese translation by Dharmarakṣa.

<sup>90</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 128<sub>2-3</sub>: *yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāśubhaṃ karmotpannaniruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayena viśiṣṭā saṃskārasantatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanety ucyate* | For a detailed discussion, see §3.3.2.1, {3.3E}.

declares that “potency” (*śakti*), “seed” (*bīja*), and “*vāsanā*” are of the same meaning.<sup>91</sup>

Moreover, Saṅghabhadra views Vasubandhu’s theory of seed as being similar to the notions of pursuant element (*anudhātu*), *vāsanā*, potency, non-disappearance (*avipraṇāśa*), and accumulation (*upacaya*)<sup>92</sup> — all of which are related to the preservation of karma. It seems impossible that Vasubandhu was thoroughly ignorant of karmic *vāsanā* at all. In fact, Saṅghabhadra even explicitly criticizes Vasubandhu as holding the theory of *vāsanā*.<sup>93</sup> In this light, it was very likely that Vasubandhu used the notion of *vāsanā* in the sense of karmic imprint during his Abhidharma period, though the term is not seen in his AKBh. Even if Vasubandhu does not speak of *vāsanā* in the AKBh, this notion should be understood as being entirely compatible with the concept of *saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*.

In addition, Vasubandhu’s KSP employs the analogy of a citron flower (*mātuluṅga-puṣpa*) dyed with garnet lac (*lākṣārāsa*) to illustrate karmic imprints (*\*vāsanā*) in the *ālayavijñāna*—just as a citron fruit turns red when its flower is dyed with a reddish color, so too do specific karmic effects arise from their corresponding karmic *bījas*. The same analogy is also used earlier in the AKBh to explain the karmic causal mechanism of *saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*.<sup>94</sup> In the KSP, a stanza on which Vasubandhu’s idea is based is given:

{3.2A} This mind (*citta*) composed of (*sahita*) limitless seeds (*bīja*) proceeds because of continuity (*saṃtāna*).  
When its own condition is produced in mind, this and that seed comes to be nourished.

<sup>91</sup> AKVy 149: *śaktir bījaṃ vāsanety eko 'yam arthaḥ* | In another place, the *bījabhāva* is taken as the potency that has the characteristic of *vāsanā*, see AKVy 220: *paurva-janmikenaiha janmikena ceti kleśa-dvayenāśyām saṃtatau pratyutpannāyām bīja-bhāvo vāsanā-lakṣaṇaṃ sāmāthyam āhito 'nāgate 'vyotpattaye* | (AKBh quotations underlined.)

<sup>92</sup> See NA, T29, 398b26–29: 復有諸師，於此種子處處隨義建立別名：或名隨界、或名熏習、或名功能、或名不失、或名增長。See also NA, T29, 535a23–24; 627a19–20. Cf. Park 2014, 359.

<sup>93</sup> NA, T29, 410b8–10: 又如所執於後心中前心差別所引習氣，此不可說異於後心。“Moreover, just as it is maintained [by the Kośakāra] that the *vāsanā* in the posterior mind is induced by the previous specific mind (*\*pūrva-citta-viśeṣa*), this [*vāsanā*] cannot be said as being different from the posterior mind.”

<sup>94</sup> See AKBh 478: *yathā lākṣārasarañjītaṃ mātuluṅgapuṣpāt saṃtatipariṇāmaviśeṣajāḥ phale raktāḥ keśara upajāyate na ca tasmāt punar anyah...*

That [seed] being thriving, the function (*vr̥tti*) gradually (*\*krama*)<sup>95</sup> obtained turns into the fruit-issuing (*phalada*) in the course of time.

Just as the color dyed on the citron flower, the deposit (*nyasta*)<sup>96</sup> [of the reddish color] appears in the flesh of that [citron].<sup>97</sup>

According to Sumatīśīla's commentary, the stanza above is attributed to Aśvaghoṣa<sup>98</sup>, a Sarvāstivāda master who has close relationship with the early Yogācāra school.<sup>99</sup> Dhammajoti (2018, 15–16) suggests that Vasubandhu's "*saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*" could have been developed from Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*, where the individual continuity of sentient beings is compared to the continuance of seed-sprout, because seed and sprout are neither identical nor different.<sup>100</sup> Nevertheless, in the extant texts composed by Aśvaghoṣa, there seems to be no mention of *vāsanā*. It should also be noted that the citron trees, as illustrated by Aśvaghoṣa, are mainly planted in

<sup>95</sup> *krama* (Tib.: *rim gyis*; Ch.: 漸次/次第) em.: *druma*.

<sup>96</sup> *nyastasya* em.: 'nyas tasya.

<sup>97</sup> The Sanskrit original is found in AKVy 720: *cittam hy etad anantabīja-sahitam saṃtānato vartate | tat-tad bījam upaiti puṣṭim udite sve pratyaye cetasi | tatpuṣṭam <krama>(Wogihara: druma)-labdhavṛtti phaladam kālena sampadyate | raṃgasyeva hi mātulūṃga-kusume <nyastasya> tatkesare.* || KSP 39: *sems 'di sa bon mtha' yas pa dang ldan pa rgyun gyis 'jug 'gyur zhing // sems la rang rkyen byung na de dang de yi sa bon brtas par 'gyur // de ltas rim gyis 'jug pa rnyed na dus su 'bras bu 'byin pa 'grub // ma du lung ga'i me tog la bsgos tshon ni de yi sha dmar bzhin // Cf. the Tibetan translation of AKVy (D no. 4092, mngon pa, ngu 331b3–4): sems 'di sa bon mtha' yas pa dang lhan cig rgyun gyis 'byung // sa bon de ni rang rkyen byung na sems la rgyas par 'gyur // de rgyas rim gyis 'jug pa rnyed na dus su 'bras bu 'grub // ma tu lung ga'i me tog bskus tshon de yi ge sar bzhin // See also Xuanzang's Chinese translation (T31, no. 1609, 784c20–23): 心與無邊種，俱相續恒流。遇各別熏緣，心種便增盛。種力漸次熟，緣合時與果，如染拘櫟花，果時靚色赤。Cf. \*Vimokṣaprajñā-ṛṣi's translation (T31, no. 1608, 780a4–7): 此心識種子，無邊相續行，自心中因緣，彼彼種力生。彼次第不失，時至則得果，如摩登隆伽，塗花瓢時現。*

<sup>98</sup> D no. 4071, *sems tsam*, hi 90b3–4: *de nyid kyi dbang du byas nas zhes bya ba ni / gnas brtan rta skad kyis / rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa de nyid kyi dbang du byas nas / tshigs su bcad de bshad do zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste / ...* (Underline mine) Cf. Yamaguchi 1975: 199.

<sup>99</sup> On Aśvaghoṣa's school affiliation, see Matsunami (1954, 211–16), Kodama et al. (1992, 125), Yamabe (2003, 241–43), and Eltschinger (2020, 165).

<sup>100</sup> D no. 4156, *skyes rabs*, ge 62a6–7: *ji ltar sa bon las ni myu gu skye ba ste // myu gu des na sa bon de ni shes min zhing // g'zhan las g'zhan du ma yin de las de ma yin // de bzhin lus dang dbang po blo yi rim pa'o //* "Just as the sprout arises from seed, that seed is not known as those sprouts. That [seed] is not different [from sprout], nor is it not different [from sprout]. In that way, there is the succession of body, faculties, and mind." Cf. T4, no. 192, 33a12–13: 芽因種子生，種非即是芽，不即亦不異，眾生亦然。Aśvaghoṣa's idea of seed could have been inspired by his knowledge of the *Śālistambasūtra*. A similar idea is found in Nāgārjuna's MMK 17.7–8: *yo 'ṅkuraprabhṛtir bījāt saṃtāno 'bhipravartate | tataḥ phalam ṛte bījāt sa ca nābhipravartate || bījāc ca yasmāt saṃtānaḥ saṃtānāc ca phalodbhavaḥ | bījapūrvaṃ phalam tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam ||*

Northeast India in the Himalayan foothills (Wu et al. 2018, 312).<sup>101</sup> In this biogeographic consideration, the experience of dyeing citron flower with reddish color must have been alien to northwestern Indians.<sup>102</sup> However, as Āśvaghoṣa was from East India<sup>103</sup>, it is very likely that this analogy was introduced by Āśvaghoṣa to Northwest India. As a result, the AKBh, which was composed in Gandhāra, employs this analogy. According to the KSP, which is composed later from the Yogācāra point of view, the karmic *vāsanā* in the *ālayavijñāna* entails specific transformation (*\*pariṇāma-viśeṣa*), as Vasubandhu writes, “*vāsanā* is the arising of the specific potency (*\*śakti-viśeṣa*), just like a citron flower is impregnated by the liquid of reddish color. If there is no specific transformation, in that manner, there is no *vāsanā*...”<sup>104</sup> It can be seen that in the KSP, Vasubandhu’s understanding of *saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa* is equivalent to the notion of *vāsanā*. This may serve as an ancillary proof of the contention that the term *saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa* in the AKBh is endowed with the implication of karmic imprint.

However, if Vasubandhu holds the idea of *vāsanā* in the sense of karmic imprint, why isn’t there even a single mention of the notion in the AKBh? Rather than hypothesizing that Vasubandhu either disguised his Yogācāra belief (Harada 1996, 152; Kritzer 1999, 20) or intended to adjust the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharmic doctrines to the Yogācāra theories (Kritzer 2005, xxx), I am inclined to deem that Vasubandhu might have found *bīja* a better term than *vāsanā* in his Abhidharma period before he accepted Asaṅga’s more articulate definition of *vāsanā*. On this issue, let us examine

<sup>101</sup> According to Waku’s (2013, 42) *Dictionary of Buddhist Plants* (s.v. 133. *matulūṅga*), *Matulūṅga* (i.e., *citrus medica*) trees are found around the Satpura region in central India, the Khasi Hills, the Garo Hills, Chittagong, the Western Ghats, and the valleys at the foot of the Himalayas, extending up to 4,000 feet in elevation in Sikkim and Garhwal. In addition, the lac cultivation is found mainly in Central and East India (*Nature* 1927, 299), though, of course, lac could have been sold all over India.

<sup>102</sup> This may also explain why Kumāralāta, who is slightly later than Āśvaghoṣa, does not have the idea of karmic imprint when he speaks of karmic seeds. It is known that Kumāralāta lived in Taxila, a city in North India, and preached in Khabandha (modern Tashkurgan).

<sup>103</sup> T53, no. 2122, 681b26–27: 《馬鳴菩薩傳》云：佛去世後三百餘年（《摩耶經》：六百年）出自東天竺桑岐多國（\*Sāketa, i.e., Ayodhyā）。Xuanzang’s record also supports Āśvaghoṣa’s East origin (T51, no. 2087, 942a16–18): 當此之時，東有馬鳴，南有提婆，西有龍猛，北有童受，號為四日照世。

<sup>104</sup> KSP 50: *bag chags ni nus pa’i khyad par skyed pa yin te / ma du lung ga’i me tog rgya skyegs kyi khu bas bsgos pa bzhin no // yongs su ’gyur ba’i khyad par med na / ji ltar de’i bag chags med par ...* Cf. Xuanzang’s Chinese translation: “If there is no *vāsanā*, the specific transformation is not possible.” (T31, no. 1609, 785b22–23: 若無熏習則無轉變差別功能。) Similarly, Vimokṣaprajñā-ṛṣi’s translation: “If there is no *vāsanā*, no specific transformation, ...” (T31, no. 1608, 780b25: 若無熏者、無轉勝法…….)

Saṅghabhadra's criticism of Vasubandhu's theory of seed which also gives an account of *vāsanā*:

{3.2B} It is just like your [notion of] imprint or [*dharmas* such as] eye and so on. That is to say, you (i.e., Vasubandhu) do not admit the effect arises from its perished cause after an interval of time. [Instead, you maintain that] different seeds (*\*bīja-viśeṣa*) induced by multiple causes exist at the same time in a serial continuity (*\*saṃtati*), but their fruits do not arise simultaneously at all times.<sup>105</sup>

The phrase “eye and so on” here refers to all conditioned *dharmas*. It can be seen that according to Saṅghabhadra's description, seed for Vasubandhu is responsible for both the arising of *dharmas* and the continuity of karma, but *vāsanā* is only understood as karmic seed. In other words, the scope of seed is larger than the scope of *vāsanā* for Vasubandhu. It is probably because of this that Vasubandhu does not find it necessary to employ the term *vāsanā* in the AKBh. On the other hand, just as Saṅghabhadra noted<sup>106</sup>, the term *vāsanā* requires the simultaneity between the perfumer and the perfumed. However, the idea of karmic seed in Vasubandhu's AKBh does not entail such simultaneity. After Asaṅga provided an elaborative explanation of *vāsanā* in MSg I.15 which necessitates simultaneous causality (see §4.2.2), Vasubandhu started to the term *vāsanā*.

Saṅghabhadra, as an orthodox Vaibhāṣika from Kāśmīra, completely objects to the theory of karmic *vāsanā*:

{3.2C} If [you] say it is known as experiencing (*√vid*) [the karmic effect] because of the constant continuance (隨轉; *\*prabandha/\*anuvṛtti*) of the imprint of ripening (*\*vipāka-vāsanā*) there, that is not reasonable either. It is because the imprint maintained [by you] is not universally acknowledged (極成; *\*prasiddha*) and has the fault of overgeneralization (太過失; *\*atiprasaṅga*).

If, though the [result of] ripening (i.e., the karmic effect) [in the incorporeal sphere] is over, its imprint continues (*\*anu-√vṛt*), such as the imprint of karma, then, there should not be the time of death. If the ripening is over but there is no imprint, then the karma should not have remaining imprint. If you say the imprint with regard to the ripening in the present is like our (Sarvāstivādins') [notion of] acquisition (*prāpti*), then it should be

<sup>105</sup> NA, T29, 632a22–25: 如汝熏習，或如眼等，謂汝不許從已滅因隔中間時而有果起。多因所引種子差別，於相續中同時現有，而非彼果恒俱時生。

<sup>106</sup> NA, T29, 713c7–11. See {4.1H}.



just like our [notion of] acquisition. If the [result of] ripening does not arise, there would be no imprint.

Moreover, it is not the case that the continuance of the imprint of ripening is called the experience (\**anubhava*) of ripening, as [the imprint] is not of the nature of that [karmic effect].<sup>107</sup>

Concerning the rebirth in lower spheres from the incorporeal sphere (*ārūpya-dhātu*), one has to answer the question as to how the initial corporeal matter (*rūpa*) arises. On this issue, the Vaibhāṣikas recourse to the *dharma* of acquisition (*prāpti*), a *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra-dharma* (a conditioning factor disjoint from mind) that links up the past corporeal matter to the present being in one's individual continuity. By contrast, the supposed argument given by Saṅghabhadra above, most probably held by some Sautrāntikas<sup>108</sup>, brings into focus the imprint of ripening, namely the karmic *vāsanā*. For the Sautrāntikas, it is the imprint of ripening in the mental continuity (*citta-santati*) that gives rise to the new body, thus the physical material *dharma*s are called “born of ripening” (*vipāka-ja*). However, according to Saṅghabhadra's understanding, since ripening (*vipāka*) refers only to the maturation of karmic effect, it is not possible for the effect of ripening to have further imprint. Otherwise, as he argues, one karmic cause would have endless effects. On the other hand, in Saṅghabhadra's view, if there is no *vāsanā* left behind by the karmic effect, it would be impossible for karma as a cause of ripening to produce any *vāsanā*. Consequently, there should be no karmic *vāsanā*. According to the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of tri-temporal existence, when karma is produced, it at the same time projects its effect (i.e., *phala-pratigrahaṇa*, “grasping of effect”)<sup>109</sup>. And at the time of experiencing the karmic effect, acquisition (*prāpti*)<sup>110</sup> connects the future effect with the present

<sup>107</sup> NA, T29, 382a29–b6: 若謂於彼異熟習氣恒隨轉故名為受者，理亦不然。所執習氣非極成故，太過失故。異熟雖盡，習氣隨故，如業習氣，應無死期。若異熟盡，無習氣者，業亦不應有餘習氣。若言習氣望現異熟，如我得者，應如我得。異熟不起，習氣則無。又非異熟習氣隨轉，名受異熟，非彼性故。

<sup>108</sup> AKBh 112: *tasmān nāsty arūpiṇām sattvānām citta-santater anyonyam niśraya iti sautrāntikāḥ* |

<sup>109</sup> Saṅghabhadra articulates that projecting (*ā-√kṣip*) an effect amounts to grasping (*prati-√grah*) an effect (G. Sasaki 1981, 226; Dhammajoti 2015a, 208). Against Fukuda's hypothesis that not all *phala-pratigrahaṇa* is *phalākṣepa*, Isshiki (2012, 87) argues that the two terms are synonyms.

<sup>110</sup> Many scholars neglect the significant role of *prāpti* at the occasion of *phaladāna*. J. Katō (2012, 130), for instance, mistakenly understands that the *phala-dāna* happens at the second moment after the cause which is a *kuśala* or *akuśala* action. He even argues that there should be a *citta* in continuity that guarantees the *phaladāna* in the future. However, J. Katō's way of understanding the Sarvāstivāda doctrine seems to be adopted from the Sautrāntika position of the diachronic causality as well as the continuity of impregnated *citta*. As noted by G. Sasaki (1981, 208), for Saṅghabhadra, the continuity

sentient being and thus there is the issuing of effect (*phala-dāna*) (Dhammajoti 2015a, 208–9). In this regard, with the operation of acquisition, it is not necessary for the Vaibhāṣikas to presuppose the mechanism of the karmic imprint.

In fact, the most intense discussion on the karmic *vāsanā* is mainly concentrated in Saṅghabhadra's rebuff to Śrīlāta's theory of pursuant element (*anudhātu*).<sup>111</sup> In Saṅghabhadra's view, as long as the theory of pursuant element is successfully repudiated, the Sautrāntika theory of seed together with its synonyms of *vāsanā* and so on would be proved as invalid. According to Saṅghabhadra, Śrīlāta holds the idea of the impregnation (*\*paribhāvitatva/paribhāvanā*) of karma and defilements in the six sense-bases (*āyatana*).<sup>112</sup> It should be noted that in Śrīlāta's theory of pursuant element, the continuity of karma is not differentiated from the continuity of *dharmas*—both karma and *dharmas* are discussed in terms of pursuant element. However, for the Sarvāstivādins, the karmic causality (between *vipākahetu* and *vipākaphala*) should not be confused with homogenous causality of *dharmas* (between *sabhāga* and *niṣyandaphala*). Saṅghabhadra argues that if the preceding *dharma* serves as the pursuant element—the cause— of the succeeding *dharma* that is of a different moral nature, it would turn out to be unreasonable. Neither can one claim that wholesomeness or unwholesomeness is the karmic cause that immediately gives rise to non-defined effect. Nor can one argue that a non-defined karmic effect has been impregnated by wholesomeness or unwholesomeness.<sup>113</sup> By the same token, in terms of Vasubandhu's seed theory, the

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of karma is not identical to that of *citta*.

<sup>111</sup> On the issue of Śrīlāta's *anudhātu* theory, modern scholars have carried out extensive researches (see §1.5.3), and there remains little to supplement. In brief, Śrīlāta holds that *anudhātu* is the impregnation (*\*paribhāvanā*) in one's six *āyatanas* by the preceding *dharma* or karma; and it serves as the *hetu-pratyaya* and so on of the arising of the succeeding *dharma* or *vipākaphala*. Saṅghabhadra criticizes that this idea means multiple *dhātus* are impregnated in one *citta*, which “confounds one and all”, because Śrīlāta fails to distinguish the multiple *dhātus* from one *citta* in terms of their nature. See NA, T29, 442b1–2: 又彼上座，如何可執言：一心具有種種界熏習？Also NA, T29, 442b2–7: 一心多界，理不成故。非聖教中許勝義法，有唯一體，多體集成。若言有心，其體雖一，而於其內界有眾多。多界與心，體無異故，界應成一。心與多界，體無異故，心應成多。諸界相望，體無異故，一與一切，體應相雜。此執終非理，應正(T: 上/止)廣思擇。Cf. Dhammajoti's translation (2011, 32).

<sup>112</sup> Based on Saṅghabhadra's argument, Mitomo (1980, 26, 30) argues that *anudhātu* is impregnated only in one *citta* instead of in the six *āyatanas*, which are merely the “windows”(窓口) of the impregnation. However, Zhizhou 智周 clearly categorizes Śrīlāta's theory of *anudhātu* as the impregnation through the six *āyatanas*. (T43, no. 1833, 880b10–14: 本經部許內六根是所熏性.....又《順正理》第十八云：此舊隨界體不可說，但可說言是業煩惱所熏六處，感餘生果。)

<sup>113</sup> NA, T29, 442a12–22: 云何復許善、不善法為因緣，生無記異熟？非善、不善隨界為因，可

seed of non-defined material *dharma* cannot serve as the cause of the arising of wholesome and unwholesome *dharma*s.<sup>114</sup> In Saṅghabhadra's view, given that the Sautrāntika concept of seed is not distinct from the wholesome or unwholesome *citta*, there would be the fault that wholesome *dharma*s become the seeds of unwholesome *dharma*s and *vice versa*.<sup>115</sup> However, as noted by Yinshun (1970, 184–85), when criticizing Śrīlāta's Sautrāntika theory, Saṅghabhadra always digresses from repudiating the impregnation in the six sense-bases to refuting the impregnation in *citta*.<sup>116</sup>

At any rate, Śrīlāta's understanding of impregnation can be compared with the notion of *vāsanā*. As noted in §1.2, *vāsanā* can be construed as impregnating in a dynamic sense and thus is interchangeable with *paribhāvanā*. Although *vāsanā* in quotes {3.1A} and {3.1B} of the MVbh only refers to the continuing karmic efficacy, it can be imagined that the idea of karmic *vāsanā* might have been interpreted later by Śrīlāta as impregnation of karma. Similarly, the Yogācāras who were contemporary with Śrīlāta use *vāsanā* in both the sense of karmic imprint and the impregnating of *dharma*s (§3.3 and §4.3). It should be noted that Śrīlāta's doctrine was influential particularly in East India, as he lived in Ayodhyā, the place where Asaṅga is said to have studied the Yogācāra doctrines under Maitreya-nātha. The early Yogācāras might have brought the idea of karmic *vāsanā* from northwest India to Ayodhyā and interchanged their ideas with Śrīlāta. At least, some early Yogācāra texts, such as the *Maulī Bhūmi* of the YBh, predate Śrīlāta, Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra. In order to reveal this connection, we shall examine the karmic *vāsanā* in the YBh.

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生無記，相續異故。若善、不善無間能生無記異熟，此中應說，何故云何善、不善為因，生無記異熟？若言無記熏善、不善，故善不善為無記因，此亦非理。前已數辯彼熏習言，無實義故。又彼云何善、不善法，無記熏故，成異熟因？若謂先時異熟熏故，則應異熟為異熟因。See Dhammajoti's translation (2011, 45–46).

<sup>114</sup> NA, T29, 397b26–27: 如何可執無記色種為善不善諸法生因？

<sup>115</sup> NA, T29, 397c6–9: 今汝所執功能差別種子，與彼善、不善心，為有別體，為無別體？此無別體。豈不許善為不善種，及許不善為善種耶？

<sup>116</sup> Yinshun believes that this fact reflects that the theory of impregnation in one's mental continuity was the popular opinion of the contemporary Dārṣāntikas.

### 3.3. Karmic *Vāsanā* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*

#### 3.3.1. Preliminary Discussion in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi*

In the ŚrBh, no mention is made of *vāsanā* at all. The term *vāsanā* occurs in the BoBh and the VSg only in the sense of *kleśavāsanā*, “traces of defilement” (see chapter 5). Thus, in the oldest layer of the YBh, *vāsanā* is not connected with the idea of seed (*bīja*) or potency (*śakti*) of producing karmic effect. The idea of karmic *vāsanā* in connection with seed was developed later than the BoBh.

Nonetheless, what deserves our attention in the ŚrBh is the definition about the projection cause (*ākṣepaka-hetu*), which is later interpreted as *vāsanā* in the SavBh, and the production cause (*abhinirvṛtti-hetu*), which denotes the cause for the production of rebirth:

{3.3A} There are ... two causes. ... There, the projection cause means: “(i) the delusion (*saṃmoha*) with regard to the two effects (i.e., *ātmabhāva-phala* and *viśayopabhoga-phala*); preceded by the delusion, merits (*puṇya*), non-merits, and immovable (*āniñjya*) (ii) conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*); sustained (*parigrhīta*) by the conditioning factors, its seed that leads to the manifestation of the sprout (*aṅkura-prādurbhāva*) of (iii) the consciousness in further rebirth (*punarbhava-vijñāna*); [subsequently] sustained by the consciousness, the seed of (iv) the psycho-physical complex (*nāma-rūpa*) pertaining to further rebirth, the seed of (v) six sense-bases (*ṣaḍ-āyatana*), and the seed of (vi) contact (*sparśa*), and (vii) sensation (*vedanā*)”—in this way, for the purpose of the arising (*utpatti*) of consciousness, psycho-physical complex, six sense-bases, contact, and sensation which (altogether) take the name of birth (*jāti*) in the future, that which sustain the seed (*bīja-parigraha*) precisely of the former one in order (*ānupūrvyā purvam eva*)<sup>117</sup>. This is the projection cause.

Furthermore, the production cause means, when one is experiencing the sensation that is generated from the full contact (*saṃsparśa-ja*) with ignorance (*avidyā*), on account of (viii) the craving (*trṣṇā*) that takes that [sensation] as object (*ālambana*), that which (a) produces the craving for further rebirths, (b) sustains (*pari-√grah*) (ix) the appropriation (*upādāna*)

<sup>117</sup> Xuanzang reads this part as “為令……次第生故”. Accordingly, “*ānupūrvyā*” should be read together with its previous word “*utpattaye*”, and another clause starts after “*ānupūrvyā*”. Xuanzang translates the sentence as follows: “... for the arising of *vijñāna*, *nāma-rūpa*, six *āyatanas*, *sparśa* and *vedanā* in succession, now what previously sustains the seed of those *dharma*s is the *ākṣepa-hetu*”. However, reading in this way, the original Sanskrit text should have been “*utpattaya ānupūrvyā*”. On the contrary, the Tibetan translation “*rim gyis dang po kho par*” suggests that “*ānupūrvyā*” should be read with its following phrase “*pūrvam eva*”. Accordingly, it is from “*ānupūrvyā*” that another clause begins.

pertaining to craving and delusion, and (c) by that force (*bala*) and that potency (*sāmarthya*), becomes capable (*samartha*) of issuing [the result of] ripening (*vipāka-dāna*) of (x) that karma<sup>118 119</sup>.

It can be seen that both the causes are defined in the context of the twelvefold chain of dependent co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*).<sup>120</sup> The projection cause covers the first seven links (*aṅga*) of the twelve-membered formula, namely from ignorance (*avidyā*, i.e., *saṃmoha*) to sensation (*vedanā*), and puts emphasis on keeping the potentiality of the seeds for each of the links from consciousness to sensation. The production cause encompasses the links from craving (*trṣṇā*) to existence (*bhava* = “*tat-karma*”) and highlights the craving’s capability of producing rebirth. Moreover, the production cause is not related to seed. As Matsuda (1983, 32) argues, this passage implies the Yogācāra theory of the onefold causality in two lifetimes. It should be noted that although the twelvefold chain of dependent co-arising concerns the karmic context, the term *bīja* here is not used in the karmic sense, but signifies the potentiality of conditioned *dharmas*.<sup>121</sup> In other words, it is not the case that karmic seeds bring forth their effect of ripening, but the seeds of each links of the twelve-membered dependent co-arising gives rise to its own effect. Such an idea could be traced to one of the earliest Mahāyāna *sūtras*, the *Śālistamba-sūtra*, where the doctrine of dependent co-arising is illustrated as the arising of sprout from the destruction of seed.<sup>122</sup> Additionally, different from other Buddhist sects, the

<sup>118</sup> As suggested by the text edited by some Japanese scholars (ŚrBh iii 60), another possible reading of the sentence is to treat “*tat karma*” as two nominative words: “By the force of which and by the potency of which, that karma becomes capable of issuing [the results of] ripening.” Cf. Xuanzang’s Chinese translation: “By this force and by this potency, it nourishes the karmic seeds, causing them to issue the effects of ripening.” (T30, 454b28–29: 由此勢力、由此功能潤業種子，令其能與諸異熟果。)

<sup>119</sup> ŚrBh iii 58–60: *dvividho hetur ... tatrākṣepako hetur dvividhe phale saṃmohaḥ | saṃmoha-pūrvakāś ca puṇyāpuṇyāniṣṭyāḥ saṃskārāḥ | saṃskāra-parigrhītaṃ ca punarbhava-vijñānānkura-prādurbhāvāya tad-bījaṃ, vijñāna-parigrhītaṃ paunarbhavika-nāmarūpa-bījaṃ, śaḍāyatana-bījaṃ, sparśa-vedanā-bījaṃ iti | ya evam āyatyaṃ jāti-saṃjñakānāṃ vijñāna-nāmarūpa-śaḍāyatana-sparśa-vedanānāṃ utpattaye, ānupūrvyā pūrvam eva bīja-parigrahaḥ | ayam ākṣepako hetuḥ | yat punar avidyā-saṃsparśajam vedanāṃ vedaḥpamānas tad-ālambanayā trṣṇayā paunar-bhavikīm tṛṣṇām utpādayati | trṣṇā-pakṣyaṃ moha-pakṣyaṃ copādānaṃ parigrhṇāti | yad-balena yat-sāmarthyena tat karma-vipāka-dāna-samarthaṃ bhavaty | ayam abhinirvṛtti-hetuḥ |* Cf. D no. 4036, *sems tsam*, dzi 140b1–7; T30, no. 1579, 454b15–c2. See also Abe’s English translation (2015, 58).

<sup>120</sup> According to Kritzer (1994, 1053; 1999: 159–61), the idea of the two causes in connection with *pratītya-samutpāda* may originate from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, though the terms “*ākṣepahetu*” and “*abhinirvṛtīhetu*” do not occur in the *sūtra*.

<sup>121</sup> Similar usage of the term *bīja* is attested in another places of the ŚrBh, see Yamabe 2021, 467–68.

<sup>122</sup> See Reat (1993, 34ff.) and Schoening (1995, 275ff.). Abe (2015, 59; 2023, 276–77) suggests that

Yogācāras do not take seed as an analogy but hold the idea of internal seed—*bīja* is used in the technical sense as a metaphor of cause.

The BoBh further expands the two causes into ten<sup>123</sup> in terms of all the defiled and pure causes in the saṃsāric progression of a sentient being. Among them, more causes, including the productions cause, are dealt with in terms of seed:

{3.3B} Therein, the [initial]<sup>124</sup> seed is the projection cause (*ākṣepa-hetu*) of its final own effect/fruit (*phala*). Apart from the seed, the condition, other than that [seed], is the sustaining cause (*parigraha-hetu*). That very seed is the production cause (*nirvṛtti-hetu*)<sup>125</sup> of its own effect. Furthermore, that effect produced from the [initial] seed is the inducing cause (*āvāhakahetu*) of the subsequent effect projected by the seed<sup>126</sup>...

{3.3C} Just in the present life, the seeds of the *dharma*s of ignorance (*avidyā*) and so on, while being born and arisen here, they are the projection cause of the birth (*jāti*) and aging-and-dying (*jarā-maraṇa*) of another life. Attending bad men (*asad-puruṣa*), learning untrue doctrines (*asad-dharma*), false attention (*ayoniśo-manaskāra*) and the continuing force (*āvedha*) of previous repeated practices (*abhyāsa*) conducive to the arising of ignorance and so on is the sustaining cause. Each individual seed of ignorance and so on is the production cause. Moreover, those [links] beginning from ignorance up to existence (*bhava*), bringing one after another successively, are the inducing cause of the birth and aging-and-dying of a life other than that.<sup>127</sup>

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idea of the *ākṣepakahetu* in relation to *bīja* in the ŚrBh could have been originated from *sūtra* #39 of the *Samyuktāgama*, which corresponds to the *Bīja-sutta* of the SN (#22.54). However, the *Bīja-sutta* does not connect *bīja* with *pratītyasamutpāda*.

<sup>123</sup> The ten causes are (1) cause of concordant conventional discourse (*anuvyavahāra-hetu*); (2) dependence cause (*apekṣā-hetu*); (3) projection cause (*ākṣepa-hetu*, identical to *ākṣepaka-hetu*); (4) production cause (*nirvṛtti-hetu*, also referred to as *abhinirvṛtti-hetu*); (5) sustaining cause (*parigraha-hetu*); (6) inducing cause (*āvāhaka-hetu*); (7) cause of distinction (*pratīnyama-hetu*); (8) coordinating cause (*sahakāri-hetu*); (9) cause of opposition (*virodha-hetu*); and (10) cause of non-opposition (*avirodha-hetu*). See BoBh<sub>W</sub> 97–100; BoBh<sub>D</sub> 68–71. As the BoBh does not clearly define the ten causes, I do not quote the relevant texts here. For an English translation, see Engle 2016, 175–78. Kritzer (1999: 156) notes that the ten causes enumerated in the BoBh are also listed in the Chinese translation of the VSg in the same order. Nevertheless, no explanation is given in the VSg (T30, no. 1579, 881b10–13).

<sup>124</sup> Added according to Xuanzang's Chinese translation.

<sup>125</sup> *Nirvṛtti-hetu* seems to be interchangeable with *abhinirvṛtti-hetu* in the BoBh.

<sup>126</sup> BoBh<sub>W</sub> 97–98; BoBh<sub>D</sub> 69: *tatra bījaṃ āvasānikasya svaphalasyākṣepa-hetuḥ | bīja-nirmuktaḥ tad-anyah pratyayah parigraha-hetuḥ | tad eva bījaṃ svaphalasya nirvṛtti-hetuḥ | tat punar bīja-nirvṛttaṃ phalam uttarasya bījākṣipta-*(Dutt: *bījākṣiptasya*)*phalasyāvāhaka-hetuḥ |...* Cf. D no. 4037, sems tsam, wi 52b7–53a1; T30, no. 1579, 501a20–24.

<sup>127</sup> BoBh<sub>W</sub> 100, BoBh<sub>D</sub> 71: *avidyādīnāṃ dharmānāṃ dṛṣṭa eva* (Dutt: *dṛṣṭe*) *dharme yāni bījāni jātasya*

“Seed” in these two passages seems to be also discussed in the sense of cause of *dharmas*, in line with the ŚrBh ({3.3A}). However, different from the ŚrBh, according to the BoBh’s definition, the seeds of ignorance and so on are also spoken of concerning the projection cause and the production cause. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the definition of production cause has been changed to giving rise to the own fruit of a seed, which is not necessarily related to resulting in rebirth as suggested in the ŚrBh. According to Kritzer (1999, 162), it is because the related BoBh passage is not an analysis of the twelve-membered dependent co-arising that the explanation of the causes differs from that in the ŚrBh.

In accordance with the new definition in the BoBh, Sāgaramegha (*rGya mtsho sprin*), the author of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi-vyākhyā* (*Byang chub sems dpa’i sa’i rnam par bzhad pa*), introduces the concept of sprout (*myu gu*) to clarify the definition of those causes. It is not certain if Sāgaramegha, when making such a statement, had in mind the analogy of seed-sprout in the *Śālistamba-sūtra*.<sup>128</sup> According to him, with the seed serving as the production cause, the sprout comes into being. Then, the sprout, being the inducing cause, brings about the subsequent fruit.<sup>129</sup> In this way, the seed in the seed-sprout-fruit series becomes the projection cause: “The seed is the projection cause (*’phen pa’i rgyu*), because by that seed, through the continuity of sprout[-flower-fruit] and so on gradually, the potency (*nus pa*; *\*sāmarthya*) of producing [what] is similar to the own nature is established.”<sup>130</sup> Sāgaramegha’s explanation of production cause is clearly different from the idea of producing rebirth in the ŚrBh.

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*bhūtasyeḥa | tāny anya-jānmikasya jāti-jarā-maraṇasyākṣepa-hetuḥ | asat-puruṣa-saṃsevā asad-dharma-śravaṇam ayoniśo-manaskāraḥ pūrvābhyāsāvedhaś cāvidyādinām utpattaye parigraha-hetuḥ | svaka-svakaṃ bijam avidyādinām nirvṛtti-hetuḥ | te punar avidyādayo bhava-paryavasānā uttarottarāvāhana-pāraṃparyeṇa tasyānya-jānmikasya jāti-jarā-maraṇasyāvāhaka-hetuḥ |* Cf. D no. 4037, sems tsam, wi 54a7–b2. T30, no. 1579, 501c17–23.

<sup>128</sup> See Reat 1993, 35 and Schoening 1995, 277.

<sup>129</sup> See D no. 4047, sems tsam, yi 117b5–118a3. See also Engle’s partial translation (2016, 176–77 n. 538–542).

<sup>130</sup> D no. 4047, sems tsam, yi 117b6–7: *sa bon ni ’phen pa’i rgyu yin te / sa bon des myu gu la sogs pa’i rgyun gyis rim gyis rang gi ngo bo dang ’dra ba skyed pa’i nus pa gzhas pa’i phyir ro //* See also Engle’s translation (2016, 176 n. 538).

### 3.3.2. Karmic *Vāsanā* in the *Savīṭarkasavicārādibhūmi*

#### 3.3.2.1. *Vāsanā* as Projection Cause (*ākṣepa-hetu*)

The SavBh connects the ten causes mentioned in the BoBh to fifteen bases of [establishing] cause (*hetvadhiṣṭhāna*).<sup>131</sup> Kritzer (1999, 157) notes that the idea of the fifteen bases of cause is not discussed anywhere earlier than the SavBh. I would like to suggest that the fifteen bases (*adhiṣṭhāna*) are the *sūtra* expressions that the Yogācāras identify as the canonical origins of the ten causes. In other words, the enumeration of the fifteen bases serves as a justification of the Yogācāra theory of the ten causes.

In the elaboration on the ten causes in the SavBh, the projection cause is described as having *vāsanā* as its basis of cause, while the production cause is regarded only as seed with moistening (*sābhiniṣyanda-bīja*), being a basis of cause independent from the *vāsanā*. In terms of their effects, the *vāsanā* and conformity (*ānukūlya*) bring about effect of ripening (*vipākaphala*) and effect of [uniform] outflow (*niṣyandaphala*), whereas the seed with moistening as the production cause merely gives rise to fruit/effect of dominance (*adhipatiphala*).<sup>132</sup> This suggests that the production cause in the SavBh is not connected to the course of karmic ripening (*vipāka*), though it contributes to the arising of karmic effect. The discussion about *vāsanā* and seed with moistening in the SavBh is as follows:

{3.3D} Therein, relying on imprint (*vāsanā*) as the basis of cause, the projection cause is designated. Why? It is because the conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) impregnated (*paribhāvita*) by good and bad karma, in the desired and undesired destinies of existence (*gati*) in the triple sphere<sup>133</sup>, project the desired and undesired individual existence (*ātmabhāva*). By the same dominance [of influence] (*adhipati*), external beings have the nature of

<sup>131</sup> See YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 106–111. Cf. D no. 4035, sems tsam, tshi 54b3–57a5; T30, no. 1579, 301b4–302a26.

<sup>132</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 111: *tatra vāsanām ānukūlyam ca hetv-adhiṣṭhānam pratyayādhiṣṭhānam cādhiṣṭhāya vipāka-phalam niṣyanda-phalam ca prajñāpyate | tattva-darśanam... puruṣa-kāram ... | avaśiṣṭāni hetv-adhiṣṭhānāni pratyayādhiṣṭhānāni cādhiṣṭhāyadhipati-phalam prajñāpyate |*

<sup>133</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 108<sub>2</sub> restores the missing part as *traidhātuke[ṣṭāniṣṭagatiṣv]* according to the Tibetan translation (*kham s gsum du sdug pa dang | mi sdug pa'i 'gro ba rnam su |*). Thus “*traidhātuka*” qualifies “*gati*”. However, Xuanzang translates the sentence as “三界諸行於愛不愛趣中”, which suggests “*traidhātuka*” modifies “*saṃskārāḥ*”—\**saṃskārās traidhātukā iṣṭa-anīṣṭa-gatiṣu*. According to Ji’s 基 commentary, both the Chinese and Tibetan readings are acceptable: “the conditioning factors in the triple sphere impregnated by the good and bad karma project the desired and undesired individual existence in the triple sphere.” (T43, no. 1829, 142c8–9: 云由淨不淨業熏習三界諸行，於三界中牽引愛非愛自體。)



flourishing and declining. Therefore, relying on imprint, the projection cause is designated.

Therein, relying on seed with moistening<sup>134</sup> as the basis of cause, the production cause is designated. Why? It is because *dharma*s pertaining to [the spheres of] sensuality, [fine] corporeality and incorporeality, from their respective (*svaka-svaka*) seeds, have manifestation (*prādurbhāva*).<sup>135</sup> The craving (*trṣṇā*), moreover, is called the moistening (*abhinīṣyanda*; *rlan*; 能潤) of the seed.<sup>136</sup> After that, the seed moistened (*abhiṣyandita*) by that [craving] becomes fit for the production of the individual existence that has been projected.<sup>137</sup> Just as it is said [in a *sūtra*]<sup>138</sup>: “Karma is the cause for rebirth (*upapatti*). Craving is the cause for production (*abhinirvṛtti*).” Therefore, relying on seed with moistening, the production cause is designated.<sup>139</sup>

According to this definition, *vāsanā* as the projection cause is specifically dedicated to the issue of the continuity of karma. Although *vāsanā* is not taken as a technical term in the early Buddhist texts (see chapter 2), a clear connection between *vāsanā* and conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) is found in the

<sup>134</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 108<sub>5</sub> gives “*sābhiṣyandaṃ*”, which should be equivalent to “*sābhinīṣyandaṃ*”.

<sup>135</sup> Tib.: ‘*dod pa dang ldan pa’i chos rnams dang / gzugs dang gzugs med pa dang ldan pa’i chos rnams / rang rang gi sa bon las ’byung bar ’gyur ba /*

<sup>136</sup> Cf. Ch.: 愛名能潤，種是所潤。 “Craving is called moistening, seed is what is moistened.”

<sup>137</sup> Cf. Ch.: 由此所潤諸種子故，先所牽引各別自體，當得生起。 Similarly, Tib.: *de bas na des sa bon brlan nas lus ’phags pa rnams mngon par ’grub bar ’gyur ba ...*

<sup>138</sup> Ch.: 如經言。 This is from a *sūtra* in the Sanskrit *Ekottarikāgama* (EĀ-f, 146), which does not exist in the Chinese *āgama* texts. This quotation also occurs in Vasubandhu’s AKBh 333: “*karma hetur upapattaye trṣṇā hetur abhinirvṛttaya*” *iti sūtre vacanāt* | Honjō (2014, 723–24) notes that the AKBh quotation is from the *Ekottarikāgama*. Abe (2023, 276) further argues that the *Ekottarikāgama* passage should also be the source of the *ākṣepahetu* and *abhinirvṛttihetu* mentioned in the ŚrBh. Besides, Kritzer (1999, 154–55) once opined that since the term *abhinirvṛttihetu* cannot be traced to any extant *sūtra* passage or Abhidharma text earlier than the AKBh, what Vasubandhu relied on might be the Yogācāra texts. However, this opinion is not mentioned at all in his 2005 monograph, which seems to suggest that Kritzer has abandoned this view.

<sup>139</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 107–108: *tatra vāsanā-hetvadhīṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyākṣepahetuḥ prajñāpyate | tat kasya hetoḥ | tathā hi | śubhāśubhakarma-paribhāvitāḥ saṃskārās traidhātuke[śtāniṣṭagatisv] iṣṭāniṣṭātmabhāvān ākṣipanti | bāhyānām ca bhāvānām tenaivādhīpatyena sampanna-vipannatā | tasmāt saṃskārāṇām śubhāśubhakarma-vāsanām adhiṣṭhāyākṣepa* (Bhattacharya: *āpekṣā*)-*hetuḥ prajñāpyate || tatra sābhiṣyandaṃ bījaṃ hetvadhīṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyābhinirvṛttihetuḥ prajñāpyate | tat kasya hetoḥ | tathā hi | kāmā-pratisaṃyuktānām dharmānām rūpārūpya-pratisaṃyuktānām svakasvakād bījāt prādurbhāvo bhavati | trṣṇā punar bījābhinīṣyanda ity ucyate | tatas tayābhiṣyanditaṃ bījaṃ ākṣiptānām ātmabhāvānām abhinirvṛttaye bhavati | yathoktaṃ | “karma hetur upapattaye | trṣṇā hetur abhinirvṛttaya” iti | tasmāt sābhiṣyandaṃ bījaṃ adhiṣṭhāyābhinirvṛttihetuḥ prajñāpyate || Cf. D no. 4035, sems tsam, tshi 55a5–55b3; T30, no. 1579, 301b28–c8.*

\**Ādiviśeṣavibhāgadharmaṃparyāya*<sup>140</sup> 分別緣起初勝法門經 (T no. 717), which is said to be a *sūtra* maintained by the Sautrāntikas. According to the explanation of dependent co-arising in this *sūtra*, the *vāsanā* of merits, non-merits, and immovable conditioning factors deposited in the consciousness of ripening (\**vipāka-vijñāna*) sustains the seeds for the arising of the psycho-physical complex (\**nāmarūpa*), six sense-bases (\**ṣaḍ-āyatana*), contact (\**sparśa*), and sensation (\**vedanā*) in the future rebirth.<sup>141</sup> Such an idea is very similar to quote {3.3A} of the ŚrBh. It is very likely that the early Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas should have shared common ground on the issue of dependent co-arising. At any rate, the *vāsanā* of three types of conditioning factors must be karmic *vāsanā*.<sup>142</sup> Therefore, it can be concluded that in terms of the definition of the projection cause, the SavBh diverts from the discussion in the ŚrBh about the twelve-membered dependent co-arising to the idea of karmic *vāsanā* through the medium of the \**Ādiviśeṣavibhāgadharmaṃparyāya*.

In {3.3D}, “seed with moistening” as the production cause is discussed mainly in terms of the arising of *dharma*s in the triple sphere on account of the force

<sup>140</sup> Restored through the Tibetan translation of Sumatīśīla’s commentary on Vasubandhu’s KSP. See Matsuda 1982, 42.

<sup>141</sup> T16, no. 717, 838b13–18: 如是非福、福、不動行，障礙對治，與六識身俱生俱滅，能於現在已得生滅異熟識中安置諸行三種習氣(\**vāsanā*)，由此方便攝受後有新生種子。攝受後有新種子故，於當生中所起後有所攝名色、六處、觸、受次第而生。Also in the same text (839a28–b2): 世尊告曰：「以六識身與福、非福及不動行相應俱有，同生同滅，異熟識中安置諸行熏習(\**vāsanā*)種子，引發餘生新異熟識。由此道理，是故宣說行是識緣。Matsuda (1982, 69) identifies the corresponding Tibetan text of this passage in the *Yogācārabhūmividyākhyā*: (D no. 4043, sems tsam, ‘i 82b5–7) *de bzhin du dang po’i khyad par gyi cha dang mthun pa zhes bya ba’i mdo las kyang ... ci’i slad du ‘du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par shes pa zhes bgyi lags / dge slong ‘di ltar rnam par shes pa’i tshogs drug po bsod nams dang / bsod nams ma yin pa dang / mi g.yo ba’i ‘du byed rnam dang lhan cig tu ‘byung zhing mtshungs par ldan pa ma ‘gags pa rnam ni tshe rabs gzhan gyi rnam par shes pa gar skyes pa’i tshul gyis rnam par smin pa’i rnam par shes pa la ‘du byed kyi bag chags ‘jog par byed do zhes gsungs so //* See also the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu’s *Pratītyasamutpādayākhyā* which briefly refers to the *sūtra* (D no. 3995, mdo ‘grel, chi 52a2–4): *yan lag bcu gnyis bstan pa ‘dis mdor ci bstan zhe na / dang po’i bye brag rnam par ‘byed pa’i chos kyi rnam grangs la brten pa byas nas ji ltar khong du chud pa mdor bstan par bya’o // ... gang gis ‘phangs she na / ma rig pa’i rkyen can ‘du byed kyi so // ji ltar ‘phangs she na / rnam par shes pa la bag chags bsgos pa’i phyr ro // ci zhiḡ ‘phen zhe na / yang srid pa pa’i ming dang gzugs dang skyed mched drug dang / reg pa dang / tshor ba ste ci rigs par mthar gyis dang cig car ‘byung bar bya ba’i phyr ro //* (underlines mine.)

<sup>142</sup> According to Kritzer’s account (1999, 97), “Kajiya Yuichi has pointed out that *saṃskāra* can have two meanings, karma and *vāsanā*.” However, it is not explained how Kajiya differentiates *vāsanā* from karma. In my view, karma refers to the initial action that serves as the *vipāka-hetu*, whereas karmic *vāsanā* refers to the continuing karmic efficacy that is the potency to produce *vipāka-phala*. It can be said that both karma and karmic *vāsanā* are of the nature of *saṃskāra*. Nevertheless, I do not see that the Yogācāras were serious in distinguishing the karma and karmic *vāsanā*. What should be discriminated in the Yogācāra school is karmic *vāsanā* and *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharma*s.

projected by past karma. In other words, what the seed with moistening represents is the condition qua cause of a *dharma*, which, in coalescence with other necessary conditions, gives rise to its own fruit. This description is in line with {3.3C} of the BoBh. On the other hand, the concept of the seed with moistening can be traced to the *Śālistamba-sūtra*<sup>143</sup>, which uses the expression “[seed] moistened by the moisture of craving” (*trṣṇā-snehābhiṣyandita*). According to this *sūtra*, karma and consciousness are respectively likened to a field (*kṣetra*) and the seed (*bīja*), while craving (*trṣṇā*) is compared to the moisture (*sneha*).<sup>144</sup> The reiteration of craving in {3.3D} of the SavBh reminds us of the earlier definition of the production cause in the ŚrBh. Therefore, the new definition of the production cause in the SavBh can be regarded as reconciliation between the different explanations of the cause in the ŚrBh and BoBh.

Since the projection cause in the SavBh is centered on karma, it is also categorized as the cause that has ceased long ago (*cira-niruddha*) among the five modes of cause. It must be out of the Yogācāra position that *dharma*s exist only in the present moment that the projection cause is also included in the contribution cause (*upāya-hetu*) instead of the generative cause (*janako hetu*).<sup>145</sup> In comparison, the BoBh takes both the projection cause and the production cause as generative

<sup>143</sup> *Śālistamba-sūtra* (Schoening 1995, 725): *api tu vijñāna-bīje karma-kṣetra-pratiṣṭhite trṣṇā-snehābhiṣyandite 'vidyāvākīrṇe...* Cf. Reat 1993, 60: *atha ca vijñāna-bījaṃ karma-kṣetra-pratiṣṭhitaṃ trṣṇā-snehābhiṣyanditaṃ avidyāvākīrṇaṃ virohati...*

<sup>144</sup> Kragh (2006, 178) notes the similarity between the *Śālistamba-sūtra* and a *sutta* in the *Anguttara Nikāya* (AN i 223): *Iti kho Ānanda kammaṃ khettaṃ viññāṇaṃ bījaṃ tanhā sineho...*

<sup>145</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 111: *api khalu pañcabhir ākārair hetu-vyavasthānaṃ bhavati | tadyathā janako hetuḥ | upāya-hetuḥ | sahabhūto [hetuḥ] | anantara-niruddhaḥ | cira-niruddhaḥ ca | tatra janako 'bhinirvṛtti-hetuḥ | avaśiṣṭhā upāya-hetavaḥ [] sahabhūtāḥ | tadyathā | ekatyah parigraha-hetuḥ | tadyathā cakṣuś cakṣur-vijñānasya | evaṃ śrotrādayas tad-anyosāṃ vijñānānām [] anantara-niruddhaḥ | tadyathā | abhinirvṛtti-hetuḥ | [ciraniruddhaḥ] | tadyathā ākṣipto hetuḥ ||* “The establishment of cause (*hetu-vyavasthāna*) is by means of five modes, namely, generative cause (*janako hetu*), contribution cause (*upāya-hetu*), what has co-arisen [as cause] (*sahabhūta*), what has immediately ceased [as cause] (*anantara-niruddha*), and what has ceased long ago [as cause] (*cira-niruddha*). There, the generative [cause] is the production cause. The remaining are the contribution causes. The co-arisen [cause] (*sahabhūta*) is one part of the sustaining cause, viz., eye for the visual consciousness, likewise ear and so on for the consciousness other than that (visual consciousness). What has immediately ceased is the production cause. What has ceased long ago is the projection cause (*ākṣipto hetu*).” In the Sanskrit text of the SavBh, at the place where the five modes of causes are enumerated, only the *janako hetu* and the *upāyahetu* are called “cause” (*hetu*). This suggests that the establishment of cause in terms of five modes must have been developed from the BoBh which only speaks of the two types of causes. Note that besides this version of five modes of cause, the SavBh also provides another two ways of counting five modes and seven modes of cause immediately after this passage.

cause, and the remaining eight causes as contribution cause.<sup>146</sup> This difference demonstrates that the idea that the projection cause is equivalent to karmic *vāsanā* is not developed in the BoBh.<sup>147</sup>

In any case, the notion of *vāsanā* is, in essence, the conditioning factors induced by the long perished karma in the past. This idea is made clear in another place in the SavBh:

{3.3E} It is also said, “past karma exists, because of which sentient beings experience the injurious and non-injurious [sensations]”—there, too, the metaphorical expression (*upacāra*) of the existence of that [karma] has been implicitly spoken of in terms of its imprints (*vāsanā*). Among the conditioning factors, good and bad karma becomes produced and perished.

<sup>146</sup> BoBh<sub>W</sub> 98, BoBh<sub>D</sub> 69–70: *punaś ca* (Dutt: *punaḥ*) *sarvam eṣām* (Dutt: *sarveṣām eṣām*) *hetūnām dvābhyām hetubhyām saṃgrahaḥ* | *janakena ca hetunā upāya-hetunā ca* | *yad ākṣepakaṃ nirvartakaṃ ca bījaṃ taj janako hetuḥ* | *avaśiṣṭā hetava upāya-hetur veditavyaḥ* |

<sup>147</sup> Later Indian commentators seems to have noted and taken pains to reconcile the difference between the two statements in the BoBh and SavBh. According to the CWSL, one explanation is that among the six causes of *ākṣepahetu*, *abhinirvṛtīhetu*, *āvāhakahetu*, *pratiniyamahetu*, *sahakārihetu*, and *avirodhahetu*, each contains *hetupratyaya*’s present *bīja* that can be called *janako hetu*, while the *abhinirvṛtīhetu* also contains the aspect that is not *hetupratyaya*. The other explanation is that in the SavBh, the *abhinirvṛtīhetu* alone is called *janako hetu* because it is closer to its effect than other causes. See CWSL, T31, 41c17–42a14. Furthermore, Toryun’s *Yújiālùn jì* (瑜伽論記, T no. 1828) also records the explanation about the different descriptions by a Tripiṭaka Master—most probably Xuanzang—who made use of the terms of the MSg, and another explanation of Ji (T42, no. 1828, 527b16–25; cf. T43, no. 1829, 142c20–25): 三藏云：「此《菩薩地》中明牽引、生起二因，皆通有分及名言熏習，故此二因皆能生因攝；《尋伺地》中，唯說有分熏習為牽引因，是故不入能生，牽引因攝。」基云：「牽引、生起二因何別？義曰二別：一、寬狹別，牽引因通增上緣、因緣故，是能生因、方便因二因所攝；生起因狹，唯因緣攝。二、為潤未潤別，故依處中云：『牽引因是習氣因依處』，行、識支種未被潤也；『生起因是有潤種子因依處』，即已被潤也。」故有差別。“It is asserted by the Tripiṭaka [Master]: ‘The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* shows that both the projection cause and the production cause apply to the [impregnation of] existence-link (有分; *\*bhavāṅga*) and the impregnation of linguistic expression (名言熏習; *\*abhilāpa-vāsanā*). Therefore, the two causes are subsumed under [the category of] the generative cause. The *Savitarkasavicārādibhūmi* only claims that the impregnation of existence-link is the projection cause. Therefore, they are not contained in the generative cause but subsumed under the projection cause.’ Ji said, ‘what is the difference between projection cause and production cause? According to their meanings, there are two differences: First, the difference in terms of their scope. As the projection cause corresponds to condition of dominance and condition qua cause, it is subsumed under [the categories of] both generative cause and contribution cause. [By contrast,] the scope of the production cause is narrow, [as] it is only subsumed under condition qua cause. Second, the difference between the moistening and the moistened. It is thus said in [the discussion of] the bases of cause: “the projection cause is the cause-basis of imprint (*\*vāsanā*)”—the seeds of the links of conditioning factors (*\*saṃskāra*) and consciousness have not been moistened; “the production cause is the cause-basis of the seed with moistening”—[the seeds] have been moistened.’ Thus there are differences.” According to Ji’s interpretation, *vāsanā* can be considered as a special mode of seed: *vāsanā* refers to the continuity of the unmoistened karmic seeds, which are in contrast to the seed with moistening (*sābhiṣyanda-bīja*).

By means of that cause and that condition, a specific continuity of conditioning factors operates (*viśiṣṭā saṃskāra-santatiḥ pravartate*)—That is called imprint. From that [imprint] which has fallen into a continuous series (*prabandha-patitā*), a desirable or undesirable effect issues.<sup>148</sup>

The so-called “karma” is in fact a figurative expression of the present karmic *vāsanā*, because the past karma, which functions as the cause of ripening (*vipākahetu*), has already ceased. It is also in this sense that the SavBh defines past karma as that which either has or hasn’t issued the effect in the state of imprint (*vāsanāvastha*).<sup>149</sup> In other words, it is *vāsanā* that keeps the karmic efficacy. This early Yogācāra understanding of *vāsanā* appears to be similar to the Abhidharma idea of karmic *vāsanā* as reflected in the MVbh (§3.1).

### 3.3.2.2. Simultaneous Impregnation (*paribhāvanā*) in the *Savitarkasavicārādi-bhūmi*

In the SavBh, *vāsanā* means karmic imprint and does not express the idea of impregnation in the dynamic sense as the later Yogācāras maintain. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the SavBh alludes to the simultaneous mode of impregnation (*paribhāvanā/paribhāvanatā*) in the context of twelve-membered dependent co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

When discussing the twelve factors of dependent co-arising, the SavBh distinguishes three modes of condition: the co-existent (*sahabhāva*), what has immediately ceased (*anantara-niruddha*), and what has long ceased (*cira-niruddha*). In this context, impregnation is mentioned in terms of co-existent condition for two of the twelve links of dependent co-arising:

{3.3F} How should conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) be regarded as the threefold condition of consciousness? In respect of impregnating the seed-

<sup>148</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 127–28: *yad apy uktam asty atītaṃ karma yataḥ sattvāḥ savyābaddhāvyābadhāṃ vedayantīti | tatrāpi tad-vāsanāyāṃ tad-astitvopacāram abhipretyoktaṃ | yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāśubhaṃ karmotpanna-niruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayena viśiṣṭā saṃskāra-santatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanā ity ucyate | tasyāḥ prabandha-patitāyā iṣṭāniṣṭa-phalaṃ nirvartate |...* Cf. D no. 4035, sems tsam, tshi 64b2–3; T30, no. 1579, 305b1–6. See also Dhammajoti’s English translation (2017, 243). The same argument is reiterated in the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* (T31, no. 1602, 523a18–23).

<sup>149</sup> See YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 192: *atītaṃ karma yad vāsanāvasthaṃ datta-phalaṃ adatta-phalaṃ vā, anāgataṃ karma yad anirvṛttaṃ, vartamānaṃ karma yad abhisaṃskṛtaṃ abhisañcītaṃ anuparataṃ |* Cf. D no. 4035, sems tsam, tshi 97b7–98a1; T30, no. 1579, 320a1–3. “Past karma is that which has issued effect or hasn’t issued effect in the state of imprint; future karma is what has not ceased (*anirvṛtta*); present karma is what has been [volitionally (已思)] done (*abhisaṃskṛta*), accumulated (*abhisañcīta*), and has not deceased (*anuparata*).”

state (*bījabhāva-paribhāvanā*)<sup>150</sup>, it is the co-existent (*sahabhāva*) condition. After that, in respect of the proceeding by force of those [conditioning factors], the immediately ceased is the condition of generating (*saṃjanana*). In the future [life], in respect of the projection of the fruit/effect that is produced, it is the projection (*ākṣepa*) condition. In the manner that conditioning factors are the condition of consciousness, in this way consciousness [is the condition] of psycho-physical complex (*nāmarūpa*), psycho-physical complex [the condition] of the six sense-bases, the six sense-bases [the condition] of the contact (*sparsā*), contact [the condition] of sensation (*vedanā*), sensation [the condition] of cravings (*trṣṇā*)<sup>151</sup>... How is existence (*bhava*) a condition of birth (*jāti*) in terms of the threefold condition? [It is] the co-existent condition in respect of the impregnation (*paribhāvanatā*) of seed-state...<sup>152</sup>

In this context, seed-state (*bījabhāva*) signifies consciousness, which has the nature of seed. Thus, impregnating the seed-state (*bījabhāva-paribhāvanā*) refers to the fact that karma impregnates *ālayavijñāna*. The description of the threefold condition of consciousness aligns with the definition of the projection cause (*ākṣepaka-hetu*) in the ŚrBh (see {3.3A}). Considering that the projection cause (*ākṣepa-hetu*) is discussed only in terms of karma in the SavBh, both the case of consciousness being conditioned by conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) in the present life and the case of birth (*jāti*) being conditioned by existence (*bhava*) in the future life should be regarded as the fact of consciousness being impregnated by karma. This elucidates why the descriptions of the co-existent condition are similar in both cases. It can be analyzed that in terms of conditioning factors being the co-existent condition of consciousness, karma that was performed impregnated (*pari-√bhū*) simultaneously the *bījas* in the performer's consciousness. In terms of existence being the co-existent condition of birth, the Sanskrit text uses *paribhāvanatā* to denote impregnation instead of *paribhāvanā*. This nuance may indicate that the impregnation in this case is expressed in a more abstract sense than the former case: It is not the link of

<sup>150</sup> *Bījabhāva* refers to *vijñāna*.

<sup>151</sup> Note that in Xuanzang's Chinese translation, the last part "sensation [is the condition] of cravings" (*vedanā trṣṇāyāḥ*) is not mentioned.

<sup>152</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 219–20: *saṃskārā vijñānasya katham triprakāra-pratyayatayā draṣṭavyāḥ | bījabhāva-paribhāvanayā sahabhāva-pratyayaḥ | tad-ūrdhvaṃ tad-vaśa-vartanatayā saṃjanana-pratyayo 'nantara-niruddhaḥ ātyayā phalābhinirvartitākṣepatayā ākṣepa-pratyayaḥ || yathā saṃskārā vijñānasya [pratyayaḥ] | evaṃ vijñānaṃ nāma-rūpasya | nāma-rūpaṃ ṣaḍ-āyatanasya | ṣaḍ-āyatanam sparsāsya sparśo vedanānām | vedanā trṣṇāyāḥ | ... bhavo jāteḥ katham triprakāra-pratyayatayā pratyayaḥ | sahabhāva-pratyayo bījabhāva-paribhāvanatayā | Cf. D no. 4035, sems tsam, tshi 113a5–b5; T30, no. 1579, 325c21–326a11.*

existence that directly impregnates the link of birth, because existence and birth cannot be the impregnator and the impregnated respectively. Instead, in this course, it is still karma, the force of existence, that impregnates simultaneously the *bījas* in the consciousness, whose arising in the future takes on the name of birth.<sup>153</sup>

It is very important to note that this kind of simultaneous impregnation occurs between different links of the twelvefold formula of dependent co-arising: the karmic force serves as the simultaneous impregnator of the seed of consciousness. Accordingly, consciousness nevertheless arises from the seed of consciousness, which has been impregnated by karma. Such a theory of impregnation in the SavBh significantly differs from the developed Yogācāra theory of *vāsanā* of *dharmas*. As will be discussed in §4.2.3, *vāsanā* of *dharmas* expresses the idea that a manifested *dharma*, which arises from its *bīja*, impregnates its own *bīja* in *ālayavijñāna* in the meantime.

On the other hand, the fact that karmic force simultaneously impregnates consciousness should be regarded as a sustaining cause (*parigraha-hetu*) rather than a projection cause (*ākṣepa-hetu*); because, according to the five modes of the establishment of causes, the co-existent condition is interpreted as a part of the sustaining cause, while a projection cause corresponds to what has long ceased.<sup>154</sup> As the projection cause is defined as karmic *vāsanā*, it can be argued that the simultaneous impregnation mentioned in {3.3F} in the SavBh is not identical to karmic *vāsanā*.

However, since the term *paribhāvanā* expresses the same idea of *vāsanā*, the simultaneous impregnation of the two links (*aṅga*) of conditioning forces (*saṃskāra*) and existence (*bhava*) finally came to be known as *\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā* (*srid pa'i yan lag gyi bag chags*), “the impregnation of the existence-link”, which constitutes one type of *vāsanā* in Asaṅga’s MSg. The expression “existence-link” (*\*bhavāṅga*)<sup>155</sup> in the term *\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā* seemingly suggests its doctrinal origin from the discussion of the twelve-membered dependent co-arising in connection with projection cause in the ŚrBh, as well as {3.3F} in the SavBh. Just as the context of

<sup>153</sup> Ji 基 seems to interpret the simultaneity as the seeds being co-existent with their present fruits. (See T43, no. 1829, 62b20–22: 有望生為三緣。云熏發彼種子者，由昔業熏識等種故，今名為有而生現果，故成俱有。) However, such an interpretation is not in accordance with the Sanskrit expression.

<sup>154</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 111: *saha-bhūtāḥ | tadyathā | ekatyaḥ parigraha-hetuḥ | ...[cira-niruddhaḥ | tadyathā | ākṣipto hetuḥ ||]* Cf. D no. 4035, sems tsam, tshi 57a6–7; T30, no. 1579, 302b1–3.

<sup>155</sup> Note that “existence-link” does not mean the link of existence (*bhava*) alone, but is a general term that covers the range of all the twelve links of dependent co-arising.

simultaneous impregnation in {3.3F} addresses the twelve links of dependent co-arising, the *\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā* represents the dependent co-arising that distinguishes between the desirable and the undesirable [realms of existence (*gati*)] (*\*iṣṭāniṣṭavibhāgika/ iṣṭāniṣṭavibhāgin*), which is one of the two types of dependent co-arising of *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>156</sup>

### 3.3.3. Karmic *Vāsanā* in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*

In the VinSg, although, in most cases, *vāsanā* is used mainly in the sense of the impregnation of conditioned *dharmas* (§4.2) and the sense of *kleśavāsanā* (see §5.4), karmic *vāsanā* is not absolutely absent. According to the *Śrutamayībhūmi-viniścaya*, among the twelve types of hindrance (*\*āvaraṇa*) to a person, besides the karmic hindrance (*\*karmāvaraṇa*) which is due to committing the five grave crimes (*\*pañcāntaryāṇi karmāṇi*), the imprint-hindrance (*\*vāsanāvaraṇa*) is due to the imprints (*vāsanā*) of repeated practice (*\*abhyāsa*) in terms of the evil action that is done formerly (*\*pūrva-duṣkṛta-karman*).<sup>157</sup> In this context, only the *vāsanā* of unwholesome karma is spoken of because it hinders the arising of the Noble Path.

Nevertheless, the concept of karmic continuity is expressed in the VinSg by the term *bīja* instead of *vāsanā*. For example, in the PMBhVin, it is argued that the Buddha spoke of the existence of past karma only on account of the constant continuation of conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) that sustain (*\*parigrhīta*) and impregnate (*\*paribhāvita*) the seeds (*\*bīja*) of the good and bad karma, which has already arisen and ceased in the past life but will produce desired and undesired effects in the future.<sup>158</sup> Such an expression is very similar to the description of the projection cause (*ākṣepahetu*) or karmic *vāsanā* in the *Maulī Bhūmi*. However, *vāsanā* is not mentioned in this context in the VinSg.

Furthermore, it is also noteworthy that *vāsanā* in other Maitreya's works<sup>159</sup> such as the MAV and the MSA is not discussed in the sense of karmic imprint as reflected

<sup>156</sup> See MSg I.19.

<sup>157</sup> See D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 193a2–3: *de la sgrib pa yang rnam pa bcu gnyis te / las kyi sgrib pa ni 'di lta ste / mtshams med pa lnga'i las byed pa nyid kyi phyir ro // bag chags kyi sgrib pa ni 'di lta ste / sngon nyes par byas pa'i las la goms pa'i bag chags nyid kyi phyir ro// ...*

<sup>158</sup> See D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 18a4–5: *bcom ldan 'das kyis las 'das pa ni yod de... gang gsungs pa de la dgongs pa gang yin zhe na / 'das pa'i tshes rabs rnam su las dge ba dang mi dge ba bskyed cing 'gags pas phyi ma la 'bras bu 'dod pa dang mi 'dod pa mngon par 'grub par de'i sa bon gyis 'du byed kyi rgyun phyi ma phyi ma yongs su bzung zhing yongs su bsgos pa las dgongs nas / bcom ldan 'das kyis las 'das pa yod do //*

<sup>159</sup> Yokoyama (1971, 44–45) argues that the interpretations about conceptualization of the unreal



in the YBh at all, but only in the sense of dynamic impregnation of conditioned *dharmas*.

### 3.4. Aśaṅga's Further Discussion of Karmic *Vāsanā*

The idea of karmic *vāsanā* can also be seen in Aśaṅga's works.

According to the AS, if the karma derived from volition (*saṃcetanīyatā*) on account of fundamental attachment (*mūlābhiniveśa*) and mistake (*viparyāsa*) has been performed (*kṛta*) or accumulated (*upacita*), their ripening is definitely experienced (*pratiṣaṃ-√vid*). Here, being performed and being accumulated are respectively explained as the actual presence (*samudācāra*) having been caused to arise (*samutthāpita*) and the *vāsanā* having been heaped up (*samupacita*).<sup>160</sup> On this point, the ASBh further explains, “accumulation means the increase (*vrddhi*) of *vāsanā*” should be understood as the nourishing (*paripoṣaṇa*) of the seed of [karmic] ripening in the *ālayavijñāna*”<sup>161</sup>. Such an interpretation of *vāsanā* must be in accordance with the discussion of karmic *vāsanā* in the SavBh.

In the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* 顯揚聖教論 (T no. 1602), which is attributed to Aśaṅga according to the Chinese tradition, karma is said to encompass three states (*\*avastha*), viz., the state of performing (*\*kriyāvastha*), state of imprint (*vāsanāvastha*), and state of issuing effect (*\*phaladānāvastha*).<sup>162</sup> According to this classification, the state of performing must mean the karma that is generated at the moment when the volitional action is performed. In other words, in the words of the AS, it refers to the phase of the actual presence (*samudācāra*) of the initial volitional action. The state of *vāsanā*, then, refers to the karmic causal efficacy that lasts in a serial continuity before the final state of the arising of the karmic effect.

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(*abhūtaparikalpa*), grasped-grasper (*grāhyagrāhaka*), manifestation (*pratibhāsa/prakhyāna*), emptiness (*śūnyatā*), and the three natures in the MSA, MAV, and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga* belong to one group that is different from the corresponding notions in the YBh.

<sup>160</sup> AS 53: *teṣu mūlābhiniveśa-saṃcetanīyatākarma-viparyāsa-saṃcetanīyatākarmabhyāṃ yadi kṛtaṃ bhavaty upacitaṃ ca na nāśya vipākāḥ pratiṣaṃvedyate | kṛtaṃ samudācārasamutthāpitaṃ | upacitaṃ ca vāsanā samupacitaṃ ||* Cf. Bayer 2010, 148. In his endnotes, Bayer (2010, 338 n. 114–115) fails to differentiate between karmic *vāsanā*, *kleśavāsanā*, and *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharmas*.

<sup>161</sup> ASBh 64: *upacayo vāsanā-vrddhir ity ālayavijñāne vipākabīja-paripoṣaṇaṃ veditavyam ||* Cf. Bayer 2010, 148–49.

<sup>162</sup> T31, no. 1602, 573c16–19: 如是等業當知有六種果、三種位……三位者，謂作用位、習氣位與果位。

The above ideas about karmic imprint (*vāsanā*) finally came to be recapitulated as the *vāsanā* of existence-link (*\*bhavāṅgavāsanā*) in Asaṅga's MSg I.58. In MSg II.2, among the eleven types of cognition/manifestation (*\*vijñapti*) which constitute the entire universe, *vāsanā* of existence-link is associated with the cognition/manifestation of de cease and birth in fortunate and unfortunate realms of existence (*\*gati*)<sup>163</sup>, and thus is explained as the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*). In this relation, MSg I.19 calls the twelve-membered depend co-arising "that which differentiates between the desirable and undesirable [realms of existence] (*\*iṣṭāniṣṭa-vibhāṅgika*<sup>o</sup>-*vibhāgin*)".<sup>164</sup> Accordingly, karmic *vāsanā* which originally refers to the continuation of karmic causal efficacy also takes on the dynamic sense of impregnation. After the SNS which propounds the *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* (see §4.3), the term *vāsanā*'s connotation of impregnation in the dynamic sense became predominant. It would be hard to comprehend an imprint without associating it with the concept of dynamic impregnation. In fact, the scope of *bhavāṅga-vāsanā* is larger than the karmic imprint, as it covers all the twelve links in the dynamic process of dependent co-arising. As a result, in the MSg, the karmic *vāsanā* in the *ālayavijñāna*, known as *bhavāṅga-vāsanā*, is regarded as a course of impregnation/perfuming, alongside the *vāsanā* of linguistic expression (*\*abhilāpa*) and the *vāsanā* of self-view (*\*ātmadrṣṭi*).

By and large, the theory of *\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā* may have at least the following doctrinal origins. One origin is the Abhidharmic idea of karmic imprint, which refers to the karmic efficacy that continues in the present in a serial continuity. Another origin has been discussed in §3.3.2.2, namely the simultaneous impregnation (*paribhāvanā/paribhāvanatā*) in terms of the links of conditioning forces (*saṃskāra*) and existence (*bhava*) in the twelvefold formula of dependent co-arising. Moreover, with the karmic *vāsanā* acquiring the dynamic sense of impregnation, *\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā* is associated with the dependent nature. As will be elaborated in §4.3, this change is probably due to Asaṅga's reinterpretation of the theory of the threefold object (*vastu*) caused by the eightfold conceptualization (*vikalpa*) in the

<sup>163</sup> MSg II.2: *bde 'gro dang ngan 'gro dang 'chi 'pho dang skye ba'i rnam par rig pa gang yin pa de ni / srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags kyi sa bon las byung ba'i phyir ro* // Cf. Vasubandhu's MSgBh (D no. 4050, sems tsam, ri 143b7): *gang bde 'gro dang ngan 'gro dang / 'chi 'pho ba dang / skye ba'i rnam par rig pa ste / 'khor ba'i 'gro ba sna tshogs de ni srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags kyi sa bon nye bar len pa las byung ngo* //

<sup>164</sup> MSg I.19: *rtan cing 'brel par 'byung ba yan lag bcu gnyis pa gang yin pa de ni sdug pa dang mi sdug pa rnam par 'byed pa can te / bde 'gro dang ngan 'gro dag tu sdug pa dang mi sdug pa'i lus rnam par dbye ba sna tshogs kyi rkyen gyi dngos por 'gyur ba'i phyir ro* //

*Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh. Therefore, the threefold object, particularly the object of greed, hatred and delusion (*rāga-dveṣa-mohā*), may also have contributed to the formation of the concept of *\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā*. At any rate, when Vasubandhu and Sthiramati speak of impregnation of karma (*karmaṇo vāsanā/ karma-vāsanā*) or impregnation of ripening (*vipāka-vāsanā*) in the TrK and TrBh, they seem to have returned to the initial scope of karmic imprints, albeit in a dynamic sense (see §7.2).

### 3.5. Concluding Remarks

Among the extant northern Abhidharma texts, the earliest occurrence of the idea of karmic *vāsanā* is seen in the MVbh in the context of unmanifested matter (*avijñapti-rūpa*). As the early function of the unmanifested (*avijñapti*) is to preserve karmic efficacy, some non-orthodox Sarvāstivādins put forward the concept of firm *vāsanā* of wholesome and unwholesome unmanifested karma, which is likened to the perfume (*\*vāsa*) by a fragrant flower left on the hand. The same analogy is employed in the Hṛdaya treatises to describe the unmanifested karma. However, the AH-Dh and the MAH, which belong to the tradition of Western Sarvāstivādins, only take the Vaibhāṣika notion of unmanifested matter as a designation.

Vasubandhu, when composing the AKBh under the influence of the MAH, must have accepted the idea of karmic *vāsanā*. Although Vasubandhu does not explicitly speak of karmic *vāsanā* in the AKBh, as suggested later by Saṅghabhadra's criticism against the AKBh, Vasubandhu's KSP and Yaśomitra's AKVy, Vasubandhu's notions of "seed" (*bīja*) and *saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa*, as well as Śrīlāta's theory of pursuant element (*anudhātu*) sufficiently imply the idea of karmic *vāsanā*. However, from the Vaibhāṣika point of view, karmic *vāsanā* is impossible, because this theory results in endless karmic ripening.

The notion of *vāsanā* in the sense of karmic imprint was not employed in the ŚrBh and the BoBh. Nevertheless, the ŚrBh speaks of projection cause (*ākṣepakahetu*) and production cause (*abhinirvṛtтиhetu*) in the context of the twelve-membered dependent co-arising. The two causes are discussed in the sense of seeds in the BoBh. The SavBh associates projection cause with the term *vāsanā*, which is probably derived from the *\*Ādiviśeṣavibhāgadharmaparyāya*. In the SavBh, it is *vāsanā* that keeps karmic causal efficacy.

Although the idea of karmic *vāsanā* is not explicated in the VinSg, it appears in Asaṅga's AS and the *Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn*, where *vāsanā* is understood as the continuous karmic efficacy that is between the initial action and the effect of ripening.

Finally, in the MSg, karmic *vāsanā*, recapitulated as *\*bhavāṅgavāsanā*, is considered as a cognition/manifestation (*\*vijñapti*) of saṃsāric destinies (*\*gati*), and is thus associated with the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), in connection with the dependent co-arising that differentiates between the desirable and the undesirable (*\*iṣṭāniṣṭavibhāgika pratītyasamutpāda*). Additionally, the idea mentioned in the SavBh of the simultaneous impregnation (*paribhāvanā*) of conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) and existence (*bhava*), which are karmic forces by nature, may foreshadow the development of *\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā* in the MSg.



## 4. *Vāsanā* as the Impregnation of Conditioned *Dharmas*

*Vāsanā* of conditioned *dharmas* is one of the major connotations of *vāsanā* used by the Yogācāra school. This idea, however, can be traced back to the concept of meditative impregnation (*vāsanā*)<sup>165</sup> in the Abhidharma period. Although the AKBh uses the neuter noun *vāsana* when speaking of meditative impregnation, remarkable connections can be found between this Abhidharmic notion and the Yogācāra idea of the impregnation of conditioned *dharmas*, expressed by the feminine noun *vāsanā*. *Vāsanā* investigated in this chapter does not convey the meaning of imprint as a remaining influence but refers to the dynamic course of impregnation or perfuming. It will be argued that due to the mechanism of simultaneous impregnation, with the equation between *vāsanā* and *bīja*, the Yogācāra school came up with the idea of the simultaneous mode of causality between seed and its fruit/effect (*phala*). Then, this chapter continues to investigate how the idea of the mutual causation between the eightfold conceptualization (*vikalpa*) and the threefold object-base (*vastu*) in the BoBh develops in the Yogācāra school in connection with the concept of impregnation and yields the theory of the three types of *vāsanā* in Asaṅga's MSg.

### 4.1. *Vāsanā* Related to Meditative Cultivation in Abhidharma

#### 4.1.1. Flowers Perfume Sesame

In the pan-Sarvāstivāda tradition, meditative cultivation (*bhāvanā*) is explained as the impregnation in one's *citta*. A commonly seen simile used to illustrate this meditative impregnation is that flowers perfume sesame, as seen in the Chapter on Karma of the AKBh:

{4.1A} Only the concentrated (*samāhita*) wholesomeness is cultivation (*bhāvanā*). (IV.123cd)

What is this called "concentrated"? That which has concentration (*samādhi*) as intrinsic nature [and] is co-existent. For what purpose is this called "cultivation"?

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<sup>165</sup> McHugh (2012, 140) takes the neuter noun *vāsana* as a term of perfumery and the feminine *vāsanā* as a philosophic term. This might also be true in the Abhidharma texts at the outset, but as will be argued, the Yogācāras later do not differentiate them.

It is because of the impregnation in *citta* (*citta-vāsanāt*)<sup>166</sup>. (IV.123d)  
 That concentrated wholesomeness exceedingly impregnates (*vāsayati*) the *citta*, because the qualities [of *samādhi*] make the serial continuity [of the *citta*] have the substance of them<sup>167</sup>, just as perfuming sesame (*tila-bhāvanāvat*)<sup>168</sup> with flowers.<sup>169</sup>

In this text, meditative impregnation is expressed by the neuter Sanskrit noun *vāsana*. One may speculate that Vasubandhu has an intention to distinguish this term from the feminine noun *kleśavāsanā* in the AKBh, or even that the Sarvāstivāda tradition may have been using the neuter form exclusively in the context of meditation. However, it is more plausible that the neuter form is employed because of the restriction of Sanskrit metres<sup>170</sup>. The feminine noun occurs in Yaśomitra's commentary in the compound "*tila-vāsanāvad*", which seems to suggest that *vāsana* is identical to *vāsanā*. Vasubandhu's above explanation is grounded in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma literature. However, among the extant documents, the *\*Tridharmaka-śāstra*, which is attributed to the early Vātsīputrīya school (Thich 1984, 7–8), is probably the earliest<sup>171</sup> text that compares meditative cultivation to flowers perfuming sesame:

{4.1B} Question: What is cultivation (*\*bhāvanā*)<sup>172</sup>?

<sup>166</sup> ADV (217) reads *cittabhāvanāt*. Additionally, the Tibetan rendering uses "sgo" instead of "*bag chags*" to translate the Sanskrit word "*vāsana*". It is clear that the Tibetan word "*bag chags*", which literally means "slight desire", is by no means proper to be applied to the context of cultivating wholesomeness. This demonstrates that the translators were clearly aware of the two distinct meanings of the same Sanskrit word.

<sup>167</sup> Cf. AKVy 437: *samādhi-guṇais tan-mayī kṛiyate citta-saṃtatiḥ* | (The serial continuity of thought, by the qualities of meditative concentration, is made to have the substance of them.) According to Xuanzang and Paramārtha's Chinese translations, the "*ta*" (*tan-*) here refers to the qualities (*guṇa*); see also I. Funahashi 2011, 521–22.

<sup>168</sup> Note that Yaśomitra's AKVy (437) quotes "*tila-vāsanāvad*". Yaśomitra also clearly explains that *bhāvanā* is *vāsanā*.

<sup>169</sup> AKBh 273–74: *samāhitam tu kuśalam bhāvanā* | *kim idam samāhitam nāma* | *samādhi-svabhāvam* <*sahabhu*>(MS: *sahabhū*) *yat* | *kim artham etat bhāvanety ucyate* | *citta-vāsanāt* | *tad dhi samāhitam kuśalam atyartham cittam vāsayati* | *guṇais tan-mayī-karaṇāt saṃtateḥ* | *puṣpais tila-bhāvanāvat* | Cf. P no. 5591, mngon pa'i bstan bcos, gu 263a8–b2; D no. 4090, mngon pa, ku 225a7–b1; T29, no. 1558, 97c11–13.

<sup>170</sup> The majority of the Sanskrit verses in the AKBh, including stanza IV.123, use the *śloka* metre.

<sup>171</sup> As noted by Yinshun (1968, 466), Saṅghasena, a contemporary to Aśvaghōṣa, has made a commentary on this treatise. Since Aśvaghōṣa is said to have participated in the compilation of the MVbh, the *\*Tridharmaka-śāstra* should be regarded to be earlier than that.

<sup>172</sup> The *Sì āhánmù chāojiě* 四阿鈐暮抄解 (T no. 1505), an earlier Chinese translation of the treatise,

Answer: Cultivation refers to the [four] meditations (*dhyāna*), the [four] immeasurables (*\*apramāṇa*), the [four] incorporeal (*\*ārūpya*) [meditative attainments (*samāpatti*)]. They are called cultivation in terms of being wholesome praxis. Therefore, cultivation is similar to how flowers perfume (*\*saṃ-√vās*) sesame (*\*tila*)/sesame oil (*\*taila*)<sup>173</sup>. Practice (*\*āsevanā*) is cultivation, which is like frequent approach (*\*niṣevana*)<sup>174</sup> to a king. Just like a subordinate of a king well attends on (*\*saṃ-√sev*) [a king], its outcome/effect (*\*phala*) must be achieved<sup>175</sup>, in this way, the cultivation through practice must bring about a good effect (*\*śubha-phala*).<sup>176</sup>

It was an Indian tradition to put flowers and sesame seeds together so that the fragrance of the flowers perfumes the sesame. The extracted sesame oil would then bear the fragrance of the flowers (McHugh 2012, 141). Such a process is likened to meditative cultivation, because the wholesomeness obtained in the meditation persists in the serial continuity (*santati*) of the meditator. Notably, *vāsanā* has not become a technical term in the *\*Tridharmaka-sāstra*. This treatise only reflects a preliminary idea of meditative impregnation/perfuming. Nevertheless, the employment of the words derived from *√sev*, such as *\*āsevanā*, *\*niveṣaṇa* or

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reads “分別” (*\*bhedana*?), which was perhaps translated from a corrupted Prakrit form. For the alteration of *-ā-* and *-e-* in Gāndhārī, see Allon 2001, 74–75 (#5.1.4); and Glass 2007, 111 (#5.1.2.4). For the possible confusion between *-v-* and *-d-* in Gāndhārī, see Allon 2001, 78 (#5.2.1); Glass 2007, 118 (#5.2.1.6); and Karashima 2015, 136–37, particularly n. 73.

<sup>173</sup> One Chinese translation reads *má yóu* 麻油.

<sup>174</sup> Some Sanskrit words derived from root *√sev*, such as *niṣevana* and *saṃsevana*, bear the meanings of practicing (習), approaching (近), frequenting, and worshipping (求).

<sup>175</sup> A similar idea is expressed in some Mahāyāna texts, such as MSA (MSABh 3): *rājeva durārādho dharmo 'yaṃ vipulagāḍhagambhīraḥ | ārādhitāś ca tadvadvaraguṇadhanadāyako bhavati ||* (I.5) I thank Professor Nobuyoshi Yamabe for drawing my attention to this passage. For similar Mahāyāna sources, see also Nagao (2007, 15). Another possible way of understanding the underlined sentences is as follows: “Practice is cultivation, which is like a king of frequent practice (*\*niṣevana*). Just like a king and subordinates devote to (*\*saṃ√sev*) goodness, its outcome/effect (*\*phala*) must be achieved.” This way of explanation can be backed by the *Serī-sutta* in the SN (#2.23), cf. *sūtra* #999 of the *Samyuktāgama*.

<sup>176</sup> T25, no. 1506, 16b13–17: 問：云何修？答：修者，禪、無量、無色。此修於善行，是故修如華薰麻。習是修，如習近王。譬如王臣善習近，必成其果。如是習修，必得白淨果故。 Cf. the corresponding paragraph in the earlier Chinese translation *Sì āhánmù chāojiě* (T25, no. 1505, 2a7–10): 問：是分別何法？答：分別禪、無量、無色(修諸路)。分別是善行。是故分別如麻油花合。行分別，如王求。如等求(*\*saṃ√sev*)王，果得。有是求行，淨果相應。 According to this earlier version, this statement should be an elaborative interpretation of a *sūtra* passage (Probably the *Sanḡīti-sūtra* in the *Dīrghāgama*, which corresponds to the *Sanḡīti-sutta*. See T1, no. 1, 50c, cf. DN iii 222–24).



\**saṃsevana*, seem to sufficiently adumbrate its connection with *vāsanā*, given that the *Dhātupāṭha* defines √*vās* as “*upasevāyām*” (see §1.2).

Considering the close doctrinal connections between the Vātsīputrīya and the Sarvāstivāda, it is not impossible that this idea was also shared by the Sarvāstivādins. When the MVbh uses the simile of flower perfuming sesame (see {4.1C}) to explain the meditative impregnation, it does not provide any objection. In other words, the Sarvāstivādins take that simile as their own opinion. Therefore, it was very likely that the idea of comparing the impregnation in meditative cultivation to flowers perfuming sesame was formed between the completion of the JñP and the composition of the \**Tridharmaka-śāstra* among the Sarvāstivādins and the Vātsīputrīyas.

As a matter of fact, the concept of meditative impregnation did not appear in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharmas until the encyclopedic MVbh:

{4.1C} Question: Why is it called cultivation (\**bhāvanā*)?

Answer: Because of fully impregnating (遍修; \**paribhāvanā*), it is called cultivation; because of devoted practice (數習<sup>177</sup>; \**āsevanā*), it is called cultivation; because of perfuming (熏; \**vāsanā*), it is called cultivation; because of training (學; \**śikṣa*), it is called cultivation; because of purifying (令光淨; \**bhāsanā*), it is called cultivation.<sup>178</sup>

It can be seen that the idea of cultivation is linked up with various related notions such as “*paribhāvanā*”, “*vāsanā*”, and “*āsevanā*”. These terms are integrally interrelated: the “meditative cultivation” (*bhāvanā*) must be “fully impregnated” (*paribhāvitā*) through the “devoted practice” (*āsevanā*) in the manner of “perfuming” (*vāsanā*). It will be noted that the discussion about *vāsanā* in its dynamic sense of impregnating/perfuming is always associated with the term *paribhāvanā*.

In the MVbh, the simile that flowers perfume sesame is used to explain the meditative practice of mixed cultivation (雜修, \**vyavakīrṇa-bhāvanā*)<sup>179</sup>, a type of

<sup>177</sup> In most cases, “數習” (*shù xí*) is Xuanzang’s translation of “*abhyāsa*”, which means repeated practice. Nevertheless, *abhyāsa*, particularly in the Yogācāra texts, often expresses a negative sense and can be related to *kleśa*, unwholesome karma and so on. Considering that this Abhidharmic context is dealing with *bhāvanā*, I surmise that the Chinese word here translates \**āsevanā*.

<sup>178</sup> MVbh, T27, 824b29–c2: 問：何故名修？答：遍修故名修；數習故名修；熏故名修；學故名修；令光淨故名修。

<sup>179</sup> Park (2014, 193–94) noted that *vāsanā* is related to “the intermingled state of divergent mental entities in the mental continuum in meditation”. However, Park, without sufficient argument, takes it as being connected with the Sautrāntika theory of karmic *vāsanā*. In contrast to Park’s opinion, I

meditative cultivation through which a contaminated (*sāsrava*) *citta* can be gradually purified through the *vāsanā* by the adjacent uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) *cittas*. This idea is related to the meditative practice of the Śrāvaka *yogācāras* (瑜伽師)<sup>180</sup>:

{4.1D} It is called the mixed cultivation because of being fully impregnated/perfumed (遍熏, *\*paribhāvitatva/\*paribhāvanā*), just as putting clothes in a chest and fully perfuming them with fragrance. Likewise, for the *yogācāras*, the uncontaminated [*cittas*] in the previous and the successive moments fully impregnate/perfume the contaminated [*citta*] in the intermediate moment.

It is called mixed cultivation because of being impregnated/perfumed together (合熏, *\*saṃvāsitatva*<sup>181</sup>), just as placing flowers and sesame together (or perfuming sesame with flowers) to make [the sesame oil] fragrant (*\*puṣpa-tila-saṃvāsanavat*). Likewise, for the *yogācāras*, the uncontaminated [*cittas*] in the adjacent two moments impregnate/perfume (熏發, *\*pari-√bhū*) in a mixed (雜, *\*vyavakīrṇa*) manner the contaminated [*citta*] in one moment.

It is called mixed cultivation because of adorning (令嚴好, *\*maṇḍana*), just like spreading flowers on a *chaitya* to adorn it. Likewise, a meditator (行者, *\*yogin*<sup>182</sup>) spreads the uncontaminated [factors] in the two moments on the contaminated [*citta*] in the one moment to grace it (i.e. the *citta*).

It is called the mixed cultivation because of purifying (令明淨, *\*bhāsanā*), just as putting gold and so on in a furnace, through tempering and fusing, to purify it. Likewise, a meditator puts the one-moment contaminated [*citta*] between the uncontaminated [*cittas*] in two moments, through repeated tempering, to make it beautiful.<sup>183</sup>

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consider the statement in the MVbh as a precursory theory of the Yogācāra doctrine of *vāsanā* of all *dharma*s (*sarva-dharma-vāsanā*).

<sup>180</sup> In this book, the lower case of “*yogācāra*” refers to a professional Śrāvakayānist meditator, who belongs to the broad Sarvāstivāda tradition, whereas the upper case of “Yogācāra” refers to either the specific Mahāyāna school or a member of this school.

<sup>181</sup> Cf. AKVy 437: *tat samāhitaṃ kuśalam atyarthaṃ cittam saṃvāsayaṭi* |

<sup>182</sup> It can be understood according to the context that the *yogin* here may also refer to a Sarvāstivādin *yogācāra*.

<sup>183</sup> MVbh, T27, 879c22–880a4: 遍熏故名雜修者，如衣置於一篋，以香遍熏。諸瑜伽師亦復如是，以前後二剎那無漏遍熏中間一剎那有漏。合熏故名雜修者，如花與苕蓐合熏令發香。彼瑜伽師亦復如是，以二剎那無漏隣雜熏發一剎那有漏。令嚴好故名雜修者，如以眾花散制多上，令其嚴好。如是行者以二剎那無漏散一剎那有漏上，令其妙好。令明淨故名雜修者，如以金等置於爐中，調鍊銷鑠，令轉明淨。如是行者以一剎那有漏置於無漏二剎那中，數數調鍊令轉淨妙。 See also Dhammajoti’s (2011, 31) partial translation.

On this issue, the early Sarvāstivāda *yogācāras* even provide a very practical description of this cultivation: through the repeated praxis of bringing about the contaminated *cittas* between the uncontaminated *cittas* in the fourth *dhyāna*, the contaminated *cittas* would become fewer. Then, the meditator applies the method in lower *dhyānas*, until he brings about a contaminated *citta* in one moment, after a preceding uncontaminated *citta* and before another succeeding uncontaminated *citta*. Eventually, the contaminated *citta* disappears because of the force of the impregnation/perfuming.<sup>184</sup> In this way, the idea of impregnation should be understood. Furthermore, according to the MVbh, the mixed cultivation must be within the context of the four *dhyānas*.

It must be in close connection with the earlier expositions of the impregnation in the meditative context that Dharmatrāta's MAH presents the following argument:

{4.1E} What are the two types of cultivation?

In terms of the meditations (*\*dhyāna*), the immeasurables, and the incorporeal [meditative attainments], the cultivation as obtaining (*\*pratīlambha-bhāvanā*) and the cultivation as practice (*\*niṣevaṇa-bhāvanā*) [are the two types of cultivation]...

These qualities (*\*guṇa*) of the meditations, etc., impregnate (*\*√vās*) *citta*, just like perfuming<sup>185</sup> clothes, flowers perfuming sesame, or fusing gold. Therefore, in this way, it is said to be like the cultivation (*\*bhāvanā*) as perfuming clothes, the cultivation as perfuming sesame, and the cultivation as fusing gold.<sup>186</sup>

It can be seen that this interpretation of cultivation is very similar to what has been noted in the *\*Tridharmaka-śāstra* passage {4.1B}. Moreover, the similes employed here are exactly the same as those enumerated in quote {4.1D} from the MVbh.

In {4.1E}, the qualities of various forms of meditation must be wholesome in terms of leading to uncontaminated states. It is such wholesome qualities of meditation that impregnate the *citta* of the meditator. Similarly, Vasubandhu expressly states in the AKBh, “only the concentrated wholesomeness is cultivation” (*samāhitaṃ tu kuśalaṃ bhāvanā*) as noted in quote {4.1A}. On this point, Yaśomitra

<sup>184</sup> See MVbh, T27, 880b13–27.

<sup>185</sup> Note that Dessein (1999, 515–16) improperly renders “熏” (perfuming) as mixing.

<sup>186</sup> MAH, T28, 933b24–29: 云何二種修？答：禪、無色、無量，得修及習修，不淨、安般念，二修義亦然。此諸禪等功德熏心，如熏衣、如花熏麻、如融金。是故如是說：如熏衣修，如熏麻修，如融金修。

explains that the term “wholesomeness” here is “for the purpose of denying the defiled meditation conjoined with the concentrated enjoyment” (*kuśala-graḥaṇaṃ samāhitāsvādanā-saṃprayukta-kliṣṭa-dhyāna-nivṛtṭy-arthaṃ*)<sup>187</sup>. The *Abhidharmadīpa* (see {4.1F}) further points out that such cultivation is relevant to meritorious work (i.e., *puṇyakriyāvastu*) conjoined with the qualities of loving-kindness and so on.<sup>188</sup> This suggests that the meditative cultivation of the four immeasurables (i.e., loving-kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity) and so on, as non-defiled meditation, are wholesome in terms of leading to the uncontaminated state. According to the AKBh, the qualities connected with *samādhi* are the four immeasurables, the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*), the eight bases of victory (*abhibhvāyatana*), and the ten bases of entirety (*kṛtsnāyatana*).<sup>189</sup> All these qualities are supported by the meditative experience of the four *dhyānas* and the four incorporeal *samāpattis*. Thus, Vasubandhu’s expression is generally in line with the idea of meditative impregnation as seen in the MAH. Since the composition of the AKBh was based on the AH-Dh and MAH (Taiken Kimura 1968, 242–62), Vasubandhu must have referred to the MAH when composing {4.1A}.

Concerning Vasubandhu’s statement in {4.1A}, the *Abhidharmadīpa*, representing the position of the Vaibhāṣikas, expounds as follows:

{4.1F} “It is because of the cultivation/impregnation (*bhāvana*) of *citta*.” In the manner that the sesame oil (*taila*), perfumed (*vāsita*) by *Champaka* flowers and so on, come to have the substance of them (i.e., the fragrance of the flowers), the *citta* impregnated (*bhāvita*) by the *dharma*s that are conjoined and co-existent with that meditative concentration (*samādhi*) is said to be “impregnated/perfumed” (*vāsita*), because of making [the *citta*] have the substance of them (i.e., the qualities). The non-concentrated [*citta*] is not so, thus only the concentrated *citta* having the substance of cultivation should be seen as the substance of meritorious action (*puṇya-kriyā-vastu*), which are conjoined with the qualities of loving-kindness, etc.<sup>190</sup>

<sup>187</sup> AKVy 437. Note that the term “*kliṣṭa-dhyāna*” is not seen in Sthiramati’s *Tattvārthā: dge ba smos pa ni mnyam par gzhaḡ pa ro myang ba dang mtshungs par ldan pa bzlog pa’i phyir ro* // (D no. 4421, sna tshogs, do 96a5)

<sup>188</sup> Cf. ADV 217 (AKBh 268): *bhāvanāmayaṃ maitrī puṇyaṃ ca puṇyakriyāyās ca vastu* | “Concerning the [merit-action-place] derived from cultivation, loving-kindness is merit and a place of meritorious action.”

<sup>189</sup> See AKBh 452ff. For a detailed study of these *guṇas* of *samādhi*, see Wei Shan 2005, chapters 12 and 13 (405–69).

<sup>190</sup> ADV 217: *citta-bhāvanāt | yathā tailaṃ puṣpaiś campakādibhir vāsitaṃ tanmayibhavati*

According to this passage, only the concentrated *citta* can impregnate, but the non-concentrated *citta* cannot. In other words, from the Vaibhāṣika standpoint, the impregnation is discussed only in the context of meditative cultivation. On the contrary, Sthiramati and Yaśomitra claim that the non-concentrated *citta* also impregnates (*asamāhitam api vāsayati*), but it is not exceedingly wholesome, and thus cannot be called “cultivation”.<sup>191</sup> It is important to note the different attitudes towards the non-concentrated *citta* between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntika idea of the impregnation of non-concentrated *citta* seems to be related to the Mahāyāna Yogācāra idea of the impregnation of all *dharma*s in the *ālayavijñāna*. It is not certain whether Sthiramati and Yaśomitra’s Sautrāntika position could have been influenced by the Mahāyāna Yogācāras, or there was an earlier interpretation of the Sautrāntikas that influenced the Yogācāra doctrine of impregnation of all *dharma*s. The latter seems to be more probable because the Sautrāntika idea bridges the gap between the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of meditative impregnation and the Yogācāra theory of impregnation of *dharma*s. I shall come back to this issue in §4.2.2.

It is also noted in {4.1F} that the *Abhidharmadīpa* employs the notions of “conjoined” (*saṃprayukta*) and “co-existent” (*sahabhūka*) to interpret the concept of impregnation. According to the Sarvāstivādins, “conjoined cause” (*saṃprayuktaka-hetu*) refers to the fact that co-existent *citta* and mental factors (*caitta*) are mutual causes. In light of this standpoint, what the author of the *Abhidharmadīpa* suggests can be understood as that the impregnator, which consists of some mental *dharma*s conjoined with the meditative concentration (*saṃādhi*), must co-exist with the impregnated *citta*. Moreover, the impregnator, which is the mental factors related to the concentrated wholesomeness, and the impregnated *citta* are the causes of each other.

This mechanism of meditative impregnation should also hold good for the case of mixed cultivation as mentioned in the MVbh, which could be explained as follows:

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*tatsamādhisaṃprayuktais tatsahabhūkaiś ca dharmaiś cittam bhāvitam vāsitam ity ucyate, tanmayikaraṇāt | na caivam asamāhitam iti | samāhitam eva cittam bhāvanāmayaṃ puṇyakriyāvastu maitrīyādiguṇasaṃprayuktaṃ draṣṭavyam |*

<sup>191</sup> *Tattvārthā* (D no. 4421, sna tshogs, do 96a6): *shin tu yang zhes bya ba ni mnyam par gzhas pa ma yin yang bsgom par ni byed mod kyi / mnyam par gzhas pa bzhin du ni ma yin no* // Cf. AKVy 437: *tat samāhitam kuśalam atyarthaṃ cittam saṃvāsayati | bhāvayati | asamāhitam api vāsayati | na tv evam atyarthaṃ...* Similarly, the MAH clearly suggests that defilements (*kleśa*) also impregnate, but it is only \**mārga-vāsanā* that is *bhāvanā*. (See MAH, T28, 930a20–22: 淨禪三種：一、煩惱動，二、道動，三、不動。煩惱動者，退分(有漏有煩惱氣，故名煩惱動也)。道動者，道所動，謂動修。餘者非動。)

The uncontaminated *citta* in one moment in the meditation is impregnated by the uncontaminated mental factors. Through repeatedly and continuously bringing about the uncontaminated mental *dharma*s (i.e., *citta-caittas*), the inclination towards the arising of uncontaminated mental *dharma*s becomes reinforced. When the *citta* in the meditation suddenly turns into a contaminated one in one moment, the contaminated mental factors that co-arise with the *citta* would be fewer, because the impregnated *citta* that has habituated to the arising of uncontaminated mental factors is not habituated to the arising of the contaminated ones. As the meditator then immediately introduces another series of uncontaminated mental *dharma*s and thus stops the serial continuity of the contaminated *citta*, the contaminated mental factors have not become strong enough to influence the succeeding *citta*. As a result, the contaminated *citta* would finally become an uncontaminated one on account of the impregnation in the form of meditative cultivation. Therefore, though the mixed cultivation requires a series of moments, the impregnated and the impregnator should still be concurrent.

Although the AKBh does not deny the Sarvāstivāda idea of “conjoined cause” and “co-existent cause” (*sahabhū-hetu*), the Sautrāntikas generally do not acknowledge that a cause can co-exist with its effect. In the NA, when refuting the Sautrāntika idea that karma and *dharma*s are impregnated in the six [internal] sense-bases (*āyatana*), Saṅghabhadra reiterates the principle of impregnation/perfuming, which requires the simultaneity of the impregnator/perfumer and the impregnated/perfumed:

{4.1G} If [you Sautrāntikas] say, [karma and defilements]<sup>192</sup> are like seeds, nourished and infused (\**vāsita*) by manure, being capable to sprout, it is invalid... Because our school (i.e., Sarvāstivāda) acknowledges the simultaneous causality, we can use this simile. [Since] your school (i.e., Sautrāntikas) does not [acknowledge it], how could it be like the seed nourished and infused by manure?<sup>193</sup>

{4.1H} If [you Sautrāntikas] say, this (i.e., the arising of uncontaminated *dharma*s) is like the perfuming/impregnation of external phenomena, it is not

<sup>192</sup> Park (2014, 194) provides a partial translation of what follows this passage. It should be noted that Śrīlāta’s *anudhātu* theory not only concerns karma, but also explains all internal *dharma*s. Park seems to understand the expression 業煩惱 as “defiled karma” (\**kliṣṭa-karman*?), which, however, should be read as “*karma-kleśa*”, a *dvandva* compound which means “karma and defilements”.

<sup>193</sup> NA, T29, 441a26–28: 若謂如種(T: 神), 糞土資熏, 能生芽等, 此亦非理……謂我宗許有同時因, 可立此喻; 汝宗不爾, 云何如種糞土資熏?

the case, because these [internal *dharmas*] are not similar to those [external phenomena]. That is to say, the two external phenomena—the perfumer and the perfumed—are simultaneous, and abide in the serial continuity. [As a result,] a specific taste and so forth abide in the perfumed. After a long time, it accompanies the serial continuity. [By contrast,] the internal *dharmas* are not like this, how could there be impregnation/perfuming?<sup>194</sup>

What Saṅghabhadra denies is not the meditative impregnation in *citta*, but the Sautrāntika theory of the impregnation of karma and defilements in the six sense spheres. The question posed by Saṅghabhadra is that, since all *dharmas* are momentary, given that the Sautrāntikas do not accept simultaneous causality, how is impregnation possible? It can be seen that in Saṅghabhadra’s Vaibhāṣika point of view, simultaneous causality is a prerequisite of perfuming/impregnation.

#### 4.1.2. Association of Meditative *Vāsanā* with the Simile of Seed in the *\*Tattvasiddhiśāstra*

It is interesting to note that Harivarman’s *\*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, a Dārṣṭāntika treatise composed before Vasubandhu’s AKBh, expressly compares the meditative impregnation to seed. When discussing the cultivation of *samādhi*, a question is raised as to how cultivation is possible given that a concentrated *citta* arises and ceases momentarily. In response to this question, the *\*Tattvasiddhi* explains as follows:

{4.11} Cultivation (*\*bhāvanā*) is also known as growth (*\*upacaya*)... It is just as from seeds arise sprouts, and [subsequently] stems, nodes, flowers, leaves, up to fruits, all [*dharmas*] that are perceived grow gradually from their causes. The *dharmas* such as meditative concentration (*\*samādhi*), wisdom (*\*prajñā*) and so on, should also be likewise. Moreover, it is perceived that the fragrance of the sesame perfumed [by flowers] increases. Although this fragrance and the sesame are momentary, there is the influence of perfuming (*\*vāsanā*). Therefore, it is known that momentary *dharmas* can be cultivated...

Moreover, it is perceived that though cause and effect are not simultaneous, the effect arises from the cause. Thus there can be the cultivation of momentary mental *dharmas*. Moreover, just as the seed absorbs water, though it does not reach [the state of] sprout and so on, it is able to

<sup>194</sup> NA, T29, 713c7–11: 若謂此如外法熏習，不爾，此彼不相似故。謂彼外法能熏所熏二法俱時，相續而住，有別味等住所熏中，經於多時相續隨轉。內法不爾，寧有熏習？

bring forth sprout and so on. In this way, when the previous *citta* is cultivated by wisdom, the subsequent *citta* is developed.<sup>195</sup>

Because Harivarman does not accept the Sarvāstivāda concept of conjoined cause<sup>196</sup> and denies simultaneous causality, meditative impregnation, for him, has to be a gradual process. Due to this position, in {4.11}, Harivarman likens the gradual impregnation in meditative cultivation to the botanical phenomenon that a seed sprouts, gradually grows, and finally fruits. Such an idea is not found in other extant Abhidharma treatises. Therefore, it is very likely that Harivarman's position of successive causality in the context of meditative cultivation made possible the connection of the concept of impregnation (*\*vāsanā*) with the simile of botanical seed (*\*bīja*). It must be noted here that precisely speaking, it is the mechanism of successive mediative impregnation that is compared to the botanical mechanism of seed's growing. Thus, *vāsanā* as the course of impregnation/perfuming can be taken as being identical to the development (*bhāvanā*) of seed.

## 4.2. *Vāsanā* of All Conditioned Dharmas and *Bīja* of All Dharmas

### 4.2.1. Yamabe's Hypothesis

As noted by Yamabe (1989, 50; 2021, 473–75), in the oldest layer of the YBh, while *bīja* of *dharmas* is widely spoken of in terms of primordial *dhātu*, the use of *vāsanā* is limited to traces of defilements (*kleśavāsanā*) and karmic imprints (§5.4 and §3.3). There is even no room for the idea of *vāsanā* of all *dharmas*, because material *dharmas* (*rūpa*) cannot consciously leave their imprints. The explicit occurrence of *vāsanā* of all *dharmas* was not seen until the VinSg of the YBh. Yamabe thus doubts, “*bīja* and *vāsanā* could not have been synonymous in the early stages.” Precisely speaking, *vāsanā* indicates making something to have the characteristic of another thing, while *bīja* indicates the potential to give rise to a specific thing. The two terms are not semantically equivalent. In this respect, a question that arises here is how the

<sup>195</sup> T32, no. 1646, p. 359a10–29: 又修名增長……如種牙莖節花葉果實，現見皆從因漸次增長，定慧等法亦應如是。又現見動麻其香轉增，是香及麻念念不住而有動力，故知念念滅法亦可修習……又現見因果雖不同時，亦得從因有果，如是心法雖念念滅亦有修習。又如種得水，雖不到牙等，亦能令牙等滋茂，如是智慧修習先心，後心增長。Cf. Sastri 1978, 452–53.

<sup>196</sup> See T32, no. 1646, 276b4–278b4. See Sastri (1978, 132–41).



two notions of *bīja* and *vāsanā* become synonymous in the Yogācāra school.

Yamabe (2021, 478–81) opines that the concept of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) made possible the identification between *bīja* and *vāsanā* of all *dharma*s. According to Yamabe, in the BoBh, conceptualization, which plays the role of defilements (*kleśa*) and karma, causes “object” (*vastu*), which is subsumed under “worldly existence” (*prapañca*). Thus, conceptualization can be taken as the fundamental cause of *saṃsāra*. On the other hand, similar to defilements and karma, conceptualization should also leave its imprints (*vāsanā*). Thus, *vāsanā* of conceptualization became possible. Since all *dharma*s can be conceptualized, when it comes to the VinSg, *vāsanā* of conceptualization, known as the *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in SNS V.2 and *\*parikalpita-svabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā*<sup>197</sup> in the PMBhVin<sup>198</sup>, serves as the fundamental cause of *saṃsāra* and all conditioned *dharma*s. Therefore, at this stage, *bīja* became equated with *vāsanā*.

I acknowledge the significant role of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) in the formation of the Yogācāra theory of *vāsanā* (see §4.3), as brought into focus by Yamabe. However, I have some reservation in accepting his hypothesis. If *vāsanā* of conceptualization is considered to be possible because defilements and karma also leave traces or imprints, *vāsanā* of conceptualization should be equivalent to *kleśavāsanā* and karmic *vāsanā*. However, the latter two types of *vāsanā* do not accordingly apply to all *dharma*s. Moreover, the early Yogācāras did not accept the idea that *kleśavāsanā* is *bīja* that produces further defilements until Dharmapāla adopted the notion of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* (§5.6.2.2). On the other hand, *vāsanā* of karma brings about its corresponding effect of ripening (*vipākaphala*) only once, being contradictory to *\*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā* which constantly gives rise to conditioned *dharma*s. As I have been emphasizing in this book, the different connotations of *vāsanā* should not be confused. Therefore, the reason why *vāsanā* became equated with the *bīja* of all conditioned *dharma*s should be otherwise.

<sup>197</sup> Cf. TrBh 52: *tatrādhyātman upādānam parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpaṃ nāma ca* | Cf. also MAVBh 40: *vāsanā-samudayārthaḥ parikalpita-svabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā* |

<sup>198</sup> Tib.: *kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags*. Ch.: 遍計所執自性妄執習氣. See Pravṛtti Portion, Hakamaya 2001, 390: #I.1.(b)A.1.

#### 4.2.2. Contextual Shift of Impregnation from Abhidharma to Yogācāra

Different from Yamabe's view, my hypothesis is that the Yogācāra idea of *vāsanā* of all *dharma*s was developed from the Sarvāstivāda theory of meditative impregnation, and it is from the same context that *vāsanā* is equated with *bīja*. To prove my hypothesis, an immediate question that needs to be answered is how the meditative cultivation could have been related to the impregnation of all *dharma*s.

It should be noted that SNS VIII.7–8, which concerns the doctrine of mere-representation/ mere-cognition (*vijñaptimātratā*), articulates that not only the images perceived in meditative concentration (*\*samādhi*) are not different from *citta*, but also the images of material matter (*\*rūpa*)<sup>199</sup> and so on in the non-concentrated state<sup>200</sup> are identical to *citta*.<sup>201</sup> This statement is also expressly referred to by Asaṅga in MSg II.7 as a *sūtra* proof of mere-representation. As persuasively argued by Schmithausen (2014, 489, 501), the Yogācāra idealism developed in close relation to meditative experience.<sup>202</sup> The idea of SNS VIII.7–8 should have been developed from the *Pratyutpanna-buddha-sammukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra*, an early Mahāyāna *sūtra* which suggests that whatever belongs to this triple sphere as well as the Buddha seen in meditative concentration are produced by *citta*.<sup>203</sup> When SNS VIII.8 implies that whatever is perceived in non-concentrated states can be taken as

<sup>199</sup> Lamotte (1935, 212) renders “*gzugs la sogs par snang ba sems kyi gzugs brnyan*” as “*des images de pensée qui ont l'apparence matérielle, etc.*” According to the commentaries on the SNS (Nozawa 1957, 195, 200), “*rūpa*” (Tib.: *gzugs*) here is interpreted as the entity (*dravya*) of blue and so on. The entity of blue color is also a material *dharma*.

<sup>200</sup> The term “*rang bzhin du gnas pa*” (*\*svabhāvāvasthita*) should be understood as an external state (*\*bāhyabhāva*), which amounts to the non-concentrated (*\*asamāhita*) state. See Nozawa (1957, 195, 200). Schmithausen (1987, 88–89) interprets it as “everyday experiences”.

<sup>201</sup> See SNS 90–91: *bcom ldan 'das rnam par lta bar bgyid pa'i ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan gang lags pa de ci lags / sems de dang tha dad pa zhes bgyi 'am / tha dad pa ma lags zhes bgyi / byams pa tha dad pa ma yin zhes bya'o // ci'i phyir tha dad pa ma yin zhe na / gzugs brnyan de rnam par rig pa tsam du zad pa'i phyir te / byams pa rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phyed ba yin no zhes ngas bshad do / ... / bcom ldan 'das sems can rnam kyi gzugs la sogs par snang ba sems kyi gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa gang lags pa de 'ang sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags zhes bgyi 'am / bka' stsal pa / byams pa tha dad pa ma yin zhes bya ste / Cf. T16, no. 676, 698a27–b11. See Nozawa (1957, 191–200). For relevant discussion, see Schmithausen (1987, 88–89: #5.5.1).*

<sup>202</sup> A few objections to Schmithausen's theory are also discussed in Schmithausen 2014, 389–91: §340–§342.

<sup>203</sup> PratyS 36 (§3L)–37 (§3O): *kham s gum pa 'di dag ni sems tsam mo // ... // sems kyi sangs rgyas byed pa ste // sems nyid kyi kyang mthong ba'o // sems nyid nga yi sangs rgyas te // sems nyid de bzhin gshegs pa'o // Cf. T13, no. 417, 899b27–c3 and T13, no. 418, 905c29–906a7.*

produced by *citta*, from the Abhidharma point of view, anything perceived, even if material, must be reducible to some mental *dharma*s conjoined with the *citta*. As observed in §4.1.1, the Sautrāntikas hold that the impregnation takes place not only in the concentrated *citta-caittas*, but also in the non-concentrated states. Hence, the Yogācāra idealistic theory of the impregnation of all *dharma*s in *ālayavijñāna* must postulate the Sautrāntika position of impregnation in non-concentrated mental state. The introduction of the Sautrāntika theory of impregnation in both meditative and non-meditative states made possible the Yogācāra doctrine that the mechanism of impregnation between concentrated *citta-caittas* can be extended to between *ālayavijñāna*, which is the *citta* that contains all *bījas*, and all manifested *dharma*s.

It can be seen that the Sautrāntika position about the impregnation in non-concentrated *citta-caittas* plays the role of bridging between the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of meditative impregnation of concentrated *citta-caittas* and the Yogācāra theory of impregnation of all *dharma*s. The crucial difference between the Abhidharma discussion and the Yogācāra tenet is that for the Mahāyāna Yogācāras, the *citta* that is impregnated by *dharma*s is *ālayavijñāna*. By contrast, the Ābhidharmikas do not recognize *ālayavijñāna* apart from *citta*.

As noted in {4.1F}, the *Abhidharmadīpa*, from its Vaibhāṣika point of view, maintains that impregnation takes place only among the *citta-caittas* conjoined with the meditative concentration (*samādhi*), thus the meditative impregnation of wholesome *dharma*s requires the simultaneity of the concentrated wholesomeness as the impregnator and the conjoined *citta-caittas* as the impregnated. The Sautrāntikas, who insist that only the present *dharma*s exist, are attacked by the Vaibhāṣikas for their failure to establish the mechanism of impregnation in two successive moments. The Yogācāras, while denying the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of tri-temporal existence, advocate the simultaneous causality, so that their theory of impregnation in *ālayavijñāna* can be justified.

What is equally important to note is that while the Sautrāntika understanding of impregnation was introduced to the Yogācāra system, the temporality of impregnation remained the same during the shift from the Abhidharma context of meditative cultivation to the Yogācāra context of all *dharma*s. For the Sarvāstivādins, as the *Abhidharmadīpa* suggests, the *citta-caittas* as the impregnated and the impregnator are co-existent and conjoined. Likewise, the Yogācāra doctrine requires the manifested *dharma*s as the impregnator to co-exist with the impregnated *bīja* in *ālayavijñāna*.

Nevertheless, the Yogācāra pattern of the simultaneous causality slightly differs

from that of the Sarvāstivāda. In the view of the Sarvāstivādins, the conjoined *citta* and *caittas*, which play the role of the impregnated and the impregnator, serve as simultaneous, mutual causes. By contrast, for the Yogācāras, the *bīja* that is impregnated by the co-existent manifestation gives rise to another *bīja* in the next moment from which the corresponding *dharma* manifests simultaneously. Such a type of successive mutual causation between the manifestation and the *bīja* does not accord with the simultaneous pattern of mutual causality implied by the Sarvāstivāda notion of conjoined cause (*saṃprayuktaka-hetu*). Rather, it follows an earlier Yogācāra idea of successive mutual causation between object-base (*vastu*) and conceptualization (*vikalpa*) seen in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh ({4.3G})<sup>204</sup>, which will be discussed in detail in §4.3. At any rate, in the Pravṛtti Portion of the VinSg<sup>205</sup>, *ālayavijñāna* is said to be impregnated by the co-arising manifesting consciousnesses (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) on the one hand, and hold the *bījas* of the operative consciousnesses for their arising in the future on the other hand.

As a result of the contextual shift<sup>206</sup> of the concept of impregnation from meditative cultivation to all *dharma*s, MSg I.15 employs the analogy of flowers perfuming sesame to explain the *vāsanā* of all *dharma*s in *ālayavijñāna*:

{4.2A} What is this so-called “imprints” (\**vāsanā*)? What is to be expressed by this expression of “imprints”?

Depending on [what is] co-arising and [co-]perishing with that *dharma*, that which is the cause (\**nimitta*) of generating that [*dharma*] is the expressed. It is just like in the case of sesame, though the flowers and the sesame that is perfumed (\**vāsita*) by the flowers co-arise and [co-]perish<sup>207</sup>, the sesame becomes the cause of generating another fragrance of those [flowers]... Thus in terms of *ālayavijñāna*, [imprints] should be understood in the same

<sup>204</sup> According to Schmithausen (2014, 357: §303.2), this paragraph does not lead to the conclusion that the individual things generated from conceptual constructions can be reduced to mere images in mind, but seemingly demonstrates that they still have objective reality.

<sup>205</sup> See Hakamaya 2001, 395–96: #I.3.(b)B, and Waldron 2003, 182.

<sup>206</sup> I only deem this situation as a contextual shift rather than a paradigm shift. “Paradigm shift” refers to the case that *x* is valid in paradigm *P*, but becomes invalid in paradigm *Q*. It means that the validity of a proposition may change because of the change of structure of knowledge while the elements remain the same. However, what I would like to suggest is that although the context changes from meditation to *ālayavijñāna* (and the terminology changes accordingly), the paradigm of impregnation remains the same—the simultaneity between *citta* and *cittas* or the impregnator and the impregnated. In other words, we may even say the Yogācāra paradigm of impregnation can be taken as being inherited from the Ābhidharmikas.

<sup>207</sup> Though the Tibetan text here uses past tense “’gags”, it is most likely a rendering of “*nirodha*”.

manner.<sup>208</sup>

By using this particular simile, Asaṅga is seemingly implying that the idea of simultaneous impregnation of *dharma*s was developed from the Sarvāstivāda theory of meditative impregnation. It is equally noteworthy that in the above-quoted passage, *vāsanā* is understood in a passive-objective sense as the impregnated imprints (§4.3.1). Thus, *vāsanā* in the MSg must be used as a synonym for *bīja*. By the same token, the some Yogācāra masters (probably \*Jayasena and \*Nanda) documented in the CWSL articulate that *bīja* is a synonym (\**paryāya*) for *vāsanā*, and *vāsanā* presupposes being impregnated (\**vāsita*), just like the fragrance of sesame [oil] emanates because of being perfumed (\**vāsita*) by flowers.<sup>209</sup>

#### 4.2.3. The Simultaneity of *Bīja* and Manifested *Dharma* and the Simultaneous Mode of Impregnation

According to this understanding, how did *bīja* of conditioned *dharma*s come to be a synonym for *vāsanā*? As also noted by Yamabe (2021, 480), in the PMBhVin, *bīja* is expressly defined as “the *vāsanā* of the attachment to the imagined nature of all *dharma*s (\**sarvadharmā-parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā*), which exists in *ālayavijñāna*” (§4.3E).<sup>210</sup> According to the Pravṛtti Portion at the beginning of the PMBhVin, the *vāsanā* of attachment to the imagined nature constitutes a part of *ālayavijñāna*’s inward appropriation (*upādāna*), which is one of the two cognitive objects (*ālambana*) of *ālayavijñāna*. The outward appropriation, which is the other cognitive object of *ālayavijñāna*, refers to the fact that *ālayavijñāna* continuously and uninterruptedly cognizes the external receptacle world (*bhājana-loka*) relying on the inward appropriation. It is noteworthy that the inward appropriation of *vāsanā* is regarded as the simultaneous cause of outward appropriation of the receptacle

<sup>208</sup> MSg I.15: *bag chags zhes bya ba 'di ci zhig / bag chags zhes brjod pa 'di'i brjod par bya ba ni ci zhe na / chos de dang lhan cig 'byung ba dang / 'gag pa la brten nas de 'byung ba'i rgyu mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ni brjod par bya ba ste / dper na til dag la me tog gis bsgos pa til dang me tog lhan cig 'byung zhing 'gags kyang til rnam de'i dri gzhan 'byung ba'i rgyu mtshan nyid du 'byung ba dang ... / bag chags des yongs su zin par chos 'dzin pa zhes bya ba ltar kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la yang tshul de bzhi du blta bar bya'o // Cf. T31, no. 1594, 134c2–10. For another English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 162–63.*

<sup>209</sup> CWSL, T31, 8b8–9: 種子既是習氣異名，習氣必由熏習而有，如麻香氣花熏故生。See also Yamabe’s English translation (2021, 464).

<sup>210</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 27b1–2; cf. T30, no. 1579, 589a9–11.

world, just like the wick-oil is the cause of light when burning a lamp-flame.<sup>211</sup> This simultaneous causality implies that the *bījas* of *dharma*s co-exist with their fruits. It should be noted that this statement only reflects one aspect of the simultaneous causality, namely the *bījas* giving rise to manifested *dharma*s. That the manifestation simultaneously impregnates the corresponding *bīja* is not stressed in the analogy of wick-oil and lamp-flame<sup>212</sup> in the VinSg. However, when it comes to the MSg, Asaṅga expressly uses the analogy of lamp-flame burning wick to describe the simultaneous mutual causation between the defiled *dharma*s and *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>213</sup>

In fact, it is against people's everyday experience that a botanical seed generates its fruit simultaneously. It thus appears to be not very likely that the metaphor of *bīja* was employed directly to denote the simultaneous cause of an active *dharma* in the first place. The Yogācāra's doctrine of *bīja* being simultaneous with its fruit is not attested in the *Maulī Bhūmi* or the VSg. Taking this into account, there could have been a doctrinal bridge through which a *bīja* in its botanical sense transforms into a *bīja* of *dharma* that is simultaneous with its manifestation—its fruit. On this issue, Harivarman's *\*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, which does not allow simultaneous causality, may lend us some support.

As noted in §4.1.2, in the *\*Tattvasiddhi*, the course of successive impregnation is regarded as identical to the growing of botanical seed in the context of meditative cultivation. Once such an idea of seed-impregnation was implanted in the Yogācāra doctrinal system which is based on the simultaneous mode of impregnation of *dharma*s, *vāsanā* and *bīja* became equated. On the other hand, it also entails the simultaneity between *bīja* and its manifestation. Thus, through the paradigm shift

<sup>211</sup> See Hakamaya (2001, 390–91): #I.1.(b)A.1: *de la nang gi len pa ni kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags dang rten dang dbang po'i gzugs so // de yang gzugs can gyi kham na'o // gzugs can ma yin pa na ni bag chags len pa kho nar zad do //* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 580a4–7; Waldron 2003, 179; Schmithausen 2014, 286. Schmithausen (1987, 90–97; 2014, 196–293) provides a detailed discussion on the idea of the twofold appropriation.

<sup>212</sup> As suggested by Schmithausen (2014, 203), the analogy of wick-oil and lamp-flame stems from *sūtra* #285 of the *Samyuktāgama* (T2, no. 99, 79c27–80b6; cf. *Samyojana-sutta* and *Dutiyasamyojanasutta*, SN #12.53–54). However, the simultaneity between wick-oil and flame-lamp is not intended in the early Buddhist texts, according to which, the flame of a lamp (*dīpa*) being sustained (*tadāhāra*) and fueled (*tadupādāna*) by wick (*vaṭṭi*) and oil (*tela*) is analogous to the growing of craving (*taṇhā*) due to the enjoyment (*assāda*) in fettering phenomena. In the *Samyuktāgama*, this analogy explains that *upādāna* arises depending on *trṣṇā* and so on up to the whole mass of suffering.

<sup>213</sup> See MSg I.17: *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos de dag dus mnyam du gcig gi rgyu nyid du gcig 'gyur bar ji ltar blta zhe na / dper na mar me'i me lce 'byung ba dang / snying po tshig pa phan tshun dus mnyam pa dang / ...* For another English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 163.

from the successive impregnation to simultaneous impregnation, the Yogācāra theory of the simultaneous causality between *bīja* and its fruit came to be established.

Here, what I intend to demonstrate is not that Harivarman is the very first person to doctrinally link *bīja* with *vāsanā* in the sense of impregnation, but rather that he is an exemplar of a number of scholars that adopted such a usage. Harivarman can be regarded as an example of those who are doctrinally connected with the Sarvāstivādins, Dārṣṭāntikas and East Indian Mahāyānists. According to his biography<sup>214</sup>, Harivarman had received a Sarvāstivāda education, but later travelled to Pāṭaliputra in Northeast India and came in contact with some Mahāyānists, while continuing to hold on to some Dārṣṭāntika doctrines (Mizuno 1931, 137). It can be imagined that there would have been a circle of Buddhists who had been influenced by the different doctrinal groups and came to support the view that the meditative impregnation can be likened to the growing of botanical seed. Ayodhyā, for example, the city where Asaṅga is said to have received the Yogācāra teachings from Maitreya-nātha<sup>215</sup>, could have been one of the places where such an idea circulated, as it is located on the way that leads from Kaśmīra to Pāṭaliputra. The date of Harivarman (circa 3<sup>rd</sup>–4<sup>th</sup> century CE)<sup>216</sup> should be earlier than, or at latest contemporary with, the compilation of the SNS, which is hypothetically dated by Deleanu (2006, 195) to around the first half of the 4<sup>th</sup> century. Therefore, there would have been sufficient time for the early Yogācāras to digest the Abhidharma idea of meditative impregnation and combine it with the concept of botanical seed. The Yogācāra's inheritance from the Sarvāstivāda and the Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika<sup>217</sup> theories of impregnation can be illustrated as below (connections underlined):

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<sup>214</sup> See T55, no. 2145, 78c3–79a20.

<sup>215</sup> See Xuanzang's *Dàtáng xīyù jì* 大唐西域記 (T51, no. 2087, 896b20–24).

<sup>216</sup> Because Harivarman was a disciple of Kumāralāta, who was a contemporary of Nāgārjuna (see Xuanzang's *Dàtáng xīyù jì*: T51, 942a16–18), the earliest limit of Harivarman should be later than the 3<sup>rd</sup> century. According to his biography, Kumārajīva, who translated the *\*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* in 412 CE, was captured in Kucha by Lü Guang in 382 CE (see T50, 331b20–c3; T55, 78a7–10). Therefore, the *\*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* must have been circulated in India before the mid-4<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>217</sup> For a detailed discussion about the relationship between the early Dārṣṭāntikas and the later Sautrāntikas who were also sometimes referred to as “Dārṣṭāntikas”, see Dhammajoti (2018, 6–38). Note that though the AKBh is reported to contain many Sautrāntika doctrines, I do not take Vasubandhu's stance as strictly loyal to the Sautrāntikas’.

&lt;Table 3&gt;

School	Temporality of Impregnation	Impregnated and Impregnator	Analogy
Sarvāstivāda	<u>simultaneous mode</u>	concentrated <i>citta-caittas</i>	flowers perfuming sesame
Dārṣṭāntika/ Sautrāntika	successive mode	concentrated <i>citta-caittas</i> or <u>non-concentrated <i>citta-caittas</i></u>	flowers perfuming sesame, <u>seeds growing into fruits</u>
Yogācāra- Vijñānavāda	<u>simultaneous mode</u>	<u>ālayavijñāna and all dharmas</u>	flowers perfuming sesame, <u>seeds producing fruits</u>

In this connection, Kondō (2016, 107) and Yamabe (2017, 22) suggest that the simultaneous mode of causality may owe its existence to the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, which provides a latent realm of *bījas*. Yamabe (2017, 20) argues that before the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, “a *bīja* and its fruit must necessarily be successive.” This opinion seems to be deduced from the mere fact that the simultaneous mode of causality is found only in the layer of the YBh where *ālayavijñāna* is discussed in detail. On this issue, it needs to be further examined whether the simultaneous causality between *bīja* and its fruit must be the result of the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, or the two concepts simply coincide.

According to what we have observed, the contextual and paradigm shift of the idea of impregnation does not necessarily require the *ālayavijñāna* to support simultaneous causality. On the issue of the impregnation of *dharmas*, the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, which is identified as *citta* in the Yogācāra, merely provides a place where all the *bījas* or *vāsanā* is stored. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the simultaneous mode of impregnation was not innately implied in the concept of *ālayavijñāna* at the very early stage of its formation. It might be because of the equation of *vāsanā* with *bīja* and the development of the doctrine of mere-representation (*vijñaptimātratā*) that the *bījas* in *ālayavijñāna* are considered to be simultaneous with the manifested *dharmas*. In this regard, the doctrine of the simultaneous impregnation of *dharmas* in *ālayavijñāna* cannot be developed earlier than the SNS and VinSg, when *vāsanā* and *bīja* became synonymous. Therefore, the mechanism of simultaneous impregnation serves as the logical premise of the simultaneity between *bīja* and its fruit, which contributes to the formulation of the theory of *ālayavijñāna*.



### 4.3. Impregnation (*vāsanā*) and Conceptualization (*vikalpa*)

#### 4.3.1. *Vāsanā* and *Vyavahāra* within the Framework of *Trisvabhāva*

According to the above discussion, the doctrine of mere-representation (*vijñaptimātratā*) in the SNS should have facilitated the application of *vāsanā* as a mechanism of impregnation in all conditioned *dharmas*. It has been pointed out by Yamabe (1989 and 2021) and Schmithausen (2014, 39) that the idea of *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharmas* is not seen in the old layer of the YBh, but appeared for the first time in the SNS and VinSg. Yamabe (1989, 52) notes that the term *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in SNS V.2 “is apparently considered as an expression belonging to the same series as the *\*vyavahāra-vāsanā*” in SNS VI.9:

{SNS V.2} For whatever sentient beings in this transmigration (*saṃsāra*) of six destinies (*gati*)... In that context, from the beginning, in the manner of depending on two [types of] appropriation (*\*upādāna*)<sup>218</sup>—the appropriation of the physical sense faculties along with bases (*\*sādhiṣṭhāna-rūpīndriyopādāna*), and the appropriation of the impregnation of conceptual proliferation of conventional verbalization<sup>219</sup> regarding phenomena<sup>220</sup>, words, and conceptualization (*\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanopādāna*)—the all-seed (*\*sarvabījaka*) *citta*, during the ripening (*\*vipāka*) and coagulation (*\*sammūrchana*)<sup>221</sup>, develops, increases, and

<sup>218</sup> Schmithausen (1987, 356) suggests that the word can be restored as “*upādāya*” according to the old Tibetan translation “*blangs pa*”.

<sup>219</sup> The Sanskrit term *vyavahāra* is generally construed in the Yogācāra school as a conventional linguistic construction. Tibetan renders it as “*tha snyad 'dogs pa*”, “linguistic designation”; Xuanzang translates the term as 言說, “speech/discourse”. Schmithausen (2014, 276 n. 1271), Buescher (2008, 29), Yamabe (2021, 479) respectively translate it as “conventional dealing”, “conventional discourse” and “designations”. Ye (2019, 769–71) translates *vyavahāra* in the MMK XXIV.10 as “conventional conception”, which is explained as the content of *saṃvṛti-satya* or the mechanism of worldly convention. Taking these opinions into account, I translate the term as “conventional verbalization”.

<sup>220</sup> Schmithausen (1987, 201, 357) renders *nimitta* here as “phenomena”, which I adopt.

<sup>221</sup> For a re-edited Sanskrit version see Schmithausen 1987, 127 (#6.3.1). Schmithausen (2014, 174) restores *jug / hé hé* 和合 as *sammūrchati*, which is more plausible than Lamotte’s restoration “*pravṛt*”. For a re-edited Sanskrit version see Schmithausen 1987, 127 (#6.3.1). Cf. YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 24: [*tatra*] *sarvabījakam vipāka-saṃgrhītam āśrayopādānād ālayavijñānam sammūrchati* | *katham punaḥ sammūrchati* | *tena saṃjāta-śareṇa śukra-śoṇita-piṇḍena saha tadviparyastālabhanato 'ntarābhavo nirudhyate* | *tannirodha-samakālam ca tasyaiva sarvabīja[ka]sya sāmāthyāt tadanya-sūkṣmendriya-mahābhūta-vyatimīśro 'nyas tatsabhāgaḥ śukra-śoṇita-piṇḍo jāyate sendriyaḥ* |

expands (\**vṛddhiṃ virūḍhiṃ vipulatām āpadyate*)<sup>222, 223</sup>

{SNS VI.9} Just as that transparent crystal met with dyes, in this manner, the impregnation of conventional verbalization (\**vyavahāra-vāsanā*) of the imagined characteristic (*parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*) in the dependent characteristic (*paratantra-lakṣaṇa*) should be seen. Just as the wrong grasping (\**mithyā-grāha*) of precious jewels [such as] sapphire, dark blue (\**mahānīla*), ruby, emerald, and gold on the transparent crystal, in this manner, the wrong grasping of the imagined characteristic on the dependent characteristic should be seen.<sup>224</sup>

Yokoyama (1985, 184–85) is undoubtedly right to note that on the one hand, the compiler(s) of the SNS was clearly aware of the relationship between language and phenomena; on the other hand, since “*bīja*” (which should be *vāsanā*) is combined with language in the SNS, the idea of \**vyavahāra-vāsanā* comes to be established, which adumbrates the notion of “*vāsanā* of linguistic expression” (\**abhilāpa-vāsanā*) in the MSg.

Regarding the above two occurrences of the term *vāsanā* in the SNS, rather than understanding it as the remaining influence of karma or defilements, I consider the term to be an action noun, which means impregnating. *Vāsanā* in this sense pertains to all conditioned *dharmas*. In this understanding, the appropriation (*upādāna*) of *vāsanā* amounts to wrongly grasping the dynamic process of the impregnation of linguistic activities. On the other hand, it also implies that such impregnation sustains

<sup>222</sup> Restored by Lamotte 1935, 55. As Matsumoto (2004, 300) points out, this expression must be derived from the *Bījasūtra* (sūtra #39 of the *Samyuktāgama*). See SN iii 558: ... *vuddhiṃ virūḍhiṃ vepullam āpajjeyya* || Cf. DN iii 228.

<sup>223</sup> SNS 55: ... *'gro ba drug gi 'khor ba 'di na sems can gang dang gang dag... der dang por 'di ltar len pa rnam pa gnyis po rten dang bcas pa 'i dbang po gzugs can len pa dang / mtshan ma dang ming dang rnam par rtog pa la tha snyad 'dogs pa 'i spros pa 'i bag chags len pa la rten nas / sa bon thams cad pa 'i sems rnam par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro* // The Sanskrit restorations in this paragraph owe to Lamotte (1935, 55). Cf. T16, no. 676, 692b8–13: .....彼彼有情.....於中最初一切種子心識成熟、展轉和合、增長、廣大，依二執受：一者、有色諸根及所依執受；二者、相名分別言說戲論習氣執受。For an English translation, see Powers 1995, 69–71. See also Yamabe's (2021, 479) partial English translation.

<sup>224</sup> SNS 62 (D no. 106, mdo sde, ca 15a2–3): *shel shin tu gsal ba [la] tshon dang phrad pa de lta bur ni gzan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la kun brtags pa 'i mshan nyid kyi tha snyad kyi bag chags* (D: +su) *blta bar bya'o / ... shel shin tu gsal ba la nor bu rin po che an <da>* (Lamotte: dha) *rnyil dang / mthon ka chen po dang / pa dma <rā ga>* (Lamotte: ral) *dang / ma rgad dang / gser du log par 'dzin pa lta bur ni gzan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la kun brtags pa 'i mshan nyid du 'dzin pa blta bar bya'o* // Cf. T16, no. 676, 693b10–14: 如彼清淨頗胝迦上，所有染色相應；依他起相上，遍計所執相言說習氣，當知亦爾。如彼清淨頗胝迦上，所有帝青、大青、琥珀、末羅羯多、金等邪執；依他起相上遍計所執相執，當知亦爾。For an English translation, see Powers 1995, 85.

the saṃsāric progression. This way of interpretation is grounded in the following reasons:

First, *upādāna*, besides its active meaning of “appropriation” or “clinging”, also bears a passive-objective meaning of “material support” (Schmithausen 2014, 203). It seems to be in the latter sense that the inner appropriation of both *vāsanā* of the attachment to the imagined nature (*\*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā*) and the physical matter of sense faculties along with bases (*\*sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpa*) is described in the Pravṛtti Portion of the PMBhVin as one of the two cognitive objects (*ālambana*) of *ālayavijñāna* (§4.2.3).<sup>225</sup> Since a cognitive object must co-arise with its corresponding consciousness according to the Yogācāras, the appropriated *vāsanā* should be understood in accordance with MSg I.15, where *vāsanā* denotes the action of impregnating and entails the simultaneity between the impregnator and the impregnated.

Second, since the contexts of SNS V.2 and VI.9 differ from the twelve-membered dependent co-arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) as seen in the SavBh (§3.3.2), *vāsanā* in the SNS can hardly be equated with the karmic imprint that maintains karmic causal efficacy in one’s serial continuity. Notwithstanding that the context of SNS V.2 concerns *saṃsāra*, which is still related to karma and defilements, the term *vāsanā* employed in these two passages should be primarily spoken of in terms of all conditioned *dharma*s. In this relation, Yamabe (2021, 478) asserts, “here *\*vyavahāra-vāsanā* is understood to be the cause of worldly phenomena that appear in front of us.” Moreover, karmic *vāsanā* is formed because of only one action (*karman*) in the past, whereas the *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* implies repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) of linguistic activities.

Third, there is no compelling textual evidence to suggest that *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* or *\*vyavahāra-vāsanā* is related to the idea of *kleśavāsanā*. Some may argue that because SNS VII.10 associates latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) with *\*vyavahāra-vāsanā*, conventional verbalization (*vyavahāra*) should be responsible for defilements (*kleśa*). However, *\*vyavahārānuśaya* should be read as a *karmadhāraya* compound. Accordingly, the term refers to the latent dispositions that are conventional verbalization. It is not the case that all conventional verbalization is latent dispositions.<sup>226</sup> The related passage is translated as follows:

<sup>225</sup> See Hakamaya 2001, 390, #I.1.(b)A.1. Yamabe (2021, 480) also takes this passage as “a direct offspring of *\*nimittanāma-vikalpa-vyavahāraprapañcavāsanā* in the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*”.

<sup>226</sup> For instance, the Noble Ones (*ārya*), who have no more *anuśaya*, still need to employ the imagined conventional linguistic expression (*\*vyavahārābhilāpa*) to deliver the supramundane wholesome

{SNS VII.10a} Sentient beings, having superimposed (\**samāropya*) the imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) on the dependent (*paratantra*) [nature] and the perfect nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*), concordantly verbalize (\**anuvyavaharanti*) the characteristic of imagined nature on the dependent and the perfect natures. In such and such manner of concordant conventional verbalization (\**anuvyavahāra*)<sup>227</sup>, the *citta* impregnated (*paribhāvita*)<sup>228</sup> by the conventional verbalization (\**vyavahāra*)<sup>229</sup>—either by the awareness as conventional verbalization (\**vyavahāra-anubodha*)<sup>230</sup> or by the latent dispositions as conventional verbalization (\**vyavahāra-anuśaya*)<sup>231</sup>—attaches (\**abhiniviśati*) to the characteristic of imagined nature

teachings. See SNS 35: *ston pas btags pa'i tshig gang yin pa de ni / kun tu rtog pa las byung ba tha snyad du brjod pa yin la / kun tu rtog pa las byung ba tha snyad du brjod pa gang yin pa de ni / kun tu rtog pa sna tshogs kyi tha snyad du brjod pa gtan yongs su ma grub pa'i phyir 'dus byas ma yin no //* Cf. T16, no. 676, 688c29–689a3.

<sup>227</sup> *Anuvyavahāra* is one of the ten causes listed in the BoBh and SavBh (YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 107). It is said to be designated upon speech (*vāc*) which is one of the fifteen bases of cause (*hetvadhīṣṭhāna*). To the best of my knowledge, there is no significant difference between *anuvyavahāra* and *vyavahāra*. The prefix *anu-* seems to only indicate that the conventional verbalization is concordant with words and conception concerning all *dharma*s (BoBh<sub>w</sub> 97: *tatra sarvadharmāṇāṃ yan nāma nāma-pūrvikā ca saṃjñā saṃjñā-pūrvakāś cābhilāpaḥ | ayam ucyate teṣāṃ dharmāṇāṃ anuvyavahāra-hetuḥ* |). Hakamaya (1994, 81–82) argues that in the Yogācāra tradition, *anuvyavahāra* or *vyavahāra* refers to the routine language activity induced in accordance with what is seen, heard, thought and recognized.

<sup>228</sup> The Tibetan *yongs su bsgos pa* is restored by Yamabe (1989, 50; 2021, 479) and Hakamaya (1994, 150) as *paribhāvita*, and by Lamotte (1935, 71) as *parivāsita*. *Parivāsita* and *paribhāvita* are used interchangeably in later Yogācāra texts. Thus, the Tibetan translators render both Sanskrit terms as *yongs su bsgos pa*. Xuanzang also renders both of them as *xūnxī* 熏習 without differentiation. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Bodhiruci translates *tha snyad btags pas yongs su bsgos pa'i sems* (\**vyavahāra-paribhāvita-citta*) as *yī míngzì xīn* 依名字心 (T16, no. 675, 671b5–8), “because of the mind of names and words”, while he faithfully uses *xūnxī* 熏習 for the two occurrences of \**vāsanā* in SNS V.2 and VI.9. According to the manner of expression in Buddhist Chinese, the Sanskrit verb (*pari-*)*bhū* is sometimes omitted in Chinese translations, while *√vās*, carrying a strong sense of impregnation/perfuming, is less likely to be ignored. Hence, the original Sanskrit term for *yongs su bsgos pa* should be *paribhāvita*.

<sup>229</sup> Lamotte (1935, 71) restores the Tibetan term *tha snyad btags pa* as *vyavahāra-prajñapti*, for he might have read the term as two separate Sanskrit words—*tha snyad* as *vyavahāra* and *btags pa* as *prajñapti*. However, it seems not so necessary, since it is seen in the SNS V.2 and VI.9 that the word *vyavahāra* is always translated as *tha snyad 'dogs pa*. Therefore, *tha snyad btags pa* in the past form could be another way of expressing *vyavahāra*.

<sup>230</sup> As also noted by both Lamotte (1935, 196, n. 13) and Yamabe (1989, 57 n. 20; 2021, 479 n. 47), the Tibetan reads *rjes su 'brel pa* (\**anubandha*), whereas Xuanzang's Chinese translation reads *suí jué* 隨覺 (\**anubodha*). Both Lamotte and Hakamaya (1994, 148) restore the word as *anubandha* according to the Tibetan translation. Yamabe, however, notes that a similar passage in the BoBhVin gives *sad pa*, which corresponds to *anubodha*. He thus suspects the Tibetan translators might have misread the Sanskrit original. Here, I adopt Yamabe's restoration.

<sup>231</sup> Hakamaya (1994, 150) suggests that another possibility of the term here might be “*anuṣṭhāna*” as a fragment of the earlier Tibetan translation reads *rjes su srong ba* and Bodhiruci reads *yòng shǐ xīn* 用使

in the dependent and the perfect natures.<sup>232</sup>

What this quote expresses is that there are two ways of impregnating *citta* by conventional verbalization: One is the conscious linguistic activity, known as “awareness” (*\*anubodha*). The other is the inner language that accompanies sentient beings in the form of “latent dispositions” (*\*anuśaya*). The second aspect suggests that even though a sentient being does not or is unable to speak, such as in the case of infants or animals, the structure of language is still inherent in one’s mind, functioning in the manner of latent dispositions. Such a kind of latent dispositions as conventional verbalization should refer to the inborn self-view (*\*sahajā satkāyadrṣṭi*). According to the SavBhVin, self-view (*satkāyadrṣṭi*) is said to have two types as the inborn (*sahaja*) and the imagined (*parikalpita*).<sup>233</sup> It is proclaimed in the ASBh that the Noble Ones on the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*), though having abandoned the impurities of the imagined self-view, may still have the inborn self-view to be abandoned on the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*).<sup>234</sup>

Moreover, similar arguments are reflected in the VinSg:

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心。However, according to the context, the original word used here is most likely to be *anuśaya*.

<sup>232</sup> SNS 70–71: *sems can rnam s gzhan gyi dbang dang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid du sgro btags nas / gzhan gyi dbang dang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la / kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid rjes su tha snyad 'dogs te / ji lta ji ltar rjes su tha snyad 'dogs pa de lta de ltar tha snyad btags pas yongs su bsgos pa'i sems tha snyad btags pa dang rjes su 'brel pa'am / tha snyad btags pa bag la nyal gyis gzhan gyi dbang dang yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid la kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid du mngon par zhen no // Cf. Xuanzang's translation (T16, no. 676, 694c1–6): 由遍計所執自性相故，彼諸有情於依他起自性及圓成實自性中，隨起言說。如如隨起言說，如是如是由言說熏習心故，由言說隨覺故、由言說隨眠故，於依他起自性及圓成實自性中，執著遍計所執自性相。 Cf. also Bodhiruci's Chinese translation (T16, no. 675, 671b5–8). See also Powers's (1995, 105–6) and Yamabe's (2021, 478–79) English translations. Yamabe (1989, 50–51) takes this passage as an illustration of *\*vyavahāra-vāsanā*.*

<sup>233</sup> See D no. 4038, *sems tsam*, zhi 108a4–5: *de la 'jig tshogs la lta ba gang zhe na / nye bar len pa'i phung po lnga po dag la bdag gam bdag gir lta ba dang / mngon par zhen pa dang sems la 'jog pa gang yin pa de ni 'jig tshogs la lta ba zhes bya'o // de 'ang rnam pa gnyis su rig par bya ste / lhan cig skyes pa dang kun brtags pa'o // de la lhan cig skyes pa ni byis pa so so'i skye bo thams cad dang tha na ri dvags dang bya rnam kyi yang yin no // kun brtags pa ni gzhan mu stegs can rnam kyi yin par blta bar bya'o // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 621b6–10.*

<sup>234</sup> ASBh 62: *sahajā satkāyadrṣṭiḥ kā bhāvanā-prahātavyā | yām adhiṣṭhāyotpanna-darśanamārgasyāpy āryaśrāvakasyāsmimāṇaḥ samudācarati | ... evam eva darśanamārgaṇa prahīṇa-parikalpita-satkāyadrṣṭi-malasyāpy āryaśrāvakasya pūrvābhīniveśābhyaśa-kṛtam aparicchinna-vastukam ātmadarśanam anuvartate yat tat punar mārgabhāvanayā prahātavyaṃ bhavātīti | Cf. T31, no. 1606, 726c10–21.*

{4.3A}(PMBhVin:) What is conception (*\*saṃjñā*)? Due to the assembly of the three, whatever grasps symbolically the designation of cognitive object (*\*ālabhāna*). That, moreover, is [twofold]: awareness (*\*anubodha*) and latent dispositions as conventional verbalization (*\*vyavahārānuśaya*). Between them, the awareness is just like that of the case of gods and human beings who are skilled in conventional verbalization; the latent dispositions as conventional verbalization are like that of unlearned infants who are unskilled in conventional verbalization, and even of beasts and birds.<sup>235</sup>

{4.3B}(BoBhVin:) Moreover, in the dependent nature (*\*paratantra-svabhāva*), the attachment (*\*abhiniveśa*) to the imagined nature should be understood in two ways: (1) awareness (*\*anubodha*) and (2) latent dispositions because of the impregnation of the repeated practice of that (*\*tad-abhyāsa-vāsanā-anuśaya*).<sup>236</sup>

Taking these two quotes together into consideration, it can be argued that the conventional verbalization (*\*vyavahāra*) functions in the way of *vāsanā* of the repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) of language. It should be noted that in the SNS and the related passages in the VinSg, the impregnation associated with latent dispositions engenders the cognition of conditioned *dharma*s. By contrast, *kleśavāsanā* in the entire YBh is incapable of producing further defilements (§5.4). Therefore, *vāsanā* of conventional verbalization cannot be immediately relevant to *kleśavāsanā*.

Fourth, SNS V.2 appears to be doctrinally influenced by a passage in the *Manobhūmi* of the YBh, which speaks of the impregnation (*paribhāvitatva*) in the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*):

{4.3C} Since the affection to individual existence (*ātmabhāva-sneha*) has been produced immediately [before the moment of death], because that basis

<sup>235</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 58b7–59a2: 'du shes gang zhe na / gsum 'dus pa nyid las dmigs par 'dogs pa la brdar 'dzin pa gang yin pa ste / de yang rjes su sad pa dang / tha snyad bag la nyal ba'o // de la rjes su sad pa ni 'di lta ste / lha dang mi tha snyad la mkhas pa rnams kyi'o // tha snyad bag la nyal ba ni 'di lta ste / byis pa tha snyad la mi mkhas pa rnams dang / tha na ri dvags dang bya rnams kyi'o // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 601c16–19. Woncheuk's explanation of the SNS VII.10 must be based on this passage, as he asserts that the *\*vyavahārānubodha* can be understood as the speech of human and celestial beings; and the *\*vyavahārānuśaya* should be understood as the universal latent dispositions that give rise to the conceptualization pervading among dumb cattle, sheep and goats (see X21, no. 369, 265c13–16).

<sup>236</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 23b5–6: gzhan yang gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid la kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen pa ni rnam pa gnyis su rig par bya ste / sad pa dang / de la goms pa'i bag chags bag la nyal ba'o // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 705b10–12. Here, neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese translation clearly shows the relation between the *vāsanā* and the *anuśayas*. However, because Arhats must have abandoned both *kleśas* and *anuśayas* whereas they still possess *kleśavāsanā*, *vāsanā* cannot be the same as *anuśaya* (see §5.4.2). In the BoBhVin, *vāsanā* is only regarded as *dauṣṭhulya*.

(*āśraya*, i.e., the all-seed consciousness) has been impregnated (*paribhāvitatva*) by previous joy (*abhirati*) at conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*) qua [one] cause, and because that [basis] has been impregnated by good and bad karma qua [the other] cause<sup>237</sup>—on account of (*adhipatiṃ kṛtvā*) those two causes, the manifestation of intermediate existence (*antarābhava*), immediately after that place [of death], comes to arise from its own seed.<sup>238</sup>

The twofold impregnation (*paribhāvitatva*) in this passage prefigures two kinds of *vāsanā* specified in the MŚg—the *vāsanā* of linguistic expression (*\*abhilāpa-vāsanā*) and the *vāsanā* of existence-link (*\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā*). According to Toryun’s *Yūjiā lùn jì* 瑜伽論記, the expression “impregnated by previous joy at conceptual proliferation qua [one] cause” in the above quote refers to the *bīja* of linguistic expression (名言種子, *\*abhilāpabīja*), which serves as the causal condition (因緣, *\*hetupratyaya*) for the production of the intermediate existence. On the other hand, the expression “impregnated by good and bad karma as a cause” refers to the impregnation of existence-link (有分熏習, *\*bhavāṅgavāsanā*), which serves as the auxiliary condition (增上緣, *\*adhipatipratyaya*) for the production of the intermediate existence. It is from the *bīja* of linguistic expression in the *ālayavijñāna* that the intermediate existence comes to arise.<sup>239</sup> Although Toryun’s explanation makes use of the terminology that is seen in later Yogācāra texts than the *Manobhūmi*, it does shed light on the idea of impregnation (*paribhāvitatva*) in quote

<sup>237</sup> Added according to Tibetan and Chinese translations.

<sup>238</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 18–19: *anantara-samutpannatvāc ca tasya ātmabhāva-snehasya pūrva-prapañcābhirati-hetu-paribhāvitatvāc ca śubhāśubhakarma-paribhāvitatvāc ca tasyāśrayasya taddhetu-dvayam adhipatiṃ kṛtvā svabījād antarābhavasya tad-deśa-nirantarasya prādurbhāvo bhavati* | Cf. T30, no. 1579, 282a13–16. The Tibetan paragraphing is slightly different from the Sanskrit and Chinese. See D no. 4035, sems tsam, tshi 10a2–3 (P no. 5536, sems tsam, dzi, 11a4–6): ... *de lus la chags pa skyes pa dang / sngon spros pa la mngon par dga’ ba’i rgyus yongs su bsgos pa dang* (P: *pas /*) *dge ba dang mi dge ba’i las kyi rgyus yongs su bsgos pas / rgyu de gnyis kyi dbang du byas te / de ma thag tu* (P: *-tu*) *rang gi sa bon las bar ma do’i srid pa / phyogs de nas bar chad med par dus gcig tu ’gag pa dang / skye ba’i tshul gyis* ... A similar passage is also found in another place in the *Manobhūmi* (YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 25): *asyāṃ punaḥ sarvabījākāyām ātmabhāvābhiniṣṛtaḥ śubhāśubha-karma-hetutve ’pi sati prapañcābhiratiḥ eva kāraṇaṃ draṣṭavyaṃ* |

<sup>239</sup> T42, no. 1828, 322b1–12: 「由我愛無間已生故」者，牒前將死起於我愛，雖次潤生愛滅，起正死心，今現舉初，故略而不說。「無始樂著戲論因已熏習」者，即是名言種子，望生中有是親因緣。「淨不淨業因已熏習故」者，有分熏習，望生中有為增上緣，故《顯揚》云：「無始熏習為因，善惡業為緣。」「彼所依體」者，中有賴耶與同時蘊為所緣體故。「由二種因增上力故」者，牒前我愛及淨不淨業名增上力。「從自種子即於是處中有異熟無間得生」者，從名言熏習自種子，即於死有滅處中有生，如種滅處即有芽生。

{4.3C}. As argued earlier, the term *paribhāvitatva* can be regarded as expressing the same meaning as *vāsanā*. Nonetheless, it does not mean that an explicit idea of *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharma*s was formed in the *Manobhūmi*. It is arguable that the idea in the *Manobhūmi* that the impregnation of previous joy at conceptual proliferation contributes to one's rebirth could have served as a direct source of the expression *\*(nimitta-nāma-vikalpa)-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in SNS V.2, whose context also concerns rebirth.

Since the BoBh, conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*) has been expressly connected with the phrase “impregnated by linguistic expression derived from conception words” (*nāma-saṃjñābhilāpa-paribhāvita*)<sup>240</sup>. The *Tattvārthapaṭala* states as follows:

{4.3D} These three types of conceptualization (*vikalpa*)—(1) the conceptualization of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-vikalpa*), (2) the conceptualization of differences (*viśeṣa-vikalpa*), and (3) the conceptualization of grasping the whole (*piṇḍagrāha-vikalpa*)—generate the object-base (*vastu*), having the name “form” (*rūpa*) and so on, which is (a) a base (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of conceptualization qua conceptual proliferation (*vikalpa-prapañca*) and (b) a cognitive object (*ālambana*) of conceptualization qua conceptual proliferation.

Based on the object-base, when conceptually proliferating (*prapañcayant*), that conceptualization, sustained (*parigrhīta*), and impregnated (*paribhāvita*)<sup>241</sup> by linguistic expression derived from conception of words (*nāmasaṃjñābhilāpa*), expands (*vicarati*)<sup>242</sup> into manifold and multifarious [notions] with regard to exactly that object-base.<sup>243</sup>

The idea of conceptualization (*vikalpa*) sustained and impregnated by the linguistic expression derived from conception of words (*nāma-saṃjñābhilāpa-paribhāvita*) in

<sup>240</sup> See BoBh<sub>w</sub> 97: *tatra sarvadharmānām yan nāma nāmapūrvikā ca saṃjñā saṃjñāpūrvakāś cābhilāpaḥ* | Nevertheless, in some Yogācāra texts, *nāman*, *saṃjñā* and *abhilāpa* are used as synonyms. (Kramer 2004, 34)

<sup>241</sup> Xuanzang reads 所顯 (T30, 489c18), “manifested”, which is perhaps “*prabhāvita*”. Cf. Tib.: *yongs su bsgoms pa*.

<sup>242</sup> Xuanzang seems to understand “*vicarati*” as “to ascertain” 計度 (T30, 489c19).

<sup>243</sup> Takahashi 2005, 107 (#8.2.2.1): *yaś ca svabhāvavikalpo yaś ca viśeṣavikalpo yaś ca piṇḍagrāhavikalpa itīme trayo vikalpā vikalpaprapañcādhiṣṭhānaṃ vikalpaprapañcālambanaṃ vastu janayanti rūpādisaṃjñakam* | *yad vastv adhiṣṭhāya sa nāmasaṃjñābhilāpaparigrhīto nāmasaṃjñābhilāpaparibhāvito vikalpaḥ prapañcayan tasminn eva vastuni vicaraty anekavidho bahunānāprakāraḥ* | An English translation is provided by Fok 2017, 178.



connection with conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*) bears remarkable resemblance to the expression *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in SNS V.2. It can be seen that increasingly greater stress has been given on linguistic activities in the Yogācāra school, as Yamabe (1989, 52) remarks. In general, the association of the notions of *vāsanā*, *vikalpa*, *vyavahāra*, and *prapañca* and so on in the SNS may find its doctrinal source in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh.

In the Pravṛtti Portion of the VinSg, the term *\*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā*<sup>244</sup>, which constitutes one part of the inner appropriation (*upādāna*) as one cognitive object of *ālayavijñāna*, stems from SNS V.2 (Schmithausen 2014, 286). On the other hand, {4.3C} in the *Manobhūmi* may also have contributed to the formation of the term, because *\*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā* is comparable with the expression *pūrva-prapañcābhirati-hetu-paribhāvitatva*. In line with this development, in another place in the PMBhVin, the same term is employed to define *bīja* in *ālayavijñāna*:

{4.3E}(PMBhVin:) What is the concise establishment/definition (*\*vyavasthāna*) of seed (*\*bīja*)? It is the impregnation of the attachment to the imagined nature<sup>245</sup> (*\*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā*) of all *dharmas*, which exists in *ālayavijñāna*. That impregnation<sup>246</sup> is not only a real existence (*\*dravya-sat*) but also a conventional existence (*\*saṃvṛti-sat*). That [impregnation]<sup>247</sup> should not be said to have a characteristic (*\*lakṣaṇa*) different from or identical to those *dharmas*, just like Suchness (*\*tathatā*) [cannot be said to be different from or identical to *dharmas*]. In that context, it should be known as being the universal grossness (*\*sarvatraga-dauṣṭhulya*<sup>248</sup>).<sup>249</sup>

<sup>244</sup> Cf. MAVBh 40: *vāsanā-samudayārthaḥ parikalpita-svabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā* |

<sup>245</sup> Cf. SNS VII.10a (see §4.3.1) and *Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn* (T31, no. 1602, 559c12–13): 於依他起自性執著初自性故，起於熏習，則成雜染。

<sup>246</sup> Park (2014, 374) mistakenly understands *\*vāsanā* here as “karmic impression”.

<sup>247</sup> According to the Tibetan translation, the subject of the sentence should be *\*saṃvṛti-sat*: “between them, the conventional existent...” (*de la kun rdzob tu yod pa ni...*). However, both Paramārtha and Xuanzang’s Chinese translations read the subject as *vāsanā*. Doctrinally, the Chinese translations are more reasonable.

<sup>248</sup> Park (2014, 374) misinterprets *\*sarvatraga-dauṣṭhulya* as *anuśaya*. However, *anuśayas* are only mental *dharmas*. By contrast, *dauṣṭhulya* in the VinSg refers to all the contaminated (*sāsrava*) *dharmas*. Though in some special contexts, *dauṣṭhulya* can also be *anuśaya*, it does not apply to the karmic imprint as Park understands. See *Manobhūmi* (YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 26): *yāni ca punar vipāka-pakṣyāṇi tadanyāvyākṛta-pakṣyāṇi ca teṣu dauṣṭhulya-saṃjñāiva nānuśaya-saṃjñā* |

<sup>249</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 27b1–3: *sa bon mdor bsdus pa’i rnam par gzhas pa yang brjod par bya*

As mentioned in §4.2.3, this passage is perhaps the earliest place where the technical term *bīja* is overtly equated with *vāsanā* in the Yogācāra school. As I have argued in §4.2.2, the congruence between the seed being the potentiality of its fruit and the process of impregnation is made possible only in the context of meditative impregnation on the basis of successive causality. With the equation between *bīja* and *vāsanā*, the term *vāsanā* which originally refers to the process of impregnation, also came to be understood as the impregnated. It seems to be grammatically possible to take the neuter *vāsana* as having a passive-objective sense, namely, to understand *vāsana* as *vāsyā*, that which is to be impregnated.<sup>250</sup> Although the feminine form *vāsanā* always expresses an abstract sense and thus is more likely to denote the act of impregnating, it is plausible that the Buddhists, especially the Yogācāras, did not seriously differentiate the active sense expressed by *vāsanā* from the passive-objective sense delivered by *vāsana*. As a consequence, for the later Yogācāras, *vāsanā* is understood as both the act of dynamic impregnation and the imprints which is synonymous with *bīja*. Briefly speaking, the above analysis can be formalized as: *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* = *\*vyavahāra-vāsanā* = *\*parikalpita-svabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā* = *bīja*.

In connection with {4.3E}, the AS also describes the all-seed *citta* as the *ālayavijñāna* impregnated (*paribhāvita*) by the *vāsanā* of aggregates (*skandha*), elements (*dhātu*), and sense-bases (*āyatana*) on the ground that their impregnation (*vāsanā*) has been accumulated.<sup>251</sup> In this context, both the active and passive-objective senses of *vāsanā*—impregnation or impregnator and the impregnated one—are reflected: on the one hand, *ālayavijñāna* is impregnated by the impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s; on the other hand, the accumulation of *vāsanā*

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*ste / sa bon mdor bsdus pa'i rnam par gzhas pa gang zhe na / chos thams cad kyi kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la yod pa gang yin pa ste / bag chags de yang rdzas su yod pa dang / kun rdzob tu yod pa'o // de la kun rdzob tu yod pa ni chos de dag la gzhan dang gzhan ma yin pa'i mtshan nyid du brjod par mi bya ba ste / 'di lta ste dper na de bzhin nyid yin no // de yang kun du 'gro ba'i gnas ngan len yin par brjod par bya'o // Cf. Xuanzang's translation (T30, no. 1579, 589a9–13): 云何略說安立種子？謂於阿賴耶識中，一切諸法遍計自性妄執習氣，是名安立種子。然此習氣是實物有，是世俗有。望彼諸法不可定說異不異相，猶如真如。即此亦名遍行龐重。Cf. also Paramārtha's translation (T30, no. 1584, 1025c9–13): 復更略說諸種子相而得在於阿羅耶識中，一切諸法著妄想習。以此習氣亦名實法、亦名假名。從此諸法無別有相、無不別相，如真如法。復次習氣遍一切處諸惡罪法。See also Yamabe's slightly different Sanskrit restoration and English translation (2021, 480).*

<sup>250</sup> I thank Professor Nobuyoshi Yamabe for pointing out this possibility.

<sup>251</sup> AS 11–12: *tatra cittam katamat | skandha-dhātva-āyatana-vāsanā-paribhāvitam sarvavijakam ālayavijñānam vipākavijñānam ādānavijñānam api tat | tad-vāsanā-citātām upādāya ||*

suggests that *vāsanā* is apparently used as a synonym for *bīja*.

In addition, in {4.3E}, *vāsanā* being described as both a real existence and a conventional existence can be viewed through the *trīsvabhāva* theory. As a synonym for *bīja*, *vāsanā* contributes to the mechanism of dependent co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*). In this respect, it is a real existence. Thus, both *bīja* and *vāsanā* indicate the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) of phenomena. Meanwhile, since *vāsanā* is not as real as the perfect nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*) of phenomena, it is also regarded as a conventional existence.<sup>252</sup> The aspect of *vāsanā* being conventional reminds us of Nāgārjuna's MMK, where conventional verbalization (*vyavahāra*) indicates conventional truth (*saṃvṛti[-satya]*).<sup>253</sup> Candrakīrti further explains that "conventional" means the conventional expression (*saṃketa*), which is worldly conventional verbalization (*lokavyavahāra*).<sup>254</sup> In this regard, if "conventional existence" (*\*saṃvṛti-sat*) in {4.3E} is spoken of in the sense of conventional verbalization (*\*vyavahāra*) in accordance with the MMK, this passage should imply that the attachment to the imagined nature (*\*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa*) represents the conventional aspect of *vāsanā*. At any rate, the significance of the SNS and VinSg on the issue of *vāsanā* is that by using the new theoretical framework of the three natures (*trīsvabhāva*), *vāsanā* is connected with conventional verbalization (*vyavahāra*).

Concerning *vāsanā*'s being two types of existence, it is perhaps safe to assert that the expression *\*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā* connects *vāsanā* with the imagined nature. It is also noteworthy that according to the BoBhVin, the dependent nature is known on the basis of the attachment to the imagined nature.<sup>255</sup> If we follow the classical Yogācāric explanation as presented in the MSg<sup>256</sup>, *vāsanā*, as a synonym for *bīja* in the *ālayavijñāna*, must belong to the dependent nature. However, in the

<sup>252</sup> See Ji's commentary (T43, no. 1829, 184b15–17): 望遍計所執無體，此是依他有體，故言實；不如圓成實性，名世俗有。

<sup>253</sup> MMK XXIV.10: *vyavahāram anāśrītya paramārtho na deśyate | paramārtham anāgamyā nirvāṇam nādhigamyate ||*

<sup>254</sup> *Prasannapadā* 492 (on MMK XXIV.8): *atha vā saṃvṛtiḥ saṃketo lokavyavahāra ity arthaḥ |* This is last one of the three etymological explanations of *saṃvṛti* given by Candrakīrti. Siderits and Katsura (2013, 272) suggest that this explanation is likely to be favored by Candrakīrti.

<sup>255</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 18b5: *gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid gang la brten nas rab tu shes she na / smras pa / kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa la brten nas rab tu shes so //*

<sup>256</sup> For instance, MSg II.2: *de la gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid gang zhe na / gang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i sa bon can yang dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pas bsdu pa'i rnam par rig pa'o //*

MSABh, *vāsanā* is proclaimed to belong to the imagined nature (§4.3.2). Prabhākaramitra's Chinese translation even straightforwardly identifies the *vāsanā* belonging to the imagined nature as *bīja* of mental speech (\*[*mano-*] *jalpa*).<sup>257</sup> In this connection, when discussing the content of SNS V.2, Hakamaya (1994, 103) holds that *vāsanā* as latent “imprints” depending on linguistic action (*vyavahāra*, 言語の営為) belongs to the imagined nature (*parikalpita-svabhāva*) because it is taken as pure words (*nāman*), while it also belongs to the dependent nature because of being a remainder in the *citta* and mental factors (*caitta*). It seems that there was a certain branch of the Yogācāra school which understood *vāsanā* as the imagined nature.<sup>258</sup>

In addition, when discussing the four Noble Truths, the MAV considers *vāsanā* as one type of Origination (*samudaya*):

{4.3F} The threefold meaning (*artha*) of [the Truth of] Origination (*samudaya*) is, precisely, impregnation (*vāsanā*), arising (*samutthāna*), and non-disjunction (*avisamyoga*). (MAV III.8)

The impregnation-origination is the impregnation of the attachment to the imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā*); the arising-origination is karma and defilements; the origination of non-disjunction is the non-disjunction of hindrance because of Suchness.<sup>259</sup>

Being one aspect of Origination, *vāsanā* seems to be spoken of in terms of the dependent nature. According to Vasubandhu's explanation, the Origination that is *vāsanā* refers to “the impregnation of the attachment to the imagined nature”, a term adopted from the PMBhVin of the YBh ({4.3E}). The other two meanings of Origination represent the defiled karmic aspect and the pure aspect of the dependent nature. Accordingly, *vāsanā* in the MAVBh is only considered as the impregnation of conditioned *dharmas*, and thus pertains to the dependent co-arising of all phenomena. By contrast, in the AS, *vāsanā* conspicuously expresses the idea of

<sup>257</sup> T31, no. 1604, 613c21–23: 習光者，習謂意言種子，光謂從彼種子直起義光。“As for the manifestation of *vāsanā*, ‘*vāsanā*’ refers to the seeds of mental speech; and ‘manifestation’ refers to the manifestation of the referents (\**artha*) that directly arise from those seeds.”

<sup>258</sup> Ui (1935, 386) notes that the definition of the three natures as presented in the SNS should have developed from a different doctrinal system from the one reflected in the \**Mahāyānābhīdharmasūtra*, the MSA and MAV. Yokoyama (1971) also compares five key concepts in the Yogācāra works attributed to Maitreya and concludes that the MSA, MAV and *Dharmadharmatāvibhāṅga* belong to a different tradition from the YBh.

<sup>259</sup> MAVBh 40: *trividhaḥ samudayārthaḥ | vāsanātha samutthānam avisamyoga eva ca |* (III.8) *vāsanā-samudayaḥ parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā samutthāna-samudayaḥ karma-kleśāḥ | avisamyoga-samudayaḥ | tathatāyā āvaraṇāvisamyogaḥ |*

karmic impregnation in the context of the truth of Origination. According to the AS, the truth of Origination has the characteristic of cause (*hetu-lakṣaṇa*), which means the cause (*kāraṇa*, i.e., karma and defilements) brings forth the imprints (*vāsanā*) of further rebirth. It also has the characteristic of origination (*samudaya-lakṣaṇa*), which means the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the appearance (*udaya*) in a particular group of sentient beings who have accumulated imprints (*upacita-vāsanā*).<sup>260</sup> Interestingly, the idea of karmic *vāsanā* is not alluded to in the entire MAVBh.<sup>261</sup>

#### 4.3.2. Mutual Causation between *Vikalpa* and *Vastu/nimitta*

The idea of *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in SNS V.2 should have developed in close relation to the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh, according to which, conceptualization (*vikalpa*) and object-base (*vastu*)<sup>262</sup> cause each other from beginningless time:

{4.3G} Then, in brief, these (i.e., eight types of conceptualization and three types of object-base) are twofold: (1) conceptualization (*vikalpa*); and (2) object-base (*vastu*) that is the base for conceptualization (*vikalpādhiṣṭhāna*) as well as the cognitive object of conceptualization (*vikalpā lambana*). Then, both of them should be known as being from beginningless time and causing each other (*anyonya-hetuka*). The previous conceptualization is [the cause]<sup>263</sup> leading to the manifestation (*prādurbhāva*) of the present object-base that is the cognitive object of conceptualization [as well as the base for conceptualization]. Then, the manifested present object-base, as the [base and] cognitive object of conceptualization, is the cause leading to the manifestation of the present conceptualization that takes that (object-base) as [its base and] cognitive object. In this context, not knowing thoroughly

<sup>260</sup> AS 61–62: *tathā ca samudayasatyam samāsato lakṣaṇaprabhedena caturvidham | ... | hetulakṣaṇam katamat | punarbhavavāsanāyā āhāraṇam kāraṇam hetur iti hetulakṣaṇam veditavyam || samudayalakṣaṇam katamat | teṣāṃteṣāṃ upacitavāsanānām sattvānām tasmimstasmin sattvanikāye udayasya kāraṇam iti samudayalakṣaṇam veditavyam ||*... For an English translation, see Rahula and Boin-Webb 2001, 132–33.

<sup>261</sup> On this point, Vasubandhu's MAVBh does not reveal any Sautrāntika influence. Schmithausen (1967, 135; 2014, 27 n. 53) suggests that the MAVBh, MSABh, MSgBh, and *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* might not have been composed by the same Vasubandhu whose *Viṃśatikā* and TrK and so on have notable Sautrāntika elements.

<sup>262</sup> Note that “*vastu*” in BoBh contains two aspects: (1) the base that is the Reality (*tattva*) beyond linguistic expression; (2) the object-base for conceptualization on which language is designated. See Takahashi 2005, 24–33; Deleanu 2006, 218 n. 106. Here, the term “*vastu*” is used in the second sense. For the meanings of both object and base carried by *vastu* in the BoBh, see Willis 1979, 126.

<sup>263</sup> The content within square brackets in this quotation is added based on Xuanzang's Chinese translation.

(*aparijñāna*) the present conceptualization leads to the manifestation of the object-base that is [the base and] cognitive object of that (conceptualization) in the future. And because of the production (*saṃbhāva*) of that (object-base) [in the future], again, the manifestation of conceptualization, which takes that (object-base) as a base (*tad-adhiṣṭhāna*) but also is based on that (*tad-āśrita*), definitely arises.<sup>264</sup>

From the expressions “present” (*etarhi*) and “future” (*ayātyām*) in the above passage, it can be seen that the idea of mutual causation between object-base (*vastu*) and conceptualization (*vikalpa*) in the BoBh is not discussed in terms of simultaneous causality but in terms of the successive pattern (Takahashi 2005, 30). In this context, conceptualization cannot be considered to represent solely the dependent nature as the later Yogācāras hold, but seems to also involve the imagined nature.

In the BoBhVin, when discussing the five categories concerning Reality-object (*tattvārtha*)<sup>265</sup>, such mutual causation between object-base and conceptualization comes to be further elaborated as the relationship of mutual production between phenomena (*nimitta*) and conceptualization (*vikalpa*).<sup>266</sup> According to the BoBhVin, “phenomena” is defined as “whatever object-base (*vastu*) at linguistic expression’s foundational place of speech (*\*abhilāpasya vāk-padasthāna*)”; “whatever appellations (*adhivacana*) with regard to the phenomena themselves” are called “words” (*nāman*); and “conceptualization” is explained as “the *dharma*s of *citta* and mental factors (*\*caitasika*) belonging to the triple sphere (*\*traidhātukāvacara*)”.<sup>267</sup>

<sup>264</sup> Takahashi 2005, 110 (#8.4): *tac caitad dvayaṃ bhavati samāsataḥ vikalpaś ca vikalpādhiṣṭhānaṃ vikalpālambanaṃ ca vastu | tac caitad ubhayaṃ anādikālikaṃ cānyonyahetukaṃ ca vedītavayam || pūrvako vikalpaḥ pratyutpannasya vikalpālambanasya vastunaḥ prādurbhāvāya | pratyutpannaṃ punar vikalpālambanaṃ vastu prādurbhūtaṃ pratyutpannasya tadālambanasya vikalpasya prādurbhāvāya hetuḥ || tatraitarhi vikalpasyāparijñānaṃ āyatyām tadālambanasya vastunaḥ prādurbhāvāya || tatsaṃbhāvāc ca punar niyataṃ tadadhiṣṭhānasyāpi tadāśritasya vikalpasya prādurbhāvo bhavati ||* See also Yamabe’s (2021, 476) and Fok’s (2017, 200) English translations. Cf. T30, no. 1579, 490a22–b1; T30, no. 1581, 895c12–17.

<sup>265</sup> For a detailed analysis of the five categories (*\*pañcavastu*), see Takahashi 2005, 34–49.

<sup>266</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 289a4–5: *rgyu mtshan gang las rab tu skye bar brjod par bya zhe na / smras pa / rgyu mtshan las rab tu skye ba dang / sngon gyi rnam par rtog pa las rab tu skye ba yin no // ... // rnam par rtog pa gang las rab tu skye bar brjod par bya zhe na / smras pa / rnam par rtog pa las rab tu skye ba dang / rgyu mtshan las rab tu skye ba yin no //* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 696b27–c1. It can be seen that the BoBhVin also speaks of the homogenous causality as that *nimitta* arises from *nimitta*, and that *vikalpa* arises from *vikalpa*. This may be a theoretical supplement to the mutual causation as demonstrated in the BoBh. Takahashi (2005, 48) argues that this amounts to the idea that *nimitta* and *vikalpa* can be *niṣyanda-phala*, and thus the mutual causation reflected in the BoBh is not necessarily understood in its literal sense that *vastu* or *nimitta* must arise from *vikalpa*.

<sup>267</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 287b2–3: *rgyu mtshan gang zhe na / mdor bsdu na / mngon par brjod pa’i tshig gi g’zhi’i gnas su gyur pa’i dngos po gang yin pa’o // ming gang zhe na / rgyu mtshan de nyid*

As Kramer (2005, 26, 36, 54) noted, in the BoBhVin, *\*nimitta* is synonymous with *vastu*, while *\*nāman*, which constitutes conventional verbalization (*vyavahāra*), stands for conceptual designation (*prajñapti*). Accordingly, *\*nāman* should be classified into the imagined nature, while *\*nimitta* and *\*vikalpa* should be attributed to the dependent nature (Kramer 2005, 62). In this understanding, “phenomena, words, and conceptualization” (*\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa*) in SNS V.2 reveals the mutual causation between object-base and conceptualization sustained by conceptual designation. Such constant interactions constitute the content of the conceptual proliferation of conventional verbalization (*\*vyavahāra-prapañca*).

It is noteworthy that the BoBhVin distinguishes between two types of phenomena (*nimitta*) as nature-cause (*\*prakṛti-nimitta*) and image-sign (*\*pratibimba-nimitta*). The former refers to the phenomena produced by previous conceptualization (*\*vikalpa*), and the phenomena produced and accomplished by phenomena. The latter refers to the phenomena that are imagined (*\*parikalpita*), manifested on account of conviction (*\*adhimukti*), and are not abiding-in-nature (*\*prakṛtistha*).<sup>268</sup> Taking this into account, “*nimitta*” (phenomena) that is caused by conceptualization must be the *prakṛti-nimitta* (nature-cause), which amounts to object-base (*vastu*) in the BoBh. By contrast, *pratibimba-nimitta* (image-sign) is just a manifestation in the level of the imagined nature.

Furthermore, the BoBhVin<sup>269</sup> also gives another account of the mutual causation, according to which, words (*\*nāman*) and speech (*\*jalpa*) arise relying on object-base (*\*vastu*), and on the other hand, object-base arises relying on speech (*\*jalpa*). In terms of the former aspect, the BoBhVin explains that words and speech,

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*la tshig bla dags gang yin pa'o // rnam par rtog pa gang zhe na / kham gsum na spyod pa'i sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos rnam so // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 696a2–4.*

<sup>268</sup> See D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 4a4–5: *yang rgyu mtshan gzhan gnyis te / rang bzhin rgyu mtshan dang / gzugs brnyan rgyu mtshan no // rang bzhin rgyu mtshan gang zhe na / sngon gyi rnam par rtog pas bskyed pa'i mtshan ma dang / mtshan mas bskyed pa grags pa'i mtshan ma'o // gzugs brnyan rgyu mtshan gang zhe na / kun brtags pa gang yin pa de ni mos pas snang ba yin gyi / rang bzhin du gnas pa ni ma yin no // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 697b8–11. See also Takahashi's Japanese translation (2005, 191).*

<sup>269</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 22a1–3: *gzhan yang gcig gi skye ba'i gnas gcig yin pa'i phyir te / 'di ltar dngos po la brten nas brjod pa skye ba yang dmigs la / brjod pa la brten nas kyang dngos po skye ba dmigs pa'i phyir te 'di lta ste / dper na 'jig rten pa dag dngos po yod na / ming du yang brjod pas rab tu rtog par byed kyi / dngos po med pa la ni yongs su rtog par mi nus pas / de ltar na dngos po la brten nas ming dang brjod pa skye bar dmigs pa yin no // 'di lta ste / dper na bsam gtan pa so so'i bdag nyid la bsam gtan byed pa na / ji lta ji ltar yid la brjod pa'i yid la byed pa de lta de ltar sems kyi rgyud du gtogs pa'i shes bya'i dngos po dang cha mthun pa'i gzugs brnyan dag snang bar 'gyur ba'i tshul gyis 'byung bar 'gyur bas / de ltar na brjod pa la brten nas dngos po skye ba yang pa yin no // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 704b20–27.*

which play the role of conceptualization (*\*parikalpa*), must rely on the existence of an object-base. This idea seems to be also derived from the discussion about conventional designations (*prajñapti*) in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* that those designations of “form” (*rūpa*) and so on with regard to the object-bases are said to be conventions (*saṃvṛti*).<sup>270</sup> Then, to illustrate the aspect of object-base’s arising depending on speech, the BoBhVin makes use of meditative experience: to the extent that a meditator is engaged in mentation with mental speech (*\*manojalpa-manasikāra*), in the meditator’s mental continuity, knowable things (*\*jñeya-vastu*) and their resemblant images (*\*sabhāga-pratibimba*) will arise in the manner of appearance in front. It is legitimate to say that the knowable things and their resemblant images respectively stand for the nature-cause (*\*prakṛti-nimitta*) and image-sign (*\*pratibimba-nimitta*). Hence, the fact that the object-base arises relying on speech should involve two aspects: (1) object-base arises from conceptualization and (2) conceptualization that arises from conceptualization.

In a similar vein, the MSA-*kārikā* also alludes to such a mutual causal relationship:

{4.3H} Because of the conception (*saṃjñā*)<sup>271</sup> of referents (*artha*) in conformity to speech (*jalpa*), phenomena-cause (*nimitta*) arise. The impregnation (*vāsanā*) of that (i.e., phenomena) is also because of that [speech]. The distinctive manifestation (*vikhyāna*) of the referents is the imagined characteristic. (MSA XI.38)

That which is the manifestation (*prakhyānatā*) of referents and words (*nāman*) according to the words and the referents [respectively] is the imagined characteristic, which indeed (*hi*) is the cause (*nimitta*) of the

<sup>270</sup> See Takahashi 2005, 103 (#6.2.2.2): *rūpādīsaṃjñāke vastuni yā rūpam ity evamādyāḥ prajñaptayaḥ | tāḥ saṃvṛtaya ity ucyante ||*

<sup>271</sup> In this context, *saṃjñā* is perhaps both a *caitasikadharma* but also a synonym for *nāman*. See the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* (T31, no. 1602, 481a26–28): 想者，謂名句文身熏習為緣；從阿賴耶識種子所生，依心所起；與心俱轉，相應取相為體；發言議為業。 Scholars have different understandings about the relationship between *artha* and *saṃjñā*. Ui (1961, 220) understands the compound *yathā-jalpārtha-saṃjñā* as “the referents and conceptions according to mental speech” (意言の如き義と想), followed by Yokoyama (1971, 42: 言の如き想と義). However, Lévi (1911, 117: *le Signe de Connotation du Sens en fonction du Verbe*), Limaye (1992, 188: understanding of *artha*, meaning in function of word), Thurman (2004, 131: the concept of objective referents corresponding to verbalization), and Nagao (2007, 89: 言葉で云われた通りに物ありと感受すること) read “*artha-saṃjñā*” as a *tatpuruṣa* compound.



conceptualization of non-existents (*asatkālpa*<sup>272</sup>). (MSA XI.39)<sup>273</sup>

There are a few possibilities to explain these two stanzas.<sup>274</sup> In my unconventional translation above, which is at the risk of violating the traditional interpretation seen in the MSABh, I attempt to demonstrate that MSA XI.38–39 implies the mutual causation between conceptualization (*vikālpa*) and object-base (*vastu*) as seen in the BoBh.<sup>275</sup> The conception of referents in conformity to speech represents the previous conceptualization. That “because of the conception of referents in conformity to speech, phenomena-cause (*nimitta*) arise” represents that previous conceptualization causes present object-base (*vastu*) (see {4.3G}). During this course, linguistic expression derived from conception of words (*nāmasaṃjñābhilāpa*) also impregnates one’s mind ({4.3D}), forming the *vāsanā* of speech. Then, in the following stanza, that the manifestation of referents and words, being the imagined characteristic, “is the cause of the conceptualization of non-existents (*asatkālpa*)” represents that present object-base give rise to present conceptualization ({4.3G}). Moreover, *kārikā* XI.39ab also recalls the description in the BoBhVin that the imagined nature is known relying on the connection between the phenomena and words (*\*nimitta-nāma-sambandha*)<sup>276</sup>. Nevertheless, in these two stanzas in the MSA, *artha* should pertain to the imagined nature.<sup>277</sup> Accordingly, at the level of the

<sup>272</sup> Emended according to Bagchi (1970), N. Funahashi (2000, 47), and Nagao (2007, 91). Note that the Chinese translation reads 非真分別, “conceptualization of the unreal”. Similarly, the Tibetan translation reads *yang dag min rtog*. Cf. The Tibetan translation of *abhūta-parikalpa* in MSA XI.15: *yang dag ma yin kun rtog*.

<sup>273</sup> MSABh 64: *yathā-jalpārtha-saṃjñāyā nimittam tasya vāsanā | tasmād apy artha-vikhyānam parikalpita-lakṣaṇam ||* (XI.38)  
*yathā-nāmārtham arthasya nāmnaḥ prakhyānatā ca yā | <asatkālpa>(Lévi: asaṃkalpa)-nimittam hi parikalpita-lakṣaṇam ||* (XI.39) Cf. D no. 4020, sems tsam, phi 14b5–6; T31, no. 1604, 613c14–15. See also N. Funahashi 2000, 46–47.

<sup>274</sup> For example, one natural way of reading this verse could be, “The cause (*nimitta*) of the conception of referents in conformity to speech is the imprint (*vāsanā*) of that [speech]. Moreover (*api*), because of that [cause (*nimitta*)], the distinctive manifestation of the referents is the imagined nature.” However, this understanding differs from the explanation given in the MSABh, according to which, *parikalpita-lakṣaṇa* comprises three elements including (1) *yathā-jalpārtha-saṃjñāyā nimitta*, (2) *vāsanā* of that speech, and (3) *artha-vikhyāna* because of that *vāsana* (see n. 292).

<sup>275</sup> The influence of the BoBh on the MSA has been pointed out by Lévi (1911, \*10–\*11), Ui (1958, 43–45), Odani (1984, 15, 40–41), and so on.

<sup>276</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 18b4–5: *kun brtags pa’i ngo bo nyid gang la brten nas rab tu shes she na / smras pa / rgyu mtshan dang ming ’brel pa la brten nas rab tu shes so //*

<sup>277</sup> Cf. MAVBh 19: *kalpitāḥ paratantras ca pariniṣpanna eva ca | arthād abhūtakalpāc ca dvayābhāvāc ca deśitāḥ ||* (I.5)

imagined nature, referent (*artha*) and words (*nāman*)<sup>278</sup>/speech (*jalpa*) cause each other. Even, *kārikā* XI.39cd may be a double entendre: On the one hand, *asatkālpa-nimitta* is understood as a *tatpuruṣa* compound according to the MSABh and Sthiramati's commentary (Hyōdō 2010, 340–41). In this way, the imagined nature, in terms of beings the cognitive object (*ālambana*) of conceptualization, serves as a cause of the dependent nature. Such an idea is substantiated in the BoBhVin, where the imagined nature is explicitly said to bring about the dependent nature.<sup>279</sup> This idea is also comparable with SNS VII.10, according to which, the attachment to the imagined nature (*\*parikalpita-svabhāvābhīniveśa*) causes the future dependent nature (Yamabe 2021, 479), which further brings about defiled *saṃsāra*.<sup>280</sup> On the other hand, if *asatkālpa-nimitta* is read as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, qualifying *parikalpita-lakṣaṇam*, the imagined nature has as its cause the conceptualization of the non-existent grasped and grasper, which plays the role of the dependent nature.

In relation to the mutual causation in MSA XI.39–39, an elaborate analysis is given in the *Xiānyáng shèngjiào lùn* 顯揚聖教論 (henceforth *Xiānyáng*), which may lend support to my analysis above:

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*arthaḥ parikalpitaḥ svabhāvaḥ | abhūtaparikalpāḥ paratantraḥ svabhāvaḥ | grāhyagrāhakābhāvaḥ pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ |*

<sup>278</sup> Cf. MAVBh 42–43: *nimittasya vikalpasya nāmaś ca dvayasamgrahaḥ | yathāyogaṃ pañca vastūny ārabhya nimittavikalpayoḥ paratantraṇa samgrahaḥ nāmaḥ parikalpiṭena |*

<sup>279</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 24a5–7: *kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid las du dag byed ce na / smras pa / lnga ste / gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid skyed par byed pa dang / de nyid la tha snyad 'jug par byad pa dang / gang zag la mngon par zhen pa skyed par byed pa dang / chos la mngon par zhen pa skyed par byed pa dang / de gnyi ga la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags gnas ngan len yongs su 'dzin par byed pa'o //*

<sup>280</sup> SNS 71 (VII.10b): *ji lta ji ltar mngon par zhen pa de lta de ltar gzhan gyi dbang 'gi* (Lamotte: [*dang yongs su grub pa'i*]) *ngo bo nyid la kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen pa'i rgyu de dang / rkyen des phyi ma la gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid kun tu bskyed de / gzi des na / nyon mongs pa'i kun nas nyon mongs pas kyang kun nas nyon mongs par 'gyur / las kyi kun nas nyon mongs pa dang skye ba'i kun nas nyon mongs pas kyang kun nas nyon mongs par 'gyur zhing / yun ring por ... kun tu rgyug cing 'khor bar 'gyur te /...* Cf. The Chinese translations by Xuanzang (T16, no. 676, 694c6–13) and Bodhiruci (T16, no. 675, 671b8–12). “To the extent of the attachment, [sentient beings] have attached (*\*abhiniṣṭa*) to the imagined nature on the dependent nature (Xuanzang adds: and the perfect nature). On account of that cause and that condition (*\*taddhetunā tatpratrayena*), future dependent nature arises (*\*samutpadyate*). Caused by that (*\*tannidāna*), [sentient beings] become corrupted by the affliction of defilements (*\*kleśa-saṃkleśa*), affliction of karma (*\*karma-saṃkleśa*) and affliction of birth (*\*janma-saṃkleśa*), for a long time wander and transmigrate (inside the six destinies) ...” See also Powers's (1995, 107) and Yamabe's (2021, 479) English translations. Note that later Yogācāra exegetes interpret *parikalpita-svabhāvābhīniveśa* as the *paratantra-svabhāva*.

{4.3I} Moreover, it should not be maintained that referent (*\*artha*) is different from words (*\*nāman*), because the grasping of referent arises only depending on words. It is just as there are only conditioning factors (*samskāra*), which have the nature of proceeding from beginningless time, and because of the force of repeated practice (*\*abhyāsa-bala*) among ordinary beings (*\*prthagjana*), produce wrong grasping of sentient beings (*\*sattva-mithyāgrāha*) on the serial continuities of oneself and others (*\*sva-para-santāna*). In this manner, because the repeated practice of conventional verbalization (*\*vyavahāra*) over a long time impregnates (*\*pari-√bhū*) *citta*, by this means, conceptualization of non-existents (*\*asatparikalpa*) arises and attaches to the concept of *dharma*s. This wrong grasping of *dharma*s (*\*dharma-mithyāgrāha*), similar to [the wrong grasping of] sentient beings, because of being mistaken superimposition (*\*samāropa*), should be understood as inversion (*\*viparyāsa*).

How do such inversion and defiled (*\*kliṣṭa*) *dharma*s arise in a reciprocal manner? The stanza says: “Because of impregnation (*\*vāsanā/bhāvitatva*), the dependent [nature] arises. On that [dependent nature], inversion arises. In this way, they (i.e., the inverted *dharma*s and the dependent nature) condition each other, and successively (*\*parampara*) produce the continuance (*\*santāna*).”

The Commentary says: By the force of impregnation (*\*vāsanā-bala*) of this inversion, subsequent effect, which is the dependent [nature], arises. Moreover, depending on this effect, the inversion, being the grasping of *dharma*, comes about at a later time.<sup>281</sup>

In view of the *Xiānyáng*, the inverted wrong grasping of sentient beings and *dharma*s, also called conventional verbalization (*vyavahāra*), impregnates *citta* and thus brings forth the dependent nature, also known as the conceptualization of non-existents (*asatkalpa*). Again, the dependent nature is wrongly grasped as sentient beings and *dharma*s and thus causes further inversion (*viparyāsa*). In comparison with the “wrong grasping of sentient beings”, “words” (*nāman*) in the BoBhVin is said to be produced by the longing for persons (*\*pudgala-chanda*)<sup>282</sup>, and thus should be taken as the imagined nature. *Vāsanā* in this context refers to the impregnation of the

<sup>281</sup> T31, no. 1602, 557c23–558a5: 又不應執義異名異，由唯依名起義執故。譬如唯有諸行無始流轉自性，異生數習力故，於自、他相續，起眾生邪執。如是於長夜中串習言說熏修心故，由此方便，起妄遍計，執有諸法。此法邪執，猶如眾生，妄增益故，當知顛倒。如是顛倒，云何與雜染法展轉生起？頌曰：「由熏起依他，依此生顛倒。如是互為緣，展轉生相續。」論曰：由此顛倒熏習力故，後依他果自性得生。又依此果，後時復生法執顛倒。如是二法更互為緣，生死展轉，相續不斷。

<sup>282</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 289a4–5: *ming gang las rab tu skye bar brjod par bya zhe na / smras pa / gang zag gi 'dun pa las rab tu skye ba yin no //*

inverted imagined nature on the dependent nature. Nevertheless, it can be seen that *vāsanā* in the *Xiǎnyáng* also bears the meaning of a habitual imprint as it is related to repeated practice (*abhyāsa*). This should be seen as the consequence of the doctrinal synthesis at a relatively later stage. In any case, just as Takemura (1995, 305–8) points out the doctrinal connection between {4.3G} in the BoBh and {4.3I} in the *Xiǎnyáng*, the idea expressed in {4.3I} is also in agreement with MSA XI.38–39. Whereas “words” (*nāman*) is recognized as the imagined nature in the MSABh, the concept belongs to the dependent nature in the *Xiǎnyáng*. According to the *Xiǎnyáng*, the non-existence of the imagined nature is due to the fact that the imagined nature is not among the five categories (*vastu*), including phenomena (*nimitta*), words (*nāman*), conceptualization (*vikalpa*) and so on.<sup>283</sup> A corollary of this position is that words cannot be the imagined nature, but the dependent nature. This position must be the result of the adjustment of the different doctrines held by the different traditions within the early Yogācāra school. As pointed out by Yokoyama (1971), the MSA, MAV and *Dharmadharmatāvibhaṅga* attributed to Maitreya belong to a different doctrinal tradition from the YBh.

The above interpretation of MSA XI.38–39 can also be corroborated by the MAV/Bh:

{4.3J} The mentation of speech (*jalpa-manaskāra*), which is impregnated (*bhāvita*) by that speech, is the basis (*āśraya*) of that [speech].

The non-erroneousness (*aviparyāsa*) regarding the mentation is with respect to the cause (*kāraṇa*) for the manifestation (*prakhyāna*) of duality. (MAV V.16)

The “mentation consisting of speech”, which is impregnated (*paribhāvita*) by the speech [characterized by the duality of] the grasped (*grāhya*) and the grasper (*grāhaka*), is the basis for the conceptualization of grasped and grasper. [This understanding] is the non-inversion regarding the mentation. With respect to which mentation [is there non-inversion]? [It is] with respect to [understanding] the cause for the grasped-grasper manifestation (*samprakhyāna*). It is because, that mentation of speech, on account of being impregnated by the conception in form of linguistic expression (*abhilāpa-saṃjñā*), should be understood as the basis of the grasped-grasper conceptualization (*vikalpa*).<sup>284</sup>

<sup>283</sup> T31, no. 1602, 557b27–29: 遍計所執自相是無。何以故？五事所不攝故，除五事外更無所有。何等為五？一、相，二、名，三、分別，四、真如，五、正智。

<sup>284</sup> MAVBh 66: *taj-jalpa-bhāvito jalpa-manaskāras tad-āśrayaḥ | manaskāre 'viparyāso dvaya-prakhyāna-kāraṇe ||* (V.16)

In this passage, mentation (*manaskāra*)<sup>285</sup> takes the place of the conceptualization of non-existents (*asaṭkalpa*) in the MSA and plays the role of the dependent nature. The dependent nature is not only impregnated by speech (*jalpa*) or conception in the form of linguistic expression (*abhilāpasamjñā*), which stands for the imagined nature, but also brings forth the manifestation of the duality of the grasped and the grasper. The term “*bhāvita*” in MAV V.16 must express a similar idea to “*vāsanā*” in MSA XI.38. Whereas the *Xiānyáng* proclaims that what impregnates the *citta* is the wrong grasping of *dharma*s, the MAVBh explains that the agent of the impregnation is speech characterized by the duality of the grasped and the grasper, which implies the grasping of *dharma*s (*dharma-grāha*). Likewise, Sthiramati also comments that what is “impregnated by the speech [characterized by] the grasped and the grasper” refers to the growth of *bīja* for the arising of homogeneous speech in the future.<sup>286</sup> In other words, according to Vasubandhu’s *Bhāṣya* and Sthiramati’s *Ṭīkā*, impregnation in the context of the MAV is understood as the *vāsanā* of the grasping of *dharma*s being the propensity of the conceptual bifurcation into the grasped and the grasper. However, this understanding is based on the presumption that *vāsanā* is identical to *bīja*, which I take as a relatively later explanation that is not explicitly alluded to in Maitreya’s *kārikās*. At least, in terms of the *kārikā* portion, MAV V.16 must express a comparable idea with MSA XI.38.

Furthermore, mutual causation of this sort between speech and the dependent nature is reiterated by a verse in MSg II.32b: “*dharma*s are generated from the impregnation of linguistic expression (\**abhilāpa-vāsanā*), and that [*vāsanā*] is also

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*grāhya-grāhaka-jalpa-paribhāvito jalpa-manaskāras tasya grāhya-grāhaka-vikalpasyāśrayo bhavātīty ayaṃ manaskāre 'viparyāsaḥ | katamasmin manaskāre grāhya-grāhaka-samprakhyāna-kāraṇe sa hy asau jalpa-manaskāro 'bhlāpa-samjñā-paribhāvitatvāt grāhya-grāhaka-vikalpāśrayo veditavyaḥ |* For an English translation, see Dharmachakra Translation Committee 2006, 138. Cf. D no. 4027, sems tsam, bi 22a6–7. Also cf. Xuanzang’s translation of the *Bhāṣya* (T31, no. 1600, 475a16–21): 於作意無倒，知彼言熏習，言作意彼依，現似二因故。論曰：所取能取言所熏習，名「言作意」。即此作意，是所能取分別所依，是能現似二取因故。由此作意是戲論想之所熏習，名「言作意」。如實知見此作意者，應知是於作意無倒。“The ‘mental application of speech’ means being impregnated by the speech of the grasped and the grasper. This mentation is precisely the basis for the grasped-grasper conceptualization, because this is the cause of the manifestation of the twofold grasping. This mentation, because of being impregnated by the conception of conceptual proliferation, is called ‘mentation of speech’. One who truly knows and sees this mention should be known as having no inversion with respect to mentation.”

<sup>285</sup> Note that *manaskāra* here is not used in the Abhidharmic sense of a *caitta*.

<sup>286</sup> MAVT 218: *anena jalpena paribhāvito 'nāgata-tajjāṭīya jalpotpādāya bīja-paripoṣaṇam iti bhāvita ity ucyate |* Cf. D no. 4032, sems tsam, bi 297b3–4.

[generated from] exactly those [*dharmas*].”<sup>287</sup> Nevertheless, Asaṅga innovatively uses this mutually causal relationship to describe the reciprocal causation between *ālayavijñāna* and the manifesting consciousnesses (*\*pravṛttivijñāna*).<sup>288</sup> In addition, it is noteworthy that Vasubandhu’s MSgBh even argues that it is the *vāsanā* of speech and *dharmas* that cause each other.<sup>289</sup> Vasubandhu’s explanation must be based on the understanding that *vāsanā* is synonymous with *bīja* and does not reflect the idea concerning conceptualization and phenomena in the earlier Yogācāra texts examined above (see Table 4). On this issue, I am inclined to consider that the verse in Asaṅga’s MSg is derived from the related passages of those texts.

By and large, the mutual causation mentioned in various Yogācāra texts can be summarized as in the table below:

<Table 4-1>

	Past	Present	
<b>BoBh</b>	<i>vikalpa</i>	$\frac{\text{pari-}\sqrt{\text{bhū}}}{\longrightarrow} \text{vastu}$	$\rightarrow \text{vikalpa}$
<b>BoBhVin</b>	<i>*vikalpa</i>	$\rightarrow \text{*nimitta}$	$\rightarrow \text{*vikalpa}$
	<i>*parikalpita-svabhāva</i>	$\rightarrow \text{*paratantra-svabhāva}$	
<b>SNS</b>	<i>*parikalpita-svabhāvābhiniṣeṣa</i>	$\rightarrow \text{*paratantra-svabhāva}$	$\rightarrow \text{*parikalpita-svabhāva}$

<sup>287</sup> MSg II.32b: *chos rnam sbrjod pa'i bag chags las / byung ste de dag nyid las de / ...* See also Takemura (1995, 312).

<sup>288</sup> MSg II.32b (continued from the quotation in the previous footnote): *... zhes ji skad gsungs pa lta bu ste / rnam par smin pa dang 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa dag phan tshun du rkyen du gyur pas 'byung ba'i phyir ro //*

<sup>289</sup> D no. 4050, sems tsam, ri 155a1–2: *bag chags de las byung ba ni chos thams cad de / gang 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo'o // de dag nyid las te zhes bya ba ni rnam par rtog pa'i bag chags de yang chos kyi rgyu las byung ngo zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go //* For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 320.

&lt;Table 4-2&gt;

<b>MSA XI. 38–39</b>	<i>yathājalpārthasamjñā</i>	$\xrightarrow{vāsanā}$ <i>nimitta</i>	→ <i>artha-vikhyāna</i>
	<i>nāmārtha = parikalpita-lakṣaṇa</i>	→ <i>asatkālpa</i>	→ <i>parikalpita-lakṣaṇa</i>
<b>MAV/Bh V.16</b>	<i>(grāhya-grāhaka-) jalpa/abhilāpasamjñā</i>	$\xrightarrow{(pari-)\sqrt{bhū}}$ <i>jalpa-manaskāra</i>	→ <i>dvaya-prakhyāna/ grāhya-grāhaka- samprakhyāna</i>
<b>Xiānyáng</b>	<i>*vyavahāra</i>	$\xrightarrow{*(pari-)\sqrt{bhū}}$ <i>*asatparikalpa</i>	→ <i>*dharma- mithyāgrāha (=viparyāsa)</i>
	<i>viparyāsa</i>	$\xrightarrow{vāsanā}$ <i>paratantra-phala</i>	<i>viparyāsa</i>
<b>MSg</b>	<i>*dharmaś (abhilāpa)</i>	→ <i>*abhilāpa-vāsanā</i>	→ <i>*dharmaś</i>
	<i>*pravṛttivijñāna</i>	→ <i>*vipāka(vijñāna)</i>	→ <i>*pravṛttivijñāna</i>

However, according to the MSABh, which was perhaps composed by a certain Vasubandhu<sup>290</sup>, the imprint (*vāsanā*) of mental speech is considered distinctively one of the three components of the imagined nature. The other two components are the sign (*nimitta*) of the conception (*saṃjñā*)<sup>291</sup> of a referent in conformity to mental speech, and the referent (*artha*) that manifests from the imprint even without the conception of a referent for those who are not skillful in conventional verbalization.<sup>292</sup> It can be seen that the MSABh recognizes *vāsanā* to be identical to *bīja*, being a potency to manifest the referent. According to Vasubandhu's explanation, MSA XI.38 should be translated thus: “(1) The sign (*nimitta*) of the conception of referents in conformity of speech, (2) its imprint (*vāsanā*), and also (*api*) (3) the manifestation of referent because of that (i.e., *vāsanā*) are the imagined characteristic.”<sup>293</sup> Here, *nimitta* must be understood in the sense of sign-image (*\*pratibimba-nimitta*) as seen in the BoBhVin (§4.3.2). If the MSABh's interpretation were what the stanza originally meant, it would be questionable as to

<sup>290</sup> As I have explained earlier, Schmithausen (1967, 135; 2014, 27 n. 53) does not consider the author of the MSABh to be the same person who authored the *Triṃśikā* and so on.

<sup>291</sup> The MSABh seems to consider *saṃjñā* as a *caitasika-dharma*.

<sup>292</sup> MSABh 64: *tatra parikalpita-lakṣaṇaṃ trividhaṃ yathājalpārthasamjñāyā nimittaṃ tasya <ca>* (Lévi: *–ca*) *jalpasya vāsanā tasmāc ca vāsanād yo 'rthaḥ khyāti avyavahāra-kūśalānāṃ vināpi yathājalpārthasamjñāyā* | See also N. Funahashi 2000, 46.

<sup>293</sup> See the English translations by Limaye (1992, 188) and by Thurman (2004, 131). Cf. Lévi's French translation (1911, 117).

why two alternative stanzas<sup>294</sup> that express a similar idea were provided. This question may partially substantiate D'amato's conjecture (2005, 186) that earlier strata of the MSA were re-edited and commented on by another person.

On the other hand, it is also interesting to note that Vasubandhu particularly interprets “*tasmād apy artha-vikhyānaṃ*” in the verse as “*tasmāc ca vāsanād yo 'rthaḥ khyāti.*” In other words, that because of which a referent manifests comes to be recognized as the imprint (*vāsana*). However, this explanation does not appear to be strictly loyal to MSA XI.38b<sup>295</sup>, where *vāsanā* occurs in its feminine form. Although the neuter *vāsana* and the feminine *vāsanā* do not differ in meaning in Buddhist texts (§4.1 and §6.1.2), it appears that the author of the MSABh deliberately reads the neuter ablative *tasmāt* as “because of that (neuter) *vāsana*”. Again, if this were the true intention of the author of the MSA, the term *vāsanā* that occurs in verse XI.38b should have been replaced by “*vāsanam*”, because such an alteration at the end of a verse does not violate the metric rule of *śloka*.<sup>296</sup> However, this possibility is not attested in any extant manuscript of the text. Therefore, I am inclined to take the interpretation of *vāsanā* being the imagined nature in the MSABh as an Indian variant understanding, which deviates from the mainstream Yogācāra tenet.

Nevertheless, it is still necessary to ask how the MSABh could have arrived at this different understanding, inasmuch as it was followed by the \**Sūtrālaṃkāravṛttibhāṣya*<sup>297</sup> and \**Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā*<sup>298</sup>. One possibility is that the author of the MSABh understood the term \**parikalpitasvabhāvābhīniveśa-vāsanā* in the VinSg in its literal sense as the imagined nature. Another possibility is that the author of the MSABh may have understood *nimitta* in the verse as a sign-image (\**pratibimba-nimitta*) instead of a nature-cause (\**prakṛti-nimitta*). This results in taking the discussion of *vāsanā* in the same stanza as one component of the imagined nature. The author of the MSABh was perhaps not familiar with the use of *vāsanā* as impregnation of *dharma*s developed in the VinSg, and thus confuses

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<sup>294</sup> MSABh 64: *aparaparyāyo...*

<sup>295</sup> This may undermine D'amato's opinion (2005, 188) that the current form of the MSA and MSABh together “present a consistent discourse”.

<sup>296</sup> Alternatively, using *tasyāḥ* instead of *tasmāt* in verse XI.38c would also match the metre.

<sup>297</sup> For how Sthiramati explains *parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*, see D no. 4034, sems tsam, mi 185b7–187b1. See also Kramer's explanation (2016, 53–54).

<sup>298</sup> See D no. 4029, sems tsam, bi 90b1–5.



it with the *vāsanā* as tendency or traces as seen in other earlier Buddhist texts. As will be seen in §6.1.2, *vāsanā* in the MSA/Bh also means the impression of hearing the Dharma. Hence, *vāsanā*'s dynamic sense of impregnation is not reflected in the MSABh. It seems to be legitimate to claim that *vāsanā* that denotes the action of impregnating (derived from the Class-X verb √*vās*) can be classified as the dependent nature, while *vāsanā* that indicates remaining influence or imprint (derived from the Class-I verb √*vas*) should belong to the imagined nature.

Moreover, it should be noted that the perfect nature (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*) in the MSA is defined as non-conceptualization (*akalpa*), namely the removal of both the imagined nature and the dependent nature.<sup>299</sup> This is in contrast to the explanation of the dependent nature as seen in the SNS and TrK, where the perfect nature is regarded as the dependent nature being free from the imagined.<sup>300</sup> In Sponberg's (1982, 99) terms, it can be regarded that the former explanation follows the progressive model concerning the dependent nature and the latter the pivotal model.<sup>301</sup> According to the progressive model of the three natures reflected in the MSA/Bh, no matter whether *vāsanā* belongs to the imagined nature or the dependent nature, ultimately they both should be transcended to attain the realization of the perfect nature. In this regard, the role that *vāsanā* plays among the three natures may have been equivocal. At any rate, I must acknowledge that the above arguments are hypothetical.

#### 4.3.3. *Vikalpa* and the Three Types of *Vāsanā* in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*

As noted earlier, the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh also mentions that the eightfold conceptualization (*vikalpa*) causes the threefold object-base (*vastu*). The three types of object-base are (i) the object-base for the conceptualization which is conceptual proliferation (*vikalpa-prapañca-vastu*), (ii) that for self-view (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) and self-conceit (*asmimāna*), and (iii) that for greed (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), and delusion (*moha*).<sup>302</sup> Among them, the object-base for the conceptualization which is

<sup>299</sup> MSABh 65: *abhāvabhāvatā yā ca bhāvābhāvasamānatā | aśāntaśāntā 'kalpā ca pariniṣpannalakṣaṇam ||* (XI.41)

<sup>300</sup> TrBh 122, 124: *paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ |... niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitā tu yā |... ata eva sa naivānyo nānanyaḥ paratantrataḥ |...*

<sup>301</sup> Nevertheless, Sponberg opines that the progressive model is only found in the exegetical tradition in East Asia.

<sup>302</sup> See Takahashi 2005, 108 (#8.2.2.4): *evam ayam aṣṭavidho vikalpaḥ asya trividhasya vastunaḥ prādurbhāvāya saṃvartate | yad uta vikalpādhiṣṭhānasya prapañcavastunaḥ | dr̥ṣṭyasmimānasya | rāgaḍveṣamohānām ca || tatra vikalpaprapañcavastvāśritā satkāyadr̥ṣṭir asmimānaś ca |*

conceptual proliferation, as explained in {4.3D}, refers to the manifold *dharmas* which serve as the conceptualization's base (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and cognitive object (*ālambana*). Then, self-view and self-conceit can be regarded as the fundamental cause of *kleśavāsanā* according to the VSg (§5.1.1 and §5.4.2). Finally, the object-base for greed, hatred and delusion is generated by the conceptualization on agreeable (*priya*)/ good (*śubha*), disagreeable (*apriya*)/ bad (*aśubha*), and neither-agreeable-nor-disagreeable (*priyāpriyobhayaviparīta*) cognitive objects, which is connected with the operation of karma.<sup>303</sup> In this respect, the production of the three types of object-base from the eightfold of conceptualization represents the aspects of (i) multifarious conventional existence, (ii) *kleśavāsanā*, and (iii) karma. These three aspects exactly correspond to the three types of impregnation (*vāsanā*) stated in MSg I.58. Their connections are shown in the following table:

&lt;Table 5&gt;

8 types of <i>vikalpa</i>	3 types of <i>vastu</i>	3 types of <i>vāsanā</i>
<i>svabhāva-vikalpa</i>	<i>vikalpa-prapañca-vastu</i>	<i>*abhilāpa-vāsanā</i>
<i>viśeṣa-vikalpa</i>		
<i>piṇḍagrāha-vikalpa</i>		
<i>ahamiti vikalpa</i>	<i>(satkāya-)dṛṣṭy-asmimāna-vastu</i>	<i>*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā</i>
<i>mameti vikalpa</i>		
<i>priya-vikalpa</i>		
<i>apriya-vikalpa</i>	<i>rāga-dveṣa-moha-vastu</i>	<i>*bhavāṅga-vāsanā</i> <sup>304</sup>
<i>priyāpriyobhayaviparīta vikalpa</i>		

The correlations shown above do not mean that *vāsanā* takes the place of the object-base (*vastu*). Rather, the three types of *vāsanā* imply the mechanism of how the eightfold conceptualization, which reflects the different functions of mind or *ālayavijñāna*, is produced on the basis of the threefold object-base. Furthermore, according to the BoBh, relying on the object-base for the conceptualization which is conceptual proliferation, self-view and self-conceit arise; and relying on the self-view and self-conceit, greed, hatred and delusion come into being.<sup>305</sup> In a similar

*satkāyadrṣṭyasmimānāśritāḥ rāga-dveṣa-mohāḥ ||*

<sup>303</sup> See Takahashi 2005, 110 (#8.3.5–#8.3.7): *priyavikalpaḥ katamaḥ | yaḥ śubhāmanāpavastvāmbano vikalpaḥ || apriyavikalpaḥ katamaḥ | yo 'śubhāmanāpavastvāmbano vikalpaḥ || priyāpriyobhayaviparīto vikalpaḥ katamaḥ | yaḥ śubhāśubhāmanāpāmanāpātadubhayavivarjitavastvāmbano vikalpaḥ ||*

<sup>304</sup> As for the karmic *vāsanā* represented as *\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā* in MSg I.58, see §3.4.

<sup>305</sup> Takahashi 2005, 108 (#8.2.2.4): *tatra vikalpaprapañcavastvāśritā satkāyadrṣṭir asmimānāś ca |*

sense, the *Xiānyáng* also states that because of the grasping of *dharma*s (\**dharmagrāha*), ordinary beings in the world give rise to the grasping of sentient beings (\**sattvagrāha*).<sup>306</sup> Although such an interdependent causal relationship is not mentioned in the theory of threefold *vāsanā* in the MSg, it may suggest that the impregnation of linguistic expression (\**abhilāpa-vāsanā*) is the most fundamental. So to speak, in terms of causation, all the defiled impregnation is ultimately reducible to the impregnation of linguistic speech. In this regard, it is expressly proclaimed in the *Xiānyáng*, “When the grasping of *dharma*s are abandoned, it should be known that the latent dispositions (\**anuśaya*) for the grasping of sentient beings is also abandoned.”<sup>307</sup>

According to the BoBh, as long as the eight types of conceptualization are known thoroughly and properly, there will be no more manifestation of the object-base that falls into conceptual proliferation, and thus no more conceptualization. As a result, there will be the cessation of all conceptual proliferation, and thus a Bodhisattva attains the Mahāyāna *parinirvāṇa*.<sup>308</sup> In this understanding, the removal of the three types of *vāsanā* is tantamount to the transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) or attaining the Buddhahood.

Among the three types of *vāsanā* in Asaṅga’s MSg, *vāsanā* of linguistic expression (*abhilāpa*) must have been spoken of in line with the doctrinal development about the impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s in relation to conceptualization (*vikalpa*) in the Yogācāra tradition. This string of concepts includes the production of the object-base for conceptualization which plays the role of conceptual proliferation (*vikalpa-prapañca-vastu*) in the BoBh, \**vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in the SNS, *vāsanā* of phenomena (*nimitta*) because of the conception of referents in conformity to speech (*yathājalpārthasaṃjñā*) in the MSA, *abhilāpa-vāsanā* in the MSg, as well as beginningless *vāsanā* (*anādi-vāsanā*) in

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*satkāyadrṣṭy-asmimānāśritā rāgadveṣamohāḥ ||*

<sup>306</sup> T31, no. 1602, 559c4: 由法執故，世間愚夫起眾生執。

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid.*, 559c6: 法執斷時，當知亦斷眾生執隨眠。

<sup>308</sup> See Takahashi 2005, 114–115 (#10.2): *yadā ca bodhisattvena caturvidhaṃ yathābhūtaparijñānaṃ niśritya so ’ṣṭavidho vikalpaḥ pariñāto bhavati || drṣṭe dharme tasya samyakpariñānād āyatyāṃ tadadhiṣṭhānasya tadālambanasya prapañcapatitasya vastunaḥ prādurbhāvo na bhavati || tasyānudayād aprādurbhāvāt tadālambanasyāpi vikalpasyāyatyāṃ prādurbhāvo na bhavaty evaṃ tasya savastukasya vikalpasya nirodho yaḥ sa sarvaprapañcanirodho veditavyaḥ || evaṃ ca prapañcanirodho bodhisattvasya mahāyānaparinirvāṇam iti veditavyam ||*

Dharmakīrti's works<sup>309</sup>. Since such linguistic activity is also explained as the bifurcation into the grasped (*grāhya*) and the grasper (*grāhaka*) in the MAV, the doctrinal development of this concept culminated in the term “impregnation of twofold grasping” (*grāhadvaya-vāsanā*) in Vasubandhu's TrK, which will be discussed in §7.2.1. Some later Buddhists, when discussing the idea of the *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharma*s, primarily use the expression “*vāsanā* of twofold grasping”.

It is also noteworthy that with the equation between *vāsanā* and *bīja* in the Yogācāra tradition, at least since the time of Asaṅga, the dynamic impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s came to be also regarded as the potency of the *dharma*s. As a result, the two basic meanings of *vāsanā*, impregnation derived from  $\sqrt{vās}$  and imprint derived from  $\sqrt{vas}$ , become incorporated. The dynamic impregnation through repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) thus also suggests the impregnated imprint being habitual propensity for the arising of a *dharma*. Such doctrinal synthesis can be attested in Vasubandhu's MSABh and MAVBh as well as Sthiramati's commentaries (§4.3.2).

#### 4.4. Concluding Remarks

In the pan-Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, meditative impregnation (*vāsanā*), which is comparable to flowers perfuming sesame, is primarily concerned in the context of meditative cultivation (*bhāvanā*). The meditative impregnation is spoken of only in terms of the *citta-caitasika-dharma*s. Whereas the Sarvāstivādins insist that the impregnation only takes place in the concentrated/meditative (*samāhita*) state, the Sautrāntikas claim that non-concentrated/non-meditative *citta*s are also capable of being impregnated. This Sautrāntika position makes possible the Yogācāra theory that all manifested *dharma*s are impregnated in *ālayavijñāna* as the all-seed *citta*.

For the Sarvāstivādins, since *citta* and mental factors (*caitta*) mutually serve as the co-existent conjoined causes (*samprayuktaka-hetu*), the impregnator and the impregnated in the meditative impregnation must co-exist. By contrast, for the Dārṣṭāntikas who disallow simultaneous causality, such meditative impregnation is regarded as involving a series of changes. Accordingly, out of such a stance of successive causality, Harivarman in his *\*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* likens the course of

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<sup>309</sup> For instance, *Pramāṇavārtika* I (Gnoli 1960, 205): *anādi-vāsanodbhūta-vikalpa-pariniṣṭhitaḥ | śabdārthas trividho dharmo bhāvābhāvobhayāśrayaḥ* || For a detailed discussion, see Dunne 2004, 140–43.

impregnation in meditative cultivation to the gradual course of a botanical seed's germination and fruition. It was very likely that Harivarman's Dārṣṭāntika idea of associating *vāsanā* with seed (*bīja*) was shared by other Buddhists who had frequent communication with the Sarvāstivādins, Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas, and even some early Mahāyāna Yogācāras. Consequently, at the time when the SNS and the VinSg were compiled, the concept of *bīja* was connected and equated with *vāsanā* in the Yogācāra school. During the contextual shift from meditative cultivation to all *dharma*s regarding impregnation, the Sarvāstivāda theory that the impregnated necessarily co-exists with the impregnator transformed into the Yogācāra principle that a *bīja* must be simultaneous with its corresponding manifested *dharma*.

In the SNS, *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* also refers to the impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s. This concept should have been derived from the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh, particularly from the context of the reciprocal causal relationship between object-base (*vastu*) and conceptualization (*vikalpa*). In line with this idea, the SNS, the *kārikā* portion of the MSA and MAV, the *Xiānyáng* as well as the MSg also account for such mutual causation. In brief, because of speech (*jalpa*) or "conception of referents" (*arthasamjñā*) depending on words (*nāman*), phenomena (*nimitta*) as a member of object-base come into being through the impregnation of speech. Moreover, conceptualization (*vikalpa*) plays the role of conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*), which is sustained by linguistic expression (*abhilāpa*). The synonyms for linguistic expression that occur in various Yogācāra texts include conventional verbalization (*vyavahāra*) and speech (*jalpa*). In this understanding, *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* is regarded as equivalent to the *vāsanā* of linguistic expression (*\*abhilāpavāsanā*) in the MSg. Since the structure of linguistic activity is analyzed as the bifurcation of the grasped (*grāhya*) and grasper (*grāhaka*), *vāsanā* of linguistic expression is also referred to as the *vāsanā* of twofold grasping (*grāhadvayavāsanā*). In addition, the idea in the BoBh that the eightfold conceptualization brings about the threefold object-base should have prefigured the three types of *vāsanā* in *ālayavijñāna* as mentioned in the MSg.

According to the SNS, the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), based upon which the imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) is mistakenly apprehended, is also said to be caused by the attachment (*abhiniveśa*) to the imagined nature. Accordingly, *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in the SNS is also known as *\*parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśa-vāsanā* in the VinSg. Under the newly developed theoretical framework of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*), the attribution of some of

the notions mentioned above appears to be ambiguous. For example, “*vikalpa*” in the BoBh can be categorized as the imagined nature but its variant “*parikalpa*” or “*kalpa*” is certainly recognized as the dependent nature in the MAV and later Yogācāra texts. Likewise, whereas *vāsanā* in the MSABh is considered to belong to the imagined nature, *vāsanā* as a content of the Truth of Origination (*samudaya*) mentioned in the MAV should be taken as the dependent nature. At least, such an equivocal position seems to have been adumbrated in the VinSg where *vāsanā* is said to be both a real existence (\**dravya-sat*) and a conventional existence (\**saṃvṛti-sat*).

During the development of the Yogācāra doctrines, with the increasingly wide acceptance that *bīja* and *vāsanā* are synonymous, *vāsanā*’s meaning of “remaining imprint” derived from Class I verb √*vas* and its meaning of “dynamic impregnation” being an action noun derived from Class X verb √*vās* came to be unified without the necessity of discrimination. As a result, the term *vāsanā* may denote at the same time both the dynamic impregnation of *dharmas* and the imprint of past/present *dharmas*, which is capable of producing present/future *dharmas*. In other words, it was not the case that *bīja* being the impregnated became a synonym for *vāsanā*. Rather, because of the equation of *bīja* and *vāsanā* during the contextual shift from meditative cultivation to all conditioned *dharmas*, *vāsanā* that refers to the action of impregnating came to be understood as compatible with the connotation of the remaining imprint. This hermeneutic situation became more obvious in the later Yogācāra texts.



## 5. *Kleśavāsanā*: from Traces Left Behind by Defilements to Imprints Impregnated by Defilements

One of the major uses of the term *vāsanā* in the Abhidharma texts and early Mahāyāna scriptures is *kleśavāsanā*. “*Kleśa-vāsanā*” was understood by Buddhists as a *tatpuruṣa* compound, which literally means traces of defilements. Precisely speaking, *kleśavāsanā* refers to the traces left behind by defilements. This specific use of *vāsanā* would bring forth a question as to whether this connotation of *vāsanā* has a different doctrinal source from karmic *vāsanā* and *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharma*s. In response to this question, this chapter examines the theories related to *kleśavāsanā* maintained by the Vibhajyavādins, Sarvāstivādins, early Mahāyānist, Yogācāras, and the *tathāgatagarbha* school of thought. It will be noted that the concept of *kleśavāsanā* appeared in Buddhism earlier than the ideas of karmic *vāsanā* and *vāsanā* of all conditioned *dharma*s.

Among the different Buddhist schools, *kleśavāsanā* has been either associated with or interpreted through various sectarian notions such as *akliṣṭājñāna*, *jñeyāvaraṇa*, *dauṣṭhulya*, and *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. The fact of its wide acceptance among Buddhists suggests that the concept of *kleśavāsanā* was so effective in terms of its explanatory power that each Buddhist school attempted to account for it with their own doctrinal terms. It will be noted that due to the later prevalence of the Yogācāric understanding that *vāsanā* refers to impregnating, *kleśavāsanā* finally came to be broadly understood as the imprints impregnated by defilements. Nevertheless, the developed Yogācāra school only speaks of *jñeyāvaraṇa* instead of *kleśavāsanā*.

### 5.1. Early Sources of *Kleśavāsanā*

#### 5.1.1. A Canonical Source

Y. Kimura (2019, 72) suggests that the *Kṣemaka-sūtra* (no. 103) in the *Samyuktāgama* is a source of the idea of *kleśavāsanā*. According to the Āgama text, much-learned disciples, who properly contemplate that the five aggregates of appropriation (*\*upādāna-skandha*) are without a self or what belongs to a self (*\*ātmīya*), still have not abandoned self-conceit (*\*asmīti-māna*), self-desire (*\*asmīti-*



*chanda*), and self-disposition (*\*asmīty-anuśaya*) regarding the five aggregates of appropriation. They should further contemplate the five aggregates together with their origination and cessation to abandon all the remaining defilements. This course is comparable to a launderer washing the stained clothes of a wet nurse—although using various types of woodash water to wash away the (milk) stains, there is still a remaining smell (of milk), which should be further perfumed (*\*paribhāvita*) by various fragrances to make it disappear.<sup>310</sup> Y. Kimura argues that this simile describes abandoning the defilements abandonable through cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya*) after abandoning the self-view (*ātma-dṛṣṭi*) abandonable through seeing (*darśana-heya*) the Truths. However, this Āgama text does not explicitly mention *kleśavāsanā*. The original intention of this text is not necessarily related to the idea of *kleśavāsanā*.

In comparison, the Pāli parallel text, *Khemaka-sutta*, tells a nuanced simile: A launderer washes dirty stained clothes with salt, lye, and cow dung; even after rinsing them with clean water, the smell of the various detergents remains; then, the (male) owners put the washed clothes in a fragrant casket to remove the unpleasant smell.<sup>311</sup> It can be noted that no wet nurse is mentioned in the Pāli texts, and the smell (*gandha*) here is explicitly said to be that of the cleansing substances. Similarly, the Vātsīputrīya's *\*Tridharmaka-sāstra* also expressly mentions that cultivation (*\*bhāvanā*) is comparable to perfuming with fragrant flowers clothes, which retain the smell of woodash after being washed.<sup>312</sup> However, this analogy seems not to be so appropriate as that of the Sarvāstivādins' version as seen in the Chinese *Samyuktāgama*, because it is hard to understand that seeing the four Noble Truths, which is likened to washing the stained clothes, would cause some additional

<sup>310</sup> T2, no. 99, 30b24–c4: 譬如乳母衣，付浣衣者，以種種灰湯，浣濯塵垢，猶有餘氣，要以種種雜香，薰令消滅。如是，多聞聖弟子離於五受陰，正觀非我、非我所，能於五受陰我慢、我欲、我使，未斷、未知、未離、未吐，然後於五受陰增進思惟，觀察生滅，此色、此色集、此色滅，此受、想、行、識，此識集、此識滅。於五受陰如是觀生滅已，我慢、我欲、我使，一切悉除，是名真實正觀。For an English translation, see Anālayo 2014, 9–10.

<sup>311</sup> See SN iii 131: *Seyyathāpi āvuso vattham saṃkiliṭṭham malaggahitaṃ tam enaṃ sāmikā rajakassa anuppadajjeyyūṃ || tam enaṃ rajako ūse vā khāre vā gomaye vā samam madditvā acche udake vikkhāleti || || Kiñcāpi taṃ hoti vattham parisuddhaṃ pariyodātaṃ || atha khvassa hoti yo ca anusahagato ūsagandho vā khāra-gandho vā gomayagandho vā asamūhato || tam enaṃ rajako sāmikānaṃ deti || tam enaṃ sāmikā gandhaparibhāvite karaṇḍake nikkhipanti || yo pissa hoti anusahagato ūsa-gandho vā khāragandho vā gomayagandho vā asamūhato so pi samugghātaṃ gacchati ||* For an English translation see Bodhi (2000, 945).

<sup>312</sup> T25, no. 1506, 19b10–13: 如以淳灰浣衣，雖去垢白淨，猶有灰氣，然後須蔓那華等諸香華熏。如是見地清淨意禪無量諸定，斷除諸結盡極動，是謂修。Cf. an earlier abstruse Chinese translation: T25, no. 1505, 5a5–8.

defilements, which are likened to the malodor of the detergents. Rather than supposing that this simile underwent similar revision among the Vibhajyavādins (including both the Vātsīputrīyas and the Theravādins), it seems more likely that the Sarvāstivādins improved the simile. At any rate, this different recension of the story suggests that for the Vibhajyavādins, this canonical text is irrelevant to *kleśavāsanā*.

However, as Y. Kimura (*ibid.*, 73) further notes, in the MPPU, a similar simile of the remaining smell of milk stains on the clothes of a wet nurse is used to describe *kleśavāsanā*:

{5.1A} It is like the clothes of a wet nurse have been stained for a long time. Even though they become stainless after being well washed with woodash, the smell of the [milk] stains persists. The clothes are comparable to the mind of the Noble Ones, and the stains are comparable to defilements: Even though being washed with the water of wisdom, the traces (\**vāsanā*) of the stain-like defilements still persist.<sup>313</sup>

This passage must be making reference to the Sarvāstivāda's version of the *Kṣemaka-sūtra*. Considering that the MPPU is a commentary on the Larger *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, which corresponds to the PvsP, the explanation shown in {5.1A} is probably a Mahāyāna re-interpretation of the Āgama text, since abandoning *kleśavāsanā* also becomes a task of Bodhisattvas in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārga*) (§5.3). This, however, cannot lend support to the opinion that the *Kṣemaka-sūtra* of the Sarvāstivāda school implies *kleśavāsanā*.

Furthermore, in the corresponding comments of the *Kṣemaka-sūtra* in the VSg, which contains the *Māṭṛkā* of the Sarvāstivāda *Samyuktāgama*, two types of self-conceit (\**asmimāna*) are distinguished: (1) The self-conceit that occurs because of attachment (\**abhiniveśa-samudācāra*) refers to the self-view (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*) that has been abandoned by the Noble Ones. (2) The self-conceit that occurs because of absent-mindedness (\**muṣita-smṛtā-samudācāra*) on properly cultivating the Noble Path is described as being connected with the mere *vāsanā* of the abandoned self-view.<sup>314</sup> According to the Chinese exegetical tradition handed down from Xuanzang<sup>315</sup>, *vāsanā* in this context can be explained as either inborn (\**sahaja*) self-

<sup>313</sup> MPPU, T25, 260c6–9: 如乳母衣，久故垢著，雖以淳灰淨浣，雖無有垢，垢氣猶在。衣如聖人心，垢如諸煩惱，雖以智慧水浣，煩惱垢氣猶在。 Cf. Lamotte's French translation (1976, 1760).

<sup>314</sup> D no. 4039, sems tsam, zi 183b4–184a2; T30, no. 1579, 797c13–27.

<sup>315</sup> See T42, no. 1828, 832b25–c21.

view as weak latent dispositions, or the traces left behind by conceptualized (*\*parikalpitā*) self-view<sup>316</sup>. Whichever the case is, in the VSg, which is within the Śrāvakayāna framework (Deleanu 2006, 170–71), *kleśavāsanā* in the path of cultivation is considered to be implied in this Āgama text. In fact, this explanation that the absent-mindedness in the path of cultivation concerns *vāsanā* also accords with the Vaibhāṣika interpretation that *kleśavāsanā* is associated with non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*) (§5.2.2.3).

To conclude, the early Buddhist idea of likening cultivation after seeing the Noble Truths to perfuming clothes after washing with detergents was improved in the Sarvāstivāda recension of the *Kṣemaka-sūtra*. Nevertheless, the term *vāsanā* does not occur in this canonical text. The MPPU must have made use of this Āgama text to prove the *kleśavāsanā* which should be abandoned through cultivation by Bodhisattvas. On the other hand, based on this *sūtra*, the VSg spoke of the *vāsanā* of inborn self-view (*satkāyadrṣṭi*) that persists in the path of cultivation.

### 5.1.2. Sectarian Sources: Mahāsāṅghika and Vibhajyavāda

Lamotte (1974, 94–95) maintains that the idea of *kleśavāsanā* was first proposed by the Vibhajyavādins and the Mahāsāṅghikas under the influence of the Lokottaravādins. According to Lamotte, based on their Buddhology (i.e., the theories about Buddhas) and their doctrine of defilements, the Vibhajyavādins and Mahāsāṅghikas advocate the absolute purity of the Buddha—the physical body of the Buddha is uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) because the Buddha has abandoned both defilements and *vāsanā*. The proof provided by Lamotte is from the MVbh as follows:

{5.1B} The Vibhajyavādins and the Mahāsāṅghikas assert thus: The physical body (*\*janma-kāya*) of the Buddha is uncontaminated (*\*anāsrava*). Why do they make such an assertion?

It is because of relying on a *sūtra*, as the *sūtra* says: “The Tathāgata has been born in the world, dwells in the world; coming out to the world. [He] is not defiled by worldly [*dharma*s]”<sup>317</sup> Relying on this [*sūtra* passage], they claim that the physical body of the Buddha is uncontaminated.

<sup>316</sup> Note that this differs from the *anuśaya* (=bīja) of the conceptualized self-view.

<sup>317</sup> Lamotte (1974, 94) gives the Pāli parallel: “*Tathāgato loke jāto loke samvaddho lokam abhibhuyya viharati anupalitto lokena.*” (*Puppha Sutta*, SN i 140) This sentence is not found in the Chinese corresponding place in the *Samyuktāgama*. The content of the Pāli text is also slightly different from the MVbh.

Moreover, they argue that because the Buddha absolutely abandons all the defilements along with traces (\**vāsanā*), how could [his] physical body be contaminated (\**sāsrava*)?<sup>318</sup>

This argument contains both scriptural evidence (*sūtra*) and logical reasoning (*yukti*). Notably, the concept of *vāsanā* as traces left behind by defilements appears in the logical argumentation and is related to the defiled physical body. This implies that the idea of *kleśavāsanā* is not attested in early Buddhist canonical texts.

Interestingly, in another place in the MVbh and its parallel place in Buddhavarman and Daotai's older translation, this contention is attributed only to the Mahāsāṅghikas, and only the scriptural evidence is provided in the answer.<sup>319</sup> It can be inferred that the logical argumentation which employs the term *vāsanā* was developed by the Vibhajyavādins, while the early Mahāsāṅghikas may not have used this term to express the superiority of the Buddha. In fact, even the Mahāsāṅghika's \**Puṇya-vibhaṅga* (T no. 1507), a commentary on the *Ekottarikāgama*, does not allude to *kleśavāsanā* at all<sup>320</sup>, even at the places where the use of the notion should have offered a better explanation.<sup>321</sup> Moreover, as noted in §2.1, *vāsanā* in the entire *Mahāvastu* of the Lokottaravādins is not used in the negative sense of *kleśavāsanā*.

In this regard, Lamotte's hypothesis needs a reexamination. As Dhammajoti (1998, 71) remarks, over the issue that the Buddha abandons both defilements and *vāsanā*, all references used by Lamotte are confined to Mahāyāna *sūtras* and *śāstras* that are later than the MVbh. Thus, it is necessary to examine the texts before the MVbh concerning the purity of the Buddha's physical body.S

In order to prove that the Buddha's body is impure, the MVbh responds to the Mahāsāṅghika-Vibhajyavādins that although the Tathāgata has absolutely

<sup>318</sup> MVbh, T27, 871c2–7: 分別論者及大眾部師執：佛生身是無漏法，彼何故作是說？依契經故。如契經說：如來生世、住世、出現世間，不為世法所染。彼依此故，說佛生身是無漏法。又彼說言佛一切煩惱并習氣皆永斷故，云何生身當是有漏？ Cf. Lamotte's translation (1974, 94–95).

<sup>319</sup> MVbh, T27, 391c27–392a3: 謂或有執：佛身無漏，如大眾部。問：彼何故作此執？答：依契經故，如契經說：「苾芻當知！如來生在世間，長在世間，出世間住，不為世法之所染污。」彼作是說：「既言如來『出世間住，不為世法之所染污』，由此故知佛身無漏。」 Cf. AVbh, T28, 293b10–15.

<sup>320</sup> Note that in the following sentence in the \**Puṇya-vibhaṅga*, 習 *xí* means *samudaya*: 已斷諸結使，仙人不受習。(T25, no. 1507, 44a9) “Having abandoned all *kleśa* and *anuśaya*, the Noble Ones do not experience the origination [of suffering].”

<sup>321</sup> For example: 結使都盡，無能過者，故稱為尊。(T25, no. 1507, 35b17–18) “Because in terms of extinguishing all the *kleśas* and *anuśayas*, nobody can surpass [the Buddha], [the Buddha] is called the Bhagavant.”

abandoned all defilements along with *vāsanā*, since he is still able to produce the fluxes (*\*āsrava*) in others, the Buddha's body must be contaminated (*\*sāsrava*).<sup>322</sup> This answer of the Sarvāstivādins indicates that the absolute destruction of defilements along with *vāsanā* does not logically entail the purity of the Buddha's physical body. In this light, it was plausible that the two ideas evolved independently. Therefore, *kleśavāsanā* should have been a notion developed by the Vibhajjavādins without much necessary connection with the Mahāsāṅghikas.

This hypothesis can be substantiated by the *\*Śāriputrābhidharma* (T no. 1548):

{5.1C} [There are] fetters (*\*saṃyojana*), latent dispositions (*\*anuśaya*)<sup>323</sup>, occurrence of defilements (*\*kleśa-samudācāra?*), and behavior of traces (*\*vāsanā-ceṣṭā?*). Since the fetters have not ceased and not exhausted, they turn into birth, aging-and-death, [until] the heap of unsatisfactoriness (*\*duḥkha*).<sup>324</sup>

The *\*Śāriputrābhidharma*, which keeps the fundamental format of Abhidharma, is believed by many scholars (Taiken Kimura 1968, 129–40; Nakamura 1987, 108) as a work belonging to the Vibhajjavāda school with a close relationship to the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Vātsīputrīyas. As one of the earliest Abhidharma texts, the *\*Śāriputrābhidharma* often provides a list of terms without further elaboration. What {5.1C} brings into focus is that there is subtle *vāsanā* aside from defilements. In this context, *vāsanā* about defilements must be used in a negative sense. It should also be noted that such an idea of the subtle *vāsanā* is not attested in the canonical texts of the Theravāda school, which also belongs to the broader Vibhajjavāda tradition. It is probable that the notion was developed somewhat later in a sub-sect of the

<sup>322</sup> MVbh, T27, 872a27–29: 問：如來於一切煩惱并習氣皆已永斷，云何當說是有漏耶？答：雖自身中諸漏永斷，而能增長他身漏故。

<sup>323</sup> Here, 根 is possibly a typo of 眠. Accordingly, 結諸使眠 seems to denote *saṃyojana* and *anuśayas*. (I owe this interpretation to Ven. Prof. KL Dhammajoti.) A similar expression can be also found in Kumārajīva's translation of the MPPU (T25, 103c2): “諸結使眠”. On the other hand, the possibility cannot be ruled out that 根 (*gēn*) denotes root (*\*mūla*). See *\*Puṇya-vibhaṅga* (T25, no. 1507, 47a9–10): 身即結本，根辟則支從，身斷則結除。Chang (2016, 448–49) understands the first sentence of {5.1C} as “結 (*jié*) is the root of 使 (*shǐ*).” She interprets *jié* 結 as latent defilements dissociated from mind and *shǐ* 使 as manifested defilements associated with mind. Nevertheless, it should be noted that prior to Xuanzang, the term *shǐ* 使 has been often used to translate *anuśaya*, and *jié* 結 often refers to the manifested *kleśas*.

<sup>324</sup> T28, no. 1548, 690b2–3: 結、諸使根，諸煩惱行、習微氣行。結未滅、未盡，轉受生老死眾苦聚集。

Vibhajyavāda tradition and was not widely accepted by all Vibhajyavādins. In addition, {5.1C} has nothing to do with the absolute purity of the Buddha's physical body. Nor does it give any information about whether the *vāsanā* is defiled and thus contributes to *saṃsāra*. The dearth of the text does not allow us to make more conjectures, but it evinces that the Vibhajyavāda use of the notion should have become a source of the idea of *kleśavāsanā* in the Abhidharma period. As will be noted in §5.2.1, the Sarvāstivādins started to take this concept into account no earlier than the MVbh.

Another of the earliest occurrences of the term *vāsanā* in connection with defilements is in the *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya*, which is believed by many scholars<sup>325</sup> to represent “the most ancient stratum of Vinaya literature” (Nattier and Prebish 1977, 245). The *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya* mentions that Venerable Pilindavatsa had addressed the goddess of the Ganges River as well as other monks as “*śūdra*”<sup>326</sup>, except the Buddha and the eight great disciples. The Buddha explained to the monks that it was not because of Pilindavatsa's arrogance but because of his *vāsanā* acquired in the past five hundred lives as a Brahmin that Pilindavatsa keeps on addressing others as “*śūdra*.” A similar story is also found in the texts of other Buddhist schools. According to the exegetical tradition, such as in the MVbh<sup>327</sup> of the Sarvāstivāda school and the Mahāyānist MPPU<sup>328</sup>, Pilindavatsa's imperfection is regarded as a typical example of Arhats' *kleśavāsanā*. In the Pāli sub-commentaries after the 10<sup>th</sup> century, there are several notable references to Venerable Pilindavatsa's (Pā.: *Pilindavaccha*) case that is used as an illustration of the *vāsanā* pertaining to defilements.<sup>329</sup> It is noteworthy that at the end of the story in the *Mahāsāṅghika-*

<sup>325</sup> Nattier and Prebish (1977, 245) list Bareau, Pachow, Hofinger, Frauwallner, and Roth who hold the same view.

<sup>326</sup> According to other sources, such as Pāli (Ud 28–29), Bhikkhu Pilindavaccha addressed other *bhikkhus* as “outcastes” (*vasala*; Skt.: *vr̥ṣala*). Lamotte (1974, 102 n. 18) summarizes all the occurrences of the story in both the Pāli and the Chinese Buddhist canon. It can be concluded that the anecdote about Pilindavatsa was widely accepted among the Theravādins, Sarvāstivādins, Mahāsāṅghikas, and early Mahāyāna Buddhists.

<sup>327</sup> See MVbh, T27, 77a28–b1: 瞋恚習(\**dveṣa-vāsanā*)者，如尊者畢陵伽跋蹉，語殃伽神言：「小婢(\**vr̥ṣala*)！止流！吾今欲渡。」) Cf. AVbh, T28, 63b12–14.

<sup>328</sup> See MPPU, T25, 251b4–5.

<sup>329</sup> *Visuddhimaggamahāṭīkā* i 220: *Kā panāyaṃ vāsanā nāma? Pahīnakilesassāpi appahīnakilesassa payogasadisapayogahetubhūto kilesanihito sāmattiyaviseso āyasmato pilindavacchassa vasalasamudācāranimittam viya.* (Norman (1983, 148–49) notes that the *ṭīkā* of the *Visuddhimagga* should have been composed in the 10<sup>th</sup> century, and its author should be a different Dhammapāla from the author of the *Theragāthā-aṭṭhakathā* in the 7<sup>th</sup> century.)

*vinaya*, out of his respect to the Buddha, Venerable Pilindavatsa did not commit the abusive language anymore after being instructed by the Buddha:

{5.1D} “You are able to absolutely eradicate all the greed, hatred and delusion [rooted] since beginningless time, [how] cannot you abandon the habit (\**vāsanā*) developed in the past five hundred years? Do not utter the word ‘*śūdra*’ anymore from now on!”<sup>330</sup>

Since the Buddha describes Pilindavatsa as having eradicated all defilements, Venerable Pilindavatsa must be an Arhat, and thus such a spontaneous behavior is impossible to produce any unwholesome karma. In this respect, Pilindavatsa’s breaking his bad habit seems to suggest that *vāsanā* is not unabandonable by Arhats. That the *vāsanā* or habits have not been abandoned by Arhats must be only because the existence of these habits does not hinder one’s liberation. In this context, *vāsanā* should only be understood as a mere habit rather than the unabandonable *kleśavāsanā* by Arhats. Therefore, it is arguable that the concept of *kleśavāsanā* should be alien to the early Mahāsāṅghikas.

In this connection, it will be noted in §5.3 that even in the AsP, the sole occurrence of the term *vāsanā*, which is in association with “*kleśa-jñeya-āvaraṇa*”<sup>331</sup>, is very likely a later addition after the rise of the Yogācāra school (§5.4). This very early Mahāyāna scripture is said to have been circulated among some Mahāsāṅghikas at the outset (Nakamura 1987, 159). Moreover, this Mahāyāna text must have come into existence later than the Lokottaravādins’ *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya*. In this light, it can be imagined that if the idea of *kleśavāsanā* had been so popular among the Mahāsāṅghikas when the AsP was compiled, the term should have been explicitly employed. However, the term *kleśavāsanā* that denotes traces left behind

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*Sāratthadīpanīṭikā* i 217: *Kā panāyaṃ vāsanā nāma? Pahīnakilesassapi appahīnakilesassa payogasadisapayogahetubhūto kilesanissito sāmattiyaviseso āyasmato pilindavacchassa vasalasamudācāranimittaṃ viya.* (This *ṭīkā* is composed by Sāriputtatthera, who is a contemporary of King Parākramabāhu I in the 12<sup>th</sup> century.)

*Vimativinodanīṭikā* i 44: *Savāsanānaṃ kilesānaṃ viddhamsitattāti iminā paccekabuddhādīhi asādhāraṇaṃ bhagavato arahattanti dasseti tesāṃ vāsanāya appahīnatā, vāsanā ca nāma nikkilesassāpi sakalañeyyānavabodhādīdvāratayappayogaviguṇatāhetubhūto kilesanihito ākāro ciranigaḷitapādānaṃ nigaḷamokkhepi saṅkucitatāgamanahetuko nigaḷanihito ākāro viya. Yāya pilindavacchādīnaṃ vasalavohārādiviguṇatā hoti, ayaṃ vāsanāti gahetabbā.* (The author of this *ṭīkā* is said to be Kassapa Thera from the Coḷa country in South India, around the 12–13<sup>th</sup> century.)

<sup>330</sup> See the *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya* (T22, no. 1425, 467c19–468a29).

<sup>331</sup> Vaidya 1960, 86: *sarvakleśajñeyāvaraṇavāsanānusaṃdhiprahīṇatām upādāya anutpādikā bhagavan sarvadharmāṇaṃ prajñāpāramitā |*

by defilements did not appear in Mahāyāna scriptures until the larger *Prajñāpāramitās* corresponding to the Sanskrit AdsP and PvsP (§5.3). Since *kleśavāsanā* is not a key notion in the AsP, the adoption of the concept probably took place between the compilation of the AsP and the AdsP/ PvsP, shortly after the Common Era.

In brief, the *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya* uses the term *vāsanā* to denote the habit of an Arhat in his past lives that affects his present behavior. This notion should have developed independently from the Vibhajyavādins' idea that there are *vāsanā* as traces in connection with defilements as seen in the \**Śāriputrābhidharma*. In the Abhidharma period, *kleśavāsanā* became a doctrinal term, which suggests that Arhats are still in possession of habitual traces left behind by defilements. The notion of *kleśavāsanā* was adopted by the Sarvāstivādins and Mahāyānists in the context that only the Buddha is free from all defilements together with *kleśavāsanā*. Therefore, the notion also contributes to their shared doctrine that the Buddha is superior to Arhats.

### 5.1.3. *Akliṣṭājñāna* and Mahādeva's Position

Notwithstanding that the term *vāsanā* did not appear in the relevant Sarvāstivāda or Mahāsāṅghika texts earlier than the MVbh, Dhammajoti (1998, 70) contends, “the first three of the so-called ‘Mahādeva's Five Points’—that arhats can be tempted, that they still have *ajñāna*, that they still have doubt—are all suggestions of the notion of *vāsanā*.” As I have argued earlier, there seems to be no direct evidence that shows that the idea of *kleśavāsanā* originates from the Mahāsāṅghikas. In this respect, it is questionable as to whether *kleśavāsanā* must be related to Mahādeva's propositions.

The five propositions of Mahādeva should have come into being during the reign of King Aśoka or even shortly after that. In the Southern tradition, the *Kathāvatthu*<sup>332</sup>, compiled during the last half of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE (Hirakawa 1993, 91), documents detailed arguments about the five heretic opinions. The *Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā* further attributes the views mainly to the Pūrvaśāila (Pā.: *Pubbaseliya*) school, a sub-sect of the Andhaka Mahāsāṅghikas.<sup>333</sup> In comparison, the JñP of the

<sup>332</sup> Kv 164ff.

<sup>333</sup> See KvA 55–56. Among the five points, the first one, “emission of impure semen” (*asucisukkhavisaṭṭhi*), is attributed to both Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas. A. K. Warder (2000, 278) dates the appearance of the Aparasāila and the Pūrvaśāila schools to after the middle of the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE, but this is much later than the record of the five opinions in the JñP and the *Kathāvatthu*.



Sarvāstivāda school, composed around the mid-2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE (Yinshun 1968, 115), mentions these views without specifying their source.<sup>334</sup> After that, Vasumitra, one of the four great commentators of the JñP, in his *\*Samayabhedoparacanacakra*, takes note of the five opinions and calls them “the Five Points of Mahādeva”. Later, the MVbh discusses the Five Points at length. It is interesting to note that both the *Kathāvatthu* and the JñP, composed in parallel around the same time, mention almost identical sectarian views. The Northern tradition ascribes the schism of the Saṅgha during the reign of King Aśoka to the five propositions of Mahādeva. However, the record of the Northern tradition about the time and reason for the basic schism is not necessarily accurate. Hirakawa (1993, 82) suggests that the five propositions of Mahādeva should be the causes of a later schism within the Mahāsāṅghikas rather than the basic schism of the Saṅgha.<sup>335</sup> In this understanding, Mahādeva seems to have been mistakenly accounted by Vasumitra as the culprit in the basic schism of the Saṅgha. According to Vasumitra, the five propositions are also held by the Bahūśrutīyas, a sub-sect of the Mahāsāṅghikas, and the Haimavata school, a sub-sect of the Sarvāstivādins.<sup>336</sup> As Yinshun (1988, 41–45) suggests, if we accept the description in the *Samantapāsādikā* that Mahādeva, Majjhantika (Skt.: Madhyāntika), and Moggaliputta Tissa served as the ordination masters (*ācārya*) of King Aśoka’s son Mahinda, the Mahāsāṅghika, Sarvāstivāda, and Vibhajyavāda schools could have existed in the time of King Aśoka.<sup>337</sup>

In any case, the propositions attributed to either the Pūrvaśaila school or Mahādeva mainly aim to highlight the superiority of the Buddha’s wisdom—the awakening of Arhats is not as perfect as that of the Buddha. Such a doctrinal position seems to have been associated with the Vibhajyavādins’ idea of *vāsanā* as traces in connection with defilements. As a result, *kleśavāsanā* as presented in the MVbh

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<sup>334</sup> See JñP, T26, 956b1–14.

<sup>335</sup> On this issue, Hirakawa also admits, “It is unclear whether this Mahādeva should be identified with the monk of the same name who was dispatched as a missionary by Moggaliputta Tissa.”

<sup>336</sup> See Bareau 1955, 82, 111.

<sup>337</sup> Yinshun (1988, 41–45) argues that the three ordination masters of Mahinda represent the three main Buddhist sects at the time of King Aśoka. In this respect, Moggaliputta Tissa represents the Vibhajyavāda, Majjhantika the Sarvāstivāda, and Mahādeva the Mahāsāṅghika. It is plausible that this Mahādeva was dispatched by Venerable Moggaliputta Tissa to Mahisakamaṇḍala in South India, and somehow accounted for the Mahāsāṅghika opinion of the five propositions. Accordingly, the five points of Mahādeva should have been formed later than the coronation of King Aśoka (268 BCE), and earlier than the final compilation or the composition of the *Kathāvatthu* and the JñP (circa 150 BCE).

expresses the idea of the non-defiled traces left behind by the defiled habitual deeds in past lives.

In light of this new understanding of the term, the story of Pilindavatsa came to be reinterpreted in the following way: the offensive word is uttered by Pilindavatsa only because of his unexhausted *vāsanā* of the defiled deeds frequently practised in the past five hundred lives, even though he has abandoned all defilements. In this case, since Pilindavatsa is an Arhat free from defilements, his *vāsanā* cannot be defiled but still causes the speech in resemblance to a defiled action. As the mind of an Arhat must be pure, his *kleśavāsanā* must be confined to improper speech that does not influence one's awakening. When the term *vāsanā* takes on the new meaning of traces left behind by former defilements, the story came to be reinterpreted in the way that only the Buddha absolutely abandons defilements along with *vāsanā*, while Arhats, though having abandoned defilements, still have *kleśavāsanā* revealed from their body and speech.

Let us further examine the second proposition attributed to Mahādeva, “Arhats still have nescience (*\*ajñāna*),” which is regarded to be in direct relation with the concept of *kleśavāsanā*. On this issue, the MVbh records Mahādeva's evil words thus:

{5.1E} Arhats also have nescience. Now, you should not distrust yourself (about your spiritual attainment). There are two kinds of nescience: One defiled (*\*kliṣṭa*), which is absent in the Arhats; the other, non-defiled (*\*akliṣṭa*), which the Arhats still possess. It is for this reason that you do not know your own [attainments].<sup>338</sup>

This contention is explicitly labeled as an “evil view” (惡見, *\*pāpikā dṛṣṭi*) by the Vaibhāṣikas. However, the differentiation between the two types of nescience was not necessarily proposed by Mahādeva or the Mahāsāṅghikas.

According to the *Kathavatthu*, the Pūrvaśailas (Pā.: Pubbaseliya), as the opponents, maintained that Arhats may not know the name and lineage of men and women, the [right] path and wrong path, and the name of grass, wood, or tree bearing fruit, etc. When repudiating this argument, the Theravādins, who call themselves Vibhajjavādins (Pā.: Vibhajjavādī), argue that these facts do not hold good for

<sup>338</sup> MVbh, T27, 511b3–6: 諸阿羅漢亦有無知。汝今不應於己不信。謂諸無知略有二種：一者染污，阿羅漢已無；二者不染污，阿羅漢猶有。由此汝輩不能自知。

knowing the attainment of spiritual fruits.<sup>339</sup> In that context, neither the *Kathavatthu* nor its commentary uses the technical term “non-defiled nescience” (*akliṣṭājñāna*) (Jaini [1992] 2001, 170–71). This may indicate that the notion was not used in reality by the Mahāsāṅghikas, but was perhaps developed by the Sarvāstivādins. In comparison with the Vibhajyavādins’ refutation of Arhats’ nescience, what the Vaibhāṣikas actually criticize in the MVbh must be the misinterpretation that the ignorance of attaining certain spiritual fruits constitutes the non-defiled nescience. In other words, for the Vaibhāṣikas, the evil view attributed to Mahādeva is to regard a defiled situation as being non-defiled.<sup>340</sup>

Moreover, the Sarvāstivādins even document without objection the following view in the MVbh:

{5.1F} According to some, one who abandons both defiled and non-defiled nescience is called “the Buddha”; Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas can only abandon the defiled one, but not the non-defiled one, and thus cannot be called “Buddhas”.<sup>341</sup>

Therefore, it is very likely that the notion of non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*) was developed by the Sarvāstivādins rather than the Mahāsāṅghikas.

In fact, regarding the doctrinal connection between non-defiled nescience and *kleśavāsanā*, the association of the two notions can only be possible within the doctrinal framework of the Sarvāstivāda school. Morphologically speaking, the Sanskrit prefix *a-* in the term *ajñāna* may indicate absence (*abhāva*), inferiority/smallness (*alpatā*), or even improperness (*aprāśastya*).<sup>342</sup> It is only the Sarvāstivādins that consider the non-defiled nescience as intrinsically a kind of inferior intelligence (*\*prajñā*)<sup>343</sup>, which has its causal efficacy. By contrast, for the

<sup>339</sup> Kv 180: [Pubbaseliyas:] *Arahā iṭṭhipurisānaṃ nāmagottaṃ na jāneyya, maggāmaggaṃ na jāneyya, tiṇakaṭṭhavanappatīnaṃ nāmaṃ na jāneyyāti...*  
[Theravadins:] *Arahā sotāpattiphalaṃ vā sakadāgāmiphalaṃ vā anāgāmiphalaṃ vā arahattaṃ vā na jāneyyāti? Na h’evaṃ vattabbe ...pe...*

<sup>340</sup> Cf. Dhammajoti 1998, 69: “This account clearly intends to show that Mahādeva craftily distorts the doctrine of two kinds of *ajñāna*, in order to explain away his wrong-doing. While, as seen above, the Vaibhāṣika[s] too accept this doctrine, they outrightly reject the twisted version of Mahādeva...”

<sup>341</sup> MVbh, T27, 735b21–23: 有說：若斷二種無知，謂染不染，說名為佛；聲聞、獨覺唯能斷染，不斷不染，故不名佛。

<sup>342</sup> AP, s.v. “a.”

<sup>343</sup> See Fabao’s 法寶 remark (T41, no. 1822, 462a2–3): 染污無知無明為體，不染無知劣慧為體。“Defiled nescience is intrinsically ignorance (*\*avidyā*); non-defiled nescience is intrinsically inferior

Mahāsāṅghikas, nescience (*ajñāna*) should merely signify the absence of knowledge. It is hard to imagine how a non-existence leaves traces (*vāsanā*) (or, how *vāsanā* can be associated with the non-existence) and even causes bodily and vocal deeds out of nothing. Hence, the association between *kleśavāsanā* and “non-defiled nescience” must also be a Vaibhāṣika view.

## 5.2. *Kleśavāsanā* in the Sarvāstivāda School

### 5.2.1. Adoption of “*Kleśavāsanā*” in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*

Although the Sarvāstivādins spoke of the Buddha’s absolute abandonment of all defilements along with *vāsanā*, the idea of *kleśavāsanā* is not found in any one of the seven canonical Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts<sup>344</sup>. It was very likely that before the Common Era, the notion of *kleśavāsanā* was not employed by the Sarvāstivādins. Once the Sarvāstivādins adopted the notion from the Vibhajyavādins, they must have also contributed considerably to the development of the theory of *kleśavāsanā*. Since then, the notion has become an integral component of the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of defilements.

In Xuanzang’s translation of the MVbh, the term *vāsanā* (習氣/煩惱習/餘習) appears 31 times<sup>345</sup> in 18 places. Among them, besides the two places that discuss karmic *vāsanā* ({3.1A} and {3.1B}), the other 16 places deal with *kleśavāsanā*. Whereas the term *vāsanā* is found in five places in the AVbh, an old partial Chinese translation of the *Vibhāṣā* text by Buddhavarman and Daotai 道泰, the notion appears in 11 places in the part of the MVbh comparable with the AVbh. Since the compilation of the MVbh should have lasted for almost two centuries, supposing that

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intelligence.”

<sup>344</sup> I.e., *Dharmaskandha*, *Samgūtiparyāya*, *Prajñaptiśāstra*, *Vijñānakāya*, *Prakaraṇapāda*, *Dhātukāya*, and *Jñānaprasthāna*. (see AKVy 9; Willemen et al. 1998, 63)

<sup>345</sup> I exclude 2 occurrences of 餘習 (*yú xí*) that expresses the idea of remaining habituation, which seem to be Xuanzang’s addition or a rendering of *abhyāsa*: (1) MVbh, T27, 216b1–5: 阿羅漢曰：「汝等不知，我此生前曾為牝象，載佛馱都來入此國。由斯善業，今得為人。出家修道，成阿羅漢。餘習力故，日應食飯一斛五斗，恒自節量。但食一斛，如斯易滿。非我而誰？」 In the corresponding passage in the AVbh (T28, 165a), no similar expression to “habitual force” (underlined phrase) is seen at all. (2) MVbh, T27, 508b6–8: 或有說者：彼未除滅攝眾愛故，謂先於此為眾導師，後生彼天猶有餘習，由此勢力引起彼愛。(Underlines mine.)

the translation of the AVbh was faithful to the original text, it is not impossible that the remaining references to the notion that are seen only in Xuanzang's translation of the MVbh were added later to the text by the Vaibhāṣikas. In these five places, the records seen in the two translations are almost identical, except for the order of sentences. The following translation of the five places relies on Xuanzang's version:

{5.2A} The Buddha, the Blessed One, has absolutely abandoned lust (\**anunaya*) and anger (\**krodha*), equalized the hostile (\**anurodha*) and the favorable (\**virodha*), eradicated the roots of conflict, and ceased the basis of contemptuousness (\**atimāna*). ... He has no [action] similar to lust, anger, and contemptuousness, because he has absolutely abandoned traces of defilements (\**kleśavāsanā*)—unlike Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas who, though having abandoned defilements, still have traces...<sup>346</sup>

{5.2B} Moreover, the firm traces (\**vāsanā*) and the defilements that are hard to extinguish are the characteristics of proclivities (\**anuśaya*). Just like the fire caused by hard charcoal<sup>347</sup>, wherever it is, its heat is difficult to die down—these [proclivities] are also like so. [By contrast,] the traces of the two *dharma*s [of non-modesty (*āhrīkya*) and shamelessness (*anapatrāpya*)] are weak and easy to be extinguished, thus they are not proclivities. Just like the fire caused by grass and leaves<sup>348</sup>, wherever it is, its heat easily dies out—these [two *dharma*s] are also like so.<sup>349</sup>

{5.2C} Among the Noble Ones, from stream-entrants (\**srotaāpanna*) up to Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas, all have dreams except the Blessed One. Why? Dreams are like inversion (\**viparyāsa*). The Buddha<sup>350</sup> has absolutely abandoned and exhausted all inversion and traces (\**vāsanā*), thus he is devoid of dreams.<sup>351</sup>

<sup>346</sup> MVbh, T27, 77a23ff.: 謂佛世尊愛患永斷、違順平等、拔諍論根、滅憍慢本。.....無相似愛及患慢等，諸煩惱習已永斷故；非如獨覺及諸聲聞，雖斷煩惱而有餘習.....Cf. AVbh, T28, 63b11–17: 世尊愛患已斷離於憎愛，斷一切諍訟根本。如諸弟子有煩惱習.....如是等習，佛世尊永無。

<sup>347</sup> According to the AVbh, “just like burning Catechu (\**khadira*) wood” (如燒佉陀羅木). Wood of this type is very hard.

<sup>348</sup> According to the AVbh, “just like burning birch bark” (如燒樺皮).

<sup>349</sup> MVbh, T27, 180a13–17: 復次，習氣堅固，難滅煩惱，是隨眠相。如剛炭火，所在之處，熱勢難息，此亦如是。此二習氣，器虛易滅，故非隨眠。如草葉火所在之處熱勢易息此亦如是。Cf. AVbh, T28, 139c5–9: 問曰：如此惡法，何以不名為使耶？答曰：此所行龜，使性微細。復次，此習氣不牢固，如燒樺皮；使習氣牢固，如燒佉陀羅木。

<sup>350</sup> Note that in the AVbh, the word “*Buddha*” appears in the plural form (諸佛).

<sup>351</sup> MVbh, T27, 194a10–12: 聖者中從預流果乃至阿羅漢獨覺亦皆有夢，唯除世尊。所以者何？

{5.2D} In terms of the firmness of traces (*\*vāsanā*), bondage (*\*anubandha*) denotes proclivities (*\*anuśaya*)... Furthermore, the traces of proclivities (*\*anuśaya-vāsanā*) are firm—just like burning mountain trees on this ground: even though the fire has long died out, the ground remains hot. The traces of those two [*dharmas* of jealousy (*\*īrṣyā*) and miserliness (*\*mātsarya*)] are not firm—just like burning grass and birch bark, the fire having just died down, the ground turns cool.<sup>352</sup>

{5.2E} According to some: If one in his continuity has absolutely abandoned all improper traces (*\*vāsanā*), he is said to be a Buddha. The Two Vehicles are not so.<sup>353</sup>

The above quotes can be divided into two groups. Quotes {5.2A}, {5.2C}, and {5.2E} aim at distinguishing the Buddha from the Two Vehicles. This position, according to {5.2E}, is even ascribed to some anonymous Buddhists—perhaps the Vibhajyavādins who maintain the superiority of the Buddha, or some non-orthodox Sarvāstivādins and even some early Mahāyānists who adopted this Vibhajyavāda idea. The MVbh does not object to this contention.

On the other hand, quotes {5.2B} and {5.2D}, which use an identical analogy, speak of both the firm *vāsanā* of proclivities and the weak *vāsanā* of minor defilements. For the Sarvāstivādins, “proclivities” (*anuśaya*) is a synonym for “defilements” (*kleśa*). Thus, the firm *vāsanā* of proclivities amounts to *kleśavāsanā*. Therefore, the idea seen in quotes {5.2B} and {5.2D} is a further development of the notion of *vāsanā* in connection with defilements as seen in the *\*Śāriputrābhidharma*. It can be conjectured that the Sarvāstivādins must have learned the notion from outside at the early stage when they used the term.

Among the remaining 11 places where the notion of *vāsanā* is mentioned only

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夢似顛倒，佛於一切顛倒習氣皆已斷盡，故無有夢。Cf. AVbh, T28, 145b1–4: 聖人從須陀洹至辟支佛盡夢，唯有諸佛不夢。所以者何？唯有諸佛，無有疑故，亦離一切無巧便習氣故。

<sup>352</sup> MVbh, T27, 257b13c27–29 隨縛義是隨眠義者。依習氣堅牢說。……復次隨眠習氣堅固，如於此地燒擔山木，火滅雖久，其地猶熱。彼二習氣不堅固，如於此地燒草樺皮，火纔滅已其地便冷。Cf. AVbh, T28, 200b29–c5: 復次嫉慳習氣不牢固，使性習氣牢固。習氣牢固者立使，不牢固者不立。如燒草燒樺(T: 裸)皮處，火滅其地即冷。嫉慳習氣，亦復如是。如燒佉陀羅木，火雖久滅，其地猶熱。使性習氣，當知亦如是。

<sup>353</sup> MVbh, T27, 735b15–16: 有說：若相續中，永伏一切非理習氣，說名為佛，二乘不爾。Cf. AVbh, T28, 277a13–15: 復次，所不應行習氣，於此身永斷，是名為佛，聲聞辟支佛不爾。

in the new translation of the MVbh<sup>354</sup>, 9 places<sup>355</sup> use the term *vāsanā* to convey the idea of the superiority of the Buddha to the Two Vehicles. Regarding this, the fact that only the Buddha is able to abandon all *vāsanā* in addition to defilements is attributed to his unique sharp wisdom:

{5.2F} Question: The Two Vehicles also have the insight of destroying contamination (*\*āsrava-kṣaya-jñāna*). Why is it not a power (*\*bala*)?  
 Answer: It is because the Buddha's insight is sharp (*\*tīvra*), which quickly abandons defilements and their traces (*\*vāsanā*), whereas the Two Vehicles are not [so].<sup>356</sup>

This suggests that according to the Sarvāstivādins, *kleśavāsanā* is correlated with knowledge/insight (*jñāna*). At the very least, it must be considered to be belonging to mental *dharma*s.

In this relation, Dhammajoti (2023, 9–11) draws attention to the non-defiled (*akliṣṭa*) false knowledge (邪智, *\*mithyā-jñāna*) in the MVbh<sup>357</sup>: the Two Vehicles are said to have only abandoned the defiled false knowledge conjoined with ignorance (*avidyā*), whereas the non-defiled one, which is false only in the sense of the conventional truth, is eradicated only by the Tathāgata because he has absolutely abandoned defilements along with *vāsanā*. Thus, the non-defiled false knowledge, even though abandoned by the Two Vehicles, may still occur (現行, *\*samudā-√car/saṃmukhī-√bhū*)<sup>358</sup> in them.<sup>359</sup> Such a description resembles the later Vaibhāṣika definition of *kleśavāsanā* ({5.2Jb}). Regarding this, Dhammajoti understands the non-defiled false knowledge as being the same as the non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*), and thus takes this passage as implying a close connection between non-defiled nescience and *kleśavāsanā*. However, in the entire MVbh, the Buddha's absolute abandonment of defilements along with *vāsanā* only suggests his

<sup>354</sup> MVbh, T27, 42b26–c4 (AVbh, T28, 31a22–25); 77c4–8 (AVbh, T28, 63b–c); 158a4–6 (AVbh, T28, 121a); 185c12–14 (AVbh, T28, 138c5ff.); 189b10–12 (AVbh, T28, 142a–b); 531a4–15 (AVbh, T28, 383b5–15); 871c2–7; 872a27–29, c4–10; 897c5–7; 959a9–12.

<sup>355</sup> I.e., except MVbh, T27, 871c2–7 and 959a9–12.

<sup>356</sup> See MVbh, T27, 158a4–6: 問：二乘亦有漏永盡智，何故非力？答：佛智猛利，速斷煩惱及彼餘習，非二乘故。See also MVbh, T27, 77c4–8, and 531a4–15 (cf. AVbh, T28, 383b5–15). Particularly, T27, 531a9–10: 又，二乘智雖能盡漏，有餘習故，不名為力。

<sup>357</sup> MVbh, T27, 42b16–c4; cf. AVbh, T28, 31a21–25.

<sup>358</sup> Restored by Dhammajoti (1998, 69; 2023, 10), cf. AKVy, 4. See also Jaini ([1992] 2001, 168).

<sup>359</sup> See Dhammajoti's translation (1998, 68–69; 2023, 10).

sharpest wisdom. What this context intends to express is that it is only the supreme wisdom of the Buddha that is able to abandon the non-defiled false knowledge, which is not explicitly recognized as *kleśavāsanā*. Thus, non-defiled false knowledge seems not to be identical to the non-defiled nescience<sup>360</sup>, regardless of the morphological possibility (§5.1.3) that *ajñāna* can be construed as improper knowledge. According to the Sarvāstivādins, non-defiled false knowledge refers to the case of wrong conventional knowledge that does not hinder one's liberation, such as recognizing a bare tree as a man. By contrast, based on a later Vaibhāṣika explanation (§5.2.2.3), the non-defiled nescience refers to the inferior/weak intelligence (*\*mṛduprajñā*) that is incapable of knowing a particular knowable object (*jñeya*). Additionally, it should also be noted that the non-defiled false knowledge is said to be in the sphere of sensuality (*\*kāmadhātu*) and abandonable by cultivation (*\*bhāvanā-heya*)<sup>361</sup>, whereas the non-defiled nescience must exist throughout the triple sphere. In fact, no matter where an Arhat abandons a certain defilement, there can be its *kleśavāsanā* that persists as a collective name of the mind and mental factors (*citta-caitta*) associated with the non-defiled nescience.<sup>362</sup> It can be conceded that logically speaking, the non-defiled false knowledge can be expediently subsumed under the non-defiled nescience. Nevertheless, no explicit textual sources support this surmise. At any rate, the Sarvāstivāda discussions about the non-defiled nescience and non-defiled false knowledge only follow a similar pattern but cannot be identical.

By and large, the MVbh should only represent the Sarvāstivāda school's early stage of adapting the notion of *kleśavāsanā*. There is no direct evidence that proves that the idea of *kleśavāsanā* is developed from the concept of non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*). Rather, it will be seen in Saṅghabhadra's NA (§5.2.2.2–3) that articulate explanation of *kleśavāsanā* in association with non-defiled nescience should be a later development by the Vaibhāṣikas.

<sup>360</sup> For a detailed examination of *\*akliṣṭa-mithyājñāna* and *akliṣṭājñāna* in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, see Y. Kimura 2016, 55–67.

<sup>361</sup> MVbh, T27, 42b16–17: 問：此邪智是何？答：此是欲界修所斷中，無覆無記邪行相智。

<sup>362</sup> For instance, the MVbh explicitly proclaims that the Two Vehicles are not able to transcend the (*kleśa*)-*vāsanā* pertaining to the peak of existence (*bhavāgra*) abandonable by cultivation. See MVbh, T27, 185c12–14: 問：二乘亦爾，何故不說？答：彼不能越見修所斷有頂習氣，非增上故。



### 5.2.2. The Vaibhāṣika Development of “*Kleśavāsanā*” in the Time of Vasubandhu

When investigating *kleśavāsanā* in Vasubandhu’s AKBh and contemporary Vaibhāṣika treatises, it must be kept in mind that the discussion in these documents took place more than two centuries after the final compilation of the MVbh. During this period, the doctrine concerning *kleśavāsanā* developed not only among the Sarvāstivādins but also Mahāyānists (§5.3–§5.5). Some doctrinal similarities on the issue of *kleśavāsanā* can be found in both Abhidharma and Mahāyana texts.

#### 5.2.2.1. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Its Commentaries

In the AKBh, there are two references to *kleśavāsanā* (Dhammajoti 1998, 82): One concerns the eighteen unshared qualities of the Buddha (*āveṇika buddhadharma*)<sup>363</sup>. The other appears in the discussion of the fourfold perfections about abandoning (*prahāṇa-saṃpad*) defilements.<sup>364</sup> Among the four, the abandonment (of defilements) along with *vāsana* (*savāsana-prahāṇa*), according to Yaśomitra’s explanation, is spoken of from the aspect of the non-existence of the connection-continuity (*anubandhābhāva*).<sup>365</sup> This suggests that the causes for all defilements, together with non-defiled behaviors that resemble defilements, become no more.

Concerning the eighteen unshared qualities of the Buddha, Sthiramati in his commentary defines *vāsanā* as a “specific potency” (*\*sāmarthya-viśeṣa*):

{5.2G} What is called “*vāsanā*”? The specific potency (*\*sāmarthya-viśeṣa*), being the cause of bodily and vocal movement (*\*ceṣṭā*) and perturbation (*\*vikāra*) determined by the defilements that have been conducted previously, is *vāsanā*.<sup>366</sup>

<sup>363</sup> AKBh 414: *kasmād ete āveṇikā buddhadharmā ucyante | savāsanaprahāṇāt |*

<sup>364</sup> AKBh 416: *caturvidhā prahāṇasaṃpat | sarvakleśaprahāṇam atyantaprahāṇam savāsanaprahāṇam sarvasamādhisamāpattiyāvaraṇaprahāṇam ca |* “The fourfold perfection of abandonment are (1) abandonment of all defilements, (2) absolute abandonment, (3) abandonment along with *vāsana*, and (4) abandonment of all hindrance to attaining meditative concentration.

<sup>365</sup> AKVy 650: *savāsana-prahāṇam iti | anubandhābhāvataḥ |*

<sup>366</sup> *Tattvārthā*, D no. 4421, sna tshogs, do 324b4–5: *bag chags zhes bya ba 'ang ci zhe na / gang snga ma nyon mongs pa spyad pa de'i nges pa'i lus dang ngag gi g.yo ba dang 'gyur ba'i rgyur gyur pa'i nus pa'i khyad par ni bag chags yin no //*

Likewise, Yaśomitra further adds that *vāsanā* is a specific potency in mind.<sup>367</sup> This interpretation may remind us that Vasubandhu in his AKBh often uses the term “potency” (*sāmarthya/śakti*) to express the latent capability of producing (*utpādana/utpatti*) certain *dharma*s. In comparison, Vasubandhu defines the *bīja* of defilements as “an individual existence’s potency (*śakti*) that is produced by defilements and produces defilements”.<sup>368</sup> However, it should be noted that *kleśavāsanā* for Vasubandhu certainly cannot be considered as the *bīja* of defilements, namely latent dispositions (*anuśaya*). At this juncture, a nuance should be carefully noted: Originally, at least in the MVbh, *kleśavāsanā* only refers to Arhats’ non-defiled habitual propensities, regarded as the traces of the abandoned defiled actions. However, by adjusting the notion to the developed Abhidharma framework, the notion came to stress the aspect of being the potency or cause of bodily and vocal distortion. Such a subtle modification of its connotation should have been related to or concurrent with the understanding that karmic imprints (*vāsanā*) keep the potency of producing karmic effects (§3.2).

It is also noted that *vāsanā* in connection with the eighteen unshared qualities of the Buddha (*āveṇika buddhadharma*) is mentioned in the context of the three types of abode of mindfulness (*smṛty-upasthāna*) in terms of the Buddha’s imperturbability about sentient beings’ attitudes to his teachings. According to the AKBh together with its commentaries<sup>369</sup>, the three abodes of mindfulness are regarded as unshared qualities of the Buddha, because it is the Buddha alone who not only abandons the defilements such as joy and anger but also eradicates all *vāsanā*. This idea is also attested in the MVbh:

{5.2H} Why are the three abodes of mindfulness said to be “unshared qualities of the Buddha”?

... Moreover, it is because the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, though having abandoned greed and anger, still possess traces (\**vāsanā*). When their disciples become unamenable, the resemblance to greed, hatred, sorrow, and

<sup>367</sup> See AKVy, 647: *kā punar iyaṃ vāsanā nāma śrāvakāṇāṃ | yo hi yatkleśa-caritaḥ pūrvam tasya tatkrtaḥ <kāya-vāk-ceṣṭā>*(Wogihara: *kāyavāgaceṣṭā*)-*vikārahetusāmarthyaviśeṣaś citte vāsanety ucyate* | Cf. Dhammajoti’s translation (1998, 83).

<sup>368</sup> AKBh 278: *ko ’yaṃ bījabhāvo nāma | ātmabhāvasya kleśajā-kleśotpādana-śaktiḥ |*

<sup>369</sup> *Tattvārthā*, D no. 4421, sna tshogs, do 324b4: *bag chags dang bcas pa spang ba’i phyir ro zhes bya ba ni bcom ldan ’das kyis rjes chags pa dang / khong khro ba dag gi bag chags kyang spangs kyi / nyan thos rnam kyis ni ma yin no* // On this issue, Yaśomitra’s commentary seems to be abstracted from Sthiramati’s *Tattvārthā*, cf. AKVy 647: *kasmād ete āveṇikā asādhāraṇā buddha-dharmā ucyante | savāsana-prahāṇād iti | savāsanaṇām ānaṃdy-ādinām prahāṇāt |*

joy will be produced in them (i.e., the Two Vehicles). Therefore, the three abodes of mindfulness are not established [in them].<sup>370</sup>

This passage indicates that *kleśavāsanā* is responsible for the non-defiled behaviors that resemble the actions caused by defilements in the Two Vehicles. According to the MVbh, abandoning *vāsanā* is supplementary to the list of the eighteen unshared qualities of the Buddha. One question that arises here is why the absolute abandonment of *kleśavāsanā*, which is only achieved by the Buddha, is not included among the eighteen unshared qualities of the Buddha. It is very likely that both the theory of the eighteen unshared qualities of the Buddha and that of abandoning *kleśavāsanā* developed in parallel during the compilation of the MVbh.<sup>371</sup> On the other hand, the compilers of the MVbh did not form a clear definition about the nature of *kleśavāsanā* probably because the notion had been freshly adopted. In this regard, it was difficult to roughly consider the abandonment of *kleśavāsanā* a specific quality (*dharma*) of the Buddha. Nevertheless, it is not unexpected to find that in the Mahāyāna Yogācāra, abandoning *kleśavāsanā* is included in the list of one hundred and forty unshared qualities of the Buddha (*catvāriṃśad-uttaram āveṇikaṃ buddha-dharma-śatam*).<sup>372</sup>

#### 5.2.2.2. Saṅghabhadra's Refutation of Two Contemporary Theories about *Vāsanā*

Articulate elaborations of *kleśavāsanā* were given by the Vaibhāṣikas after the formation of the MVbh. In his NA, Saṅghabhadra discusses five opinions about the nature of non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*) in relation to *kleśavāsanā*.<sup>373</sup> The first opinion is that non-defiled nescience means the non-existence of knowledge

<sup>370</sup> MVbh, T27, 189b6–12: 何故說三種念住是佛不共法耶？……復次，聲聞獨覺雖斷貪恚而有餘習故。若徒眾有違順時便生相似貪恚憂喜。故不建立有三念住。The second part of the quotation is not seen in the corresponding place in the AVbh (T28, 142a–b).

<sup>371</sup> Har Dayal (1978, 23) claims that the list of the eighteen unshared qualities of the Buddha should be assigned as late as the 3<sup>rd</sup> century CE. However, Endo (2017, 59) argues that Mizuno and Mori's dating of the *Milindapañha* may suggest "the term '*aṭṭhārasabuddhadhamma*' would have been in use before the end of the first century A.D." Considering that the term is used in all the three Chinese translations of the *Vibhāṣā*, which was finalized by the mid-2<sup>nd</sup> century CE, Endo's opinion is more convincing.

<sup>372</sup> See BoBh<sub>W</sub> 88–89, 405.

<sup>373</sup> Regarding Saṅghabhadra's elucidation on *vāsanā* and non-defiled nescience, Dhammajoti (1998; 2023) has conducted comprehensive research (see §1.3.1). Dhammajoti's 2023 paper is partially based on my PhD dissertation under his supervision. In this book, I only acknowledge his new discoveries beyond my contentions.

(\*jñānābhāva).<sup>374</sup> Saṅghabhadra rejects this view as he insists that non-existence cannot serve as a cause (\*kāraṇa).<sup>375</sup>

The second opinion is that *vāsanā* refers to exactly non-defiled nescience, which is incapable of perceiving the various aspects of *dharma*s, such as taste (\**rasa*), strength (\**vīrya*), ripening (\**vipāka*), might (\**prabhāva*), number (\**saṃkhyā*), size (\**pramāṇa*), place (\**deśa*), time (\**kāla*), sameness (\**saṃatā*), and difference (\**anyatā*).<sup>376</sup> In this relation, Saṅghabhadra quotes a definition given by some ancient masters:

{5.2I} There is a distinct, non-defiled mental factor (\**akliṣṭa-caitta-viśeṣa*) that is induced by the repeated practice (\**abhyāsa*) of defiled and non-defiled *dharma*s; it arises in the serial continuities of those who are not omniscient (\**asarvajña*), causing [their] thought and mental factors to operate (\**pravṛt*) unfreely. This is called *vāsanā*.<sup>377</sup>

Dhammajoti (1998, 83) notes that this opinion can be compared with Bhadanta Anantavarman's contention that *vāsanā* is a specific *citta* made by the previously performed defilements.<sup>378</sup> Regarding this second view, Saṅghabhadra maintains that neither does nescience have *citta* as its intrinsic nature (\**svabhāva*), nor is it a specific mental factor (\**caitta*) different from *citta*.

### 5.2.2.3. Saṅghabhadra's Vaibhāṣika Analysis of *Kleśavāsanā*

Then, Saṅghabhadra provides the third revised Vaibhāṣika definition of *vāsanā* as follows based on the second view:

{5.2Ja} The understanding (*prajñā*) that does not strive diligently to understand the taste, strength, ripening, and so on, together with the *dharma*s of other characteristics (\**lakṣaṇa*), serves as the cause for the arising of a subsequent homogeneous understanding. This understanding, again, does not

<sup>374</sup> NA, T29, 501c24–25: 有作是說：若能障智是染無知，不染無知唯智非有。

<sup>375</sup> NA, T29, 502a6: 非唯智無，無法無容能為因故。

<sup>376</sup> NA, T29, 502a1–3: 若於諸法味、勢、熟、德、數、量、處、時、同、異等相不能如實覺，是不染無知。此不染無知，即說名習氣。

<sup>377</sup> NA, T29, 502a3–5: 有古師說習氣相言：「有不染污心所差別，染不染法數習所引；非一切智相續現行，令心心所不自在轉，是名習氣。」 Adapted from Dhammajoti's translation (2015a, 403).

<sup>378</sup> AKVy 647: *yo hi yatkleśacaritaḥ pūrvam | tasya tatkrtaḥ kāyavāgaceṣṭāvīkārahetusāmarthyaviśeṣaś citta vāsanety ucyate | avyākṛtaś cittaviśeṣo vāsaneti bhadantānantavarmā |*

strive diligently to understand and thus becomes the cause for the arising of another understanding that does not strive diligently to understand. Such a successive cause-effect series from beginningless time brings about a propensity acquired through repeated practice (\**abhyāsa*). Thus, this weak intelligence (\**mṛdujñāna*), induced by the frequented (\**niṣevita*) intelligence incompetent (\**akarmanya*) to understanding the object (\**ālambana*), such as taste and so forth, is called non-defiled nescience (\**akliṣṭājñāna*), with which the co-arising (\**sahaja*) *citta* and mental factors are known collectively as imprint (\**vāsanā*). This must be reasonable.<sup>379</sup>

It should be noted that this explanation is not directly related to defilements. *Vāsanā* here is explicitly defined as the mental *dharma*s conjoined with non-defiled nescience. It is the incompetence of knowing (*jñāna*), or broadly speaking the inflexibility (\**akarmanyatā*) of mental *dharma*s, that results in the Two Vehicles' being inferior to the Buddha in terms of wisdom. This implies that *vāsanā* functions as a sort of hindrance (*āvaraṇa*) to the omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) of the Buddha. This Vaibhāṣika implication echoes the Yogācāra notion of knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) (§5.4.1).

Additionally, it is very likely that Saṅghabhadra's recognizing *kleśavāsanā* as all the mental *dharma*s conjoined with non-defiled nescience is due to his understanding of *vāsanā* as impregnated imprints instead of mere traces of defilements. As noted in §4.1, the Sarvāstivādins insist that impregnation (*vāsanā*) requires the simultaneity of an impregnator and the corresponding impregnated. On the other hand, for the Sarvāstivādins, since all defilements are mental factors, which are the simultaneous, cojoined causes of a defiled *citta*, the defilements play the role of the impregnator. Thus, *kleśavāsanā* takes on the meaning of the impregnated by the defilement (i.e., *akliṣṭājñāna*). Accordingly, Saṅghabhadra's explanation can be regarded as confirming that the defilement as an impregnator is nothing but non-defiled nescience, and the *vāsanā* or the impregnated refers to the conjoined mental *dharma*s. Therefore, Saṅghabhadra's explanation of *kleśavāsanā* is not an innovation that transcends the earlier understanding of *kleśavāsanā* as traces left behind by defilements, but is based on the contemporary predominant understanding of the term *vāsanā* as impregnation. This popular Buddhist understanding of *vāsanā* during the time of Saṅghabhadra should be influenced by the Yogācāras.

<sup>379</sup> NA, T29, 502a21–27: 即於味、勢、熟等不勤求解慧與異相法俱為因，引生後同類慧；此慧於解又不勤求，復為因引生不勤求解慧。如是展轉，無始時來因果相仍，習以成性。故即於彼味等境中，數習於解無堪能智，此所引劣智，名不染無知；即此俱生心心所法，總名習氣。理定應然。 Adapted from Dhammajoti's translation (1998, 90; 2023, 27–28).

Immediately after the above analysis ({5.2Ja}), Saṅghabhadra offers another supplementary view without objection:

{5.2Jb} Or, at the defiled stage (*\*sakleśāvasthā*) of sentient beings, all the non-defiled *cittas* and their serial continuity, because of being impregnated (*\*paribhāvita*) by defilements that are mixed with them, are endowed with smell portion (*\*vāsa-bhāga/vāsa?*) in accordance with the arising [of defilements]. Accordingly, the non-defiled *cittas* together with their retinues (*\*parivāra*) arise in a specific manner in resemblance to the appearance (*\*ākāra*) of those [defilements]. They arise successively by virtue of the force of frequent performance (*\*niṣevana-bala*). Therefore, with regard to the faultless body (i.e., the Two Vehicles), it is still said to be in possession of imprints (*\*vāsanā*). [However, in the case of] the Omniscient One (*\*sarvajña*; i.e., the Buddha), it (i.e., *vāsanā*) is absolutely abandoned and does not occur (*\*samudā-√cār*) anymore.<sup>380</sup>

Considering its context, Saṅghabhadra seemingly intends to demonstrate that it is the inflexibility of understanding *dharma*s that brings about the disagreeable bodily and vocal perturbation of a Noble person (*ārya*)—once the perfect awakening (*samyak-sambodhi*) is attained, there will be no more nescience and thus no more *kleśavāsanā*.<sup>381</sup> In other words, the *vāsanā* reflected in a Noble One’s bodily and vocal behaviors should be regarded as the result of his intellectual imperfection. However, it should be noted that only this fourth explanation about *vāsanā* is explicitly connected with defilements—*vāsanā* is used in the specific sense of *kleśavāsanā*. Notwithstanding the compatibility of the two theories supported by Saṅghabhadra, it is difficult to see any necessary doctrinal connection between the two explanations seen in {5.2Jab}.<sup>382</sup> This suggests that the Sarvāstivādins, after

<sup>380</sup> NA, T29, 502a27–b2: 或諸有情有煩惱位，所有無染心及相續，由諸煩惱間雜所熏，有能順生煩惱氣分，故諸無染心及眷屬，似彼行相差別而生，由數習力相繼而起。故離過身中，仍名有習氣；一切智者，永斷不行。 Cf. Dhammajoti’s translation (2023, 28). Saṅghabhadra’s subsequent argument concerns *kleśavāsanā* abandonable by seeing and cultivating (*darśana-bhāvanā-heya*) (see Dhammajoti 1998, 91–92). This can be seen as an explication of the statement in the new translation of the MVbh that the Two Vehicles are not able to overcome *kleśavāsanā* pertaining to existence-peak (*bhavāgra*) abandonable by seeing and cultivating. See MVbh, T27, 185c13–14: 問：二乘亦爾何故不說？答：彼不能越見修所斷有頂習氣，非增上故。(This argument is not found in AVbh, T28, 139c5ff.)

<sup>381</sup> Cf. Dhammajoti 2023, 28: “This second explanation entails that *vāsanā* refers to the non-defiled nescience together with the co-existent serial continuity—i.e., the co-nascent psycho-physical complex.”

<sup>382</sup> Both Puguang 普光 and Fabao 法寶 note that the NA gives two Vaibhāṣika explanations about the nature of *vāsanā*. See T41, no. 1821, 5b21–24 and T41, no. 1822, 462b23–29.

accepting the idea of *kleśavāsanā* from the Vibhajyavādins since the MVbh, were trying to adapt the alien concept to the Sarvāstivāda's abhidharmic framework, which requires the notion to be reducible to some certain real *dharma*s. Accordingly, the concept of *kleśavāsanā* should not have been developed from the Sarvāstivāda idea of non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*). Rather, it was because *kleśavāsanā* was a term adopted from outside that the Vaibhāṣikas felt obliged to use a Sarvāstivāda notion to justify it.

In this relation, Dhammajoti (2023, 26) draws attention to a description in the MVbh about non-defiled nescience by “other masters”, according to whom, Arhats still have the manifestation of delusion (*\*moha*) because their non-defiled nescience has not been abandoned.<sup>383</sup> Since semblances of defilements are said to be due to *kleśavāsanā* as seen in the NA ({5.2Jb}), this statement seems to imply the close relationship between *kleśavāsanā* and non-defiled nescience. However, in the corresponding passage in the AVbh, this opinion is not attested.<sup>384</sup> Thus, I am inclined to take this opinion documented in the MVbh as a relatively later development in the Sarvāstivāda school for the purpose of associating *kleśavāsanā* with non-defiled nescience.

In the *Jùshě lùn jì* 俱舍論記, Puguang 普光 summarizes that Saṅghabhadra's position on *vāsanā* are of two interpretations: (1) *vāsanā* means the mental *dharma*s conjoined with inferior intelligence (*\*mṛdu-prajñā*); (2) *vāsanā* includes not only *citta-caitta dharma*s but also the body of a serial continuity.<sup>385</sup> In fact, in the late 4<sup>th</sup> century and early 5<sup>th</sup> century, *vāsanā* became an inevitably significant Buddhist doctrinal term, and the term *vāsanā* that appears in various Buddhist contexts came to be treated as a unified notion. As a result, the traces (*vāsanā*) left behind by abandoned defilements were taken for granted to be identical with the imprints (*vāsanā*) impregnated (*vāśita/paribhāvita*) by the defilements. As can be seen from {5.2Jb}, Saṅghabhadra explains *kleśavāsanā* with the theory of impregnation. As noted in §4.1, the Sarvāstivādins acknowledge the impregnation between mental *dharma*s. Thus, as Fabao correctly points out, the second interpretation which he attributes to Yuanyu 元瑜 is incorrect.<sup>386</sup> Nevertheless, considering the Sautrāntika

<sup>383</sup> MVbh, T27, 78b7–8: 有餘師說：阿羅漢等亦現行癡，不染無知猶未斷故。

<sup>384</sup> See AVbh, T28, 64c.

<sup>385</sup> T41, no. 1821, 5b21–24: 正理意說：不染無知劣慧為體。無知狹，習氣寬。然解習氣二解不同：一解，劣慧俱生心心所法總名習氣。一解，習氣不但通心心所法，亦通相續身。

<sup>386</sup> T41, no. 1822, 462b27–29: 是心心所不取於身。元瑜師引此文證，兼取其身為習氣者，誤

theory of mutual seeding (*anyonyabījaka*), in the Chinese exegetical tradition, it is not impossible to understand *kleśavāsanā* as partially concerned with corporeal *dharma*s.

Following {5.2Jb}, Saṅghabhadra distinguishes two types of *kleśavāsanā*: (1) the non-defiled *kleśavāsanā* abandonable through seeing [the Truths] (*\*darśana-heyā*) manifests among trainees (*\*śaikṣa*); (2) the non-defiled (*\*akliṣṭa*) but contaminated (*\*sāsrava*) *kleśavāsanā* abandonable through cultivating (*\*bhāvanā-heyā*), though having been abandoned by the Arhats, may still manifest due to the inferior faculties (*\*indriya*) of non-trainees (*\*aśaikṣa*). Because the Buddha has no more manifestation of *kleśavāsanā*, he acquires the unshared qualities such as the three abodes of mindfulness (*\*smṛty-upasthāna*).<sup>387</sup> The differentiation of two types of *kleśavāsanā* must be influenced by the theory of impregnation, as it differs from what we have observed in the VSg (§5.1.1): *kleśavāsanā* is only spoken of in terms of the path of cultivation (*\*bhāvanāmārga*). This argument further demonstrates Saṅghabhadra's attempt to link *kleśavāsanā* to non-defiled nescience.

On this issue, how *kleśavāsanā* can be both non-defiled (*akliṣṭa*) and contaminated (*sāsrava*) appears to be intricate. Above all, it should be borne in mind that the Sarvāstivādins hold that Arhats are subject to spiritual retrogression. When a non-trainee retrogresses from a superior faculty (*\*indriya*) to an inferior faculty (such as from a *prativedhanā-dharman* Arhat to a *sthitākampya-dharman* Arhat), a *citta* that is of neither-trainee-nor-non-trainee arises together with the acquisition (*\*prāpti*) of the *dharma*s pertaining to the non-trainees of an inferior faculty.<sup>388</sup> In other words, for a circumstantially liberated (*samaya-vimukta*) Arhat who is liable to retrogression, it is not the case that, in his mental series, *citta* constantly arises with the acquisition of *dharma*s that are the antidotes (*pratipakṣa*) of defilements. In

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也。所以定知不通於身。

<sup>387</sup> NA, T29, 502b2–13: 然於已斷見所斷位，通染不染心相續中，有餘順生煩惱習性，是見所斷煩惱氣分。於中染者，說名類性，金剛道斷，皆不現行；若不染者，名見所斷煩惱習氣，亦彼道斷，由根差別有行不行。若於已斷修所斷位，唯於不染心相續中，有餘順生煩惱習性，是修所斷煩惱氣分，名修所斷煩惱習氣。是有漏故，無學已斷，隨根勝劣，有行不行。世尊已得法自在故，彼如煩惱畢竟不行，故佛獨稱善淨相續。即由此故行無誤失，得不共法，三念住等。又由此故，密意說言唯佛獨名得無學果。For an English translation, see Dhammajoti 1998, 91–92.

<sup>388</sup> See MVbh, T27, 811c7–13: 非學非無學心退、無學得起者，謂阿羅漢退勝根住劣根時，彼非學非無學心與劣根心無學法諸得俱起。有說「唯煩惱現前故退」者，彼說：「此中但應言勝進，不應言退。」如是說者，住無覆無記心亦退故，此中亦應說退。謂住無覆無記心，退堪達根住住法根。



this understanding, even though an Arhat of an inferior faculty has abandoned all the defilements on the paths of seeing and cultivating, there can still be mental continuity of non-defiled imprints (*vāsanā*) that are (formerly) impregnated by the abandoned defilements. As noted in the VSg (§5.1.1), the *vāsanā* left behind by defilements may manifest in resemblance of the defilements when a trainee or non-trainee is absent-minded (*\*muṣita-smṛti*). It must be in this sense that *kleśavāsanā* can be described as being contaminated (*sāsrava*). Additionally, it can also be inferred from Saṅghabhadra's argument that an uncircumstantially liberated (*asamaya-vimukta*) Arhat (i.e., *akopya-dharman*), who possesses faculties superior to other Arhats, cannot have any *kleśavāsanā*. At any rate, notwithstanding that Saṅghabhadra took pains to expound on *kleśavāsanā*, it is hard for a reader to recognize the non-defiled *kleśavāsanā* as necessarily and intrinsically being associated with non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*).

#### 5.2.2.4. Bhadanta Rāma's Theory of Non-defiled *Vāsanā*

The last theory partially criticized by Saṅghabhadra after {5.2Jab} is “non-defiled *vāsanā*” maintained by his contemporary, the Sautrāntika Bhadanta Rāma:

{5.2K} Bhadanta Rāma asserts thus: There are non-defiled *dharma*s that are called “imprints” (*vāsanā*), just like [the result of] ripening (*vipāka*) induced by unwholesome causes. When the Blessed One was formerly in the stage of Bodhisattva, he cultivated preparatory practices (*\*prayoga*) in three innumerable eons (*\*kalpa*). Though possessing defilements, he was able to eradicate gradually the non-defiled imprints induced by the defilements and to increase gradually the imprints of white factors (*\*śukla-dharma-vāsanā*). Later, at the time of absolutely abandoning the acquisition (*\*prāpti*) of fluxes (*\*āsrava*), some of his former imprints have ceased while some have not. Because of having cultivated the preparatory practices for a long time, he attained supremacy (*\*anuttaratva*) and absolute exhaustion of all fluxes. Nevertheless, the Buddha is still in possession of the imprints of white factors, since it is said that “some imprints have ceased while some have not.”<sup>389</sup>

Bhadanta Rāma compares *vāsanā* with effect of ripening (*vipākaphala*), which persists after abandoning all defilements. However, Saṅghabhadra criticizes that

<sup>389</sup> NA, T29, 502b13–19: 大德邏摩作如是說：有不染法名為習氣，如不善因所招異熟。世尊昔在菩薩位中，三無數劫修諸加行，雖有煩惱，而能漸除煩惱所引不染習氣，白法習氣漸令增長；後於永斷諸漏得時，前諸習氣有滅不滅，以於長時修加行故，證得無上諸漏永盡。然佛猶有白法習氣，言「習氣有滅不滅」故——如是所說理亦可燃。Cf. Fukuda's translation (2003, 277–78) and Dhammajoti's translation (2023, 27).

Rāma's theory fails to explain the intrinsic nature (\**svabhāva*) of the non-defiled *vāsanā*.<sup>390</sup> In quote {5.2K}, the non-defiled *vāsanā* that ceases at the time of the ultimate awakening refers to *kleśavāsanā*. On the contrary, the *vāsanā* that does not cease at this moment refers to the *vāsanā* of white factors. It should be noted that *vāsanā* for Rāma, as a contemporary of Saṅghabhadra, also expresses the idea of impregnated imprints. It must be in this sense that the decrease in the imprints caused by defilements can concur with the increase of the imprints of white factors. I will come back to the issue of the *vāsanā* of white factors in §6.4.

### 5.3. *Kleśavāsanā* in Early Mahāyāna Texts

The notion of *vāsanā* also appears in early Mahāyāna scriptures to differentiate the Buddha from the Two Vehicles. In the AsP, one of the earliest Mahāyāna *sūtras*, the term “the abandonment of the serial succession of the *vāsanā* of all the defilement-[hindrance] and knowable-hindrance” (*sarva-kleśa-jñeyāvaraṇa-vāsanānusamdhiprahīṇatā*) does occur once.<sup>391</sup> Such an expression is also attested to in the corresponding Tibetan translation.<sup>392</sup> However, except Dānapāla's 10<sup>th</sup>-century translation, the term *vāsanā* is not seen at all in all other earlier Chinese translations of this text.<sup>393</sup> Considering that the extant Sanskrit original and the

<sup>390</sup> See NA, T29, 502b20–21: 而彼不能顯其體性。不染習氣，其體是何？非但虛言，令生實解。

<sup>391</sup> See AsP 86: *sarvajñataiva bhagavan prajñāpāramitā* | *sarvakleśajñeyāvaraṇa-vāsanānusamdhiprahīṇatām upādāya anutpādikā bhagavan sarvadharmāṇām prajñāpāramitā* | *anirodhikā bhagavan sarvadharmāṇām prajñāpāramitā* | *anutpannāniruddhā bhagavan prajñāpāramitā*... (Underline mine.)

<sup>392</sup> See D no. 12, shes phyin, ka 97a1: *bcom ldan 'das shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ni nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa'i bag chags dang mtshams sbyor ba thams cad spong pa'i slad du chos thams cad mi skyed pa lags so* // (Underline mine.)

<sup>393</sup> Lokakṣema (T8, no. 224, 440b21–23): 天中天！薩芸若者，即般若波羅蜜是。天中天！般若波羅蜜者，是菩薩摩訶薩母。天中天！無所生無所滅，即般若波羅蜜是。

Zhiqian 支謙 (T8, no. 225, 487b25–27): 天中天！……無生無滅……明度慧門，大士之母……

Kumārajīva (T8, no. 227, 550a6–7): 世尊！般若波羅蜜即是薩婆若。世尊！般若波羅蜜是諸菩薩母。世尊！般若波羅蜜非生法者，非滅法者。

Xuanzang 玄奘 (T7, no. 220, 798c24–25): ……顯諸法性即薩婆若，示一切法無滅無生，是諸菩薩摩訶薩母……

Dānapāla (T8, no. 228, 613c1–5): 般若波羅蜜多是一切智藏，普攝煩惱等障為作斷滅；般若波羅蜜多是無生法、無滅法、無起法、無作法；般若波羅蜜多自相本空；般若波羅蜜多是諸菩薩

Tibetan text are much later than the Chinese translations, this mention of *vāsanā* in the AsP must be a later addition to the Sanskrit text after the 7<sup>th</sup> century.

The early Mahāyānists started to employ the concept of *kleśavāsanā* while compiling the PvsP. It is noteworthy that in a passage in the PvsP that is comparable with the aforementioned text in the AsP, all the Chinese translations use the expression “because of absolutely abandoning the serial succession of all defilements along with *vāsanā*”.<sup>394</sup> This may suffice to suggest that the Chinese translators cannot have missed the part concerning *vāsanā* in the AsP, if there were such an expression in the original Sanskrit manuscripts that were available to them.

As for the idea of *kleśavāsanā* in the larger *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, many scholars (Lamotte 1974, 95; Dhammajoti 1998, 96)<sup>395</sup> draw attention to a distinctive description as follows:

{5.3A} The Blessed One said: O Subhūti! The serial succession of traces (*vāsanā*) is not defilements (*kleśa*).<sup>396</sup> However, even though those Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas have destroyed greed, hatred and delusion, [they still

母。

<sup>394</sup> English translation based on Xuanzang’s version.

Cf. \*Mokṣala (T8, no. 221, 61a16–19): 世尊！般若波羅蜜者薩云若是，能除諸習緒。世尊！般若波羅蜜者菩薩之母，生諸佛法故。世尊！般若波羅蜜者不生不壞，從有名至竟空故。

Kumārajīva (T8, no. 223, 302a27–b1): 世尊！般若波羅蜜是一切種智，一切煩惱及習斷故。世尊！般若波羅蜜是諸菩薩摩訶薩母，能生諸佛法故。世尊！般若波羅蜜不生不滅，自相空故。

Xuanzang (T7, no. 220, 576b25–28): 善能發生一切智智，永斷一切煩惱相續并習氣故；是諸菩薩摩訶薩母，菩薩所修一切佛法從此生故，不生不滅，自相空故。

PvsP ii–iii 143: ... *sarvākārajñatākaraṇī bhagavan prajñāpāramitā sarvavāsanānusandhiklēsaprahānatām upādāya, mātā bhagavan prajñāpāramitā bodhisattvānām mahāsattvānām buddhadharmajanānatām upādāya, anutpannā niruddhā bhagavan prajñāpāramitā svalakṣaṇasūnyatām upādāya*... (Underlines mine)

<sup>395</sup> Dhammajoti notes that Lamotte mistakenly breaks up the Chinese sentence and thus renders the idea wrongly as the Two Vehicles “having cut off the passions, still retain a small part of them”.

<sup>396</sup> Both the Chinese and the Tibetan translations understand the Sanskrit phrase “*vāsanānusandhiklēsō*” in the way of “*vāsanā-anusandhiḥ klēśo*”. As noted by many scholars (Kurumiya 1978, xxvi; Watanabe 1975, xiii–xiv; Takasaki 1965, 407), *visarga* is sometimes dropped even before a hard consonant in Sanskrit manuscripts.

have] some<sup>397</sup> perturbations in body [and speech]<sup>398</sup>. They (i.e., the perturbations) operate (*saṃvartante*) as being useless (*anartha*) to foolish ordinary beings. However, [this] is not the case for Śrāvakas [and Pratyekabuddhas]. The Tathāgata does not have them.<sup>399</sup>

<sup>397</sup> Conze (1962, 149) restores the Sanskrit as “*kaścī*” according to the *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, and thus links the word with “*śrāvāka-pratyekabuddhānām*.” Accordingly, Conze (1975, 519) translates the part of sentence as “on the part of the Disciples and Pratyekabuddhas”. However, this translation neither makes much sense nor properly explains why the conjunction *tu* occurs after the indefinite pronoun *kaścī*. Since the parallel part of the *Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* has not been published, and the corresponding folio in both the Dunhuang and the Gilgit manuscripts of the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā* (Karashima et al. 2016, vii; Suzuki & Nagashima 2015, 783–86) is missing, it is not certain whether Conze’s restoration is correct. Another way of restoring the sentence, which accords with the Chinese and Tibetan translations (see *infra*), is to replace the masculine singular *kaścī* with the plural *kecit*, which qualifies *vikārāḥ*. In this way, the compound *rāga-doṣa-moha-prahāṇam* goes with the first part of the sentence. In this circumstance, the word *pravarttante* added by Conze (claimed to be restored according to the Sanskrit *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*) is not necessary. Therefore, a plausible Sanskrit original of this sentence could be “*api tv asti teṣāṃ śrāvāka-pratyekabuddhānām rāga-doṣa-moha-prahāṇam, kecit tu kāya-vāg-vikārās, te bāla-prthagjanānām anarthāya saṃvartante*.” I translate the sentence according to this reading.

<sup>398</sup> Added according to Tibetan and Chinese translations.

<sup>399</sup> AdsP i 149: *bhāgavān āha: na subhūte vāsanānusandhi-kleśo ’sti | api tv asti teṣāṃ śrāvāka- (Conze: śrāvāka-)pratyekabuddhānām rāga-doṣa-moha-prahāṇam[, <kecit>] (Conze: [kaścī]) tu kāya-vikārās (Conze: +[pravarttante]) te bālaprthagjanānām [an]arthāya saṃvartante | [na tu śrāvākānām] te tathāgatasya <na santi> (Conze: nāsti) |* (The parts in square brackets are restored by Conze.) Cf. D no. 10, shes phyin, ka 11a3–5: *rab ’byor bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba ni nyon mongs pa ma yin te / nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas de dag la ’dod chags dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug dang bral ba yang yod mod kyi / lus kyi ’gyur ba yang ’byung ste / de dag ni byis pa so so ’i skye bo <rnam> (D: rnam) la yang gnod par mi ’gyur la / nyan thos rnam la yang ma yin te / de dag ni de bzhin gshegs pa la mi mnga ’o //* Also cf. T7, no. 220, 695c7–11.

Note that the Sanskrit PvsP (v 126) involves a similar passage: *na subhūte vāsanānusandhi-kleśa-prahāṇam | api nu teṣāṃ rāga-doṣa-moha-prahāṇam asti | kāya-vāg-vikārās tu pravartante | te tu bāla-prthagjanānām anarthāya pravartante | na tu śrāvākānām | te tathāgatasya na santi |* However, both the Tibetan and the Chinese translations of this PvsP passage accord remarkably with what has been seen in the AdsP passage above. See the part in the Tibetan PvsP: *bcom ldan ’das kyis bka’ stsal pa / rab ’byor bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba ni nyon mongs pa yang ma yin mod kyi / nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas rnam la ’dod chags dang / zhe sdang dang / gti mug gi lus kyi rnam pa dang / ngag gi rnam pa yod de / de dag gi bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor pa de ni byis pa so so ’i skye bo kun dang thun mong du gnod par ’gyur ba ni ma yin te / de ni de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa ’i sangs rgyas rnam la thams cad du thams cad / rnam pa thams cad du thams cad mi mnga’ zhing mi dmigs so //* (D no. 9, shes phyin, ga 131b6–132a2; cf. T7, no. 220, 338a4–9.) Regarding the first sentence of the Sanskrit text of the PvsP, all the Tibetan and the three Chinese translations express the idea that “the serial succession of *vāsanā* is not *kleśa*”. It appears that the compound *vāsanānusandhi-kleśa-prahāṇa* here should be a typo, which is confused with the more common expression *sarva-vāsanā-anusandhi-kleśa-prahāṇa*” (*bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba ’i nyon mongs pa thams cad spangs pa*; 永斷一切煩惱習氣相續). Otherwise, the whole sentence should mean: “it is not the case that [the Two Vehicles have] the abandonment of the defilements with the serial succession of *vāsanā*.” This might have been a mistake made while copying the Sanskrit manuscript. As a result, what the Gilgit manuscript of the AdsP shows is closer to the Tibetan and Chinese translations of the

This passage explicitly claims that *kleśavāsanā* is not defilements. According to the Chinese translations, both Kumārajīva and Xuanzang express the idea that *kleśavāsanā* is just bodily and vocal perturbations that are similar to the appearance of greed, hatred and delusion.<sup>400</sup>

This Mahāyāna scripture emphasizes the significance of *kleśavāsanā*—it is useless (*anartha*) to foolish ordinary worldlings, but otherwise to the Two Vehicles. Here, as Conze’s rendering (1975, 519) suggests, *kleśavāsanā* is “harmful” (*anartha*) to ordinary beings, but since Śrāvakas have abandoned all defilements, the remaining *kleśavāsanā* does not harm them. In this relation, Lamotte (1974, 95) renders *anartha* as “disagreeable”, which seems to be based on the description in the MPPU that the *vāsanā* of the Two Vehicles who have no defilement may still incur defilements in others.<sup>401</sup> As noted in §5.1.2, such an understanding is in accordance with Sarvāstivādins’ standpoint. Kumārajīva translates the *sūtra* sentence as “ordinary foolish worldlings become sinful because of it” (凡夫愚人為之得罪). A similar understanding is also attested in \*Mokṣala’s Chinese translation (為凡夫身作耗). Regarding this sentence, Jizang 吉藏 (549–623CE) explains that when seeing the behaviors that resemble greed, hatred and delusion done by the Noble Ones, ordinary people would speak ill of them, and thus become sinful.<sup>402</sup> However, Jizang’s interpretation must be based on the Chinese exegetical tradition.

In the Tibetan translation of the AdsP, on the contrary, the word “*anartha*” is understood as “unharmful” (*gnod par mi ’gyur*) to ordinary beings. Such a difference cannot be caused by a typo, because the parallel part in the Tibetan translation of the

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PvsP. Therefore, it is very probable that the original form of the statement in the PvsP is close to the version provided in the AdsP.

<sup>400</sup> Xuanzang’s translation (T7, no. 220, 338a4–9): 佛言：善現！習氣相續實非煩惱，然諸聲聞及諸獨覺煩惱已斷，猶有少分似貪瞋癡動發身、語，即說此為習氣相續。此在愚夫異生相續能引無義，非在聲聞、獨覺相續能引無義，如是一切習氣相續，諸佛世尊究竟無有。Cf. T7, no. 220, 695c7–11 and T6, no. 220, 872a15–19.

Kumārajīva’s translation (T8, no. 223, 376a3–6): 佛告須菩提：習非煩惱。是聲聞、辟支佛身口有似婬欲、瞋恚、愚癡相；凡夫愚人為之得罪。是三毒習，諸佛無有。

Cf. \*Mokṣala’s translation (T8, no. 221, 114b6–8): 諸習者非習緒也。雖有婬怒癡，為凡夫身作耗，非為是緒。如來者無緒。

<sup>401</sup> MPPU, T25, 649c8–10: 「是習，不名真煩惱。」有人雖斷一切煩惱，身、口中亦有煩惱相出；凡(夫)(T: 人)見聞是相已，則起不清淨心。

<sup>402</sup> See X24, no. 451, 324a4–6: 凡夫見聞二乘人習相，如見身子瞋習，畢陵伽罵恒水習，便言聖人有瞋慢，故成罪也。

PvsP expressly reads “not harmful” (*gnod par 'gyur ba ni ma yin*).<sup>403</sup> It indicates that *kleśavāsanā* does not matter to ordinary beings who have not even overcome their defilements, whereas for the Two Vehicles, *kleśavāsanā* represents their imperfection in terms of awakening. Therefore, distinct understandings of the same term should have existed among the translators of different traditions.

Furthermore, the PvsP also suggests that it must be at the last stage of attaining Buddhahood that *kleśavāsanā* is thoroughly abandoned:

{5.3B} O Kauśika! Here, a Bodhisattva, a great being, practising in the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), surpasses the stages of Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha, and enters into the certitude (*niyāma*) of Bodhisattva. [Having entered the certitude of Bodhisattva,<sup>404</sup> he] completely perfects (*paripūrayati*) the [eighteen unshared] qualities of the Buddha. [Having completely perfected the qualities of the Buddha, he]<sup>405</sup> will subsequently acquire (*anuprāpsyati*) the all-mode insight (*sarvākāra-jñatā*). Having subsequently acquired the all-mode insight, [he] will become a Tathāgata, the deserving one (*arhant*), the perfectly awakened one, who has abandoned all defilements along with the serial succession of traces (*sarva-vāsanā-anusamḍhi-kleśa-prahāna*).<sup>406</sup>

Accordingly, obtaining the all-mode insight of the Buddha is a prerequisite to abandoning the serial succession of *kleśavāsanā*. In the PvsP, abandoning *kleśavāsanā* appears to be a secondary product of obtaining the perfect awakening of the Buddha, because in the entire scripture, there is no mention of how exactly *kleśavāsanā* should be counteracted. However, since attaining Buddhahood is the ultimate goal of the Bodhisattva’s path, abandoning *kleśavāsanā* gradually came to be regarded as a necessity for Bodhisattva’s practice. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the MPPU asserts, “The *vāsanā* of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas are the defilements for Bodhisattvas.”<sup>407</sup>

<sup>403</sup> D no. 9, shes phyin, ga 131b7.

<sup>404</sup> Added according to the Tibetan translation.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>406</sup> PvsP v 65: *atra hi kauśika prajñāpāramitāyāñ caran bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha-bhūmim atikrāmati, bodhisattva-niyāmam avakrāmati, buddhadharmān paripūrayati, sarvākārajñatām anuprāpsyati, sarvākārajñatām anuprāpya tathāgato 'rhan samyaksaṃbuddhaḥ sarvavāsanānusamḍhikleśa-prahāno bhaviṣyati*. Cf. D no. 9, 61a6–b2.

<sup>407</sup> MPPU, T25, 368a5–6: 聲聞、辟支佛習氣於菩薩為煩惱。It is not certain if this sentence is added by the translator Kumārajīva, since no similar expression is found in other places in the MPPU or even in the entire *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. Nevertheless, taking into account that an analogous idea is found

At any rate, in the early Prajñāpāramitā literature, whether *kleśavāsanā* is mental or physical, or even both, remains unclear. On the one hand, *kleśavāsanā* is responsible for bodily and vocal perturbations ({5.3A}); on the other hand, abandoning *kleśavāsanā* marks the obtainment of all-mode insight ({5.3B}).

In the MPPU, most of the contentions that distinguish the Buddha from the Two Vehicles are ultimately ascribed to the abandonment of *kleśavāsanā*. On the other hand, every time when the term *vāsanā* is employed<sup>408</sup>, it is merely for describing the inferiority of the Two Vehicles. Notwithstanding the fact that the author of the MPPU must have been very familiar with the Sarvāstivāda doctrines in the *Vibhāṣā*<sup>409</sup>, the MPPU uses the term *vāsanā* only in the sense of traces left behind by defilements, without any reference to karmic imprints or imprints of cultivation.<sup>410</sup>

As a commentary on the PvsP, the MPPU sheds light on the process of Bodhisattva's practice of abandoning *kleśavāsanā*:

{5.3C} Now, it should be said in accordance with fact: when a Bodhisattva obtains the receptivity to non-arising of *dharma*s (\**anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*), his defilements have been destroyed, but his traces (\**vāsanā*)<sup>411</sup> [of defilements] have not been eliminated. Because of these traces, he acquires and becomes subject to a body born from the *dharma*-realm<sup>412</sup> (\**dharmadhātu-ja kāya*), which enables him to be reborn spontaneously (\**upapāduka-ja*) at will. Because of his great loving-kindness (\**maitrī*) and compassion (\**karuṇā*) for the benefit of sentient beings, and for the purpose of fulfilling his initial vows (\**pūrva-praṇidhāna*), he returns to the mundane world to accomplish the remaining qualities of the Buddha.

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in some later *tathāgatagarbha sūtras* (see §5.5), it is not impossible that the author of the MPPU also espouses this idea. Moreover, Dhammajoti (personal communication) notes that the MPPU contains some doctrines that seem to be in connection with the thoughts of *tathāgatagarbha*. For instance, the MPPU (see T25, 714a9–15) states that Arhats, who have abandoned all *kleśas* and transcended the triple sphere, will study the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra* in a pure Buddha-land to attain Buddhahood. Fazang 法藏 points out that this idea in the MPPU is in line with the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine of the \*[*acintya-pāriṇāmikī cyuti*] (變易生死). (See T44, no. 1838, 62a29–b3).

<sup>408</sup> Various renderings of *vāsanā* are found in the MPPU, such as 餘習, 餘氣, 殘習, 殘氣, 氣殘, 煩惱習, 煩惱氣, and so on.

<sup>409</sup> Lamotte 1970, xxi: *Bien que le Traité combatte l'Abhidharma des Sarvāstivādin Vaibhāṣika, son auteur se révèle comme un spécialiste hors ligne de cet Abhidharma...*

<sup>410</sup> It seems not so likely that the author of the MPPU was absolutely ignorant of other uses of *vāsanā*. As will be noted in §6.4, the DBhS, which the MPPU quotes from, explicitly mentions various ways of impregnation with the term “*vāsanā-vāsitatā*”.

<sup>411</sup> In this context, Lamotte (1976, 1780) renders *vāsanā* as “*relents*”, reeks.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.*: *élément fondamental*.

Having accomplished (*\*paripūrṇa*) the tenth ground (*\*bhūmi*), he sits on the platform of awakening (*\*bodhimaṇḍa*). Through the power of his unobstructed liberation (*\*asaṅga-vimokṣa*), he attains omniscience (*\*sarvajñatā*) and all-mode insight (*\*sarvākāra-jñatā*), and abandons traces of defilements.<sup>413</sup>

In comparison with the DBhS (Dayal 1970, 213, 275), the beginning part of this quote must be dealing with a Bodhisattva at the eighth ground, who has abandoned all defilements, obtained the receptivity to non-arising of *dharma*s, and become non-retrogressive (*avaivartika*). Then, the MPPU continues to describe the case of the reincarnation of the Bodhisattvas in the last three grounds: Since all defilements have been abandoned, the advanced Bodhisattvas take on a body born from the *dharma*-realm (*\*dharmadhātu-ja*) owing to their *vāsanā* and initial vows, instead of a physical body (*rūpakāya*) born of the triple sphere (*\*tridhātu-ja*) owing to defilements.<sup>414</sup> The former is generated spontaneously and beyond death, whereas the latter is subject to death.<sup>415</sup> Thus, there seems to be a penchant in early Mahāyāna to associate *kleśavāsanā* with advanced Bodhisattvas' body. This differentiation of the two types of body in the MPPU adumbrates the ideas of mind-made body (*manomaya-kāya*) and the two types of death (i.e., *acintya-pāriṇāmikī cyuti* and *pariccheda-cyuti*) as seen in the *tathāgatagarbha* scriptures (§5.5.1).<sup>416</sup> It is also plausible that the Mahāyānic association of *vāsanā* and body is partially because *vāsanā* can be interpreted as something that causes a body to dwell (*√vas*) in *saṃsāra*. In this understanding, Master Yuanyu's opinion that *kleśavāsanā* is connected with body (§5.2.2.3) is not utterly groundless.

Different from *kleśavāsanā*, initial vows in this context play a specific role: though Arhats still possess *kleśavāsanā*, since they do not have great compassion to

<sup>413</sup> MPPU, T25, 261c22–27, also 664c3–5: 今當如實說：菩薩得無生法忍，煩惱已盡，習氣未除故，因習氣受及法性生身，能自在化生。有大慈悲為眾生故，亦為滿本願故，還來世間，具足成就餘殘佛法故。十地滿，坐道場。以無礙解脫力故，得一切智、一切種智，斷煩惱習。The Sanskrit words are restored by Lamotte. Lamotte (1974, 100–101) cites this passage without further discussion. See also Lamotte's French translation (1976, 1780).

<sup>414</sup> MPPU, T25, 264b4–7: 菩薩入法位住阿鞞跋致地，末後肉身盡，得法性生身；雖斷諸煩惱，有煩惱習因緣故，受法性生身，非三界生也。

<sup>415</sup> MPPU, T25, 485c18–19: 一者、生死肉身菩薩，二者、出三界不生不死法性生身菩薩。

<sup>416</sup> See also Dhammajoti 2023, 49: "It is interesting to see the author of [the] *Dà zhìdù lùn* here essentially agreeing to a doctrine which is usually ascribed to the Tathāgatagarbha school of thought."



make initial vows, they do not have further rebirth.<sup>417</sup> In other words, the rebirth of an advanced Bodhisattva depends on two conditions: (1) *kleśavāsanā* is responsible for a Bodhisattva's undertaking a body beyond death at will; (2) initial vow which represents his great compassion propels a Bodhisattva to travel around different worlds in the triple sphere to save sentient beings. From a conventional perspective, there seems to be a dilemma regarding *kleśavāsanā*: On the one hand, the goal of Bodhisattva's practice is to acquire all-mode insight (*sarvākāra-jñatā*), abandon all *kleśavāsanā*, and attain Buddhahood. On the other hand, in order to benefit all sentient beings to fulfil the initial vows, it is necessary for the Bodhisattvas to remain in the triple sphere by means of *kleśavāsanā*. Accordingly, a Bodhisattva may have to deliberately preserve his last *kleśavāsanā* in order to undertake reincarnation for the sake of sentient beings. However, such a contradiction is not a challenge for the early Mahāyānists, because the perfection of wisdom is no other than the perfection of compassion. Probably due to the Bodhisattvas' skillful means (*upāyakaūśalya*), the negative *kleśavāsanā* can also have a positive function.

Elsewhere, the MPPU claims that even the Bodhisattvas at the tenth ground still have unknown (*\*ajñāta*) objects and possess *kleśavāsanā*, which need to be overcome through the path of cultivation (*\*bhāvanā-mārga*).<sup>418</sup> Notably, *kleśavāsanā* here is spoken of in juxtaposition with what has not been known, which seems to imply nescience (*ajñāna*). It will be noted in §5.4 that in the Yogācāra school, *kleśavāsanā* is considered as knowable-hindrane (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). Probably influenced by the Abhidharmic way of analysis, Sthiramati recognizes the *kleśavāsanā* to be identical to non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*) (§5.4.1).

Last but not least, in the *Lalitavistara*, one of the early Mahāyāna scriptures, *vāsanā* is used in both the positive sense of imprint of cultivation and the negative sense of traces left behind by defilements. In chapter II of this scripture, it is said that the Buddha in his previous life as a Bodhisattva in the Tuṣita heaven has sought all the wholesome roots, impregnated with *vāsanā*, and so forth.<sup>419</sup> The term *vāsanā* here must be used in its positive sense as the imprint of cultivation. On the other

<sup>417</sup> MPPU, T25, 264b7–9: 問曰：阿羅漢煩惱已盡，習亦未盡，何以不生？答曰：阿羅漢無大慈悲，無本誓願度一切眾生……

<sup>418</sup> *Ibid.*, 340c10–12: 復次，是菩薩雖在十住地，猶有煩惱習在；又於諸法猶有所不知，是故修道。

<sup>419</sup> Lv i 282–86 (cf. Vaidya 7–8): ... bodhisattvasya tuṣitavarabhavanāvasthitasya... paryeṣita-sarvakuśalamūlasya vāsitavāsanasya...

hand, in chapter XX of the *sūtra*, a Bodhisattva is praised as the one whose *vāsanā* of greed, hatred and impurity has been removed.<sup>420</sup> In this context, *vāsanā* refers to the traces left behind by defilements. According to Okano (1987, 103; 1988, 101), the part that contains the positive meaning of *vāsanā* in chapter II of the *sūtra* should be a later addition, whereas the part concerning *kleśavāsanā* in chapter XX is found in the earliest Chinese translation. After all, at the time when the *sūtra* was finalized, the compilers must have been aware of the existence of the different meanings of *vāsanā*.

By and large, the early Mahāyāna description of *kleśavāsanā* agrees with the early Sarvāstivādins' understanding of the term as reflected in the MVbh in two aspects: (1) only the Buddha is free from *kleśavāsanā* and thus is superior to the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas; and (2) *kleśavāsanā* is not identical to defilements.

#### 5.4. *Kleśavāsanā* in the Early Yogācāra School

The early Mahāyānic idea that the elimination of *kleśavāsanā* distinguishes the Buddha from Arhats holds good for the early Yogācāras. On the other hand, considering the close relationship between the Sarvāstivādins and the early Yogācāras, the Sarvāstivāda concept of non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*) in relation to *kleśavāsanā* was also adopted by the Yogācāras. These two aspects are reflected in the old layer (Schmithausen 1987, 14) of the YBh.

##### 5.4.1. *Vāsanā* and *Jñeyāvaraṇa* in the Oldest Layer of the *Yogācārabhūmi*

As argued in §5.3, the sectarian idea of Tathāgata's superiority to Arhats inspired Mahāyānists to pursue their ultimate goal of attaining the supreme Buddhahood through the Bodhisattva path. In this background, some new Mahāyānic notions in connection with *kleśavāsanā* were developed in the Yogācāra school. In the BoBh, *kleśavāsanā* is spoken of in the context of two types of hindrance—defilement-hindrance (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*):

{5.4A} In this context, what is awakening (*bodhi*)? In brief, awakening means the twofold abandonment (*prahāṇa*) and the twofold insight (*jñāna*). Regarding that, abandonment is twofold: (1) the abandonment of defilement-

<sup>420</sup> Lv ii 304 (Vaidya 211): *yasyākīṃcanarāgadoṣakaluṣā* 'sā *vāsanā*' (Hokazono: *sāvāsanā*; Vaidya) *uddhṛtā*...

hindrance, and (2) the abandonment of knowable-hindrance. Moreover, insight is twofold: (1) because of the abandonment of defilement-hindrance, the stainless (*nirmala*) insight free from the connection-continuity (*niranubandha*)<sup>421</sup> of all defilements; and (2) because of the abandonment of knowable-hindrance, the unopposed and unhindered insight with regard to all that should be known (*jñeya*).

Other synonyms [for awakening]—pure insight (*śuddha-jñāna*), insight of all (*sarva-jñāna*), non-impediment insight (*asaṅga-jñāna*), destruction (*samudghāta*)<sup>422</sup> of all defilements and traces (*vāsanā*), and abandonment of non-defiled (*akliṣṭa*) ignorance (*avidyā*) without remainder (*niḥśeṣa-prahāṇa*), are called the supreme perfect awakening (*anuttarā samyak-saṃbodhi*). Among them, the insight, which is [obtained] because of the absolute abandonment of all defilements along with traces in all aspects, is said to be pure...<sup>423</sup>

The Tathāgata is endowed with the supreme unequal abandonment of all defilements along with traces (*savāsana*) and the abandonment of knowable-hindrance—this is said to be his highest abandonment.<sup>424</sup>

In the above-quoted passage, Dhammajoti (2023, 51–53) draws attention to the expression “non-defiled ignorance” (*akliṣṭāvidyā*), taking it as a doctrinal development from the Abhidharma concept of non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*). Dhammajoti (*ibid.*, 53) also notes that *kārikā* II.16 of the MAV speaks of the non-defiled ignorance being the tenfold covering concerning the *dharmadhātu*, while the Bhāṣya interprets the non-defiled ignorance as non-defiled nescience.<sup>425</sup> Although

<sup>421</sup> Dutt: *niranubandha*; Wogihara: *niranubaddha*. Cf. Tib.: *rjes su 'brel pa med pa*

<sup>422</sup> Cf. Ch.: 無餘永害, “absolute destruction without any remainder”.

<sup>423</sup> BoBhw 88 (cf. BoBhp 62): *tatra bodhiḥ katamā | samāsato dvi-vidhaṃ ca prahāṇaṃ dvi-vidhaṃ ca jñānaṃ bodhir ity ucyate | tatra dvi-vidhaṃ prahāṇaṃ | kleśāvaraṇa-prahāṇaṃ jñeyāvaraṇa-prahāṇaṃ ca | dvi-vidhaṃ punar jñānaṃ yat* (Wogihara: *ya*) *kleśāvaraṇa-prahāṇāc ca nirmalaṃ sarva-kleśa-niranubandha* (Wogihara: *niranubaddha*)-*jñānaṃ | jñeyāvaraṇa-prahāṇāc ca yat sarvasmiṃ jñeye apratihataṃ anāvaraṇa-jñānaṃ | aparāḥ paryāyaḥ śuddha-jñānaṃ sarva-jñānaṃ asaṅga-jñānaṃ ca sarva-kleśa-vāsanā-samudghātaś cākliṣṭāyāś cāvidyāyāḥ niḥśeṣa-prahāṇaṃ anuttarā samyak-saṃbodhir* (Wogihara: *saṃbhodhir*) *ity ucyate | tatra savāsanānāṃ sarva-kleśānāṃ sarvataś cātyantaṃ ca prahāṇād yaj jñānaṃ | tac chuddham ity ucyate | ...* Cf. D no. 4037, sems tsam, wi 47b5–48a1; T30, no. 1579, 498c20–27.

<sup>424</sup> BoBhw 90 (cf. BoBhp 63): *yat tathāgataḥ savāsana-sarvakleśa-prahāṇena niruttareṇāpratisamena jñeyāvaraṇa-prahāṇena* (Dutt: *+ca*) *samanvāgataḥ | iyaṃ asya prahāṇa-paramatety ucyate |* Cf. D no. 4037, sems tsam, wi 48b7; T30, no. 1579, 499b1–3.

<sup>425</sup> MAVBh 35: *dharmadhātāv avidyeyam akliṣṭā daśadhāvṛtiḥ | daśabhūmivipakṣeṇa pratipakṣās tu bhūmayah || dharmadhātāu daśavidhe sarvatragādyarthe yad akliṣṭam ajñānaṃ tad daśasu bodhisatvabhūmiṣv āvaraṇaṃ yathākramaṃ tadvipakṣatvāt |*

acknowledging that ignorance (*\*avidyā*) is intrinsically nescience (*\*ajñāna*)<sup>426</sup>, the Sarvāstivādins did not recognize the non-defiled nescience as ignorance, because, for the Sarvāstivādins, ignorance must always be defiled. By contrast, the term “non-defiled ignorance” that occurs in the BoBh suggests that the early Yogācāras used the term ignorance in a broad sense and further distinguished between the defiled and the non-defiled ignorance.<sup>427</sup> Notably, in MSg V.1b, Asaṅga proclaims that the ten types of undefiled ignorance (*\*akliṣṭāvidyā*), which should be counteracted on their corresponding ten grounds of Bodhisattva, are not defiled for the Śrāvakas but are defiled for Bodhisattvas.<sup>428</sup> This reminds us of the Tibetan understanding about the AdsP passage {5.3A}, according to which, *kleśavāsanā*, while not harmful (*anartha*) to ordinary beings, is otherwise for Bodhisattvas. Furthermore, it will be noted in §5.5 that according to some *tathāgatagarbha* scriptures, the *vāsanā* in the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* is not abandonable by the Two Vehicles but has been abandoned only by the Tathāgatas. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the idea of non-defiled ignorance used by the early Yogācāras may have also been shared by some other Mahāyānists and thus contributed to the development of the *tathāgatagarbha* idea of the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*, also known as *avidyā-vāsanā-bhūmi*.

It is important to note that in the oldest layer of the YBh, the early Yogācāras seem not to have regarded *kleśavāsanā* as being identical to the non-defiled ignorance. As seen in quote {5.4A}, *kleśavāsanā*, non-defiled ignorance, and knowable-hindrane were merely juxtaposed without any clear exposition of their relations. It is even arguable that *kleśavāsanā* differs from knowable-hindrane in the oldest layer of the YBh. In the VSg, *vāsanā* is mentioned as being subordinate to the defilement-hindrane, which is side by side with the knowable-hindrane.<sup>429</sup> This perhaps owes to the early Mahāyānist understanding that *kleśavāsanā* is related to

<sup>426</sup> NA, T29, 501c22–23: 是故無明定有別法，無知為體，非但明無。

<sup>427</sup> For a relevant description of *\*akliṣṭasaṃmoha* in the BoBhVin, see D no. 4038, zhi 110a3: *sems phyin ci log tu ma gyur pas mi shes pa ni nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i kun tu rmongs pa zhes bya'o* // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 622a9–10.

<sup>428</sup> See Nagao 1987, 80: *chos kyi dbyings la ma rig pa // nyon mongs can min sgrib pa bcu // sa bcu'i mi mthun phyogs rnams kyi // gnyen po dag ni sa yin no // ma rig pa 'di yang nyan thos rnams kyi ni nyon mongs pa can ma yin gyi / byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyi ni nyon mongs pa can du rig par bya'o* //

<sup>429</sup> D no. 4039, *sems tsam*, zi 169a6–7: *de nyid kyis byang chub mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas la de ltar gzhan gyi don kyang mngon par mkhyen na sgrib pa gnyis po nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa bag chags dang bcas pa dang / shes bya'i sgrub pa thams cad kyi sgrib pa las rnam par grol bar 'gyur te / zla med pa dang / lhar bcas pa'i 'jig rten gyi thar pa'i slob dpon du yang 'gyur ro* //

body (§5.3), in contrast to the knowable-hindrane which must be intellectual by nature. In this connection, the BoBh may lend some support to my conjecture:

{5.4B} In this context, the Tathāgata, while moving, beholding, speaking, or staying, does not have frequent occurrences (*asamudācāra-pracuratā*) of the behaviors (*ceṣṭā*) in resemblance to existing defilements—this is called Tathāgata’s destruction of traces (*vāsanā*). However, Arhats, who have even abandoned defilements, still have behaviors in resemblance to existing defilements while moving, beholding, speaking, or staying.<sup>430</sup>

Here, *kleśavāsanā* is recognized as the defilement-like behaviors. It appears that the early Yogācāras regarded *kleśavāsanā* as something corporeal, or at least related to body and speech. Moreover, {5.4A} also implies that knowable-hindrane is abandonable through knowing all knowable things. However, in the YBh, it remains unclear how *kleśavāsanā* should be abandoned. So to speak, abandoning *kleśavāsanā* appears to be an outcome, rather than a cause, of attaining Buddhahood.

However, the demarcation between *kleśavāsanā* and knowable-hindrane seems to become less evident in the developed Yogācāra school. After the compilation of YBh, the notion of *kleśavāsanā* came to be unequivocally acknowledged as a type of knowable-hindrane. As noted by Dhammajoti (1998, 75), in the commentary on the TrK, Sthiramati also asserts that knowable-hindrane is identical to non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*).<sup>431</sup> Consequently, *kleśavāsanā* comes to be integrated into the notion of knowable-hindrane, which is also recognized as the non-defiled nescience.

Last but not least, the Yogācāra idea of *kleśavāsanā* being knowable-hindrane is also found in some Pāli commentaries. Regarding this, one of the typical examples is a statement in Dhammapāla’s *Udāna-aṭṭakathā*:

{5.4C} What is this so-called “imprints” (*vāsanā*)? They say that it is an inclination (*adhimutti*) of such kind: A mere potency (*sāmatthiya*) in the continuum of even one who has removed defilements, which have been impregnated (*bhāvita*) from beginningless time, and have become the cause for behavior similar to that of unabandoned defilements. This, however, does

<sup>430</sup> BoBh<sub>w</sub> 404 (BoBh<sub>d</sub> 279): *tatra yā tathāgatasya spandite vā prekṣite vā kathite vā vihāre vā kleśa-sadbhāva-sadrśa*-(Dutt: *sadrśaṃ*)*ceṣṭā ’samudācāra-pracuratā*(Dutt: *pracāratā*) | *ayam tathāgatasya vāsanā-samudghāta ity ucyate* | *arhatāṃ punaḥ prahīṇa-kleśānām api kleśa-sadbhāva-sadrśī ceṣṭā spandita-prekṣita-kathita-vihṛteṣu bhavaty eva* | Cf. D no. 4037, sams tsam, wi 208a5–6; T30, no. 1579, 574a18–22. Cf. Yamabe’s English translation (2021, 473).

<sup>431</sup> TrBh 38: *jñeyāvaraṇam api sarvasmin jñeye jñāna-pravṛtti-pratibandha-bhūtam akliṣṭam ajñānam* |

not exist in the Blessed One's continuum, where defilements have been abandoned by virtue of the power (*vasa*) of abandoning knowable-hindrances (*ñeyyāvaraṇa*) through accomplishing the resolution (*abhinīhāra-sampatti*). But where defilements have not been abandoned in this manner, it exists in the continua of the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. Therefore, it is only the Tathāgata who is unhindered in knowledge and vision.<sup>432</sup>

It is interesting to note that in this passage, the Pāli term *vāsanā* is not understood as “traces” derived from defilements, but in a typical Yogācāric sense of impregnated “imprints” (§4.3.1). Taking into account the author's background, such an idea should have been influenced by the Northern tradition. Dhammapāla is most likely the earliest Pāli commentator who took note of the idea of knowable-hindrances. Knowable-hindrances in relation to *vāsanā* is also mentioned in some Pāli Tīkās, which should have been composed relatively late.<sup>433</sup>

#### 5.4.2. *Vāsanā* and *Dauṣṭhulya* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*

Another term that concerns *kleśavāsanā* in the *Maulī Bhūmi* is “grossness” (*dauṣṭhulya*). In the Pāli Vinaya and *suttas*, the Pāli word “*duṭṭhulla*” expresses the idea of moral wickedness, discomfort; being lewd or grievously wrong.<sup>434</sup> For the Yogācāras, grossness denotes all the badness in one's individual existence before attaining *nirvāṇa* without any remainder of substratum (*nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*).

In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, grossness is considered the intrinsic nature of unsatisfactoriness (*duḥkham*) and identical to being perturbed

<sup>432</sup> Adjusted from Dhammajoti's translation (1998, 66). UdA 194: *Kā panāyaṃ vāsanā nāma? Yaṃ kilesarahitassāpi santāne appahīnakilesānaṃ samācārasadisāsamaṃcārahetubhūtaṃ, anādikālabhāvitehi kilesehi āhitaṃ sāmattiyamattaṃ, tathārūpā adhimuttīti vadanti. Taṃ panetaṃ abhinīhārasampattiyā ñeyyāvaraṇappahānavasena yattha kilesā pahīnā, tattha bhagavato santāne natthi. Yattha pana tathā kilesā na pahīnā, tattha sāvakaṇaṃ paccekabuddhānaṃca santāne atthi, tato tathāgatova anāvaraṇaññadassano.*

<sup>433</sup> As for the time when the composition of the Pāli Tīkās began, see Norman 1983, 148–49. *Samyuttaṭīkā* i 3: *Paññāva ñeyyāvaraṇappahānato pakārehi dhammasabhāvajotanaṭṭhena pajjototi paññāpajjoto. Savāsanappahānato viśesena hataṃ samugghāṭitaṃ vihataṃ. Paññāpajjotena vihataṃ paññāpajjotavihataṃ. ...* Though this work is attributed to Dhammapāla, it is very likely to be a different person under the same name.

Moreover, *Samyuttaṭīkā* i 4: *Abhinīhārasampattiyā savāsanappahānameva hi kilesānaṃ ñeyyāvaraṇappahānanti, parasantāne pana mohatamavidhamanassa kāraṇabhāvato phalūpacārena anāvaraṇaññānaṃ “mohatamavidhamana”nti vuccatīti.* Almost the same expression is also found in the *ṭīkā*s of the *Dīghanikāya* and *Majjhimanikāya*, which are also said to be composed by Dhammapāla.

<sup>434</sup> See PED, s.v. “*Duṭṭhulla*”, 326; *A Dictionary of Pāli*, s.v. “*duṭṭhulla*”, 415. See also Sakuma 1990b, 434.

(\**akṣema*).<sup>435</sup> In comparison, the *Manobhūmi* of the YBh also takes unsatisfactoriness of conditioning factors (*saṃskāra-duḥkhatā*) as intrinsically grossness (*dauṣṭhulya-svabhāva*).<sup>436</sup>

Additionally, the Vaibhāṣikas also discuss grossness in the context of meditative experience. Saṅghabhadra asserts in the NA thus:

{5.4D} We (Sarvāstivādins) acknowledge that in the state of meditative concentration (\**samādhi*), there are atoms (\**paramāṇu*), which are induced by the joy and happiness (\**prīti-sukha*) produced from separation (\**vivekaja*), permeating in the body [of the meditator], functioning like the adhesive force in a lump. They counteract the corporeal grossness pertaining to defilements (\**kleśa-pakṣya*), [and thus] benefit the body [of the meditator]...<sup>437</sup>

For the Sarvāstivādins, grossness is related to the body of a meditator. Such an idea is also attested in the ŚrBh of the YBh. Sakuma (1990b, 440–39; 2011, 41–42) notes that in the ŚrBh, grossness is related to the idea of transformation of the basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti*), which in that context refers to the exchange of grossness for ease (*praśrabdhi*) in meditative practice. As Sakuma (2011, 41) argues, in the ŚrBh, the idea of the elimination of grossness is the effect of supranormal perception of Suchness (*tathatā*) rather than its prerequisite.

Sakuma (2011, 42) further notes that in the BoBh, grossness is not discussed in opposition to ease, but concerns defilements (*kleśa*). In light of this observation, it is noteworthy that in the BoBh, grossness is also spoken of together with *vāsanā* in the context of one's psycho-physical basis (*āśraya*):

{5.4E} Among them (the fourfold all-mode purification), what is the purification of basis (*āśraya*)? (1) On account of the basis, the absolute cessation (*atyantoparama*) of grossness (*dauṣṭhulya*) pertaining to all defilements along with traces (*vāsanā*) without remainder (*niravaśeṣatas*, i.e., completely); and (2) in his own individual existence (*ātmabhāva*), the conduct at will (*vaśa-vartitā*) while appropriating (*ādāna*), abiding, and

<sup>435</sup> MVbh, T27, 409a26: 龜重所逼，故名為苦。Cf. NA, T29, 333a25–26: 謂或名苦，即五取蘊，是諸逼迫所依處故，自性龜重不安隱故。

<sup>436</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 26: *ataś ca sakalam āśrayam dauṣṭhulyopagatatvād dauṣṭulyasvabhāvāt tathāgatā duḥkhatāḥ prajñāpayanti | yad uta saṃskāraduḥkhatayā* || See Schmithausen 1987, 67; 347 n. 469.

<sup>437</sup> NA, T29, 761a25–27: 謂我宗亦許正在定位，有離生喜樂所引極微遍在身中，如團中膩力，能對治諸煩惱品身之龜重，攝益於身.....

dying according to wish (*yathā-kāma*) are said to be the all-mode purification of the basis (*sarvākārā āśraya-pariśuddhi*).<sup>438</sup>

Since this quote is related to one's biological basis when abandoning all defilements, *kleśavāsanā* in this context should be understood in terms of physical negativity. This can be compared with the idea in the NA ({5.4D}) that grossness is discussed in the sense of bodily negativity. Nevertheless, in {5.4E}, the relationship between grossness pertaining to all defilements and *vāsana* is not sufficiently clear. It seems that *kleśavāsanā* is subordinate to the grossness pertaining to defilements.

In the *Manobhūmi*, grossness is analyzed into three categories. In addition to the grossness pertaining to defilements as seen in the BoBh, two new categories are spoken of—namely, grossness pertaining to ripening and grossness pertaining to other morally neutral *dharmas*:

{5.4F} Moreover, in those individual beings (*ātmabhāva*), those seeds (*bīja*) that are pertaining to defilements (*kleśa-pakṣya*) in that context are called “grossness” as well as “latent dispositions” (*dauṣṭhulya-anuśaya-saṃjñā*).

And those [*bījas*] which pertain to [karmic] ripening (*vipāka-pakṣya*) and pertain to the [morally] neutral (*avyākṛta-pakṣya*) [*dharmas*] other than those [pertaining to the ripening (of wholesome and unwholesome karma)] in them (i.e., *ātmabhāvas*) are merely called “grossness”, not “latent dispositions”.<sup>439</sup>

Schmithausen (1987, 67) notes that grossness, which is originally not identical with *bīja*, comes to be explained to consist of *bījas*. Since grossness is regarded as the cause of defilements and unsatisfactoriness (*duḥkha*), it becomes equivalent to *bījas*. In this connection, it has been noted in {4.3E} that *bīja* of conditioned *dharmas* is defined as *vāsanā* and universal grossness (*\*sarvatraga dauṣṭhulya*) in the PMBhVin. However, this doctrinal development may bring forward a paradox: on the one hand, grossness pertaining to defilements is taken as *bīja*, latent dispositions, or cause for defilements; on the other hand, *kleśavāsanā* subsumed under the grossness pertaining to defilements, albeit also being *bīja*, cannot be latent dispositions that

<sup>438</sup> BoBh<sub>W</sub> 384 (BoBh<sub>D</sub> 265): *tatrāśraya-pariśuddhiḥ*(Dutt: °-*viśuddhiḥ*) *katamā* | *savāsanānām sarva-kleśa-pakṣyāṇām dauṣṭhulyānām āśrayān niravaśeṣato 'hyantoparamah*(Dutt: 'hyantaparamah) *sve cātmabhāve yathā-kāmādāna-ssthāna-cyuti-vaśavartitā sarvākārā āśraya-pariśuddhir*(Dutt: °-*śuddhir*) *ity ucyate* | Cf. D no. 4037, sams tsam, wi 197a4–5; T30, no. 1579, 568c21–25.

<sup>439</sup> YBh<sub>Br</sub> 26: *teṣu punar ātmabhāveṣu yāni bījāni kleśa-pakṣyāṇi tatra dauṣṭhulyānuśaya-saṃjñā* | *yāni ca punar vipāka-pakṣyāṇi tadanyāvyākṛta-pakṣyāṇi ca teṣu dauṣṭhulya-saṃjñāiva na anuśaya-saṃjñā* | Cf. D no. 4035, sams tsam, tshi 13b3–4; T30, no. 1579, 284c3–6.



produce further defilements. It should be noted that in the entire YBh, *kleśavāsanā* is never explicitly related to *bīja*. As early as in the VSg, *kleśavāsanā* was expressly treated as a different force from latent dispositions:

{5.4G} Among them (the four aspects of knowing self-view), [the aspect of] effect means that self-view (*\*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*) acts as an obstruction in three circumstances: (1) the time of [obtaining] the receptivity (*\*kṣanti*) to observation in *dharma*s starting from selflessness (*\*nairātmya*); (2) the time of direct realization (*\*abhisamaya*); and (3) the time of attaining Arhathood. ... In this context, in the [first] two circumstances, it acts as an obstruction by the force of latent dispositions (*anuśaya*); in the third circumstance, it acts as an obstruction by the force of traces (*vāsanā*).<sup>440</sup>

This passage indicates that *kleśavāsanā* differs from latent dispositions, which have already been abandoned by Arhats. Moreover, *kleśavāsanā* is caused by self-view. As has been noted in §5.1.1, the VSg also explicitly stated that self-view has been abandoned by the Noble Ones but its traces remain in them except for the Buddha. At any rate, the connection between *kleśavāsanā* and self-view (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) must have served as a doctrinal source of *vāsanā* of self-view (*\*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā*) in Asaṅga's MSg (§see 4.3.3).

To resolve the paradox, in the PMBhVin, *kleśavāsanā* turned to be regarded as belonging to grossness pertaining to ripening instead of that pertaining to defilements:

{5.4H} [Question:] When the grossness pertaining to defilements (*\*kleśapakṣya-dauṣṭhulya*) has been completely abandoned by an Arhat, is there any division (*\*pakṣya*) of grossness that has not been abandoned by the Arhat, and on account of the abandonment of which, the traces (*\*vāsanā*) have been completely destroyed by the Tathāgata?

[Answer:] That grossness pertaining to ripening (*\*vipākapakṣya-dauṣṭhulya*) has not been abandoned by Arhats, while the Tathāgata is the one who has [completely]<sup>441</sup> abandoned [all grossness].<sup>442</sup>

<sup>440</sup> D no. 4039, sems tsam, zi 182a5–182b3: *de la 'bras bu ni dus skabs gsum du 'jig tshogs la lta bas sgrib par byed pa ste / 'di lta ste / bdag med pa las brtsams nas chos la rtog pa'i bzod pa'i dus dang / mngon par rtogs pa'i dus dang / dgra bcom pa nyid 'thob pa'i dus kyi tshe'o // ... de la gnas skabs gnyis su ni bag la nyal gyi stobs kyi sgrib par byed do // gsum pa'i skabs su ni bag chags kyi stobs kyi sgrib par byed do // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 797a14–29.*

<sup>441</sup> Added according to Xuanzang's Chinese translation: 究竟.

<sup>442</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 103b5–7: *gang gi tshe dgra bcom pas nyon mongs pa'i 'phyogs* (D: *tshogs*; P, N) *dang mthun pa'i gnas ngan len ma lus par spangs pa'i tshe dgra bcom pas gang ma spangs pa'i gnas ngan len gyi phyogs de gang zhig yod na / de bzhin gshegs pas de spangs pas bag*

*Vāsanā* in the quote above is undoubtedly used in the sense of *kleśavāsanā*. Since the abandonment of grossness pertaining to ripening is said to be responsible for the abandonment of *kleśavāsanā*, *kleśavāsanā* should consist of grossness pertaining to ripening. The term “ripening” (*vipāka*) in this circumstance must refer to the effects of ripening, which are always morally neutral. Since one’s physical body can be taken as neutral effects of ripening, attributing *kleśavāsanā* to the grossness pertaining to ripening is also in accordance with the early Yogācāra understanding that *kleśavāsanā* is related to body. In this regard, when *ālayavijñāna* was explicitly defined as the consciousness of ripening (*vipāka-vijñāna*), *kleśavāsanā* would naturally become recognized as a type of impregnation in the *ālayavijñāna*.

In SNS IX.28, three types of latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) are distinguished as (1) concomitants of the completely destroyed (*\*samudghāta-sahāya*<sup>443</sup>, i.e., *darśanaheya-kleśas*), (2) weak latent dispositions (*\*durbalānuśaya*), and (3) subtle latent dispositions (*\*sūkṣmānuśaya*). Among them, the subtle type is described as follows: above the eighth ground of Bodhisattva where no defilements arise at all, the subtle latent dispositions only abide in knowable-hindrance.<sup>444</sup> Immediately after this statement, SNS IX.29 further explains that the abandonment of the first two types of latent dispositions amounts to the abandonment of grossness situated in skin (*\*tvaggata-dauṣṭhulya*); the abandonment of the third type of latent dispositions amounts to the abandonment of grossness situated in corium (*\*phalgugata-dauṣṭhulya*); and the abandonment of the grossness situated in bones (*\*sāragata-dauṣṭhulya*) refers to the stage of Tathāgata, who is free from all latent dispositions.<sup>445</sup> It can be deduced that the grossness situated in bones cannot be latent

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*chags yang dag par bcom pa yin zhe na / smras pa / dgra bcom pas ni rnam par smin pa'i phyogs dang mthun pa de ma spangs la de bzhin gshegs pas ni spangs pa yin no //* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 619b23–26.

<sup>443</sup> Cf. Guṇabhadra (T no. 678, 717c14), Bodhiruci (T no. 675, 684b14), and Xuanzang (T no. 676, 707c11): 害伴.

<sup>444</sup> See SNS 145: *bcom ldan 'das sa de dag la nyon mongs pa'i bag la nyal rnam pa du mchis lags / spyen ras gzigs dbang phyug rnam pa gsum ste / spyen ras gzigs dbang phyug grogs yang dag par bcom pa ni 'di lta ste / sa lnga po dag na nyon mongs pa lhan cig skyes pa / kun tu 'byung ba'i grogs nyon mongs pa lhan cig skyes pa ma yin pa kun tu 'byung ba de de'i tshé de la med pas de'i phyir grogs yang dag par bcom pa zhes bya'o // bag la nyal stobs chung ba ni 'di lta ste / sa drug pa dang bdun pa la cha phra mo kun tu 'byung ba nyid dang / bsgoms pas mnan pas kun tu 'byung ba nyid kyi phyir ro // bag la nyal phra mo ni 'di lta ste / sa brgyad pa dang de'i gong ma rnam la nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi thams cad du kun tu mi 'byung ba dang / shes bya'i sgrib pa tsam la gnas pa nyid kyi phyir ro //* For an English translation see Power 1995, 265–67.

<sup>445</sup> See SNS 146: *bcom ldan 'das bag la nyal de dag gnas ngan len spangs pa rnam pa dus rab tu phyé ba lags / spyen ras gzigs dbang phyug rnam pa gsum gyis te / gnas ngan len lpags shun la yod pa lta bu spangs pas ni dang po dang gnyis pa rab tu phyé ba yin no // bri la yod pa lta bu spangs pa ni gsum*

dispositions. This idea of the three types of grossness situated in body is derived from the BoBh, where grossness pertaining to knowable-hindrane (*jñeyāvaraṇa-pakṣyam...dauṣṭhulyam*) is said to be threefold, being situated in skin, in corium, and in bones.<sup>446</sup> Therefore, it can be concluded that the scope of knowable-hindrane is larger than *kleśavāsanā*: knowable-hindrane contains both latent dispositions and *kleśavāsanā*. The abandonment of all latent dispositions does not necessarily mean being free from all *kleśavāsanā*. The abandonment of *kleśavāsanā* is the final stage of abandoning knowable-hindrane. The absolute abandonment of knowable-hindrane entails the abandonment of *kleśavāsanā*. Moreover, the early Mahāyāna implication that *kleśavāsanā* is related to corporeal matter (*rūpa*) became explicit in the SNS according to the above discussion. Therefore, *kleśavāsanā* came to be recognized as intrinsically a type of knowable-hindrane. Such doctrinal development was due to the Yogācāra analysis of grossness.

In the BoBhVin, *kleśavāsanā* is defined as the ripening-grossness qua hindrance:

{5.4I} It is because (in contrast to the Tathāgata,) an Arhat who is dwelling in the state of *nirvāṇa* with remainder [of aggregates] (*\*sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu*) has not completely destroyed all marks (*\*nimitta*). And the undestroyed ripening-grossness qua hindrance (*\*vipāka-dauṣṭhulyāvaraṇa*)<sup>447</sup> is known as his traces of defilements (*\*kleśavāsanā*). Depending on the marks and grossness, hindrance is established there. In [the state of *nirvāṇa*] without remainder (*\*nirupadhiśeṣa*), because of having no [marks and grossness], it should be known that there is exactly no hindrance.<sup>448</sup>

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*pa'o // gnas ngan len snying po la yod pa lta bu spangs pa gang yin pa de ni thams cad kyi thams cad du bag la nyal med pa'i gnas skabs yin te / sangs rgyas kyi sa yin par ngas yongs su bstan no //* For an English translation see Power 1995, 267.

<sup>446</sup> BoBh<sub>w</sub> 356–57; BoBh<sub>D</sub> 243: *parame punar vihāre sarva-kleśa-savāsanānuśayāvaraṇa-prahāṇam veditavyam | tac ca tathāgataṃ vihāram anupraviśataḥ jñeyāvaraṇa-pakṣyam api dauṣṭhulyam trividhaṃ veditavyam | tvag-gataṃ phalgu-gataṃ sāra-gataṃ ca | tatra tvag-gatasya pramudite* (Dutt: *pramudita*–) *vihāre prahāṇam bhavati | phalgu-gatasya nābhoge nirmimite | sāra-gatasya tathāgate vihāre prahāṇam bhavati | sarvāvaraṇa-viśuddhi-jñānatā ca |* Cf. D no. 4037, sems tsam, wi 184b7–185a2; T30, no. 1579, 562b6–13.

<sup>447</sup> Tibetan reads: the hindrance of ripening and grossness.

<sup>448</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 124a7–b2: *'di ltar dgra bcom pa phung po'i lhag ma dang bcas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i dbyings la gnas pa'i mtshan ma thams cad kyi thams cad du ma 'gags pa dang / rnam par smin pa dang / gnas ngan len gyi sgrib pa ma 'gags pa de ni de'i nyon mongs pa'i bag chags zhes bya ste / mtshan ma dang gnas ngan len la ltos nas sgrib pa rnam par gz'ag pa de la ni phung po'i lhag ma med pa la med pas de'i phyir de la ni sgrib pa med pa kho nar rig par bya'o //* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 748c6–9: 諸阿羅漢住有餘依涅槃界時，一切眾相非悉永滅，異熟龜重亦非永滅，由彼

The “ripening-grossness” (\**vipāka-dauṣṭhulya*) mentioned in this passage undoubtedly refers to the grossness pertaining to ripening (\**vipākakapakṣya-dauṣṭhulya*). An Arhat’s ripening-grossness qua hindrance must indicate his knowable-hindrance, because Arhats have no more defilement-hindrance. To conclude, Arhats’ *kleśavāsanā* is recognized by the Yogācāras in the VinSg as the grossness pertaining to ripening situated in bones, being a part of knowable-hindrance.

Furthermore, it is equally important to note that according to the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh, the Bodhisattvas’ insight of the purification of knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa-viśuddhi-jñāna*), leading to the penetration into the selflessness of *dharma*s (*dharma-nairātmya*), takes as its object-domain (*gocara-viṣaya*) reality (*tattva*), which is characterized by the ineffable nature (*nirabhilāpya-svabhāvatā*) of all *dharma*s.<sup>449</sup> This indicates that the hindrance that obstructs the knowledge of knowable objects should be the attachment to *dharma*s (*dharmābhiniśa*), which consists of linguistic expressions (*abhilāpa*). In this connection, SNS VII.6 suggests that the perfect characteristic (\**pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*), also known as the absence of intrinsic nature from the perspective of the ultimate truth (\**paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*), is due to the selflessness of *dharma*s.<sup>450</sup> It can be thus inferred the clinging to the imagined (*parikalpita*) on the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), being opposite to the perfect nature, is due to the attachment to a *dharma*s, namely the knowable-hindrance.

From the time of the compilation of VinSg, the Yogācāras spoke of *vāsanā* in the sense of the impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s, and considered it to belong to the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) (§4.3.1). Since then, this particular connotation of *vāsanā*, as a synonym for *bīja*, became increasingly predominant in

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說有煩惱習氣。即觀待彼相及龜重安立有障。住無餘依涅槃界時，彼永無有。The English translation mainly follows Xuanzang’s translation which makes better sense.

<sup>449</sup> See Takahashi 2005, 87 (#2.2.4.1–#2.2.4.2): *jñeyāvaraṇaviśuddhijñānagocaras tattvaṃ katamat | jñeye jñānasya pratighāta āvaraṇam ity ucyate || tena jñeyāvaraṇena vimuktasya jñānasya yo gocaro viṣayas taj jñeyāvaraṇaviśuddhijñānagocaras tattvaṃ veditavyam || tat punaḥ katamat | bodhisattvānām buddhānām ca bhagavatām dharmanairātmyapraveśāya praviṣṭena suviśuddhena ca sarvadharmānām nirabhilāpyasvabhāvatām ārabhya prajñāptivādasvabhāvanirvikalpasamena jñānena yo gocaraviṣayaḥ |* For an English translation, see Engle 2016, 67.

<sup>450</sup> SNS 68: *don dam yang dag ’phags gzhan yang chos rnams kyi yongs su grub pa’i mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ’ang don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ces bya’o // de ci’i phyir zhe na / don dam yang dag ’phags chos rnams kyi chos bdag med pa gang yin pa de ni / de dag gi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ces bya ste //* Cf. T16, no. 676, 694a26–28. For an English translation see Schmithausen 2014, 559.

the Yogācāra school. As a result, on the one hand, related Yogācāric discussions became more focused on knowable-hindrances than on *kleśavāsanā*. On the other hand, the Yogācāras came to understand *kleśavāsanā* as a type of impregnation in relation to defilements rather than simply the traces left behind by defilements. This shift in understanding is exemplified by the Ci'en Master Ji 基, who explicitly proclaims that the grossness pertaining to ripening, which implies *kleśavāsanā*, should be understood as the *bīja* for grasping of *dharma*.<sup>451</sup>

In brief, the early Yogācāras often speak of *kleśavāsanā* in connection with knowable-hindrances abandonable only by the Tathāgata. The discussion about *kleśavāsanā* in the YBh seems not to be consistent. In the VinSg, *kleśavāsanā* came to be regarded as one type of knowable-hindrances, being grossness pertaining to ripening. The knowable-hindrances including *kleśavāsanā* is thoroughly abandoned through the realization of the selflessness of *dharma*s.

## 5.5. *Vāsanā* in the *Tathāgatagarbha* Literature

In parallel with the genesis of the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* in the early Yogācāra school, some Mahāyānists developed the doctrine of *tathāgatagarbha*. In accordance with the emergence of the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, *kleśavāsanā* that distinguishes the Buddha from the Two Vehicles came to be reformulated.

### 5.5.1. *Śrīmālādevīsīṃhanāda-nirdeśa*

In the ŚrMS, the idea of *kleśavāsanā* is implied by the term “*avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*”, which literally denotes a ground wherein abides ignorance. It should be borne in mind that the Sanskrit word *vāsa*, “abiding”, mainly delivers the meaning of impregnating (*vāsanā*) in the ŚrMS. In the RGVV, the term *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* is given as “*avidyā-vāsanā-bhūmi*” in a different manuscript (Ui 1959, 530). Ui (*ibid.*, 487, 530–32, 558) suggests that the Indian masters should have understood the term *vāsa* indiscriminately as *vāsanā*. Moreover, in the translation of the CWSL,

<sup>451</sup> See T43, no. 1829, 213a14–22: 論云：異熟品龜重阿羅漢等所未能斷者。一釋云：諸種子名異熟，此品剛礦性，由未能斷所以有高足越坑等。又解謂：由煩惱為緣力故，引得異熟無記相起，煩惱雖斷，然煩惱習氣力故，令異熟體由有無堪任性隨逐，名為異熟品龜重。又：法執種子，四無記中異熟品攝，品言品類，是異熟種故，此《佛地論》解。今由有此龜重苦，名異熟品龜重，如來永斷。

Xuanzang explicitly uses the rendering “impregnating-ground of ignorance” (無名習地)<sup>452</sup>. Therefore, it is legitimate to understand *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* as the ground where ignorance impregnates.

The ŚrMS distinguishes between two types of impregnating-ground (*\*vāsa-bhūmi*): (1) the four *vāsa-bhūmis* (i.e., *\*ekadr̥ṣṭisthita-vāsabhūmi*, *\*kāmatr̥ṣṇāsthita-°*, *rūpatr̥ṣṇāsthita-°*, and *\*bhavatr̥ṣṇāsthita-°*) from which all arising-defilements (*\*paryutthāna-kleśa*) are produced, and (2) the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* from beginningless time, being the support (*\*saṃniśraya*) and condition (*\*pratyaya*) of all impurities (*\*upakleśa*)<sup>453</sup> and arising-defilements.<sup>454</sup> It seems that in the term *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*, the Sanskrit word *bhūmi*, besides its common meaning of a “ground” where adventitious defilements abide, is also construed as a locus of arising (derived from √*bhū*), suggesting that defilements arise from the impregnated imprints of ignorance. Thus, *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* is considered to be the most fundamental ignorance that gives rise to all defilements.

According to the ŚrMS, the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* is more powerful than the other four *vāsa-bhūmis*, as the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* can be destroyed only by the wisdom of Tathāgatas and cannot be suppressed by the insights of Śrāvakas and Praytekabuddhas.<sup>455</sup> In this respect, it is arguable that the *vāsanā* in the *avidyā-vāsa-*

<sup>452</sup> See CWSL, T31, 45a22–25: 如取為緣，有漏業因續後有者而生三有；如是無明習地為緣，無漏業因有阿羅漢、獨覺、已得自在菩薩生三種意成身，亦名變化身，無漏定力轉令異本如變化故。

<sup>453</sup> Wayman and Wayman (1990) translate *upakleśa* as “secondary defilements”. This rendering, notwithstanding applying to the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra texts, does not fit the context of the ŚrMS. The term *upakleśa* in this context should be used in a sense similar to the Vibhajyavādins and Mahāsāṅghikas’ understanding of adventitious defilements (*\*āgantuka upakleśa*). See AN i 10: *pabhassaram idaṃ bhikkave cittaṃ tañ ca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭaṃ...* See also the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (D no. 4138, *dul ba*, su 143b1): *glo bur du 'ongs pa'i nye ba'i nyon mongs pas / sems rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal ba ni 'dus ma byas kyi dngos po dgu'o* // (underlines mine.)

<sup>454</sup> See D no. 92, *dkon brtsegs*, cha 265a6–b1: *bcom ldan 'das nyon mongs pa dag ni rnam pa gnyis te / gnas kyi sa'i nyon mongs pa rnam dang / kun nas ldang ba'i nyon mongs pa rnam so // bcom ldan 'das gnas kyi sa yang rnam pa bzhi ste / ... bcom ldan 'das gnas kyi sa bzhi po de dag gis nyon mongs pa kun nas ldang ba thams cad skyed lags so* // And D no. 92, cha 267b4: *ma rig pa'i gnas kyi sa ni nye ba'i nyon mongs pa dang / kun nas ldang ba thams cad kyi rgyu dang / gzhi dang rkyen lags so* // Cf. T11, no. 310, 675b18–21, 676a7–8; T12, no. 353, 220a2–5, b20–22. For an English translation, see Wayman and Wayman 1990, 84, 88.

<sup>455</sup> See D no. 92, *dkon brtsegs*, cha 265b2–7: *bcom ldan 'das gnas kyi sa bzhi po 'di dag gi nang na stobs che ba gang lags pa de ni nye ba'i nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi gzhir gyur pa ma rig pa'i gnas kyi sa stobs che ba'i grangs sam / cha'am / bgrang ba'am / dpe 'am / rgyur yang mi bzod lags so // ... bcom ldan 'das de bzhin du ma rig pa'i gnas kyi sa srid pa'i 'dod chags la gnas pa'i gnas kyi sa zhes bgyi bas kyang gnas kyi sa bzhi po 'di dag zil gyis gnon te / nye ba'i nyon mongs pa gang ga'i klung gi bye ma las 'das pa snyed kyi rten du gyur pa dang / nyon mongs pa bzhi dang yang yun ring po nas*

*bhūmi* is equivalent to *kleśavāsanā* which is unabandonable by the Two Vehicles. Since *vāsa(nā)* is understood in the *tathāgatagarbha* scripture as impregnating instead of its common meaning of traces when connected with defilements, the meaning of *kleśavāsanā* shifted accordingly from the traces (derived from Class I  $\sqrt{vas}$ ) left behind by defilements to the impregnated imprints (derived from Class X  $\sqrt{vās}$ ) by defilements. This shift in meaning enables *kleśavāsanā* to generate further defilements. As a result, *kleśavāsanā* which had been regarded as passive remaining traces derived from defilements became recognized as an active producer of all defilements.

It is also said in the ŚrMS that the arising-defilements are momentarily associated (\**samprayukta*) with mind, whereas the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* is dissociated from mind.<sup>456</sup> This idea can be seen as being in line with the Mahāsāṅghika doctrine<sup>457</sup> (also held by the Mahīśāsakas<sup>458</sup>) that latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) as dormant defilements are dissociated from mind whereas envelopments (*pariyavasthāna*) as active defilements are associated with mind.<sup>459</sup> It is arguable that the arising-defilements function as the Mahāsāṅghika notion of envelopment and *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* functions as latent dispositions. Takasaki (1974, 361) asserts that

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*lhan cig gnas pa dang / nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas kyi shes pas mi rdzi ba dang / de bzhin gshegs pa'i byang chub kyi ye shes kyiis gzhom par bgyi ba lags te / bcom ldan 'das ma rig pa'i gnas kyi sa ni stobs che ba lags so //* Cf. T11, no. 310, 675b22–29; T12, no. 353, 220a6–15. For an English translation, see Wayman and Wayman 1990, 84–85.

<sup>456</sup> See D no. 92, dkon brtsegs, cha 265b1–2: *bcom ldan 'das de dag kyang skad cig pa ste / sems kyi skad cig pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa lags so // bcom ldan 'das ma rig pa'i gnas kyiis thog ma ma mchis pa'i dus nas mchis pa ni sems dang mi ldan pa lags so //* Cf. T11, no. 310, 675b21–22; T12, no. 353, 220a5–6. For an English translation, see Wayman and Wayman 1990, 84.

Note that in the *tathāgatagarbha* context as well as the Mahāsāṅghika context below, I intentionally translate *citta-samprayukta* and *citta-viprayukta* respectively as “associated with mind” and “dissociated from mind”. By contrast, in the Sarvāstivāda context, the two terms are translated respectively as “conjoined with thought” and “disjoined from thought”. The reason for this differentiation is that *citta* for the Sarvāstivādins is always momentary and arises necessarily in conjunction with *caittas*, whereas *citta* in a Mahāsāṅghika/*tathāgatagarbha* context is always an intrinsically pure mind with adventitious defilements.


<sup>457</sup> According to the Waymans (1990, 3), the formation of the ŚrMS was within the Mahāsāṅghika school in third-century Andhra.

<sup>458</sup> See D no. 4138, 'dul ba, su 145b7–146a3; cf. T49, no. 2031, 16c26–17a1.

<sup>459</sup> See *Samayabhedoparacanacakra* (D no. 4138, 'dul ba, su 142b1–143b2): *de la dge 'dun phal chen po'i sde zhes bya ba tha snyad gcig pa'i sde dang / 'jig rten 'das smra'i sde dang / bya gag ris kyi sde zhes bya pa rnams kyi gzhi'i gzhung dag yod de / ... bag la nyal dag gzhan la kun nas dkris pa dag gzhan yin par brjod par bya'o // bag la nyal rnams ni sems dang mi ldan pa yin par brjod par bya'o // kun nas dkris pa dag ni sems dang mtshungs par ldan bdag go //* Cf. T49, no. 2031, 15b25–16a1.

*vāsa-bhūmi* refers to latent dispositions as well as *vāsanā*. Accordingly, it can be deduced that the four *vāsa-bhūmis*, being latent dispositions, are also dissociated from mind. In this understanding, *kleśavāsanā* seems to be also regarded as a kind of latent dispositions. It can thus be conceded that for the *tathāgatagarbha* proponents, *kleśavāsanā* plays a role equivalent to the *bīja* of defilements. In this connection, it should be noted that “*bīja*” in the entire ŚrMS is not used as a technical term as it is in the Yogācāra texts in the sense of a latent cause, let alone any mention of “\**kleśa-bīja*”.

The doctrinal connection between *kleśavāsanā*, the five *vāsa-bhūmis*, and the Mahāsāṅghika notions of envelopment and latent dispositions can be briefly illustrated below:



According to the ŚrMS, taking *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* as a condition and uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) karma as its cause, three kinds of mind-made body (*manomaya-kāya*)—of Arhats, Pretyekabuddhas, and the Bodhisattvas who have obtained mastery—come into existence.<sup>460</sup> Though the three types of mind-made body are uncontaminated, they cannot be seen as completely purified. As noted in §5.3, the MPPU expresses the idea that *kleśavāsanā* contributes to Bodhisattvas’ reincarnation beyond death at will. In line with this idea, the mind-made bodies conditioned by *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*, which amounts to *kleśavāsanā*, are responsible for the inconceivable transformational death (*acintyā pārīṇāmikī cyuti*).

<sup>460</sup> See D no. 92, dkong brtsegs, cha 265b7–266a1; T11, no. 310, 675b29–c3; T12, no. 353, 220a15–18. The citation of this portion in the Sanskrit RGVV (33–34) is slight different from the Tibetan and the Chinese translations: *eṣa ca grantho vistareṇa yathāsūtram anugantavyaḥ | syād yathāpi nāma bhagavann upādānapratyayāḥ sāsraṇakarmahetukāstrayo bhavāḥ sambhavanti | evam eva bhagavann avidyāvāsabhūmipratyayā anāsravakarmahetukā arhatāṃ pratyekabuddhānāṃ vaśitāprāptānāṃ ca bodhisattvānāṃ manomayāstrayaḥ kāyāḥ sambhavanti | āsu bhagavan tisṛṣu bhūmiṣveṣāṃ trayānāṃ manomayānāṃ kāyānāṃ sambhavāyānāsravasya ca karmaṇo 'bhinirvṛttaye pratyayo bhavaty avidyāvāsabhūmir iti vistaraḥ |*



It is also interesting to note that an idea similar to the Yogācāra idea of knowable-hindrane (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) can be seen in the ŚrMS. It is mentioned in this *tathāgatagarbha* scripture that although Arhats and Pratyekabuddhas have abandoned all the defilements in the four *vāsa-bhūmis*, they, as well as the Bodhisattvas even in their last existence, are still hindered by the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. Thus, they have not actually (*\*sākṣāt*) acquired the mastery (*\*vaśitā*) over the exhaustion of flux (*\*āsrava-kṣaya*), and have not thoroughly known and perceived this and that *dharma*.<sup>461</sup> In a similar vein, knowable-hindrane, in respect of its doctrinal connection with non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*), indicates that the Two Vehicles and Bodhisattvas are still subject to the hindrance of unknown *dharma*s. The above comparison does not imply any unilateral or mutual doctrinal influence between the ŚrMS and the YBh, but only reveals the fact that there was a common ideal of attaining perfect Buddhahood among the Mahāyānists, with a specific emphasis on completely knowing the pure nature of all *dharma*s, or emptiness (*śūnyatā*). At any rate, such doctrinal congruity enables later Yogācāra exegetes, from the time of the CWSL<sup>462</sup> down to the Chinese Faxiang school<sup>463</sup>, and Tsongkhapa<sup>464</sup> to take *avidyā-vāsa(nā)-bhūmi* as being identical to knowable-hindrane.

As a matter of fact, since *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* gives rise to all defilements, even if all arising defilements and the defilements in the four *vāsa-bhūmis* have been fully

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<sup>461</sup> D no. 92, dkong brtsegs, cha 266a5–7: *bcom ldan 'das dgra bcom pa rnam dang / rang sangs rgyas rnam* <kyis>(D: *kyi sa*) *ni gnas kyi sa bzhi spangs kyang zag pa zad pa la dbang ba'i stobs kyang mi 'thob / mngon sum du yang mi bgyid do // bcom ldan 'das zag pa zad pa zhes bgyi ba de ni ma rig pa'i gnas kyi sa'i tshig bla <dwags>(D: dags) lags so // bcom ldan 'das de lta lags pas dgra bcom pa rnam dang / rang sangs rgyas rnam dang / srid pa tha ma par gtogs pa'i byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyang ma rig pa'i gnas kyi sas bsgrigs shing chod la yongs su dkris te ldongs par bgyis pas chos de dang de dag rab tu ma 'tshal cing mi rtogs so // bcom ldan 'das chos de dang de dag ma 'tshal cing ma mthong bas spang bar bgyi ba'i chos de dang de dag mi spongs shing byang bar mi bgyid do // Cf. T11, no. 310, 675c8–13; T12, no. 353, 220a23–28. For an English translation, see Wayman and Wayman 1990, 86.*

<sup>462</sup> See CWSL, T31, 48c23–29: 若所知障有見疑等，如何此種契經說為「無明住地」？無明增故，總名無明，非無見等。如煩惱種立見一處、欲、色、有愛四住地名，豈彼更無慢、無明等？如是二障，分別起者，見所斷攝；任運起者，修所斷攝。二(T: 二斷攝。)乘但能斷煩惱障，菩薩俱斷永斷二種。

<sup>463</sup> For example, the Ci'en master Ji remarks as follows (T43, no. 1829, 57c1–4): 《勝鬘經》說：有五住地，一、見一處住地，二、欲愛住地，三、色愛住地，四、有愛住地，五、無明住地。前四煩惱障，後一所知障。

<sup>464</sup> For example, *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* (473): *de la ma rig pa'i bag chags ni shes bya yongs su gcod pa'i gegs su gyur pa yin la // zhes shes sgrib tu yang gsung so //* (underlines mine.)

uprooted, the Two Vehicles may still be subject to the reoccurrence of the defilements produced from the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. In this understanding, the true liberation from the defilement-hindrane must be warranted by the abandonment of knowable-hindrane.

### 5.5.2. *Ratnagotravibhāga and The Mahāyāna Treatise on the Non-difference of the Dharmadhātu*

In *Ratnagotravibhāga* I.82, the *tathāgatagarbha*, contradictory to *avidyā-vāsa(nā)*<sup>465</sup>-*bhūmi*, is said to be not harmed by minute ailments of *vāsanā* (*vāsanā-vyādhi*)<sup>466</sup> because of being quiescent.<sup>467</sup> Accordingly, “*vāsa*” in “*avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*” is overtly understood as *vāsanā*. The expression of “ailments” (*vyādhi*), again, reminds us of the idea delivered in the MPPU that *kleśavāsanā* plays the role of an illness for Bodhisattvas (§5.3).

It has been noted by Takasaki (1966, 58) that the RGVV borrows considerably from Vijñānavāda theories.<sup>468</sup> Similar to the idea of *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in SNS V.2 (§4.3.1), the RGVV associates *avidyā-vāsa(nā)-bhūmi* with conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*).<sup>469</sup> According to the RGVV, at the end of removing *kleśavāsanā*, the abandonment of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* amounts to the obtainment of the perfection of purity (*śubha-pāramitā*). Moreover, conditioned by the *avidyā-vāsa(nā)-bhūmi*, in consequence of the occurrence (*samudācāra*) of conceptual proliferation with subtle signs (*sūkṣmanimitta-prapañca*), Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas, and Bodhisattvas do not obtain the perfection of self (*ātma-pāramitā*) as non-formation (*anabhisaṃskāra*).<sup>470</sup> These features of

<sup>465</sup> Not only one manuscript gives *avidyā-vāsanā-bhūmi* instead of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* (Ui 1959, 530), but also the Tibetan translation of this text shows *ma rig pa'i bag chags kyi sa*, namely, *avidyā-vāsanā-bhūmi*. See D no. 4025, sems tsam, phi 92a3–b5.

<sup>466</sup> Another possible reading of the term can be *vāsanā-āvyādhi* (Ui 1959, 558), “the wound of impregnation”. In comparison with the Tibetan (*bag chags phra mo'i nad rnam*) and the Chinese translations (病), I choose to split the compound as “*vāsanā-vyādhi*”. See D no. 4024, sems tsam, phi, 58a4; T31, no. 1611, 835a24.

<sup>467</sup> See RGVV 54: *vāsanāvyādhibhiḥ sūkṣmair bādhyate na śivatvataḥ | ... pūrvāparāntam upādāya śivatvān na punar bādhyate 'vidyāvāsabhūmi-parigraheṇa |*

<sup>468</sup> The *Ratnagotravibhāga* and its *Vyākhyā* are believed to be composed in close relation to Maitreya and Asaṅga. It is known that the author of the RGVV must have referred to the MSA but is silent about the Yogācāra doctrines of *ālayavijñāna* and the three natures.

<sup>469</sup> Takasaki (1966, 58) notes that there is no quotation from the SNS in the RGVV.

<sup>470</sup> See RGVV 33: *tatra sarvopakleśasaṃnīśrayabhūtāyā avidyāvāsabhūmer aprahīṇātvād arhantaḥ*

perfection are ascribed to the Tathāgata's body of Truth (*dharmakāya*) according to the ŚrMS.<sup>471</sup>

The RGVV cites the ŚrMS, which states that, conditioned by *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* and caused by uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) karma, three types of mind-made body (*manomaya-kāya*) are produced. Thus, the RGVV compares (1) *avidyā-vāsa(nā)-bhūmi*, (2) uncontaminated karma, and (3) the three types of mind-made body and the transformational death (*pariṇāmikī-cyutī*) respectively with the three types of afflictions (*saṃkleśa*) mentioned in SNS VII.10b as (1) affliction of defilements (*kleśa-saṃkleśa*), (2) affliction of karma, and (3) affliction of birth (*janma-saṃkleśa*) in the defiled situation.<sup>472</sup> Since in SNS VII.10b, defilements serve as the causes for karmic formation, which causes birth and death, it is arguable that *avidyā-vāsa(nā)-bhūmi* functions as a major cause of uncontaminated karma, because of which the mind-made bodies that are responsible for the transformational death are produced. It seems that the term *vāsanā/vāsa* in the RGVV, regardless of its early connotation of traces left behind by defilements, not only expresses the idea of impregnation of defiled *dharmas* as in the ŚrMS, but also implies karmic imprints as it contributes to the uncontaminated karmic dependent co-arising. It can be thus imagined that when the RGVV was being composed, the different connotations of *vāsanā* must have been intermingled as a whole. As a result, when speaking of *vāsanā*, the author could not have referred to only one specific meaning of the term while excluding its other noticeable connotations.

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*pratyekabuddhā vaśitāprāptāś ca bodhisattvāḥ sarvakleśa-maladaurgandhya-vāsanāpakarṣa-paryanta-śubhāpāramitāṃ nādhigacchanti | tām eva cāvidyāvāsabhūmiṃ pratītya sūkṣmanimitta-prapañca-samudācāra-yogād atyantam anabhisamskāram ātmapāramitāṃ nādhigacchanti |* See also RGVV 34 (kārikā I.37): *sa hi prakṛtiśuddhatvād vāsanāpagamāc chuciḥ paramātmāmanairātmyaprapaṇcaḥ śāntitāḥ ||*

<sup>471</sup> See RGVV 34: ... *tathāgatadharmakāya eva nityapāramitā sukhapāramitātmāpāramitā śubhāpāramitety uktam |* Cf. D no. 92, dkong brtsegs, cha 273b7.

<sup>472</sup> See RGVV 32: *tatra pratyaya-lakṣaṇam avidyāvāsabhūmir avidyeva saṃskārāṇām | hetu-lakṣaṇam avidyāvāsabhūmipratyayam eva saṃskāravad anāsravaṃ karma | saṃbhavalakṣaṇam avidyāvāsabhūmipratyayānāsravakarmahetukī ca trividhā manomayātmabhāvanirvṛtīś caturupādānapratyayā sāsravakarmahetukīva tribhavābhinirvṛtīḥ | vibhavalakṣaṇam trividhamanomayātmabhāvanirvṛtipratyayā jātipratyayam iva jarāmaraṇam acintyā pariṇāmikī cyutir iti |* Also RGVV 34: *tatra kleśasaṃkleśavad avidyāvāsabhūmiḥ | karmasaṃkleśavad anāsravakarmābhisaṃskārah | janmasaṃkleśavat trividhā manomayātmabhāvanirvṛtīr acintyāpariṇāmikī ca cyutir iti | eṣa ca grantho vistareṇa yathāsūtram anugantavyaḥ | syād yathāpi nāma bhagavann upādānapratyayāḥ sāsravakarmahetukāstrayo bhavāḥ saṃbhavanti | evam eva bhagavann avidyāvāsabhūmipratyayā anāsravakarmahetukā arhatāṃ pratyekabuddhānāṃ vaśitāprāptānāṃ ca bodhisattvānāṃ manomayaś trayāḥ kāyāḥ saṃbhavanti |*

It is also noteworthy that the expression “*savāsana-kleśa-jñeyāvaraṇa*”, which means hindrance that consists of defilements along with impregnation and knowables, occurs three times in the RGVV.<sup>473</sup> Such an expression should have been influenced by the Yogācāra understanding of *kleśavāsanā* in association with the twofold hindrance (§5.4.1). Although the RGVV absorbed the Yogācāra notion of knowable-hindrance, no exposition is made in the treatise about the relationship between knowable-hindrance and *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. Taking into consideration that *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* is connected with the conceptual proliferation of subtle signs as mentioned earlier, *kleśavāsanā* should be related to knowable-hindrance.

However, in one Chinese translation of *The Mahāyāna Treatise on the Non-difference of the Dharmadhātu*—*Dàshèng fǎjiè wúchābié lùn* (大乘法界無差別論, T no. 1627), which is believed to have been composed in close relation to the RGVV, the expression \**sarva-savāsana-kleśa-jñeyāvaraṇa-samudghāta* is translated as “the destruction of all defilement-hindrance along with *vāsanā* and knowable-hindrance” (一切煩惱習障及所知障俱永斷).<sup>474</sup> This suggests that the translator<sup>475</sup> understood *kleśavāsanā* as being not derived from knowable-hindrance.

In comparison, the parallel sentence in the other Chinese translation (T no. 1626) of the same text reads, “no ailments, because of absolutely abandoning all illness of the hindrance as defilements and knowable things, as well as *vāsanā*”<sup>476</sup>. Fazang 法藏 (643–712) explains this sentence as the exhaustion of the ailments of the twofold hindrance as well as *vāsanā*.<sup>477</sup> This explanation should not be regarded as merely a

<sup>473</sup> RGVV 40: *samyagaviparyastā niṣprapañcā ca savāsana-kleśajñeyāvaraṇa-samudghātāt samyak-sambuddhānām* | RGVV 58: *tad-anantaram buddhabhūmy-adhigamāya sarva-savāsana-kleśajñeyāvaraṇa-vimokṣa-jñāna-saṃniśrayeṇa guṇa-viśuddhi-paramatā samudāgacchati* | RGVV 82: *yā savāsana-kleśajñeyāvaraṇa-vimokṣād anāvaraṇa-dharmakāya-prāptir iyam ucyate svārthasampattiḥ* |

<sup>474</sup> Literally, “twofold absolute destruction of all defilement-impregnating-hindrance and knowable-hindrance”. See T31, no. 1627, 895a14–15: 言無病者，一切煩惱習障及所知障俱永斷故。

<sup>475</sup> The translator of T no. 1627 is attributed to \*Devaprajñā 提雲般若. However, it is certain that T no. 1626, an obviously different translation of the same text, was translated by \*Devaprajñā in 691 CE. When Fazang 法藏 composed the commentary on T no. 1626, he did not mention the existence of the other translation at all. Therefore, T no. 1627 could have been translated after the early 8<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>476</sup> T31, no. 1626, 892b6–7: 無病，一切煩惱所知障病及與習氣皆永斷故。Here I translate literally from Chinese because Fazang must have understood the text in Chinese.

<sup>477</sup> T44, no. 1838, 65b10–12: 四、無病者，標也。謂二障及習所病盡故。《寶性論》云：「清涼故不病，無煩惱習故。」

Chinese Buddhist interpretation, as Fazang also adduces the Indian translator's elucidation about *vāsanā* in the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*:

{5.5A} Question: What is the difference between this [*vāsanā*] and the knowable-hindrane mentioned before it?

Answer: Two explanations are made by the *Tripiṭaka* master (i.e., \*Devaprajñā). The first explanation is that this [*vāsanā*] deals with the ignorance in impregnating-ground, whereas that [the twofold hindrance] deals with the ignorance at the time of arising (i.e., the arising-defilements), just as it is spoken of in the *Śrīmālā[-sūtra]*. The second explanation is that this [*vāsanā*] has the subtle portion of knowable-hindrane as its nature, and serves as the supporter of that [twofold hindrance], because the gross [portion of knowable-hindrane] arises depending on the subtle [portion].

[Question:] If so, does not the defilement[-hindrance] have gross and subtle [portions]?

It is explained that both (1) the gross and subtle defilement-hindrane and (2) the gross knowable-hindrane are the supported. Only this [*vāsanā* in the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*] is subtle and serves as the supporting basis of the other two.<sup>478</sup>

According to \*Devaprajñā, the first explanation is based on the ŚrMS, where two types of defilements are recognized as the defilements of impregnating-ground and the arising-defilements (§5.5.1). Because the twofold hindrance is not mentioned in the ŚrMS, this explanation must be a later adaptation of the twofold hindrance to the *tathāgatagarbha* theoretical pattern of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* and arising-defilements. However, it appears to be not so reasonable to consider the knowable-hindrane to be arising-defilements, because the arising-defilements correspond to the defilement-hindrane which has been abandoned by Arhats. According to what has been observed in §5.5.1, the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* is distinct from the defilements of the four impregnating-grounds, let alone the arising-defilements. Though all the abiding-grounds can be regarded as *vāsanā* in nature, the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* specifically refers to *kleśavāsanā* that is disjoined from mind. Another plausibility is that \*Devaprajñā's first explanation focuses on defilement-hindrane instead of knowable-hindrane, while Fazang misunderstood \*Devaprajñā's explanation.

<sup>478</sup> T44, no. 1838, 65b14–19: 問：此與前所知障何別？答：三藏兩釋。一云：此是住地無明，彼是起時無明，如《勝鬘》說也。二云：此是所知障中細分為本，是彼所依，以依細起麤故。若爾，煩惱豈無麤細？釋云：煩惱麤細與所知，俱是能依。唯此微細，是彼二所依。

By contrast, the second explanation, which accords with the YBh (§5.4.2) and the CWSL<sup>479</sup>, is more reasonable. According to \*Devaprajñā, the gross defilement-hindrance refers to all manifested defilements, and the subtle one refers to the four impregnating-grounds; the gross knowable-hindrance is the uncontaminated karma that constitutes the three types of mind-made body produced from the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*, and the subtle knowable-hindrance is nothing else but the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. The correspondence of the notions can be illustrated in the table below:

&lt;Table 6&gt;

<i>kleśa-āvaraṇa</i>	gross	all arising-defilements (= <i>paryavasthāna</i> )	effect ↑ cause
	subtle	defilements in the four <i>vāsa-bhūmis</i> (= <i>anuśaya</i> )	
<i>jñeya-āvaraṇa</i>	gross	uncontaminated karma that constitutes the three types of mind-made body	effect ↑ cause
	subtle	<i>avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi</i> (= <i>kleśavāsanā</i> )	

According to this framework, the absolute abandonment of the twofold hindrance entails the abandonment of the subtle *vāsanā*. On the other hand, the abandonment of *kleśavāsanā* necessarily results in the abandonment of knowable-hindrance, because the *kleśavāsanā* in the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* serves as the cause of the entire defilement-hindrance and the gross knowable-hindrance. Since *kleśavāsanā* plays the role of the fundamental defilement that generates all defilements, the word *vāsanā* seems to be used as a synonym for potency (*sāmarthya*).

### 5.5.3. Are There Remaining Traces (*vāsanā*) after Abandoning *Jñeyāvaraṇa*?

In this connection, it is noteworthy that N. Funahashi (1965, 58–66) argues that there should be *vāsanā* of both defilement-hindrance and knowable-hindrance, and *vāsanā* remains even after the abandonment of knowable-hindrance. This contention is based on two pieces of textual evidence. The first one is taken from the RGVV as below:

<sup>479</sup> The CWSL distinguishes the subtle knowable-hindrance being the extremely subtle delusion of attachment to all knowable objects from the *bīja* of defilement-hindrance being the extremely subtle delusion of obstruction. See CWSL, T31, 53c21–26: 由斯佛地說斷二愚及彼龜重。一，於一切所知境極微細著愚，即是此中微所知障。二，極微細礙愚，即是此中一切任運煩惱障種。故《集論》說，得菩提時頓斷煩惱及所知障，成阿羅漢及成如來，證大涅槃、大菩提故。See also 48c29–49a2: 菩薩住此資糧位中，二龜現行雖有伏者，而於細者及二隨眠，止觀力微，未能伏滅。

{5.5B} (According to the *Jñānālokālaṃkāra-sūtra*<sup>480</sup>, the *dharmadhātu* of sentient beings who have not awakened is seen as) “unpurified” (*aśuddha*) in terms of foolish ordinary beings’ defilement-hindrane; “not stainless” (*avimala*) in terms of Śrāvakas’ and Pratyekabuddhas’ knowable-hindrane; and “blemished” (*sāṅgaṇa*) in terms of Bodhisattvas’ remainders (*avaśiṣṭatā*)<sup>481</sup> from either of those two.<sup>482</sup>

N. Funahashi (*ibid.*, 58) opines that though the term “*vāsanā*” is absent in Sanskrit, there must be *vāsanā* in addition to the defilement-hindrane and knowable-hindrane, because not only the word *xíqì* 習氣 (\**vāsanā*) appears in the Chinese translation, but also the Tibetan rendering of “*avaśiṣṭatā*” as *lhag ma*, “remainders”, suggests the idea of *vāsanā*. However, according to what has been observed in §5.5.2, *vāsanā* in the RGVV is mainly understood as impregnation rather than the remaining traces. As for “*xíqì*” in the Chinese translation, it must be noted that the expression *èrzhǒng xíqì zhàng* 二種習氣障 should be properly understood as “the two types of impregnation (\**vāsanā*) that function as hindrance”, rather than “the remnants (\**vāsanā*) of the two types of hindrance”. If it is understood in the latter way as N. Funahashi favors, the Chinese expression would have become *èrzhǒng zhàng xíqì* \* 二種障習氣. Thus, it is unnecessary to suppose the existence of *vāsanā* apart from the twofold hindrance. Bodhisattvas may still have the two types of hindrance, though they are capable of overcoming both of them. In this way of reading, *lhag ma* in the Tibetan translation should be a translation of *śiṣṭatā* or *avaśiṣṭatā*, rather than *viśiṣṭatā* as the original Sanskrit manuscripts show.

It is noteworthy that Ui (1959, 496), probably taking the Chinese translation into consideration, remarks, “‘blemished’ means, depending on that of Bodhisattvas, which is different from either of the aforementioned two (types of hindrance), namely depending on the *vāsanā*.” On this point, Ui’s reading strictly follows the two extant Sanskrit manuscripts, which read *tadubhayānyatama-viśiṣṭatayā*, “in

<sup>480</sup> The *sūtra*, known in full as the *Sarvabuddhaviṣayāvatārajñānālokālaṃkāra nāma mahāyānasūtra*, describes *bodhi* as *śuddha*, *vimala* and *anaṅgaṇa*. See Takayasu Kimura et al. 2004, 65 (532), §35.

<sup>481</sup> Tib.: *lhag ma*; Ch.: 習氣. Takasaki (1989, 227) suggests to read it as “*avaśiṣṭatā*”.

<sup>482</sup> RGVV 9: *aśuddhaṃ kleśāvaraṇena bālaprthagjanānām | avimalaṃ jñeyāvaraṇena śrāvakaṃ pratyekabuddhānām | sāṅgaṇaṃ <tadubhayānyatamāvaśiṣṭatayā>* (or Johnson: *tadubhayānyatama-viśiṣṭatayā bodhisattvānām* | Cf. T31, no. 1611, 823b8–11: 不淨者以諸凡夫煩惱障故。有垢者以諸聲聞辟支佛等有智障故。有點者以諸菩薩摩訶薩等依彼二種習氣障故。D no. 4025, sems tsam, phi, 79a7–b1: *byis pa so so 'i skye bo rnam kyī ni nyon mongs pa 'i sgrib pas ma dag pa'o // nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnam kyī ni shes bya 'i sgrib pas dri ma dang ma bral ba'o // byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyī ni de gnyi ga gang yang rung ba 'i lhag mas skyon dang bcas pa'o //*

terms of the distinctiveness of either of them”, rather than °-*avaśiṣṭatayā* as Takasaki suggests. Accordingly, Ui understands *viśiṣṭatā* as being different. Nevertheless, even in this case, it does not necessarily mean *vāsanā* is separated from the twofold hindrance. Rather, *vāsanā* as the impregnated latent propensity is a distinctive type of the twofold hindrance, being different from the manifested ones. Therefore, no matter which way of reading accords with the intention of the author of the RGVV, there cannot be *vāsanā* after the abandonment of knowable-hindrances.

The other evidence that N. Funahashi provides is Sthiramati’s commentary on MSA IX.1–2:

{5.5C} The expression “because of the exhaustion of immeasurable hindrances” (*ameyāvaraṇa-kṣayāt*) shows to what extent the defilement-hindrances and knowable-hindrances have been abandoned. It means not only the defilement-hindrances unabandoned since beginningless *samsāra* has been abandoned, but also the knowable-hindrances has been abandoned. ... The expression “stainlessness from all hindrances” (*sarvāvaraṇa-nirmalā*) is to show the collection of the threefold liberation. Because at the time of [attaining] Buddhahood, even the impregnation (*vāsanā*) of defilement-hindrances and knowable-hindrances pertaining to the ten stages is abandoned without remainder, it is called “stainlessness from all hindrances”.<sup>483</sup>

According to what has been observed, this quote only demonstrates that there is impregnation of both defilement-hindrances and knowable-hindrances, which are absolutely abandoned without remainder when becoming a Buddha. The term *vāsanā* here is not necessarily understood merely as traces left behind but can be understood in its dynamic sense of impregnating. In this respect, the *vāsanā* of defilement-hindrances refers to latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) as the seed of defilements, and the *vāsanā* of knowable-hindrances subsumes *kleśavāsanā*. Therefore, there should not be any remaining *vāsanā* after the abandonment of the twofold hindrances.

In addition, according to the TrBh, the selflessness of the person and *dharmas* (*pudgaladharmanairātmya*) serves as the antidote to defilement-hindrances and

<sup>483</sup> D no. 4034, sems tsam, mi 106b5–7: *dpag med sgrib pa zad pa'i phyir // zhes bya bas / nyon mongs pa dang / shes bya'i sgrib pa ji tsam spangs pa bstan te / 'khor ba thog ma med pa nas ma spangs pa'i nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa yang spangs / shes bya'i sgrib pa yang spangs zhes bya ba'i don to // ... // sgrib pa kun gyi dri med pa // zhes bya bas spangs pa phan sum tshogs pa bstan te / sangs rgyas kyi dus na sa bcur gtogs pa'i nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa dang / shes bya'i sgrib pa'i bag chags kyang ma lus par spangs pas / sgrib pa kun gyi dri med ces bya'o //*



knowable-hindrane. <sup>484</sup> Accordingly, the defilement-hindrane and knowable-hindrane should be regarded as the attachment to the person (*pudgalābhiniveśa*) and attachment to *dharma*s (*dharmābhiniveśa*) respectively. In the BoBhVin, the imagined nature (*\*parikalpitasvabhāvatā*) is said to be responsible for bringing forth both the attachment to the person and the attachment to *dharma*s, as well as sustaining (*\*parigrāha*) the grossness (*\*dauṣṭhulya*) that consists of the *vāsanā* of the twofold attachment, while the dependent nature (*\*paratantrasvabhāvatā*) is said to serve as the basis for the twofold attachment together with the *vāsanā*-grossness. <sup>485</sup> In this context, *vāsanā* expresses the same meaning as *bīja*. Thus, the grossness that consists of the *vāsanā* of the attachment to the person and *dharma*s can be construed exactly as the *bīja* of the twofold hindrance. It seems not necessary to suppose the persistence of the *bīja* after the abandonment of the twofold hindrance.

## 5.6. *Vāsanā* in Relation to Defilements in the Developed Yogācāra School

### 5.6.1. *Ātmaḍṛṣṭivāsanā* in the *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*

In Asaṅga's MSg, all *vāsanās* in the *ālayavijñāna* are regarded as either the course of impregnation or the impregnated. As a synonym for *bīja*, *vāsanā* also conveys the idea of a cause. With this background, *ātmaḍṛṣṭi-vāsanā* is discussed instead of *kleśavāsanā* in the MSg. This new term sufficiently suggests that *kleśavāsanā*, which used to be understood as traces left behind by defilements, is derived from the impregnation by self-view, the fundamental defilement.

As noted in the BoBh (§4.3.3), the idea that the conceptualization (*vikalpa*) of “I” and “mine” causes the object-base for self-view and self-conceit (*satkāyaḍṛṣṭi-asmimāna-vastu*) must have served as a doctrinal source of *ātmaḍṛṣṭi-vāsanā*. Meanwhile, the VSg also contributes to the formation of Asaṅga's “*ātmaḍṛṣṭi-*

<sup>484</sup> TrBh 38: *pudgaladharmanairātmyapratipādanam punaḥ kleśajñeyāvaranāprahāṇārtham* |

<sup>485</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 24a5–b1: *kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid las du dag byed ce na / smras pa / lnga ste / ... / gang zag la mngon par zhen pa skyed par byed pa dang / chos la mngon par zhen pa skyed par byed pa dang / de gnyi ga la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags gnas ngan len yongs su 'dzin par byed pa'o // gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid las du dag byed ce na / smras pa / lnga kho na ste / ... / gang zag la mngon par zhen pa'i rten byed pa dang / chos la mngon par zhen pa'i rten byed pa dang / de gnyi ga la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags gnas ngan len gyi rten byed pa'o //*

*vāsanā*”. Schmithausen (1987, 148) draws attention to the VSg, where *vāsanā* (in the sense of *kleśavāsanā*) is said to be responsible for the occasional occurrence of self-conceit (*asmimāna*) even after the abandonment of latent dispositions (*anuśaya*).<sup>486</sup> It is perhaps out of this concern that Vasubandhu argues that *ātmadr̥ṣṭi-vāsanā* is impregnated in *ālayavijñāna* by the defiled *manas* through the force of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*.<sup>487</sup> I will discuss the connection between *ātmadr̥ṣṭi-vāsanā* and the other two types of *vāsanā* in the MSg in §7.1.2.

## 5.6.2. *Kleśavāsanā* Implied in *Jñeyāvaraṇa*

### 5.6.2.1. *Jñeyāvaraṇa* Explained in the *Triṃśikāvijñapti-bhāṣya*

In both the TrBh and CWSL, the two commentaries on Vasubandhu’s TrK, no occurrence of “*vāsanā*” is used in the sense of *kleśavāsanā*. Instead, the idea of *kleśavāsanā* is implied in the discussion about knowable-hindrances (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). Since *kleśavāsanā* can be taken as the subtle portion of knowable-hindrances (§5.4.2), the absolute abandonment of knowable-hindrances entails the abandonment of *kleśavāsanā*. In terms of *vāsanā* being synonymous with *bīja*, *kleśavāsanā* can be regarded as *bīja* of knowable-hindrances.<sup>488</sup> It is perhaps due to this reason, later Yogācāras seldom mention *kleśavāsanā*.

In the TrBh, Sthiramati provides an explicit definition of knowable-hindrances as “the non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭam ajñānam*), which serves as an obstruction to the activity (*pravṛtti*) of knowledge (*jñāna*) with regard to all knowables (*jñeya*).”<sup>489</sup> It can be seen that Sthiramati adopted the Sarvāstivādins’ notion of non-defiled

<sup>486</sup> D no. 4039, sems tsam, zi 328a4–5: ‘du byed la ‘chums (P: *chums*) pa ste / ‘das pa dang / ma ‘ongs pa dang / da ltar byung ba’i ‘du byed rnams la ‘chums (P: *chums*) pa dang / le lo dang / snyom (P: *snyoms*) las dang / ‘jig tshogs la lta ba spangs su zin kyang bag chags dang ‘brel bas nga’o snyam pa’i nga rgyal kun du spyod pa dang ... Cf. T30, no. 1579, 865a23–25: 又於過去未來現在一切行中，諸行愛染、若癡墮、懈怠、若薩迦耶見，雖已斷滅，習氣隨縛，我慢現行。

<sup>487</sup> See Vasubandhu’s commentary, D no. 4050, sems tsam, ri 142b1: *bdag tu lta ba’i bag chags kyi bye brag ces bya ba ni ‘jig tshogs la lta ba’i dbang gis nyon mongs pa can gyi yid gang gis kun gzhi rnam par shes pa las bdag ces bag chags sgo bar byed de /...* Cf. T31, no. 1597, 336c7–9. See also Asvabhāva’s commentary, D no. 4051, sems tsam, ri 217b7–218a1: *bdag tu lta ba’i bag chags kyi bye brag ces bya ba ni nyon mongs pa bzhis nyon mongs par gyur pa’i yid ‘jig tshogs la lta ba’i dbang gis kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la bdag go snyam pa’i bag chags kyi bye brag go //* Cf. T31, no. 1598, 397a29–b2.

<sup>488</sup> This idea can be attested in some Tibetan commentaries, such as Rgyal tshab rje’s *Byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa la ‘jug pa’i rnam bshad rgyal sras ‘jug ngogs* (392): *shes sgrib kyi sa bon ni nyon mongs pa’i bag chags mihar thub pa dang ...*

<sup>489</sup> Cf. TrBh 38: *jñeyāvaraṇam api sarvasmin jñeye jñānapravṛttipratibandhabhūtam akliṣṭam ajñānam* |

nescience (§5.2) when explaining the Yogācāra notion of knowable-hindrane. Since non-defiled nescience is associated with *kleśavāsanā* for the Sarvāstivādins, our hypothetic recognition of *kleśavāsanā* as knowable-hindrane can be substantiated. Nevertheless, the object of the nescience (*ajñāna*) for the Yogācāras is the perfect nature (*pariṇiṣpannasvabhāva*) or the ineffable nature (*nirabhilāpasvabhāva*) of all *dharma*s, namely emptiness (*śūnyatā*), which is necessary for a Bodhisattva to realize. By contrast, for the Vaibhāṣikas, the non-defiled nescience, being an inferior understanding (*\*prajñā*) that is unable to know some certain aspects of *dharma*s ({5.2Ja}), is neglectable for attaining *nirvāṇa*.

### 5.6.2.2. Dharmapāla's Analysis of *Jñeyāvaraṇa* Integrated with the Concept of *Avidyāvāsabhūmi*

In the CWSL, Dharmapāla's definition of the twofold hindrance is noteworthy:

{5.6A} The defilement-hindrane refers to the 128 fundamental defilements, their outflows (*\*niṣyanda*), and all secondary defilements (*\*upakleśa*), headed by the self-view (*\*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) that grasps an imagined (*\*parikalpita*) person (*\*pudgala*)<sup>490</sup> as a real entity. As they all perturb the body and mind of sentient beings and obstruct *nirvāṇa*, they are called “defilement-hindrane”.

The knowable-hindrane refers to view (*\*dr̥ṣṭi*), doubt (*\*vicikitsā*), ignorance (*\*avidyā*), affection (*\*anunaya*), anger (*\*pratigha*), conceit (*\*māna*), and so on headed by the self-view that grasps imagined *dharma*s as real entities. As it veils the non-erroneousness (*\*aviparyāsatā*) of knowable objects and obstructs awakening (*\*bodhi*), it is called “knowable-hindrane”.<sup>491</sup>

Dharmapāla's approach to knowable-hindrane significantly differs from that of Sthiramati's: rather than resorting to the Sarvāstivādins' notion of non-defiled nescience, Dharmapāla connects knowable-hindrane to defilements. It should be noted that view, doubt, ignorance, affection, anger, and conceit adduced in {5.6A} are categorized as the six types of defilements in the SavBh.<sup>492</sup> By adding on to the

<sup>490</sup> Or, “I” (*\*ahamitī*).

<sup>491</sup> CWSL, T31, 48c6–11: 煩惱障者，謂執遍計所執實我薩迦耶見而為上首百二十八根本煩惱，及彼等流、諸隨煩惱。此皆擾惱有情身心、能障涅槃，名煩惱障。所知障者，謂執遍計所執實法薩迦耶見而為上首見、疑、無明、愛、恚、慢等，覆所知境無顛倒性、能障菩提，名所知障。Cf. de La Vallée Poussin's (1929, 566–67) translation. As noted by de La Vallée Poussin (1929, 567), this passage is comparable with the *\*Fōdī jīng lùn* 佛地經論 (see T26, no. 1530, 323a29–b12).

<sup>492</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 161: *kleśānām prahedaḥ katamaḥ* | ... | *syāt śaḍvidho rāgaḥ pratigho māno avidyā dr̥ṣṭir*

six defilements a limitation of being headed by the self-view that grasps imagined *dharma*s, Dharmapāla seemingly takes view, doubt, ignorance and so on that are focused on *dharma*s (rather than on the person) as a kind of subtle hindrances that differ from the manifested defilements subsumed under the defilement-hindrane. As noted by de La Vallée Poussin (1929, 568), knowable-hindrane is given the same name as the defilements. In any case, it seems that the CWSL attempts to interpret knowable-hindrane as an extraordinary type of defilement, or at least being responsible for the arising of defilements. Thus, there is reasonable room to argue that *kleśavāsanā* is alluded to in the discussion on knowable-hindrane in the CWSL, although the term is absent from the entire treatise.

Dharmapāla's way of defining knowable-hindrane from the perspective of subtle defilements must be influenced by the *tathāgatagarbha* idea that the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* is the origin of all defilements. According to the CWSL, defilement-hindrane has knowable-hindrane as its basis (*\*nīśraya?*).<sup>493</sup> Dharmapāla overtly admits that this knowable-hindrane is also known as *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*<sup>494</sup>—this undoubtedly reflects the idea implicitly expressed in the ŚrMS that the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* consists of *kleśavāsanā* (§5.5.1). In this connection, Dharmapāla argues that the twofold hindrance that is imagined (分別起, *\*parikalpita*) belongs to what is abandonable by seeing (*\*darśana-heya*) the path; and the twofold hindrance that spontaneously arises (任運起, *\*naisargika*, i.e. *sahaja*, “inborn”)<sup>495</sup> belongs to what is abandonable by cultivation (*\*bhāvanā-heya*). Accordingly, Dharmapāla classifies the twofold hindrance into the gross and the subtle divisions: the former refers to two kinds of manifested defilements that are suppressible by all Noble Ones, and the latter refers to two types of latent dispositions that cannot be suppressed by the Bodhisattvas at the stage of preparation (*\*saṃbhārāvasthā*) and the Two Vehicles, because of their insufficient force of calming and introspection (*\*śamatha-vipaśyanā*).<sup>496</sup> As has been observed in §5.5.2, the subtle part of knowable-hindrane

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*vicikitsā ca* || Note that *rāga* is a synonym for *anunaya*. In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, *anunaya* is often juxtaposed with *pratigha*, which is a synonym for *dveṣa*.

<sup>493</sup> CWSL, T31, 48c18–19: 煩惱障中此障必有，彼定用此為所依故。

<sup>494</sup> See *ibid.*, 48c23–24: 若所知障有見疑等，如何此種契經說為無明住地？

<sup>495</sup> According to the PMBhVin, the inborn spontaneous afflictions (*\*sahaja-nisarga-saṃkleśa*) are fourfold, which are *saṅkāyadṛṣṭi*, *asmi-māna*, *ātma-sneha*, and *avidyā*. See D no. 4038, *sems tsam*, zhi 6b5–6; T30, no. 1579, 581a17–20.

<sup>496</sup> Cf. CWSL, T31, 48c26–49a3: 如是二障分別起者見所斷攝；任運起者修所斷攝。二乘但能斷煩惱障，菩薩俱斷。……菩薩住此資糧位中，二麤現行雖有伏者，而於細者及二隨眠，止觀

is equivalent to *kleśavāsanā*. Significantly, Dharmapāla even considers the subtle knowable-hindrane a sort of latent disposition (*anuśaya*). That is to say, *kleśavāsanā*, which used to be defined as defilement-like habitual propensities in the Abhidharma and early Yogācāra texts, became regarded as the latent dispositions of defilements. Such an idea is hinted at in the ŚrMS (§5.5.1). Moreover, the CWSL clarifies that the knowable-hindrane is said to be non-veiling (*anivṛta*)—not obstructing one’s awakening (*bodhi*)—only in terms of the Two Vehicles, whereas it veils/obstructs the awakening of Bodhisattvas.<sup>497</sup> This contention, once more, reminds us of the statement in the MPPU that the *vāsanā* of the Two Vehicles functions as defilements for Bodhisattvas (§5.3). The alteration of *vāsanā*’s meaning from passive traces left behind to active impregnation made it possible that this Mahāyāna idea initially expressed in the MPPU was reiterated in the ŚrMS and CWSL.

In comparison with \*Devaprajñā’s interpretation observed in §5.5.2, Dharmapāla’s argument about the twofold hindrance can be illustrated in a table as follows:

&lt;Table 7&gt;

<i>kleśa- āvaraṇa</i>	<i>darśana-heya</i> (gross)	<i>vikalpa</i>	effect	
	<i>bhāvanā-heya</i> (subtle)	the four <i>vāsa-bhūmis</i> <i>anuśaya</i> being the <i>bīja</i> of <i>kleśāvaraṇa</i>	↑ cause	effect
<i>jñeya- āvaraṇa</i>	<i>darśana-heya</i> (gross)	<i>vikalpa</i>	effect	↑
	<i>bhāvanā-heya</i> (subtle)	<i>avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi</i> (= <i>kleśa-vāsanā</i> ) <i>anuśaya</i> being the <i>bīja</i> of <i>jñeyāvaraṇa</i>	↑ cause	cause

It should be noted that Dharmapāla also holds that the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*, “impregnation of the twofold grasping”, is latent dispositions (*anuśaya*). Regarding Stanza 26 of the TrK—“So long as the consciousness is not absorbed in the fact of mere-cognition (*viññaptimātratva*), the latent dispositions of the twofold grasping do not cease (*vinivartate*)”<sup>498</sup>, Sthiramati explains: “The latent dispositions of that

力微，未能伏滅，此位未證唯識真如。

<sup>497</sup> See *ibid.*, 48c22–23: 此名無覆，望二乘說。若望菩薩，亦是有覆(\**sanivṛta*)。

<sup>498</sup> TrBh 132: *yāvad viññaptimātratve viññānaṃ nāvatīṣṭhate | grāhadvayasyānuśayas tāvaṃ na vinivartate |*

[twofold grasping]’ means the *bīja* deposited by that in the *ālayavijñāna* for the arising of the future twofold grasping.”<sup>499</sup> This is akin to the Sautrāntika position that latent dispositions are *bīja* of defilements. Similarly, Dharmapāla explicitly recognizes latent dispositions in the Stanza as the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* and *bīja* of the twofold hindrance.<sup>500</sup> However, it has been noted in §5.4 that the early Yogācāras distinguish *kleśavāsanā* from latent dispositions. This suggests that because the Yogācāric idea of *vāsanā* in the sense of impregnation, being synonymous with *bīja*, became predominant, even *kleśavāsanā* came to be interpreted as latent dispositions in the developed Yogācāra school.

Although the CWSL should have been influenced by the ŚrMS, there are still some nuances between the two scriptures. As has been argued in §5.5.1, following the ŚrMS, there should have been a theoretical penchant to consider that defilement-hindrance cannot be absolutely abandoned until completely abandoning knowable-hindrance. By contrast, the CWSL follows the traditional Yogācāra theory which acknowledges that the defilement-hindrance can be eliminated by the Two Vehicles, who still have knowable-hindrance to be abandoned. In this connection, it should be noted that in Stanza 5 of the TrK, Vasubandhu states that the removal (*vyāvṛtti*) of *ālayavijñāna* occurs in Arhathood.<sup>501</sup> Regarding this, there seems to be a dilemma: on the one hand, the knowable-hindrance is said to have not been abandoned by Arhats; on the other hand, on account of the removal of *ālayavijñāna* where *vāsanā/bīja* is accumulated, Arhats should have no more *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* and thus should have no more hindrance. On this issue, the CWSL explains that the term “removal” in this context refers to the absolute abandonment of the grossness of defilement-hindrance (*\*kleśavarāṇa-dauṣṭhulya*), and the Arhats mentioned here refers to the fruit of non-trainees (*\*aśaikṣa*) in all the three vehicles.<sup>502</sup> The corollary of this argument is that only the defilement-hindrance has been overcome by the Arhats of the Śrāvaka Vehicle, whereas the grossness of knowable-hindrance (*\*jñeyavarāṇa-dauṣṭhulya*), which should be equivalent to the grossness pertaining to ripening (*vipākapaṅkṣya-dauṣṭhulya*) as seen in the PMBhVin ({5.4H}), remains

<sup>499</sup> *Ibid.* 134: *tasyānuśayas tadāhitam anāgatagrāhadvayotpattaye bījam ālayavijñāne* |

<sup>500</sup> CWSL, T31, 48c4–5: 二取習氣名彼隨眠。隨逐有情，眠伏藏識；或隨增過，故名隨眠，即是所知煩惱障種。 See de La Vallée Poussin’s French translation (1929, 565–66).

<sup>501</sup> TrBh 60: *tasya vyāvṛttir arhattve*.

<sup>502</sup> See CWSL, T31, 13a19–23: 阿羅漢位方究竟捨，謂諸聖者斷煩惱障究竟盡時名阿羅漢。爾時此識煩惱龜重永遠離故，說之為捨。此中所說阿羅漢者，通攝三乘無學果位。

in them. In other words, Arhats in the Śrāvaka vehicle are still in possession of one part of *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. It is probably this part of *vāsanā* that plays the role of *kleśavāsanā*. Such an idea is also in agreement with \*Devaprajñā's differentiation between the gross and subtle divisions of knowable-hindrance (§5.5.2).

Regarding Dharmapāla taking the subtle part of knowable-hindrance as latent dispositions derived from the insufficient force of calming and introspection, the CWSL appears to hint at the connection between knowable-hindrance and hindrance to some certain meditative attainments (\**samāpatty-āvaraṇa*). According to the Sarvāstivādins, though defilement-hindrance has been abandoned by the Arhats liberated through wisdom (*prajñāvimukta*), it is only when they achieve cessation-attainment (*nirodhasamāpatti*) of all mental activities that they overcome the hindrance to meditative attainments, and can be thus called Arhats liberated in both ways (*ubhayabhāgavimukta*). This specific hindrance to the cessation-attainment is known as “hindrance to [perfect] liberation” (\**vimokṣāvaraṇa*). The juxtaposition of defilement-hindrance and hindrance to [perfect] liberation is common in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts.<sup>503</sup> In comparison, the Yogācāras favor the pair of defilement-hindrance and knowable-hindrance. Saṅghabhadra recognizes the intrinsic nature (\**svabhāva*) of the hindrance to [perfect] liberation as inferior, insufficient intelligence (\**mṛdv-ajñāna*), which is non-veiling and morally neutral (\**anivṛtāvvyākṛta*)<sup>504</sup>. It is thus arguable that the hindrance to [perfect] liberation can be regarded as one type of non-defiled nescience.<sup>505</sup> Nonetheless, even the Arhats liberated in both ways may still have *kleśavāsanā* which is conjoined with non-defiled nescience. At any rate, Dharmapāla's statement possibly alludes to this doctrinal connection.

<sup>503</sup> In all the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts preserved in Chinese, there is only one occurrence of the term \**jñeyāvaraṇa* in the MVbh (T27, 724b25–29; for an English translation, see Dhammajoti 2023, 25–26). The term appears in the context of the four *samyak-prahāṇa*, which has nothing to do with *vimokṣāvaraṇa*. This sole occurrence of *jñeyāvaraṇa* is most likely Xuanzang's addition for a better understanding of the text.

<sup>504</sup> See Ny, T29, 724b11–17: 諸阿羅漢得滅盡定者名俱解脫，由慧定力，雙解脫煩惱、解脫障故。所餘未得滅盡定者名慧解脫，但由慧力於煩惱障得解脫故。何等名為解脫障體？諸阿羅漢心已解脫而更求解脫，為解脫彼障。謂於所障諸解脫中，有劣無知無覆無記性能障解脫，是解脫障體。

<sup>505</sup> According to Dhammajoti (2015, 37), “[a]n important doctrinal development in this connection within the Sarvāstivāda tradition is the linking up of the notions of liberation-hindrance (解脫障; *vimokṣa-āvaraṇa*) and of the non-defiled nescience (不染無知; *akliṣṭa-ajñāna*).” See also Dhammajoti 2023, 14.

Additionally, it is known that defilement-hindrances and knowable-hindrances came to be associated with the twofold selflessness (*nairātmya*) of the person (*pudgala*) and *dharma*s most likely in the Yogācāra school at the time when the BoBh was compiled (§5.4.2). It will be noted in §7.2.3 that according to Sthiramati's TrBh, defilement-hindrances corresponds to *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, while the knowable-hindrances is recognized as *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*. On the other hand, the CWSL takes *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* as the *bīja* of the twofold hindrance. This issue will be elaborated in §7.2.3.

### 5.6.2.3. *Jñeyāvaraṇa* in the Context of *Āśrayaparivṛtti*

For the early Yogācāras, the transformation from the state of grossness (*dausṭhulya*) to the state of ease (*praśrabdhi*) is known as the transformation of the basis (*āśraya-parivṛtti/āśraya-parāvṛtti*). As discussed earlier in §5.4.2, grossness, in both Abhidharma texts and the ŚrBh, denotes the inflexibility (*akarmāṇyatā*) of body and mind, which is opposite to the idea of ease.<sup>506</sup> In the MVbh (Yamabe 2020, 255), the term “transformation of the basis” is used in the sense of changes in a meditator's body. This idea is attributed to Vasumitra, who maintains that the subtle Great Elements (*mahābhūta*) produced in the fourth *dhyāna* block every pore without any loophole, and thus the meditator's breath suspends.<sup>507</sup> As noted by Sakuma (2001, 47), in as early as the *Dharmaskandha*, though the term “transformation of the basis” does not occur, the idea of exchanging grossness for ease is expressed.<sup>508</sup> In the AKBh, the meaning of the term refers to the purification of the mind-body at the stage of becoming an Arhat. This interpretation is closely connected with the Sautrāntika standpoint that the body of an Arhat is uncontaminated (J. Katō 1989, 243). This Abhidharmic point of view holds good for the YBh (Yokoyama 2003, 234–40). In the MSg, Asaṅga associates the notion with the Yogācāra doctrine of the three natures: the transformation of the basis means the cessation (*\*nivṛtti*) of the

<sup>506</sup> See Sakuma 1990b, 439.

<sup>507</sup> MVbh, T27, 132b21–24: 尊者世友作如是說：入第四靜慮，便得轉依。謂所依身，有第四靜慮微妙大種，令諸毛孔一切密合，無竅隙故，非息所依，由此爾時息不復轉。

<sup>508</sup> T26, no. 1537, 491b24–25: 得喜覺支，脩令圓滿。彼由此喜，身心輕安，遠離麤重。爾時便起輕安覺支。“(When contemplating on one's body mindfully,) [the meditator] acquires the awakening-factor (*\*bodhyaṅga*) of joy, and practices it to make it perfect. Because of this joy, he acquires ease (*\*praśabdhi*) in body and mind, being free from grossness. At this time, the awakening-factor of ease arises [in the meditator].”



defiled portion of the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*) and the transformation (*\*parāvṛtti*) into the purified portion of it.<sup>509</sup> The three types of *vāsanā* (§7.2.1) in *ālayavijñāna* fall into the defiled portion of dependent nature.

However, it is important to note that according to MSA IX.12, the transformation of the basis is described as the perishing of the *bīja* of the twofold hindrance.<sup>510</sup> Based on a similar understanding, Sthiramati speaks of the transformation of the basis in terms of the cessation of the twofold hindrance. Concerning TrK 29cd, “the transformation of the basis is because of the abandonment of two types of grossness” (*āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhādauṣṭhulyahānitāḥ*), Sthiramati explains that “basis” (*āśraya*) here refers to the *ālayavijñāna* which contains all *bījas*, and “two types of grossness” refers to the *bījas* of defilement-hindrance and knowable-hindrance. In terms of spiritual attainment, the Two Vehicles have only abandoned the grossness pertaining to defilement-hindrance, whereas Bodhisattvas will abandon both defilement-hindrance and knowable-hindrance. In terms of the body acquired as a result of the transformation of the basis, the Two Vehicles acquire the body of liberation (*vimuktikāya*) and Bodhisattvas the body of Truth (*dharma-kāya*).<sup>511</sup> Sthiramati’s explanation of “transformation of the basis” appears to be influenced by the Sautrāntika interpretation that the transformation of the basis concerns the purity of

<sup>509</sup> See Nagao 1982, 101: *gzhān gyur pa ni gang gzhān gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid de nyid kyi ngyen po skyes na gang kun nas nyon mongs pa’i cha ldog cing rnam par byang ba’i char gyur pa’o* // Cf. T31, no. 1594, 148c17–18: 轉依，謂即依他起性對治起時，轉捨雜染分，轉得清淨分。

<sup>510</sup> See MSABh 35: *kleśajñeyavṛtīnāṃ satatam anugataṃ bījam utkrīṣṭakālaṃ yasminn astam prayātam bhavati suvipulaiḥ sarvabhānīprakāraiḥ | buddhatvaṃ śukladharmapravaragunayutā āśrayasyānyathāptis tatprāptir nirvikalpād viṣayasumahato jñānamārgāt suśuddhāt || (IX.12)*  
In this *kārikā*, “*āśrayasya anyathā*” refers to *āśrayaparāvṛtti*, and “*vṛti*” means *āvaraṇa*.

<sup>511</sup> See TrBh 140: *tasya jñānasyānantaram āśrayasya parāvṛttir bhavatīti jñ āpanārtham āha | āśrayasya parāvṛttir iti || (29c)*  
*āśrayo ’tra sarvabījakam ālayavijñānam | tasya parāvṛttir yā dauṣṭhulya-vipāka-dvayavāsanā-abhāvena nirvṛtau satyāṃ karmaṇyatā-dharmakāya-advayajñāna-bhāvena parāvṛtīḥ | sā punar āśrayaparāvṛtīḥ kasya prahāṇāt prāpyate | ata āha | dvidhādauṣṭhulyahānitāḥ || (29d)*  
*dvidheti kleśāvaraṇadauṣṭhulyaṃ jñeyāvaraṇadauṣṭhulyaṃ ca | dauṣṭhulyam āśrayasyākarmaṇyatā | tat punaḥ kleśajñeyāvaraṇayor bījam | sā punar āśrayaparāvṛtīḥ śrāvakādigatadauṣṭhulyahānitā ca prāpyate yad āha vimuktikāya iti | bodhisattvagatadauṣṭhulyahānitā ca prāpyate yad āha | dharmākhyo ’yaṃ mahāmūner iti || (30d)*  
*dvidhā āvaraṇabhedena sōttarā niruttarā cāśrayaparāvṛttir uktā | atra gāthā | jñeyam ādānavijñānam dvayāvaraṇalakṣaṇam | sarvabījaṃ kleśabījaṃ bandhas tatra dvayor dvayoḥ || iti | dvayor iti śrāvaka-bodhisattvayor | ādyasya kleśabījaṃ itarasya dvayāvaraṇabījaṃ tadudghātāt sarvajñatāvāptir bhavatīti |*

body.

Dharmapāla not only mentions the differentiation between the two types of body of awakening, but also associates the Mahāyāna theory of the threefold body of Buddha with the fourfold insight<sup>512</sup> acquired through the transformation of the eight consciousnesses. However, this advanced theory does not concern knowable-hindrane anymore.

With regard to knowable-hindrane, as de La Vallée Poussin (1929, 639) points out, Dharmapāla made use of Vasubandhu's explanation in the MSgBh of the ten types of undefiled ignorance (*\*akliṣṭa-avidyā*) (cf. §5.4.1) which should be abandoned respectively at the beginning of entering each of Bodhisattva's ten grounds.<sup>513</sup> According to Dharmapāla, the ten types of ignorance are spoken of in terms of the delusion (*\*moha*) pertaining to non-defiled knowable-hindrane rather than to defilement-hindrane.<sup>514</sup> In support of his opinion, Dharmapāla also adduces Vasubandhu's explanation that the ten types of ignorance are not defiled for the Śrāvakas because they will not enter the ten grounds of Bodhisattva.<sup>515</sup> It is said that the hindrance to be abandoned on the first ground is called "hindrance as being an ordinary person" (*\*prthagjanatvāvaraṇa*), which consists of the imagined (*\*parikalpita*) defilement-hindrane and knowable-hindrane<sup>516</sup> together with the corresponding inborn (*\*sahaja*) knowable-hindrane<sup>517</sup>. For the Bodhisattvas, only the knowable-hindrane is intended in this context.<sup>518</sup> From the second ground

<sup>512</sup> I.e., *ādarśa-jñāna* transformed from *ālayavijñāna*, *śamatā-jñāna* transformed from *kliṣṭaṃ manas, pratyavekṣā-jñāna* transformed from *manovijñāna*, and *kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna* transformed from the five sensory *vijñānas*.

<sup>513</sup> See D no. 4050, *sems tsam*, ri 168a6–b2. For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 347. Cf. T31, no. 1597, 358a20–29 (Xuanzang); T31, no. 1596, 302b29–c7 (Gupta and Xingju 行矩); T31, no. 1595, 221b9–222a15 (Paramārtha). Note that Paramārtha's translation provides a detailed explanation of the ten *avidyās*, which differs from the explanation in the CWSL.

<sup>514</sup> See CWSL, T31, 52b20–53c26. Cf. de La Vallée Poussin 1929, 639–53.

<sup>515</sup> See CWSL, T31, 52c11–13: 說「十無明非染污」故，無明即是十障品愚。二乘亦能斷煩惱障，彼是共故非此所說。 Cf. T31, no. 1597, 358b26–27: 如是無明於聲聞等非染污者，由彼不欲入諸地故。(D no. 4050, *sems tsam*, ri 169a1: *ma rig pa 'di yang nyan thos rnam kyis ni nyon mongs pa can ma yin te / gang gi phyir [ ] de dag sa la mi 'jug pas so //*)

<sup>516</sup> CWSL, T31, 52b20–21: 一異生性障，謂二障中分別起者，依彼種立異生性故。 Cf. de La Vallée Poussin's French translation (1929, 639ff.).

<sup>517</sup> CWSL, T31, 52c15–16: 理實初地修道位中亦斷俱生所知一分。

<sup>518</sup> *Ibid.*, 52c10–11: 雖初地所斷實通二障，而異生性障意取所知。 For the Śrāvakas, this hindrance only includes the defilement-hindrane.

onward, each non-defiled hindrance to be abandoned is a type of inborn knowable-hindrance. However, the ten types of inborn knowable-hindrance appear to be not so closely associated with *kleśavāsanā*.<sup>519</sup> As observed in §5.3, early Mahāyānists once held that *kleśavāsanā* is responsible for Bodhisattva's free reincarnation. However, according to the CWSL, the final defilement-hindrance will be abandoned at the time of attaining Buddhahood:

{5.6B} Therefore, it is said that the Bodhisattvas, having obtained the direct realization (*\*abhisamaya*), only cultivate further the path to absolute abandonment of knowable-hindrance in the ten grounds on the path of cultivation. They keep the defilement-hindrance to assist the vow for undertaking reincarnation. This is unlike the Two Vehicles who hasten to attain the thorough tranquility. Therefore, [a Bodhisattva] on the path of cultivation, does not abandon his [last] defilement (i.e., defilement-hindrance), because it will be abandoned at once only at the moment of becoming a Buddha.<sup>520</sup>

In this respect, even at the tenth ground, a Bodhisattva is still in possession of some inborn subtle knowable-hindrance and seed of spontaneous defilement-hindrance. Once the twofold hindrance is abandoned by the force of the diamond-like meditative concentration (*vajropamā-samādhi*), a Bodhisattva ascends to the ground of a Buddha.<sup>521</sup> Such a standpoint may also corroborate that defilements are not ultimately and absolutely abandoned until the abandonment of knowable-hindrance, which is only realized by the perfectly awakened Buddhas.

Another important issue to note is Dharmapāla's association between *nirvāṇa* and the twofold hindrance. Though four types of *nirvāṇa* were mentioned in the MŚg and so forth, the articulation of the four types in connection with the twofold hindrance seems to be Dharmapāla's innovative opinion. Among the four types of *nirvāṇa*, the *nirvāṇa* with remainder (*\*sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*) is said to represent the Suchness (*\*tathatā*) free from defilement-hindrance. The non-abiding *nirvāṇa*

<sup>519</sup> See n. 520, and CWSL, T31, 53c20–24: 金剛喻定現在前時，彼皆頓斷入如來地。由斯佛地說斷二愚及彼龐重：一於一切所知境極微細著愚，即是此中微所知障；二極微細礙愚，即是此中一切任運煩惱障種。

<sup>520</sup> *Ibid.*, 52c19–22: 故說菩薩得現觀已，復於十地修道位中唯修永滅所知障道，留煩惱障助願受生，非如二乘速趣圓寂。故修道位不斷煩惱，將成佛時方頓斷故。Cf. de La Vallée Poussin 1929, 644.

<sup>521</sup> See *ibid.*, 53c19–21: 謂有俱生微所知障及有任運煩惱障種，金剛喻定現在前時，彼皆頓斷，入如來地。

(\**apratīṣṭhāna-nirvāṇa*), a very Mahāyānic term, refers to the Suchness free from knowable-hindrance.<sup>522</sup> As noted in {5.4I}, the VinSg only speaks of two types of *nirvāṇa* when differentiating the Tathāgata from the Arhats in terms of *kleśavāsanā*. It has been observed that knowable-hindrance seems to abide in the body of Arhats, whereas in the state of *nirvāṇa* without remainder, in terms of hindrance, there is no difference between the abandonment of Arhats and that of Tathāgatas. However, the connection between the physical body and knowable-hindrance became not a major concern anymore in the developed Yogācāra school. In the CWSL, knowable-hindrance came to be connected with the Mahāyānic notion of non-abiding *nirvāṇa*. In brief, for the Ābhidharmikas and the early Yogācāras as seen in the YBh, the existence of *kleśavāsanā* in the Two Vehicles demonstrates the superiority of the Tathāgata both mentally and physically. By contrast, according to Dharmapāla, the absolute abandonment of knowable-hindrance becomes the criteria to differentiate the *nirvāṇa* of Tathāgatas and that of the Two Vehicles.

It is reasonable to argue that although the notion of *kleśavāsanā* had been widely absorbed by various Buddhist sects, the developed Yogācāra school seemingly attempted to avoid using the term. One possible reason for this fact, as much as I could surmise, is that the Yogācāras who have origins from different Buddhist traditions found it difficult to define *kleśavāsanā*, since each Buddhist school took pain to adjust the notion to their own doctrinal system. Therefore, the Yogācāra theorists chose to use knowable-hindrance instead, which is more compatible with their doctrine of mere-cognition.

## 5.7. Concluding Remarks

The idea of *kleśavāsanā* is not attested in the early Buddhist scriptures. Regarding the simile of perfuming clothes after washing with detergents in the *Kṣemaka-sūtra/Khemaka-sutta*, there are two sectarian versions, which respectively belong to the Sarvāstivādins and the Vibhājyavādins. Neither of the two alludes to *kleśavāsanā*. However, based on the Sarvāstivādins' improved version of the simile, the MPPU associates the simile with *kleśavāsanā*, and the VSg also speaks of the *vāsanā* of

<sup>522</sup> *Ibid.*, 55b7–17: 涅槃義別，略有四種：……二，有餘依涅槃，謂即真如出煩惱障。……四，無住處涅槃，謂即真如出所知障。

self-view (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) to be abandoned in the path of cultivation when commenting on this Āgama text.

The Vibhajjavāda's *Śāriputrābhidharma* mentions *vāsanā* in juxtaposition with defilements (*kleśa*) without further elaboration. The *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya* speaks of *vāsanā* in the sense of a habit of an Arhat. With the emphasis on the purity of the Buddha's physical body by the Vibhajjavādins, *vāsanā* came to be employed in the context of the superiority of the Buddha to Arhats, expressing the idea of Arhats' traces left behind by the eliminated defilements.

The Sarvāstivādins should have adopted the concept of *kleśavāsanā* from outside—probably from the Vibhajjavādins, and even possibly some early Mahāyānists. The first occurrence of the term in the Sarvāstivāda school is seen in the MVbh in the context of demonstrating the superiority of the Buddha to Arhats. However, no explanation is given about what the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of *kleśavāsanā* is. On the other hand, the five propositions of Mahādeva were not necessarily a direct doctrinal source of the concept of *kleśavāsanā*. The Pūrvaśaila's view that Arhats still have nescience (*ajñāna*) was also held by the Bahuśrutīyas and Haimavatas. The notion of non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*) is not attested in any Mahāsāṅghika text but should be a notion maintained by the Sarvāstivādins.

The early Mahāyānists adopted the idea of *kleśavāsanā* later than the AsP. The mentions of *vāsanā* in the PvsP are in line with the Abhidharma discussion on the Buddha's superiority to Arhats. The AdsP (and a more widely circulated historical version of the PvsP) explicitly declares that *vāsanā* is not defilements (*kleśa*). A similar idea is conveyed in the VSg, which distinguishes *kleśavāsanā* from latent dispositions (*anuśaya*). It is important to note that the MPPU proclaims that *kleśavāsanā* plays the role of defilements for Bodhisattvas, but they still need to keep some *kleśavāsanā* to enable their reincarnation at will with a body born of *dharmadhātu* beyond death so as to benefit sentient beings. In accordance with this idea, the ŚrMS suggests that three types of mind-made body (*mano-maya kāya*), which are conditioned by *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* and caused by uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) karma, are responsible for inconceivable transformational death (*acintyā pāriṇāmikī cyuti*). Moreover, it should be also in line with this idea in the MPPU that the CWSL argues that knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) is non-veiling for the Śrāvakas but is obstructive for the Bodhisattvas.

In the YBh, *kleśavāsanā* is often juxtaposed to knowable-hindrance and grossness (*dauṣṭhulya*). The knowable-hindrance unabandonable by the Two Vehicles consists of both subtle latent dispositions (*sūkṣmānuśaya*) and *kleśavāsanā*.

*Kleśavāsanā* should be thus taken as one type of knowable-hindrane. Most likely inspired by the relevant Yogācāra discussion, Pāli commentators from the time of Dhammapāla also speak of (*kilesa*-)*vāsanā* in the sense of imprints impregnated by defilements, and associate it with knowable-hindrane. In the BoBh, *kleśavāsanā* is spoken of in connection with grossness pertaining to all defilements (*sarvakleśapakṣya dauṣṭhulya*). However, since the *Manobhūmi* further distinguishes between three types of grossness, it is argued in the PMBhVin that grossness pertaining to ripening (*\*vipākapakṣya-dauṣṭhulya*), instead of that pertaining to defilements, is responsible for Arhats' unabandonable *kleśavāsanā*. Moreover, for the early Yogācāras, *kleśavāsanā* concerns one's psycho-physical basis (*āśraya*), as according to the BoBhVin, grossness pertaining to ripening, also referred to as "grossness pertaining to knowable-hindrane" (*jñeyāvaraṇa-pakṣyam...dauṣṭhulyam*), is said to be situated in one's bones. According to the BoBh and SNS, the abandonment of knowable-hindrane entails the realization of selflessness of *dharma* (*dharma-nairātmya*). *Kleśavāsanā* can thus be regarded as one kind of attachment to *dharma* (*dharmābhīniveśa*). In comparison with the Vaibhāṣika interpretation of *kleśavāsanā* as non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭājñāna*), *kleśavāsanā* is associated in the BoBh with non-defiled ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*). A similar idea can be found in the ŚrMS, a *tathāgatagarbha* scripture, known as *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*, though no direct connection between BoBh and the ŚrMS can be identified. In keeping with this idea seen in the BoBh, Asaṅga's MSg mentions ten types of non-defiled ignorance which are counteracted in the Bodhsattva's ten grounds (*bhūmi*). In his commentary, Vasubandhu further names the ten types of non-defiled ignorance. In the CWSL, Dharmapāla recognizes the first non-defiled ignorance as imagined and inborn knowable-hindrane, and the remaining nine as only inborn knowable-hindrane.

Furthermore, the idea in the VSg that the Noble Ones who have abandoned self-view (*\*satkāyadrṣṭi*) still have remaining traces (*vāsanā*) foreshadows Asaṅga's notion of the impregnation of self-view (*\*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā*) in the MSg. Another doctrinal source of the impregnation of self-view is seen in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh, according to which the conceptualization (*vikalpa*) of "I" and "mine" brings about the object-base (*vastu*) for self-view (*satkāyadrṣṭi*) and self-conceit (*asmimāna*).

The later Vaibhāṣikas took pain to vindicate *kleśavāsanā* by associating the term with the Sarvāstivāda notion of non-defiled nescience. Around the early 5<sup>th</sup> century, Saṅghabhadra considered *kleśavāsanā* to be the entirety of the mental *dharma*s

conjoined with the non-defiled nescience, which is an inferior intelligence (*prajñā*). Probably influenced by the Vaibhāṣikas' analysis of *kleśavāsanā*, Sthiramati in his TrBh expressly recognizes the Yogācāra notion of knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) as non-defined nescience. Furthermore, Saṅghabhadra also explains that *kleśavāsanā* manifests in resemblance to defilements, being the imprints impregnated through repeated practice of defilements before abandoning defilements. On the other hand, Saṅghabhadra's Vaibhāṣika exposition of *vāsanā*, construed as impregnated imprints, must have been influenced by the contemporary Yogācāric understanding of the term.

The idea of *kleśavāsanā* is implied in the *tathāgatagarbha* concept of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. *Vāsanā/vāsa* in the *tathāgatagarbha* scriptures is understood as impregnating rather than remaining traces. According to the ŚrMS, *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* functions as the fundamental defilement that gives rise to all defilements and impurities (*upakleśa*). The idea expressed by *kleśavāsanā* thus changes from the passive remaining traces of defilements to the active producer of defilements. Moreover, the idea of knowable-hindrance is adumbrated in the ŚrMS. Under the influence of the ŚrMS, the CWSL not only hints that some knowable-hindrance is *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* but also acknowledges that the defilement-hindrance (*kleśāvaraṇa*) has knowable-hindrance as its basis (*\*niśraya*). Both the TrBh and CWSL take the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*<sup>523</sup> as latent dispositions (*anuśaya*), the *bīja* of the twofold hindrance. Thus, knowable-hindrance, which also contains the idea of *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* or *kleśavāsanā*, also serves as a cause for defilements.

*Avidyā-vāsa(nā)-bhūmi* is connected with conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*) in the RGVV. The RGVV, though adopting the Yogācāric concept of the twofold hindrance, does not clarify the relationship between *avidyā-vāsa(nā)-bhūmi* or *vāsanā* and knowable-hindrance. \*Devaprajñā, the Chinese translator of the *Dàshèng fājiè wúchābié lùn* 大乘法界無差別論 (T no. 1626), explains that *kleśavāsanā* in the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi* is the subtle portion of knowable-hindrance, which produces both gross knowable-hindrance and defilement-hindrance. On the other hand, both the CWSL, as well as the Chinese Faxiang school, and Tsongkhapa take *avidyā-vāsa(nā)-bhūmi* as the same as knowable-hindrance. In this connection, Dharmapāla distinguishes between the subtle and the gross twofold hindrance. It is arguable that the subtle knowable-hindrance, which is abandonable through

<sup>523</sup> I.e., *vāsanā* of both *grāhyagrāha* (grasping at the grasped) and *grāhakagrāha* (grasping at the grasper). See §7.2.1.

cultivation (*bhāvanā-heya*) constitutes the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. Lastly, there cannot be any *vāsanā* after the abandonment of both the defilement-hindrances and the knowable-hindrances.

In general, owing to the prevalence of the Yogācāric understanding of *vāsanā* as impregnating in a dynamic sense, the idea expressed by the term *kleśavāsanā* evolved from its early meaning of traces left behind by defilements into its later meaning of imprints impregnated by defilements. Nevertheless, the developed Yogācāra school was inclined to use the notion of knowable-hindrances in place of *kleśavāsanā*. Even a Bodhisattva's free reincarnation before attaining Buddhahood, which was accredited to *kleśavāsanā* in the MPPU, became ascribed to the intentionally preserved *bīja* of spontaneous defilement-hindrances, which is to be abandoned by the force of the diamond-like concentration (*vajropamā-samādhi*) when becoming a Buddha.






## 6. *Śrutavāsanā*, the Impression of Hearing the True Dharma

The MSg speaks of *śrutavāsanā* as the impression of hearing the Buddha's true Dharma. *Śrutavāsanā* is said to be the cause of supramundane purification, being contradictory to the three types of defiled *vāsanā* in the *ālayavijñāna*. Considering the previous studies on *śrutavāsanā* briefly reviewed in §1.5.4, a question that should be raised here is why the cause of supramundane uncontaminated *dharma*s is called "*śruta-vāsanā*". The widely accepted view that *śrutavāsanā* developed from the notion of *\*tathatālambanapratyaya-bīja* still cannot satisfactorily explain the use of the words "*śruta*" and "*vāsanā*". In my opinion, one doctrinal origin of *śrutavāsanā* is the Sarvāstivāda concept of *mokṣabhāgīya*. This chapter first examines, from the aspect of "*śruta*", the theoretical resemblance between the Abhidharmic concept of *mokṣabhāgīya* and the Yogācāric notion of *śrutavāsanā*. Then, following a preliminary introduction to the Yogācāra distinction between primordial and engendered *bīja* in the Yogācāra school, the chapter discusses *\*tathatālambanapratyaya-bīja* and its probable Abhidharma antecedent to elucidate why Asaṅga's theory of *śrutavāsanā* may not have been developed from the notion. From the aspect of "*vāsanā*", this chapter continues to discuss the connection between *śrutavāsanā* and memory, as well as the scriptural sources for the *vāsanā* of uncontaminated *dharma*s in early Mahāyāna.

### 6.1. *Mokṣabhāgīya* and *Śrutavāsanā*

#### 6.1.1. The Sarvāstivāda Concept of *Mokṣabhāgīya*

*Mokṣabhāgīya* is short for "*mokṣabhāgīyam kuśalamūlam*", which means the wholesome root that is conducive to liberation. Among all the non-Mahāyānic Buddhist sects, this term is used exclusively by the Sarvāstivādins. *Mokṣabhāgīya* also represents a stage of spiritual development where a practitioner obtains the wholesome root conducive to liberation. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the sequence of one's spiritual progress can be diagrammed as below:



*Puṇyabhāgīya*, “conducting to merits”, refers to the stage of performing mundane wholesome deeds such as building up a bridge to benefit others, which cause desired karmic effects, particularly a better rebirth. Then, from the stage of *mokṣabhāgīya*, “conducting to liberation”, a practitioner, having heard the Dharma with reflection (*cintā*), observes precepts and conducts wholesome deeds such as giving (*dāna*)—these behaviors will lead to eventual liberation. The significance of the *mokṣabhāgīya* in the Sarvāstivāda system of practice is that “because the wholesome mental disposition (*\*āśaya*) makes the establishment of liberation unshakable, one will definitely attain *parinirvāṇa*.”<sup>524</sup> *Nirvedhabhāgīya*, “conducting to penetration”, is the next mundane stage immediately before entering the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*). *Nirvedhabhāgīya* consists of the four wholesome roots in meditative concentration (*samādhi*), viz., warmth (*uṣmagata*), summit (*mūrdhan*), receptivity (*kṣānti*), and the mundane supreme *dharma* (*laukikāgradharma*).<sup>525</sup>

Though the seven canonical Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma treatises speak nothing of *mokṣabhāgīya*, a long exposition of the notion is given in the *Vibhāṣā* texts. This suggests that the idea of *mokṣabhāgīya* should have been formed between the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE and the 2<sup>nd</sup> century CE. After that, the description of *mokṣabhāgīya* in the MVbh is inherited by both the MAH and the AKBh. As Vasubandhu’s definition of *mokṣabhāgīya* is recounted by Saṅghabhadra without criticism, we could take the relevant account in the AKBh as representing the Vaibhāṣikas’ position.

<sup>524</sup> NA, T29, 595b26–28: 順解脫分善，謂安立解脫善阿世耶令無傾動，由此決定當般涅槃。

<sup>525</sup> See AKBh 274: *puṇya-nirvāṇa-nirvedha-bhāgīyaṃ kuśalaṃ tridhā* || [4.125cd] *puṇya-bhāgīyaṃ yad iṣṭa-vipākam, mokṣa-bhāgīyaṃ yasminn utpanne niyataṃ parinirvāṇa-dharmā bhavati ... | nirvedha-bhāgīyaṃ uṣmādi caturvidham paścād vyākhyāsyāmaḥ* | Cf. MVbh (T27, 34c28–35a7) and MAH (T28, 949c3–25).

When being asked about the nature of the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root, the Vaibhāṣikas answer, “It has the bodily, vocal, and mental karma as intrinsic nature, but the mental karma dominates.”<sup>526</sup> On this point, the AKBh explains:

{6.1A} [*Mokṣabhāgīya* consists of] three types of karma, but chiefly speaking, [it is] the mental karma. Because of being subject to (*parigraha*) the aspiration (*praṇidhāna*) of that [mental karma], the bodily and vocal karma is also conducive to liberation. Someone, having given even one morsel of almsfood, and having undertaken even one training (*śikṣā*, i.e., precept), because of exerting the power of the wish (*abhilāṣā*) for liberation, projects (*ākṣipati*) [the wholesome root] conducive to liberation.<sup>527</sup>

In this passage, giving and observing precepts stand for bodily karma and vocal karma, respectively. Both of them are caused to arise by mental karma.<sup>528</sup> Therefore, the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root can be regarded as karmic seed. As early as in the *Madhyamāgama*, the Buddha compares the unsevered (*\*asamucchinnā*) wholesome root to seed.<sup>529</sup> The MVbh explicitly calls this type of wholesome root “seed for definite liberation”.<sup>530</sup> Since *mokṣabhāgīya* operates in the manner of karmic seed, there must be its effect of ripening (*vipāka-phala*), which could be a better rebirth or the production of the supramundane right insight (*lokottara-samyagjñāna*). However, unlike the karmic seeds that result in *saṃsāra* as have been discussed in §3.2, the *mokṣabhāgīya* karmic seeds, which definitely induce *parinirvāṇa*, must be anti-*saṃsāra*.

In this regard, it is said in the MVbh, “one who has not planted the wholesome root conducive to liberation is called a stream-accordant (*\*anu-srota*); one who has

<sup>526</sup> MVbh, T27, 35a7–9: 問：此善根以何為自性？答：以身語意業為自性，然意業增上。

<sup>527</sup> AKBh 349: *trīṇi karmāṇi* [6.25ab]

*prādhānyena tu manas-karma | tat-praṇidhāna-parigrahāt tu kāya-vāk-karmāpi mokṣa-bhāgīyaṃ bhavati | kaścid ekabhikṣām api dattvaikaśikṣām api cādāya mokṣābhilāṣa-valādhānān mokṣa-bhāgīyāny ākṣipati |*

<sup>528</sup> See AKVy 541: *ekabhikṣām api dattveti kāyakarma | ekaśikṣām api cādāyati vākkarma | tac ca manaskarmotthānam iti |*

<sup>529</sup> T1, no. 26, 601b2–9, cf. AN iii 404: ‘*imassa kho puggalassa kusalā dhammā antarahitā, akusalā dhammā sammukhībhūtā, atthi ca khvāssa kusalamūlaṃ asamucchinnāṃ, tamhā tassa kusalā kusalaṃ pātubhavissati. Evam ayaṃ puggalo āyatiṃ aparihānadhammo bhavissati*’ti. *Seyyathā pi Ānanda bījāni akhaṇḍāni apūṭīni avātātapahatāni sārādāni sukhāyitāni sukhette suparikammakatāya bhūmiyā nikkhiṭṭāni...* Additionally, Collins (1980, 218) also notes that *mūla* and *bīja* are frequent pan-Indian terms for a cause.

<sup>530</sup> MVbh, T27, 35a4–6: 順解脫分善根者，謂種決定解脫種子，因此決定得般涅槃。

planted the wholesome root conducive to liberation is called a stream-discordant (*\*prati-srota*).<sup>531</sup> “Stream” (*srota*) here indicates *saṃsāra* (Dhammajoti 2015, 495). This indicates that a stream-discordant should be seen as one who has obtained an anti-saṃsāric potentiality. According to the MAH, because the wholesome root of definite liberation has been planted, even though it becomes severed (*\*samucchinna*), one who belongs to the stage of *mokṣabhāgīya* is still called a “stream-discordant”.<sup>532</sup> Such an argument can be justified only if the wholesome root is regarded as karmic seed in the Sarvāstivāda sense: even though the wholesome root is severed at present, its future karmic effect (*vipāka*) must “have existed”. Thus, it can be concluded that once the seed of *mokṣabhāgīya* has been planted, no matter how long it takes to attain *parinirvāṇa*, one will never lose the certainty of liberation. It is interesting to note that although the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root leads to the supramundane result, it remains mundane.

In terms of the significance of hearing the Dharma, the Vaibhāṣikas also reiterate that the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root is derived from hearing (*śruta-maya*) and reflection (*cintā-maya*), but not from cultivation.<sup>533</sup> This is because the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root is pertaining to the sphere of sensuality (*kāma-pratisaṃyukta*)<sup>534</sup>, whereas the wholesome roots conducive to penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) are gained in meditation (*dhyāna*) and thus are derived from cultivation (*bhāvanā-maya*). It can be seen that the idea of *mokṣabhāgīya* does not only require one to listen to the Buddha’s teaching, but also to hear and reflect on it with thorough attention (*yoniso manasikāra*), so that the seed for liberation can be planted. Such an idea is very close to the concept of imprint, “*vāsanā*”. According to the MVbh, depending on one’s disposition, hearing the Dharma, giving, and observing precepts are the various causal factors for planting the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root.<sup>535</sup> Nevertheless, among them, hearing the Buddha’s Dharma should

<sup>531</sup> MVbh, T27, 885a28–29: 若未種順解脫分善根名順流者，已種順解脫分善根名逆流者。

<sup>532</sup> MAH, T28, 949c10–12: 殖此諸善根者，中間雖斷善根，猶名逆流。何以故？必得涅槃故。

<sup>533</sup> AKBh 349: *tac ca punar mokṣa-bhāgīyaṃ varṇayanti |*  
*śruta-cintā-mayaṃ* [6.25a]  
*na bhāvanā-mayaṃ |*

<sup>534</sup> MVbh, T27, 35a12–15: 問：此善根為聞所成、為思所成、為修所成耶？答：聞思所成，非修所成。有說：亦是修所成。評曰：前說者好，唯欲界繫故。

<sup>535</sup> MVbh, T27, 35a21–23: 問：為因何事種此善根？答：或因施、或因戒、或因聞，而不決定。所以者何？意樂異故。

be the primary factor.

To sum up, the Sarvāstivāda understanding of *mokṣabhāgīya* can be recapitulated as follows:

- (A) *mokṣabhāgīya* amounts to the certainty of attaining *parinirvāṇa*;
- (B) it is produced mainly through hearing the Dharma but can also be produced by giving and observing precepts;
- (C) it is derived from hearing and reflection (*śruta-cintā-maya*);
- (D) it functions in the manner of karmic seed;
- (E) it is mundane but brings forth supramundane result;
- (F) *mokṣabhāgīya*, being stream-discordant, opposes to the continuation of *saṃsāra*.

Additionally, in the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika tradition, the idea of *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome roots is expressed by the term “seed for liberation” (*mokṣa-bīja*). To begin with, in Kumāralāta’s *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā Drṣṭāntapañkti*, which was attributed to Aśvaghoṣa in the Chinese tradition, there is a Buddhist story that Śāriputra refused to ordain a person because he found no wholesome root in the person in the past one thousand eons.<sup>536</sup> However, the Buddha told Śāriputra, “I, indeed, observe his extremely subtle seed for liberation, which is like gold hidden in the fissure of a metal (*dhātu*) stone.”<sup>537</sup> It is said that the person acquired the seed for liberation because he had chanted “Namo Buddhāya” when being endangered by a tiger in the remote past.<sup>538</sup> This story could have been developed out of the context that Śāriputra often observed the wholesome root in a person who requests for ordination.<sup>539</sup> However, this story narrated by Kumāralāta seems not to be in line with the traditional depiction of Śāriputra in the MVbh, where Śāriputra is said to have even

<sup>536</sup> Jaini ([1959] 2001, 236 n. 57) argues that according to the Pāli versions of the story, Śāriputta ordained this person. However, that seems not to be the same person.

<sup>537</sup> AKVy 5, 644: *mokṣa-bījam ahaṃ hy asya susūksmam upalakṣaye | dhātu-pāṣāṇa-vivare nilīnam iva kāmcanam ||*

<sup>538</sup> See T4, no. 201, 311b24–312b13, particularly 312a15–20: 佛於僧前告舍利弗：「以何緣故不聽此子令出家耶？」舍利弗白佛言：「世尊！我不見彼有微善根。」佛即告舍利弗：「勿作是語。」說是偈言：「我觀此善根，極為甚微細，猶如山石沙，融消則出金。」 Cf. *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā*, folio 181V–R (Lüders 1926, 172): *tan mokṣabījam ahaṃ asya ... adhyāśayena khalu buddhanama... kuśalamūlam amṛtaphalaṃ bhavati...*

<sup>539</sup> This is recorded for a few times in the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*. For example, *Samghabhedavastu* (Gnoli and Venkatacharya 1977–78) i 176: *āyusmāṃś chāriputraḥ samanvāhartuṃ pravṛttaḥ: kiṃ teṣāṃ santi kāñicit kuśalamūlāni āhosvin na santi iti; paśyati, santi; kasyāntike pratibaddhāni; mamaiveti ...* More cases can be seen in the \**Kṣudrakavastu* (T24, no. 1451, 227c6–8, 232a4–5) of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*.

preached the Dharma to continue the wholesome root of a brahmin who had already severed (*\*samucchinna*) his wholesome root.<sup>540</sup> In this respect, the story is only to demonstrate that as long as even a tiny wholesome root is planted, one will harvest immeasurable fruit.<sup>541</sup> Nonetheless, when Sthiramati adduced this story in his commentary on the AKBh<sup>542</sup>, the focus was changed to the inferiority of Śāriputra's wisdom in contrast to the Buddha's omniscience. Its Chinese translation shows more detail: Śāriputra is only able to observe the past two innumerable eons (*\*asaṃkhyakalpa*), but the Buddha is able to observe extremely remote past and future more than three innumerable eons.<sup>543</sup> At any rate, it is very likely that following Sthiramati's quotation, Yaśomitra recounted the story and, as noted by Jaini ([1959] 2001, 232), interpreted the seed for liberation mentioned in this story explicitly as the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root.

### 6.1.2. From *Mokṣabhāgīya* to *Śrutavāsānā*

The Sarvāstivāda terms of spiritual progress are also known to the early Yogācāras. In the *Maulī Bhūmi* of the YBh, the *Manobhūmi* enumerates the four types of wholesomeness—namely *puṇyabhāgīya*, *mokṣabhāgīya*, *nirvedhabhāgīya*, and the uncontaminated (*anāsrava*)—without further exposition.<sup>544</sup> In the Nivṛtti Portion of the VinSg, the *bīja* as *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root is also said to be against the saṃsāric progression (*pravṛtti*), bringing desirable karmic effects:

{6.1B} *Ālayavijñāna*, which sustains (*pari-√grah*) the seeds as wholesome roots (*\*kuśala-mūla*) conducive to liberation (*\*mokṣabhāgīya*) and to

<sup>540</sup> MVbh, T27, 184c8–10: 如喞羯吒婆羅門等斷善根已，尊者舍利子為其說法，令續善根，漸得見諦，乃至究竟。

<sup>541</sup> T4, no. 201, 312b11–12: 以是因緣故，於世尊所種少善根獲報無量。

<sup>542</sup> See *Tattvārthā* I, 16–17: *dvitrisāhasrakā saṃkhyādrśo [']rhatkhaḍgadaiśikā iti vacanāt nātiviprakṛṣṭadeśeṣv artheṣu śrāvakaṃpratyekabuddhānāṃ jñānapravṛttiḥ sthāviramaudgalyāyanasya svamātrījanmadeśāparijñānam udāhāryaṃ atītānāgatā anekakalpavyavahitavinā śātmalābhāḥ ativiprakṛṣṭakālāḥ tatrāpi teṣāṃ vyāhanyata eva jñānam sthāvirasāriputreṇa pravrajanaprekṣipuruṣapratyākhyānam udāhāryaṃ yaṃ adhikṛtyoktaṃ bhagavatā | mokṣabījā ahaṃ hy asya sasūksmāṃ upalakṣayet dhātupāśāṇavivare nilīnam iva kāmcanam iti | Cf. D no. 4421, sna tshogs, tho 11b3–4.*

<sup>543</sup> T29, no. 1561, 325b3–10: 極遠時者，謂過去未來三阿僧祇劫外，聲聞獨覺不能知。何以得知？如昔有一人於舍利子邊求出家，時舍利子觀二阿僧祇劫此人無出家善根，遂不許。此人詣佛以求出家，世尊觀之，出僧祇外此人有少善根，遂許出家。說偈言：彼人解脫種，我觀極微細，猶如諸礦中，真金隱茲住。

<sup>544</sup> YBh<sub>Bh</sub> 62: *catur-vidhaṃ puṇya-bhāgīyaṃ mokṣa-bhāgīyaṃ nirvedha-bhāgīyaṃ anāsravam ca |*

penetration (*\*nirvedhabhāgīya*), are not the cause of the Truth of Origination (*\*samudaya*), because of the fact that the wholesome roots conducive to liberation and so on are just contradictory to the saṃsāric progression (*\*pravṛtti*). When that (wholesome root) arises, other mundane (*\*laukika*) wholesome roots different from that will become clearer, and because of that, they will have greater potency (*\*sāmarthyavattara*) to sustain their own seeds, and will have greater power (*\*balavattara*) in accomplishing (*\*sampādana*) [the supramundane effect] through nourishing (*\*paripuṣṭi*)<sup>545</sup> the seeds.<sup>546</sup> Because of that seed, not only those clearer wholesome *dharma*s will become accomplished, but also in the future, more pleasant and more desirable results (*\*vipāka*) will be accomplished.<sup>547</sup>

However, in the VinSg, there is no mention of *vāsanā* in relation to *mokṣabhāgīya*. One clear connection between the two concepts is found in the MSA/Bh:

{6.1C} That [threefold or twofold *piṭaka*] is for the purpose of liberation from *saṃsāra*. Furthermore, how does that cause to liberate? (MSA XI.1cd:) “That [*piṭaka*] causes to liberate through impression (*vāsanā*), comprehension (*bodhana*), calmness (*śamana*), and penetration (*pravedha*).” It is because of impression in mind by means of hearing (*śruta*), because of comprehension by means of reflection (*cintā*), because of calmness by means of cultivation (*bhāvanā*) through calming (*śamatha*), and because of penetration by means of introspection (*vipaśyanā*).<sup>548</sup>

This passage mirrors the Sarvāstivāda understanding of one’s spiritual progress.

<sup>545</sup> According to the Chinese translation, the word “*yongs su brtas pa*” (*\*paripuṣṭi*) is interpreted as “increasing” (增長).

<sup>546</sup> Cf. Waldron’s (2003, 186) English translation.

<sup>547</sup> Hakamaya 2001, 404, #I.4.(b)B.1: *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa thar pa’i cha dang mthun pa dang / nges par ’byed pa’i cha dang mthun pa’i dge ba’i rtsa ba rnams kyi sa bon yongs su ’dzin pa gang yin pa de ni kun ’byung ba’i bden pa’i rgyu ma yin te / thar pa la sogs pa’i cha dang mthun pa’i dge ba’i rtsa ba rnams ni ’jug pa dang ’gal ba nyid yin pa’i phyir ro // de byung na de las gzhan pa ’jig rten pa’i dge ba’i rtsa ba rnams ni ches ’od gsal bar ’gyur zhing / des na de dag rang gi sa bon yongs su bzung ba la ches mthu dang ldan pa dang sa bon yongs su brtas pas bsgrub pa la ches stobs dang ldan par ’gyur ro // sa bon de las dge ba’i chos de dag kyang ches ’od gsal par ’grub pa dan / phyi ma la yang rnam par smin pa ches sdug pa dang / ches ’dod pa ’grub par ’gyur ro // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 581b10–17. Schmithausen (1987, 78) considers that this paragraph is intercalated to the Nivṛtti Portion. For a Sanskrit restoration of this paragraph, see Yamabe 1987, 29–30.*

<sup>548</sup> MSABh 54: *tac ca saṃsārād vimocanārtham | katham punas tad vimocayati | vāsanā-bodhana-śamana-pravedhais tad vimocayati* (XI.1cd)| *śrutena citta-vāsanataḥ | cintayā bodhanataḥ | bhāvanayā śamathena śamanataḥ | vipaśyanayā pravedhataḥ |*



“*Piṭaka*” stands for the Buddha’s teaching, the Dharma. “Impression” and “comprehension” imply the Sarvāstivāda idea of *mokṣabhāgīya*, which is derived from hearing and reflection. Here, *vāsanā* occurs in its neuter form *vāsana* only because of the metric restriction of the verse.<sup>549</sup> *Vāsana* in this context in the MSA must be a direct source of *śrutavāsanā* in the MSg (Takeuchi 1979, 224).

Then, a practitioner should proceed to the stage of *nirvedhabhāgīya*, “conducting to penetration”. In comparison with the content of the *nirvedhabhāgīya* in chapter VI of the AKBh, it can be noted that before discussing the four wholesome roots conducive to penetration, Vasubandhu first elaborates on calming (*śamatha*) and introspection (*vipaśyanā*). Perhaps being influenced by Vasubandhu’s order of writing, some modern Abhidharma scholars mistakenly regard calming and introspection as the content of *mokṣabhāgīya*.<sup>550</sup> However, the Sarvāstivādins’ discussion of *mokṣabhāgīya* never covers the topic of calming and introspection. Moreover, at the end of the discussion about *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root in the context of discussing *nirvedhabhāgīya*, the AKBh concludes, “*mokṣabhāgīya* has been spoken of incidentally (*prasaṅgena*).”<sup>551</sup> This indicates that in the AKBh, Vasubandhu has no intention to elaborate on the *mokṣabhāgīya*, let alone taking calming and introspection as the components of *mokṣabhāgīya*. Therefore, calming and introspection should be considered as the preparatory practice for producing the four wholesome roots of *nirvedhabhāgīya*. Quote {6.1C} explicitly states that the calming and introspection are in reference to cultivation (*bhāvanayā*). As we have noted in §6.1.1, what is derived from cultivation (*bhāvanā-maya*) on the mundane path (*laukikamārga*) cannot be *mokṣabhāgīya* but is *nirvedhabhāgīya*. Here, it can also be seen that the term “*prativedha*” in the verse strongly implies “*nirvedha*”. Accordingly, what the passage expresses is similar to the Sarvāstivāda idea that after hearing the Buddha’s Dharma, due to the power of *mokṣabhāgīya* and *nirvedhabhāgīya*, one will certainly attain liberation. It is noteworthy that not only the seed of *mokṣabhāgīya* is replaced by the term *vāsana*, but also *vāsana* is connected with hearing (*śruta*) in the MSA/Bh.

<sup>549</sup> This verse uses the *āryā* metre (MSABh 53 n. 5; Ui 1961, 11), whose third and fourth *pādas* consist of 12 and 15 morae (*mātrā*) respectively.

<sup>550</sup> For instance, see Sakurabe and Odani (1999, ii–iii) and Dhammajoti (2015, 493). This understanding has been briefly questioned by Shizuka Sasaki (2015, 343–42).

<sup>551</sup> AKBh 349: *uktam prasaṅgena mokṣa-bhāgīyam* | Cf. D no. 4090, mngon pa, khu 16a4: *thar pa'i cha dang mthun pa zhar las 'ongs pa bshad zin to //* and T29, no. 1558, 121a20: 已因便說順解脫分。(Underlines mine.)

To prove that the supramundane purification, whose *bīja* is impregnated through *śrutavāsanā*, would be impossible without the consciousness of ripening (\**vipāka-vijñāna*, i.e., *ālayavijñāna*), Asaṅga in the MSg first quotes from the Āgama: “By means of depending on other’s voice and individual thorough attention (\**yoniso-manaskāra*), from the [two] causes, right view arises.”<sup>552</sup> Here, “other’s voice” and “thorough attention” indicate that the supramundane right view (*lokottarā samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) is derived from hearing and reflection (*śruta-cintā-maya*).<sup>553</sup> Asaṅga’s adducing the Buddha’s words suggests that *mokṣabhāgīya*, which is also derived from hearing and reflection, should be a theoretical source of *śrutavāsanā*. Similarly, according to MSA I.16, the insight (*jñāna*) that takes the Reality-object (*tatvārtha*) as object-domain (*viśaya*), being the supramundane right view, comes forth from the thorough attention (*yoniso manasikāra*) which arises relying on hearing at the outset.<sup>554</sup> This idea should have been developed from the BoBhVin which claims that right insight (\**samyagjñāna*) arises from hearing the True Dharma (\**saddharma-śravaṇa*) and thorough attention.<sup>555</sup>

Asaṅga further explains how the defiled all-seed *ālayavijñāna*, though being the source of all defilements, coexists with the *bījas* of purification, which overcome the defilements:

(I.45:) ...That (i.e., purification) arises from the seed that is the impression of hearing (\**śrutavāsanā*) the outflow (\**niṣyanda*) from the absolutely pure (\**atyanta-viśuddha/suviśuddha*) Reality (\**dharmadhātu*).

<sup>552</sup> MSg I.44: “gzhān gyi sgra la brten pa dang so so rang gi tshul bzhin yid la byed pa la brten nas / de’i rgyu las yang dag pa’i lta ba ’byung ngo” zhes bcom ldan ’das kyiis bka’ stsal pa na /... Cf. T31, no. 1594, 136b16–17. Nagao (1982, 218) and Brunnhölzl (2019, 504 n. 103) recognize that this quote is from the MN (i 294) or AN (i 87), and a similar expression in Sanskrit is found in the AKVy (188): *dvau hetū dvau pratyayau samyagdr̥ṣṭer utpādāya | katamau dvau | parataś ca ghoṣo ’dhyātmaṃ ca yoniśomanaskāra iti |*

<sup>553</sup> Nagao (1982, 217) suggests that it could also be derived from cultivating (*bhāvanā-maya*). In the context of the MSg, this interpretation is not mistaken as it is based on Asaṅga’s association between the three types of wisdom (derived from hearing, reflection, and cultivation) and the three grades of impregnation of *śrutavāsanā* (see MSg I.47). However, this idea is Asaṅga’s innovation and does not reflect the origin of the concept.

<sup>554</sup> MSABh 7: *śrutam niśrityādaṃ prabhavati manaskāra iha yo manaskārāj jñānam prabhavati ca tatvārthaviśayaṃ |* (I.16ab) ... *śrutam niśrityādaṃ manaskārah prabhavati yo yoniśa ity arthaḥ | yoniśo manasikārāt tatvārthaviśayaṃ jñānam prabhavati lokottarā samyagdr̥ṣṭis ...*

<sup>555</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 289a7: *yang dag pa’i shes pa gang las rab tu skye bar brjod par bya zhe na / smras pa / yang dag pa’i shes pa dang / dam pa’i chos mnyan pa dang / tshul bzhin yid la byed pa las rab tu skye ba yin no //* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 696c2–3.

(I.46:) ... Relying on<sup>556</sup> the awakening (*\*bodhi*) of Buddhas, that which is the impression of hearing operates on a certain basis (*\*āśraya*), [namely] operates in the consciousness of ripening (*\*vipākavijñāna*) in the manner of staying together, just like milk and water [mingled together]. That [*śrutavāsanā*] is not the *ālayavijñāna*, because it is the seed of the antidote (*\*pratipakṣa*) to that [defiled *ālayavijñāna*].

(I.48:) ... Because of being the antidote to *ālayavijñāna*, it (i.e., the *bīja* of *śrutavāsanā*) is not of the nature of *ālayavijñāna*. Although being mundane, because of being the outflow (*\*niṣyanda*) from the absolutely pure supramundane Reality, it becomes the seed of supramundane *citta*... It should be known that to the beginner Bodhisattvas, [the *bīja* of *śrutavāsanā*], although being mundane, is governed (*\*saṃgrhīta*) by the Body of Truth (*\*dharmakāya*), but to Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas, it is governed by the Body of Liberation (*\*vimuktikāya*)...<sup>557</sup>

The idea that the *śrutavāsanā* (prior to the *darśanamārga*) is mundane but leads to a supramundane result, serving as the antidote to the defiled *ālayavijñāna* while being together with it, must be drawn from the Sarvāstivāda concept of anti-saṃsāric *mokṣabhāgīya*. As noted in §6.1.1, *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root is mundane but will definitely bring forth the result of liberation. Although the Sarvāstivādins maintain that a pure *dharma* cannot arise from an impure *dharma*, the operation of *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root is considered to be in the way of karmic *bīja* producing its result. Interestingly, as seen in the above-quoted passage, “consciousness of ripening” (*\*vipāka-vijñāna*) instead of “*ālayavijñāna*” is accentuated in MSg I.46, which apparently suggests that the *bīja* of *śrutavāsanā* before the path of seeing also operates in a similar manner to karmic ripening. From the perspective of mere-cognition (*vijñaptimātratā*), although *śrutavāsanā* is derived from hearing in a mundane stage, since its cognitive object (*ālambana*) is the supramundane pure *dharmadhātu*, it is possible to generate a supramundane right

<sup>556</sup> According to the three Chinese translations by Gupta, Paramārtha, and Xuanzang, 乃至/至, “up to attaining”. See also Nagao (1982, 224–25).

<sup>557</sup> MSg I.45–48: ...chos kyi dbyings shin tu rnam par dag pa'i rgyu mthun pa thos pa'i bag chags kyi sa bon las de 'byung ngo //... sangs rgyas rnams kyi byang chub la brien nas thos pa'i bag chags su gyur pa gang yin pa gnas gang la 'jug pa de lhan cig 'dug pa'i tshul gyis rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa la 'jug ste / 'o ma dang chu bzhin no // de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ma yin te / de'i gnyen po'i sa bon nyid yin pa'i phyir ro // ... kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i gnyen po yin pas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid ma yin pa dang / 'jig rten pa yin yang 'jig rten las 'das pa chos kyi dbyings shin tu rnam par dag pa'i rgyu mthun pa yin pas 'jig rten las 'das pa'i sems kyi sa bon du gyur pa'o //... byang chub sems dpa' las dang po pa rnams kyi 'jig rten pa yin yang chos kyi skur bsdu pa dang / nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas rnams kyi rnam par grol ba'i lus su bsdu par yang blta'o // Cf. T31, no. 1594, 136c3–21. For another English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 171–72.

view, which is intrinsically insight (*jñāna*), when entering the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*). In this regard, Schmithausen (1987, 78–80) draws attention to the connection between the *\*tathatāmbanapratyaya-bīja* (the seed which is Suchness as the object-condition) in the PMBhVin and the *śrutavāsanā* (I shall come back to this issue in §6.2.2).

Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that as a Mahāyāna notion, *śrutavāsanā* in the MSg is endowed with some Mahāyānic features that are not attested in the Sarvāstivāda concept of *mokṣabhāgīya*. Asaṅga emphasizes that the *śrutavāsanā* of Mahāyāna is governed by the Body of Truth for the Bodhisattvas, which differs from that governed only by the Body of Liberation for the Two Vehicles. Vasubandhu also informs us in his commentary that the expression “arising from the seed as the impression of hearing the outflow from the absolutely pure *dharmadhātu*” demonstrates the fact that the *dharmadhātu* is different from the liberation attained by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.<sup>558</sup> Thus, Asaṅga may imply that the *śrutavāsanā* of Mahāyāna contrasts with the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the Two Vehicles, though they are nearly identical in structure. In addition, Takeuchi (1950, 84) suggests that the term “outflow from the *dharmadhātu*” is derived from the notion of “outflow from the *dharmatā*” (*dharmatā-niṣyanda*) in the ŚrMS. According to the ŚrMS, going to a Tathāgata, who represents the Body of Truth (*dharmakāya*), for refuge amounts to establishing faith (*\*śraddha*) that is the outflow from the *dharmatā* (Wayman and Wayman 1990, 94). At any rate, it seems that Asaṅga vested the Sarvāstivāda concept of *mokṣabhāgīya* with Mahāyāna characteristics so that the Mahāyānic *śrutavāsanā* can be distinguished from that for the Two Vehicles.

Moreover, unlike *mokṣabhāgīya* which is derived from hearing and reflection, *śrutavāsanā* in Asaṅga’s definition is broader, as it also expands to cultivation:

{6.1D} In that context, depending on feeble impression (*\*vāsanā*), middle impression comes to arise; depending on middle impression, strong impression comes to arise. It is because [they are] accompanied by hearing, reflection, and cultivation (*\*śruta-cintā-bhāvanā*), which should be repeatedly practiced.<sup>559</sup>

<sup>558</sup> D no. 4050, sems tsam, ri 137b4–5: *chos kyi dbyings shin tu rnam par dag pa’i rgyu mthun pa thos pa’i bag chags kyi sa bon las de ’byung ngo zhes bya ba la nyan thos la sogs pa las bye brag tu byas pa ni // chos kyi dbyings shin tu rnam par dag pa’i rgyu mthun pa thos pa’i bag chags so //* Cf. T31, no. 1597, 333c14–16.

<sup>559</sup> MSg I.47: *de la bag chags chung ngu la brten nas bag chags ’bring por ’gyur ro // bag chags ’bring po la brten nas bag chags chen por ’gyur te / thos pa dang bsam pa dang / bsgom pa lan mang du bya*

In comparison, according to the AS, the three grades of raised (*samutthita*) faith and conviction (*śraddhādhimukta*), which have the Truth-related (*satyādhipateya*) Dharma as cognitive object, are endowed with (*samanvāgata*) three grades of *mokṣabhāgīya*.<sup>560</sup> This idea seems to have prefigured the three grades of *śrutavāsanā* in the MSg. Nevertheless, the idea of relating *śrutavāsanā* to cultivation is not attested in Asaṅga's earlier works, such as the MSABh. It is arguable that for Asaṅga, the *śrutavāsanā* before the path of seeing is derived from hearing and reflection, but that in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*) must be derived from cultivation. On this issue, Vasubandhu provides two alternative explanations: (1) In terms of the wisdom (*prajñā*)<sup>561</sup> derived from hearing, reflection and cultivation (*\*śruta-cintā-bhāvanā-mayī*), each of them contains three grades of *vāsanā*; (2) the wisdom derived from hearing is feeble, that derived from reflection is middle, and that derived from cultivation is strong.<sup>562</sup> Whichever is the case, *śrutavāsanā* is not confined to hearing and reflection. “*Śruta*” in the term “*śrutavāsanā*” only suggests that the initial source of the impression is hearing the Dharma. The grades of the impression are determined by the extent of purification, as the MSg states that with the development of the three grades of *śrutavāsanā*, the *ālayavijñāna*, being all the defiled *bījas*, diminishes until the complete transformation of the basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*).<sup>563</sup> Interestingly, Paramārtha's Chinese translation of Vasubandhu's commentary provides another explanation, which is not found in other versions: the feeble, middle, and strong grades of *śrutavāsanā* are respectively conducive to

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*ba dang ldan pa'i phyir ro* // Cf. T31, no. 1594, 136c5–16. See also Brunnhölzl's translation 2019, 172.

<sup>560</sup> AS 87–88: *asaṃbhṛta-saṃbhāraḥ pudgalaḥ katamaḥ | satyādhipateyaṃ dharmam ālambya mṛdumātra-samutthitaḥ śuddhaśraddhādhimuktaḥ mṛdumātrā-mokṣabhāgīya-samanvāgataḥ aniyatajanma-kālikaḥ || saṃbhṛtāsaṃbhṛta-saṃbhāraḥ pudgalaḥ katamaḥ | satyādhipateyaṃ dharmam ālambya madhyamātra-samutthitaḥ śuddhaśraddhādhimuktaḥ madhyamātra-mokṣabhāgīya-samanvāgato niyatajanma-kālikaḥ || saṃbhṛta-saṃbhāraḥ pudgalaḥ katamaḥ | satyādhipateyaṃ dharmam ālambya adhimātra-samutthitaḥ śuddhaśraddhādhimuktaḥ adhimātra-mokṣabhāgīya-samanvāgataḥ tajjanma-kālikaḥ ||*

<sup>561</sup> See Xuanzang's translation: “聞思修所成慧”.

<sup>562</sup> D no. 4050, sems tsam, ri 138a3–4: *de la chung ngu dang 'bring dang chen po'i thos pa las byung ba dang / bsgoms pa las byung ba yang blta bar bya ba yin pas re re zhing rnam pa gsum pa nyid du 'gyur ro // don gzan yang thos pa las byung ba ni chung ngu'o // bsams pa las byung ba ni 'bring ngo // bsgoms pa las byung ba ni chen po'o* // Cf. T31, no. 1597, 334a17–20.

<sup>563</sup> MSg I.48: *chung ngu dang 'bring po dang chen po ji lta ji lta bur rim gyis 'phel ba de lta de gnas kyang 'gyur ro // gnas rnam pa thams cad du gyur na rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa sa bon thams cad pa yang sa bon med par gyur pa dang rnam pa thams cad du spangs pa yang yin no* // For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 172.

liberation (*\*mokṣabhāgīya*), conducive to penetration (*\*nirvedhabhāgīya*), and penetration (*\*prativedha*).<sup>564</sup> This explanation suggests that there must have been some Indian masters who were aware of the doctrinal connection between *śrutavāsanā* and *mokṣabhāgīya* before the mid-6<sup>th</sup> century.

Another direct proof that the Yogācāra idea of *śrutavāsanā* was derived from the concept of *mokṣabhāgīya* can be found in the ASBh. On Asaṅga's explanation in the AS that the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) refers to *ālayavijñāna* and the wholesome *vāsanā*<sup>565</sup>, the ASBh remarks:

{6.1E} The condition qua cause of the contaminated (*sāsrava*) and uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*) are respectively the store consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) and the wholesome impression (*kuśala-vāsanā*)... The wholesome impression should be seen as the impression of those conducive to liberation (*mokṣabhāgīyānām vāsanā*). Because they arise from the cause (*naimittika*; *rgyu las byung ba*; 用...為緣生) as the outflow (*niṣyanda*) factors of supramundane acquirement, the fact of that impression being the cause of the supramundane *dharma* should be known.<sup>566</sup>

This explanation is obviously influenced by the MSg, as it alludes to the outflow from the supramundane *dharmadhātu*, which is absolutely pure. However, it still provides additional information that the wholesome impression, or *śrutavāsanā* in the MSg's word, exactly means the *vāsanā* of the *mokṣabhāgīya dharmas*. At least in the AS, Asaṅga acknowledges the existence of wholesome *vāsanā* that contradicts *ālayavijñāna*. Since the MSA speaks of *vāsanā* derived from hearing, a proper name of *śrutavāsanā* is finally made available in the MSg.

<sup>564</sup> T31, no. 1595, 173c10–11: 復有三品，謂解脫分品、通達分品、通達品。“Penetration” (通達, *\*prativedha*) here refers to entering the *darśanamārga*.

<sup>565</sup> AS 28: *hetu-pratyayaḥ katamaḥ | ālayavijñānaṃ kuśala-vāsanā ca ||*

<sup>566</sup> ASBh 35–36: *hetu-pratyaya ālaya-vijñānaṃ kuśala-vāsanā ca sāsravānāsravānām ca saṃskārānām yathākramam | ... | kuśala-vāsanā mokṣabhāgīyānām vāsanā draṣṭavyā | teṣāṃ lokottarādhigama* (Tatia: *ābhyupagama*)-*niṣyanda-dharma-naimittika* (Tatia: *-tas*) *tad-vāsanāyā lokottara-dharma-hetutvaṃ veditavyam ||* See Schmithausen 2014, 586 n. 2396.

## 6.2. *Gotra* and *Śrutavāsanā*

### 6.2.1. Primordial and Engendered *Bījas*

Though the issue of primordial and engendered/impregnated *bījas* has been thoroughly examined by Yamabe (1987, 1989, 1990b, 1991, 2021) and Park (2014, 157–80), since it is immediately relevant to our discussion of *śrutavāsanā*, it is necessary to briefly recount it.

At the beginning of the ŚrBh, the oldest layer of the YBh, the definition of *gotra* is given as follows:

{6.2A} In that context, what is spiritual class (*gotra*)? [It means] that which is the seed-factor (*\*bīja-dharma*) of a person who abides in a spiritual class. When that [seed-factor] exists and is not a non-existence (i.e., when the seed-factor exists at present), if the conditions of the persons who abide in a spiritual class are also gained, [the person] has the potency (*\*sāmarthya*) and power (*\*pratibala*) to obtain and attain *nirvāṇa*. What are the synonyms for that spiritual class? Seed (*\*bīja*), element (*\*dhātu*) and nature (*\*prakṛti*) are the synonyms.

Then, what is the intrinsic nature (*\*svabhāva*) of that spiritual class? That is a distinct basis (*\*āśraya-viśeṣa*)<sup>567</sup> in such a form that it is subsumed (*\*saṃgrhīta*) under the six sense-bases (*\*ṣaḍ-āyatana*), obtained on account of habit (*\*dharmatā*), and continuously comes from beginningless time. That which has these synonyms, namely “spiritual class”, “seed”, “element”, and “nature”, is called “spiritual class”.<sup>568</sup>

It can be seen that the ŚrBh leaves no room for the idea of *vāsanā* or engendered *bīja* but only considers *gotra* as primordial *bīja* that has existed from beginningless time.

The BoBh provides an almost identical description of *gotra* (Abe 2023, 178–82), but it further distinguishes two types of Bodhisattva’s *gotra*—the *gotra* that exists by nature (*prakṛtistha*) and the enhanced (*samudānīta*) *gotra*.<sup>569</sup> The latter

<sup>567</sup> Cf. Xuanzang’s translation: 附在所依, “attached to the basis.”

<sup>568</sup> ŚrBh i 2: *de la rigs gang zhe na / smras pa / rigs la gnas pa’i gang zag gi sa bon gyi chos gang yin pa ste / gang yod cing med pa ma yin la rigs la gnas pa’i gang zag rnams kyi rkyen yang rnyed na mya ngan las ’das pa thob pa dang reg par nus shing mthu yod par ’gyur ba’o // rigs de’i ming gi rnam grangs dag gang zhe na / sa bon dang khams dang rang bzhin zhes bya ba ni ming gi rnam grangs dag yin no //*

*’o na rigs de’i rang bzhin ji lta bu zhe na / de ni lus las khyad par du gyur pa dang skye mched drug gis zin pa dang chos nyid kyiis ’thob pa dang thog ma med pa’i dus nas brgyud de ’ongs pa de lta bu yin te / gang la ’di lta ste / rigs dang sa bon dang khams dang rang bzhin zhes bya ba’i ming gi rnam grangs’di dag yod pa de ni rigs zhes bya’o //* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 395c19–27. See also Park’s translation (2014, 169).

<sup>569</sup> See BoBh<sub>W</sub> 3: *tatra gotraṃ katamat | samāsato gotraṃ [dvividham] | prakṛtisthaṃ samudānītaṃ ca |*

refers to “that which has been obtained from the previous repeated practice of wholesome root” (*yat pūrva-kuśalamūlābhyāsāt pratilabdham*). Yamabe (1987, 26–31) points out that the two types of *gotra* in the BoBh should have been developed from the VSg, which mentions the two types of elements (*\*dhātu*), namely “the element that exists by nature” (*rang bzhin gyis gnas pa'i kham*s; 住自性界; *\*prakṛtistha-dhātu*) and “the element nourished by repeated practice” (*goms pas yongs su brtas pa'i kham*s; 習增長界; *\*abhyāsa-paripuṣṭa-dhātu*).<sup>570</sup> Here, the latter means:

{6.2B} Because those wholesome and unwholesome *dharma*s which have been practiced frequently (*\*āsevita*) in other former rebirths will be caused to arise (*\*samudāgama*), now the nourished seeds are abiding in the basis (*\*āśraya*); because of that, even depending on only a small condition, they (the *dharma*s) are induced from them (the seeds) and will be brought about from them<sup>571 572</sup>.

According to Yamabe’s analysis, the two types of *gotra* or *dhātu* are ultimately reducible to one type: the primordial type, which can be enhanced through repeated practice.

Additionally, Park (2014, 174) points out that “the elements nourished by repeated practice” represent the seed for karmic result. In fact, it should be noted that the two types of elements in the VSg, as an elaboration of *dhātu* in the *Akṣarāśi-sūtra* of the *Samyuktāgama* (Yamabe 1987, 21–24), are discussed in terms of all conditioned *dharma*s and karma, whereas the two types of *gotra* in the BoBh only concentrate on the wholesome aspect. Similarly, Jaini ([1959] 2001, 233) notes that for the Sautrāntikas, *gotra* must also be only wholesome. As for the *gotra* that exists by nature (*prakṛtistham gotra*) in the BoBh, Mikogami (1965, 119) suggests that this

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*tatra prakṛtistham gotram yad bodhisattvānām śaḍāyatana-viśeṣaḥ | sa tādrśaḥ parampar'āgato 'nādikāliko dharmatā-pratilabdhaḥ | tatra samudānītam gotram yat pūrvakuśalamūlābhyāsāt pratilabdham | tad asminn arthe dvividham apy abhipretam |* (Underlines mine.) See also Yamabe’s translation (2021, 469).

<sup>570</sup> See D no. 4039, sems tsam, zi 288b1, cf. T30, no. 1579, 846c18–19. For an English translation, see Yamabe (2021, 471).

<sup>571</sup> Note that the Tibetan translation for “will be brought about” is ‘gro bar ‘gyur, but the Chinese translation puts *dīng bù kě zhuǎn* 定不可轉, “it definitely cannot be changed.”

<sup>572</sup> D no. 4039, sems tsam, zi 288b2–3: *de la goms pas yongs su brtas pa'i kham ni dge ba'am mi dge ba'i chos sngon gyi skye ba gzhan dag tu kun tu brten pa gang yin pa de dag yang dag par grub par bya ba'i phyir / da lta sa bon yongs su brtas pa rten la gnas pa yin te / des na de rkyen chung ngu tsam la yang dmigs nas des bkri zhing des 'gro bar 'gyur ro //* cf. T30, no. 1579, 846c20–23. See Park’s (2014, 171) and Yamabe’s (2021, 471) English translations.



notion guarantees Buddhahood as the goal of the cultivation of Bodhisattva, and the enhanced *gotra* stands for the acquired wholesomeness. It is likely that under the Mahāyāna doctrinal system, “nature” (*prakṛti*) in the VSg, which denotes “the particular (*\*pratiniyama*) seed that exists in [one’s own]”<sup>573</sup> individual continuity (*\*saṃtāna-patita*) in the manner of these eighteen elements”<sup>574</sup>, gradually takes on the *Prajñāpāramitā* idea of the pure nature of mind<sup>575</sup> during the development Mahāyāna Yogācāra school. It is just as Jaini ([1959] 2001, 233) suggests: “The theory of an innate, indestructible, and pure (*anāsrava*) element existing in the midst of destructible, phenomenal, and impure elements shows an affinity with the Mahāyāna doctrine of *prakṛti-prabhāsvara-citta*, according to which mind is essentially and originally pure but becomes impure by only adventitious afflictions.”

The PMBhVin expands the two types of elements in the VSg into six, which are (1) elements of factors (*\*dharma-dhātu*)<sup>576</sup>, (2) pure elements (*\*śuddha-dhātu*), (3) elements of nature (*\*prakṛti-dhātu*), (4) impregnated elements (*\*paribhāvita-dhātu*), (5) elements that have issued their effects (*\*phaladatta-dhātu*), and (6) elements that have not issued their effects (*\*phalādatta-dhātu*).<sup>577</sup> In this connection, Park (2014, 174) remarks, “this sixfold treatment of *dhātu* represents the most elaborate stage of the concept of *dhātu*, in which all the functional or conceptual aspects of the notion preserved in the earlier layers of the *Yogācārabhūmi* are synthesized.” Among the six elements, the first two are spoken of in terms of the impure and pure *dharma*s at the present moment, the third and the fourth are from the perspective of the continuation of *dharma*s and karma, and the last two elements concerns the ripening (*vipāka*) of karma. Yamabe (1987, 29) draws attention to the similarity between the elements of nature and the impregnated elements in the PMBhVin and the two types of elements in the VSg. It is arguable that this pair of elements seen in the PMBhVin combines both the aspect of the continuity of the eighteen elements reflected in the VSg and the aspect of the continuity of *gotra*, which is wholesome root, in the

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<sup>573</sup> Added according to Xuanzang’s translation.

<sup>574</sup> D no. 4039, sems tsam, zi 288b1–2: *de la rang bzhin gyis gnas pa ni ji ltar khams bco brgyad po 'di dag so sor nges par rgyud la yod pa'i sa bon no* // cf. Yamabe’s Sanskrit restoration (1987, 27).

<sup>575</sup> AsP 3: *prakṛtiś cittasya prabhāsvarā* |

<sup>576</sup> According to the interpretation of the VSg, this *dharma-dhātu* has nothing to do with the Mahāyāna concept of True Reality, but is used in a Śrāvakayānic sense of an element of factor, such as eye-element (*cakṣu-dhātu*).

<sup>577</sup> See D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 79a7–79b4, cf. T1579, 610a7–16.

BoBh.<sup>578</sup>

The Yogācāric idea that *gotra* is synonymous with element (*dhātu*) may remind us of Śrīlāta's theory of pure elements (淨界; \**śuddha-dhātu*)<sup>579</sup>. Through Saṅghabhadra's criticism, it is known that Śrīlāta propounds that in one's mental continuity, there are primordial pure elements. They serve as the cause of the initial uncontaminated *dharma* while being contaminated themselves, which are comparable to the seed for fire in a piece of wood (Dhammajoti 2003, 44–45).<sup>580</sup> Park (2014, 151) associates this Sautrāntika theory of pure element in parallel to the idea of *gotra* in the ŚrBh with the Vibhājyavādins' concept of the mind that is pure by nature (\**prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta*)<sup>581</sup>. Though it is not impossible, the Yogācāra idea should have been directly influenced by the Mahāyāna doctrine that the nature of *citta* is pure during the compilation of the YBh.<sup>582</sup> At any rate, Śrīlāta's notion of pure elements seems to differ in content from the same term used by the Yogācāras: In the PMBhVin, pure elements are interpreted as the elements (*dhātu*) of those who abide in a spiritual class (\**gotrastha*).<sup>583</sup>

In the MSg, however, Asaṅga appears to be more inclined to endorse the idea of engendered *bīja*—the *bījas* in the *ālayavijñāna*, which serve as the causes of

<sup>578</sup> See D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 79b1–3: *rang bzhin gyi kham ni 'di lta ste / kham bco brgyad po ji skad bstan pa de dag nyid thog ma med pa'i dus nas skye ba phyi ma phyi ma dag tu rab tu grub pa gang yin pa dang / gang zag rigs la gnas pa dang / rigs la gnas pa ma yin pa rnam kyi thog ma med pa'i dus nas yongs su mya ngan las 'da' ba dang / yongs su mya ngan las 'da' ba ma yin pa'i chos nyid du rab tu grub pa gang yin pa'o // yongs su bsgoms pa'i kham ni 'di lta ste / sngon dge ba dang mi dge ba yongs su bsgoms pa de dag nyid 'khor bar skye ba dang / 'bri ba dang / bye brag dang / mya ngan las 'das pa thob pa'i rgyu nyid gang yin pa'o //* See also Park's (2014, 173) English translation.

<sup>579</sup> Cf. “淨界” in the PMBhVin (T30, no. 1579, 610a8), which is in Tibetan “*dag pa'i kham*” (D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 79a7).

<sup>580</sup> See NA, T29, 421a16–b17; 713a11–15. See Dhammajoti's full translation (2003, 44–45). Park (2014, 149–50) only attributes the theory of primordial pure element to the Dārṣāntikas, but he fails to note the aspect that the pure element or the seed for purification are contaminated.

<sup>581</sup> I revised Park's translation, “the inherent luminosity of mind”, because according to Mizuno (1972, 10), the Theravādins, as a representative of the Vibhājyavādins, only speaks of the *pabhassara-citta* in terms of a phenomenal *citta*, whereas the Mahāsāṅghikas discuss the pure nature of *citta*, which remains stationary.

<sup>582</sup> By referring to the Pāli commentary, Jaini ([1959] 2001, 233) asserts that the Theravādins' notion of *pabhassara-citta* refers to the *bhavaṅga-citta*. The early Mahāyāna *Prajñāpāramitā* must have adopted the idea of *prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta* directly from the Mahāsāṅghikas.

<sup>583</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 79a7–b1: *dag pa'i kham ni 'di lta ste / gang zag rigs la gnas pa rnam kyi kham gang dag yin pa'o //* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 610a8–9: 二、淨界，謂住種性補特伽羅所有諸界。

producing *dharmas*, are valid only when they are impregnated.<sup>584</sup> Asaṅga also explicitly asserts that if there is no impression of hearing and so on, the arising of [Noble] fruit is not possible<sup>585</sup>, and the *bīja* of impression of hearing is the *bīja* of the Body of Truth (*\*dharmakāyabīja*).<sup>586</sup> It seems that this idea of engendered *bīja* for pure *dharmas* could have originated from the Sarvāstivādins' understanding of *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root, which cannot be primordial.

According to the Chinese exegetical tradition, *\*Candrapāla* and *Dharmapāla*<sup>587</sup>, following the stance of the BoBh, hold that all *bījas* are primordial and are enhanced through impregnation (*vāsanā/paribhāvanā*), whereas *\*Jayasena* and *\*Nanda* maintain that *bījas* are engendered through fresh impregnation.<sup>588</sup> As a matter of fact, for *Dharmapāla*, the prime reason for sticking to the theory of primordial *bījas* is perhaps that the existence of primordial pure *bījas* guarantees a valid source of purity—ultimately speaking, according to the doctrine of mere-representation (*viññaptimātratā*), even the pure Buddha's Dharma heard from others should be manifested from within the *citta*.

### 6.2.2. *\*Tathatālanbanapratyaya*, *\*Tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja* and *Śrutavāsanā*

Asaṅga's notion of *śrutavāsanā* is generally considered (Schmithausen 1987, 78–80) to be directly developed from the idea in the PMBhVin that the first supramundane *dharmas* arise from (or “in the manner of having”) the *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja*.<sup>589</sup> According to Schmithausen (2014, 571) and Yamabe (1990b, 81–82), this so-called “*bīja*” is exactly Suchness (*tathatā*) which functions as the object-condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of the supramundane insight (*lokottara-jñāna*). Since *bīja* in the YBh is generally construed as condition qua cause (*hetupratyaya*), which *tathatā* cannot be, Schmithausen (1987, 79) remarks that the expression “*bīja*” (seed) in the

<sup>584</sup> See Yamabe 2021, 464.

<sup>585</sup> MSg I.25: *thos sogs bac hags med na ni / de 'bras skye ba mi rigs phyir / ...*

<sup>586</sup> MSg I.48: *de la thos pa'i bag chags kyi sa bon...chos kyi sku'i sa bon du blta ste /*

<sup>587</sup> For *Dharmapāla*'s view on the uncontaminated seed in the *\*Viññaptimātratāsiddhi*, see Nishi (1987, 190–207).

<sup>588</sup> T43, no. 1830, 304b5–7, 305a20–21. An English translation is available in Yamabe 2021, 463–65. For a detailed examination, see Schmithausen (2014, 579–94).

<sup>589</sup> D no. 4038 sems tsam, zhi 27b4: *'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams ni de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi sa bon dang ldan par skye'i...* See Schmithausen's translation (2014, 570).

term *\*tathatāḷambanapratyaya-bīja* is only used “by way of a metaphor of the metaphor”. Matsumoto (2004, 122) thus recapitulates this interpretation by Schmithausen and Yamabe as an equation: *tathatā* = *āḷambanapratyaya* = *bīja*. In contrast to this opinion, Matsumoto (2004, 123) suggests that *\*tathatā-āḷambanapratyaya* should be read as a *bahuvrīhi*, which means “that which has Suchness as its object-condition”, rather than a *karmadhāraya*. Based on his theory of *dhātuvāda*, Matsumoto further interprets *āḷambanapratyaya* as a “locus”, which is different from *bīja* as a generative cause. On this issue, Schmithausen (2014, 578) rejects Matsumoto’s unusual interpretation of *āḷambanapratyaya*.

In this relation, Yamabe (1990b, 81) draws attention to the passage immediately following the term *\*tathatāḷambanapratyaya-bīja* in the PMBhVin, according to which, the *\*tathatāḷambanapratyaya* exists in all types of persons (*\*pudgala*).<sup>590</sup> Yamabe argues that since it is not possible that all sentient beings have the insight (*jñāna*) of Suchness, *\*tathatā-āḷambanapratyaya* cannot be a *bahuvrīhi*. Moreover, in the *Sopadhika-nirupadhika-bhūmi-viniścayaḥ*, the transformation of the basis (*\*āśrayaparivṛtti*) is described as “*\*tathatāviśuddhiprabhāvitā tathatāgotr(ak)ā tathatābīj(ak)ā tathatāsamudāgatā*”, which suggests that *tathatā(-āḷambanapratyaya)* is equivalent to *bīja* and *gotra*.

In parallel to the above arguments, Schmithausen (2014, 578) asks the question: if some form of mind (*citta*) or insight (*jñāna*) has to be assumed when reading *\*tathatā-āḷambanapratyaya* as a *bahuvrīhi*, why did the author(s) of the PMBhVin not use a clearer form “*\*tathatāḷambanapratyaya-jñāna-bīja*” instead? Furthermore, if a kind of insight is assumed here, the insight that takes Suchness as an object-condition should be the first supramundane *dharma* that arises when entering the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*). However, it is neither possible for such a *dharma* to have itself as its *bīja*, nor can a preliminary contemplation of Suchness belonging to the imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) before the path of seeing serve as the homogeneous cause of the initial supramundane insight.

The following argumentation attempts to propose an alternative way to understand *\*tathatāḷambanapratyaya-bīja* from the Abhidharmic perspective and extrapolate whether the idea of *śrutavāsanā* must have been directly developed from it. It is arguable that to almost the same extent as proofs in the PMBhVin are given to demonstrate that *\*tathatā-āḷambanapratyaya* should be read as a *karmadhāraya*

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<sup>590</sup> D no. 4038 sems tsam, zhi 27b6: ‘*di ltar thams cad la yang de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa’i rkyen yod pa’i phyir ro ...*

compound, counterarguments can be presented to show that the term can be taken as a *bahuvrīhi*. In this way of reading, *\*tathatāḷambanapratyaya-bīja*, as a *karmadhāraya*, denotes the seed which is [the cognition] that takes Suchness as an object-condition. Nevertheless, it does not mean Matsumoto's interpretation is entirely correct. I agree with Schmithausen that *āḷambana* does not express the metaphysical idea of a locus, notwithstanding the grammatical possibility.<sup>591</sup> It should be noted that the cognition of Suchness is not necessarily an insight gained through direct realization (*abhisamaya*), but can be simply a defiled consciousness with a pure object before the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*). In this understanding, hearing the Buddha's teaching only once in the saṃsāric process, even without any reflection or any faith invoked, sufficiently gives rise to such a cognition that has Suchness as an object-condition. If one considers *\*tathatāḷambanapratyaya-bīja* as the direct doctrinal origin of *śruta-vāsanā*, the *\*tathatāḷambanapratyaya* should correspond to *śruta*, hearing, which does not entail a mundane or supramundane insight.

Concerning the question raised by Schmithausen, one plausible reason why “*jñāna*” is not added is that the term *jñāna* has a strong implication of mundane or supramundane insight in the Yogācāra.<sup>592</sup> Such kind of *jñāna* includes both mundane insights derived from cultivating (*bhāvanā-maya*) in the stage of *nirvedhabhāgīya*<sup>593</sup> and supramundane insights obtained after the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*). In terms of the supramundane insight, the Nivṛtti Portion expressly states that one transforms the basis as a result of practicing and cultivating the insight that takes Suchness as an object (*\*tathatāḷambana-jñāna*).<sup>594</sup> Similarly, as has noted in §6.1.2, MSA I.16 also articulates that hearing and thorough attention give rise to the insight that takes the Reality as an object (*jñānaṃ...tatvārthaviṣayaṃ*). However, what *\*tathatāḷambanapratyaya* indicates is the cognition of Suchness even before the

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<sup>591</sup> See *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.3.117.

<sup>592</sup> This is articulated in the BoBhVin (D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 287b4): *yang dag pa'i shes pa gang zhe na / de ni mdor bsdu na rgyu gnyis su blta bar bya ste / gcig tu 'jig rten las 'das pa dang / 'jig rten pa dang 'jig rten las 'das pa'o* // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 696a6–7.

<sup>593</sup> See ŚrBh ii 226: *sa eṣāṃ indriyāṇāṃ eteṣāṃ ca balānāṃ āsevanānvayād bhāvanānvayād bahulīkāranvayān nirvedhabhāgīyāni kuśalamūlāny utpādayati mṛdumadhyādhimātrāṇi /*

<sup>594</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 8a3: *... de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i shes pas kun tu brten cing goms par byas pa'i rgyus gnas 'gyur bar byed do* // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 581c5–6. For a detailed discussion on the understanding of the Tibetan translation, see Schmithausen 2014, 574–77. Schmithausen suggests to read “*kun tu brten*” as “*kun tu bsten*”. These two words seem to be often used interchangeably in Tibetan translations.

stage of *mokṣabhāgīya*. In fact, a word that should have appeared in the context but did not can still be assumed by readers. Grammatically, it is reasonable to read *\*tathatāmbanapratyaya-bīja* as a *madhyapadalopī-samāsa*, indicating *\*tathatāmbanapratyaya-jñāna-bīja*. In comparison, it is more questionable as to why a word that should not have appeared did appear: If the term *bīja* here is extraordinarily used as “a metaphor of the metaphor”, would one not expect another term to be employed instead of *bīja*?

In my opinion, *bīja* in the term *\*tathatāmbanapratyaya-bīja* is certainly used as a metaphor. From the phenomenological point of view, the analogy of seed implies a seed that grows in the soil and its fruit produced in midair. Similarly, a more commonly known Buddhist simile is that a pure lotus flower blossoms while its seed has been planted deep in the mud. *Bīja* as a metaphor adequately suggests that a seed which is subliminal and remains a capability in the mundane stage is capable of producing a supramundane *dharma*.

In this connection, the notion of *\*tathatāmbanapratyaya-bīja* may find its counterpart in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. The MVbh uses the simile of a botanical seed’s growing into fruit to describe the gradual process that the intelligence acquired by birth (*\*upapatti-pratilambhikā prajñā*)<sup>595</sup> on the twelve divisions of the Buddha’s teaching successively brings about the wisdom derived from hearing, reflection and cultivation, up to the abandonment of defilements and the ultimate attainment of *nirvāṇa*:

{6.2C} It should be declared that maintaining, reciting, and ultimately circulating the Tripiṭaka, the twelve divisions of the Buddha’s teaching (*\*dvādaśāṅgabuddhavadāna*) cause the intelligence acquired by birth. Relying on this, the wisdom derived from hearing (*\*śrutamayī prajñā*) arises. Relying on this, the wisdom derived from reflection (*\*cintamayī prajñā*) arises. Relying on this, the wisdom derived from cultivation (*\*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*) arises. This (*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*) [is capable of] abandoning defilements and attaining *nirvāṇa*. It is like that relying on a seed (*\*bīja*), sprout arises. Relying on the sprout, stem grows. Relying on the stem, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruit are produced.<sup>596</sup>

<sup>595</sup> Note that *upapatti-pratilambhikā prajñā* is different from *\*upapatti-sthāna-pratilambhikā jñāna* 生處得智。

<sup>596</sup> MVbh, T27, 217b12–16: 應作是說：若於三藏十二分教受持、轉讀、究竟流布，是生得慧。依此發生聞所成慧，依此發生思所成慧，依此發生修所成慧，此斷煩惱證得涅槃。如依種生芽，依芽生莖，依莖轉生枝葉花果。Cf. AVbh, T28, 168a17–21. A similar argument with the simile

According to the Sarvāstivādins, the intelligence acquired by birth is obtained by virtue of nature (*\*dharmatā*) and consists of both the mundane wholesome intelligence conjoined with the five sensory consciousnesses and the mundane contaminated wholesome intelligence conjoined with mental consciousness.<sup>597</sup> Precisely speaking, the acoustic consciousness when hearing the Buddha's teaching must be primarily the sensory consciousness par excellence with which the mundane wholesome intelligence (*prajñā*) is conjoined. In terms of having the instinctive capability for hearing the Dharma, all sentient beings must have the intelligence acquired by birth. So to speak, the intelligence acquired by birth guarantees the equal opportunity for all sentient beings to be exposed in front of wholesome objects. When commenting on a *sūtra* passage of the *Samyuktāgama*<sup>598</sup>, the MVbh articulates that because of being a causal agent one after another (*\*kāraṇa-parampara*), the wholesome acoustic consciousness produced through attentively hearing the Dharma gives rise to a wholesome mental consciousness, which in turn produces the wisdom derived from hearing and so on until the wisdom derived from cultivating abandons the five kinds of hindrance (*\*nīvaraṇa*).<sup>599</sup> Hence, the wholesome acoustic consciousness that arises when hearing the Dharma must be conjoined with the intelligence acquired by birth, which is comparable to a seed. This Sarvāstivāda concept of "intelligence (*prajñā*) acquired by birth" on the Buddha's teaching is tantamount to the Yogācāra notion of *\*tathatā-ālambanapratyaya(-jñāna)*. Thus, *\*tathatā-ālambanapratyaya-bīja* can be construed as "the seed which is the cognition

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of botanical seed in another place in the MVbh is attributed to Venerable Pārśva, see T27, 941a3–8.

<sup>597</sup> MVbh, T27, 490a20–b5: 云何為智？答：五識相應慧除無漏忍，餘意識相應慧。此中五識相應慧有三種：一、善，二、染污，三、無覆無記。善者謂唯生得善。……餘意識相應慧亦有三種：一、善，二、染污，三、無覆無記。善有二種：一、有漏，二、無漏。有漏善有三種：一、加行得，二、離染得，三、生得。加行得者，謂聞所成慧、思所成慧、修所成慧……生得者，謂生彼地法爾所得善……(underlines mine.) See also JñP (T26, no. 1544, 954b8–10): 云何世俗正智？答：五識相應善慧，及意識相應善有漏慧。

<sup>598</sup> Probably the *\*Āvaraṇanīvaraṇa-sūtra* (?), #709–#710 of the *Samyuktāgama* (see T2, no. 99, 190b). Cf. SN v 95: *Yasmiṃ bhikkhave samaye ariyasāvako aṭṭhiṃ katvā manasikatvā sabbacetaso samannāharitvā ohitasoto dhammaṃ suṇāti. imassa pañca nīvaraṇā tasmīṃ samaye na honti. satta bojjhaṅgā tasmīṃ samaye bhāvanā pāripūriṃ gacchanti.*

<sup>599</sup> MVbh, T27, 499b14–22: 如契經說：「諸聖弟子，若以一心屬耳聽法(*\*avahitaśrota dharmam śṛṇoti*)，能斷五蓋、修七覺支，速令圓滿。」問：要在意識，修所成慧能斷煩惱，非在五識。生得、聞、思能斷煩惱，如何乃說「若以一心屬耳聽法能斷五蓋」？答：依展轉因，故作是說。謂善耳識無間引生善意識，此善意識無間引生聞所成慧，此聞所成慧無間引生思所成慧，此思所成慧無間引生修所成慧，此修所成慧修習純熟，能斷五蓋，故不違理。

that takes Suchness as an object-condition”.<sup>600</sup> In this understanding, it is also plausible that *\*tathatā-gotraka* is spoken of in a sense similar to “acquired by birth” (*upapatti-prātilambhika*). This interpretation also aligns with the idea that *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja* is primordial *bīja*. By contrast, the use of *bīja* referring to *ālanbanapratyaya* by way of “a metaphor of the metaphor” is not attested in any other scriptural sources except the Chinese commentaries.<sup>601</sup>

Regarding the assertion in the PMBhVin that all sentient beings have the *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya* as brought into focus by Yamabe, it should be noted that this statement is different from claiming that the *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja* exists in all sentient beings. As suggested by the Sarvāstivāda concept of intelligence acquired by birth, though all sentient beings are instinctively capable of hearing the Dharma, it is not the case that everyone has the ability to bring forth right knowledge (*saṃyag-jñāna*). The *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya* cognition of the persons without a spiritual class (*agotrastha*) never becomes a seed that can grow into any spiritual attainment, because their seeds of absolute hindrance toward penetrating (*\*prativedha*) the Suchness<sup>602</sup> make impossible the development of intelligence acquired by birth. As will be noted in Vasubandhu’s analogy in {6.2H}, the existence of seeds is known only when they sprout after raining. Likewise, a person without a *gotra* is known as such when he is not spiritually motivated at all after hearing the rain-like Dharma—having the Suchness as an object-condition. Since having the *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya* cognition does not entail direct realization (*abhisamaya*), just like possessing the intelligence acquired by birth, all sentient beings can have the cognition that takes Suchness as an object-condition even without any supramundane insight.

As for the *\*tathatābījaka* and so on mentioned in the *Sopadhika-nirupadhika-bhūmi-viniścayaḥ*, the term should be understood together with the passage shortly after that: the cultivation of Path [where the consciousness] takes Suchness as an

<sup>600</sup> In this relation, the Chinese exegete Huizhao 惠沼 even claims that Dharmapāla calls the *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja* a *\*jñāna*. See T45, no. 1863, 428c13–15: 護法等云：此是緣真如智，以真如為所緣緣故，名真如所緣緣種子。

<sup>601</sup> This idea is attributed to (Wen-)bei 文備 and (Hui-)jing 惠景. T43, no. 1829, 184c1–7: 備、景法師云：……以真如為所緣緣之種子生。

<sup>602</sup> See D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 27b6–7: *gang dag la de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen rtogs par bya ba la gtan du sgrib pa'i sa bon yod pa de dag ni yongs su mya ngan las mi 'da' ba'i chos can gyi rigs dang ldan par rnam par gzhas la...* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 589a22–23.



object (*\*tathatālabhana-mārgabhāvanā*)<sup>603</sup> is said to be the cause of Arhats' transformation of the basis.<sup>604</sup> Different from the context of *\*tathatālabhanapratyaya-bīja* which gives rise to the initial supramundane *dharma* before the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) as seen in the PMBhVin, the context of *\*tathatālabhana-mārgabhāvanā* is the transformation of the basis in the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*). The consciousness implied here must be supramundane. A comparable idea can also be seen in quote {6.1E} in the ASBh. Accordingly, the idea expressed by *\*tathatābījaka* may not be exactly identical to, or at least may not have been regarded by Asaṅga as the same as the *\*tathatālabhanapratyaya-bīja*. The related passage can be thus translated as follows:

{6.2D} This transformation of the basis (*\*āśrayaparivṛtti*) has been made to manifest through the purification of Suchness (*\*tathatāvisuddhiprabhāvita*), has the spiritual class that derived from Suchness (*\*tathatāgotraka*), has the seed derived from Suchness (*\*tathatābījaka*), and has come forth because of *tathatā* (*\*tathatāsamudāgata*).<sup>605</sup>

In accordance with this understanding, \*Candrapāla and Dharmapāla hold that depending on the primordial uncontaminated *bījas* as the condition qua cause, the *mokṣabhāgīya* and so on as conditions of dominance, the mundane supreme *dharma* (*laukikāgradharma*) as the immediately preceding condition (*samanantara-pratyaya*), and Suchness as the object-condition, the supramundane *dharma* comes to arise in Bodhisattva's first ground (*bhūmi*).<sup>606</sup> Since they acknowledge the primordial *bījas* in accordance with the doctrine of *gotra* and *bīja* in the *Maulī Bhūmi*, there is no problem with the issue of the condition qua cause (*hetu-pratyaya*) of the

<sup>603</sup> A comparable passage that speaks of the *ālabhana* of *mārga* is seen in the *Śrāvakabhūmi-viniścaya* (D no. 4038, sems tsam, zhi 238b3–4; cf. T30, no. 1579, 675a2–5): *bsgom pa'i lam la ni 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam thams cad bden pa bzhi la dmigs pa yin du zin kyang ... 'zheng di ltar slob pa gzhi mthong bas sngon chos shes pa dang / rjes su rtogs pa'i shes pa gnyis kyi sngon sum dang / lkog tu gyur pa'i 'du byed thams cad mngon par rtogs nas ...* According to this, it is clear that the agent of the *\*ālabhana* (*dmigs pa*) is not *mārga per se* but the *jñānas* that are acquired through cultivating (*bhāvanā*) the *mārga*.

<sup>604</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 123b3: *dgra bcom pa'i gnas gyur pa ni ... de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i lam bsgoms pa'i rgyu las byung ba yin te /* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 748b6–7.

<sup>605</sup> D no. 4038, sems tsam, zi 122a7–b1: *'di ltar gnas gyur pa de ni de bzhin nyid rnam par dag pas rab tu phye ba dang / de bzhin nyid kyi rigs can dang / de bzhin nyid kyi sa bon can dang / de bzhin nyid las yang dag par grub pa yin la ...* Cf. T30, no. 1579, 747c23–24.

<sup>606</sup> T42, no. 1828, 614c15–18: 以本有無漏種子為因緣，解脫分等為增上緣，世第一法為等無間緣，真如為所緣緣故，初地出世間法得生。See Schmithausen 2014, 583.

first uncontaminated *dharma*.

It is also noted that the orthodox Sarvāstivādins hold that the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root is acquired by effort (*prāyogika*) rather than acquired by birth.<sup>607</sup> This may explain why in {6.2F} in the ŚrBh, the Sarvāstivāda idea of *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root is not represented as the *gotra* itself but only as entering (*avatarati*) into a *gotra* (§6.2.3).

By contrast, when commenting on MSg VIII.19, Vasubandhu interprets the preparatory non-conceptual insight (*\*prāyogika nirvikalpa-jñāna*) by virtue of a cause (*\*hetu*), which is one of the three types of non-conceptual wisdom obtained through effort, as the power of *gotra* (*\*gotra-bala*).<sup>608</sup> *Gotra* in this context seems to express the idea of the enhanced (*samudānīta*) *gotra* instead of the *gotra* that exists by nature (*prakṛtistha*) (§6.2.1), because Vasubandhu also remarks on MSg III.2 that the mental continuity which is impregnated by much hearing of the Mahāyāna teaching functions as the power of cause (*\*hetu-bala*).<sup>609</sup> This suggests that the MSg takes *gotra* as being formed through impregnation instead of being primordial. Therefore, the doctrinal connection between *mokṣabhāgīya* and *śrutavāsanā* appears to be closer than that between *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja* and *śrutavāsanā*. At least, the term *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja* does not occur in other works of

<sup>607</sup> MVbh, T27, 35a10–12: 問：此善根為加行得？為離染得？為生得耶？答：唯加行得。有說：亦是生得。評曰：前說者好，加行起故。

<sup>608</sup> D no. 4050, sems tsam, ri 179b4–5: *de la rnam par mi rtog pa'i sbyor ba las byung ba ni rnam par gsum ste / 'di ltar kha cig ni rigs kyi stobs las / kha cig ni 'phen pa'i stobs las / kha cig ni da ltar gyi dus su goms pa'i stobs las 'byung bar 'gyur ro // de la rigs kyi stobs las ni der rgyu gyur pa las 'byung bar 'gyur ba nyid do //* For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 372.

<sup>609</sup> See D no. 4050, sems tsam, ri 157b3–4: *yang de ni rim pa ji lta bus bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs yongs su rdzogs par byed ce na / (1) rgyu'i stobs dang / (2) dge ba'i ba shes gnyen gyi stobs dang / (3) yid la byed pa'i stobs dang / (4) nye bar ston pa'i stobs kyi so // de la tshig gnyis kyi ni stobs gnyis la grangs bzhin du rig par bya'o //... Cf. MSg III.2: (1) sems kyi rgyud theg pa chen po'i chos mang du thos pas bsgos pa / (2) sangs rgyas 'byung ba tshad med pa mnyes par bya ba thob pa (3) gcig tu mos pa can (4) dge ba'i rtsa ba legs par bsags pa'i phyir / bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs legs par bsags pa'u byang chub sems dpa'o //* (Serial numbers added by me.) See also T31, no. 1597, 349b25–28, c7–13. For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 325. To the contrary, when remarking on Asaṅga's statement that the *hetu* is the *gotra* by which preparatory non-conceptual insight arises (MSg VIII.19), Asvabhāva interprets the *gotra* as the specific six *āyatanas* from beginningless time. This interpretation accords with the definition of *gotra* in the ŚrBh, and implies that Asvabhāva has already accepted \*Candrapāla's idea of primordial seeds. (See D no. 4051, sems tsam, ri 270a3–5: *rgyu dang 'phen pa dang goms pas las byung bas rab tu dbye ba'i phyir ro zhes bya bas ni sbyor bas byung ba la sogs pa re re la yang rnam pa gsum du ston to // la la'i rigs ni 'di lta bu yin te / gang zhig rkhen rnyed nas myur du de la sbyor ba las byung ba skye ba de'i rigs las de 'byung ngo // rigs ni thog ma med pa'i dus kyi skye mched drug bye brag can sangs rgyas kyi snod du gyur pa'o //* For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 756.)

Asaṅga. Nor has Asaṅga ever claimed that all sentient beings have *śrutavāsanā*.

Moreover, the possible scriptural sources of both the theories of the primordial *bījas* and the engendered *bījas* have been compiled by Yamabe (1989, 43–45; 2021, 463–64). It is noteworthy that the idea of engendered *bījas* is not reflected in the YBh. However, considering that the MSg almost only discusses engendered *bījas*, it is plausible that either the term *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja* is construed differently by Asaṅga or *śrutavāsanā* did not necessarily originate from the term. The nuance between the early Yogācāra notion of *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja* and Asaṅga's theory of *śrutavāsanā* might have sparked off the debate on “original existence” 本有 and “fresh impregnation” 新熏 in the Yogācāra school.

Yamabe (1990b, 82–85) draws attention to the *Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* which mentions three theories that explain *śrutavāsanā*.<sup>610</sup> The first theory is that the mundane supreme *dharma* (*\*laukikāgradharma*) functions as a condition of dominance (*\*adhipatipratyaya*) and the immediately preceding condition (*\*samanantarapratyaya*) for the production of the first supramundane insight (*\*lokottarajñāna*). In this way, the first uncontaminated *dharma* arises without a condition qua cause (*hetupratyaya*).<sup>611</sup> As noted by Schmithausen (2014, 582), this view accords with \*Jayasena's opinion on the *\*tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja*.<sup>612</sup> The second theory is that the primordial uncontaminated *bījas* are enhanced through *śrutavāsanā*. This is in line with Dharmapāla's idea. According to the third theory, depending on the uncontaminated seed that exists by nature (*\*anāsravo dharmatāstha-bīja*), acoustic consciousness of hearing the Dharma arises. It is said that the wisdom derived from hearing (*\*śrutamayī*), though being contaminated (*\*sāsrava*) due to the coexistence with the defiled *manas*, is not subsumed under the *ālayavijñāna*. Subsequent to that, taking that acoustic consciousness as its object, mental consciousness derived from reflection (*\*cintāmaya*) arises. In this series, the uncontaminated *citta* pertaining to the *rūpadhātu* brings about the [mundane] supreme *dharma*, by which the *citta* conjoined with the supramundane *dharmas* (such as *duḥkha-dharma-jñāna-kṣānti*) arises from the *bīja* in the path of cultivation

<sup>610</sup> See D no. 4052, *sems tsam*, ri 358a7–359a3. For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 928–30.

<sup>611</sup> Another English translation of the first theory is given by Schmithausen (2014, 581–82).

<sup>612</sup> T43, no. 1829, 184c9–14: 又由決擇分世第一法緣真如教法為所緣故，以此為因緣種子，生見道智，即說世第一法名「真如所緣緣種子」。以緣教法影像真如，修習為緣故，言「從真如所緣緣種子生」。此是勝軍論師義。

(*bhāvanāmārga*).<sup>613</sup> The author of the *Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* seems to favor the third view.<sup>614</sup> It can be seen that this view is close to the Abhidharmic way of understanding the *tathatālanbanapratyaya-bīja* as I have argued earlier.

### 6.2.3. *Mokṣabhāgīya* and *Gotra*

If *śrutavāsanā* does not consist of primordial *bījas* of uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) *dharma*s, how did the idea of engendered/impregnated *bīja* emerge in Asaṅga's MSg out of the early Yogācāra context of primordial *bīja*? In fact, the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of *mokṣabhāgīya* also contributed to the formation of the early Yogācāra theory of *gotra*, "spiritual class"<sup>615</sup>. This implicit doctrinal connection should have provided a basis for Asaṅga to develop the idea of engendered/impregnated *bīja* of uncontaminated *dharma*s from the early Yogācāra theory in which primordial *bīja* can be enhanced (*samudānīta*) (see §6.2.1).

To begin with, for the Sarvāstivādins, planting the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root, which indicates having the certainty of attaining *parinirvāṇa*, also means that the practitioner has entered into a *gotra*, namely a spiritual class. The MVbh speaks of the different types of *mokṣabhāgīya*:

{6.2E} There are six types of *mokṣabhāgīya*, namely the retrogressive

<sup>613</sup> See D no. 4052, sems tsam, ri 358b4–359a1: *gghan dag na re rna ba'i rnam par shes pa la sogs pa'i sa bon zag pa med pa chos nyid kyi gnas pa la brten nas ji skad smos pa'i tshul gyis bshad par snang ba'i rna ba'i rnam par shes pa skye'o // de nas de'i mjug thogs su rang gi sa bon zag pa med pa kho na las de la dmigs pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa zag pa med pa bsams pa las byung bas bsdus pa'o // de nas rim pa 'dis zag pa med pa'i sems gzugs na spyod pa chos kyi mchog gis bsdus pa'i bar skye'o // de nas des bskyed pa'i sa bon las 'das pa sdug bsngal la chos shes pa'i bzod pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa'i sems so // thos pa las byung ba la sogs pa chos kyi mchog la thug pa thar pa'i cha dang mthun pa dang / nges par 'byed <pa'i cha>(D: pa; P, N) dang mthun pa 'di rnams kyang ldan pa ma yin mod kyi bsod nams kyi cha dang mthun par 'dra ba'i phyir nye bar gdags pa'i sgo nas 'dod pa dang / gzugs na spyod pa nyid yin la nyon mongs pa can gyi yid dang lhan cig 'dug pa'i phyir zag pa dang bcas pa nyid kyang yin te / 'di ltar 'di ni kun gzhi ma yin pa'i rnam par shes pas bsdus par 'chad par 'gyur ro //*

See also Brunnhölzl's English translation (2019, 929).

<sup>614</sup> D no. 4052, sems tsam, ri 359a2: *phyogs <bsum>(D, P: bar ma; N: bsam) de ni nyes pa med par snang ngo //* The expression *phyogs bar ma*, "the intermediate position", which seems to refer to the second theory, is contextually inappropriate because it appears after criticisms of the first two theories.

<sup>615</sup> *Gotra* in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts refers to the ultimate level of *nirvāṇa* that a practitioner is able to attain. Yamabe (2021, 465) renders the term as "spiritual potentiality" while Delhey (2022, 47–48) translates it as "spiritual disposition" based on its meaning expressed in the Yogācāra context. Nevertheless, in the Abhidharma texts, *gotra* is not regarded as a synonym for *bīja* as the Yogācāras maintain. For ease of reading, I render the word as "spiritual class" to suggest the idea of a family or species expressed by this Sanskrit word.

(*parihāṇa-dharman*) class (*gotra*) up to the unshakable (*akopya*) class. When the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the retrogressive class is transformed, the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the volitional (*cetanā-dharman*) class arises. [Likewise,] up to when the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the penetration (*prativedhanā-dharman*) class is transformed, the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the unshakable class arises. When the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the spiritual class of Śrāvaka is transformed, the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the spiritual class of Pratyekabuddha or Buddha arises. When the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the spiritual class of Pratyekabuddha is transformed, the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the spiritual class of Śrāvaka or Buddha arises. If the *mokṣabhāgīya* of the spiritual class of Buddha has arisen, there is no transformation, because of being extremely sharp.<sup>616</sup>

Notwithstanding that six types of *mokṣabhāgīya* are mentioned in accordance with the six types of Arhats<sup>617</sup>, there should be in total eight types of *mokṣabhāgīya*, including six corresponding to the Śrāvaka *gotra*, one to the Pratyekabuddha *gotra*, and one to the Buddha *gotra*. A *gotra* determines one's quality of attaining *nirvāṇa*. It can be argued that the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root is identical to *gotra* in the Vaibhāṣika doctrinal system, where a *gotra* is not primordial but changeable.

The early Yogācāra understanding of *gotra* is implicitly connected with *mokṣabhāgīya*. The following passage in the Avatārabhūmi Section of the first Yogasthāna in the ŚrBh may explain:

{6.2F} Nonetheless, all the class-abiding (*gotra-stha*) persons (*pudgala*) who quickly (*kṣipram*) attain *parinirvāṇa* necessarily accomplish three lives: In one [life] he enters (*avatarati*), in one [life] he ripens (*paripacyate*), and in one life he becomes completely ripe and just there attains *parinirvāṇa*.<sup>618</sup>

Such a description of the shortest period as three lives for a person who abides in a *gotra* to attain *parinirvāṇa* shows striking resemblance in the use of words to Vasubandhu's explanation of *mokṣabhāgīya* in chapter VI of the AKBh.<sup>619</sup> As for

<sup>616</sup> MVbh, T27, 34c27–35b23: 順解脫分亦有六種。謂退法種性，乃至不動法種性。轉退法種性順解脫分起思法種性順解脫分，乃至轉堪達種性順解脫分起不動法種性順解脫分。轉聲聞種性順解脫分起獨覺及佛種性順解脫分。轉獨覺種性順解脫分起聲聞及佛種性順解脫分。若起佛種性順解脫分已則不可轉，極猛利故。

<sup>617</sup> They are: (1) *parihāṇa-dharman*; (2) *cetanā-dharman*; (3) *anurakṣaṇā-dharman*; (4) *sthitākampya*; (5) *prativedhanā-dharman*; and (6) *akopya-dharman*.

<sup>618</sup> ŚrBh i 52: *api tu yo gotrasthaḥ pudgalaḥ sarvaḥ kṣipram parinirvāti, so 'vāśyaṃ trīṇi janmāny abhinirvartayati | ekasminn avatarati, ekasmin paripacyate, ekasmin janmani paripakvo bhavati, tatraiva ca parinirvāti |*

<sup>619</sup> This textual similarity is not noted by Kritzer (2005) in his comparison between the AKBh and the

how soon one who has planted the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root will attain *parinirvāṇa*, the Sarvāstivādins articulate that the liberation may occur in thousands of eons (*kalpa*) but at least it requires three lives:

{6.2G} Is that the case that one who has made the preparatory efforts (*prayoga*) just for the first time in the present life would produce those [wholesome roots] conducive to penetration (*nirvedha-bhāgīya*)? This is certainly not the case, because before them (i.e., the *nirvedha-bhāgīya* wholesome roots), [the wholesome root] conducive to liberation (*mokṣabhāgīya*) should be produced. In terms of an extremely short time indeed, liberation occurs quickly (*kṣipram*) via three lives. In one life the wholesome root conducive to liberation may cause to be produced, in the second life, that conducive to penetration, and in the third life, the path to Nobility. It is like the sequence of the planting of a seed, the growth of grain, and the production of fruit. Regarding this teaching (*dharmatā*) [of the Buddha], it is in a gradual manner that an individual continuity (*saṃtāna*) has the entering (*avatāra*), ripening (*paripāka*), and liberating (*vimukti*).<sup>620</sup>

In the quickest circumstance, one produces the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root in his first life and is called “entering”. In comparison, “entering” (*avatāra*) in the ŚrBh is defined as the fact that a person who abides in a *gotra* (*gotrasthaḥ pudgala*) for the first time comes to obtain faith in the Dharma and Vinaya taught by the Tathāgatas which has not been obtained previously, takes precepts (\**śīla*), apprehends what is heard (the Dharma), increases generosity/giving, and purifies the views.<sup>621</sup> This description is very close to the causing factors of *mokṣabhāgīya*, which are hearing

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YBh.

<sup>620</sup> AKBh 349: *kiṃ punaḥ prathama eva janmani kṛta-prayogo nirvedha-bhāgīyāny utpādayet | naitad asti avaśyaṃ hi*

*prāk tebhyo mokṣa-bhāgīyaṃ* [6.24c]

*utpādayitavyam | sarva-svalpaṃ hi*

*kṣipram mokṣas tribhir bhavaiḥ ||* [6.24d]

*ekasmin janmani mokṣa-bhāgīyaṃ kuśala-mūlam | dvitīye nirvedha-bhāgīyāni | tṛtīye āryamārgam | bīja-viropaṇa-sasyābhivṛddhi-phalōtpatti-kramavat | krameṇa hi saṃtānasyaśyaṃ dharmatāyām avatāra-paripāka-vimuktayo bhavantīti |*

Cf. MVbh (T27, 35b9–16): 問：若有種植此善根已，為經久如能得解脫？答：若極速者，要經三生。謂初生中種此種子，第二生中令其成熟，第三生中即能解脫。餘則不定，謂或有人種順解脫分善根已，或經一劫，或經百劫，或經千劫，流轉生死而不能起順決擇分。或復有人起順決擇分善根已，或經一生，或經百生，或經千生，流轉生死而不能入正性離生。

<sup>621</sup> See ŚrBh i 42: *de la zhugs pa gang zhe na / rigs la gnas pa'i gang zag gis sngon de bzhin gshegs pas gsungs pa'i chos 'dul ba la dad pa ma thob pa las / dang por thob par gyur cing tshul khriṃs yang dag par len pa dang thos pa 'dzin pa dang gtong ba spel ba dang lta ba sbyong bar byed pa gang yin pa ste / de ni zhugs pa zhes bya'o* // Cf. T30, no. 1579, 399c22–25.

the Dharma, observing precepts, and giving (§6.1.1). Then, according to the quote above, in the second life, the practitioner produces the mundane *nirvedhabhāgīya* wholesome roots and comes to be called “ripening” (*paripāka*). Within the third life, the practitioner could become a Noble person (*ārya*) and even attain *parinirvāṇa*, which is known as “liberating” (*vimukti*). As pointed out earlier, the source of the entire discussion on *mokṣabhāgīya* in the AKBh can be found in the MVbh. Therefore, the similar content in the ŚrBh should also be seen as a reference to the Sarvāstivādins’ definition of *mokṣabhāgīya*.

Furthermore, the MVbh informs us that the planting of the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root can be known through subtle bodily marks of the bristling of hair and the falling of tears when hearing the Buddha’s teaching.<sup>622</sup> On this issue, the AKBh summarizes as follows:

{6.2H} It should be understood that having heard the illuminating speech about the distress of *saṃsāra*, selflessness, and the advantages of *nirvāṇa*, one in whom bristling of hair (*roma-harṣa*) and falling of tears (*aśru-pāta*) occur has the so-called “wholesome root conducive to liberation” (*mokṣabhāgīyaṃ kuśalamūlam*). It is like that the existence of seeds in the holes in soil [can be deduced] from the growing of sprouts when it rains.<sup>623</sup>

Interestingly, these two indicators in the body of one who has planted the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root, viz., the falling of tears and the bristling of the hair, are employed in the Avatārabhūmi Section of the ŚrBh to depict a person who has entered into a *gotra*:

{6.2I} Furthermore, a person who has entered (*avatīrṇa*) [into a spiritual class], having heard or recollected the virtues of the Buddha, Dharma, or Saṅgha, obtains great wholesome pure faith (*prasāda*) of mind that is directed towards (*upasaṃhita*)<sup>624</sup> renunciation (*naiṣkramya*); and with that object repeatedly through the mind melted by the pure faith (*prasāda-drava-cittatā*),

<sup>622</sup> MVbh, T27, 886a5–19: 問：順解脫分善根在有情身其相微細，已種未種云何可知？答：以相故知。彼有何相？謂若聞善友說正法時，身毛為豎悲泣流淚，厭離生死欣樂涅槃，於法、法師深生愛敬，當知決定已種順解脫分善根。若不能如是當知未種。……故由此相可得了知。See also MAH (T28, 949c19–21): 種解脫種者，有如是相，處聽法坐，若聞法時，悲泣流淚身毛為豎，見生死過、涅槃善利，敬信正法及說法者。

<sup>623</sup> AKBh 274: *yasya saṃsārādīnava-nairātmya-nirvāṇaguṇa-dyotikāṃ kathāṃ śrutvā roma-harṣāśru-pātau bhavatas tasyāsti mokṣabhāgīyaṃ kuśalamūlam ity avaseyaṃ pravṛṣṭvāṅkura-prarohāt khala-vileṣu bījastitvam* |

<sup>624</sup> Cf. Xuanzang’s Chinese translation: 引發; but Tibetan: *dang ldan pa*.

[the person] individually obtains the falling of tears (*aśru-prapāta*) and thrill of hair (*roma-añca*)<sup>625</sup>. This is the third mark of a person who has entered.<sup>626</sup>

It seems that when expounding on the concept of *gotra*, the author(s) of the ŚrBh should have had the Sarvāstivādins' understanding of *mokṣabhāgīya* in mind. However, in the entire ŚrBh, there is no mention of the term *mokṣabhāgīya* at all. This is probably because the ŚrBh takes *gotra* as primordial from beginningless time, whereas *mokṣabhāgīya* must be planted at a later time. It is arguable that “entering into a *gotra*” in the ŚrBh plays the role the enhanced (*samudanīta*) *gotra* in the BoBh. According to Yamabe (2021), the idea of enhanced *gotra* serves as the direct doctrinal source of engendered *bīja*, equivalent to *vāsanā*. Therefore, such doctrinal connection enabled Asaṅga to introduce the new Yogācāra concept of *śrutavāsanā*.

### 6.3. Śrutavāsanā and Memory

Śrutavāsanā is also pertinent to the idea of memory, as it is said in Asaṅga's AS: “What is the basis (*āśraya*) [of the *citta-caittas* when learning the teachings in the *sūtras*? [They are] (1) informing from others (*paravijñapti*); (2) memory (*smṛti*); and (3) impression (*vāsanā*).”<sup>627</sup> The context of the passage in the AS concerns the scope (*gocara*) of the *citta-caittas* derived from hearing, reflection, cultivation in accordance with the True Dharma.<sup>628</sup> This understanding of *vāsanā* may represent the concept of *śrutavāsanā* in its formative stage. On this statement, the ASBh provides an elaborative explanation:

{6.3A} The basis refers to the informing from others, memory, and impression. Among them, at the time of teaching, this basis, which is the informing from others, is said as “from others' (reciting) sound” (*parato ghoṣatas*). After that, memory is the basis, because of the repeated practice

<sup>625</sup> This word is synonymous with *roma-harṣa*. Both of the words are translated identically as “*spu zing*” in the Tibetan translations.

<sup>626</sup> ŚrBh i 54: *punar aparam avatīrṇa-pudgalo buddhasya vā dharmasya vā saṃghasya vā guṇāṃ chrutvā, anusmṛtyā vā labhate cetasaḥ prasādam udāraṃ kuśalaṃ naiṣkramyopasaṃhitam, bhūyo bhūyas tenāmbanena prasāda-drava-cittatayā aśru-prapātān romāṃcāṃś ca pratilabhate | idaṃ tṛtīyam avatīrṇasya pudgalasya liṅgam ||*

<sup>627</sup> AS 80: *āśrayaḥ katamaḥ | paravijñaptiḥ smṛtir vāsanā ca |*

<sup>628</sup> See AS 80: *sa eṣa pīṭakatraya-saṃgrhīto dharmah kasya gocarah | śrutamaya-cintāmaya-bhāvanāmāyānām cittacaitasikānām dharmānām gocarah ||*



(*abhyasana*) by means of recollection (*anusmṛti*)<sup>629</sup> in accordance with what has been heard. After that, impression is the basis, because of the appearance (*pratibhāsa*) [in resemblance to that recollection]<sup>630</sup> afterwards by the [strong]<sup>631</sup> force of the impregnation (*bhāvanā*)<sup>632</sup> through repeated practice, even without the recollection of that [object].<sup>633</sup>

Here, *vāsanā* means the impression left by the recollection of the Buddha's teaching that has been heard long ago. Some features of the *śrutavāsanā* seen in the MSg, including hearing from others and being connected with the hearing, reflection, and cultivation, can also be found in the ASBh. As this specific type of impression is not an intentional activity of recollection, I translate *śrutavāsanā* as the impression of hearing, though it can be regarded as impregnation.

What Aśaṅga suggests in the AS about the *vāsanā* in relation to memory is that the efficacy of the previously heard, reflected, and cultivated are preserved through *vāsanā* after the primary hearing and the secondary recollection. In line with this idea, Aśaṅga proclaims in MSg II.8 that because the memory consciousness (*\*smṛti-vijñāna*), which arises on account of the [former] hearing and reflection, takes a past cognitive object, the appearance (*\*pratibhāsa*) of that (i.e., the impression of what has been heard) becomes a mere manifestation (*\*vijñaptimātra*).<sup>634</sup> This statement should also be seen as implying *śrutavāsanā*. Apart from that, Vasubandhu mentions the seed of memory (*smṛti-bīja*) in the AKBh<sup>635</sup> to refute the Mahāsāṅghika's theory

<sup>629</sup> Cf. Tib.: *rjes su dran pas*.

<sup>630</sup> Added according to the Chinese translation.

<sup>631</sup> Added according to the Chinese translation.

<sup>632</sup> Note that for the term *bhāvanā*, the Tibetan translation uses “*bag chags*” and the Chinese translation “*習氣*”, both of which correspond to *vāsanā*. It is not certain if the original Sanskrit text used by Jinamitra (the Tibetan translator) and Xuanzang (the Chinese translator) reads *vāsanā* instead of *bhāvanā*. If not, it indicates that the *bhāvanā* here should be understood as *vāsanā*, which substantiates what we have observed in chapter 2.

<sup>633</sup> ASBh 98: *āśrayaḥ paravijñapti-smṛtir vāsanā ca | tatra deśanā-kāle paravijñaptir āśrayo yo 'śāv ucyate parato ghoṣata iti tata uttarakālāṃ smṛtir āśrayo yathāśrutam anusmṛty-ābhyasanāt | tata uttarakālāṃ vāsanāśrayas tad-anusmṛtim antareṇāpi paścād abhyāsa-bhāvanā-balena pratibhāsanād iti* | Cf. D no. 4053, sems tsam, li 70b1–2. Also cf. T31, no. 1606, 744c10–15.

<sup>634</sup> MSg II.8: *thos pa dang bsams pa las byung ba la dran pa'i rnam par shes pa gang yin pa de yang 'das pa la dmigs pa'i phyir / der snang ba rnam par rig pa tsam du 'gyur ro* // Cf. T31, no. 1594, 138b19–21.

<sup>635</sup> AKBh 278: *yathānubhava-jñānājā smṛty-utpādana-śaktir...* Vasubandhu does not expound on the notion of *smṛti-bīja*. Neither does Yaśomitra's succinct comment on the analogy help. Saṅghabhadra, moreover, only concentrates on the invalidity of the analogy. It is only Sthiramati's *Tattvārthā* that

of seed of defilement. However, according to Sthiramati's commentary<sup>636</sup>, it seems that this "seed of memory" is not pertinent to the *śrutavāsanā* but is more comparable with Śrīlāta's *anudhātu* theory.

In addition, in the *Sāratthappakāsinī*, the commentary on the *Samyutta Nikāya*, Buddhaghosa also uses the term *vāsanā* to denote the impression of remembering the Buddha's teaching:

{6.3B} In that context, to the three types of people (i.e., *ugghaṭitaññū*, *vipaṇcitaññū* and *neyyo*), the Blessed One accomplishes the purpose of the teaching of Dhamma according to personality. [By contrast,] to those who take words as the highest (*padaparama*), it becomes the impression (*vāsanā*) for future benefit (*attha*).<sup>637</sup>

Among the four types of people classified according to their personality, those who are sharp in understanding (*ugghaṭitaññū*), those who realize after explanation (*vipaṇcitaññū*), and those who will be instructed to comprehend (*neyyo*) are able to understand the teaching of the Buddha in their present life. Accordingly, the Buddha

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provides a detailed elaboration.

<sup>636</sup> *Tattvārthā*: "In this way, the seed of memory (*smṛti-bīja*) means, on account of the [past] knowledge of experience (*anubhava-jñāna*) in the serial continuity of memory (*dran pa'i rgyud*; \**smṛti-santati*), that which takes its [previous] own object-domain as the cognitive object (\**svaviśaya-ālambana*). Therefore, it should be asserted, '[by] taking the object-domain of experience as the cognitive object, the memory comes about.' If it is not like that, there will be no object (\**artha*) with reference to the knowledge of experience. Moreover, if 'the knowledge of experience' is perceived as that very group of all the co-nascent (\**sahaja*) *citta* and mental factors (\**caitta*), [then] it is not a single knowledge alone, but that entire group of *citta* and mental factors. The memory that takes its own object-domain as the cognitive object is the foremost in generating the entire group of the *citta* and mental factors. It is called 'the potency (\**śakti/sāmarthya*) of its own basis (\**āśraya*).' For that reason, [how could] there be [any] contradiction in this by [claiming] the arising of memory? It should be stated that the seed of memory and so forth are not different from the cause of its own species. On [this point], some say that those [facts explain] how memory arises in the meditative attainment of cessation and the ideationlessness (\**asaṃjñīnirodha-samāpatti*).'" (D no. 4421, sams tsam, do 102a2–6: 'di ltar nyams su myong ba'i shes pas dran pa'i rgyud la rang gi yul dmigs pa ni dran pa'i sa bon te / de'i phyir nyams su myong ba'i yul la dmigs te dran pa skye'o zhes khas blang bar bya'o // de lta ma yin na nyams su myong ba'i shes pas don med do // gzhan yang nyams su myong ba'i shes pas zhes bya ba thams cad lhan cig skyes pa'i sams dang sams las skyes pa'i tshogs pa de nyid du gzung ba na / shes pa kho na 'ba' zhig ma yin gyi / sams dang sams las byung ba'i tshogs pa de mtha' dag nyid do // rang gi yul la dmigs pa'i dran pa ni sams dang sams las byung ba'i tshogs pa mtha' dag skyed pa la gtso bo ste rang gi rten gyi nus pa zhes bya'o // de'i phyir yang dran pa skye bas 'di la 'gal ba ci zhig yod / dran pa'i sa bon la sogs pa ni rang gi rigs kyi rgyu ba las tha dad ma yin par brjod par bya la / kha cig ni de dag 'gog pa dang 'du shes med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa la ji ltar dran pa skye bar brjod ces zer ro //)

<sup>637</sup> SA i 202: *Tattha tiṇṇaṃ puggalānaṃ imasmiṃ yeva attabhāve Bhagavato dhamma-desanā atthaṃ sādheti, pada-paramānaṃ anāgat'atthāya vāsanā hoti.*

causes them to attain liberation. By contrast, those who take words as the highest are not sufficiently talented to fully comprehend the Buddha's Dharma in their present life. According to the Pāli *Puggalapaññati*, "a person who takes words as the highest is said to be the person who, though has heard so much, has recited so much, has remembered so much, and has authored so much, has no direct realization (*abhisamaya*) of the Dhamma in his [present] life".<sup>638</sup> However, their good memory, which leaves an impression, will benefit them in their future life. The expression of "for future benefit" (*anāgatattāya*) seems to reflect an idea similar to that of *mokṣabhāgīya*. As discussed in §6.2.3, a person who has just entered into the stage of *mokṣabhāgīya* cannot attain liberation in the present life but only after at least three lives. In this respect, Buddhaghosa's use of *vāsanā* is also related to the former recollection of the Buddha's teaching and is comparable with Asaṅga's notion of *śrutavāsanā*.

It is very interesting to note that in Paramārtha's Chinese translation of Vasubandhu's commentary on the MSg, *śrutavāsanā* is said to be connected with recollection (憶念), as it is asserted: "Sustaining is to make [the *śrutavāsanā*] firmly established; right reflection is the cause of increasing [the *śrutavāsanā*]; recollection maintains [the *śrutavāsanā*]."<sup>639</sup> Such a statement is not attested in other translations of the corresponding text<sup>640</sup> and thus should have been added by the translator. Nevertheless, as noted above, Paramārtha's interpretation is not groundless. It seems that in the Yogācāra system, *śrutavāsanā* also functions as the impression of memorizing the Buddha's teaching. Thus, the enhancement of the recollective impression can also be regarded as the increase of the *śrutavāsanā* in three grades (§6.1.2), which results in the gradual reduction of the defiled *bījas* in the *ālayavijñāna* until the complete transformation of the basis—attaining the Buddhahood.

<sup>638</sup> Pug 41: *Yassa puggalassa bahum pi suṇato bahum pi bhaṇato bahum pi dhārayato bahum pi vācayato na tāya jātiyā dhammābhisamayo hoti, ayaṃ vuccati puggalo padaparamo.*

<sup>639</sup> T31, no. 1595, 202c4–5: 攝持令堅住；正思惟為長因；有憶念攝持。

<sup>640</sup> See Gupta's (T31, no. 1596, 294c13–21) and Xuanzang's (T31, no. 1597, 351a21–26) translations; and the Tibetan translation (D no. 4050, sems tsam, ri 161a4–5). Xuanzang's translation is generally in accordance with the Tibetan translation regardless of a couple of nuances in minor places. Gupta's translation is close to Paramārtha's translation, but nothing similar to the term "憶念" *yì niàn* (memory) is found in Gupta's version.

#### 6.4. *Vāsanā* of Pure *Dharmas*

The reason why the word “*śruta*” is employed to form the term *śrutavāsanā* has been discussed, but it remains a question as to why *śrutavāsanā* has to be called “*vāsanā*” rather than “*bīja*” or “*gotra*”. Asaṅga’s preference for the term *vāsanā* is probably due to the Mahāyāna tradition of using this term to refer to the imprints of wholesome cultivation.

In the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, when dealing with the Bodhisattvas in the ninth ground, the phrase “the fact of being impregnated by the *vāsanā*” (*vāsanā-vāsitatā*) occurs and is used in both the contaminated and uncontaminated senses:

{6.4A} He (i.e., a Bodhisattva) understands the fact of procession (*upācāra*) and non-procession of imprints (*vāsanā*). He understands the fact of being impregnated (*vāsitatā*) by the imprint (*vāsanā*) of the connection (*saṃbandha*) according to the destinies of existence (*gati*), the fact of being impregnated by the performance (*carāṇa*) according to the conduct (*caryā*) of sentient beings, the fact of being impregnated by repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) according to karma and defilements, the fact of being impregnated by the repeated practice of wholesome, unwholesome and non-defined *dharmas*<sup>641</sup>; and the fact of being impregnated (*adhivāsitatā*) by going to further existence. [He understands] the fact of being impregnated in succession, the fact of being impregnated by the non-destruction (*anupaccheda*) of what has long followed (*dūrānugata*) and the non-removal (*anuddharaṇa*) of the injury (*vikāra*) of the drawing-near (*upakarṣaṇa*) defilements, and the fact of being impregnated by the reality of entity (*dravya-bhūta*) and the non-reality of entity. And he understands [truly as it is (\**yathābhūta*)]<sup>642</sup> the fact of being impregnated by seeing (*darśana*), hearing (*śravaṇa*), and dwelling together with (*saṃvāsa*) the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Tathāgatas.<sup>643</sup>

<sup>641</sup> According to the Tibetan translation, the word “*dharma*” is given as “*karma*” (*las*).

<sup>642</sup> Added according to the Tibetan translation (*yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du*), as well as Kumārajīva’s and Buddhahadra’s Chinese translations (皆如實知).

<sup>643</sup> DBhS 49: *sa vāsanānām upacārānupacāratām ca prajānāti | yathā-gati-saṃbandha-vāsanā-vāsitatām ca | yathā-sattva-caryā-carāṇa-vāsitatām ca | yathā-karma-kleśābhyāsa-vāsitatām ca | kuśalākuśalāvyākṛta-dharmābhyāsa-vāsitatām ca | punarbhava-gamanādhivāsitatām ca prajānāti | anupūrvādhivāsitatām ca | dūrānugatānupaccheda-kleśopakarṣaṇa-vikārānuddharaṇa-vāsitatām ca | dravyabhūtadravyabhūta-vāsitatām ca | śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha-bodhisattva-tathāgata-darśana-śravaṇa-saṃvāsa-vāsitatām ca prajānāti* | Cf. D no. 44, phel chen, kha 253b1–3: *de ni bag chags rnam srgyu ba dang mi rgyu ba yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes te / lam gyi rgyud gang dang ji ltar 'brel ba'i bag chags kyis bsgos pa dang / sems can spyad pa spyod pa ji lta ba bzhin du bsgos pa dang / las dang nyon mongs pa la goms pa ji lta ba bzhin du bsgos pa dang / dge ba dang mi dge ba*

This early Mahāyāna *sūtra* synthesizes various forms of impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s and is perhaps the earliest extant text that associates impregnation with learning from the Buddhist Nobles. Accordingly, a Bodhisattva abandons the *vāsanā* that is connected with *saṃsāra*, such as the *vāsanā* of karma and defilements—this constitutes the Bodhisattva’s “non-procession of *vāsanā*”. Meanwhile, he accumulates the *vāsanā* that pertains to spiritual cultivation, such as the *vāsanā* of the repeated practice of wholesome *dharma*s and the *vāsanā* of learning from the Noble Ones—this constitutes the Bodhisattva’s “procession of *vāsanā*”. Here, no causal relationship between the two aspects of *vāsanā* is assumed.

Moreover, the two complete Chinese translations of the Chapter on Surpassing the World (*\*Lokottara-parivarta*) of the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra* enumerate ten types of Bodhisattva’s *vāsanā* as follows:

{6.4B} Son of the Buddha! Bodhisattvas, the great beings, are in possession of ten types of imprints (*\*vāsanā*). What are the ten? They are (1) imprint of the will to awakening (*\*bodhicitta*); (2) imprint of wholesome roots; (3) imprint of instructing sentient beings; (4) imprint of encountering Buddhas; (5) imprint of taking on rebirth in pure world-spheres (*\*lokadhātu*)/lands (*\*kṣetra*); (6) imprint of the practice [of Bodhisattva]<sup>644</sup>; (7) imprint of vows; (8) imprint of Perfection (*\*pāramitā*); (9) imprint of reflecting the equanimity over all *dharma*s<sup>645</sup>; and (10) imprint of various specific object-domains. These constitute ten. If a Bodhisattva abides in these *dharma*s, he would absolutely get rid of all defilements along with traces (*\*savāsanakleśa*), and acquire the imprint (*\*vāsanā*) of Tathāgata’s [supreme]<sup>646</sup> great wisdom[, the wisdom devoid of (*kleśa*)-*vāsanā*]<sup>647</sup>.<sup>648</sup>

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*dang / lung du ma bstan pa'i las la goms pas bsgos pa dang / yang srid par 'gro bar bsgos pa dang / mthar gyis bsgos pa dang / ring du song zhiṅ rgyun mi 'chad pa dang / nyon mongs pa btsal bas bsgos pa dang / dngos por gyur pa dang / dngos por ma gyur pas bsgos pa dang / nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas dang / byang chub sems dpa' dang / de bzhin gshegs pa mthong zhiṅ thos pas bsgos pa yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes so //* T10, no. 279, 202b28–c4: 又知習氣種種相，所謂行不行差別相：隨趣熏習相、隨眾修行熏習相、隨業煩惱熏習相、善不善無記熏習相、隨入後有熏習相、次第熏習相、不斷煩惱遠行不捨熏習相、實非實熏習相；見聞親近聲聞、獨覺、菩薩、如來熏習相。Also cf. T10, no. 286, 525a23–27; T9, no. 278, 568b23–27.

<sup>644</sup> Added according to Buddhahadbra’s Chinese translation.

<sup>645</sup> Buddhahadbra’s Chinese translation shows: “imprint of the equation in terms of birth” (出生平等).

<sup>646</sup> Added according to Buddhahadbra’s Chinese translation.

<sup>647</sup> This added part appears only in Śikṣānanda’s translation.

<sup>648</sup> Translated according to Śikṣānanda’s Chinese translation (7<sup>th</sup> century). T10, no. 279, 299b12–18: 佛子！菩薩摩訶薩有十種習氣。何等為十？所謂：菩提心習氣、善根習氣、教化眾生習氣、見

Here, both *kleśavāsanā* and Bodhisattva's positive *vāsanā* occur in the same paragraph. This passage also seems to suggest that the abandonment of *kleśavāsanā* is due to the accumulation of the ten types of wholesome *vāsanā*. As this quoted passage can be found neither in the Tibetan parallel text, nor in Dharmarakṣa's third-century Chinese translation<sup>649</sup>, it was very likely to be added in Central Asia (Ishii 1964, 153–54; Nakamura 1987, 195–97)<sup>650</sup> in a relatively late period, sometime before the mid-4<sup>th</sup> century—contemporary with or slightly earlier than Aśaṅga's composition of the MSg. Some modern scholars (Nakamura 1960, 93–94) note that this chapter must have been composed later than the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra*. This suggests that those Mahāyānists who came up with such an idea at that time should have been aware of the positive aspect of *vāsanā* as the imprint of cultivation (see chapter 2). Accordingly, not only Bodhisattvas are endowed with the ten types of *vāsanā*, but also Buddhas have the *vāsanā* of great wisdom, being absolutely away from all *kleśavāsanā*.

Additionally, the MPPU mentions “uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) karma”, which destroys unwholesome contaminated karma, and liberates sentient beings from desired and undesired karmic results (*vipāka*).<sup>651</sup> As long as the karmic efficacy is seen as being preserved by karmic *vāsanā*, it would be a matter of course that there is pure *vāsanā* which counteracts *saṃsāra*.

It was probably under this doctrinal influence concerning *vāsanā* that Aśaṅga came up with his theory of the transformation of the basis (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*). As noted in §6.1.2, according to MSg I.48, with the increase of the three grades of *śrutavāsanā*, the defiled *bījas* in the *ālayavijñāna* come to diminish until no more.

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佛習氣、於清淨世界受生習氣、行習氣、願習氣、波羅蜜習氣、思惟平等法習氣、種種境界差別習氣。是為十。若諸菩薩安住此法，則永離一切煩惱習氣，得如來大智習氣、非習氣智。Cf. Buddhahadra's earlier translation (5<sup>th</sup> century): T9, no. 278, 653c17–2: 佛子！菩薩摩訶薩有十種習氣。何等為十？所謂：菩提心習氣、善根習氣、教化眾生習氣、見佛習氣、於清淨土受生習氣、菩薩行習氣、大願習氣、波羅蜜習氣、出生平等法習氣、種種分別境界習氣。佛子！是為菩薩摩訶薩十種習氣；若菩薩摩訶薩安住此法，則能除滅一切眾生煩惱習氣，得佛無上大智習氣。

<sup>649</sup> See 度世品經, T no. 292. Ishii (1964, 147, 191) suggests that this *sūtra* might have circulated individually and was independent from the Chapter on Surpassing the World. This theory allows for the possibility that the Chinese version of the Chapter on Surpassing the World, which involves the discussion of the ten types of *vāsanā*, might have been developed from this individual *sūtra*.

<sup>650</sup> Most modern scholars (see Nakamura 1987, 197) believe the final compilation of the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* took place at Karghalik near Khotan.

<sup>651</sup> MPPU, T25, 720a8–9: 「無漏業」能破不善有漏業，能拔眾生令離善惡果報中。

Such an inversely proportional relationship between the *śrutavāsanā* and the defiled *ālayavijñāna* can be easily illustrated by the term *vāsanā*. In contrast, without resorting to the concept of impregnation, using the notion of *bīja* alone may bring a new hermeneutic problem as to how the increase of the seeds of uncontaminated *dharma*s necessarily results in the decrease of the seeds of the contaminated *dharma*s, because the concept of *bīja* does not necessarily presuppose a mechanism of mutual interference between the seeds of contradictory *dharma*s. It should be on this basis that Asaṅga calls the cause of the supramundane purification “*śrutavāsanā*”. In sum, the early Mahāyāna understanding of the wholesome *vāsanā* of Bodhisattvas could have served as a doctrinal source of *śrutavāsanā*.

Last but not least, as has been noted in {5.2K}, according to Saṅghabhadra’s NA, Bhadanta Rāma, who is a partisan of the Sautrāntika Sthavira, holds the opinion that the Buddha has the *vāsanā* of white factors (\**śukla-dharma*) after the absolute abandonment of all *kleśavāsanā*. The term “white factors” refers to the uncontaminated *dharma*s and is widely seen in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts. In the MVbh, the term “seed of white factors” (\**śukla-dharma-bīja*) occurs once in association with wholesome roots.<sup>652</sup> In the Yogācāra school, the white factors are taken as the cause of the transformation of the basis, or the cause of attaining Buddhahood, as the MSA proclaims, “Buddhahood is the alteration (*anyathāpti*) of the basis (*āśraya*), conjoined with the most excellent virtue of the white factors,”<sup>653</sup> and “Buddhahood is derived from the white factors, because the wholesome [factors] which are Perfection (*pāramitā*) and so on entirely arise by means of the existence of those [white factors].”<sup>654</sup> According to Rāma, when the Buddha was at the stage of Bodhisattva, he was able to gradually eradicate the non-defiled *vāsanā* induced by the defilements and gradually increase the *vāsanā* of white factors in him. Yinshun (1968, 572–73) and Fukuda (2003, 278–79) argue that it is very likely that Rāma’s theory of the *vāsanā* of white factors is influenced by the Yogācāra concept of *śrutavāsanā*. However, from the limited account of Rāma by Saṅghabhadra, it cannot be seen that the accumulation of the *vāsanā* of white factors causes the cessation of the *vāsanā* derived from defilements. This is unlike the case of the *śrutavāsanā*, which counteracts the defiled *vāsanā* in the *ālayavijñāna*. Therefore, although some of Rāma’s Sautrāntika positions could have been developed under the

<sup>652</sup> MVbh, T27, 885b28–29: 或復斷滅一切善根乃至身中無有少許白法種子……

<sup>653</sup> MSABh 35: *buddhatvaṃ śukladharma-pravara-guṇayutā āśrayasyānyathāptis* ...(IX.12)

<sup>654</sup> MSABh 34: *śukladharma-mayaṃ ca buddhatvaṃ pāramitādināṃ kuśalānāṃ tadbhāvena parivṛtteḥ*

influence of the Yogācāra, his idea about the *vāsanā* of white factors seems not to have been directly inspired by Asaṅga's theory of *śrutavāsanā*.

## 6.5. Concluding Remarks

The Yogācāra theory of *śrutavāsanā* developed from various doctrinal sources, including the Sarvāstivāda concept of *mokṣabhāgīya* and the early Mahāyāna idea of wholesome *vāsanā*.

Asaṅga's description of *śrutavāsanā* shows remarkable structural resemblance to the Sarvāstivādins' understanding of *mokṣabhāgīya*. According to the Sarvāstivādins, the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root (*kuśalamūla*) is derived from hearing and reflection (*śruta-cintā-maya*). It functions in the manner of karmic seeds and leads to definite *parinirvāṇa* in the future. Though mundane, it is contradictory to the saṃsāric progression. This Abhidharmic notion is replaced in the MSA by *vāsanā* derived from hearing and reflection on the *Piṭakas*. In a similar theoretical framework, the MSg also declares that the *bījas* of *śrutavāsanā*, from which the supramundane purification (*\*lokottaravyavadāna*) arises, are the antidote to the defiled *ālayavijñāna*. The idea that a supramundane *dharma* arises from the mundane *śrutavāsanā* is valid only when *śrutavāsanā* operates in the manner of karmic ripening.

The Sarvāstivāda concept of *mokṣabhāgīya* also contributes to the formation of the early Yogācāra theory of the primordial *gotra* being enhanced. For the Sarvāstivādins, planting the *mokṣabhāgīya* wholesome root amounts to entering (*avatāra*) into a *gotra*—one will definitely become a certain type of Arhat in the future, even though the class of attainment is changeable. By contrast, in the early Yogācāra background where *gotra* is understood as the primordial *bīja*, the ŚrBh also speaks of “entering (*avatāra*) into a *gotra*”. In that context, this expression is not only equivalent to the idea of the enhanced (*samudānīta*) *gotra* in the BoBh, but also shows striking textual resemblance to the Sarvāstivāda description of *mokṣabhāgīya*. Since the Yogācāra theory of the engendered *bīja*, or *vāsanā*, stems from the idea of the enhanced *gotra*, this allows for a connection between wholesome *śrutavāsanā* and *mokṣabhāgīya*.

The term *\*tathatālambanapratyaya-bīja* that occurs in the VinSg can be interpreted as “the seed which is [the cognition] that takes Suchness as object-condition”. The *\*tathatālambanapratyaya-bīja*, as primordial *bīja*, is comparable



with the Sarvāstivāda concept of the intelligence acquired by birth (*upapatti-pratilambhika*). On the other hand, Asaṅga's idea of *śrutavāsanā* is discussed with respect to the engendered *bīja* through impregnation, stemming from the Sarvāstivāda concept of *mokṣabhāgīya*. In this understanding, *\*tathatālambana-pratyaya-bīja* may not be the direct doctrinal source of Asaṅga's idea of *śrutavāsanā*. However, since \*Candrapāla and Dharmapāla endorsed the early Yogācāra theory of the primordial *bījas* which are enhanced through impregnation, the *\*tathatālambanapratyaya-bīja* and the *śrutavāsanā* were considered to be identical in the later Indian exegetical tradition.

On the other hand, Asaṅga's notion of *śrutavāsanā*, as the outflow from the absolutely pure *dharmadhātu*, also demonstrates some Mahāyāna characteristics. In the MSg, since three grades of *śrutavāsanā* are distinguished, *śrutavāsanā*, particularly the part after the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*), can also be derived from cultivation (*bhāvanā-maya*). Moreover, the *śrutavāsanā* of learning Mahāyāna teachings is governed by the Body of Truth (*dharmakāya*), different from the Two Vehicles *śrutavāsanā*, which is governed only by the Body of Liberation (*vimuktikāya*).

In early Mahāyāna Buddhism, in terms of the Bodhisattva's spiritual progress, a Bodhisattva in the ninth ground is said to understand the non-progression of the *vāsanā* related to *saṃsāra* and the progression of the *vāsanā* derived from hearing the Noble Ones and so on. In accordance with this idea, a Bodhisattva is encouraged to cultivate ten kinds of wholesome *vāsanā* so as to abandon *kleśa-vāsanā* and accomplish the Buddha's *vāsanā* of great wisdom. However, the accumulation of wholesome *vāsanā* seems to be still independent of the diminishment of the *vāsanā* derived from defilements—no causal relationship between the two types of *vāsanā* can be seen in these scriptures. The interrelationship between the contaminated and the uncontaminated can be found in the MPPU, which suggests the existence of uncontaminated karma that counteracts contaminated karma. Probably under the influence of these precursory Mahāyāna ideas, Asaṅga in the AS propounds that wholesome *vāsanā* in connection with recollecting the Buddha's teaching is different from *ālayavijñāna*. In the MSg, Asaṅga further defines *śrutavāsanā* as functioning as the antidote to the defiled *ālayavijñāna*. Moreover, *śrutavāsanā*'s being an antidote must be based on the premise of impregnation, which cannot be directly expressed by the term “seed” (*bīja*). For this reason, the cause of the supramundane pure *dharmas* which counteracts the defiled *ālayavijñāna* must be called *vāsanā*.

## 7. Doctrinal Synthesis of *Vāsanā*

With the understanding of the different connotations expressed by the term *vāsanā* observed in various Buddhist texts, this chapter concentrates on the doctrinal synthesis of the notion. The full-fledged Yogācāra masters must have been exposed to a considerable number of Buddhist scriptures that mention *vāsanā* with different uses of the term. In this background, Asaṅga summarized three types of *vāsanā* in his MSg. This theory was further refined in Vasubandhu's TrK as *vāsanā* of karma and *vāsanā* of twofold grasping (*grāhadvaya-vāsanā*), on which Sthiramati elaborated on *vāsanā* of ripening (*vipāka-vāsanā*) and *vāsanā* of outflow (*niṣyanda-vāsanā*). What is equally noteworthy in Sthiramati's TrBh is the introduction of *vāsanā* of conceptualization of self etc. (*ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*) and *vāsanā* of conceptualization of form etc. (*rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*). I will discuss the connection between this latter pair of *vāsanā* and the former pair of *vāsanā*. There seems to be no more significant doctrinal development concerning the notion of *vāsanā* afterward in Buddhism. Any mention of the term in later Buddhist texts can be ultimately reduced to the connotations investigated in this book. As an example, this chapter also examines the integrated use of *vāsanā* in the LAS.

### 7.1. Three Types of *Vāsanā* in the *Mahāyānasamgraha*

As a systematic summarization of the Yogācāra doctrines, Asaṅga's MSg provides an elaborative discussion of *vāsanā*. It should be noted that on the one hand, the term *vāsanā* in the MSg sometimes expresses a passive-objective sense of impregnated imprints. As has been noted in §4.2.1, MSg I.15 describes *vāsanā* as being simultaneous with the *dharmas* that impregnate. MSg I.23 further specifies four characteristics of *vāsanā* as being (i) firm (*\*dhruva*), (ii) morally neutral (*\*avyākṛta*), (iii) impregnable/perfumable (*\*bhāvya*), and (iv) [necessarily] connected with impregnator (*\*bhāvaka-saṃnibandhaka*).<sup>655</sup> On the other hand, *vāsanā* is also used to refer to the dynamic course of impregnating/perfuming. In this regard, different meanings of *vāsanā* seen in the Abhidharma period seem to have been synthesized

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<sup>655</sup> See MSg, I.23 (Nagao 1982, 29): *bṛtan lung ma bstan bsgo bya ba / sgo bar byed dang 'brel pa la / sgo byed de las gzhan ni min / de ni bag chags mtshan nyid do* // Cf. Brunnhölzl's translation (2019, 165). There have been adequate analyses on this issue, see Nagao 1982, 162–63.

in the MSg. As a result, the MSg speaks of three types of impregnation in *ālayavijñāna*.

In MSg I.58, the three types of *vāsanā* are specified as (i) *\*abhilāpa-vāsanā*, “impregnation of linguistic expression”, (ii) *\*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā*, “impregnation of self-view”, and (iii) *\*bhavāṅga-vāsanā*, “impregnation of existence-link”.

### 7.1.1. The Epistemological Scope of the Three Types of *Vāsanā*

In MSg II.2<sup>656</sup>, the three types of *vāsanā* are associated with eleven categories of cognition/manifestation (*\*vijñapti*), which constitute the entire saṃsāric universe. In comparison with Vasubandhu’s commentary on the MSg, the exact content of the eleven types of cognition/manifestation can be illustrated below:

<Table 8>

	Asaṅga’s MSg (II.2)	Vasubandhu’s MSgBh <sup>657</sup>
<i>abhilāpa-vāsanā</i>	(a) cognition/manifestation of a body ( <i>*deha</i> )	five [internal] elements, such as eye and so on
	(b) ° of that which is corporeal ( <i>*dehin</i> )	<i>manas</i> with defilements
	(c) ° of an enjoyer ( <i>*bhoktr</i> )	the element of mind ( <i>*manodhātu</i> )
	(d) ° of that which will be enjoyed by those [three] ( <i>*tadupabhogya</i> )	external elements, such as visual object and so on
	(e) ° of enjoyment in those [enjoyed] ( <i>*tadubhoga</i> )	the elements of the six consciousnesses
	(f) ° of time ( <i>*kāla</i> )	non-interruptedness of the continuity of <i>saṃsāra</i>
	(g) ° of number ( <i>*saṃkhyā</i> )	calculation
	(h) ° of place ( <i>*deśa</i> )	the vessel world ( <i>*bhājana-loka</i> ) <sup>658</sup>
	(i) ° of conventional verbalization ( <i>*vyavahāra</i> )	four types of conventional verbalization as [the objects of] seeing, hearing, sensing, and knowing

<sup>656</sup> See Nagao 1982, 58. For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 179–80.

<sup>657</sup> D no. 4050, sems tsam, ri 143b3–7; cf. T31, no. 1597, 338a11–21. For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 299.

<sup>658</sup> According to Asvabhāva’s commentary, the cognition/manifestation of place is understood as the manifestation of “the image of an inhabited place, a park, and so forth” (D no. 4051, sems tsam, ri 220a7: *grong dang kun dga’ ra ba la sogs par snang ba*; cf. T31, no. 1598, 399a20–21), which differs from Vasubandhu’s elaboration. However, in comparison with MSg II.10, Vasubandhu’s explanation should reflect Asaṅga’s original idea. In this regard, Asvabhāva might have understood (6) the *vijñapti* of *\*kāla* and (8) the *vijñapti* of *\*deśa* only in their literal meanings of time and place respectively.

<i>ātmadr̥ṣṭi-vāsanā</i>	(j) ° of distinction between self and others (* <i>sva-para-viśeṣa</i> )	distinct reliance
<i>bhavāṅga-vāsanā</i>	(k) ° of death and birth in fortunate and unfortunate destinies of existence (* <i>sugati-durgati-cyuty-upapatti</i> )	various saṃsāric destinies of existence (* <i>gati</i> )

Asaṅga's idea of analyzing the \**abhilāpa-vāsanā* into the nine types of cognition/manifestation seems to be derived from the MAV and MSA. MAV I.17 alludes to the emptiness (*śūnyatā*) of (1) an enjoyer (*bhokṭṛ*) as the internal sense-bases (*āyatana*), (2) objects of enjoyment (*bhojana*) as the external abodes, (3) the body (*deha*) that serves as a basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the former two, and (4) the supporting substance (*pratiṣṭha-vastu*) as the vessel world (*bhājana-loka*).<sup>659</sup> Notably, Vasubandhu's explanation of "enjoyer" (*bhokṭṛ*) in the MAVBh differs from his explanation in the MSg, which refers to the element of mind (\**manodhātu*). It is not certain if Vasubandhu's different explanations depend on the specific contexts, or the two commentaries were just composed by different Vasubandhus. At any rate, four elements (a, c, d, and h) among the nine types of cognition/manifestation of *abhilāpa-vāsanā* can be traced to the MAV.

The *Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn* 顯揚聖教論, by making a reference to the *Śrutamayībhūmi*<sup>660</sup>, speaks of the six bases (\**adhiṣṭhāna*) of the collection of name etc. (\**nāmakāyādi*), which are *dharma*, meaning (*artha*), person (*pudgala*, as masculine or feminine), time (*kāla*, as past, future, and present), number (*saṃkhyā*, as singular, dual, and plural), and location (*adhikaraṇa*).<sup>661</sup> It seems to be legitimate to reduce these six elements to (f) time, (g) number, and (i) conventional verbalization in the list of the ninefold cognition/manifestation of *abhilāpa-vāsanā*.

<sup>659</sup> MAVBh24–25: *bhokṭṛ-bhojana-tad-deha-pratiṣṭhā-vastu-śūnyatā* | ...

*tatra bhokṭṛ-śūnyatā* (|) *ādhyātmikāny āyatanāny ārabdhā* [|] *bhojana-śūnyatā bāhyāni* | *tad-dehas taylor bhokṭṛ-bhojanayor yad adhiṣṭhānaṃ śarīraṃ* [|] *tasya śūnyatā 'dhyātma-bahirdhā-śūnyatety ucyate* | *pratiṣṭhā-vastu bhājana-lokaḥ* [|] *tasya vistirṇatvāc chūnyatā mahā-śūnyatety ucyate* |

<sup>660</sup> *Śrutamayībhūmi: śabdavidyā katamā* | *sā ṣaḍākārā draṣṭavyā* | *dharma-prajñapti-vyavasthānataḥ* | *artha-prajñapti-vyavasthānataḥ* | *pudgala-prajñapti-vyavasthānataḥ* | *kāla-prajñapti-vyavasthānataḥ* | *saṃkhyā-prajñapti-vyavasthānataḥ* | *sakhilādhikaraṇa-vyavasthānataś ca* || *uddānam* || *dharmārthapudgalaḥ kālāḥ saṃkhyādhikaraṇaṃ ca yat* | *sakhilam tad adhiṣṭhānaṃ śabdasyeha samāsataḥ* || (Shōmonchi kenkyūkai 声聞地研究会 ed., "Bonbun Shōmonji (12)" 梵文声聞地 (十二), in *Taishō daigaku sōgō bukkyō kenkyūjo nenpō* 大正大学綜合佛教研究所年報 15 (1993): 315.)

<sup>661</sup> See T31, no. 1602, 536b1–4: 彼名身等略有六種依處：一法、二義、三補特伽羅、四時、五數、六處所。彼廣分別，如〈聞所成地〉。

Since *vāsanā* is interpreted as the cause of the eleven types of cognition/manifestation, *vāsanā* represents the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*). According to MSA XI.40, the conceptualization of the unreal (*abhūta-parikalpa*), being the threefold manifestation of the grasped (*grāhya*) and the threefold manifestation of the grasper (*grāhaka*), constitutes the dependent characteristic.<sup>662</sup> The threefold manifestation of the grasper encompasses the six consciousnesses and *manas*. Thus, (b) and (e) in Table 8 are also taken into account.

### 7.1.2. The Trichotomy concerning the *Vāsanā* in *Ālayavijñāna*

It has been noted in §4.3.3 that the three types of *vāsanā* in *ālayavijñāna* generally correspond to the three types of object-base (*vastu*) as mentioned in the BoBh. The irreducibility of the three types of object-base to each other suggests the necessity to establish the three types of impregnation.

Asaṅga must have noted that the karmic impregnation, referred to as *bhavāṅga-vāsanā*, and the impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s, referred to as *abhilāpa-vāsanā*, cannot be considered to be mutually inclusive. The karmic *vāsanā*, as seeds (*bīja*) unmoistened by craving (*trṣṇā*) (§3.3.2.1), disappears as soon as the effect of ripening (*vipākaphala*) occurs. By contrast, *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharma*s, which manifests in the form of the twofold grasping, though being momentary *bīja*s, continues to arise until the realization of selflessness (*nairātmya*) of *dharma*s. If the two sorts of *vāsanā* cannot be differentiated, there would be the fault of endless karmic ripening results, as the effect of ripening would impregnate new karmic seed. In this respect, Asaṅga explicitly distinguishes the thoroughly consumed characteristic (*\*upabhukta-lakṣaṇa*) from the unconsumed characteristic (*\*anupabhukta-lakṣaṇa*) of *vāsanā*:

{7.1A} Moreover, [as for *bīja*s, there are] the thoroughly consumed characteristic and the unconsumed characteristic. The thoroughly consumed characteristic means, that which is the ripening of wholesome and unwholesome seeds is thoroughly ripe. The unconsumed characteristic means the seeds as imprints of linguistic expression (*\*abhilāpa-vāsanā*), because of being the seeds of the arising (*\*pravṛtti*) of conceptual proliferation (*\*prapañca*) from beginningless time. If that does not exist, it is neither logical that the virtuous and evil karma, which is produced after being produced, is thoroughly consumed through actualizing the effects. Nor

<sup>662</sup> MSABh 64: *trividhatrividhābhāso grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇaḥ | abhūtaparikalpo hi paratantrasya lakṣaṇam ||*

is it logical that there are new imprints of linguistic expression that arise.<sup>663</sup>

This differentiation between the two characteristics of *vāsanā* reveals the distinct mechanism of karmic *vāsanā* and *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharma*.

Once these two types of *vāsanā* are differentiated, the principle of the twofold dependent co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*) of *ālayavijñāna* comes to be established: (i) the dependent co-arising that distinguishes intrinsic nature (*\*svabhāva-vibhāgika*), and (ii) that distinguishes agreeable from disagreeable [destinies of existence] (*iṣṭāniṣṭa-vibhāgika*).<sup>664</sup> In this regard, since the threefold *vāsanā* represents the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva*), *abhilāpa-vāsanā* represents the former type of dependent co-arising, and *bhavāṅga-vāsanā* represents the latter.

In addition to the *abhilāpa-vāsanā* and the *bhavāṅga-vāsanā*, Asaṅga also considers that self-view has its distinct impregnation, known as *ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā*. As Nagao (1982, 252) notes, since the *ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā* is recognized as the cognition/manifestation of distinction between self and others (*\*svaparaviśeṣa-vijñapti*), it can be considered a special type of the *abhilāpa-vāsanā*. It is perhaps due to this reason, Vasubandhu's TrK and Sthiramati's TrBh only speak of the karmic impregnation and the impregnation of *dharmas* (§7.2.1). Nevertheless, it is expressly stated in Vasubandhu's commentary on the MSg that *\*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā* is impregnated by the defiled *manas* through the force of *satkāyadrṣṭi* (§5.6.1). *\*Ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā* was established separately from the other two types of *vāsanā* probably with a practical concern about *manas*. One may thus also argue that the *abhilāpa-vāsanā*, *ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā*, and *bhavāṅga-vāsanā*, respectively reflect the

<sup>663</sup> MSg I.61 (Nagao 1982, 55): *yang spyad zin pa dang / ma spyad pa'i mtshan nyid de / spyad zin pa'i mtshan nyid ni gang dge ba dang mi dge ba'i sa bon gyi rnam par smin pa rnam par smin zin pa'o // ma spyad pa'i mtshan nyid ni mngon par brjod pa'i bag chags kyi sa bon te / thog ma med pa'i dus nas spros pa 'byung ba'i (P: bas) sa bon yin pa'i phyir ro // de med du zin na dge ba dang sdig pa'i las byas shing byas pa 'bras bu 'byin pas spyad zin pa yang mi rung la / mngon par brjod pa'i bag chags gsar du 'byung ba yang mi rung ngo // Cf. T31, no. 1594, 137c1–6. For another English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 176.*

<sup>664</sup> See MSg, I.19 (Nagao 1982, 26): *'di ni theg pa chen po la phra ba mchog tu zab pa'i rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'o // mdor bsdu na rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ni 'di gnyis te / ngo bo nyid rnam par 'byed pa can dang / sdug pa dang mi sdug pa rnam par 'byed pa can no // de la gang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la brten nas chos rnam 'byung ba de ni ngo bo nyid rnam par 'byed pa can te / ngo bo nyid sna tshogs rnam par 'byed pa'i rkyen gyi dngos por 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i yan lag bcu gnyis gang yin pa de ni sdug pa dang mi sdug pa rnam par 'byed pa can te / bde 'gro dang ngan 'gro dag tu sdug pa dang mi sdug pa'i lus rnam par dbye ba sna tshogs kyi rkyen gyi dngos por 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // Cf. T31, no. 1594, 134c27–135a5. For an English translation, see Brunnhölzl 2019, 163–64.*

functions related to the six consciousnesses, *manas*, and *ālayavijñāna*.

From another perspective, *\*ātmadr̥ṣṭi-vāsanā*, *bhavāṅga-vāsanā*, and *abhilāpa-vāsanā* can be regarded respectively as being responsible for the three aspects as defilements, karma, and conditioned *dharma*. As the CWSL suggests, these three types of *vāsanā* reflect the traditional defiled trinity as defilements (*kleśa*), karma, and unsatisfactoriness (*duḥkha*).<sup>665</sup> Though defilements cause karma, which brings about unsatisfactory, there seems to be no causal connection between the three types of *vāsanā*. By and large, by presenting the three types of *vāsanā* as a whole, Asaṅga not only synthesizes previous Buddhist theories about *vāsanā*, but also establishes a new hermeneutic paradigm of interpreting the mechanism of the saṃsāric progression with the Yogācāric concept of *ālayavijñāna*.

## 7.2. *Vāsanā* in the *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*

### 7.2.1. From Asaṅga's Threefold *Vāsanā* to Vasubandhu's Twofold *Vāsanā*

In Vasubandhu's TrK, two types of *vāsanā* are mentioned, which are *vāsanā* of karma (*karmaṇo vāsanā*) and *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*:

(TrK 19) The impregnation (*vāsanā*) of karma together with the impregnation of twofold grasping (*grāhadvaya*),  
When the previous ripening is worn away, generate that (*ālayavijñāna*) which is another [effect of] ripening.<sup>666</sup>

In verse 19ab, the twofold grasping (*grāhadvaya*) means grasping at what will be grasped (*grāhya-grāha*) and grasping at the grasper (*grāhaka-grāha*). The concept of twofold grasping should be derived from MSA XI.40 (§7.1.1) and the MAV/Bh<sup>667</sup>, according to which, the dependent characteristic (*paratantra-lakṣaṇa*) bifurcates into a grasped object and a grasper. In this context, “grasping” (*grāha*) is no other

<sup>665</sup> See CWSL, T31, 43b19–2: 復次生死相續由惑業苦。發業潤生煩惱名惑。能惑後有諸業名業。業所引生眾苦名苦。惑業苦種皆名習氣。前二習氣與生死苦為增上緣，助生苦故。第三習氣望生死苦能作因緣，親生苦故。

<sup>666</sup> TrBh 112: *karmaṇo vāsanā grāhadvayavāsanayā saha | kṣīṇe pūrvavipāke 'nyam vipākāṇ janayanti tat ||* (19)

<sup>667</sup> MAVBh 17–18: *abhūtaparikalpo 'sti dvayan tatra na vidyate...||* (I.1)  
*tatrābhūtaparikalpo grāhyagrāhakavikalpaḥ | dvayaṃ grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ ca |*

than attachment (*abhiniveśa*). The impregnation of the twofold grasping (*grāhadvaya-vāsanā*) thus amounts to the *\*parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśa-vāsanā*, “the impregnation of the attachment to the imagined nature”, as seen in the VinSg ({4.3E}) and the MAVBh ({4.3F}). Following this thread of doctrinal development, the concept can be traced back to *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* in SNS V.2. Therefore, the *dvayagrāha-vāsanā* expresses the idea of the impregnation of conditioned *dharmas*.

As is elucidated by Sthiramati, Stanza 19 of the TrK demonstrates how the future birth is relinked (*pratisaṃdhīyate*) at the time of the destruction of the present life.<sup>668</sup> Similarly, the term *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* is also mentioned in the context of life-relinking in the six destinies of *samsāra* in the SNS (§4.3.1). Sthiramati further explains that although the diversity of individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) is due to the difference of *karma-vāsanā*, the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* is a sine qua non of bringing forth a projected (*ākṣipta*) individual existence:

{7.2A} The impregnation of twofold grasping (*grāhadvaya-vāsanā*) refers to the seed that is projected by the grasped-grasper grasping previously arisen, for the arising of the future grasped-grasper grasping belonging to that [same] species (*taj-jātīya*). In this context, the difference in individual existence is because of the difference of the impregnation of karma (*karmavāsanā*), by means of the difference of destinies of existence (*gati*), just like the difference of sprout is because of the difference of seed.

However, the impregnation of twofold grasping is understood as being collaborative (*sahakāritva*) with all the imprints of karma (*karmavāsanā*)<sup>669</sup> engaged in the production of a projected individual existence each on their own account. It is just like water and so on [functions collaboratively] at the time when the sprout of seed comes into being. In this way, that is to say, the imprints of karma alone, which are not supported (*ananuṣṭhāta*) by the impregnation of twofold grasping, do not give rise to [an effect of] ripening. Precisely because of that, [Vasubandhu] says: “together with the impregnation of twofold grasping.”<sup>670</sup>

<sup>668</sup> TrBh 112: *idānīm vijñaptimātre anāgataṃ janma vartamānajanmanirodhe sati yathā pratisaṃdhīyate tat pradarsayann āha | ...*

<sup>669</sup> Regardless of “*karmaṇo vāsanā*” in Vasubandhu’s verse, Sthiramati seems to sometimes intentionally read *karmavāsanā* as a neuter noun (see {7.2A}) to indicate karmic imprints (i.e., the karmic efficacy left behind by the *vipākahetu* in one’s karmic continuity). However, since in Vasubandhu and Sthiramati’s time, any remaining imprint must be formed through impregnation (*vāsanā*), the nuance between the two meanings of the Sanskrit word as well as the nuance between the two genders (the neuter *vāsana* and the feminine *vāsanā*) are certainly ignorable.

<sup>670</sup> TrBh 112–14: *pūrvotpannagrāhyagrāhākagrāhākṣiptam anāgata-tajjātīya-grāhyagrāhaka-*



Therefore, the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* also contributes to one's rebirth. It can be well-argued that in this process, the *vāsanā* of karma functions as the karmic seed, while the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* assists in the way of an auxiliary condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*).

Unlike Asaṅga's MSg, which speaks of three types of *vāsanā*, Vasubandhu's TrK only mentions two types of *vāsanā*. The CWSL correlates the two theories of *vāsanā* seen in the MSg and TrK:

{7.2B} “The impregnation of karma” mentioned in this stanza (*kārikā* 19) should be known as exactly the impregnation of existence-link (*bhavāṅga-vāsanā*). “The impregnation of twofold grasping” should be known as exactly the impregnation of self-grasping (*\*ātmagrāha-vāsanā*), and the impregnation of linguistic expression (*\*abhilāpa-vāsanā*). As it is impregnated through grasping a self and what pertains to a self (*ātmātmiya*), and through grasping linguistic expressions, it is called “grasping”.<sup>671</sup>

The “*vāsanā* of self-grasping” in the above passage conspicuously signifies the *vāsanā* of self-view (*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā*) as seen in the MSg. Vasubandhu's two types of *vāsanā* can be thus seen as a simplification of Asaṅga's three types of *vāsanā*: Vasubandhu subsumes both the *ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā* and the *abhilāpa-vāsanā* into the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. *Ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā* can be regarded as a special form of *abhilāpa-vāsanā*, because the former is reified through repeatedly practicing the linguistic conceptualization of self and others.

### 7.2.2. Sthiramati's Interpretation 1: *Vipākavāsanā* and *Niṣyandavāsanā*

It has been noted that Stanza 19 of Vasubandhu's TrK (§7.2.1) primarily concentrates on the issue of life-relinking. However, in another place<sup>672</sup> in the TrBh, Sthiramati also uses the expression of *vipāka-vāsanā*, “impregnation of ripening” and *niṣyandavāsanā*, “impregnation of outflow”, to express karmic *vāsanā* and *vāsanā* of

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*grāhotpatti-bījaṃ grāhadvayavāsanā | tatra karmavāsanābhedād gatibhedenātmabhāvabhedo  
bījabhedād āṅkurabhedavat |  
grāhadvayavāsanā tu sarvakarmavāsanānām yathāsvam ākṣiptātmabhāvotpādane pravṛttānām  
sahakāritvaṃ pratipadyate | tadyathā abādayo bījasyāṅkurotpattāv iti | evaṃ ca na kevalāḥ  
karmavāsanā grāhadvayavāsanānanugrhitā vipākaṃ janayantīty uktam bhavati | ata evāha |  
grāhadvayavāsanayā saheti |*

<sup>671</sup> CWSL, T31, 43b14–17: 此頌所言業習氣者，應知即是有支習氣。二取習氣，應知即是我執、名言二種習氣，取我、我所及取名言而熏成故，皆說名取。Cf. de La Vallée Poussin 1929, 480.

<sup>672</sup> See TrBh 48, 118.

*dharmas* respectively. Scholars (Ui 1952, 291) generally consider that *vipāka-vāsanā* is identical to karmic *vāsanā*, while *niṣyanda-vāsanā* refers to or has “a function similar to” (Kanabishi 2011, 1229) *dvayagrāha-vāsanā*.

Sthiramati suggests that the development (*pariṇāma*) of consciousness can be divided into two aspects: development in terms of cause (*hetu-pariṇāma*) and development in terms of effect (*phala-pariṇāma*). The former means the growth of the impregnation of ripening and outflow (*vipāka-niṣyanda-vāsanā-paripuṣṭi*) in *ālayavijñāna*. In this context, *vāsanā* implies a cause. Regarding the latter, *vipāka-vāsanā* is responsible for the arising of *ālayavijñāna* in other group-homogeneities (*nikāyasabhāga*) as a result of karmic projection; *niṣyanda-vāsanā* is responsible for the arising of manifesting consciousnesses (*pravṛtti-vijñāna*) and defiled *manas* from *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>673</sup> In this context, the terms *vipāka* and *niṣyanda* apparently represent effect of ripening (*vipāka-phala*) and effect of outflow (*niṣyanda-phala*) respectively. Accordingly, *vipāka-vāsanā* means the impregnation that leads to an effect of karmic ripening; and *niṣyanda-vāsanā* means the impregnation that leads to (or consists of) effects of outflow.

Concerning the terminology of the two types of *vāsanā*, some nuance can be found between the TrK and the TrBh. It can be also argued that *vāsanā* of karma and *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* are discussed in terms of their serving as major causes of *saṃsāra* at the time of rebirth, whereas *vipāka-vāsanā* and *niṣyanda-vāsanā* are spoken of in terms of the effects produced. From another perspective, the pair of *vāsanā* of karma and *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* is discussed in the specific context of rebirth. By contrast, the pair of *vipāka-vāsanā* and *niṣyanda-vāsanā* in the TrBh seems to be used in the general situation of an individual’s serial continuity. In the case of rebirth, *vāsanā* of karma and *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* respectively play the role of the cause of ripening (*vipāka-hetu*) and an auxiliary condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*). By contrast, as suggested in the CWSL, in the case of the general continuum of life, *niṣyanda-vāsanā* functions as the homogeneous cause (*sabhāga-hetu*), and *vipāka-vāsanā* functions as an auxiliary condition.<sup>674</sup>

<sup>673</sup> TrBh 48: *yatrātmādyupacāro dharmopacāraś ca sa punar hetubhāvena phalabhāvena ca bhidyate | tatra hetupariṇāmo yālayavijñāne vipākaniṣyandavāsanāparipuṣṭiḥ | phalapariṇāmaḥ punar vipākavāsanāvṛttilābhād ālayavijñānasya pūrvakarmākṣepaparisamāptau yā nikāyasabhāgāntareṣv abhinirvṛttiḥ | niṣyandavāsanāvṛttilābhāc ca yā pravṛttivijñānānām kṣiptasya ca manasa ālayavijñānād abhinirvṛttiḥ | tatra pravṛttivijñānaḥ kuśalākuśalam ālayavijñāne vipākavāsanāḥ niṣyandavāsanāḥ cādhatte. avyākṛtaḥ kṣiptaḥ ca mano niṣyandavāsanām eva |*

<sup>674</sup> See CWSL (T31, 7c5–8): 等流習氣為因緣故，八識體相差別而生，名等流果，果似因故。異熟習氣為增上緣，感第八識酬引業力恒相續故，立異熟名。

### 7.2.3. Sthiramati's Interpretation 2: *Ātmādivikalpavāsanā* and *Rūpādivikalpavāsanā*

When explaining the “unclear appropriation” (*asaṃviditakopādi*) in TrK 3a, Sthiramati also uses another pair of terms as *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, “impregnation of the conceptualization of self and so on”, and *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, “impregnation of the conceptualization of form and so on” to elaborate on *ālayavijñāna*’s appropriation (*upādāna*). According to Sthiramati, because of these two types of *vāsanā*, two types of conceptualization—conceptualization of self and so on and conceptualization of form and so on—are appropriated by *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>675</sup> In addition, Sthiramati also draws attention to the appropriation of basis (*āśraya*). Here, “basis” refers to an individual existence (*ātmabhāva*), being corporeal matter of sense faculties along with their bases (*sādhiṣṭhānam indriya-rūpa*) and mentality (*nāman*).<sup>676</sup> This explanation given by Sthiramati must be based on the idea of the twofold appropriation of *ālayavijñāna* as stated in SNS V.2 (§4.3.1)—(i) the appropriation of the physical sense faculties along with bases (*\*sādhiṣṭhāna-rūpīndriyopādāna*) and (ii) the appropriation of the *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā*. Likewise, at the corresponding place, the CWSL also provides a similar interpretation: the two kinds of appropriation are (i) that of *bīja*, namely *\*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vāsanā*, and (ii) that of physical body having sense faculties.<sup>677</sup> In this respect, it seems that Sthiramati expands the *\*vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* into two aspects, namely *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* and *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*.

It should be noted that the purpose of Sthiramati’s discussion about these two types of *vāsanā* is to demonstrate the theme of the TrK—to teach the twofold selflessness of the person and *dharma*s for the purpose of abandoning the twofold hindrance.<sup>678</sup> In TrK 1ab, the expression “multifarious metaphorical expression of a

<sup>675</sup> TrBh 52: *asaṃviditakopādīsthānavijñaptikaṃ ca tat* | (3ab)

... *upādānam upādīḥ* | *sa punar ātmādivikalpavāsanā rūpādidharmavikalpavāsanā ca* | *tat-sadbhāvād ālayavijñānenātmādivikalpo rūpādivikalpaś ca kāryatvenopātta iti tadvāsanātmādivikalpānām rūpādivikalpānāṃ copādīr ity ucyate* |

<sup>676</sup> TrBh 52 : *āśrayopādānaṃ copādīḥ* | *āśraya ātmabhāvaḥ sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpaṃ nāma ca* |

<sup>677</sup> CWSL, T31, 10a14–16: 執受有二：謂諸種子及有根身。諸種子者，謂諸相名分別習氣。有根身者謂，諸色根及根依處。

<sup>678</sup> See TrBh 38: *pudgaladharmanairātmyapratipādanam punaḥ kleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇārtham* |

self and *dharmas*” (*ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho*)<sup>679</sup> indicates the Yogācāra concepts of attachment to the person (*\*pudgalābhiniveśa*)<sup>680</sup> and attachment to *dharmas* (*\*dharmābhiniveśa*) (N. Funahashi 1965, 61), which respectively represent the conceptualization of self and so on (*ātmādi-vikalpa*) and the conceptualization of form and so on (*rūpādi-vikalpa*). Since self-view (*ātmadr̥ṣṭi*, *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) generates defilements, *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* should constitute defilement-hindrance (*kleśāvaraṇa*). On the other hand, the attachment to *dharmas* plays the role of knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). Thus, on account of the realization of selflessness of the person and *dharmas*, the twofold hindrances are abandoned.<sup>681</sup>

Since liberation (*mokṣa*) is attained by abandoning defilement-hindrance, the practitioner’s karmic impregnation must be cut off in terms of being free from rebirth. Because *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* results in attachment to the person and thus brings about defilements, it contributes to the production of karma. Consequently, the *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* should encompass both impregnation of defilements and karmic impregnation. The *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, on the other hand, represents the impregnation of conditioned *dharmas*, and thus corresponds to the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. However, according to Vasubandhu’s dichotomy of *vāsanā* in his TrK, the impregnation of defilements should be subsumed under the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* ({7.2B}). In this respect, there seems to be a dilemma concerning the position of the *ātmadr̥ṣṭi-vāsanā*—should it be understood as *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, or as a specific type of *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* equivalent to *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*?

Considering the remaining *vāsanā* of the self-view (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*) abandoned by Noble Ones as specified in the VSg, it seems to be reasonable to bifurcate *ātmadr̥ṣṭi-vāsanā*: one aspect responsible for defilement-hindrance within *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, and the other addressing knowable-hindrance within *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*.

Another critical issue to be examined here is whether the *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* and *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, as the twofold hindrance, belong to *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* alone. There is no doubt that the *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* must belong to the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. The confusion lies in the status of the *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* as to whether it belongs to the *vāsanā* of karma or the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*.

<sup>679</sup> See TrBh 40.

<sup>680</sup> Also known as *\*aḥaṃkāramamakārābhiniveśa*.

<sup>681</sup> See TrBh 38: *tathā hy ātmadr̥ṣṭiprabhavā rāgādayaḥ kleśāḥ | pudgalanairātmyāvabodhaś ca satkāyadr̥ṣṭeḥ pratipakṣatvāt tatprahāṇāya pravartamānaḥ sarvakleśān prajahāti | dharmanairātmyajñānād api jñeyāvaraṇapratipakṣatvāt jñeyāvaraṇaṃ prahīyate |*

Ujike (1967, 169) argues that the two types of *vikalpa-vāsanā* in Sthiramati's TrBh only represent Vasubandhu's notion of *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. Ujike's opinion is probably derived from the CWSL, which expressly states that *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* comprises *\*abhilāpa-vāsanā* and *\*ātmagrāha-vāsanā* ({7.2B}). In this understanding, *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* and *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* correspond respectively to *ātmadr̥ṣṭi-vāsanā* and *abhilāpa-vāsanā* in Asaṅga's MSg. However, Ujike's interpretation adds up to concluding that by removing the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* alone, since it includes both types of *vikalpa-vāsanā*, one can realize the twofold selflessness of the person and *dharma*. It should be noted that according to the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh (§4.3.4, Table 5), karmic forces are also taken as conceptualization (*vikalpa*). Therefore, *vāsanā* of karma should not be ruled out from the two types of *vikalpa-vāsanā*.

In a similar vein, N. Funahashi (1965, 61) recognizes the attachment to the person (*\*pudgalābhiniveśa*) as the grasping at the grasper (*grāhaka-grāha*), and the attachment to *dharma*s (*\*dharmābhiniveśa*) as the grasping at what is to be grasped (*grāhya-grāha*). In this way, the two types of *vikalpa-vāsanā* should belong to the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* alone. N. Funahashi's interpretative approach is probably influenced by the CWSL. It is interesting to note that according to the CWSL, *vāsanā* of karma and *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* are respectively recognized as karmic *bīja* and *bīja* of the twofold hindrance.<sup>682</sup> Thus, the *bīja* of defilement-hindrance and knowable-hindrance is distinguished from the karmic *bīja*. While defilements are generally acknowledged as the cause of karma, the CWSL does not recognize the *bīja* of defilement-hindrance as *vāsanā* of karma but associates it with *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. As a matter of fact, this stance of the CWSL is rooted in Dharmapāla's method of differentiating between seeing-division (*darśana-bhāga*) and sign-division (*nimitta-bhāga*). According to Dharmapāla, *ālayavijñāna* transforms into the seeing-division as the grasper and the sign-division as the grasped object.<sup>683</sup> In this regard, Ci'en Master Ji 基 explains that a self and *dharma*s are designated on the grasper and the grasped objects respectively.<sup>684</sup> In this understanding, the twofold hindrance

<sup>682</sup> CWSL, T31, 45b21–22: 領中所言諸業習氣，即前所說二業種子；二取習氣即前所說二障種子，俱執著故。

<sup>683</sup> See CWSL, T31, 38c19–23: 所變見分說名分別，能取相故。所變相分名所分別，見所取故。由此正理，彼實我、法離識所變，皆定非有，離能、所取，無別物故，非有實物離二相故。

<sup>684</sup> See T43, no. 1830, 487a28–b4: 護法云：故彼所計心外實我、法，離識所變依他二分，皆定非有。非謂識變是實我、法。似我、法故，其外我、法離識皆無，以離識體所變能取見分、所

becomes utterly epistemological. However, there is ample room to argue that Dharmapāla's hermeneutic method does not apply to Sthiramati's analysis of *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* and *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*. Vinītadeva's commentary on the TrBh sufficiently sheds light on Sthiramati's understanding of this issue:

{7.2C} “The non-defiled nescience (*akliṣṭam ajñānam*) which serves as an obstruction to the activity (*pravṛtti*) of the knowledge (*jñāna*) with regard to all knowables (*jñeya*)”<sup>685</sup>, that which is called the impregnation of the attachment to the grasped and grasper (*\*grāhyagrāhakābhīniveśa-vāsanā*), is acknowledged (*\*iṣyate*) in this context as the knowable-hindrane (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).<sup>686</sup>

Knowable-hindrane, which consists of *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, is explicitly recognized as being identical to the *vāsanā* of the attachment to the grasped and grasper, namely the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. Therefore, in Sthiramati's TrBh, there seems to be no room to consider defilement-hindrane to belong to *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*.

In brief, the evolution of the various terms concerning *vāsanā* in the early Yogācāra school and the relation between them can be illustrated below:

<Table 9>

Text	Names of <i>vāsanā</i>		
SNS	—	<i>*nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā</i>	
MSA	—	<i>vāsanā</i> of <i>nimitta</i> in connection with the grasped and grasper	
MSg	<i>bhavāṅga-vāsanā</i>	<i>*ātmadrṣṭi-vāsanā</i>	<i>*abhilāpa-vāsanā</i>
TrK	<i>karmano vāsanā</i>	<i>grāhadvaya-vāsanā</i>	
TrBh	<i>vipāka-vāsanā</i>	<i>niṣyanda-vāsanā</i>	
	<i>ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā</i> (= <i>kleśāvaraṇa</i> )	<i>rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā</i> (= <i>jñeyāvaraṇa</i> )	
CWSL	<i>bīja</i> of karma	<i>bīja</i> of <i>kleśāvaraṇa</i>	<i>bīja</i> of <i>jñeyāvaraṇa</i>

To summarize, in Vasubandhu's TrK, *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* plays a subsidiary role during rebirth, where the *vāsanā* of karma serves as the cause of ripening that

取相分外無別物故。一切有情所變皆爾，依斯二分施設我、法，彼二離此無所依故。

<sup>685</sup> Cf. TrBh 38: *jñeyāvaraṇam api sarvasmin jñeye jñānapravṛttipratibandhabhūtam akliṣṭam ajñānam* |

<sup>686</sup> D no. 4070, sems tsam, hi 4a1–2: *shes bya thams cad la ye shes 'jug pa'i bar du gcod par byed pa nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i mi shes pa gzung ba dang / 'dzin pa la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags zhes bya ba gang yin pa de ni 'dir shes bya'i sgrib par 'dod do //*

projects the karmic results. In Sthiramati's TrBh, *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* constitutes defilement-hindrance and comprises both *karma-vāsanā* and a part of *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. On the other hand, *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* corresponds to knowable-hindrance and consists of *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* alone. The discussion of the *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* and *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* in the TrBh suggests that the abandonment of the twofold hindrance depends on the cessation of the two types of impregnation. By contrast, in the CWSL, Dharmapāla recognizes the person (*pudgala*) and *dharma*s as the grasper (*grāhaka*) and the grasped (*grāhya*) respectively. As a result, the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* comes to signify the *bīja* of both defilement-hindrance and knowable-hindrance. In this way, the ultimate goal of Mahāyāna practice as realizing the twofold selflessness of the person and *dharma*s seems to become concentrating only on abandoning *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. It is thus arguable that the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*, which represents the aspect of impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s, has been given increasingly greater emphasis in the development of the doctrine of mere-cognition (*vijñaptimātratā*).

### 7.3. Integrated Use of *Vāsanā* in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*

In the LAS<sup>687</sup>, which combines the developed Yogācāra doctrines and the *tathāgatagarbha* theories, various connotations of *vāsanā* were employed together harmoniously. It seems that the redactors of this scripture did not find it necessary to classify the different meanings of *vāsanā*. In other words, when the present version of LAS came into circulation, contemporary readers were expected to understand *vāsanā* as a coherent notion. At any rate, the different connotations of *vāsanā* expressed in the LAS can be summarized with their corresponding scriptural sources as follows:

#### (1) *Imprints of karma:*

{7.3A} Furthermore, O Mahāmati, because the Śrāvavaka and Pratyekabuddha Vehicles have not abandoned knowable-hindrance (*jñeyāvaraṇa*)<sup>688</sup> and imprints of karma (*karma-vāsanā*), [I] do not [teach

<sup>687</sup> The formation of the LAS is not a concern of this study. As this chapter focuses on doctrinal synthesis, I only consider the use of the term *vāsanā* in the extant Sanskrit version edited by Nanjio.

<sup>688</sup> Guṇabhadra's earliest Chinese translation (T no. 670, 497b15) puts *fánnāo zhàng* 煩惱障, namely \**klesāvaraṇa*. However, according to the context, what has not been abandoned by the Two Vehicles must be *jñeyāvaraṇa*. The other two later Chinese translations (T no. 671, 540a13–14; T no. 672,

them the doctrine of] the one Vehicle (*ekayāna*); because [they have] not realized the selflessness (*nairātmya*) of *dharma*s and not acquired the inconceivable transformational death (*acintyapariṇāmacūti*), I teach the Śrāvakas [the doctrine of] the three Vehicles.<sup>689</sup>

This is the only occurrence of *karma-vāsanā* adduced in the LAS. Both the Tibetan translation and Śikṣānanda's Chinese translation suggest that this compound should be read as a *tatpuruṣa* (imprints of karma) rather than a *dvandva* (karma and imprints).<sup>690</sup> In this context, since the unabandoned *karma-vāsanā* is used to describe the Two Vehicles, it should refer to the uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) karma that will generate their mind-made bodies (*manomaya-kāya*) responsible for transformational death (§5.5.1).

In another place in the LAS, the Tathāgatas, the bodies of Truth (*dharmakāya*) are described as having ejected the imprints (*vāsana*) of the seeking (*eṣaṇā*) with craving (*trṣṇā*) for all existence (*bhava*) and supporting means of existence (*bhavopakaraṇa*).<sup>691</sup> Given its association with existence and craving, *vāsana* in this expression seems to represent karmic imprints.

**(2) Impregnation of defilements (*kleśavāsanā*) or impregnation that is defilements:**

{7.3B} O Mahāmati, when their impregnations of all badness (*sarva-doṣa-vāsana*) have been abandoned on account of realizing the selflessness of *dharma*s, they (i.e., of the Two Vehicles) are individually awakened to the uncontaminated realm (*anāsrava-dhātu*) because the badness of impregnations (*vāsanā-doṣa*) and the rapture of meditative concentration (*samādhi-mada*) do not exist.<sup>692</sup>

This quote immediately follows {7.3A}. *Vāsanā* in this context expresses the idea of *kleśavāsanā*. Similar expressions are also seen elsewhere in the LAS such as “the

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607a21–22) show \**jñeyāvaraṇa* (智障) as seen by the Sanskrit.

<sup>689</sup> LAS 134: *punar aparaṃ mahāmate jñeyāvaraṇa-karmavāsanāprahīnatvāt sarva-śrāvaka-pratyekabuddhāṇaṃ naikayānaṃ dharmanairātmyānavabodhāc cācintyapariṇāma-cyuter aprāptitvāc ca yānatrayaṃ deśayāmi śrāvakāṇaṃ |*

<sup>690</sup> See Tib.: *las kyi bag chags* (D no. 107, mdo sde, ca 108b6); Cf. Śikṣānanda: 又彼未能除滅智障及業習氣 (T no. 672, 607a21–22).

<sup>691</sup> Schmithausen 2020, 91 (cf. LAS 255): *dharmakāyā hi Mahāmate tathāgatā... vānta-sarvabhavabhavopakaraṇatrṣṇaiṣaṇā-vāsanāḥ...*

<sup>692</sup> LAS 134: *yadā teṣāṃ mahāmate sarvadoṣavāsanāḥ prahīnā bhavanti dharmanairātmyānavabodhāt tadā te vāsanā-doṣa-samādhi-madābhāvād anāsravadhātau prativibudhyante |*



impregnation of the badness of all defilements” (*sarva-kleśa-doṣa-vāsanā*).<sup>693</sup> The juxtaposition of the conspicuously different uses of *vāsanā* in the same text suggests that the redactors of the LAS should have used the term in an integrated way.

It is interesting to note that the LAS also expressly takes *vāsanā* as a type of defilement:

{7.3C} In the fifth and sixth ground, having experienced the direct realization (*abhisamaya*) of the Vehicle of Hearers (*śrāvakayāna*), one (i.e., a Śrāvaka) who has abandoned the arising-defilements (*paryutthāna-kleśa*) but not the defilements that are impregnation (*vāsana-kleśa*), has gone to the inconceivable death...<sup>694</sup>

The defilements that are impregnation (*vāsana-kleśa*) adduced here must be the defilements in the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. As observed in §5.5.1, the mind-made body which is responsible for the inconceivable transformational death is conditioned by the *avidyā-vāsa-bhūmi*. In terms of the change of expression from *kleśa-vāsanā* (a *tatpuruṣa* compound) to *vāsana-kleśa* (a *karmadhāraya* compound), it may be well argued that *vāsanā* gradually became regarded as being equivalent to the deep-rooted fundamental defilement. This significant doctrinal change owes to the paradigm shift of the Buddhist understanding of the term *vāsanā* from traces left behind (derived from Class I verb *√vas*) to dynamic impregnation (derived from Class X verb *√vās*).

The ideas conveyed in the above two quotes are also concisely enunciated in Śloka II. 208 of the LAS: “Those [Śrāvakas] who are disconnected (*viśamyuta*) from the arising[-defilements] but are [still] bound up with (*sambaddha*) the impregnation qua defilements (*vāsanā-kleśa*), being intoxicated (*matta*) by the rapture of meditative concentration, stay in the uncontaminated realm.”<sup>695</sup>

### (3) *Impregnation of contaminated conditioned dharmas:*

{7.3D} The foolish people’s own consciousness (*svajñāna*) having transformed into twofold in the manner of being the grasped and the grasper, those which have been impregnated by the grossness (*daṣṭhulya*) that is the impregnation (*vāsanā*) of the conceptualization (*vikalpa*) qua conceptual

<sup>693</sup> Schmithausen 2020, 91 (cf. LAS 255).

<sup>694</sup> LAS 63: *yaḥ śrāvakayānābhisamayam drṣtvā śatpāñcamyām bhūmau paryutthānakleśaprahīṇo vāsana-kleśāprahīṇo ’cintyācyutigataḥ ...*

<sup>695</sup> LAS 135: *vāsanākleśasambaddhāḥ paryutthānair viśamyutāḥ | samādhimadamattās te dhātāu tiṣṭhanty anāsrave ||*

proliferation (*prapañca*) since beginningless time are not realized.<sup>696</sup>

In my overly literal translation above, I attempt to demonstrate that the LAS reflects the idea of *vāsanā* as *bīja* of conditioned *dharma*s, as seen in the YBh (§4.3). In the context of {7.3D}, *vāsanā* is a synonym for grossness, which is attested to in the VinSg (§4.3.1). On the other hand, *vikalpa-prapañca-vāsanā* reminds us of the term *vikalpa-prapañca-vastu* mentioned in the BoBh (§4.3.3), which is a doctrinal source of *\*abhiḷāpavāsanā*. Moreover, the bifurcation of *ālayavijñāna* into the grasped and the grasper also implies the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* in the TrK (§7.2.1). Taking these all together into account, *vāsanā* in {7.3D} expresses the idea of the impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s. Similarly, the LAS also proclaims, “the speech (*vāk*) derived from the conceptualization from beginningless time arises on account of the impregnation (*vāsanā*) as its own seed (*svabīja*) of the grossness of attachments (*abhiniveśa*) to conceptual proliferation from beginningless time.”<sup>697</sup> In fact, the majority of the occurrences of “*vāsanā*” that appears in the LAS are used in this sense.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the LAS does not discriminate between the ideas of karmic imprints and impregnation of conditioned *dharma*s when speaking of *vāsanā*. For instance, according to the LAS, the existence in the triple sphere (*trībhava*) is said to be caused by the grossness that is *vāsanā* of conceptualization qua conceptual proliferation from beginningless time.<sup>698</sup> Since what causes rebirths in the *saṃsāra* should be karmic, it is not unreasonable to conclude that *vāsanā* in the LAS is used in an integrated way which combines various prominent meanings of *vāsanā* in the Yogācāra and *tathāgatagarbha* texts.

#### (4) *Impression of uncontaminated dharmas:*

{7.3E} Furthermore, O Mahāmati, the momentary<sup>699</sup> *ālayavijñāna*, which is called *tathāgatagarbha*, along with *manas*, is momentary in terms of having impregnations of manifesting consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna-vāsanā*)<sup>700</sup>, [but] is not momentary in terms of having uncontaminated impressions<sup>701</sup>

<sup>696</sup> LAS 212: *dvidhā bālānāṃ grāhyagrāhakabhāvena pariṇāmya svajñānaṃ na cāvabodhyanta anādikāla-dauṣṭhulya-vikalpa-prapañca-vāsanā-vāsitāḥ* || Cf. D no. 107, mdo sde, ca 139b3.

<sup>697</sup> LAS 86: *anādikāla-vikalpa-vāk punar mahāmate anādikāla-prapañcābhiniveśa-dauṣṭhulya-svavīja-vāsanātaḥ pravartate* |

<sup>698</sup> See LAS 177: *ahaṃ bho brāhmaṇa anādikāla-prapañca-vikalpa-vāsanā-dauṣṭhulya-hetukaṃ trībhavaṃ varṇayāmi* ...

<sup>699</sup> This occurrence of *kṣaṇikam* is not found in the Tibetan and Chinese translations.

<sup>700</sup> I read both *pravṛttivijñāna-vāsanā* and *anāsrava-vāsanā* as *bahuvrīhi* compounds in this context.

<sup>701</sup> I choose to translate *vāsana* here as “impression” not only because it is doctrinally related to *śrutavāsanā* which I translate in chapter 6 as “impression of hearing” but also because it differs from the momentary “impregnations”.

(*anāsrava-vāsanā*).<sup>702</sup>

Here, the LAS employs the term *anāsrava-vāsanā*, uncontaminated impression, in place of Asaṅga's notion of \**śrutavāsanā*. According to MSg I.46, \**śrutavāsanā*, which is the outflow (*niṣyanda*) from the pure *dharmadhātu* and causes of uncontaminated *dharmas*, is mixed with the contaminated *bījas* in the *ālayavijñāna* while being separated from them, and serves as an antidote to them (§6.1.2). Instead of differentiating the contaminated *śrutavāsanā* before the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) from the uncontaminated *śrutavāsanā* on the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*), the LAS, by identifying *ālayavijñāna* with *tathāgatagarbha*, regards the *vāsanā* that is connected with the inherently pure *tathāgatagarbha* as entirely uncontaminated. In other words, since Asaṅga's idea of *śrutavāsanā* does not entail a mind that is inherently pure, *śrutavāsanā* has to be divided into two stages. By contrast, in the LAS, the *tathāgatagarbha*, which is considered to be pure in its nature, enables the non-momentary, uncontaminated *vāsanā*.

#### (5) *Habit*:

{7.3F} Sentient beings who are impregnated (*vāsita*) by the habit (*vāsanā*) of carnivorous beings' destiny of existence (*gati*), are desirous of eating meat. I and other Bodhisattvas, great beings, in another time in the future and present, would teach the Dharma for the purpose of their giving up the craving for the taste [of meat].<sup>703</sup>

In this context, *vāsanā* does not involve any philosophical significance but is used merely in a common sense of habit. In this connection, the LAS interprets from a new perspective the well-known Jātaka story about King Śivi's offering his own flesh to ransom a pigeon to be predated by a hawk, disguised by Indra: even Indra, though having acquired the sovereignty over gods, is still subject to the badness (*doṣa*) of his habits (*vāsanā*) of meat-eating in his previous lives.<sup>704</sup>

<sup>702</sup> LAS 235–36: *kṣaṇikam punar mahāmate ālayavijñānam tathāgatagarbhaḥ saṃśabditaṃ manaḥsahitaṃ pravṛttivijñāna-vāsanābhiḥ kṣaṇikam anāsrava-vāsanābhir akṣaṇikam* |

<sup>703</sup> Schmithausen 2020, 55 (cf. LAS 244): ...[a]haṃ cānye ca bodhisattvā mahāsattvā anāgatapratyutpanne kāle sattvānāṃ kravyādasattvagativāsanāvāsītānāṃ māmsabhojanagrddhānāṃ rasatṛṣṇāprahāṇāya dharmam deśayema | Another similar example is also seen in Schmithausen 2020, 74 (cf. LAS 250): *na ca Mahāmate 'nāgate 'dhvany ekeṣāṃ mohapuruṣāṇāṃ vividhavinayavikalpavādināṃ kravyādakula-vāsanāvāsītānāṃ rasatṛṣṇādhyavasītānāṃ idaṃ praṇītaṃ bhojanam pratibhāsyate* |

<sup>704</sup> See Schmithausen 2020, 77 (cf. LAS 251): *Indreṇāpi ca Mahāmate devādhipatyam prāptena bhūtvā pūrvajanmamāṃsādavāsanādoṣac chyenarūpam āsthāya kapotaveśarūpadhārī viśvakarmā*

In fact, there is room to argue that all habits are formed through repeated practice, which entails impregnation. On the other hand, the impregnation of linguistic activities, which are shaped by repeated practice, from beginningless time also constitutes a habit. Moreover, it is also arguable that these habits may bring about defilements, and thus can be regarded as *kleśavāsanā*. Therefore, various connotations of *vāsanā* appear to be intermingled in the LAS. Here, I don't mean to argue that the LAS intentionally and innovatively integrates the different meanings of *vāsanā*. Rather, I attempt to demonstrate that the later Buddhists, epitomized by the redactors of the LAS, employed the notion without noticing its different uses in history. In the same way, the term *vāsanā* that occurs in other later Buddhist texts can be analyzed.

#### 7.4. Concluding Remarks

In the MSg, three types of *vāsanā* are specified as the *vāsanā* of linguistic expression (*abhilāpa-°*), the *vāsanā* of self-view (*ātmaḍṛṣṭi-°*), and the *vāsanā* of existence-link (*bhavāṅga-°*), which respectively represent *vāsanā* of conditioned *dharma*s, *vāsanā* of defilements, and karmic *vāsanā*. By distinguishing the thoroughly consumed characteristic of karmic *vāsanā* from the unconsumed characteristic of *vāsanā* of *dharma*s, the MSg responds to the challenge of endless results of karmic ripening in the theory of karmic impregnation.

The three types of *vāsanā* in the MSg are simplified in Vasubandhu's TrK as *vāsanā* of karma (*karmaṇo vāsanā*) and *vāsanā* of twofold grasping (*grāhadvaya-vāsanā*). Accordingly, both *abhilāpa-vāsanā* and *ātmaḍṛṣṭi-vāsanā* are subsumed under the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. In the TrBh, Sthiramati also refers to the *karma-vāsanā* and *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* respectively as *vipāka-vāsanā* and *niṣyanda-vāsanā* in the context of the general continuum of an individual existence. Additionally, Sthiramati also discusses *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* and *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā*, which respectively correspond to defilement-hindrane (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and knowable-hindrane (*jñeyāvaraṇa*). *Ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* should involve both *karma-vāsanā* and a part of *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*, while *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* only belongs to *grāhadvaya-vāsanā*. It is improper to mechanically take *ātmādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* as the impregnation of a grasper (*grāhaka*), and *rūpādi-vikalpa-vāsanā* as impregnation

of the grasped (*grāhya*), because the idea of regarding the *bījas* of twofold-hindrane as the *grāhadvaya-vāsanā* is maintained only by Dharmapāla.

The LAS demonstrates integrated use of the term *vāsanā*. Various connotations of *vāsanā* can be recognized in the LAS, including karmic imprint, impregnation of defilements/ impregnation as defilements, impregnation of contaminated (*sāsrava*) conditioned *dharma*s, uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) impregnation, and habit. The fact that these connotations are interwoven in the LAS suggests that later Buddhists took the term *vāsanā* as a self-consistent notion.

## 8. Conclusion

The formation of a concept is not necessarily intentional or systematic, nor is the development of a notion strictly linear. A single Buddhist technical term may originate from multiple sources. It is very likely that, at the outset, the term *vāsanā* was employed by Buddhists in various contexts to express different connotations. The exact meaning of the term should be understood only within its specific context. It is even plausible that ancient Buddhist writers and contemporary readers were not always fully aware of the term's other connotations, which made sense in different contexts. Nevertheless, as the concept developed, a minor connotation could merge into a more dominant one. Later, when the various connotations of the homonyms became so equally prevalent and doctrinally important that they could not be ignored, Buddhist philosophers had to reconcile them. Consequently, they either listed them under a shared appellation of “*vāsanā*” (as Asaṅga did in the MŚg), or tailored one connotation to a more predominant one by introducing a new hermeneutic paradigm (as seen in the case of *kleśavāsanā* hinted in the *tathāgatagarbha sūtras*). These methods made certain favored connotations of the term interpretatively powerful enough to overshadow other minor historical meanings. As a result, later Buddhists tend to view *vāsanā* across different contexts as a single, coherent concept. However, this apparent comprehensiveness does not necessarily contribute to proper understanding the term within its historical and sectarian context. Therefore, in this book, I group similar uses of *vāsanā* together to explore how each connotation may have developed. I also seek to uncover the family resemblance between some seemingly unrelated connotations—an approach I refer to as the “genealogical method”.

This study constitutes a genealogical investigation into the development of the Buddhist concept of *vāsanā*. Rather than asking what *vāsanā* is, the primary question of this research is which type of *vāsanā* is being referenced. In Buddhist texts, the term *vāsanā* carries two literal meanings: (a) an imprint in the sense of a remaining influence or after-effect, derived from the Class I verb  $\sqrt{vas}$ , and (b) impregnating in a dynamic sense, derived from the Class X verb  $\sqrt{vās}$ . According to its practical uses in Buddhism, the primary ideas conveyed by *vāsanā* can be categorized into four aspects: (1) karmic imprints, (2) impregnation of conditioned *dharmas*, (3) traces left behind by defilements (*kleśavāsanā*) or impregnation of defilements, and (4) impression of hearing (*śrutavāsanā*). Since each chapter concludes with a summary

of these ideas, I will not repeat them here. Instead, in this final chapter, I will highlight the philosophical motifs underlying the development of these major meanings of *vāsanā*.

Although each Buddhist school contributed to the development of *vāsanā* theory, three major hermeneutic paradigms concerning *vāsanā* can be identified in this process. As we have seen, *vāsanā* was foreign to early Buddhism but emerged as a technical term around the Common Era. One major reason for its adoption may have been the Buddhist principle of momentariness (*kṣāṇikatva*). Given that an action (*karman*) performed in the past can produce present or future effects of ripening (*vipāka-phala*), Buddhists needed a way to explain how past karma, despite having ceased, could retain its causal efficacy in the present moment. For the Vibhajyavādins and early Yogācāras, the karmic continuity was explained through karmic *vāsanā*. Moreover, to account why Arhats, who have abandoned all defilements, still exhibit defilement-like behaviors, *vāsanā* was employed as an interpretative device. However, the Vaibhāṣikas, while frequently using *kleśavāsanā*, still sought to justify the notion within Sarvāstivāda doctrinal frameworks. It can be said that the Buddhist paradigm of momentariness, developed during the Abhidharma period, enabled the widespread acceptance of *vāsanā* among Buddhists. Within this paradigm, *vāsanā*, derived from  $\sqrt{vas}$ , denotes residual imprints. Also in line with this understanding is the notion of *śrutavāsanā*, a Yogācāra concept that has Abhidharmic roots.

The second paradigm emerged with the introduction of Yogācāra philosophy. During the Abhidharma period, Buddhist meditators used the term *vāsanā* to describe meditative cultivation (*bhāvanā*), through which one's *citta* acquires new qualities. When this idea shifted from the meditative context to the Yogācāra context of all *dharma*s, the meaning of *vāsanā* expanded to indicate that the qualities of *dharma*s are impregnated in one's *citta*, which contains all *bīja*s of *dharma*s. This Yogācāric interpretation of *vāsanā* must have become so prevalent that contemporary Buddhists began to understand other uses of *vāsanā* through the lens of "impregnation". For instance, even Saṅghabhadra, despite being an orthodox Vaibhāṣika, used the model of impregnation to explain *kleśavāsanā*. As a result of this paradigm shift, *vāsanā* derived from  $\sqrt{vās}$  took the place of that derived from  $\sqrt{vas}$ , becoming the predominant understanding in Buddhism. Consequently, all imprints came to be described as forming through impregnation. In this context, *vāsanā* also conveys a passive-objective sense of "the impregnated". It is in this sense that *vāsanā*, except for *kleśavāsanā*, was regarded as synonymous with *bīja*.

The third paradigm emerged from the synthesis of the Yogācāra philosophy and the *tathāgatagarbha* concept of *avidyā-vāsa(nā)-bhūmi*, which posits *vāsanā* as the source of all defilements. Under this paradigm, *vāsanā* was understood as a causal force that generates defilements, karmic results, and all *dharma*s. On the other hand, *vāsanā* was regarded as habitual energy, formed through repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) or cumulative strengthening (as exemplified in karmic impregnation). Accordingly, any impregnation (derived from √*vās*) necessarily leaves behind residual imprints (derived from √*vas*). This new theoretical paradigm integrated the various connotations of *vāsanā*, ultimately consolidating the term into a coherent notion, encompassing both contaminated (*sāsrava*) and uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) aspects. Thus, in the Mahāyānic practice, spiritual cultivation is framed as removing contaminated *vāsanā* through cultivating uncontaminated *vāsanā*.

Therefore, when deciphering the notion of *vāsanā* in a given Buddhist text, we should avoid projecting meanings from one paradigm onto a different historical context. On the other hand, as a consequence of later Buddhist masters' reinterpretation of *vāsanā* within new paradigm frameworks, the integration of different meanings took place.

Additionally, I seek to demonstrate the close connection between Abhidharma and Yogācāra. The Abhidharma discussion of karmic *vāsanā* and *kleśavāsanā* were adopted by the early Yogācāras, whose interpretations further advanced the Abhidharma theories. I have identified structural resemblances between the Abhidharmic theory of meditative impregnation and the Yogācāric theory of the impregnation of *dharma*s, as well as between the Sarvāstivāda concept of *mokṣabhāgīya* and the Yogācāra concept of *śrutavāsanā*.

It is certainly impossible to exhaustively examine every occurrence of *vāsanā* in all Buddhist texts in a single book. However, through the genealogical study presented here, I believe any previously unexamined reference to *vāsanā* in a given Buddhist text can now be discerned with greater precision.





## Appendix: Chronology of Major Scriptures

This study concerns a wide range of texts dated from before the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE to around the 7<sup>th</sup> century CE. A relative chronology of the major Buddhist scriptures examined in this book are introduced below for those who are not familiar with them.

The Pāli *Suttanipāta* is acknowledged to contain some of the earliest Buddhist materials. Jayawickrama (1976, 154–56), by examining the use of the phrase *pubbevāsanavāsītā*, estimates that the earliest limit of the composition of the *vatthu-gāthā* of the *Suttanipāta* is no earlier than the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE. Since the same passage is also found in the *Niddesa*, the *vatthu-gāthā* should have existed before the 1<sup>st</sup> century CE when the compilation of the *Niddesa* finished (Norman 1983, 87).

It is known that the schism within the Saṅgha into the Sthaviravāda and the Mahāsāṅghika occurred after the Second Buddhist Council, which took place approximately a hundred years after the demise of the Buddha.<sup>705</sup> In this regard, the Mahāsāṅghikas should have established their own *vinaya* quite early. Bareau (1962, 273) claims that the *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya*, which contains the shortest list of rules, is the most archaic. However, Hirakawa (1960, 406, 531, 588, 663) argues that the extant *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya* is just a simplified version of its original *vinaya-piṭaka*, and was compiled by a sub-sect of the Mahāsāṅghikas later than the compilation of the Pāli *vinaya* and the *Dharmaguptaka-vinaya* but earlier than the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*. Though there is scholarly controversy on when the extant *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya* was formed, this *Vinaya*, at least its initial version, is probably one of the earliest Vinaya texts.

The Mahāsāṅghikas remarkably developed their Buddhology—the ideology about the Buddha. In this backdrop, the *Mahāvastu*, a biography of the Buddha, came into being from the Lokottaravāda, a sub-sect affiliated to the Mahāsāṅghika school. Nakamura (1987, 130) suggests that the work was probably composed around the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE. According to Winternitz (1983, 238), however, it has been enlarged as late as in the 4<sup>th</sup> century CE. Hirakawa (1993, 264) points out that the *Mahāvastu*

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<sup>705</sup> I adopt the short chronology, though it does not affect my contentions in this book. The long chronology is based on the texts of the southern tradition, which place the *parinibbāna* of the Buddha 218 years before the consecration of King Aśoka. However, Obeyesekere (1991) points that the number 18 is often used in South Asian chronicles when the true figure is uncertain. In terms of the difference between 200 years and 100, Tāranātha, by quoting a certain Paṇḍita, explains that it was because those who spoke of 220 years counted a half year as one.

was a component of the Lokottaravāda *Vinaya*. In any case, the formation of the work should have been later than Mahāsāṅghika's *Vinaya*.

In the Pāli tradition, the *Peṭakopadesa* and *Nettipakaraṇa*, or *Netti* for short, are taken as the earliest post-canonical texts.<sup>706</sup> Mizuno (1959b, 456, 463) dates the *Peṭakopadesa* to before the 3<sup>rd</sup> century CE, for it was partially cited in the \**Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* 大智度論 and Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga*. Mizuno suspects that the *Netti* was composed later than the *Paṭṭhāna*, the last Theravāda *abhidhamma*, because the *Netti* contains some content found in the *Paṭṭhāna*. Ñāṇamoli (1964, xii) hold that the *Peṭakopadesa* was composed “as early as the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE or even perhaps a little earlier”. According to E. Hardy (1902, xxvii) the composition of the *Netti* is “at the time about or shortly after the beginning” of the Common Era. Mizuno (1959a, 55), followed by Hayashi (2003, 181), suggests that the *Peṭakopadesa* and *Netti* should have been established in the Indian continent during the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE. Norman (1983, 108) dates the *Peṭakopadesa* to before the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE because of an occurrence of the word *peṭakin* in some inscriptions dated to that time. The *Netti*, on the other hand, should be composed before the Common Era (*ibid.*, 110). Whereas Mizuno holds that the *Netti* is the revision of the *Peṭakopadesa*, Norman argues that the *Netti* is a rewritten version of the *Peṭakopadesa* and “neither text is a continuation of the other”. In South India, the Mahāsāṅghikas held their fundamental doctrinal treatise known as the \**Peṭaka*<sup>707</sup>.

<sup>706</sup> It has been noted by many scholars (Mizuno 1959b, 463; Bechert 1957, 352) that the *Peṭakopadesa* and *Netti* were introduced to Theravāda Buddhism from outside. Bechert (1961, 32, 81) notes that some *suttas* quoted in the *Netti* cannot be traced to the Theravāda *Tipiṭaka*. Norman (1983, 110) argues that the *Netti* has its origin in North India, because it contains verses in the *Āryā* metre that was lost in Sri Lanka. Hinüber (1996, 80) further suggests the geographical origin of these verses could be Ujjain or Avanti, where the author of the *Netti*, Kaccāyana, lived. Zacchetti (2002) draws attention to the striking similarity between the sixth chapter of the Pāli *Peṭakopadesa* and An Shigao's Chinese translation of the *Yīn chí rù jīng* 陰持入經. This fact indicates that the *Peṭakopadesa* should have been compiled in Northwest India or even Central Asia. According to Cox (2013, 37), the Gāndhārī *Saṅgītisūtra* commentary and the *Peṭakopadesa* and *Netti* share a similar terminology, commentarial explanations, supporting scriptural passages, and the interpretative technique of categorial reduction. Cox's discovery may imply the close connection between the Dharmaguptaka in Northwest India and the composition of the *Peṭakopadesa* and *Netti*.

<sup>707</sup> Wogihara ([1911] 1938, 206ff.) considers the word 毘勒 (*kūn lè*) that appears in the MPPU a typo of 毘勒 (*pí lè*), which thus corresponds to “*Peṭakopadeśa*”. On the contrary, Yinshun (1968, 17), though taking the word referring to the same text, insists that the original 毘勒 (*kūn lè*) is not necessarily a typo but the transliteration of “*karaṇḍa*”, which also means basket. In fact, Wogihara's argument is adequately convincing because in addition to the phonetic analysis, he even found its variations, 鞞勒 (*pí lè*) and 毘勒 (*pí lè*), in the Chinese documents. According to the principle of the ancient Chinese phonology, the pronunciation of 毘 (*kūn*) contains a nasal ending, which is not so likely to be transliterated as the nasalless syllable -ka- as in *karaṇḍa*. On the other hand, in terms of the second

Though the original text is lost, some arguments of the work are found scattered in the *\*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*. The *\*Peṭaka* is said to have been composed in the second century after the Buddha's demise by Mahākātyāyana, who analysed the doctrine of the Bahuśrutīya-Vibhajyavādins among the Mahāsāṅghikas.<sup>708</sup> Interestingly, in the Pāli tradition, the *Peṭakopadesa* is also said to be a work of Kaccāyana (Wogihara [1911] 1938, 210). Yinshun (1968, 16–17) suggests that such a coincidence may suggest the same origin of the two texts. Mizuno (1959b, 461), however, notes that the majority of the content of the two texts are different, despite their similarity in structure, author, and a little part of their detailed content. Yinshun (1968, 16ff.) further points out that the Mahāsāṅghika *\*Peṭaka* that prevailed in South India is equivalent to Abhidharma literature. Buddhaghosa also mentions a treatise known as the *Peṭaka* and quotes a passage from it, which, however, is not found in the Pāli *Peṭakopadesa*. It is not impossible that the *Peṭaka* mentioned by Buddhaghosa was the Mahāsāṅghika treatise. Norman (1983, 109) also raises a possibility that Buddhaghosa's quotation is from the Pāli *Peṭakopadesa* but is now missing. According to Mizuno (1959b, 462), it is very likely that there were various versions of *\*Peṭakopadeśa* as the analysis of *sūtras* in India. Considering the form of the text as a guide to *suttas*, the *Peṭakopadesa* can be regarded as being earlier than, or at least contemporary with, the Pāli Abhidhamma treatises.

The *Milindapañha* also has a relatively early origin. The text records the dialogue between Bhikkhu Nāgasena and King Milinda, who is identified as the Indo-Greek king Menandros I of Bactria. As the Menandros I is a historical person who reigned over Northwest India around the second half of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE, the work must have been composed later than that time. Its Chinese translation, *The Scripture of Nāgasena-bhikṣu*<sup>709</sup> 那先比丘經 (T no. 1670a), is estimated by modern

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character 勒 (*lè*), since there is no retroflex /ʈ/ initial in the Medieval Chinese phonetic system, it was not uncommon in the contemporary Chinese transliteration to use the dental /l/ as a substitute. As for the ending of this character, it should have borne a /k/-ending in its Medieval Chinese pronunciation—勒 (*lè*) was probably voiced as /lək/. Therefore, the character 勒 (*lè*) must have been the transliteration of the syllable *-ṭak-*, instead of *-raṇḍ-* which involves a nasal. On this point, Yinshun's hypothesis is overstretched.

<sup>708</sup> See *Sānlùn xuányì* 三論玄義 (T45, no. 1852, 9a17–21): 於二百年中，從大眾部更出一部，名多聞分別部。佛在世時，大迦旃延造論解佛阿含經，至二百年，大迦旃延(\*Mahākātyāyana)從阿耨達池(\*Anavatapta)出，更分別前多聞部中義，時人有信其所說者，故云多聞分別部。Wogihara ([1911] 1938, 211) argues that the author of the *\*Peṭaka*, Mahākātyāyana, cannot be the one who is the Buddha's disciple but should be the disciples who followed Mahākātyāyana's lineage.

<sup>709</sup> A common Sanskrit restoration of the scripture is *\*Nāgasenabhikṣu-sūtra*. However, even the Chinese translation (T nos. 1670a, 1670b) does not start from the common expression of a *sūtra*, *rūshi*

scholars (Mizuno 1959a, 30) to have been made during the late Han dynasty (2<sup>nd</sup> to 3<sup>rd</sup> century CE)<sup>710</sup> in consideration of its archaic renderings. However, the Chinese version only corresponds to part of Books I–III of the complete Pāli text (Sri Lankan edition). Therefore, scholars (Mizuno 1959a, 45; Norman 1983, 110) generally believe that the earliest portion of the *Milindapañha* should be the part corresponding to the Chinese version. Mizuno (1959a, 52–55) notes that the Sinhalese commentaries mention Nāgasena’s arguments, and thus believes the establishment of the *Milindapañha* in the Indian continent should be no later than the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE. Because the remaining parts of the Pāli *Milindapañha* contain some apparent later Theravāda doctrines, which are highly philosophical, Books IV–VIII of the scripture should have been composed later within the Pāli tradition but before the quotation by Buddhaghosa in the 5<sup>th</sup> century CE (Norman 1983, 110–11). During the period of further editing in the Theravāda tradition, the earlier part of the text was adjusted to the Theravāda tenets and the story of past lives in the prologue should also be seen as a later addition (Mizuno 1959a, 45).

In the Abhidharma period, it is first noted that scholarly discussion about the sectarian affiliation of the \**Śāriputrābhidharma-sāstra* 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (T no. 1548) remains unfixed.<sup>711</sup> Taiken Kimura (1968, 129–40) regards it as a work of the Vibhajyavādins with a close relationship to the Mahāsāṅghikas and the Vātsīputrīyas.<sup>712</sup> André Bareau (1955, 57) and Mizuno ([1966] 1997, 323, 340) hold that the work belongs to the Dharmaguptakas. Some scholars (Watanabe [1934] 1976, 8–10; Taiken Kimura 1968, 78–110; Yinshun 1968, 66–89) draw attention to the resemblance in the structure of some parts of the *Dharmaskandha*, *Vibhaṅga* and \**Śāriputrābhidharma*, etc. Yinshun (1985, 126–41; 1968, 66–72) argues that the three treatises represent the prototype of the Sthaviravāda Abhidharmas. In this regard, the \**Śāriputrābhidharma* should have been prior to the composition of the *Jñānaprasthāna* (T no. 1544). However, despite the structural similarity, it is not the

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wǒ wén 如是我聞. Therefore, I have some reservations about restoring the title with the word *sūtra*. \**Nāgasenabhikṣv-avadāna* would be a better choice, as the Chinese version starts from a story about the previous life of Nāgasena as an elephant king (\**nāga*) who encountered the Buddha.

<sup>710</sup> Traditionally, it was regarded as a translation done in the Eastern Jin 東晉 dynasty in the 3<sup>rd</sup> century CE. This version has been disproved by modern philologists (Fang 2002, 330–36).

<sup>711</sup> For different opinions about the sectarian affiliation of this treatise, see Willemen et al. 1998, 164.

<sup>712</sup> In the same manner, Willemen et al. (1998, 166) also note, “The \**Śāriputrābhidharma-sāstra* appears to be the most advanced of the three, specifically adding topics to the basic matrix of the *Dharmaskandha*, as well as certain key doctrinal points, and much more exegetical detail.”

case that all the doctrines in the \**Śāriputrābhidharma* may find their counterparts in the Abhidharma texts of other Buddhist sects. Therefore, the \**Śāriputrābhidharma* is also subject to later editing.

The *Jñānaprasthāna* is said to be compiled during the 3<sup>rd</sup> century after the Buddha's demise (Hirakawa 1993, 131), probably around 150 BCE (Yinshun 1968, 115). It was taken as the “body” (*śarīra*) treatise—the core text—of the Sarvāstivāda school<sup>713</sup>. As the *Jñānaprasthāna* was taken as a well-structured summarization of the Sarvāstivāda doctrines, many commentaries on it were composed. Vasumitra, one of the most notable commentators of the *Jñānaprasthāna*, also wrote the doxographical *Samayabhedoparacanacakra-śāstra*, which documents the history of the split of the Buddhist community and the doctrines of each Buddhist sect. The early Vātsīputrīyas composed the \**Tridharmaka-śāstra* 三法度論 (T no. 1506). The doctrines reflected in this treatise are very close to those of the Sarvāstivādins. According to the *Chū sānzàng jì jí* 出三藏記集 (T no. 2145), Saṅghasena, who made a commentary on the \**Tridharmaka-śāstra*, is mentioned among the group of Vasumitra, Saṅgharakṣa, Aśvaghoṣa and so forth.<sup>714</sup> Therefore, the \**Tridharmaka-śāstra* should have been composed earlier than the time of Aśvaghoṣa.

Among the seven Theravāda Abhidhamma treatises, the *Kathāvatthu* is the only work which is not attributed to the Buddha but to Moggaliputta Tissa, the leader of the Third Buddhist Council. According to the Southern tradition, the Third Buddhist Council took place during the reign of King Aśoka—from ca. 268 to 232 BCE (Hirakawa 1993, 95). However, this record of the date cannot be taken as historically true.<sup>715</sup> It is reported in the Pāli *Samantapāsādikā* that the *Kathāvatthu* was

<sup>713</sup> In connection with the Third Buddhist Council, it is recorded in the *Samantapāsādikā* that the director of the council, Moggaliputta Tissa, sent missionaries to various remote places in and outside the Indian subcontinent. Among them, Venerable Majjhantika was sent to the Kasmīra-Gandhāra region. (Sp i 63: *so tesam tesam bhikkhūnam bhāram katvā te te bhikkhū tattha tattha pesesi. Majjhantikatheram Kasmīra-gandhāra-raṭṭham pesesi, “tvam etaṃ raṭṭham gantvā ettha sāsanaṃ patiṭṭhāpehi”ti.* Cf. T24, no. 1462, 684c17–18.) This event probably fostered the development of the Sarvāstivāda school in Northwest India. However, the Buddhist tradition in the region of Kasmīra and Gandhāra must have been established before the mission of Majjhantika (Yinshun 1968, 110–11). In any case, the seven early Sarvāstivāda texts should have been composed later than the Third Buddhist Council.

<sup>714</sup> See T55, no. 2145, 65a29–b2.

<sup>715</sup> The *Samantapāsādikā* informs us that till the time of Moggaliputta-Tissa, there were five generations of *vinaya* masters in the Saṅgha. The lineage is given as Upāli (age of demise: 74; years of serving as a *vinaya* master: 30), Dasaka (64; 50), Sonaka/Sonaka (66; 44), Siggava (76; 55), and finally Moggaliputta-Tissa (86; 68). It can be noted that except Upāli, whose duration of serving as the Vinaya leader can be supported by other sources, all the other masters appear to be too young to become the

composed in order to refute the heretic views. However, the Pāli *Kathāvatthu* only refutes the views held by other non-Theravāda Buddhist schools without mentioning the views of non-Buddhist heretics. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that the compilation of the *Kathāvatthu* is not mentioned at all in the Chinese translation of the *Samantapāsādikā*, *Shànjiàn lǚ pípóshā* 善見律毘婆沙 (T no. 1462, \**Sudarśaṇa-vinaya-vibhāṣā*). At any rate, Hirakawa (*ibid.*, 91) argues that the *Kathāvatthu* should have been compiled probably during the last half of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE, because the views of some later Buddhist sects are also documented. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the composition of the *Kathāvatthu* was contemporary with Vasumitra.

Around the time of King Kaniṣka or even later, the Great Commentary on the *Jñānaprasthāna*, known as the \*(*Abhidharma*)-*Mahāvibhāṣā*(-śāstra) 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (T no. 1545), was compiled, which involves various opinions about the Sarvāstivāda dogmas within the school together with different standpoints from other Buddhist sects. Fukuhara (1965, 222), supported by Yinshun (1968, 212), dates the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* as ca. 150 CE, between King Kaniṣka and Nāgārjuna. With reference to Bareau's dating of the compilation of this compendia as ca. 200 CE, Deleanu (2006, 244) proposes that the formation period of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* can be placed between 150 CE to 200CE. Given that there are three Chinese translations of the *Vibhāṣā* with considerable disparities, scholars (see Cox 1995, 28) generally regard the three translations as different versions of the *Vibhāṣā* compendia. This may suggest that the compiling work of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* should have lasted for a long time. In this regard, King Kaniṣka could have supported the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* during a certain period.

In the meantime, Mahāyāna Buddhism came into existence around the 1<sup>st</sup> century BCE. The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* is believed to be one of the earliest Mahāyāna *sūtras* (Conze 1978, 1; Nakamura 1987, 159). It is generally acknowledged that the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā* 摩訶般若波羅蜜經 (T no. 223, also

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leader of the Saṅgha. This lineage, therefore, must be fabricated to meet the long chronology of the Buddha's date held by the Theravāda tradition. Since it was widely acknowledged that there are five generations of the Saṅgha from the Buddha's *parinirvāṇa* to the time of King Aśoka, in order to fit the five masters to 200 years, the Theravādins had to make the masters become the leader of the Saṅgha in their teenage. According to the Northern Tradition, Upagupta, the teacher of King Aśoka, was exactly the fifth generation of the Saṅgha. The lineage in the Northern Tradition is given as Mahākāśyapa, Ānanda, Madhyāntika, Śāṇakavāsin (/Saṃbhūta), Upagupta. See *Mahāsāṅghika-vinaya* (T22, no. 1425, 548b9–15), *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya Saṃyuktavastu* (T24, no. 1451, 410b1–8), and the \**Dharmatrāta-dhyāna* of the Sarvāstivāda school (T15, no. 618, 301c6–8).

known in Chinese as the *Dàpīn bōrě* 大品般若, corresponding to the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*) was enlarged from the *Smaller Prajñāpāramitā* 小品般若經 (T no. 227, corresponding to the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*). These two scriptures were translated multiple times into Chinese from the Late Han 後漢 dynasty to the early 11<sup>th</sup> century. There is a commentary on the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā*, known as *\*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* 大智度論 (T no. 1509). According to the Chinese tradition, the author of the work is attributed to Nāgārjuna (ca. 150–250 CE), the author of the *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*. Though this attribution is questioned by some scholars (Lamotte 1944, xi–xiv), at least, this work should have been composed during the 2<sup>nd</sup> to 3<sup>rd</sup> century CE. Additionally, according to modern scholars (Nakamura 1987, 195), in approximately 50–150 CE, the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, as a section of the *Avataṃsaka-sūtra*, was compiled. It is also in around the mid-2<sup>nd</sup> century CE that the *Lalitavistara* came into existence (He 2012, 3–10). Vaidya (1958, ix) notes that some *gāthās* in the *Lalitavistara* “appear to be more archaic than the corresponding prose in Pali”. However, Okano (1987, 107) argues that the extant Sanskrit version of the *Lalitavistara* and Divākara’s Chinese translation (683 CE) should have been enlarged on an earlier version, as seen in Dharmarakṣa’s Chinese translation (308 CE). Some scholars believe that the finalization of this work may date to the 3<sup>rd</sup> or 4<sup>th</sup> century CE.<sup>716</sup>

Aśvaghōṣa should have been a Sarvāstivāda Dārṣṭāntika but was venerated as a Bodhisattva by Mahāyānist (Yinshun 1968, 338–39). In addition, Eltschinger (2020, 100) suggests that Aśvaghōṣa belonged to “a certain (non-Kashmirian?) Sarvāstivāda community that later came to regard itself as Mūlasarvāstivāda.” Yinshun (1968, 324–25) notes that some of Aśvaghōṣa’s opinions were cited in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* without mentioning his name. According to the traditional description<sup>717</sup>, Aśvaghōṣa, being contemporary with King Kanīṣka, participated in the compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Accordingly, Aśvaghōṣa’s *Buddhacarita* and *Saundarananda* should have been composed around the beginning of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century. As noted by Yinshun (1968, 366–37) and Yamabe (2003, 243), the Dārṣṭāntikas, including Aśvaghōṣa, could be at the same time *dhyāna*-masters/meditators, also known as the “*yogācāras*” (瑜伽師). This group of people were the pioneers of the

<sup>716</sup> *The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism* (2014), s.v. “Lalitavistara”.

<sup>717</sup> T50, no. 2049, 189a21–25: 迦旃延子遣人往舍衛國，請馬鳴為表文句。馬鳴既至闕賓，迦旃延子次第解釋八結，諸阿羅漢及諸菩薩即共研辯，義意若定，馬鳴隨即著文。經十二年造毘婆沙方竟，凡百萬偈。



Mahāyāna Yogācāra school (Kodama 1997, 485–88; Deleanu 2006, 156–59).

Almost at the end of the final compilation of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, the Śrāvaka *yogācāras* started to compose the *Śrāvakabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Approximately some decades afterwards, under the influence of the Mahāyāna ideology, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* started to be compiled. Schmithausen (1987, 14) noticed that these two *bhūmis* together with the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* do not contain the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*. He thus distinguishes three main historical layers of the *Yogācārabhūmi*: (1) the portions where *ālayavijñāna* was not concerned, as said above; (2) the rest of the Basic Section (*Maulī Bhūmi*), where *ālayavijñāna* occurs sporadically but no reference to the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* is made; (3) the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* where *ālayavijñāna* is expatiated, with the quotation of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. According to him, the formation of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* falls between the second and the third layers of the development of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Based on Schmithausen's stratification of the text, Deleanu (2006, 155–95) further divides the compilation of the *Yogācārabhūmi* into six phases and provides a more detailed hypothetical chronology. According to him, the *Śrāvakabhūmi* was compiled during ca. 200–270CE, and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* ca. 230–300. During ca. 270–340, the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* was the earliest text that was compiled in this phase, and then the remaining part of the *Maulī Bhūmi* and the other two *Samgrahaṇīs* excluding the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* came into being. The formation of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* took place during ca. 300–350. Shortly afterwards, in ca. 320–350, the early parts of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, especially including the *Viniścaya* of *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi* and *Manobhūmi*, came to be compiled without any reference to the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. After the formation of the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*, the final part of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* was composed with the citation of the entire *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*. In around 380 CE, the compilation of the *Yogācārabhūmi* completed. Asaṅga might have participated in the final redaction of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. By and large, the order of my investigation in this book follows Deleanu's periodization.

In parallel with the compilation of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Maitreya-nātha (ca. 270–350) might have composed both the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (Ui 1963, 537). As the similarity in structure between the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* are noticed (Ui 1958, 43–81), the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* should have been composed after the compilation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. On the other hand, as some of the ideas in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Madhyāntavibhāga* seem to differ from those in the

*Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (Ui 1935, 386; Yokoyama 1971, 44–45), the two works related to Maitreya may have been composed simultaneously with the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. As for the *Bhāṣya* portion, it is acknowledged that Asaṅga authored the commentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and Vasubandhu the commentary on the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. On the issue of the authorship of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, some scholars hold that the *kārikā* portion should be attributed to Asaṅga and the *Bhāṣya* to Asaṅga or Vasubandhu (see Odani 1978, 9–11). D’amato (2005, 186) denies the attribution of *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*’s authorship to both Maitreya and Asaṅga. Instead, he only hypothesizes that “earlier strata of the MSA were compiled, redacted, added to, and commented upon by one person,” who produced the final recension of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya*. Nevertheless, as I have observed in §4.3.2, the *Bhāṣya* of the treatise does not always loyally reflects the thoughts expressed in its *kārikā* portion. Yokoyama (1971, 44) suggests that the *kārikā* portion of the *Madhyāntavibhāga* is more systematical and thus later than that of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*. At any rate, since the doctrines in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Madhyāntavibhāga* are remarkably similar, we may at least take the two treatises as belonging to the same doctrinal tradition in connection with Maitreya. Additionally, based on the *Yogācārabhūmi*, Asaṅga composed the *Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn* 顯揚聖教論. Though this work is not mentioned in the Tibetan tradition, according to Ui (1958, 13), the *kārikā* portion should be attributed to Asaṅga and the commentary portion probably to Vasubandhu.

In the meantime, the Ābhidharmikas in Northwest India continued to develop. In around the mid-3<sup>rd</sup> century, Dharmavijaya<sup>718</sup> composed the *\*Abhidharma-hṛdaya(-śāstra)* 阿毘曇心論 (T no. 1550) based on the *\*Abhidharmāmṛtarasa-śāstra* (Yinshun 1968, 488, 493). Fukuhara (1965, 395) and Willemen et al. (1998, 256) maintain that the *\*Abhidharma-hṛdaya* is earlier than the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. On the contrary, according to Yinshun’s study (1968, 488–89), the *\*Abhidharma-hṛdaya* was composed later than the *Mahāvibhāṣā* because *\*Dharmavijaya* should be later than Nāgārjuna. Yinshun also points out that the doctrinal positions in the *\*Abhidharma-hṛdaya* are somewhat in line with the Dārṣṭāntikas. Upaśānta, then, composed the *\*Abhidharmahṛdaya-vṛtti* (?) 阿毘曇心論經 (T no. 1551), a commentary on the *\*Abhidharma-hṛdaya*. Willemen et al. (1998, 259) suggests that Upaśānta is probably a Sautrāntika. In around the early second half of the 4<sup>th</sup> century,

<sup>718</sup> For the Sanskrit restoration of the name, see Kudara 1982, 374. Earlier restorations of this author include Dharmasreṣṭhin and Dharmasrī.

ca. 350–380 CE (Nakamura 1987, 108; Yinshun 1968, 519), Dharmatrāta from Gandhāra composed the *\*Miśrakābhīdharmahṛdaya* (T no. 1552), which must have been referred to by Vasubandhu while composing the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (Taiken Kimura 1968, 242–62).

The date of Vasubandhu is scholarly controversial. Some scholars, such as Taiken Kimura (1968, 234), assert that Vasubandhu must be as late as the 5<sup>th</sup> century. Ui (1932, 387), however, argues that Vasubandhu lived in the 4<sup>th</sup> century. Yinshun (1988, 243), based on the history of Chinese translation of Buddhist scriptures, dates Vasubandhu to 361–440 CE. The debate concerning Vasubandhu's date also concerns Frauwallner's two Vasubandhu theory, which was denied by Jaini (1959). Schmithausen (1992) argues that the prose part the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* must have cited from Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā Kārikā*, and this citation appears in Guṇabhadra's earliest Chinese translation of the *sūtra* in 443 CE. Based on Schmithausen's textual study, Deleanu (2006, 186–194), while taking the history of India into account, dates Vasubandhu to 350–430 CE. Therefore, the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* should have been composed in the late 4<sup>th</sup> century. No later than the beginning of the 5<sup>th</sup> century, the *\*Nyāyānusāra/Nyāyānusāriṇī* 順正理論 (T no. 1562) was written as a critique of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* by Saṅghabhadra, a Vaibhāṣika contemporary with Vasubandhu. The *Abhidharmadīpa* with its auto-commentary *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* is another commentary that criticizes the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* from the Vaibhāṣika standpoint. Li (2012, 3) notes that in the colophon of the manuscript of this treatise, the *Abhidharmadīpa* is attributed to Īśvara, whose name was also mentioned by Xuanzang as the author of the *\*Abhidharmapradīpa*. According to Li, though the author of the *Vṛtti* portion is not certain, at least the *Abhidharmadīpa* should have been composed between Vasubandhu and Xuanzang. Other important commentaries on the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* used in the present study include the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya-ṭīkā Tattvārthā* attributed to Sthiramati and Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*. According to Ui (1965, 136), the date of Sthiramati is 470–550 CE. As Yaśomitra is unknown to Xuanzang, Yaśomitra is probably a Sautrāntika later than the mid-7<sup>th</sup> century. Although it is not certain whether the author of the *Tattvārthā* is the same Sthiramati who composed the *Triṃśikāvijñāptibhāṣya*, Yaśomitra's *Vyākhyā* must have referred to the more succinct *Tattvārthā*, because similarities in wording and arguments can be noted between the two texts. At any rate, all of these three commentaries made references to Saṅghabhadra's *\*Nyāyānusāra*. Legend has it, when the *\*Nyāyānusāra* was submitted to Vasubandhu, Vasubandhu had already converted to a Mahāyāna

Yogācāra. One of the works composed during Vasubandhu's conversion is the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*. Additionally, once the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* was translated into Chinese by Xuanzang, Puguang 普光 and Fabao 法寶 authored their respective commentaries in the 7<sup>th</sup> century.

Probably contemporary with Vasubandhu or even earlier (Fukuhara 1969, 4), Harivarman composed the *\*Tattvasiddhi(-śāstra)* 成實論 (T no. 1646)<sup>719</sup>. The sectarian affiliation of the *\*Tattvasiddhi* is controversial (*ibid.*, 25–52). The close doctrinal connection between the *\*Tattvasiddhi* and the Dārṣṭāntikas is noted by Mizuno (1931). According to the *Chū sānzàng jì jí*, Harivarman had learned *\*Kātyāyanaputra's* Great Abhidharma (probably Kātyāyanīputra's *Jñānaprasthāna*) of the Sarvāstivāda school from Kumāralāta and later studied Vaipulya scriptures with a Mahāsāṅghika monk in Pāṭaliputra.<sup>720</sup>

Around the second half of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century, the *Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-nirdeśa*, also known as *Śrīmāla-sūtra*, probably came into existence among the Mahāsāṅghikas in Andhra, South India (Wayman and Wayman 1990, 3; Kagawa 1956, 196). Some scholars (Nakamura 1987, 230) propose the time of the formation of a group of *tathāgatagarbha sūtras* as between 350 and 400 CE. At any rate, the *Śrīmāla-sūtra* was translated into Chinese at earliest by Guṇabhadra in 436 CE. Because the *Śrīmāla-sūtra* does not contain any typical Yogācāra doctrines but was cited in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya* (Takasaki 1974, 350), the compilation of the *sūtra* should be before Aśaṅga.

Around 200 years later, in the 5<sup>th</sup> century (Ui 1965, 138), under the direct influence from the *Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-nirdeśa*, the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, also known as the *Mahāyanottaratantra-śāstra*, and *The Mahāyāna Treatise on the Non-differentiation of the Dharmadhātu* 大乘法界無差別論 (T nos. 1626 and 1627) are composed. Strictly speaking, in the *Ratnagotravibhāgo Mahāyanottaratantra-śāstra*, some *kārikās* classified within the *śloka*-group were likely composed earlier, and constitute the proto-text of the treatise. These earliest *ślokas*, some of which show no influence of Yogācāra terminology, should be distinguished from the *ślokaṛthasaṃgraha* and *ślokaṛthavyākhyā* parts of the *Ratnagotravibhāga-vyākhyā* (Takasaki 1966, 10–19; 1989, 389–93; Schmithausen 1971). The Tibetan tradition

<sup>719</sup> Also restored as *\*Satyasiddhiśāstra*. Other restorations of this treatise's title according to a single Japanese record, including *\*Janakaparamopadeśa* (Yao 2005, 98) and *\*Jñānakāyaprodhūtopadeśa* (Willemen 2006b, 248), seems not to be very convincing.

<sup>720</sup> See T55, no. 2145, 78c3–79a20. See also Mizuno 1931, 137.

attributes the *Ratnagotravibhāga* to Maitreya and its *Vyākhyā* to Asaṅga, whereas the Chinese tradition attributes the entire text to Sāramati. Takasaki (1966, 62; 1989, 394–97) suggests that the Maitreya probably composed the original *ślokas* and the *uddāna* verses, and Sāramati, a contemporary of Vasubandhu, authored the *Vyākhyā* commentary and *The Mahāyāna Treatise on the Non-differentiation of the Dharmadhātu*. Takasaki (1966, 33) also notes that while the *Ratnagotravibhāga* quotes from the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, it does not involve the typical Yogācāra doctrines such as the three natures and eight consciousnesses and so on.

Additionally, it was also in the 5<sup>th</sup> century that Buddhaghosa, the renowned Theravada commentator, composed a number of Pāli treatises including the *Visuddhimagga*, and the *Sāratthappakāsinī*, a commentary on the *Samyutta Nikāya*.

More advanced Yogācāra theories were developed by Asaṅga in his *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and *Mahāyānasamgraha*. Scholars (Suguro 1989, 534; N. Funahashi 1991, 33) have not reached consensus on the issue that which of the two works was composed earlier. At any rate, these two treatises must have been written after the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (Suguro 1989, 549; N. Funahashi 1991, 30). There are two commentaries on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*—one is written by Vasubandhu and the other by Asvabhāva. Ui (1965, 146–47) notes that Asvabhāva's commentary, which makes reference to Dignāga, served as a referential basis of the *Chéng wéishí lùn* 成唯識論 (T no. 1585). Thus, the date of Dharmapāla should be around 450–530 CE. Furthermore, there is a Sanskrit commentary on the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, known as the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya*. Its author is probably Buddhasiṃha, a disciple of Asaṅga (Shinoda 1970, 882). This *Bhāṣya* is believed to have been combined with Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* by Sthiramati. The result of the compilation is dubbed as *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā*, which is found in both the Chinese and the Tibetan Canons.

It is known that Vasubandhu composed the *Triṃśikā-kārikā* in his late years. Before the mid-6<sup>th</sup> century, Sthiramati wrote the *Triṃśikāvijñapti-bhāṣya* as a commentary on Vasubandhu's verses. Another commentary, which is of great importance for Buddhism in East Asia, is Dharmapāla's *\*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. It was composed around the mid-6<sup>th</sup> century (Ui 1965, 130–32), after Sthiramati's *Triṃśikāvijñapti-bhāṣya*. Dharmapāla's work also makes references to the *Śrīmāla-sūtra* and *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*. Only the Chinese translation by Xuanzang is preserved, known as the *Chéng wéishí lùn*. Xuanzang admits that his translation is mainly based on Dharmapāla's commentary, and is inclusive of the main opinions held by the ten commentators of the *Triṃśikā-kārikā* at that time. Xuanzang's disciple Ji 基 authored

the *Chéng wéishí lùn shùjì* 成唯識論述記, which provides more details about the doctrines and histories concerned in the *Chéng wéishí lùn*.



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Translated by Gupta and Xingju 行矩. T no. 1596.

*Shè dàshèng lùn zhāng* 攝大乘論章. T no. 2807.

*Shèlìfú āpítán lùn* 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (\**Śāriputrābhidharma*). Translated by  
Dharmayaśas and Dharmagupta. T no. 1548.

*Shēnmì jiětuō jīng* 深密解脫經 (*Samdhinirmocanasūtra*). Translated by Bodhiruci.  
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*Shèngmán jīng shùjì* 勝鬘經述記. Ji. X no. 352.

*Shèngmán jīng yì jì* 勝鬘經義記. Huiyuan. X no. 351.

*Shèngmán shīzǐhǒu yīshèng dà fāngbiàn fāngguāng jīng* 勝鬘師子吼一乘大方便方  
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*Sì āhánmù chāojiě* 四阿含暮抄解. Translated by Kumārabuddhi. T no. 1505.

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