

WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE
HEFT 94

Margherita Serena Saccone

ON THE NATURE OF THINGS
A BUDDHIST DEBATE ON
COGNITIONS AND THEIR OBJECT

With a Manuscript Description
by Paolo Giunta



ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN
WIEN 2018

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GEGRÜNDET VON
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HERAUSGEGEBEN VON
BIRGIT KELLNER, KLAUS-DIETER MATHES
und MICHAEL TORSTEN MUCH

HEFT 94

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Dedicated to

Anna Vitagliano (1948–1996)
My Mother

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Preface and Acknowledgements

Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest
non radii solis neque lucida tela diei discutiant,
sed naturae species ratioque.
(Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*)

Thus, it is not the rays of the sun nor
the brilliant darts of the day that will dispel
this terror and darkness of the mind and soul,
but the appearance and inner logic of nature.

The present work consists of three distinct yet complementary parts: the Introduction, the Bahirarthaparīkṣā and the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*. The Introduction contains an analysis of the Buddhist debate on cognitions and their object in the 8th century as portrayed in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* by Śāntarakṣita and the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* by Kamalaśīla. This is followed by a critical edition of that chapter accompanied by an annotated English translation and, finally, 4 appendices on Śubhagupta and his main work, the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*.

The Introduction, in particular, is an investigation into how Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla present this debate by means of a constant criticism of the views of Śubhagupta, a contemporary and fellow Buddhist. In the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*, Śubhagupta attacks the standpoints of the great masters of the logico-epistemological tradition, the very tradition which he himself appears to belong. He specifically criticizes the view of *vijñaptimātratā* (mere cognition), which posits that external objects do not exist independently of their cognitions. It is precisely to defend (and prove) this view that Śāntarakṣita and (especially) Kamalaśīla introduce their refutation of Śubhagupta's several arguments against Vasubandhu, Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti. They do so in a chapter, the Bahirarthaparīkṣā, which is largely centered around their polemic against him and his work.

In this book, the Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter is the object of a new critical edition as well as English translation. These are based on what was originally my doctoral thesis, submitted at the University of Turin. The thesis has been significantly revised and enlarged. Particularly, the critical edition has profited from the attainment (thanks to Hiroko Matsuoka) of high resolution photographs of the Jaisalmer manuscripts, the *codices unici* on which my edition mostly relies. Better quality photographs were also provided by Paolo Giunta and Matsuoka of the Pāṭan manuscripts. These are the *codices descripti*

of the Jaisalmer manuscripts. As is known, the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *pañjikā* have already been edited twice in their entirety: in 1926 (Krishnamacharya's *editio princeps*) and in 1968 (Śāstrī edition). Neither of them (for very different reasons) can be regarded as sufficiently reliable. My edition has greatly benefited from direct access to the only extant witnesses of the Sanskrit text as well as a deep analysis of the Tibetan translations. All the variants found in the manuscript sources and in the printed editions have been carefully recorded. I have tried, when possible, to discuss the choice of readings. Additionally, references to parallel passages have been provided along with the glosses (the edition of which is given at the end of the Sanskrit text). The scribe who inserted them, being acquainted with logic and the doctrines expounded, offers very useful comments on the text. The chapter has been translated a few times in Japanese. To the best of my knowledge, there is only one English translation of the whole chapter (Jha 1939), which is in fact, in many parts, just a paraphrase and in no way close to the actual text. Explanatory notes on the argumentations or the philosophical issues at stake have been added in some parts.

The Introduction is the result of further research on Śubhagupta and his **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* as well as the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā*. Particularly, some paragraphs are based on my work regarding the (unpublished) critical edition and English translation of another chapter, the *Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā*. This was made possible thanks to a post-doctoral position at the University of Naples "L'Orientale." The third part is indeed the fruit of that research, specifically appendix 3 and 4, which provide a Tibetan edition and English Translation of about 60 *kārikās* of Śubhagupta's work. A few of them are quoted or referred to in the TS and the TSP. They are all included in Appendix 1 (and discussed throughout the book). The **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* was inadequately translated into English by Shastri (1967); and into Japanese (albeit only partly) by Mikogami. The latter scholar also produced a critical edition (1986), which needed some improvements as well. Based on this, as well as the Derge and Peking editions, I have provided a Tibetan text with some emendations that reflect my understanding of Śubhagupta's views and my translation of the verses into English. Appendix 2, moreover, offers a survey of the (rather few) scholars who have devoted their attention to this greatly overlooked philosopher.

The reviewing of (many) provisional drafts of this book has taken place (and has been made possible) while I was employed at the Austrian Academy of Sciences as a research fellow. Many of my colleagues there have provided me with hints that made the present version what it is. This has immensely facilitated my work.

My first heartfelt acknowledgement goes to Francesco Sferra, my guru and friend, who has followed this work since its very inception and has very generously given me the precious gifts of his time, energy and extensive knowledge. In all these years, his contribution to my research and growth as a scholar has been invaluable. By no means, would this book be as it is today without his help.

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For several reasons, this book reflects the state of research through mid-2016. Due to time constraints, I regret not having been able to consult any works published after that date. Many of the Japanese articles in the bibliography have been consulted only cursorily and via translation.

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**Anyāpohavicāraṇikā*

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ĀP/ĀPV

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BASK

**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* (Śubhagupta):

D: *Phyi rol gyi don grub pa zes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, no. 4244, tshad ma, *ze* 189b₃–196b₁.

P: *Phyi rol gyi don grub pa zes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, no. 5742, tshad ma, *ze* 199b₈–207b₇.

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Jk

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PVP

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PVSV

Svavṛtti to PV Svārthānumāna (Dharmakīrti): see PV (Svārthānumāna).

PVṬ

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ŚV ŚūV

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

1.

The Importance of the Bahirarthaparīkṣā Chapter in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*

In the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition,¹ the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS)² by Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788) and its commentary, the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (TSP)³ by Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795), are two pivotal works.⁴ They both consist of 26⁵ “chapters,”⁶ each of them analyzing a particular philosophical subject and introducing the views of Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist opponents. By refuting these views, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla aim to prove a definitive Buddhist standpoint on each topic.

The scope and intended audience of these works has yet to be entirely established.⁷ The most viable thesis is that they were intended as a pedagogical tool to instruct Buddhist monks in the art of public debate.⁸

¹ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are generally considered two thinkers belonging to the later Indian Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. Regarding their doctrinal affiliation, cf. n. 15. While the nature of Madhyamaka works is quite evident in other works of theirs, as we shall see (cf. also n. 22), it is more debatable with respect to the TS and the TSP. Regardless, they clearly present themselves as works that summarize and develop doctrines and argumentations from the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition.

² The TS was likely composed before 763 (Frauwallner 1961: 143; Krasser 1992: 157).

³ The TSP was likely composed ca. 780 (Schmithausen 1965: 216 n. 150; Krasser 1992: 157).

⁴ For a recent account of the historiography of this school, cf. Eltschinger 2014: 154–168.

⁵ This is the total number given in the two editions, K and Ś, which also always introduce the two works together, although in a different fashion. For the total number and the location of single *parīkṣās* in the manuscripts, see Manuscripts and Editions of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*.

⁶ As noted by McClintock (2010: 47), several scholars believe that the two works were, in fact, just a collection of unrelated *parīkṣās* on different subjects. Specifically, in this respect, she quotes Chatterji 1988: i. I follow her lead in assuming that these chapters, with a self-declared overall purpose and numerous instances of self-referentiality, are parts of a whole — a mega-sentence (*mahāvākya*), as Kamalaśīla calls it in his commentary on the introductory verses of the TS. On this passage, see McClintock 2010: 47–48 n. 114.

⁷ An extensive analysis of the audience, style of reasoning, structure and purposes of the TS and the TSP is undertaken by McClintock (2010: 47–111).

⁸ Cf. McClintock 2010: 56. On Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s lives and works, see Vidyabhusana 1921: 323–328; Bhattacharya 1926: X–LIII; Tucci 1958: 5–49; Frauwallner 1961: 141–144; Seyfort Rugg 1981: 88–99. For the traditional account of Śāntarakṣita’s life, see Obermiller 1932: 187–191 and Roerich 1949: 41–44. On Kamalaśīla’s life and works, see also Keira 2004: 1–9. Eltschinger (2014: 160 n. 209) describes the TS and the TSP as “a digest aimed at introducing, in a strongly apologetic vein, Buddhist students to the main doctrines, arguments and targets of the logico-epistemological school.” In this respect, see Kamalaśīla’s commentary on the introductory verses of the TS: *ekatra hi saṅkṣiptasya tattvasya pratīpattulī ekatra hi saṅkṣiptasya tattvasya pratīpattulī sukhēnodgraho jāyate, duḥkheṇa tu viprakīrṇasyeti kṛtvā sukhodgrahakāraṇaṃ saṅgrahaṃ saṅgrahaśabdena pratīpādayaṃs tattvasukhāboddhārtham idam*

As declared by Kamalaśīla himself, their purpose⁹ is also to aid the cultivation of *cintāmayī prajñā*,¹⁰ insight born of reflection.¹¹ Accordingly, through these works, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla intend to help their audience distinguish true views from false ones¹² and, linked to this, to strengthen certain Buddhist doctrines through reasoning, both in order to defeat opponents and to defend the word of the Buddha.¹³ In this sense, the

*ārabhyata iti prakāśayati | [...] tasmāt pūrvācāryaiḥ pratipādītāny api tattvāni yo mandadhīr
ativiprakīrṇatayā sukham avadhārayitum aśaktaḥ, taṃ prati sukhāvadhāraṇāyā tattvasaṅgraha ārabhyamāṇo
na viphalatām eśyatīti manyamānaḥ śāstram idam ārabhate |* (TSP, ed. p. 11, 6–8, 11–13).

⁹ On the *prayojana* of the work according to Kamalaśīla, in particular, see Funayama 1995 and McClintock 2010 (specifically, 105–111).

¹⁰ Cf. *sa cāsmād aviparītapratītyasamutpādasamprakāśakāc chāstrāc chravanacintābhāvanākramenopajayata
ity ato 'vagamyata eva tattvasaṅgrahakriyāto jagaddhītam api sampadyata iti |* (TSP ad TS 1–6, ed. p. 12, 4–6). “And that [non-error] is produced from this treatise, which non-erroneously expounds the dependent origination, through the succession of [insights born of] hearing, reflection and realization. Therefore, one [should] indeed understand that also the benefit of the world is obtained from the action of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*.” This passage is also mentioned in McClintock 2010: 107–108 and n. 294. She notes that, according to Kamalaśīla, one of the aims of the treatise, which is the subsequent result of having understood it, is attaining the “benefit of the world” (*jagaddhīta*), which consists in elevation (*abhyudaya*) and “the highest good” (*nīḥśreyasa*). Specifically regarding the latter, Kamalaśīla states: *pudgaladharmānāirātmayāvabodhaś ca nīḥśreyasaḥetuḥ śrutacintābhāvanākramenotpadyate |* (TSP ad TS 1–6, ed. p. 13, 5–6). “And the understanding of the selflessness of the *pudgala* and *dharma*s, [which is] the cause of the highest good, arises through the succession of hearing, reflection and realization.” However, quoting a larger portion of this same passage from the TSP, Eltschinger (2014: 171–172) argues that Kamalaśīla, along with Dīnāga (for the PS) and Dharmakīrti (for the PVin), “hold epistemology (i.e., the composition of treatises such as the PS, the PVin and the TS) to answer polemical needs.” All of them regard the purpose of logic/dialectics (*hetuvidyā*) as the defeat of opponents. Kamalaśīla’s passage also suggests that dialectics is for defending the Buddhist Law. Moreover, “Dīnāga, Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla agree in denying epistemology any soteriological value whatsoever, provided one is not under the sway of epistemological misconceptions.”

¹¹ For this translation and the concept of *cintāmayī prajñā*, see Eltschinger 2014: 318–328 and Eltschinger 2010a.

¹² Cf. *tataś cintāmayyā prajñayā nītaneyārthatayā nirvedhayati | tatas tayā nīścitya bhūtam arthaṃ bhāvayen
nābhūtam | anyathā hi viparītasyaāpi bhāvanād vicikitsāyāś cāvyaṇagamat samyagjñānodayo na syāt | tatas
ca vyarthaiva bhāvanā syāt | yathā tīrthikānām | uktam ca bhagavatā — nairātmyadharmān yadi
pratyaवेक्ष्यते tān pratyaवेक्ष्यya yadi bhāvayeta | sa hetu nirvāṇaphalasya prāptaye yo anyahetu na sa bhoṭi
sāntaye [Samādhirājasūtra 9.37] | | iti |* (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 9, 18–10, 5). “Therefore, through the insight born of reflection, he penetrates [the meaning of the scriptures] as being explicit or implicit. Hence, having ascertained through that, he can meditate on the real meaning, not the false one. For, otherwise, because one also meditates on what is false and the doubt is not removed, there cannot be the arising of correct knowledge. And, therefore, the meditation would be completely purposeless, like [that] of the heretics. And this is said by the Bhagavān [in the *Samādhirājasūtra*]: ‘If he sees the selfless *dharma*s, if, having seen them, he meditates on them, this is the cause for the attainment of the fruit that is *nirvāṇa*; what is another cause does not [lead] to peace.’”

¹³ With reference to the *cintāmayī prajñā*, Kamalaśīla states: *yuktyā hi sthīrikṛtasyāgamārthasānyair
apohitum aśakyatvāt | ato yuktvyāpi pratyaवेक्षणीyam |* (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 11, 4–5). “Since the asaking of the scriptures that is confirmed indeed by reasoning cannot be denied by the opponents, one must therefore investigate also by means of reasoning.” Eltschinger

TS and the TSP represent both a manual of dialectics for Buddhist monks¹⁴ and a means for the two authors to demonstrate, once and for all, the truth of the doctrines of their school.¹⁵

The eighth century represented the peak of a fruitful period in the development of Buddhist and non-Buddhist doctrines of various schools. Accordingly, the need for internal coherence must have been keenly felt in light of the challenge of “orthodox Brahmanical hostility.”¹⁶ As a result, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are determined to reinforce and systematize

(2010a: 462–463) notes that, starting from the mid-sixth century, *yukti*, connected with *cintāmayī prajñā*, intended for investigating and demonstrating key-concepts of Buddhism, and *hetuvidyā*, meant to defeat and convert non-Buddhist opponents, had merged with one another.

¹⁴ On this, cf. Eltschinger’s claim (2014: 173) that Buddhist epistemologists, including Kamalaśīla (whom he had indeed mentioned before, along with Diinnāga and Dharmakīrti) and Śāntarakṣita, were *institution-based literati* responsible for Buddhist apologetics; they were, however, not interested in converting masses.

¹⁵ According to Bu ston (*Chos ’byun*, fol. 103a vol. 24, 836; Obermiller 1932: 135), Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are classified as Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (in Tibetan: rNal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma). This means that they advocate for the conventional reality of the Vijnānavāda and the ultimate reality of the Madhyamaka, proposing independent arguments to prove both. On this, cf., e.g., Seyfort Ruegg (1981: 87–100). On the central tenets of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s thought, cf. Ichigō 1985b: LX–XCVII and Keira 2004: 1–2 n. 3. Ichigo (1985b: XCVIII n. 2) notes that, in the MAP, Kamalaśīla defines the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and the Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka as the “two paths of the Mādhyamika.” On their position according to other Tibetan scholars, cf. Mimaki 1982a: 27–38. With reference to Śāntarakṣita’s Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis, see also Blumenthal (2004: 41–51). On the different doctrinal standpoints presented in the TS and the TSP, cf. §3.2.

¹⁶ Referring to this historical period, Eltschinger (2014: 190) argues that “the collapse of the Gupta Empire coincided not only with the rise of new sociopolitical structures and economic conditions, but also with the affirmation of orthodox Brahmanical hostility toward Buddhism as well as the religio-political (and hence economic) success of Śaivism. [...] The response was [...] twofold. Whereas Buddhist epistemology was meant to meet the challenges of Brahmanical hostility grounded in philosophical arguments, Buddhist Tantrism coalesced in order to provide those in position of power with the same kind of religio-political services as the Śaiva ritual repertoire offered. Both reactions were motivated by, and directed against, distinct aspects of the non-Buddhist environment. Both involved renewed supersectarian identities that defined themselves in relation to the non-Buddhists rather than dissenting coreligionists.” On the rise of Śaivism in the early medieval period and on the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism under the Pāla dynasty at the end of the eighth century and after, see Sanderson 2009. According to Davidson (2002: 75–112), who discusses the rise of Tantric Buddhism, after flourishing in the Gupta period, in the eighth century Buddhism was facing a period of crisis at both an institutional and an ideological level. This was due to attacks from without as well as challenges from within (Davidson 2002: 75), and resulted in a loss of patronage (in favor of Saivism). Moreover, Davidson (2002: 99–105) describes the Madhyamaka-Prāsaṅgika views, which he simply defines as Skepticism, as the cause of ethical precepts being abandoned, particularly by monks, and adherence to Buddhist doctrines at the philosophical level becoming looser. He also regards the sharp turn to epistemology, starting with Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti, as the validation standards that had arisen and matured within the Brahmanical orthodoxy being adopted.

their doctrinal system¹⁷ and establish a hierarchy of true Buddhist doctrines on the basis of the correct cultivation of *cintāmayī prajñā*.

The Bahirarthaparīkṣā, the “Investigation of External Objects,” is introduced by Kamalaśīla as an exposition of the Vijñānavāda, focusing on the theory of *vijñaptimātratā*, which posits that external objects do not exist independently of their cognitions and that only those cognitions (or representations)¹⁸ (*vijñapti*)¹⁹ are real. He relates this to the establishment of *pratibimbādisannibham* “similar to a reflection, etc.,” one of the attributes used by Śāntarakṣita to define the *pratīyasamutpāda* in the introductory verses. In the same way, through discussions of other attributes in early chapters, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla refute several (mis)conceptions about reality and affirm a final Buddhist truth. This truth is stated from two main standpoints, either a Sautrāntika one,²⁰ which is provisional,²¹ or a Vijñānavāda one, which is definitive.²² In this sense, the Bahirarthaparīkṣā

¹⁷ For an extensive treatment of epistemology as apologetics within the Buddhist epistemological school, cf. Eltschinger 2014.

¹⁸ As is well known, this is Schmithausen’s translation (2007: 213 n. 2). For a discussion of this translation, see Kellner–Taber 2014: 735 n. 90.

¹⁹ Here, I follow Kellner–Taber (2014: 735), who highlight that, in the *Vimśikā*, the meaning of *vijñapti* is that of a cognitive event-aspect, and that *mātra* serves the purpose of denying objects. They translate the term *vijñaptimātratā* as “mere cognition.” In light of the initial statement of this in TSP *ad* TS 1964, and the obvious references to the “authority” of the *Vimśikā* throughout the *pañjikā*, I believe that Kamalaśīla adopts the same meaning. Kamalaśīla himself denotes *vijñapti* as a synonym of cognition, (*jñāna*) (cf. TSP *ad* TS 2016, Sanskrit Text p. 181 and English Translation p. 267). However, in light of this definition, and given the particular “idiomatic” use of that specific word, I shall not translate it, along with the term *vijñaptimātra*.

²⁰ The term “Sautrāntika,” in the context of the chapters under examination, i.e., the Bahirarthaparīkṣā and the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā, is used with the understanding that Kamalaśīla never actually employs this term there. In fact, he uses it only a very few times in the whole TSP. As we shall see, in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā, he uses the term *bahirarthavādin* (“externalist”) and gives a brief explanation of which views are admitted according to the particular standpoint they are defending in the chapter, namely, the apprehension of an external object and the reality of atoms. On this, cf. §3.2, and n. 98. On the terms “Sautrāntika” and *bāhyārthavāda*, cf. n. 77 and 78. For a brief account of the history of the term, see Ratié 2010: 442 n. 16, who quotes Kritzer 2003a, 2003b and 2005: xxvi–xxx.

²¹ As we will see in the following, in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā, Kamalaśīla clearly states that the *bahirarthavāda* is only accepted provisionally and that the Vijñānavāda is superior to it.

²² While other works of theirs, such as the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* (MAK) and *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti* (MAV) by Śāntarakṣita, the *Madhyamakālaṅkārapañjikā* (MAP), the *Madhyamakāloka* (MĀ), and the three *Bhāvanākramas* of Kamalaśīla, undoubtedly have the nature of Madhyamaka works, this is not as certain in the case of the TS and the TSP. McClintock (2010: 87–91) tries to prove that the Madhyamaka is present as a nascent third level in the two works. Murti (1987: 102) considers the analytical character of every chapter, *parīkṣā*, as exemplifying their Madhyamaka nature. In contrast, Wood (1994: 219–221) denies the idea that the TS and the TSP have such a nature, arguing that they are rather Vijñānavāda texts.

represents a key chapter in the TS and the TSP,²³ as it deals with the main tenets of the Vijñānavāda, establishing (and defending) the latter as a definitive doctrinal system, at least within the scope of these works.²⁴ Furthermore, their arguments are also intended to support some of the views found in major works by Vasubandhu,²⁵ Diñnāga²⁶ and Dharmakīrti,²⁷ while refuting specific opponents who attack them (e.g., Śubhagupta and Kumāṛila).²⁸

As we will see in more detail, the structure of the chapter is strictly dialogic, and the statements of the opponents' positions (as well as their objections) are immediately followed by a pertinent response. The main sections are:

1. An introduction, presenting the view of the Vijñānavādins and stating the main arguments in favor of *vijñaptimātratā*: the illogicality of external objects and the absence of the characteristics of apprehended (*grāhya*)²⁹ and apprehender (*grāhaka*) regarding cognitions (cf. Argument A and Argument B in §3.1) [TSP *ad* TS 1964];
2. A demonstration of the illogicality of external objects, such objects being either atoms, the part-possessor composed by atoms, or a coarse

²³ McClintock (2010: 97) regards the Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter as representing the highest explicit level of analysis in the two works, affirming the superiority of the Yogācāra level over the Sautrāntika; its primary purpose is that of proving the superiority of the former over the latter (McClintock 2010: 162). In her opinion, the Bahirarthaparīkṣā is the last chapter of a first part of the two works, dealing with the investigation of reality, which is understood as the dependent arising. The second part, she argues, concerns the dispelling of misconceptions regarding the person, i.e., the Buddha, who is credited with having first realized and conveyed this reality.

²⁴ Cf. *vijñaptimātratāsiddhir dharmadbhīr vimalkṛtā | asmābhis taddiśā yātaṃ paramārthavinīścaye ||* (TS 2083). “The establishment of *vijñaptimātratā* has been made clear by wise persons. We have proceeded through this method in the *Paramārthavinīścaya*.” Cf. also *paramārthatas tu nirāmbanāḥ sarva eva pratyayāḥ* [...] (TSP *ad* TS 2083) “However, according to absolute truth, every cognition is devoid of object-support.”

²⁵ Ca. 350–430. On Vasubandhu's dates, see Deleanu 2006: 186–194. On the theory of the two Vasubandhus, see n. 189.

²⁶ The dates Frauwallner (1961: 134–137) proposes for Diñnāga are ca. 480–540.

²⁷ The dates proposed by Frauwallner (1961: 137–139) regarding Dharmakīrti are ca. 600–660. Krasser (2011) proposes moving his dates to the mid-sixth century. For a discussion of the date of Dharmakīrti, see Eltschinger 2010b: 398. Very recently, Balcerowicz (2016: 477) has proposed to date him to 550–610, based on a new chronology of the two Jaina authors Samantabhadra (530–590) and Pūjyapāda Devanandin (540–600).

²⁸ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla were probably also influenced by Dharmakīrti's commentators: Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi and perhaps others. On the relationship between Kamalaśīla and Haribhadra, see Moriyama 1984a and 1984b; on that of Arcaṭa, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, see Funayama 1995; on that of Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, see Krasser 1992.

²⁹ As is well known, even though *grāhya* is strictly speaking a gerundive, its translation with a past participle is appropriate and well-attested. As a substantive, I shall translate it as “apprehended” or “apprehended [object].”

thing not composed by them [TS 1964–1997 and TSP *ad* TS 1964–1997];

3. A demonstration of the absence of “apprehended” and “apprehender” in relation to cognitions, including specific proof of the self-awareness of cognitions [TS 1999–2003 and TSP *ad* TS 1999–2003]. The three theses analyzed are (in order): (a) the thesis that cognitions are devoid of the images of their objects (*nirākāravāda*); (b) the thesis that cognitions are endowed with the images of their objects (*sākāravāda*);³⁰ and (c) the thesis that cognitions are endowed with images other than those of their objects (*anyākāravāda*)³¹ [TS 1998–2049 and TSP *ad* TS 1998–2049];
4. A refutation of the arguments brought forward by opponents in order to prove the reality of external objects [TS 2050–2077 and TSP *ad* TS 2050–2077];
5. Conclusive arguments to demonstrate *viññaptimātratā* [TS 2078–2083 and TSP *ad* TS 2078–2083].

Throughout the chapter, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla³² choose another Buddhist, Śubhagupta, as their main opponent, and address their criticism to one of his main works,³³ the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*³⁴ (Tib: *Phyi rol gyi don grub pa zes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa*)³⁵ (henceforth BASK), the “Verses on the

³⁰ The term *nirākāravāda* generally refers to epistemological theories that regard cognitions as occurring without assuming the image of their objects. Instead, the term *sākāravāda* applies to those views that regard cognitions as being endowed with the image of their objects. In the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla appear to be endorsing the *sākāravāda*. However, within the context of the Bahirarthaparīkṣā, they refute both the *nirākāravāda* and the *sākāravāda*. With reference to one of the first studies on the subject of *nirākāravāda* and *sākāravāda*, see Kajiyama 1965b (as well as Mookerjee 1935: 77). For a more recent overview on the subject of *ākāras* of cognitions, see Kellner–McClintock 2014.

³¹ In TS 1998, Śāntarakṣita uses the terms *anirbhāsa*, *sanirbhāsa* and *anyanirbhāsa*.

³² On the differences between the two authors regarding quotations of and references to Śubhagupta, cf. §2.1.

³³ Śubhagupta's works, as recorded in the *bsTan 'gyur*, are: 1. **Sarvajñasiddhikārikā* (Tōhoku no. 4243); 2. **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* (Tōhoku no. 4244); 3. **Śrutiparīkṣākārikā* (Tib.: *Thos pa brtag pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*) (Tōhoku no. 4245); 4. **Anyāpohavicārakārikā* (Tōhoku no. 4246); and 5. **Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā* (Tib.: *dBan phyug 'jig pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*) (Tōhoku no. 4247). All of them are recorded in the *lHan kar ma* (711, 713, 722, 710 and 714, respectively). Two other works of his, **Nairātmyasiddhi* (*lHan kar ma* 712) as well as **Paralokasiddhi* and its commentary (*lHan kar ma* 715, 716), have also been identified by Frauwallner (1957: 9–100) and Steinkellner (1985: 216–218), respectively.

³⁴ The title that is actually reconstructed in the Tibetan translation is **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikānāma*. I refer to the Sanskrit title with an asterisk as I am not yet aware of any mention of this title in extant Sanskrit texts.

³⁵ Like all of Śubhagupta's works, the BASK is lost in its original Sanskrit and extant in full only in Tibetan, in the *bsTan 'gyur*. According to the colophon, the authors of this translation are Jinamitra (ca. 800), a Vaibhāṣika master from Kāśmīr, and the translator dPal brtsegs rakṣita (ca. 800), a Tibetan monk. Cf. *kha che bye brag du smra ba'i slob dpon chen po ji na mi tra*

Establishment of External Objects.”³⁶ This comes as no surprise if we consider that the conflicting positions of other Buddhists compromised the solidity of the Buddhist doctrinal system (and Śāntarakṣita’s as well as Kamalaśīla’s), supplying weapons to the Brahmanical opponents. Furthermore, Śubhagupta is particularly keen on refuting the pivotal tenets of the Vijñānavāda,³⁷ arguing for an external realism and supporting views that can be classified as ranging between the Vaibhāṣika³⁸ and the Sautrāntika. Accordingly, in a chapter designed to establish the superiority of the Vijñānavāda in general and over other “inferior” Buddhist truths in particular (their provisional Sautrāntika viewpoint being one of them), Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla need to refute his views in order to assert this superiority. Moreover, it is noteworthy that in one of the main chapters of a work that is “overtly apologetic” (Eltschinger 2014: 188), namely the TSP, and focuses “almost exclusively” on “the critique of non-Buddhist, mainly orthodox Brahmanical doctrines and arguments,” the main antagonist is a Buddhist. This further proves that Śubhagupta must have constituted a threat for “what our authors hold to be the doctrinal foundations of Buddhism” (Eltschinger 2014: 188).

Śubhagupta thus plays a central role as an antagonist within the Bahirarthaparīkṣā, and some of the main arguments contained therein must

dan | bod kyī lo tsa ba dge sloṅ dpal brtsegs ra kṣi tas bsgyur cin žus te gtan la phab pa’o | (D 196b)₁. “The Great Kaśmīrian Vaibhāṣika Master Jinamitra and the Tibetan lo tsa ba monk dPal brtsegs ra kṣi ta translated [it] and established [its] final redaction.” As already mentioned, the BASK is listed in the *lHan kar ma* (dated ca. 800). Accordingly, one can determine 800 as a *terminus ante quem* for the composition of the BASK. Moreover, if one accepts the above-mentioned date for Śubhagupta, the translation of the BASK must have been done just a few decades after its composition. On dPal brtsegs rakṣita and the *lHan kar ma*, see Hermann-Pfandt 2008. Cf. also Yoshimura 1950; Lalou 1953; Frauwallner 1957; Tucci 1958: 46–48 n. 1 and Frauwallner 1961 (see Appendix 2 §6).

³⁶ For studies on the BASK, see Appendix 2. According to D and P, the BASK is composed of 761 *pādas*. They were counted in 188 *kārikās* by Shastri 1967, a numbering that was subsequently rejected. I generally follow the edition and numbering by Mikogami (1986) with 186 *kārikās*. In some cases, based on D and P, I have chosen variants that differ from that edition. I have also emended the text when needed. For the Tibetan text, see Appendix 3.

³⁷ Cf. *mal gnas mig la sogs pa yi | | mam śes spyod yul phyi’i don min | | śes phyir don du snan ba’i phyir | | rmi lam zla ba gñis blo bžin | | de ltar blo tsam smra ba yis | | phyi yi dños med par bsgrubs pa | |* (BASK 2–3ab). “An external object that is the object of a sense cognition of a healthy person is not [real,] since it is cognition and since [this] appears as an [external] object, as [in the case of] perceptions in the dream state or [of] the two moons. Thus by the upholder of *vijñaptimātra* (Vasubandhu/Diñnāga) the absence of an external real thing (*dños/*vastu*) is demonstrated.” On these two verses, see also Mikogami 1993: 86.

³⁸ As is known, the most popular source of information regarding the views of the Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda tradition(s) is the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu. Cox (1995: xxii) argues that “the role as representative or as the final determinant of Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy should more appropriately be accorded to the *Vibhāṣā* compendia, or to the works of Vasubandhu’s opponent, Saṅghabhadra.” For a valuable study on Saṅghabhadra’s thought, see Cox 1995. On the Sarvāstivāda, cf. also Willemen–Dessein–Cox 1998.

be understood as responses to his views, especially the ontological standpoints on external reality and their epistemic counterparts.³⁹ In the coming sections, I shall undertake an investigation of those views, examining both the way these are introduced by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and the way they are presented in their original context, namely within the BASK.

2.

Śubhagupta and the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*⁴⁰ as
Introduced in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*

2.1 Quotations and Use of

Materials from the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*

Śubhagupta's activity as a philosopher can be dated between Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. In this regard, Frauwallner's dating, i.e., 720–780,⁴¹ seems to be the most accurate.⁴²

As discussed in Appendix 2, one aspect that originally aroused scholarly interest in this author was the presence of “quotations” from the BASK (to date, only extant in its Tibetan translation)⁴³ in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā*, along with portions of what has been conjectured to be his lost autocommentary on the verses (cf. Appendix 2). In fact, even though they are not always patently ascribed to him,⁴⁴ in this chapter there are numerous

³⁹ When dealing with the subject of the omniscience of the Buddha as treated in this chapter, McClintock (2010: 350) notes that both segments bearing on that problem are responses to Śubhagupta's arguments.

⁴⁰ For stylistic reasons, in the titles, I shall refer to the works with their entire names.

⁴¹ With regard to this, cf. Appendix 2 §6.

⁴² Bhattacharya (1926: LXXXIV–LXXXV) and Shastri (1967: 2) regard 650 as his date of birth. However, Frauwallner's dating also takes into account the possibility of Śubhagupta having been Dharmottara's teacher, whom he dates to around 750–810 (Frauwallner 1961: 147). In his *The Arising of the Dharma in India*, Tāranātha mentions the great logician Śubhagupta (dGe bsrūn in Tibetan) living during the reign of Dharmapāla, who was a contemporary of King Khri sroṅ lde btsan. Cf. *rags rtsis su byas pa la bod kyi btsan po khri sroṅ lde btsan dan dus mñam par śes so || rgyal po 'di'i dus su rtog ge pa chen po dge bsrūn [...]* (*Rgya gar chos 'byun*, ed. p. 166, 15–17). “Based on a rough calculation, [Dharmapāla] is known [to have lived] at the same time as the Tibetan king Khri sroṅ lde btsan. At the time of this king[, i.e., Dharmapāla,] the great logician Śubhagupta [lived.]” Since Dharmapāla's reign has been dated to 775–812 (Sanderson 2009: 87), maybe dates a little later than that are also feasible. In the English translation of that work, the name dGe bsrūn is rendered as Kalyāṇagupta (Chimpa, Lama–Chattopadhyaya 1970: 276 and n. 9). For more information on the Sanskrit rendering of dGe bsrūn and the history of Śubhagupta's identification, see Appendix 2.

⁴³ Here, what I call the BASK is the work that was lost in the Sanskrit original and extant in its Tibetan translation. For the sake of brevity, I will also call the Tibetan translation of that work BASK, as this is the only textual evidence of it.

⁴⁴ Śubhagupta's name (always as “Bhadanta Śubhagupta”) is explicitly mentioned only nine times by Kamalaśīla.

references to Śubhagupta's views as expounded in the BASK.⁴⁵ Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla use materials from the BASK in a variety of ways,⁴⁶ namely:

(i) Direct quotations of *kārikās*, verbatim and non-verbatim. With “verbatim,” I am referring to occurrences where the Sanskrit text of the stanzas in the TS and the TSP fairly corresponds to the Tibetan translation of the BASK. With “non-verbatim,” I am referring to all cases in which there are differences.⁴⁷

(ii) Paraphrases of individual as well as groups of *kārikās*, some of which bear the characteristics of commentary.⁴⁸ The wording of these paraphrases is, at times, extremely close to that of the verses, except for the metrical structure (cf. BASK 46).⁴⁹

(iii) General references to views (usually attributed to an unidentified opponent) that correspond to those expressed in particular stanzas of the BASK. However, the correspondence can only be conjectured, with some references more obvious than others.

One striking feature is that material from the BASK appears far more often in the TSP than in the TS. Indeed, the impression that Śubhagupta is one of the main opponents in the chapter, if not the primary one, is mainly generated by the *pañjikā*. It seems that Kamalaśīla is more eager than his teacher to attack and refute Śubhagupta's views. In any case, his presence in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā proves that Śubhagupta's role in the heated debate on the epistemological and ontological issue of the existence of external objects of cognitions must have been significant, a fact that has largely been overlooked by modern scholars.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Based on the Tibetan translation of the BASK, one can identify several stanzas in the TS and the TSP as being the original Sanskrit of *kārikās* (or parts of them) from the lost Sanskrit work. Analogously, it is possible to understand certain Sanskrit prose passages as in fact being paraphrases of one or more verses from the BASK.

⁴⁶ For a thorough analysis on the ways in which Kamalaśīla quotes his opponents, see Steinkellner 1963. In that article, Steinkellner deals particularly with quotations from Udyotakara, reaching the conclusion that Kamalaśīla utilizes that material in a variety of ways, including a free use of it tailored to his own purposes. As we shall see, the same thing holds true for Śubhagupta.

⁴⁷ I am assuming that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, being contemporaries with Śubhagupta, were aware of the verses in a form that was very close to the “original” version. This notwithstanding, minor differences might also have been due to the transmission of the work, regardless of whether that happened orally or not. On the subject of the oral transmission of works, particularly in the case of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, see McClintock 2010: 52–57, who also quotes Griffiths 1999a, 1999b.

⁴⁸ A very significant example in this sense is that of TS 1971 and TSP *ad* TS 1971, where Śāntarakṣita quotes a *kārikā* from the BASK and Kamalaśīla introduces a prose passage with the characteristics of a commentary on it (cf. §4.1). This would also appear to be the case with TS 1974 and TSP *ad* TS 1974. However, in the latter occurrence, Śubhagupta is not explicitly mentioned, and the *kārikā* is not found in the BASK.

⁴⁹ As we will see, it is the presence of these paraphrases that has given rise to the hypothesis that there was an autocommentary, now lost (cf. Appendix 2).

⁵⁰ On records of Śubhagupta's life and works in ancient sources, see n. 42 and n. 73.

2.2 Steinkellner's Method of Classification:

The "Autocommentary" as *Citatum in Alio*

Modo Referendi (Where the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* is **T**)

With reference to the material from the BASK found in the TS and the TSP, based on a comparison with its Tibetan translation, I shall additionally classify the stanzas according to the system defined in Steinkellner 1988.⁵¹ Considering the BASK as **T** (i.e., the original Sanskrit text to be constituted), passages in the TS and the TSP can be classified as follows:

1. *citatum in alio* (**Ci**) – text quoted⁵² verbatim from **T**.
2. *citatum in alio modo referendi* (**R**) – text from **T**, introduced as such, that is not literally quoted, but only referred to.
3. *textus usus secundarii* (**T'**) – text from **T** that is not introduced as such, but integrated in another work as part of it. **T'** and **T** may contain significant differences.

Steinkellner's method of classification was originally designed for commentaries, where **T** is the work commented on, or texts that transmit **T** as an authoritative work. This is not the case with the BASK, since it is rather a target of refutation in the works where it is quoted. This is perhaps the primary factor one must consider when classifying stanzas from the BASK. In this case, the definition and use of the term *citatum* must be considered instance by instance, since the two authors "quote" in order to refute. Through an analysis of individual occurrences, I shall show that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are not always quoting Śubhagupta; instead, at times, they are freely using materials from his work for their own convenience.⁵³ This process of classification will shed light on Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's "*modus citandi*" as well as their "*modus argumentandi*," particularly where Śubhagupta is concerned.

⁵¹ In spite of the subsequent modifications, adaptations and expansion of this system, I follow the original one, as it complies with my very limited scope here.

⁵² When referring to **Ci**, Steinkellner (1988: 122) clearly includes also those quotations where there is no explicit mention of the work or the author, but the passage is introduced by formulas marking a quotation as such, for example *tad uktam...iti*. Therefore, it is possible to define as **Ci** also those texts where only Śubhagupta's name is mentioned or where such formulas are used. The title **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* is never mentioned in the TS and the TSP.

⁵³ The reuse does not include all cases of minor differences that could be explained also as errors in the transmission of the text. Most problematic are the cases where the Tibetan translation of the BASK does not correspond to the Sanskrit text. Then we are faced with the dilemma of whether to consider the Sanskrit in the TS and the TSP to be the proper quotation (namely, "the original") and the Tibetan translation as misleading, or, rather, to consider such cases as an example of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's reuse of the materials, or even as unintentional errors in the transmission.

Based on this, I aim to demonstrate that the alleged lost autocommentary is a mere literary artifice (at least in the cases I have investigated). In 1933,⁵⁴ Frauwallner conjectured the existence of an autocommentary on the BASK. This has been acknowledged as likely ever since, to the point that it has been unquestionably regarded as one of Śubhagupta's works. Frauwallner's proof is mainly based on the fact that there are prose passages, introduced as quotations in the TSP, which correspond to specific verses of the BASK and quote some words verbatim; he also suggests that there are seemingly no paraphrases of the verses. However, he does not provide an actual list, thus essentially including all passages that bear such characteristics.⁵⁵ Based on the same criteria, Hattori (1960) "identified" a few "quotations" and published a list.⁵⁶ I shall analyze some of these prose passages,⁵⁷ proving that they were likely constructed by Kamalaśīla as a dialectical tool for his argumentative purposes. In other words, Kamalaśīla made the conscious choice of presenting Śubhagupta's views in the form of a prose explanation (likely for pedagogical reasons). This method must have been obvious to his audience of Buddhist monks.

In the case of Frauwallner's (and others') conjecture of an "autocommentary,"⁵⁸ the existence of the original text is merely inferred from the presence of quotations in another work. In a way, the status of "original text" is subordinated to that of "quotation from it."⁵⁹ We do not have any evidence of the former's existence, as it is neither extant in Sanskrit nor in the form of a Tibetan translation. Similarly, there are no other sources providing information on such an "autocommentary." We are expected to safely assume the existence of the original text based only on those "quotations." I cannot prove the non-existence of an autocommentary on the BASK; however, I shall show that the arguments brought forward by Frauwallner (and Hattori)⁶⁰ in favor of its existence are weak and, in some cases, blatantly wrong. The prose passages that I analyze cannot be proven

⁵⁴ Cf. Appendix 2 §3.

⁵⁵ Cf. Appendix 2 §3.

⁵⁶ Cf. Appendix 2 §5.

⁵⁷ Given the above-mentioned criteria used by Frauwallner (and Hattori), I regard as "prose passages identified by Frauwallner as part of the lost autocommentary" all the prose passages that share the following characteristics: (i) being explicitly introduced as a quotation (regardless of whether or not the name of Śubhagupta is actually mentioned); and (ii) quoting some parts of some *kārikās* from the BASK verbatim. I will also mention, instance by instance, whether or not the passage was listed by Hattori.

⁵⁸ From now on, I shall assume that in the cases under analysis, such prose passages are nothing but parts of the TSP.

⁵⁹ Usually, the identification of quotations, i.e., determining parts of texts to be "quotations," is derived from a comparison with an original text that is existent and available. In this case, however, the existence of an original text, otherwise unknown and unavailable, has been established based on the fact that there are supposed "quotations" from it.

⁶⁰ Cf. Appendix 2 §5.

to have been written by Śubhagupta; moreover, some are indeed paraphrases of verses. In brief (using Steinkellner's classification), I shall demonstrate that the prose passages that Frauwallner and Hattori considered to be **Ci**, with **T** being the lost autocommentary, are instead **R** (or, at times, **T'**), where **T** is actually the BASK.

2.3 The Case of Haribhadra Sūri

As already noted by Matsumoto (1980), in his *Anekāntajayapatākā*, Haribhadra Sūri (ca. eighth cent.) introduces a number of prose passages presenting the views of Śubhagupta as found in *kārikās* from the BASK, especially kk. 68 and 71. Unlike in the TSP, they are not introduced as quotations from Śubhagupta (or from anyone else) or references to him and, except for one instance (the commentary on BASK 68), these statements are different from those found in the TSP. As such, I hardly think that they could be regarded as fragments of the lost autocommentary. It should be noted that Haribhadra quotes five verses, attributing them to Śubhagupta, whom he describes as a follower of Dharmakīrti (*vārttikānusārin*).⁶¹ These have been identified with verses of the **Anyāpohavicāra-kārikā*⁶² (Tib. *gžan sel brtag pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*).⁶³

2.4 The Intended and Ideal Audience for Criticism of Śubhagupta

In her comprehensive work on the TS and the TSP, McClintock (2010: 48–49) argues that the best way to understand Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's views on omniscience is first to ascertain the nature of these works. This nature can be established according to four main areas of investigation: 1) the audience, both intended and ideal; 2) the styles of

⁶¹ Cf. *yathoktam vārttikānusāriṇā śubhaguptena (Anekāntajayapatākāsvopajñāvyākhyā*, vol. I, ed. p. 337, 23–24).

⁶² The colophon does not record any translators. In D and P, the reconstructed Sanskrit title is attested with °vicara° instead of °vicāra°.

⁶³ Cf. *rūpāntaram vikalpe yad ubhayoḥ pratibhāsatē | saty arthe tatra saṅketa ekatvādhyavasāyataḥ || 1 || yādrśād yaḥ samutpannaḥ sa bhavaty eva kāraṇam | tādr̥gvidhavidhikalpasya dhvaniḥ saṅketasamsthitiḥ || 2 || kim etad iti saṅketya ūtaro 'py evam ity adah | na kalpayati yāvad dhi tāvan na samayodbhavaḥ || 3 || vaktuḥ śrotuḥ ca tulyābhe buddhī tenaika-gocare | tattvena bahirartho 'sti na kaścic chabdagocaraḥ || 4 || svabuddhipratibhāsayā samvittāu api jāyate | bahirarthagrahe mānas tulyatāimīrabuddhivat || 5 ||* (*Anekāntajayapatākā*, vol. I, ed. p. 337, 10–338, 8). Mikogami (1978: 2) has identified kk. 1, 3, 4 and 5 as **Anyāpohavicāra-kārikā* 18, 19, 20 and 21. Cf. *gñis ka'i mnam par rtog pa la || don yod na ni gzugs gžan žig || snañ ba gañ yin don gcig la || žen pas de la brdar 'dogs so ||* (**Anyāpohavicāra-kārikā* 18) *brdas bsgos 'di ni ci žig yin || cig šos kyis kyañ 'di yin žes || ji srid mnam rtog mi dmigs pa || de srid pa rda ni mi 'byuñ no ||* (**Anyāpohavicāra-kārikā* 19) *de phyir smra po ñan pa po'i || blo gñis mtshuñs snañ spyod yul gcig || kho na ñid du phyi rol don || sgra'i spyod yul 'ga' yañ med ||* (**Anyāpohavicāra-kārikā* 20) *rañ gi blo la snañ ba ni || rig pa yin yañ (em.) yad D) phyi rol dan || gcig par 'dzin pa'i na rgyal skye || rab rib can du mtshuñs blo ba nin ||* (**Anyāpohavicāra-kārikā* 21) (**Anyāpohavicāra-kārikā*, D 197b7–198a2).

reasoning in the work; 3) the structure of the work as a whole; and 4) the function or purpose of the work. Seeing the nature of the TS and the TSP as pedagogical tools for teaching students how to engage in (and win) debates, McClintock determines the intended audience as consisting mostly of Buddhist monks (as well as some non-Buddhists, perhaps).⁶⁴ However, an ideal audience would clearly be one comprised of judicious (*prekṣāvat*) persons, whose characteristics she defines as being “eminently rational” and respecting “some version of the law of contradiction and the excluded middle.”⁶⁵ More significantly, she adds (2010: 61), “The *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Pañjikā* can thus be seen as a guide for judicious persons who wish to undertake an examination of the rationality of Buddhist doctrines and not only as a polemical work addressed at those who get it wrong.”

In my brief analysis of Śāntarakṣita’s and, above all, of Kamalaśīla’s treatment of Śubhagupta’s arguments, I find establishing the intended and ideal audience to be a very useful key to interpretation.

According to McClintock (2010: 55–56), the nature of the TS and the TSP as pedagogical tools accounts for the authors’ acquaintance with the non-Buddhist opponents’ views and works that they quote verbatim. After all, in public debates, a monk was expected to show that he was knowledgeable about the subtleties of the opponent’s arguments. I think that the case with Śubhagupta is slightly different. Śubhagupta was a Buddhist, arguably someone from the same religious and intellectual environment and background as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and his ideas share some similarities with theirs.⁶⁶ As we shall see in more detail, they show an awareness of his work (which they quote both verbatim and extensively) along with a profound understanding of his views.⁶⁷ However, at times, they also reuse his materials (cf., e.g., BASK 50–51 in TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991) and implicitly attribute to Śubhagupta views he himself would never accept

⁶⁴ McClintock (2010: 52) notes that “Paul Griffiths has argued that many, if not all, Indian Buddhist works of various types are probably best interpreted as addressed exclusively to a religious community of Buddhist monks.” Cf. Griffiths 1999a and 1999b.

⁶⁵ McClintock (2010: 59) also claims that “a judicious person does not act toward some goal in a haphazard or whimsical manner, but proceeds only upon completing a suitable investigation into the means for attaining his goal.” Eltschinger (2014: 195) defines a practically rational (*prekṣāvat*) person as “someone who wishes to engage (*pravṛttikāma*) in (religious) practice and resorts to *yukti*, especially to inferences, in order to maximize his/her chances of being successful in his/her endeavours.” He also points out, “There can be little doubt that the Buddhists’ rational agent is but one case of the sixth- to eighth-century Indic philosophers’ repeated appeals to rationality as a criterion for the appraisal of their doctrines and the acceptance of their *pro domo* arguments” (Eltschinger 2014: 220). On this term, see Eltschinger 2014: 195 n. 17, 219–234, as well as Eltschinger 2007b: 137–150 and McClintock 2013.

⁶⁶ On his doctrinal affiliation, cf. §2.5.

⁶⁷ As we shall see, in the *Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā* they also endorse ontological and epistemological views that seem very close to those of Śubhagupta.

(cf. TS 1974 and TSP *ad* TS 1974). For this reason, I believe that the task of preparing students for a debate played only a minor role in this case.

McClintock (2010: 57) also raises the question as to whether or not the opponent referred to in the TS and the TSP was still living when the works were composed, as well as to the presence of possible followers or would-be followers.⁶⁸ Even though (according to the dates provided by Frauwallner)⁶⁹ Śubhagupta might still have been alive when the TS and the TSP were composed,⁷⁰ one cannot determine this with certainty, nor can one positively establish whether or not there were followers of his doctrines.⁷¹ Surely, Kamalaśīla must have perceived Śubhagupta's ideas as potentially "dangerous" in terms of doctrinal "proselytism."

Therefore, with regard to the criticism of Śubhagupta in the TS and the TSP, I suggest that the intended audience was a group of Buddhist students who needed to learn (and be convinced) that Śubhagupta's doctrines were a dangerous internal "heresy." At the same time, the addressees were also monks who, for spiritual reasons, desired to cultivate the insight born of reflection. Thus, the ideal audience would have been Buddhist monks (who are also judicious persons)⁷² wishing to refine their abilities in philosophical investigation through the rejection of inferior Buddhist doctrines.

2.5 Śubhagupta's Doctrinal Affiliation

The subject of Śubhagupta's doctrinal affiliation deserves particular attention. Scholars have had different opinions on the matter, with Śubhagupta being regarded either as a Vaibhāṣika or a Sautrāntika (cf. Appendix 2). This ambiguity was also present in ancient sources.⁷³ However, with specific reference to his views as portrayed in the BASK, he is

⁶⁸ As also mentioned by McClintock (2010: 57 n. 132), Kellner (1997: xxvii–xxviii) depicts the debate between the authors and their opponents as an ahistorical and idealized abstraction.

⁶⁹ Cf. §2.1 and n. 42.

⁷⁰ For the dates of composition of the two works, cf. n. 2 and 3.

⁷¹ On the tradition that considers Dharmottara his student, cf. Appendix 2 particularly n.1.

⁷² According to McClintock, for judicious persons, i.e., the ideal audience, the Bahirarthaparīkṣā is the last truly crucial chapter. What follows must be understood as being addressed toward a specific intended audience, an audience that does not necessarily overlap with the ideal one.

⁷³ With regard to his being identified as a Vaibhāṣika, Mimaki (1987–1988: 276 n. 10) quotes the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (XIV cent.), where Śubhagupta is addressed as a logician of the Vaibhāṣika: *bye brag tu smra ba'i rtog ge pa slob dpon dGe bsrungs* (*Blo gsal grub mtha'*, ed., édition facsimilé 124b₃). In that work, Śubhagupta's BASK is quoted extensively to exemplify some Vaibhāṣika theories. With regard to his being identified as a Sautrāntika, Matsumoto (1980a: 289) brings forward Ratnākaraśānti's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (P 327b₈–328a₆) and Atiśa's *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṇanāmamadhyaṃakopadeśa* (P 126a_{3.4}) as evidence that these two authors considered Śubhagupta, Dharmottara and the former Vasubandhu as Sautrāntikas. On this, cf. Appendix 2 §8 and §11.

mainly regarded as a Vaibhāṣika.⁷⁴ Most recently, Śubhagupta has been presented by Eltschinger (2003: 137) — who also discussed the Dharmakīrtian background of his *Śrutipariṅśākārikā* (Eltchinger 1999) — as a forerunner to a movement of thinkers belonging to an intermediate period within the development of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. After the composition of the primary works of that tradition — the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS), *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) and the TS — these thinkers wrote short treatises that further developed the major themes presented therein. They worked in the same “universities” as most of the masters of the previous generations, i.e., in Vikramaśīla, Nālandā or Kaśmīr.⁷⁵

Based on an analysis of his views as found in the BASK and presented in the TS and the TSP (as well as those found in his **Sarvajñasiddhikārikā*),⁷⁶ it is clear that Śubhagupta was part of that philosophical and cultural milieu which I would define as a “second-generation” Buddhist logico-epistemological school, in the sense of further elaborating on and finding new applications of some of the ideas already introduced in the primary works. However, some of his theories diverged significantly from those of the great masters, such as Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti.⁷⁷ Specifically, he adheres tenaciously to what we may call a *bāhyārthavāda*,⁷⁸ in the sense of proposing his own view on the real existence of external entities as well as theories on the cognitive process that follow from that. As we shall see, these views find their fullest expression in the BASK. Feasibly for this reason, this work

⁷⁴ See Shastri 1967 and Mikogami; cf. also Appendix 2 §7 and §9. As already seen, in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, his views along with numerous quotations from the BASK are introduced in the chapter dealing with the exposition of the Vaibhāṣika tradition.

⁷⁵ In his work, Eltschinger refers specifically to Jitāri (second half of the 10th cent.) and the *Vedāpṛamāṇyasiddhi*.

⁷⁶ In the **Sarvajñasiddhikārikā* (SSK) (Verses on the Establishment of the Omniscient One) (Tib: *thams cad mkhyen pa grub pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*), Śubhagupta argues for views that can be regarded as being in line with the logico-epistemological tradition (utilizing, for example, Dharmakīrti's theories of language) and clearly addresses the Mīmāṃsakas as his opponents. The context is thus one of interreligious debate rather than intrareligious controversy. For a critical edition, translation and analysis of this work, I refer to two forthcoming articles of mine. On this, cf. also Watanabe Shigeaki 1987.

⁷⁷ Certain views of Śubhagupta's are extremely close to those of Dharmakīrti and Dinnāga, as expressed in parts of some of their works, including the PS and the PV. With regard to Dharmakīrti, these views are defined as *bāhyārthavāda* by Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, and as Sautrāntika by later commentators (Dunne 2004: 58). On this, cf. Saccone 2015: 126–128.

⁷⁸ For the use of the term *bāhyārthavāda*, see also the point made by Dunne (2004: 58, 59 n. 13), who talks about “External Realism” (instead of “Sautrāntika”) with regard to Dharmakīrti. He states that “it may be heuristically unwise to equate ‘Sautrāntika’ with all post-Vasubandhu External Realism (*bāhyārthavāda*), even if that External Realism is qualified as not Sarvāstivāda and not Madhyamaka.” He depicts Śubhagupta's theories as one brand of Sautrāntika, namely the External Realist theories of Dharmakīrti's successor. In TSP ad TS 2029–2030, Kamalaśīla uses the term *bāhyārthavādin* to define his adversary (*para*), likely Śubhagupta.

became one of the main targets of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's criticism in their *parīkṣā* devoted to external objects and the defense of *vijñaptimātratā*. In the latter chapter, the authors proudly defend certain specific views of Vasubandhu and Dinnāga as well as Dharmakīrti.

In the following sections, while analyzing certain parts of the Bahirarthaparīkṣā, I shall investigate the most significant aspects of Śubhagupta's views on both ontological and epistemological issues. I shall do so by examining both the "original" standpoints as expressed in the BASK and their interpretation in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā. However, I am not interested in determining Śubhagupta's "official" doctrinal affiliation. One can surely maintain that his quite original standpoints on the ontological status of external reality and its cognition oscillate between what is considered as Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika.⁷⁹ My aim, however, is to clarify two main elements of Śubhagupta's thinking: (i) his *bāhyārthavāda*, which posits the existence of infinitesimal material particles that are ultimately (substantially, **dravyataḥ*) existent and cause their own cognition; and (ii) his *nirākāravāda*,⁸⁰ which advocates that such cognition is devoid of the images of these external realities.

3.

The Examination of External Objects of Perception in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā

3.1 Proof in Favor of *Vijñaptimātratā* in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā

In the introduction to his commentary on the first stanza of the *parīkṣā*, Kamalaśīla introduces the point of view of the Vijñānavādins. He first gives a brief and very concise account of their ontological views — that all things are nothing but cognitions (*vijñaptimātratā*)⁸¹ and that consciousness, *vijñāna*,⁸² is infinite and perishable at every moment. This differs from the unitary, unchangeable Brahman, maintained by the followers of the *Upaniṣads*.

Immediately after this, Kamalaśīla mentions two ways of proving *vijñaptimātratā*, introducing a proof statement⁸³ (relating to both) that — he states — is intended to demonstrate that a cognition is devoid of the characteristics of "apprehended" (*grāhya*) as well as "apprehender" (*grāhaka*),

⁷⁹ Like some other authors, Śubhagupta himself argues as follows (at the end of the BASK): *rīgs dan mi rīgs dpyad pa la || bdag la mkhas blo mtshan bcas med || 'on kyan gzan smras bden pa ni || man po mdor bsduṣ nas bstan gyis ||* (BASK 185). "In the investigation of what is logical or illogical, I am not extremely wise; however, I show the truths stated by others in many *sūtras*."

⁸⁰ On the terms *nirākāravāda*, *sākāravāda*, etc., and the bibliography on them, see n. 30.

⁸¹ Cf. *tatra vijñaptimātram evedaṃ traidhātukam* | (TSP ad TS 1964).

⁸² The word *vijñāna* has been translated differently according to the context. This is the only occurrence as "consciousness." Generally, I translate it simply as "cognition," a synonym of *jñāna*. For the translation as "[bare] cognition," see English Translation n. 415.

⁸³ On the use of proof statements in the TS and the TSP, see McClintock 2010: 7–8, 67–85.

precisely because of the fact that it is a cognition.⁸⁴ At this stage, the goal is evidently to affirm an epistemological truth. Though not explicitly stated by Kamalaśīla, these two proofs amount to two distinct arguments: the first (“Argument A”) is logical in nature; the second (“Argument B”) is strictly epistemological.

Argument A

While logical in nature, Argument A presupposes an ontological standpoint, namely, the non-existence of material, external objects that can be apprehended:

bāhyasya pṛthivyādīsvabhāvasya grāhyasyābhāve grāhakatvasyāpy abhāvāt |

Because, if an external apprehended [object], having the nature of earth and so on, is absent, [then] the state of being an apprehender is also absent [from cognition].

This argument is mainly based on the logical interdependence of the two concepts of apprehended and apprehender; the latter is grounded on (and presupposes for its validity) the former, and vice versa.⁸⁵ Argument A is valid only if the required ontological condition is conclusively demonstrated, i.e., that external material objects do not exist. As we shall see, within the first part of the chapter, Argument A will be essentially reduced to this ontological proof.

Argument B

The second argument is strictly epistemological. It denies that the characteristics of apprehended and apprehender belong to cognition:

saty api vā santānāntare grāhye grāhyagrāhaka lakṣaṇavaidhuryāt |

Or, because, [in relation to cognitions,] even if there were an apprehended⁸⁶ in a different mental continuum [(i.e., an internal apprehended)], the characteristics of [being an] apprehended and apprehender are absent.

⁸⁴ Strictly speaking, both arguments are intended to deny the characteristic of apprehender as belonging to cognitions. However, with reference to the characteristic of apprehended, only the second argument is meant to refute it as belonging to cognitions; the first is intended to refute it as belonging to an external material object.

⁸⁵ As Kamalaśīla very well puts it: *asatī grāhye grāhako na yukto grāhakaśya grāhyāpekṣatvāt |* (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 18, 16–17, restored on the basis of the Tibetan translation). “If there is no apprehended, the apprehender is not tenable, because the apprehender is dependent on the apprehended.”

⁸⁶ On this translation and the accepted reading of the Sanskrit text, see English Translation n. 7.

Immediately after these two arguments, Kamalaśīla commences his demonstration of the validity of the general proof,⁸⁷ namely that a cognition is devoid of the conditions of apprehended and apprehender due to the fact that it is cognition. This proof, which is epistemological in nature, is established using an ontological argumentation: earth, etc., which are admitted as apprehended by others, do not exist, since they lack intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*),⁸⁸ either one or many.⁸⁹ In doing this, he immediately starts discussing the ontological prerequisite of Argument A.⁹⁰

Finally, as a response to the *pūrvapakṣa*,⁹¹ with which the TS begins, Kamalaśīla claims that he (and Śāntarakṣita) will show that a cognition is devoid of *grāhya* and *grāhaka* by proving that external material objects are devoid of *svabhāva*.

Before proceeding with the specific analysis of the doctrine of *viññaptimātratā* as found in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā*, I shall briefly refer to Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's provisional external realism and its role in relation to *viññaptimātratā*. This will shed further light on Śubhagupta's views as well as their refutation by the two authors.

⁸⁷ In fact, Kamalaśīla wants to prove the pervasion between the logical reason (*hetu*), "being a cognition" (*jñānatva*), and the property to be proven (*sādhyā*), "being devoid of the conditions of apprehended and apprehender" (*grāhyagrāhakarāhitatva*).

⁸⁸ The term *svabhāva* can be rendered as "intrinsic nature" (also simply "nature") or "essential property" (also simply "property"). Steinkellner (1971) argued that these two meanings are related to ontological contexts and logical contexts, respectively, in Dharmakīrti's works. For a recent discussion of this term, the debate around it and a bibliography about it, cf. Dunne 2004: 145–222. At times, I shall also leave it untranslated.

⁸⁹ On the "neither-one-nor-many" argument, especially with reference to the MAK by Śāntarakṣita and its Tibetan interpretations, see Tillemans 1982, 1983, 1984; Blumenthal 2004: 60–137 and 2009; with reference to the MĀ by Kamalaśīla, see Keira 2004.

⁹⁰ In the long discussion that follows, Kamalaśīla equates the two properties of being real (*sattva*) and being apprehended as real (*sattvena grāhyatva*), and determines them both as being pervaded by the property of having a *svabhāva*. On *sattva*, see *ekatvānekatvābhyāṃ sattvasya vyāptatvād* [...] (TSP *ad* TS 1964); on *sattvena grāhyatva*, see *yad ekānekasvabhāvaṃ na bhavati na tat sattvena grāhyam preṣṣāvatā yathā vyomotpalam | ekānekasvabhāvarahitāś ca parābhūmatāḥ prthivyādaya iti vyāpakānūpalabdhiḥ* | (TSP *ad* TS 1964). Cf. also the gloss on the latter: *sattvena grāhyatvaṃ vyāpyam tasya vyāpakam ekānekasvabhāvatvaṃ tasyānūpalabdhiḥ*.

⁹¹ Kamalaśīla introduces the *pūrvapakṣa* as opposing the idea of the pervasion between *jñānatva* and *grāhyagrāhakarāhitatva*. The opponent argues that the *hetu*, which is the non-cognition of the property of having a *svabhāva*, either one or many, is unestablished with reference to external objects. In brief, he maintains that cognition is not proven as being devoid of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, because external objects are not established as unreal due to their lacking an intrinsic nature.

3.2 The Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā:⁹² The View of

Externalism as a Step Within the Cultivation of *Cintāmayī Prajñā*⁹³

In an article on epistemology and meditation, Kajiyama (1978: 114) defines Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's school as "syncretic" with regard to philosophy, and teaching "gradual enlightenment" with regard to religion. I would rather argue that their philosophy is syncretic because it involves graduality. This gradual philosophical analysis is connected with the cultivation of the *cintāmayī prajñā*, which entails the refinement of reason through the use of several views from distinct standpoints (or schools), particularly Sautrāntika and Yogācāra. As we shall see, regarding the concept of an external object of cognition, this is also due to the fact that the Sautrāntika views reveal themselves to be more useful when arguing against non-Buddhists. As already mentioned, McClintock (2010: 97) regards the Bahirarthaparīkṣā as expressing the highest level of analysis within the two works, namely the Vijñānavāda (as being superior to the Sautrāntika).⁹⁴ Here,⁹⁵ she is referring to the "sliding scale of analysis" (discussed by other scholars regarding Dharmakīrti).⁹⁶ The scale is sliding because the authors move up and down the doctrinal hierarchy according to the particular context with which they are dealing.

An explicit statement linked to this gradual approach within their philosophical analysis is found in a passage of the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā. There, Kamalaśīla openly indicates Externalism⁹⁷ (*bahirarthavāda*)⁹⁸ as being a

⁹² Texts from the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā are from my unpublished critical edition. Some of them are already found in Saccone 2016. However, I refer to pages and line numbers according to Ś.

⁹³ It should be noted that the progression of truths in the *cintāmayī prajñā* relates to Buddhist truths. In this particular chapter, however, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are relying on the provisional truth of the Sautrāntika standpoint in order to refute an inferior view that they do not consider as true at all (i.e., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view). This is also the case, for example, in the *Bhāvanākrama* I where, within the criticism of origination, Kamalaśīla analyzes the view of the heretics (*tīrthika*), who admit an eternal cause such as Īśvara.

⁹⁴ Funayama (2007: 192–199) notes that, in reference to TS 3236 and the omniscience of the Buddha, Kamalaśīla also discusses the internal debate between *nirākārajñānavādins* and *sākārajñānavādins* within the Yogācāra school.

⁹⁵ She has referred to this already in McClintock 2003. Previously, Kajiyama (1978) had also referred to a similar topic regarding the MAK.

⁹⁶ See Dunne 2004: 53–79; Dreyfus 1997: 98–99, 103–105; Kellner 2011a.

⁹⁷ I translate *bahirarthavāda* as "Externalism," more generally intending a view according to which material objects are real and are the cause of their cognitions (whether or not such cognitions assume the image of their objects). In addition, other occurrences of the term "Externalism" are used with this definition in mind. Cf. also Kamalaśīla's description n. 98.

⁹⁸ In this passage, Kamalaśīla actually describes this as a doctrine establishing that an external object is apprehended and that atoms are real. He then generally defines the theory that cognitions have an [external] object (*viśaya*) as *bahirarthavāda*. Cf. *tathā hidam jñānam aviśayam tāvad bahirarthavādinā satā naiveṣṭavyam anyathā hi vijñānamātratādarśanam eva syāt* | (TSP ad TS 591, ed. p. 245, 24–246, 10). "To explain, this cognition is not admitted as being, indeed, devoid of

provisional step and Vijñānavāda as being superior to that.⁹⁹ This provisional view is discussed and temporarily endorsed by Śāntarakṣita in TS 583–591.¹⁰⁰ He utilizes this standpoint in order to refute the

an object by someone who is a *bahirarthavādin* since, otherwise, precisely the theory of *vijñānamātratā* would be [admitted].” The term *bahirarthavādin* is used as a general means of referring to externalist views, and thus also to the Mīmāṃsakas; cf. *yeyam asmābhir vijñānavadasthūlāir nirākāracintā prāg akāri sā sāmpratam bāhyarthābhiniṣṭhān bhavato mīmāṃsakān prati bahirartham abhyupetya sarvajñe pratipādyamāne bhavatām bahirarthavādinām katham aṇi nopayuyjyāta eva kartum* | (TSP *ad* TS 3645, ed. p. 1130, 15–17. On this passage, see also McClintock 2010: 341 n. 742). On the term *bāhyarthavāda* and its use, see also n. 77, 78 and 289.

⁹⁹ Another occurrence of this sort is found in the Lokāyataparīkṣā. Cf. *kiṃ ca teṣāṃ cārvākānām kṣāṇikatvam abhyupagacchatām, svopagamah svasiddhānto bādhyate bhūtānām nityavābhyupagamo bādhyate bhūtānām nityavābhyupagamāt | yadi nyāyānurāgād vāh svapakṣe ’py anapekṣatā | bhūtāny eva na santīti nyāyo ’yam para iṣyatām ||* *atha yukyupelatvāt kṣāṇikatvam abhyupagamyate tadā vijñāptimātratānayas [tarhi expunge?] para utkṛṣṭo ’bhyupagamyatām, tatrāpi yukyupelatvasyābhyupagamakāraṇasya tulyatvāt ||* (TS 1887 and TSP *ad* TS 1885cd, 1887, ed. p. 649, 18–23). “Moreover, ‘for them,’ i.e., for the Cārvākas, who admit instantaneousness, ‘their own admitted [viewpoint,]’ i.e., their own *siddhānta* is ‘contradicted,’ namely, the admitted [viewpoint] of the permanence of the elements is contradicted because the permanence of elements is admitted [by them]. ‘If you disregard even your own position [of the permanence of elements] for [the] love of logic, [then] let the axiom that elements indeed do not exist be admitted [by you] as superior.’ If instantaneousness is accepted because of being logically tenable, then let the doctrine of *vijñāptimātratā* be admitted as superior, i.e., the best, because the fact of being logically tenable, [which is] the reason for admitting [it], is the same also in this case.” Here, with regard to the Cārvākas, it is argued that, if they are led to accept the instantaneousness of all entities for the love of logic, then they may as well admit that the doctrine (*naya*) of *vijñāptimātratā* is superior to theirs. In fact, in the *kārikā*, Śāntarakṣita does not explicitly mention *vijñāptimātratā*; it is Kamalaśīla who does, commenting on “the axiom that elements indeed do not exist” (*bhūtāny eva na santīti nyāyaḥ*), which is found in the stanza, with *vijñāptimātratānaya*. Kamalaśīla introduces a reference to TS 1887cd in TSP *ad* TS 1964 while presenting the *pūrvapakṣa*, as if to mark the passage to the new, higher level of analysis. McClintock (2010: 86) notices that the TSP is replete with explicit indications of shifts in the level of analysis.

¹⁰⁰ In particular, in TS 583–591 Śāntarakṣita is refuting a *pūrvapakṣa* previously expounded in TS 561–562. There, the idea at stake is that of a coarse (*sthūla*) object being logical because of two arguments: (i) since, otherwise, nothing at all could be perceived, given the imperceptibility of atoms; and (ii) since the very idea of subtleness (*sūkṣmatā*) is logically based on the concept of coarseness; accordingly, there would be neither the concept nor designation of “atom.” If one is not admitted, the other cannot hold either. Cf. *sthūlārthāsambhave tu syān naiva vṛkṣādīdarśanam | atīndriyatayānūnām na cānuvacanam bhavet ||* (TS 561) *sthūlavastuwyapekṣo hi susūkṣmo ’rthas tathocyate | sthūlaikavastvabhāve tu kimapekṣāsyā sūkṣmatā ||* (TS 562). “However, if a coarse object did not occur, [then] there would not be perception of trees, etc., at all. And, since atoms are beyond [the reach of the] senses, there could not be the expression ‘atom’ to refer to them. For a subtle object is called as such being dependent on a coarse thing, but, if there is not a coarse unitary thing, being dependent on what will something be [regarded as] subtle?” Cf. *yadi hy awayavī na syāt sarvāgrahaṇaprasaṅgaḥ, paramānūnām atīndriyatvāt | sthūlābhāve ’nur iti vyapadeśa eva na syāt | kasmād ity āha — sthūlavastuwyapekṣo hītyādi | subodham ||* (TSP *ad* TS 561–562, ed. p. 236, 15–17). “For, if there were no part-possessor, there would be the undesirable consequence of the non-apprehension of everything, because atoms are beyond [the reach of] the senses. If there is no coarse thing, the designation ‘atom’ itself would not exist. [To the implicit question,] ‘Why?’ [The opponent] responds, [with the words]

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika category (*padārtha*) of substance (*dravya*),¹⁰¹ particularly their view of atoms as being eternal and imperceptible. This Externalism at first seems to contradict the theory of *vijñaptimātratā* and the arguments used in its defense. This must have been quite evident to Kamalaśīla, who feels the need (but only in the middle of the argumentation)¹⁰² to specify that this Externalism is just an alternative view to be provisionally admitted. It will ultimately be superseded by a superior doctrine, the Vijñānavāda. Moreover, he makes a point of briefly outlining a few arguments against the very standpoint they are trying to defend in this chapter.¹⁰³ Significantly,

beginning, ‘For a subtle object is called as such.’ This is easily understood.” According to Kamalaśīla’s interpretation, TS 561 should read: “However, if a coarse object did not occur, [then] there would not be perception of trees, etc., at all, because atoms are beyond [the reach of] the senses. Also, there could not be the expression ‘atom’ to refer to them.” As is clear also from the TSP, the view referred to here is the one expressed in *Nyāyabhāṣya* and *Nyāyavārtika* on *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.34: *sarvāgrahṇam awayayasiddeh*. Cf. *Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.34 (ed. p. 75, 10–17) and *Nyāyavārtika ad Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.34 (ed. p. 227, 14–228, 2). With reference to this, cf. Saccone 2016: 168–171.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvam ayuktaṃ prāk prakāśitam | dravyādayaḥ śaḍ arthā ye vidyante pāramārthikāḥ ||* (TS 546) *ity ākṣapādakāṇādāḥ prāhur āgamamātrakāḥ | dravyādipratīṣedho ’yaṃ saikṣeṣeṇa tad ucyate ||* (TS 547). On these two verses, cf. Saccone 2016: 168 n. 14.

¹⁰² I believe the reason why Kamalaśīla feels the need to insert this digression here is that the view expressed in TS 587, on which he is commenting, is the proper response to what I shall call below the “Epistemic Proof” of the of the imperceptibility/unreality of atoms; cf. §4.1 and Saccone 2016.

¹⁰³ As noted by Arnold (2008: 15–16) and Ratié (2014: 358–362), in PVV *ad* PV Pratyakṣa 336, Manorathanandin responds to an objection by a Sautrāntika, who states that, even though an external imperceptible object is not proven, it is still not established as being non-existent. However, if the refutation of the existence of external objects is insisted upon by the opponent, the philosopher advises a further investigation according to Vasubandhu’s (*ācāryīya*) disproof of the reality of atoms, namely, the mereological analysis. Cf. *na, tathāpi parokṣasya bāhyasya sādhakasyābhāve ’pi nābhāvasthitir iti cet | pratibhāsamānam jñānam bāhyam tu na pratibhāsata eveti tāvataivābhimatasiddheḥ, sādhakapramāṇarahitapīṣācāyamānabahirarthanīṣedhe nāsmākam ādaraḥ | yadi tu tannīṣedhanirbandho garīyān sāmśatvānamśatvakalpanayā paramāṇupratīṣedha ācāryīyaḥ paryeṣitavyaḥ |* (PVV *ad* PV Pratyakṣa 336, ed. p. 220, 16–20. Regarding some emendations, I follow the Sanskrit text in Ratié 2014: 359 n. 23). This passage has been interpreted differently by Arnold and Ratié; I follow Ratié. Arnold notes how, here, one should make a distinction between epistemic arguments for idealism (i.e., that all we immediately know are mental things) and metaphysical arguments (i.e., that only those mental things exist). The difference between the two scholars lies in the fact that Arnold considers the second type of argument (which is found in Vasubandhu) as a further, decisive, demonstration of idealism. By contrast, Ratié notes that for Manorathanandin, the epistemic argument neutralizes all ontological questions — it shows that investigating into the existence of external objects is useless. Only a stubborn opponent must be lead to investigate according to the mereological analysis. In the TSP, Kamalaśīla is surely also adding “metaphysical arguments” in order to prove the non-existence of atoms. However, the context and scope here are quite different from that of Manorathanandin. For an overview of recent scholarship on the subject of the epistemic as opposed to the metaphysical variety of idealism, see Ratié 2014 and the bibliography therein.

these arguments are also found in the *Vimśikā*.¹⁰⁴

He says:

*etac ca sarvaṃ paramāṇūnāṃ siddhiṃ bāhyasya cārthasya
pratyakṣatvasiddhiṃ abhyupagamyoktam | yasya tu vijñānavādinō na
bāhyo rtho nīlādirūpatayā pratyakṣasiddhaḥ, svapnādau vināpi bāhyam
arthaṃ tathāvidhanīlādīpratibhāśopalambhena saṃśayāt tasya ca
nīlādirūpasyaikānekasvabhāvasūnyatvena bhrāntajñānapratibhāśātmaka-
tvāt, nāpi paramāṇavaḥ siddhāś teṣāṃ paurvāparyāvasthāyitayā
digbhāgabhedinām ekatvāsiddheḥ | taṃ¹⁰⁵ prati katham nīlādirūpatayā
paramāṇūnāṃ pratyakṣatvaṃ pūrvāparyasya¹⁰⁶ cānupalakṣaṇam¹⁰⁷
bhrāntinimittēnārthāntarasamāropād iti śakyaṃ vaktum |* (TSP ad
TS 587, ed. p. 244, 20–245, 12)

And all this[, which has been discussed so far,] is stated accepting (*abhyupagamyā*)¹⁰⁸ the establishment of atoms and the establishment of the apprehensibility of an external object. But [there is the] *vijñānavādin*, for whom an external object is not established as being directly perceived as having the form of [something] blue, etc., (1) since there is a doubt because of [the occurrence], in [the case of] dreams, etc., [of] a perception having the appearance of a blue [thing], etc., of that kind[, i.e., as if it were external,] also without an external object; and (2) because this [external] form of a blue [thing], etc., has the nature of an appearance belonging to an erroneous cognition, since it is devoid of a *svabhāva*, either one or many; [and for whom] atoms are not established either, (3) because there is no establishment of the singularity, regarding those which

¹⁰⁴ For the title of the work as being *Vimśikā* instead of *Vimśatikā*, cf. Kanō Kazuo 2008: 345. A recent and exhaustive analysis of the *Vimśikā* as a whole, along with a bibliography of studies on the work, is found in Kellner–Taber 2014.

¹⁰⁵ Jp^g (and Pp^g) has the following gloss here: *jñānavādinam prati*.

¹⁰⁶ *pūrvā°* Jp Pp (*pūrvā°*) *paurvā°* K Ś

¹⁰⁷ *cā°* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*yai*) *vā°* K Ś

¹⁰⁸ McClintock (2010: 65 n. 155) refers precisely to this passage to point out that the technical term *abhyupagamyā* indicates the provisional status of an argument, translating it as “having [provisionally] accepted.” In Kamalaśīla’s usage, *abhyupagam-* is also found in the sense of “accepting,” “admitting” *tout court*. Nonetheless, the sense of a provisional admittance is confirmed by the subsequent passages. For her interpretation of *abhyupagam-*, she referred me to Marui 2012 (McClintock 2016, personal communication, June). McClintock (2010: 65) uses this reference to argue that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla always advance *ad hominem* arguments (that is, arguments against a particular opponent and/or school) merely as provisional steps to larger arguments addressing a universal audience (*ad humanitatem* arguments), where the latter consists of an ideal audience of judicious persons. Regarding *ad hominem* arguments, she follows the definition of Perelman and Olbrechts–Tyteca (1969: 111): “arguments which the speaker knows would be without weight for the universal audience, as he conceives it.”

are endowed with different parts based on orientation, since they are placed in [spatial] continuity. How is it possible to tell him[, i.e., the *viññānavādin*,] that atoms are directly apprehended as being endowed with the form of a blue [thing], etc., and that [things] that are in [spatial] continuity are not distinct, since there is the superimposition of a different object because of an error?

While advocating this Externalism, both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla use certain arguments that they will subsequently refute in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* and that are similar to those of Śubhagupta.¹⁰⁹ In TS 583, Śāntarakṣita upholds that atoms are the object (*gocara*) of sense perceptions when they arise as supporting each other in being the cause of their own cognition:

anyonyābhisarās caivaṃ ye jātāḥ paramāṇavaḥ |
*naivātīndriyatā teṣāṃ akṣāṇām*¹¹⁰ *gocaratvataḥ ||* (TS 583)

And the atoms that, meeting (*abhisara*) one another, arise in this way[, i.e., endowed with a differentiated condition,] are not at all beyond the [reach of the] senses because they are the object (*gocara*) of sense perceptions.

And Kamalaśīla comments on this:

asiddham aṇūnām atīndriyatvaṃ viśiṣṭāvasthāprāptānām indriyagrāhya-
tvāt | yasya hi nityāḥ paramāṇava iti pakṣas taṃ praty aṇūnām
viśeṣābhāvāt sarvādaivātīndriyatvaṃ syāt, nāsmān prati | ***anyonyā-***
bhisarā *ity anyonyasahāyā ity arthaḥ ||* (TSP ad TS 583, ed. p. 243, 13–16)

The fact that atoms are beyond the [reach of the] senses is unestablished, because [those atoms] that are found with a specific condition[, i.e., the quality of producing a cognition,] are apprehensible by the senses. For atoms can be always and only beyond the [reach of the] senses [only] according to him whose view is that atoms are eternal, since, for him, there is not a difference¹¹¹ [in their condition], but not for us. “Meeting one another” means “assisting each other.”

The view expressed here is that atoms, since they arise together, come into existence by means of a special characteristic, or “distinct condition”

¹⁰⁹ What may be considered a contradiction in their *modus argumentandi* is that they first utilize these views as the best ones in order to refute the Vaiśeṣika concept of atoms as eternal and imperceptible. However, later, in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* (see §4.5), they accuse Śubhagupta, who actually maintains very similar views on atoms, of having gotten too close to the Vaiśeṣika system.

¹¹⁰ *akṣāṇām* Jk Pk Ś T_{1P} T_{1D} (*dbaṇ po'i*) *anyānām* K

¹¹¹ Given the context, *viśeṣa* might also refer more precisely to a “specifying feature” of the atoms.

(*viśiṣṭāvasthā*),¹¹² and are different from the previous atoms in the same continuums. This characteristic is the causal capacity of producing awareness, and indeed coincides with their own-nature. Such atoms cannot be considered beyond the perception of the senses, since they themselves are the cause of that kind of sense awareness.¹¹³ Therefore, it is proven that atoms are apprehensible. Moreover, in TS 587 (cf. §4.3),¹¹⁴ Śāntarakṣita also proves that atoms, in terms of their *śvalakṣaṇa*, are apprehended by sense perceptions, even though they are not conceptually determined with their partless nature.

¹¹² Cf. *ye 'pi prthak samastā vā kvacid upayujyante ta avasthāviśeṣavācibhiḥ sakrd eva śabdaiḥ pratyayārthaṃ khyāpyante sanidarśanāḥ sapratighā veti tadanyebhyo bhedaśāmānyena* | (PVSV ad PV Svārthānumāna 137–142, ed. p. 68, 21–24). Here, Dharmakīrti talks about a condition (*avasthā*) that all atoms acquire individually or as aggregates. They are expressed by words that signify this condition. See Dunne 2004: 106–107.

¹¹³ This view, especially the idea of a *viśeṣa* that coincides with the condition of atoms arising together, reminds us of a similar theory expressed in PV Pratyakṣa 195–196: *arthāntarābhisambandhāḥ jāyante ye 'navo 'pare | uktās te sañcitās te hi nimittam jñājanmanah* || (PV Pratyakṣa 195). *anūnām sa viśeṣaś ca nāntarenāparān anūn | tad ekānīyamāḥ jñānam uktam sāmānyagocaram* || (PV Pratyakṣa 196). “Those atoms, which are different [from the previous ones in the same continuum and] arise because of a relation with other things[, i.e., atoms], are said [to be] ‘aggregated’ (*sañcita*), for they are the cause of producing a cognition. And this specific characteristic [of producing a cognition] of atoms is not without other atoms; therefore, because it is not necessarily related to a single [atom], a cognition is said to have a whole (*sāmānya*) as [its] object.” These are regarded as the statement of what has been defined as Dharmakīrti’s *bāhyārthavāda* (or also the Sautrāntika standpoint), which is subsequently refuted by the author himself in favor of the “superior” Vijñānavāda. Cf. also *ko vā virodho bahavaḥ samjātātīśayāḥ sakrd | bhavyeṣu kārāṇam buddher yadī nāmendriyādivat* || (PV Pratyakṣa 223). “Or else, what is the contradiction if many [atoms] endowed with an arisen preeminence were simultaneously the cause of a cognition, like the senses and so on?” Cf. Tosaki 1979: 319–320. On this, cf. Saccone 2015: 126–128. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla most likely also have the elaboration of the early commentators in mind. Cf., e.g., Devendrabuddhi’s PVP: *don gzan dan ni mñon 'drel phyir | mam par śes par skyed par byed pa'i nus pa'i rañ b'zin skyed pa'i rkyen ñe ba'i phyir | rdul phra rab ñe bar len pa'i rgyu śnar nus pa med pa dag las mam par śes pa skyed par byed pa'i nus pa* | (PVP D 189b₁₋₂). “Due to a relation with other objects, that is, due to the presence of conditions that generate a *svabhāva*, that is, the capacity of producing a cognition, atoms [arising] from their previous primary causes [(i.e., previous atoms in the same continuum)] that do not have the power have the capacity of producing a cognition.” On this passage, cf. Dunne 2004: 103. Moreover, Śākyabuddhi states: *mam par śes pa skyed par byed pa'i nus pa'i rañ b'zin skyed pa'i rkyen ñe ba'i phyir zes bya ba ni mam par śes pa skyed par byed pa rdul phra rab kyi | rañ b'zin skyed pa gañ yin pa de'i rkyen te | lhan cig byed pa gañ yin pa de ñe ba'i phyir zes bya ba'i don to* | (PVT D ñe 198b₇–199a₁). “Due to the presence of conditions that generate a *svabhāva* that is the capacity of producing a cognition, atoms produce a cognition. However, [the] condition is the generating of [that] *svabhāva*. What is [their] cooperation, that is because [they] are proximate. This is the meaning.” On the same line is the much later Manorathanandin; cf. *anūnām sa ca jñājananasāmārthyalakṣaṇo viśeṣo 'parān anūn avyavadhānavartino 'ntareṇa vinā na bhavati* | (PVV ad PV Pratyakṣa 196, ed. p. 177, 13–14). On this cf. Saccone 2016: 176 n. 45.

¹¹⁴ As we shall see, TS 587 is one of those points where Śāntarakṣita convincingly argues that atoms are not conceptually distinguished because they are the object of sense cognitions only in terms of *śvalakṣaṇa*.

As we shall see, in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā*, the idea of atoms being apprehended is one of the main targets of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's criticism; the non-perception of their partless, unitary nature is (one piece of) evidence in favor of *vijñaptimātratā*. In this context, they introduce a long and detailed refutation of Śubhagupta's idea, as expressed in the BASK, especially kk. 33de–37, that atoms are indeed established by perception, in spite of not being distinguished individually.

The reason for this apparent contradiction lies in the composite nature of the TS and the TSP. From the point of view of the philosophical debate against their opponents, in the *Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā*, this view, which I called Externalism (but may also be defined as Sautrāntika), reveals itself as particularly useful for refuting other, “inferior” externalisms, particularly that of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. From the point of view of the philosophical-analytical process inherent in the two works, it responds to the very character of the practice of the *cintāmayī prajñā*. The idea of provisionally accepting one standpoint as fit for denying other inferior theories, but with the intention of surpassing it with a far superior truth still (a method certainly not unique to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla) is also found in other works by these authors.¹¹⁵ In the *Bhāvanākramas*, in particular, this is described as a part of the practice of the *cintāmayī prajñā*, propaedeutic to the *vipaśyanā*,¹¹⁶ which

¹¹⁵ On this hierarchy of views as found in the MAK, its *vṛtti* by Śāntarakṣita and the *pañjikā* by Kamalaśīla, in particular, see Kajiyama 1978. Kajiyama also refers to the *Bhāvanākrama* I and the quotation of *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 10.256–258 (ed. p. 298–299) found therein. On the latter topic, see also Nagasawa 1962; Gómez 1983; Lindtner 1997; Bentor 2002. This quotation is also found in the MAV and MAP; cf., respectively, ed. p. 296, 298, 300 and 297, 299, 301 as well as in the MĀ (D 157a). On this, cf. also Ichigō 1989: 156–157, 220–223 and Kajiyama 1978: 132. For a recent contribution on the development of the argumentations in the *Bhāvanākrama* I, see Arnold 2015 (online).

¹¹⁶ For example, in the *Bhāvanākramas*, the *vipaśyanā* consists of gradually surpassing the *pudgalavāda*, the false concept of the existence of material *dharmas* and so on. Cf. [...] *tato vipaśyanāṃ bhāwayet | bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate | bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgaladharmanairātmyam | tatra pudgalanairātmyaṃ yā skandhānām ātmāmīyarahitā | dharmanairātmyaṃ yā teṣāṃ eva māyopama-tā | [...] tato rūpiṇo 'pi dharmān dharmanairātmyādhigamāya vicārayet [...] tathā cānupalabhamānas teṣv astināstivavikalpān nivartayati | cittamātram ca traidhātukam avatarati nānyathā | [...] sa evaṃ vicārayati | cittam api paramārthato māyāvat anutpannam | [...] yathā citrākāratayā rūpādayo naikānekasvabhāvas tathā cittam api tadavyatirekeṇa naikānekasvabhāvam | [...] tasmān māyopamam eva cittam | yathā cittam evaṃ sarvadharmā māyāvat paramārthato 'nutpannāḥ |* (*Bhāvanākrama* III, ed. p. 5, 17–20; 6, 5–11; 6, 21–7, 9). “Therefore, one should realize *vipaśyanā*. And the investigation of reality is called '*vipaśyanā*.' Moreover, the reality is the selflessness of *pudgala* and *dharmas*. Between these, the selflessness of *pudgala* is that the aggregates are devoid of 'I' and 'mine.' The selflessness of *dharmas* is that they are indeed similar to an illusion. [...] Therefore, in order to understand the selflessness of *dharmas*, one should examine also the material *dharmas*. [...] And thus, not perceiving [material *dharmas*], he abandons the concepts regarding their existence and non-existence. Moreover, he comes to understand that these three worlds are mind-only, not differently. [...] He investigates as follows: 'Also mind, from an absolute point of view, is non-arisen, like an illusion.' [...] Just as visual forms, [sensations,] etc., because of having variegated aspects, are devoid of *svabhāva*, either one or many, similarly also mind,

leads to the direct realization of the supreme truth of the Madhyamaka. In this meditative practice, according to Kamalaśīla, the Vijñānavāda indeed surpasses the Sautrāntika, only to be subsequently transcended by the Madhyamaka. Accordingly, the philosophical examination of the doctrines contained in the different *parīkṣās* of the TS(P) can also be regarded as being directly connected to *cintāmayī prajñā* (and *vipaśyanā*). Specifically, the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā and the Bahirarthaparīkṣā (each with their different kinds of arguments — those outlined in the former being provisional, and those in the later, final) can be considered as distinct, necessary and consecutive steps of this process.

3.3 Positions on the Nature of an

External Object: Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

In the *pūrvapakṣa*, in order to disprove the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between *jñānatva* and *grāhyagrāhakarāhitatva*, the opponent opposes the proof through direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). Unless one wants to discuss the validity itself of *pratyakṣa* as a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*)¹¹⁷ (this being an undesirable consequence for both the Vijñānavādins and their opponents), one cannot but admit that it establishes the existence of external elements as being separate from cognition; that is, they are apprehended as being real.¹¹⁸

According to the previous argument, if being real (or being apprehended as real) is pervaded by the fact of having a *svabhāva*, then, Śāntarakṣita argues, an analysis of the kind of nature (i.e., *svabhāva*) that an external object has when appearing in a cognition is in order. In this respect, Śāntarakṣita refers to two positions — (A) an external object has atoms as its *svabhāva*; or (B) an external object has a part-possessor as its characterizing feature (*lakṣaṇa*):

bhāsamānaḥ kimātmāyaṃ bāhyo 'rthaḥ pratibhāsate |
paramāṇusvabhāvaḥ kiṃ kiṃ vāvayavilakṣaṇaḥ || (TS 1966)

With which nature does this external object manifest, when appearing [in direct perception]? Having atoms as [its] *svabhāva* or having the part-possessor (*vayavin*) as [its] characterizing feature?

through a non-difference from those, is devoid of *svabhāva*, either one or many. [...] Therefore, mind is nothing but similar to an illusion. Like mind, also all *dharma*s, similar to an illusion, are non-arisen from an absolute point of view.”

¹¹⁷ As is known, the term *pramāṇa* has been rendered with slightly different English translations, all of them conveying the idea of a means of (or simply) valid, reliable or trustworthy cognition and so on. I shall mostly leave it untranslated.

¹¹⁸ The opponent claims that direct perception apprehends external objects as separate. If the Vijñānavādin does not admit the reality of external objects, in spite of their appearing vividly in direct perception, then he is putting into discussion its being a *pramāṇa*. On this, cf. English Translation n. 21.

Commenting on this stanza, Kamalaśīla lists not two, but three possible positions (*pakṣa*) on the nature of an external object that can be established by direct perception:

*tatra pratyakṣasiddho 'rtho bāhyo bhavann aneko vā paramāṇuśo bhinno
bhavet, eko vā tair ārabdho 'vayavī, sthūlo 'nārabdho veti pakṣāḥ |*
(TSP *ad* TS 1966)

In this respect, the positions [to be considered] are [as follows].
An object that is established by direct perception, provided that it is external, could be: (I) many, distinct in [terms of] atoms;
(II) one, a part-possessor composed of them; (III) coarse, not [being] composed [of atoms].

At the point where Śāntarakṣita discusses position (A) and Kamalaśīla position (I), Śubhagupta is introduced for the first time. However, before discussing Śubhagupta's views and their refutation, I shall illustrate the background of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's statements of their respective positions.

3.4 Theses on the Nature of an

External Object: Vasubandhu and Diñnāga

With regard to the above-mentioned positions, it was likely that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla bore in mind certain earlier works. In *Vīṃśikā* 11 and its *vr̥tti*,¹¹⁹ Vasubandhu mentions three possible theses concerning the nature of an external sense sphere that could be the object of sense perceptions, being: (i) one, like the part-possessor admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas;¹²⁰ (ii) many atoms; or (iii) those atoms aggregated (*saṃhata*).¹²¹

¹¹⁹ See *na tad ekaṃ na cānekaṃ viśayaḥ paramāṇuśaḥ | na ca te saṃhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na siddhyati | |* (*Vīṃśikā* 11) [...] *yat tad rūpādīkaṃ āyatanaṃ rūpādīvijñaptīnāṃ pratyekaṃ viśayaḥ syāt tad ekaṃ vā syād yathāvayavirūpaṃ kalpyate vaiśeṣikāiḥ | anekaṃ vā paramāṇuśaḥ | saṃhatā vā ta eva paramāṇavaḥ |* (*vr̥tti* on *Vīṃśikā* 11, ed. p. 6, 27–29). “That [external *āyatana*] as the object (*viśaya*) [of sensory perceptions] is not one, nor many [divided] into atoms. Nor is it those [atoms themselves when] aggregated, since the atom is not established.” [...] “Any [external] *āyatana*, such as the visual form, which could be the object (*viśaya*), respectively, of the perceptions of visual forms, etc., could be one, like [that] form that is the part-possessor is imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas; or many [divided] into atoms; or those atoms themselves [when] aggregated.”

¹²⁰ The *avayavin*, translated as “part-possessor,” or “whole,” is a new ontological reality, composed of parts, but existing as distinct from, and spreading over, them. This term is found and discussed in the *Nyāyasūtra* (2.1.31–37; 4.2.4–17). Cf. also n. 100.

¹²¹ Hattori (1968: 89) distinguishes between the two terms *sañcita* and *saṅghāta* as indicating two different ways in which atoms are admitted as aggregating by Diñnāga in AP 1–5 and Vasubandhu in *Vīṃśikā* 11 and *vr̥tti*. He claims that they divide realists into three groups based on their theories regarding the object-support of cognitions. The first group maintains that the object of a cognition is a *dravya*, i.e., an individual atom or an *avayavin*; the second group, that it is an aggregate (*sañcita*) of atoms; and the third, that it is the gathering (*saṅghāta*) of atoms. He then adds that the second group is reported by Kuiji to be the Vaibhāṣikas. Kapstein (2001: 186), referring only to *Vīṃśikā* 11 and *vr̥tti*, interprets the theses as (i) the whole as a

In contrast, in both the *Ālambanaparīkṣavṛtti* (ĀPV) and the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV), Diñnāga puts forward only two possible theses¹²² regarding an external object-support (*ālambana*) of sense cognitions.¹²³

simple part-possessing form; (ii) the mere sum of atomic parts; and (iii) a unified collection of atomic parts. I do not think that, in the BASK, Śubhagupta makes a distinction between *sañcita* atoms and *saṅghāta* atoms. There, he refutes both the aggregates of atoms, 'dus pa, in the ĀP, and aggregated atoms, *saṃhata*, in the *Vimśikā*. On this, cf. Saccone 2015. For a brief discussion of the term 'dus pa, as well as the terms *sañcita* and *saṅghāta*, cf. Saccone 2015: p. 111 n. 11.

¹²² In ĀP 3 and ĀPV, after discussing and refuting these two alternatives, Diñnāga also mentions a third thesis by some masters who uphold that atoms are the cause of a cognition endowed with the image of their aggregates ('dus pa). I do not think that Diñnāga mentions this as a truly different thesis on the external object-support of perceptions, but is somehow including it in the two other positions. Cf. *rdul phra rab mams la yan* 'dus par snañ ba'i šes pa bskyed pa'i rgyu'i dños po yod do || (ĀPV ad ĀP 3cd, ed. p. 159, 2–3).

¹²³ In PSV ad PS 1.15, the theses are introduced as follows: those with the image of which a cognition arises are called *ālambana*; or things, as they really exist, are the cause of a cognition (and are accordingly regarded as its *ālambana*), even though the latter has an image different from theirs. Here, Diñnāga is analyzing a definition of *pratyakṣa* as found in the *Vāḍavidhi* (a work by Vasubandhu that Diñnāga denies as his, or views as not expressing the quintessence of his thought), namely *tato 'rthād vijñānaṃ pratyakṣam* "the cognition [that arises] from that object is [said to be] direct perception." While refuting this, he considers the possible meaning of *ālambana* with reference to sense cognitions. Cf. *rūpādiṣu tv ālambanārtho vaktavyaḥ. kim yadābhāsaṃ teṣu jñānam utpadyate, tathā ta ālambanam ity uktā atha yathāvidyamānā anyābhāsaśyāpi vijñānasya kāraṇaṃ bhavanti. tataḥ kim iti cet, yadi yathābhāsaṃ teṣu jñānam utpadyate, tadā [em.] sañcitālambanatvāt pañcānāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ saṃvṛtisad evālambanam iti. kāmaṃ nīlādyābhāseṣu vijñāneṣu tato 'rthād utpannam vijñānaṃ pratyakṣam syāt. tathā hi teṣu tatsamudāye prajñaptisatyāpi dravyasadākāro labhyate. dravyasaṅkhyādyākāreṣu api tu prāpnoti. ta eva hi dravyāditvena ābhāsante. atha yathā vidyamānā kāraṇaṃ bhavanti, evaṃ satī dravyādiṣu prasaṅgadoṣo na syāt, tathā teṣāṃ asattvāt. evaṃ tu yasya tad vyapadiśyate ity etan na prāpnoti. na hi pratyekaṃ teṣu jñānaṃ. pratyekaṃ ca te samudītāḥ kāraṇaṃ, na tatsamudāyaḥ, prajñaptisattvāt. tad evāha yadābhāsaṃ na tat tasmāc citālambam hi pañcakam | yatas tat paramārthena na tasya vyapadiśyate || ity antaraślokaḥ. yāvac cakṣurādīnāṃ apy ālambanatvaprasaṅgaḥ. te 'pi hi paramārthato 'nyathā vidyamānā nīlādyābhāsaśyā dvicandrādyābhāsaśyā ca jñānasya kāraṇībhavanti. artharūpaviviktaṃ ca na vācyam sarvaṃ jñānam artharūpavyatirekenāśakyam vyapadeṣtum. viśayo 'sya ca | sāmānyarūpanirdeśyas tasmān na vyapadiśyate || [pañcānāṃ vijñānānāṃ viśayas tatsāmānyarūpeṇa vyapadiśyate, na tu svarūpeṇa vyapadiśyate. sāmānyarūpeṇa rūpāditvena vyapadiśyeta. tasmāt pañcānāṃ vijñānānāṃ viśayo na śakyo vyapadeṣtum ...] (PS 1.15–16 and PSV, ed. p. 6, 7–7, 5). "However, with regard to visual forms, etc., one should state the meaning of *ālambana*. (i) Is it those [aggregates] with the image of which the cognition, regarding the [visual forms, etc.,] arises that are accordingly said [to be its] '*ālambana*'? Or (ii) do [things] as they really exist[, i.e., atoms] become the cause of a cognition even though it has another image? If [it is said], 'What follows from this?' [The answer is that] if a cognition regarding the [visual forms, etc.,] arises as it appears, thus, since the five groups of [bare sense] cognitions have the aggregates [of atoms] as [their] *ālambana*, the *ālambana* [of that cognition] would be only conventionally true. Let us grant that, with reference to cognitions having the images of [something] blue, etc., a cognition arisen from that object can be direct perception. To explain, regarding these [cognitions], even though the aggregations of those [atoms] are conventionally true, [still] the image of something existing substantially is perceived (*labhyate*). However, this [would] also follow with regard to images of substances or numbers, etc. [i.e., the *padārthas* of the Vaiśeṣikas.] For those[, i.e., atoms,] indeed appear as substances,*

In ĀPV *ad* ĀP 1, the theses presented are (i) atoms and (ii) their aggregates (*de 'dus pa*).¹²⁴

As previously mentioned, Śāntarakṣita introduces two theses, as does Diñnāga in the ĀP and the ĀPV. They both refer to the view of atoms as being the real nature of an external object.¹²⁵ Moreover, if one interprets

[numbers,] etc. If [one supposes that things] as they really exist[, i.e., atoms,] are the cause [and, accordingly, the *ālambana* of a cognition], this being the case, the defect of the *prasaṅga* regarding [the perception] of substances, [numbers,] etc., would not [follow], since those do not exist like that. However, in this way this [statement] 'of which [object (*viṣaya*)] it[, i.e., cognition] is called [...]' does not follow, for the cognition is not of the [atoms] individually. And, having individually arisen together, they are the cause, not their aggregate [is the cause], as [the latter] has only a conceptual reality. He states precisely this: 'That[, i.e., the cognition,] is not [arisen] from that of which [it] has the appearance, for the five [groups of sense cognitions] have the aggregates (*cita*) as object-support. Ultimately that[, i.e., the cognition,] is not named with reference to that from which [it arises].' This is an *antarasloka*. Also as for the eyes, etc., there [would] be the *prasaṅga* of being the *ālambana* [of cognitions]. For they, too, ultimately existing otherwise [that is, having a different form,] become the cause of cognitions that have the image of [a] blue [thing], etc., and that have the image of a double moon, etc. 'And [a cognition] cannot be expressed as distinct from the form of [its] object.' All cognitions cannot be expressed without [expressing] the form of [their] object. 'And the object of that [cognition], being indicated through a general (*sāmānya*) form, is therefore not designated.' The object of the five [bare] cognitions is designated through that general form, but not through its own form. [This object] could be designated as visual form, etc., by virtue of a general form. Therefore, the object of the five [bare] cognitions cannot be designated. [...]' Hattori (1968: 119 n. 2.20), referring to the first thesis regarding external *ālambanas*, discusses it and points out that Jinendrabuddhi calls it *anekākārāthavāda*. According to this view, individual atoms are the cause of a cognition, with each of them being the cause of a single representation that constitutes that cognition. When the atoms are homogeneous, the form of an object appears in the cognition as the totality of their representations; when they are not homogeneous, the form that appears in the cognition is not the sum of those representations, but rather the product of *kalpanā*. Hattori ascribes this view to Śubhagupta. As we shall see in the following, I do not think that Śubhagupta's view can be considered as consistently corresponding to the *anekākārāthavāda* as described above.

¹²⁴ Cf. *gañ dag mig la sogs pa'i mam par śes pa'i dmigs pa phyi rol gyi don yin par 'dod pa de dag ni de'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir rdul phra rab dag yin pa'am der snañ ba'i śes pa skye ba'i phyir de 'dus pa yin par rtog grañ na* | (ĀPV *ad* ĀP 1, ed. p. 157, 1–4). "Those who admit that the object-support of sense cognitions is an external object imagine that [this] is atoms since they are their cause, or that [this] is aggregates of them, since the cognition arises as being endowed with [their] image in it." In the ĀP and the ĀPV, Diñnāga indicates two requirements for being an object-support of a cognition: bestowing its image on it and being its cause. He proves that the two positions concerning external entities (*don/*artha*) as object-support (*dmigs pa/*ālambana*) of sensory perceptions are not logical, because they lack one of those requirements. Atoms are not the object of a perception, since they do not bestow their form on it. Cf. *der mi snañ phyir de'i yul ni* || *rdul phran ma yin dbaṅ po bžin* || (ĀP 1cd). Aggregates are not the object-supports of a perception because they cannot be the cause of it. On this cf. n. 178 and 179. Śastry (1980: 4) attributes the thesis of atoms as an object of cognition to the Vaiśṇavikas, such as Śubhagupta (*sic*). He also notes that, according to Kuiji, the thesis of aggregates of atoms as an object of cognition is that of the authors of the Sūtra sect, perhaps the Sautrāntika (*sic*).

¹²⁵ In ĀP 1 and ĀPV *ad* ĀP 1, Diñnāga refers to atoms as the cause of a cognition, i.e., as a real entity that is the true nature of what appears in cognition. Analogously, in PSV *ad* PS 15,

avayavin as simply an aggregate of atoms,¹²⁶ then the second view in Śāntarākṣita also appears to be similar to the second one in Diñnāga.

On the contrary, the three theses of Vasubandhu and Kamalaśīla are stated in a slightly different way. Both present the idea of an external object being manifold in terms of atoms. In Vasubandhu this is the second thesis (*anekaṃ vā paramāṇuśaḥ*). In Kamalaśīla it is the first, which is the only one discussed in depth, and is attributed to Śubhagupta (*aneko vā paramāṇuśo bhinnah*).¹²⁷ They both refer to one *avayavin*; Vasubandhu in the first thesis, Kamalaśīla in the second. Nevertheless, while Vasubandhu defines this precisely as the part-possessor that is conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas, Kamalaśīla simply describes it as unitary and composed of atoms (*tair ārabdhaḥ*), not necessarily intending the Vaiśeṣika concept of a new entity existing as distinct from its parts and spreading over them.

What is most puzzling here is the presentation of the third thesis. Vasubandhu states that atoms are the object (*viśaya*) of a cognition when they are aggregated (*saṃhata*); the Vaibhāṣikas from Kaśmīr are his main target.¹²⁸ In contrast, Kamalaśīla refers to a coarse thing not composed by them. Indeed, he is alluding to a non-atomistic view when expressly saying, “coarse, not [being] composed [of atoms].”¹²⁹ However, the refutation is based on an argument that is already present in PV Pramāṇasiddhi 84¹³⁰ and is addressed against the concept of the part-possessor.

Being certainly aware of Vasubandhu’s *Viṃśikā*, it appears that Kamalaśīla intentionally omits the thesis of atoms as aggregated (*saṃhata*). However, as we will see, Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla do deal with such a

even though he does not expressly mention atoms, he refers to things as they really exist, which are the cause of a cognition.

¹²⁶ Alternatively, the term *avayavin* may be a precise reference to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of the part-possessor.

¹²⁷ As we have already seen, Kamalaśīla introduces Śubhagupta’s views on atoms and their refutation while discussing this thesis.

¹²⁸ Unlike with the Vaiśeṣikas, Vasubandhu does not immediately ascribe this view to the Vaibhāṣikas. However, after refuting it, he introduces an objection of theirs defending the idea of *saṃhata* atoms. Cf. *naiva hi paramāṇavaḥ saṃyujyante niravayavatvāt | mā bhūḍ eṣa doṣaprasaṅgaḥ | saṃhataś tu paraṣparaṃ saṃyujyanta iti kāśmīravaibhāṣikāḥ |* (*ṛtti* on *Viṃśikā* 13, ed. p. 7, 9–10). “It is not indeed that atoms conjoin, since they do not have parts. Let there not be the undesirable consequence of [the above-mentioned] defect [for us]. However, [when] aggregated [they] join each other. This is [the view of] the Vaibhāṣikas from Kaśmīr.”

¹²⁹ Also Vasubandhu, after having analyzed and refuted these three theses, takes into consideration the thesis that the object (*viśaya*) of a sense cognition can be unitary, arguing as follows: *ekatve na krameṇetir yugāpan na grahāgrahau | vicchinmānekavṛttiś ca sūkṣmānūṣā ca no bhavet ||* (*Viṃśikā* 15). “If [the object] is unitary, there could not be gradual moving, nor simultaneous apprehension and non-apprehension; neither the existence of [things that are] separate and manifold nor the non-perception of subtle things could be there.”

¹³⁰ Cf. *pānyādikampe sarvasya kampaḥprāpter virodhinaḥ | ekasmin karmaṇo ’yogāt syāt prthak siddhir anyathā ||* (PV Pramāṇasiddhi 84). Cf. English Translation n. 145. Cf. TSP ad TS 1997 Sanskrit Text p. 172, 20–173, 1 and English Translation p. 255.

view, using similar arguments as found in the *Vīmśikā*, in their refutation of the first thesis, i.e., position (A) and position (I), respectively.¹³¹ Within this refutation, their main opponent is Śubhagupta.

4.

The Apprehensibility of Atoms: Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Śubhagupta

4.1 Atoms and Their Proof Through Direct Perception:

The Vijñānavāda “Epistemic Proof” in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā;

**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* kk. 35 and 44 as Quoted in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā

As just seen, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla first introduce Śubhagupta’s ontological and epistemological views when refuting the idea of atoms being external, apprehensible realities.¹³² They do so through direct quotations from the BASK.

In refuting position (A), Śāntarakṣita says:

na tāvat paramānūnām ākāraḥ prativedyate |
niraṃśānekamūrtānām pratyayāprativedanāt | | (TS 1967)

First of all, the form of atoms is not specifically brought to awareness (*prativedyate*), since, in cognition, there is no specific awareness (*prativedana*)¹³³ of [atoms being] devoid of parts, many and corporeal.

Śāntarakṣita claims that atoms are not established by direct perception because they do not appear in it in their partless nature-form.¹³⁴ This proof — that an object of sensory perception must appear with its own form to be admitted as apprehended by perception — is already present in the *Vīmśikā*¹³⁵ and the ĀP.¹³⁶ Accordingly, as we will see, Śubhagupta regards

¹³¹ As we will see, in refuting this, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla utilize two main arguments: (i) atoms are not proven through direct perception, since they never bestow their image on it (the “Epistemic Proof”; cf. §4.1); and (ii) atoms are not real, since they are not established as unitary. While the first argument is similar to the one used by Vasubandhu in refuting his first thesis, i.e., many atoms (cf. n. 119), the second is directly (and in the TSP explicitly) connected with the refutation of Vasubandhu’s third thesis, i.e., these atoms themselves when aggregated.

¹³² On this first part of the Bahirarthaparīkṣā and Śubhagupta, see also Duckworth et al. 2016: 64–68.

¹³³ Here, the term *prativedana* conveys the idea of a singular, specific perception of each atom. On the translation of this word, cf. Saccone 2014: 383 n. 27.

¹³⁴ I translate *rūpa* as nature-form in those occurrences when the meanings of “nature” and “material form” are both found at the same time. The term is otherwise variously translated as “form,” “nature” and “visual form.”

¹³⁵ Atoms are not the object of sensory perceptions because they are not apprehended individually. Cf. *nāpy anekam paramānūnām pratyekam agrahaṇāt |* (*vṛtti* on *Vīmśikā* 11, ed. p. 6, 30–7, 1).

this as one of the main arguments for the Vijñānavāda tenet that external objects do not exist. I shall call this the “Epistemic Proof” of the imperceptibility/unreality of atoms. Significantly, the term *prativēdana* is already found in PV Pratyakṣa 320b.¹³⁷ This verse marks the beginning of a section where Dharmakīrti defends the theory of *vijñaptimātratā*. Here he takes issue with the Sautrāntika conception of images being similar in form (*tādrūpya*) with their external objects.¹³⁸ This is the background that Sāntarakṣita had in mind as well.

¹³⁶ Dinnāga argues that atoms are not the object of sensory perceptions, since they do not appear in perception, like the sense faculties. Cf. ĀP 1cd in n. 124.

¹³⁷ Cf. *kārthasaṃvid yad evedaṃ pratyakṣaṃ prativēdanam | tad arthavedanam kena tādrūpyād vyabhicāri tat ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 320). “What is the awareness of an object? Precisely what is directly perceived specific awareness, that is the awareness of an object. Why? Because of sameness of form. This is endowed with deviance.”

¹³⁸ Here, Dharmakīrti is refuting the possibility of the awareness of an external object. He uses the term *prativēdana* to specify what, according to the opponent (namely, a Sautrāntika), *arthasaṃvid* is, namely, a direct perception and the specific awareness of an object. This is because an external object that is brought to awareness bestows its own image (that is, produces a similar image), and this fact of bestowing its own image is one of the requirements for admitting something as being perceived. Therefore, since there is an image similar to it, the existence of the object must be inferred from that image. It must be admitted as its cause and, therefore, as real. Dharmakīrti responds that this reason, i.e., *tādrūpyāt*, is endowed with deviance because of the existence of erroneous images like a hair-net, etc., where there is no a similar object as a cause. Cf. *yadi pratiniyatam vedanam prativēditam vā, tadā sākārajñānam evārthavedanam iti vyapadeśamātram eva kevalam, na tv arthasya vedanam sīdhyati | atha tādrūpyād evārthasya vedanam, tathābhūtam artham antareṇa tādrūpyasyābhāvāt | na, vyabhicāri keśamaśakādiṣu |* (PVA ad PV Pratyakṣa 320, ed. p. 349, 17–20). “If a particular awareness or a specific awareness is [admitted], then the awareness of an object is just a cognition endowed with an image. Therefore, only the mere representer [(i.e., the image)] alone is established, but not the awareness of an object. If [it is objected:] ‘The awareness of an object [is established] precisely because of [its] sameness of form [with it], since there is no sameness of form without an object with such a form,’ [it will be answered:] ‘No, because there is deviance with reference to hair, flies, etc., which appear to people with defective vision.’” Cf. also *yad evedaṃ pratyakṣam anubhavasiddham prativēdanam nīlādīyākāreṇa pratiniyatam vedanam pratisantānanīyatam vā saivārthasaṃvid ucyate | nanu tat pratiniyatam vedanam anubhūyamānam arthasya vedanam | kena hetunā | ucyate — svaprakāśātmakatvāt svavedanam eva tad yuktaṃ nārthavedanam | tasya sarvadā parokṣatvāt | tādrūpyād arthasārūpatvāj jñānam arthavedanam iti cet tad arthasārūpyaṃ vyabhicāri dvicandrakeśonḍuka-jñānādīyākāraśārtham antareṇāpi bhāvāt |* (PVV ad PV Pratyakṣa 320, ed. p. 215, 9–15). “‘Precisely what is directly perceived,’ i.e., established through direct experience, ‘specific awareness,’ that is, a particular awareness with an image of [something] blue, etc., or restricted to each mental continuum, this, indeed, is said ‘awareness of an object.’ [Objection:] That particular awareness that is directly experienced is the awareness of an object. For which reason? It is answered: That [awareness] is tenable only as self-awareness because it consists in self-illumination, but not as the awareness of an object. For this is always beyond [the reach of] the senses. If [it is argued:] because of sameness of form, that is, because of the fact of having the same form as the object, a cognition is [admitted as being] the awareness of an object, [it will be replied:] that fact of having the same form as the object is endowed with deviance, because of the presence, also without an object, of an image in the cognition of two moons, or a hair-net, etc.”

In TSP *ad* TS 1967,¹³⁹ Kamalaśīla comments on *pratyayāprativedanāt*, providing two distinct interpretations — one using the genitive and one using the locative.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, he employs this differentiation to state the argument in two ways. According to the proof statement mentioned with reference to the locative, there is a pervasion¹⁴¹ between the property of appearing with the object's own form and the property of being directly perceived. In his opinion, this pervasion is proven further in TS 1968, where Śāntarakṣita explicitly states that atoms must appear with their partless nature in cognition, as otherwise they cannot be admitted as perceived, since they do not bestow their own image on cognition.¹⁴²

As a possible response to this point, in TSP *ad* TS 1969, we find Kamalaśīla's first mention of Śubhagupta. He quotes a prose passage which contains a verse that can be identified as BASK 44:

*athāpi syāt — samudītā evotpadyante vīnaśyanti ceti siddhāntān naikaika-
paramāṇupratibhāsa iti yathoktaṃ bhadantaśubhaguptena —*

*pratyekaṃ na hi cāṇūnām svātantryeṇāsti sambhavaḥ |
ato 'pi paramāṇūnām ekaikāpratibhāsanam | |*

iti [...] (TSP *ad* TS 1969)

However, this might be the [objection] (*athāpi syāt*), “By virtue of the axiom (*siddhānta*) ‘they arise and vanish only [when and in the condition of being] aggregated,’ atoms do not appear [independently,] one by one. As was said by Bhadanta Śubhagupta:

¹³⁹ Cf. Sanskrit Text p. 158 and English Translation p. 231.

¹⁴⁰ Kamalaśīla seems to prefer the locative, since he then refers to this compound with the following words: *yataḥ pratyayāprativedanād ity atra pratyakṣābhimatē pratyaye parāmarśahetāv apratibhāsanād ity ayam artho 'bhipretaḥ* (TSP *ad* TS 1972). “Because, with regard to this — i.e., ‘since there is no specific awareness’ (TS 1967d) — the intended meaning is [the following], ‘since there is no appearance [of atoms] in a cognition admitted as direct perception [and acting as the] cause of a reflective awareness.’” Accordingly, I have also adopted this for my translation.

¹⁴¹ A gloss on *vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ* in the preceding passage reads: *pratyakṣābhimatānekāparamāṇor astitvaṃ vyāpyaṃ pratyakṣābhimatē pratyaye svenākāreṇāpratibhāsamānatvaṃ vyāpakam tasyānupalabdhiḥ* Jp^g Pp^g.

¹⁴² Cf. *vyapetabhāgabhedā hi bhāseran paramāṇavaḥ | nānyathādhyakṣatā teṣāṃ ātmākārāsamarpaṇāt | |* (TS 1968). “For atoms should appear as being devoid of [any] difference of parts, otherwise they cannot be perceived at all, since they do not bestow their own form.”

Moreover, atoms do not indeed arise one by one, independently [from one another]. For this reason also (*api*), atoms do not appear [in cognition]¹⁴³ one by one.”

The Tibetan translation of BASK 44 reads:

rdul phran mams ni re re nas || ran dban 'byun ba mi srid do ||
de phyir phra rab rdul mams ni || re re snan bar mi 'gyur ro ||

This emended verse in TSP *ad* TS 1969¹⁴⁴ can be regarded as the original text of BASK 44; in other words, a verbatim quotation (cf. §2.1) or *citatum in alio* [C].¹⁴⁵ Śubhagupta's response, according to Kamalaśīla, would be that atoms are apprehended, but not individually, because, in fact, they never occur individually. The arguments, as expounded in BASK 44 and BASK 43 (cf. §6.3), aim to prove epistemological issues and are founded on ontological standpoints.¹⁴⁶ Atoms always arise together and never without each other; based on these two interrelated yet different characteristics of their reality, it follows that cognition cannot but apprehend them simultaneously.

Śāntarakṣita's direct refutation of BASK 44, according to Kamalaśīla, is found in TS 1969, where he argues that, also when aggregated, atoms should appear with their own partless form in cognition and should not lose

¹⁴³ As a *nirākāravādin*, here Śubhagupta does not really refer to the phenomenal content of cognition. It is rather a figure of speech to indicate the mere grasping of atoms by a cognition. On this, cf. also n. 261.

¹⁴⁴ *Pāda* a in the *kārikā* as found in Jp^{pc}, and accordingly copied by Pp, is *contra metrum*, as it is hypometrical. Krishnamacharya (whose edition is based only on Pp), likely being aware of this, proposes as an emendation: *pratyekaparamānūnām*. Ś ignores the issue altogether and follows the reading in Pp or in Jp^{pc}. In fact, Jp^{ac} has *hi* at the beginning of the verse, following *yathoktam bhadantaśubhaguptena*; based on the style of the TSP, this is unlikely to be there. Accordingly, one might conjecture that *hi* was misplaced and follows the negative particle instead. In this case, the Tibetan translation of BASK 44 is not particularly helpful, even though *ni* can sometimes be used to translate *hi*.

¹⁴⁵ There is indeed one difference between the *kārikā* as found in the TSP and the Tibetan translation of BASK 44. The difference consists in the presence of the term *api* in the *kārikā*, which is also found in the Tibetan translation of TSP *ad* TS 1969. Cf. *rdul phran mams kyī ran dban du || re re 'byun ba yod ma yin || 'di yi phyir yan rdul phran mams || re re snan ba ma yin no ||* (T_{2p}110b₇–111a₁, T_{2p}148b₆). This is missing in the Tibetan translation of BASK 44. The presence of *api* is rather interesting. Although it is possible to consider it as a mere filler due to metrical reasons, it actually refers to the other reason why atoms do not appear in cognition separately, that is, “since [atoms] do not arise without one another” (*phan tshun med na mi 'byun phyir*), found in BASK 43. Therefore, the presence of *api* finds its justification given the meaning of the previous stanza, and one can safely regard this *kārikā* as the original Sanskrit of BASK 44.

¹⁴⁶ As we shall see in more detail, the reverse is also true. In the BASK, Śubhagupta aims to prove ontological truths based on epistemological arguments, namely, that atoms are an existing external reality because they cause their own cognition.

that nature while aggregating. Śubhagupta's response is then conjectured in TS 1971:

tulyāparakṣaṇotpādād yathā nityatvavibhramah |
avicchinnasajātīyagrahe cet sthūlavibhramah ||

If [Śubhagupta argues that,] just as there is the error of permanence due to the arising of similar, successive instants, [then] there is[, similarly,] the error of [something being] coarse¹⁴⁷ when one apprehends spatially continuous and homogeneous [atoms].¹⁴⁸

TS 1971 corresponds to BASK 35,¹⁴⁹ with slight differences, namely, it is a non-verbatim quotation. Śāntarakṣita is clearly reusing the verse to fit his own argument,¹⁵⁰ not introducing it as a quotation, but rather as part of his work. Accordingly, it can be defined as a *textus usus secundarii* [**T**].¹⁵¹ There and (more explicitly) in TSP *ad* TS 1971 (where Kamalaśīla introduces a

¹⁴⁷ Tib. has *rigs pa 'khrul pa* for *sthūlavibhrama*.

¹⁴⁸ A very similar concept, maintained by Śāntarakṣita from a *bahirarthavāda* perspective, is found in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā: *samānajaṇvālāsambhūter yathā dīpaikavibhramah | nairantarya-sthītānekasūksmavittau tathāikadhīh ||* (TS 588).

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *'dra ba'i skad cig gzan 'byun phyir || ji ltar rtag pa ñid 'khrul ltar || rgyun chags rigs mthun 'dzin pa la || ñion po ñid du 'khrul pa skye ||* (BASK 35). “Just as, because of the arising of similar, subsequent instants, there is the error of permanence, likewise the error of [something] being blue occurs when one apprehends spatially continuous and homogeneous [atoms].”

¹⁵⁰ First of all, in TS 1971, one finds the particle *ced*, since the verse is an objection in the context of that work. Moreover, Śāntarakṣita mentions “the error of [something being] coarse” (*sthūlavibhrama*), while Śubhagupta talks about “the error of [something] being blue” (*ñion po ñid du 'khrul pa/*ñilatvavibhrama*). Śāntarakṣita may be referring to the original text as found in BASK 35 (i.e., **ñilatva*, as opposed to *sthūla*) in his response to Śubhagupta's argument: *kṣaṇikā iti bhāṇās ca niścīyante pramāṇataḥ | anavas tv iti gamyante katham pītasitādayaḥ ||* (TS 1973). “Additionally, things are ascertained as being ‘instantaneous’ by means of a *pramāṇa* [i.e., inference], but how can what is yellow or white, etc., be understood as being [an image of] ‘atoms’?” This same objection is introduced in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā. Cf. *etāvat tu bhaved atra katham eṣaṃ aniścaye | ñilādi paramāṇūnām ākāra iti gamyate ||* (TS 590). “However, in this case, [the objection] may be in such a manner: without their ascertainment, how can a blue thing be understood as being an image [related to] atoms?” Here, Kamalaśīla presents Śāntarakṣita as teaching the opponents (that is, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas) how they could properly counter his own argument. The latter argument is advanced from a Sautrāntika (or, as Kamalaśīla also refers to it, *bahirarthavāda*) point of view. Once again, while officially defending such an externalist point of view, Kamalaśīla points to the Vijñānavāda as providing the most logical theory regarding this point. Cf. English Translation, p. 234.

¹⁵¹ It is likely that the original Sanskrit of BASK 35 read *grahaṇe* instead of *grāhe ced*, as is suggested by the commentary in the TSP. Kamalaśīla must have known the original verse from the BASK and inserted that word from it. Since Steinkellner uses these symbols also in the case of small portions of a text, we can define this word as **Ci**, *citatum in alio*, where **T** is the BASK and “*alius (locus)*” is a passage from the TSP (and not the “autocommentary”). In this sense, I propose that the original Sanskrit text of BASK 35 may have read as follows: *tulyāparakṣaṇotpādād yathā nityatvavibhramah | avicchinnasajātīyagrahaṇe ñilavibhramah ||*. Cf. Appendix 1. In this case, *ñion po ñid du 'khrul pa skye* would be the translation of *ñilavibhramah*.

prose passage having the features of a commentary),¹⁵² Śubhagupta is reported as saying that a deluded person always has the mental error of something permanent, even while directly perceiving instants that arise one after the other, as in the case of sounds, etc. Similarly, she/he indeed apprehends atoms, which are homogeneous and placed in spatial continuity, but conceptually determines them as one coarse thing. Atoms are grasped, even though they do not bestow their single partless image in cognition.¹⁵³ In this passage, Kamalaśīla presents Śubhagupta as directly responding to the original argument brought forward by Śāntarakṣita in TS 1967 — the “Epistemic Proof,” i.e., that atoms are not established through direct perception “since, in cognition, there is no specific awareness of [atoms being] devoid of parts, many and corporeal” (*niraṃśānekamūrtānām pratyayāprativedanāt*). He is introduced as claiming that the logical reason (*hetu*) in that argument is unestablished.

This passage, found with the characteristics of the alleged “autocommentary,” is evidently a prose explanation of what is stated in the verse. It contains two elements that prove its being at least partly constructed by Kamalaśīla as a dialectical tool within the flow of his argument.¹⁵⁴ Firstly, in the “autocommentary” on his BASK, most likely composed before the TS, Śubhagupta would be making a reference to a logical reason as stated in TS 1967cd,¹⁵⁵ i.e., to a later work.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, I believe that Śubhagupta would have never labeled this logical reason as “unestablished.” In this respect, analyzing BASK 35 and 44 in their original context will shed further light on Śubhagupta’s standpoints on ontology and epistemology.

4.2 Rebuttal of the Vijñānavāda “Epistemic Proof” by

Śubhagupta: **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 35 in Its Original Context

Within the context of the BASK, kk. 34¹⁵⁷ and 35 are the response to a *pūrvapakṣa*, expounded in BASK 32–33abc, in which Śubhagupta introduces

¹⁵² This is not listed by Hattori as a quotation from Śubhagupta, although TS 1971 is; cf. Appendix §5 (no. 2).

¹⁵³ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1971, Sanskrit Text p. 160 and English Translation p. 233–234. On this passage as a part of the “autocommentary” on the BASK, see Saccone 2014: 389–390.

¹⁵⁴ On this, cf. Saccone 2014: 389–390.

¹⁵⁵ Moreover, the commentary refers to *sthūla iti mānaso vibhramah*, while BASK 35, as already noted, mentions *śīno po ñīd du ’khrul pa/*ñīlavibhrama* or **ñīlatavibhrama*.

¹⁵⁶ Of course, one could advance the hypothesis that *niraṃśānekamūrtānām pratyayāprativedanāt* was indeed a **Gi** in both the TS and Śubhagupta’s autocommentary from an earlier third work. In other words, Śubhagupta (first) and Śāntarakṣita (later) were both quoting from an earlier author. To the best of my knowledge, however, this is not the case.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. *ji ltar skad cig ’jig pa mams || re re nas mi rtogs pa ltar || de b’zin g’segs pas yonis bcaḍ la’an || rdul phran nes par mi ’gyur ro ||* (BASK 34). “Just like instantaneous things are not understood separately, likewise, atoms cannot be ascertained [by a deluded person], even though the Tathāgata distinguishes them.” The verse is found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (having *ses pas*

the “Epistemic Proof” of the imperceptibility/unreality of atoms as the main proof advanced by the Vijñānavādins to demonstrate the unreality of external objects of cognition.¹⁵⁸ As a rebuttal, he states that atoms are indeed apprehended even though not ascertained singly, i.e., conceptually determined as such. Refuting the latter idea, Śāntarakṣita, in TS 1972,¹⁵⁹ refers back to the “Epistemic Proof” as stated in TS 1967 and adds a specification to it — that a thing can be considered directly perceived only if a perception, merely through its proper function as a perception, causes a reflective awareness of it. Anything that is not the object of an awareness of the kind “this is that thing” can be logically treated as being perceived. Additionally, Kamalaśīla comments that the logical reason in TS 1967 must be understood as “since there is no appearance [of atoms] in a cognition admitted as direct perception [and acting as the] cause of a reflective awareness.”¹⁶⁰

On this account, it is clear that Śubhagupta would not admit the logical reason in TS 1967 as being unestablished since he too admits that single atoms are not an object of reflective awareness for ordinary people. Still, according to him, this does not prove their non-apprehension by a perception. They are indeed apprehended, but falsely determined (**adhyavasāya*) as one, coarse object. Only those endowed with extraordinary faculties perceive them singly.¹⁶¹

instead of *gśegs pas* in *pāda c*): *ji ltar skad cig 'jig pa mams || re re nas ni rtogs pa ltar || de bžin śes pas yonś bcad la'an || rdul phran nes par mi 'gyur ro ||* (*Blo gsal grub mtha'*, ed. p. 59, 21–24).

¹⁵⁸ *gžan dag mam śes thams cad ni || yul yod rtog pas 'khrul sems kyi || śes bya ran sems las skyes gañ || gzugs sam de yi ma yin no ||* (BASK 32) *don med yañ dag bsgrub pa la || re re yonś su mi chod phyir || rdul phran mi snañ žes smras pa || sems dan sems byuñ mams kyis kyañ || the tshom za ba ñid du 'gyur ||* (BASK 33) “Others [say,] ‘All [types of] cognitions are erroneous consciousness, since there is the imagination of the existence of an [external] object. However, the knowable, which arises from one’s own mind (**svacitta*), is neither form, nor is it of that [form].’ Regarding the correct proof of the non-existence of [external] objects it is said, ‘Since they are not distinguished one by one, atoms do not appear [in perception].’ [To this we answer, ‘If this were the case,] also because of [the instance of] mind and mental states[, that] would be doubtful.” BASK 33 is found identically in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 60, 2–6), with a minor variant (*sgrub* instead of *bsgrub* in *pāda a*). The verse quoted therein also includes five *pādas*.

¹⁵⁹ TS 1972 is in fact a response to TS 1971 (i.e., BASK 35). Cf. §4.1.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. TSP ad TS 1972, Sanskrit Text p. 161 and English Translation p. 236–237.

¹⁶¹ Cf. *mi g.yo sogs gnas blo ldan ni || grañs la sogs pa'i bye brag gis || dmyal sogs rdul phran la rtog pas || de phyir med par mi ruñ no ||* (BASK 59) *gal te de 'khrul dbañ las gsuñs || drug pa blo tsam rtogs pa ni || ji ltar brgyad par rdul phran gyi || grañs sogs 'khrul pa skye bar 'gyur ||* (BASK 60). *de bas rdul phran yod pa ñid || mi g.yo sogs gnas blo ldan ni || de las gžan nes ma gzuñ ba'i || de dag śes phyir yonś su rtog ||* (BASK 64). According to Mimaki (1987–1988), *blo ldan*/**dhīmat*, is an attribute of the Bodhisattva who resides in a *bhūmi* such as the eight called *Immovable* (*mi g.yo*/**acalā*). BASK 59 and 60 are also found identically in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 132, 11–18), with a small variant (*gtogs pas* instead of *rtog pas* in BASK 59c2).

4.3 Apprehension with No Ascertainment:

The “Epistemic Proof” Disproven in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā

This same theory held by Śubhagupta is also held by Śāntarakṣita in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā. Before proceeding with my analysis of Śubhagupta’s theory on the cognitive act, I shall briefly introduce Śāntarakṣita’s viewpoint on the perception of real external atoms as expounded in this chapter. This viewpoint, being extremely close to that of Śubhagupta, will assist in the understanding of the argumentations from both ends.

As previously mentioned (cf. §3.2), in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā, Śāntarakṣita aims at disproving the six categories of reality admitted by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. In particular, the passages concerned here are those regarding atoms as the permanent aspect of the nine substances (*dravya*). In refuting the existence of eternal, imperceptible atoms that are perceivable only through their impermanent aggregate, the *avayavin*, Śāntarakṣita finds it useful to admit provisionally that atoms are indeed perceptible and, specifically, that they are apprehended through their partless nature-form:

sarveṣām eva vastūnām sarvavyāvṛttirūpiṇām |
dṛṣṭāv api tathaiyeti na sarvākāraṇiścayaḥ || (TS 586)

Even though every single thing is observed as having a form through the exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) of all other [things], there is no ascertainment of all [its] aspects in the form (*it*): “[it] is precisely like this.”

akalpanākṣagamyē ’pi niramṣe ’rthasvalakṣaṇe |
yadbhedavyavasāyē ’sti kāraṇam sa pratīyate || (TS 587)

Even though the *svalakṣaṇa* of an object, being devoid of parts, is perceived by a [cognition] that is devoid of conceptualization and based on a sense faculty, that (*sa*) [aspect (*ākāra*)], from which the cause of the determination of the exclusion [of others] occurs, is cognized.¹⁶²

¹⁶² Cf. *pratyakṣeṇa gṛhīte ’pi viśeṣe ’mśavivarjite | yadvīśeṣāvasāyē ’sti pratyayaḥ sa pratīyate ||* (PV Svārthānumāna 58). On this, see also the *svavṛtti*: *yady apy amśarahitāḥ sarvato bhinnasvabhāvo bhāvo ’nubhūtas tathāpi na sarvabhedeṣu tāvatā niścayo bhavati | kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt | anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsam niścayapratīyān janayati | yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe ’pi kuṇāpakāminībhakṣyavikalpāḥ | tatra buddhipāṭavam tadvāsānābhyāsaḥ prakaraṇam ityādayo ’nubhavad bhedanīścayotpattisahakāriṇaḥ | teṣām eva ca pratyāsattitāratanāyādibhedāt paurvāpyam | yathā janakatvādhyāpakatvāviśeṣe ’pi pītaram āyāntam dṛṣṭvā pītā me āgacchati nopādhyāya iti |* (PVSV ad PV Svārthānumāna 58, ed. p. 32, 3–11). “Even though a *svabhāva* different from everything [and] devoid of parts, i.e., a true nature, is experienced, nevertheless, there is not the ascertainment to such an extent regarding all the differences[, i.e., aspects], since [that ascertainment] depends [also] on other causes. For experience generates cognitions related to ascertainment according to the habituation to

And Kamalaśīla comments on those verses:

*yady evaṃ sarvaprakāreṇāniścaye satī katham nāma pratyakṣatā teṣāṃ
yuktimatīty āha — sarveṣāṃ ityādi | na hy aparadarśanānām kvacid
api vastuni pratyakṣeṇa grhīte 'pi sarvākāraṇiścayo 'sti | yāvatā tu
rūpeṇārthāntaravyāvṛttikṛtena tan niścīyate, tāvatā tat pratyakṣam iti
vyavasthāpyate | na sarvākāreṇa | grhītasya'pi prakārāntarasya niścayānu-
tpatter vyavahārāyogyatvenāgrhītakalpatvāt | **tathaiyeti** yathā tad vastu
anubhūtam || nanu ca niraṃśatayā sarvātmanaiva pratyakṣeṇānubhū-
tatvād vastunaḥ kasmāt sarvātmanā niścayo na bhavatīty āha —
akalpanākṣagamyē 'pītyādi | akṣe bhavam ākṣam indriyajñā-
nam ity arthaḥ | **akalpanam** avidyamānakalpanam ca tad ākṣam ceti
vighrahaḥ | tena **gamyē** 'pi nirvikalpendriyajñānagamye 'pīty arthaḥ |
yadbhedavyavasāya iti | yasmād bhedo vyāvṛttir yadbhedas tatra
vyavasāyo niścayas tasya **kāraṇam** abhyāsaḥ pratyāsattis tārātmya-
buddhipāṭavaṃ¹⁶³ cetyādi | na hy anubhavamātram eva niścayakāraṇam
kim tv abhyāsādayo 'pi | tena yatra te santi tatra niścayaḥ prasūyata ity
arthaḥ | (TSP ad TS 586–587, ed. p. 244, 8–20)*

If this is so, since there is no ascertainment according to all aspects (*prakāra*), how can their being directly perceived be logical? Therefore, [Śāntarakṣita] says [the stanza] beginning with “even though.” Since, for those who are endowed with ordinary perception, there is no ascertainment of all the aspects, regarding some thing, even though it is apprehended through direct perception. However, inasmuch as that [thing] is ascertained with a form acquired through the exclusion of another object, to that extent it is established as “directly perceived.” [This is] not [so] with every aspect, since another aspect, even though apprehended, because [it] is not ascertained, is equal to [being] non-apprehended, as it is not apt to be treated [as such] (*vyavahārāyogyatva*). “It is indeed like this,” i.e., like that thing was experienced. [Objection:] But since a thing is experienced through direct perception as partless, i.e., indeed completely, why is it not ascertained completely?

conceptual constructions. For instance, even though there is no difference in seeing a visual form [related to a woman], there [arise] the concepts of a corpse, a woman and food. In this respect, the acuity of the cognition, the habituation to its latent impressions, the context, etc., are cooperating causes for the arising of different ascertainments from the experiencing [of some thing]. Moreover, the succession of these [different ascertainments] is, indeed, due to the difference of proximity, difference in degree, etc. For instance, even though there is no difference between [his] being a father and being a teacher, [the son,] having seen the father coming, [thinks,] ‘my father is coming,’ and not, ‘a teacher [is coming].’” On this cf. Kellner 2004: 19–32 and Dunne 2004: 184 n. 59. On a similar note, see also: *parivṛtākāmuḥśanām ekasyām pramadātanau | kuṇapaḥ kāmīnī bhakṣya iti tistro vikalpanāḥ ||* (*Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 20).

¹⁶³ °buddhi° Pp K Ś T_{2D} T_{2P} (blo)] °śuddhi° (°suddhi°) Jp

Therefore, [Śāntarakṣita] says [the verse] beginning with “even though the *svalakṣaṇa*.” Relating to the sense faculty (*akṣe*) = “based on a sense faculty” (*ākṣa*), that is, a sense cognition; this is the meaning. [*Akalpanākṣa*^o is a *karmadhāraya* that is] analyzed as follows: that [cognition] is both “devoid of conceptualization,” i.e., endowed with an absent conceptualization and “based on a sense faculty.” “Even though perceived” by this [sense cognition], i.e., even though perceived by a sense cognition devoid of conceptualization; this is the meaning. With reference to [the compound] *yadbhedavyavasāye*, [the analysis is as follows:] *yadbhedah*, that is, from which (*yasmāt*) there is the difference, i.e., the exclusion. Related to this, there is the “determination,” i.e., ascertainment (*vyavasāya=niścaya*); its “cause” is the habituation, the proximity and the acuity of the cognition due to difference in degree, etc. For direct experiencing alone is not the only cause of ascertainment, but also habituation, etc. Therefore, ascertainment occurs only regarding that with reference to which there are those[, namely, habituation, etc.] This is the meaning.

Also in this passage, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla refer to the idea that a thing must be conceptually determined in the same way as it is perceived in order to be properly treated as “apprehended” according to conventional truth (cf. TSP *ad* TS 1972 and §4.2). One can regard some thing as “apprehended” only if a subsequent conceptual determination occurs. Nevertheless, they use this argument to prove that a particular (*svalakṣaṇa*, *viśeṣa*), in this case atoms, can still be admitted as perceived by a sense cognition that is devoid of conceptualization,¹⁶⁴ even though only some of its aspects can be treated as “apprehended.” Mere apprehension does not entail conceptualization of all the properties of a thing. In the next moment of conceptual ascertainment, that thing is determined according to certain attributes, inasmuch as it is excluded (*vyāvṛtti*) from all other heterogeneous things. Furthermore, no ordinary being ascertains a thing according to all of its properties, but only according to a specific one, since other factors, such as habituation, are involved.¹⁶⁵ In other words, a real thing is completely

¹⁶⁴ On this, see also PV Svārthānumāna: *ekasyārthasvabhāvasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayam | ko 'nyo na dṛṣṭo bhāgaḥ syād yaḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣyate ||* (PV Svārthānumāna 43) *no ced bhrāntinimittena samyojyeta guṇāntaram | śūktau vā rajatākāro rūpasādharmyadarśanāt ||* (PV Svārthānumāna 44) *tasmād dṛṣṭasya bhāvasya dṛṣṭa evākhilo guṇaḥ | bhrānter niścīyate neti sādhanam sampravartate ||* (PV Svārthānumāna 45).

¹⁶⁵ With reference to the idea that ascertainment does not automatically arise through perceptual experience, McClintock (2003: 158 n. 21; 2010: 82 n. 215) mentions Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā. Cf. *syād etat — yathā kṣaṇikatvaṃ śabdāder avyatiriktam api sat tadgrahane saty apy agrhītam ucyate, tadvad idam api bhaviṣyatīti | tad ayuktam | na hi śabde dharmiṇi grhīte 'pi tadavyatireki kṣaṇikatvaṃ agrhītam iti vyavasthāpyate | kintu — grhītam api tanniścayotpattikāraṇābhāvād*

apprehended with its partless form by a sense cognition, even though only some of its aspects are subsequently ascertained and can be, accordingly, treated as “apprehended.”

This is precisely the point at which Kamalaśīla feels the urge to specify that these arguments are made from the point of view of an Externalist (*bahirarthavādin*), but not of a Vijñānavādin (cf. §3.2). I believe that he clearly sees the preceding argument as a proper rebuttal of the “Epistemic Proof,” especially in light of the *apoha* theory that he, Śāntarakṣita and Śubhagupta all admit. In fact, as we shall see in BASK 36–37, Śubhagupta brings forward exactly this type of argument to demonstrate that atoms are apprehended, since they exist substantially (**dravyataḥ*).

4.4 Apprehension with No Ascertainment:

The “Epistemic Proof” Disproven in **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 36–37

In BASK 36–37, Śubhagupta clearly states his viewpoint regarding the apprehension of atoms. In so doing, he also explicates his theory on the cognitive act:

blo yis rtag tu rgyun chags dan | | rigs mthun pa la 'dzin mod kyī | |
mam par rtag pa'i śes pa yis | | de gcig ñid du ñes par byed | |
 (BASK 36)

Even though cognition always apprehends continuous and homogeneous [atoms], [still] conceptual cognition determines them as one.

de phyir ran gi mtshan ñid kyis | | mam par śes la rdul phran mams | |
mī snañ žes ni smra ba gañ | | de dag thams cad sgrub ma yin | |
 (BASK 37)

Therefore, all statements [of the kind] “atoms do not appear in terms of *svalakṣaṇa* (**svalakṣaṇatvena*) in cognition” are unestablished.

In these two *kārikās*, Śubhagupta argues that a sense cognition, being devoid of conceptualization, apprehends many atoms, which are then determined as one thing by conceptual cognition. They are apprehended in

anīcitam ity abhidhīyate | na hy anubhavamātrād eva niścayo bhavati | tasyārthitvābhyāsasādgūnyā-disāpekṣatvāt | (TSP ad TS 458, ed. p. 201, 9–13). “Let the following be the case: like momentariness, even though non-distinct from sounds, etc., is said [to be] ‘non-apprehended,’ in spite of the apprehension of that [sound], similarly, this will be too. [It will be replied that] this is illogical. For it is not established that, with reference to sound as a property-bearer, even though it is apprehended, [its] instantaneousness, [which is] non-distinct from it, is non-apprehended. However, even though apprehended, it is said ‘non-ascertained’ because there are not the causes of the arising of its ascertainment. For the ascertainment does not arise only from the mere experiencing, since it [also] depends on interest, habituation, good qualities, etc.”

their *svalakṣaṇa* even though there is no conceptual discrimination of it. Accordingly, Śubhagupta admits atoms as being apprehended as *dravyasvalakṣaṇa*.¹⁶⁶ That is to say, they are an object of cognition, since they are absolutely real. In sum, Śubhagupta's view of the perception of atoms is as follows: they are not grasped singly by specific awarenesses having each of them as their content; they are, however, indeed apprehended all together with their partless form by non-conceptual sense perception. On this account, BASK 37 must be considered the direct rebuttal of the "Epistemic Proof" as expounded in the *pūrvapakṣa* in BASK 32–33abc (cf. §4.2).

While proceeding with the demonstration of *vijñaptimātratā*, Kamalaśīla depicts Śubhagupta as arguing that aggregates of atoms are *dravya*. In order to shed light on Śubhagupta's actual ontological views, I shall first discuss in greater depth how they are portrayed by Kamalaśīla.

4.5 An Instance of Intentional "Misrepresenting":

Tattvasaṅgraha 1974 and *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*

With reference to the argument presented in TS 1971 (corresponding to BASK 35) and TSP *ad* TS 1971, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla advance two different objections. As already seen, the first objection utilizes the "Epistemic Proof," specifying that the apprehension of atoms may be admitted as logical only if followed by an accordant conceptual image, to which we have already seen the possible rebuttal by Śubhagupta. In contrast, the second argument concerns the notion of coarseness as being a mental error. The example of permanence and instants in BASK 35 is invalid, since permanence is established as a mental error because the momentariness of

¹⁶⁶ For the difference between the concepts of *āyatanasvalakṣaṇa* and *dravyasvalakṣaṇa*, see Dunne 2004: 109 n. 87. For their treatment in Śubhagupta, see Saccone 2015: 130–132. Cf. also *nanu caivam samastālambanatvāt sāmānyaviśayāḥ pañcavijñānakāyāḥ prāpnuvanti na svalakṣaṇaviśayāḥ | āyatanasvalakṣaṇam praty ete svalakṣaṇaviśayā isyante na dravyasvalakṣaṇam ity adōṣaḥ |* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 1.10d, ed. p. 7, 22–24). "[Objection:] But, in this way, since [they] have an aggregate as an object-support, [these] five groups of [bare sense] cognitions follow as having universals as objects, not *svalakṣaṇas* as objects. [It will be replied that,] with reference to *svalakṣaṇa* as a sense sphere, these are admitted as having the *svalakṣaṇa* as objects, not [with reference to] *svalakṣaṇa* as a substance. Therefore, there is no logical defect." On this passage, cf. Arnold 2005a: 224 n. 20. He refers to this passage in connection with Cox's statement (Cox 1995: 153 n. 27) that *svalakṣaṇa* does not necessarily refer to the *svabhāva* as a *dravya*, but also to its nature as belonging to a particular sense sphere (*āyatana*). The passage is also quoted in the PSV. Cf. *katham tarhi sañcitālambanāḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ, yadi tad ekato na vikalpayanti. yac cāyatanasvalakṣaṇam praty ete svalakṣaṇaviśayā na dravyasvalakṣaṇam iti |* (PSV *ad* 1.4cd, ed. p. 2, 22–23). Here, Dinnāga counters the objection that the statement that the five groups of [bare sense] cognitions have aggregates (*sañcita*) as object-supports is contradictory to the view of perception being free of conceptuality (because a perception in that case would have a universal as its object).

things is proven through inference. However, there is no such inference demonstrating the reality of atoms.¹⁶⁷

Śāntarakṣita continues by introducing an objection by an unidentified opponent who provides such an inference. Namely, what is firstly visible must consist of an accumulation of subtle things, since it is coarse, like, for example, a mountain.¹⁶⁸ In other words, what an ordinary being apprehends must be understood as the gathering of subtle things, since the latter are, by definition, imperceptible; only through accumulation do they reach perceptibility, i.e., become coarse. This inference is valid also for atoms and their aggregates. Here Śāntarakṣita does not mention his opponent but, given the flow of the argument, he evidently wants his audience to understand that it is Śubhagupta. Regardless, this objection is functional to his proof, as it provides him with the possibility of refuting the feasibility of an inference that establishes the reality of atoms. Analogously, Kamalaśīla introduces a prose passage by an unidentified objector that expands on this argument.¹⁶⁹ This prose passage is endowed with the characteristics of a commentary; moreover, the verse in the TS could appear as if it were a quotation from an opponent's work. However, neither the verse nor the argument is found in the BASK. Additionally, in the prose passage, Kamalaśīla introduces two references to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.¹⁷⁰ He reports that the opponent (i.e., Śubhagupta) refers to the dyad as the last stage in which atoms are imperceptible¹⁷¹ (*cākṣuṣagrahaṇam acākṣuṣasya dṛyaṇukāder vyavacchedāya*),¹⁷² and defines the subject of the inference with the words “a part-possessing substance,” (*avayavidravaya*), namely, a new ontological reality different from the atoms that compose it.¹⁷³ However, the latter point in particular would never have been accepted by Śubhagupta, since he defines atoms as ultimately real — *dravya* — though not their aggregates.

¹⁶⁷ Additionally, Kamalaśīla mentions a third point: a coarse image cannot be a mental error, since it is vivid. However, a mental error, as a concept, is never vivid. Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1973, Sanskrit Text p. 161 and English Translation p. 237. Cf. Saccone 2014: 393 and MAK 27, 30 as quoted in Kajiyama 1978: 123. Kajiyama (1978: 142 n. 14) also refer to TS 1252–1255 as identical to those verses.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. TS 1974, Sanskrit Text p. 160 and English Translation p. 234–235.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1974, Sanskrit Text p. 161–162 and English Translation p. 237.

¹⁷⁰ For an explicit reference to those traditions in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā, see TS 546–547 in n. 101.

¹⁷¹ Cf. *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (ed. p. 130–131).

¹⁷² Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1974, Sanskrit Text p. 162, 3 and English Translation p. 237.

¹⁷³ The same term, *avayavidravaya*, is also found in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā (e.g., TSP *ad* TS 585, ed. p. 243, 23), where Kamalaśīla is in fact dealing with the criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *dravya*. This term is present in the Nyāya literature; see, e.g., *Nyāyavārttika ad Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.34, ed. p. 227, 14–228, 2. On this passage and the reference to this concept in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā, cf. n. 100 and Saccone 2016.

For this reason, TS 1974 and TSP *ad* TS 1974 cannot be regarded as material from the BASK. This offers further evidence for a *modus argumentandi* of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla that involves ascribing views to Śubhagupta for argumentative purposes. In this respect, it is also relevant to note how Kamalaśīla employs ĀP 1 at the end of the chapter (cf. TSP *ad* TS 2082). He appears to suggest that Śubhagupta had formulated an objection to Diñnāga, using his own words. This verse is not found in the BASK. Even though it was likely very clear to his audience that that was not the case, one can still see this as an instance of the free use of Śubhagupta's name and ideas in Kamalaśīla's works.

As already seen, this also raises legitimate doubts about the authenticity of other prose passages that have been considered parts of the supposed autocommentary.

4.6 Atoms as Ultimately Real in Terms of Being

Causally Efficient: **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 39, 57 and 58¹⁷⁴

In the BASK, Śubhagupta does not admit the aggregates of atoms as *dravya*. On the contrary, he is particularly concerned with proving that single atoms are *dravya* because they are causally efficient and unitary. Regarding their causal efficiency, the clearest statements are found in BASK 39, 57 and 58, where he claims:

rdul phran gañ dag phrad gyur ciñ || rigs mthun bya ba gcig byed pa ||
de dag 'dus pa zes brjod na || de dag rdzas med ga la žig ||
 (BASK 39)

If [it is argued,] “Atoms are aggregated [when,] joined [and] being homogeneous, they produce one effect,” [it will be answered,] “Then how can they not exist substantially?”¹⁷⁵

phan tshun du ni phan 'dogs pa'i || bye brag gis ni brgyus pa bžin ||
rdo rje la sogs rdul phran mams || de dag chad par mi 'gyur te ||
 (BASK 57)

By virtue of the distinctive quality of mutual assistance (*phan 'dogs pa/*upakāra*), these atoms, like [those of] a diamond, are indivisible, as if they were tied (*brgyus pa/*nibaddha*) to each other.

ji ltar snags kyi mthu yis ni || 'dre sbrul la sogs 'džin pa bžin ||
rdzas kyi mthu yis phan tshun du || rdul phran kha cig srid 'gyur gyi ||
gžan dag nus pa stobs chuñ ño || (BASK 58)

¹⁷⁴ This topic is treated in detail in Saccone 2015. I shall outline it only briefly here.

¹⁷⁵ This *kārikā* has been analyzed and translated by other scholars. Cf. Hattori 1960: 397; Shastri 1967: 40 and 1980: 9; Gangopadhyaya 1980: 99–100; Mikogami 1983: 5. On this cf. also Saccone 2014: 395 and Saccone 2015: 116–118.

Just as, by force of a mantra, demons, snakes, etc., are subdued, likewise, certain atoms arise, one with the other, by the force of [their] being **dravya*, but others have [only] a small [amount of the] power of [that] **śakti* (*nus pa*).

These *kārikās* represent the response to the argument¹⁷⁶ brought forward in BASK 38¹⁷⁷ and corresponding to the one advanced by Diñnāga in ĀP 2ab¹⁷⁸ stating that aggregates (*'dus pa*) of atoms cannot be the object of their cognitions, since they are not ultimately real and therefore cannot be the cause of a cognition.¹⁷⁹ In BASK 39, Śubhagupta immediately responds to this argument and then resumes his proof in BASK 57–58 after having demonstrated that atoms are unitary (*ekadravya*, cf. §5.4). In these *kārikās*, he establishes the existence of a logical relationship between atoms' distinctive quality of mutual assistance and their being *dravya* as causally efficient. Atoms arise as aggregating, since only with other atoms do they have the distinctive characteristic of supporting each other in performing one activity, i.e., in being causally efficient and causing their own cognition. In short, they arise as aggregating, since they are *dravya*. Each of them arises with the nature of *dravya* along with others. Their aggregates, on the other hand, cannot be regarded as absolutely true, their ultimate reality being the atoms that constitute them. Atoms are “tied” to each other through *dravyaśakti*, which is like the force of a *mantra*; accordingly, they cause their own cognition and are apprehended as such.

¹⁷⁶ In Saccone 2015, I define this as “Argument A: Against Aggregates of Atoms (*'dus pa*);” it is the first argument that Śubhagupta refutes within his proof strategy of atoms as existing substantially. This is in fact the second argument in the ĀP, used to demonstrate the non-existence of external *ālambanas* of cognitions.

¹⁷⁷ *gañ ltar snañ de de las min || rdzas med phyir zla gñis bzün zes || smras pa'i sgrub pa gañ yin pa || de la'an gtan tshigs ma nes ñid ||* (BASK 38). “‘What appears like this[, i.e., with the image of some thing,] is not from that, since it does not exist substantially (**dravyataḥ*), like a double moon.’ Also with regard to this proof stated (*smras pa/*ukta*) [by Diñnāga], the logical reason is inconclusive.”

¹⁷⁸ *gañ ltar snañ de de las min || rdzas su med phyir zla gñis bzün ||* (ĀP 2ab). “What appears like this[, i.e., with the image of some thing,] is not from that, since it does not exist substantially (**dravyataḥ*), like a double moon.”

¹⁷⁹ *de bzün du rdzas su yod pa ma yin pa ñid kyi rgyu ma yin pa'i phyir 'dus pa dmigs pa ma yin no |* (ĀPV ad ĀP 2b, ed. p. 158, 16–18).

5.

Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Śubhagupta
on the Singularity of Atoms

5.1 Proving the Unreality of Atoms:

Tattvasaṅgraha 1989–1991 and *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*

After having demonstrated that atoms are not established through perception or inference, in TS 1989–1991, Śāntarakṣita brings forward an argument to prove the non-existence of atoms.¹⁸⁰ This is based on the idea that the nature-form (*rūpa*) of an atom cannot be unitary if atoms are admitted as aggregating with others, in the various ways that might happen.¹⁸¹ This argument echoes Vasubandhu's refutation in the *Vimśikā* of the above-mentioned view (iii) regarding the nature of external objects of sense perceptions, i.e., atoms as aggregated (*saṃhata*) (cf. §5.2). In particular, he states that this thesis is untenable because an atom is not established as a unitary substance (*ekadravya*).¹⁸²

In the proof statement found in TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991, Kamalaśīla advocates the pervasion between the fact of being devoid of *svabhāva*, either one or many (*ekānekasvabhāvarahitvatā*), and the fact of being apt to be treated as non-existent (*asadvyavahārayogyatā*). Atoms cannot be considered to exist, since they do not have a unitary *svabhāva*. In order to prove this, he explicitly refers to an argument based on the existence of different spatial parts (*digbhāgabhedā*).¹⁸³ This concept is also found in *Vimśikā* 14ab,¹⁸⁴ which is in

¹⁸⁰ Cf. TS 1988, Sanskrit Text p. 166 and English Translation p. 245.

¹⁸¹ With reference to these, TS 1989–1991 (and MAK 11–13), Kajiyama (1978: 141 n. 5) maintains that, while in the *Vimśikā* and *vṛtti* Vasubandhu analyzes atoms quantitatively, Śāntarakṣita criticizes them qualitatively, changing the idea of segments of atoms into that of intrinsic natures. Cf. 'byar ba dan ni bskor ba'am || bar med nam par gnas kyan ruñ || dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la || bltas pa'i ran bzin gañ yin pa || (MAK 11) rdul phran gzan la blta ba yañ || de ñid gal te yin brjod na || de lta yin na de lta bu || sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ram || (MAK 12) rdul phran gzan la lta ba dños || gal te gzan du 'dod na ni || rab tu phra rdul ji ltar bur || gcig pu cha śas med par 'gyur || (MAK 13). These correspond to 1989–1991. Cf. Sanskrit Text.

¹⁸² In Saccone 2015: 115, I define this as "Argument B: Against Atoms as Aggregated (*saṃhata*)."

¹⁸³ On the argument based on a difference of parts, cf. also: *tatra ye tāvad rūpiṇo ghatādayas te 'nuṣo vibhinnarūpatvān naikasvabhāvāḥ | anūnām pūrvāparasthitānām pūrvādīdigbhāgatvena vibhidyamānānām asiddhatve nāpy anusañcayātmakatvenānekasvabhāvo yuktah |* (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 12, 17–19). "Among these, first of all, those that are material, such as pots, etc., are devoid of a unitary *svabhāva* since they are divided into atoms. Nor is it logical that [they have] a manifold *svabhāva* as consisting of an agglomeration of atoms, since atoms that are placed in spatial continuity [and] are divided as having parts based on orientation, such as east, are unestablished." On this, see English Translation n. 101.

¹⁸⁴ For the concept of *digbheda*, cf. also: *phyogs kyi dbye bas phyē ba yis || rdul phran la yañ dbye ba mthoñ || gañ la cha śas kyis brtags pa || der ni rdul phran ji ltar 'thad ||* (*Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 18). An atom, when analyzed, is seen as divided according to a difference of parts based on orientation. Therefore, it cannot be logically admitted as an "atom."

fact quoted at the end of the passage.¹⁸⁵ Specifically, in TSP *ad* TS 1989, Kamalaśīla says:

*tathā hi — ekatvaṃ tāvad aṇūnām asiddhaṃ bhūḍharādīpracitarūpāṇām
dīghbhāgabhedasya vidyamānatvāt | tam eva dīghbhāgabhedam bhūḍharā-
dyupacayānyathānupapattyā paramāṇūnām prasaṅgyann ekatvaniṣedhaṃ
tāvad āha — **saṃyuktaṃ dūradeśastham** ityādi |*

To explain, [it is] precisely (*tāvat*) the singularity (*ekatva*)¹⁸⁶ of atoms [that] is not established, since a difference of parts based on orientation exists for those [things] endowed with the nature (*rūpa*) of accumulations [of atoms], such as mountains, etc. Applying to (*prasaṅgyan*) atoms precisely that difference of parts based on orientation, because the [existence of their] accumulations, such as mountains, [would] otherwise be logically incongruous, [Śāntarakṣita] states precisely the denial of [their] singularity with [the verse] beginning with “[regardless of whether the atoms are] conjoined, situated at a distance.”

Kamalaśīla’s argument is as follows: since aggregates of atoms have parts based on orientation, then each atom does as well; if they did not, their aggregates would be illogical. Four main points are made here: (i) aggregates of atoms, as spatially located entities, have different parts; (ii) since these aggregates have different parts, so does each atom;¹⁸⁷ (iii) atoms cannot be admitted as aggregating if this kind of difference of parts is not also accepted regarding them; (iv) atoms are not unitary (and hence are unreal) if they are admitted as being endowed with that difference.

Even though the arguments are arranged differently, all of these points are reminiscent of Vasubandhu’s criticism of aggregated atoms and, particularly, his refutation of the Vaibhāṣikas from Kaśmīr as found in *Vīmśikā* 12–14 and its *vṛtti* (and in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 1.43d). Moreover, in the same part of the TSP, Kamalaśīla subsequently introduces

¹⁸⁵ In fact, the property of “having a difference of parts based on orientation” is explicitly mentioned only in *Vīmśikā* 14ab where Vasubandhu actually states that, regardless of whether or not they are admitted as conjoining, atoms that are endowed with parts based on orientation cannot be unitary. Nonetheless, in spite of not being explicitly stated, the idea that an atom would have parts based on orientation if it aggregates is also implied in the previous argument (cf. *Vīmśikā* 12 and *vṛtti*). This also appears to be Śubhagupta’s understanding of this; cf. BASK 45ab, §5.4.

¹⁸⁶ While I generally render the term *eka* and derivatives with the “literal” corresponding translation of “one,” “uni-” and derivatives, I translate the abstract noun *ekatva* with singularity.

¹⁸⁷ This can be regarded as a reference to the Vaibhāṣikas. As we will see, the Vaibhāṣikas are reported as admitting that aggregates are endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation, unlike the atoms composing them. Cf. *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* in n. 197.

Śubhagupta¹⁸⁸ as his main opponent and paraphrases some *kārikās* from the BASK (45cd, 46, 48, 50, 51) (cf. *infra*) that were originally intended to refute precisely these arguments of Vasubandhu.

This does not necessarily mean that Kamalaśīla sees Śubhagupta as a Vaibhāṣika. However, in analyzing Śubhagupta's criticism of the *Vīmśikā*, it emerges that he certainly had some views in common with that school. Due to its importance in the understanding of Śubhagupta's and Kamalaśīla's points, I shall briefly introduce Vasubandhu's proof.

5.2 Vasubandhu's Refutation of

Samhata (Aggregated) Atoms as Objects of
Sense Cognitions: *Vīmśikā* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*¹⁸⁹

In *Vīmśikā* 12–14 and *vṛtti*, Vasubandhu brings forward various arguments (a–f below).¹⁹⁰

Vīmśikā 12 and *vṛtti*

- (a) If an atom is admitted as joining other atoms, it must have parts, one for each atom surrounding it, hence it cannot be unitary.
- (b) If, in order to maintain the singularity of atoms, one states that the position of one atom is also that of the others, then all atoms would

¹⁸⁸ On this part of the TSP, cf. also Manabe 2010.

¹⁸⁹ Frauwallner (1951) maintains the existence of two Vasubandhus: the “elder,” brother of Asaṅga and head of the Yogācāra school, and the “younger,” author of the *Abhidharmakośa*. The elder was born around 320 in Peshāwar. In his youth he was a Sarvāstivādin and wrote several works. Afterwards, he was converted to the Mahāyāna by his brother. He died before him, about 380. The younger was born about 400. He belonged to the Sarvāstivāda school, leaning more and more towards the Sautrāntika. Frauwallner (1951: 56) refers to the *Vīmśikā* as a work whose author is not clearly determined. Later (Frauwallner 1961: 131–132) he mentions that Vasubandhu the younger also converted to Mahāyāna towards the end of his life. For this reason, he could compose only a few works on this tradition, the *Vīmśikā* being one of them. Schmithausen (1987: 262 n. 101) regards the author of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Vīmśikā* as being one and the same person. Deleanu (2006: 194) surmises that Vasubandhu composed the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* in his thirties and the Mahāyāna works starting from his forties. He states that his dating refers to Vasubandhu the Kośakāra and follows Schmithausen's lead in admitting that the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the *Vīmśikā* were written by the same person (Deleanu 2006: 234–235). I myself assume this to be true. For a bibliography regarding scholars who do or do not accept this distinction of two Vasubandhus, see Tola–Dragonetti 2004: 157 n. 10. For a more recent treatment of Vasubandhu, his works and dates, see Skilling 2000; Tola–Dragonetti 2004; Kritzer 2005; Deleanu 2006; Franco–Preisendanz 2010 (XV–XVII).

¹⁹⁰ This section, which has been referred to as the *āyatana* section (Kellner–Taber 2014: 713), has been analyzed by many scholars, particularly Kapstein 1988 and Oetke 1992. A review of these studies is found in Kellner–Taber 2014. Since this paragraph is expected to be just a summary of the argumentations, I shall omit a critical review of previous interpretations. The Sanskrit text is based on Sylvain Lévi 1925 (see Bibliography). A newer edition is provided in Balcerowicz–Nowakowska 1999. Cf. also Mimaki et al. 1989.

occupy the same position and a conglomerate could not exist.¹⁹¹

Vimśikā 13 and *vṛtti*

The following arguments are expressly intended against the Vaibhāṣikas from Kaśmīr, who claim that atoms do not conjoin, since they do not have parts, but that their aggregates do, since they do have parts.

- (c) Aggregates are not a new, different entity from the atoms that compose them, and therefore the conjoining is of nothing but the atoms themselves. If atoms cannot conjoin, neither can aggregates, since they are nothing but those atoms themselves.
- (d) The argument that atoms cannot conjoin because they do not have parts is not valid. This is because aggregates, which are admitted as having parts, do not conjoin either, since their parts, which are atoms, do not conjoin.¹⁹²

Vimśikā 14ab and *vṛtti*

- (e) Atoms are admitted as being endowed with different parts based on orientation since they are placed in space regardless of whether or not

¹⁹¹ Cf. *yasmāt* | **ṣaṭkena yugapadyogāt paramānoḥ ṣaḍaṁśatā** | ṣaḍbhyo digbhyah ṣaḍbhiḥ paramānūbhir yugapadyoge sati paramānoḥ ṣaḍaṁśatā prāpnoti | *ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyāsambhavāt* | **ṣaṇṇām samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakah** || *atha ya evaikasya paramānor deśaḥ sa eva ṣaṇṇām* | *tena sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramāṇumātrah syāt parasparārya-tirekāḍ iti na kaścit piṇḍo drśyaḥ syāt* || (*Vimśikā* 12 and *vṛtti*, ed. p. 7, 2–9). “Since, ‘because of the simultaneous joining (*yoga*) with six [atoms], an atom would have six parts,’ since there is the simultaneous joining with six atoms from six directions, an atom [would] follow as having six parts. Since it is impossible for another [atom to occur] in that spot where one [atom] is, ‘because [those] six [atoms] would all be in the same spot, a conglomerate would amount to only one atom.’ If [it is argued that] precisely that spot where one atom is is also [the spot] for the [other] six [atoms], then, since all of them would share the same spot, every conglomerate would amount to only one atom because there would not be an exclusion from each other. Therefore, no conglomerate would be perceivable.”

¹⁹² Therefore, in that case, the concomitance between the *sādhya* and the logical reason does not follow. Cf. *naiva hi paramāṇavaḥ saṃyujyante niravayavatvāt* | *mā bhūḍ eṣa doṣaprasaṅgaḥ* | *saṃghatās tu parasparam saṃyujyanta iti kāśmīravaibhāṣikās* | *ta idaṃ praṣṭavyāḥ* | *yaḥ paramānūnām saṃghātō na sa tebhyo ’rthāntaram iti* | **paramānor asaṃyoge tatsaṃghāte ’sti kasya saḥ** | *saṃyoga iti vartate* | **na cānavayavatvena tatsaṃyogo na sidhyati** || *atha saṃghātā apy anyonyaṃ na saṃyujyante* | *na tarhi paramānūnām niravayavatvāt saṃyogo na sidhyatīti vaktavyam* | *sāvayavasyāpi hi saṃghātasya saṃyogānabhūyapagamāt* | *tasmāt paramānur ekaṃ dravyam na sidhyati* | (*Vimśikā* 13 and *vṛtti*, ed. p. 7, 9–17). “It is not indeed that atoms conjoin, since they do not have parts. Let there not be this undesirable consequence of [the above-mentioned] defect. However, [when] aggregated, [they] conjoin with each other. This is [the view of] the Vaibhāṣikas from Kaśmīr. One should ask the following [question] to them: ‘The aggregate of atoms is not another object, different from them[, is it]?’ ‘If atoms do not conjoin, with reference to their aggregates, of what is this [conjoining]?’ Conjoining is understood. ‘And not because [atoms] are devoid of parts is their conjoining not established.’ If [one argues that,] even though aggregated, [atoms] do not conjoin with each other, then, not because they do not have parts is the conjoining of atoms not established. This must be said. For, even though they have parts, the conjoining of aggregates is not admitted [either]. Therefore, an atom is not established as a unitary substance.”

they are admitted as conjoining with other atoms. This concept is also implied in the earlier argument (a).¹⁹³

Vimśikā 14cd and *vṛtti*

- (f) Furthermore, this difference is proven by the existence of shadows and obstructions. If atoms did not have different parts, shadows and obstructions would not be possible. In the first case, when the sun rises, there would not be any other part where a shadow could be; in the second, there would not be any other side of one atom that could hinder another atom. By the same token, their aggregation would also be illogical.¹⁹⁴

Some of these ideas are also found in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 1.43d. There, Vasubandhu criticizes the Vaibhāṣikas from Kaśmīr, preferring the view of Bhadanta Vasumitra, upholder of a different kind of atomistic theory.¹⁹⁵ Here too the Vaibhāṣikas are reported as saying that atoms cannot

¹⁹³ Cf. *yadi ca paramāṇoḥ saṃyoga īsyate yadi vā neśyate | digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvaṃ na yujyate | anyo hi paramāṇoḥ pūrvadigbhāgo yāvad adhodigbhāga iti digbhāgabhedo sati katham tadātmakasya paramāṇor ekatvaṃ yoksyate |* (*Vimśikā* 14ab and *vṛtti*, ed. p. 7, 17–21). “And [regardless of] whether or not the conjoining of an atom is admitted. ‘The singularity of that which is endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation is not tenable.’ For, regarding [a single] atom, the part that is in the east until the part that is at the nadir are different, there being a difference of parts based on orientation of this sort, how will the singularity of an atom having that nature follow?”

¹⁹⁴ Cf. *chāyāvṛtī katham vā yady ekaikasya paramāṇor digbhāgabhedo na syād ādityodaye katham anyatra chāyā bhavaty anyatrātapah | na hi tasyānyah pradeśo ’sti yatrātapo na syāt | āvaraṇaṃ ca katham bhavati paramāṇoḥ paramāṇvantareṇa yadi digbhāgabhedo neśyate | na hi kaścid api paramāṇoḥ parabhāgo ’sti yatrāgamanād anyenānyasya pratighātaḥ syāt | asati ca pratighāte sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ saṃghātaḥ paramāṇumātṛaḥ syād ity uktam | kim evaṃ neśyate pīṇḍasya te chāyāvṛtī na paramāṇor iti | kim khalu paramāṇubhyo ’nyah pīṇḍa īsyate yasya te syātām | nety āha | anyo na pīṇḍas cen na tasya te || yadi nānyah paramāṇubhyah pīṇḍa īsyate na te tasyeti siddham bhavati |* (*Vimśikā* 14cd and *vṛtti*, ed. p. 7, 21–8, 5). “‘Or how will the shadow and obstruction be?’ If there could not be a difference of parts based on orientation of every single atom, when the sun rises, how come there is shadow in one place and sunshine in another? For there is not another part of it where sunshine would not be. And how [can] an atom be hindered by another one if a difference of parts based on orientation is not admitted? For there is not any other part of the atom whatsoever, where, because of [its] coming [there], there can be the obstructing of one [atom] by another. But if there were no obstructing, since all [atoms] would occupy the same spot, all aggregates would amount to [one] atom, as it is said [previously in *Vimśikā* 12cd]. Why, in this way, is it not admitted that these two, shadow and obstruction, belong to the conglomerate and not to the atom? Maybe indeed the conglomerate to which these two could belong is admitted as different from the atoms? No. Therefore, he says, ‘If [it is said that] the conglomerate is not different [from the atoms], [then] these two[, i.e., shadow and obstruction,] do not belong to it.’ If the conglomerate is not admitted as being different from the atoms, these two do not belong to it. This is established.”

¹⁹⁵ Cf. *yadi paramāṇavaḥ sprśeyuḥ, uttarakṣaṇāvasthānaṃ syād iti Bhadantavasumitrah | na sprśanti, nirantere tu sprśasamjñēti Bhadantaḥ | Bhadantamatam caīṣṭavyam | anyathā hi sāntarāṇāṃ paramāṇūnāṃ śūnyeṣu antareṣu gatīḥ kena pratibādhyeta, yataḥ sapratighā īsyante |* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 1.43d, ed. p. 33, 2–5). “‘If atoms touched [each other], there would be [their] remaining in a subsequent instant (*uttarakṣaṇa*),’ thus the Venerable Vasumitra says. ‘They do not touch

touch each other, since otherwise they would have parts, and that aggregates indeed touch each other, since they do have parts.¹⁹⁶ His refutation is as follows:

na ca paramāṇubhyo 'nye saṅghātā iti | ta eva te saṅghātāḥ sprśyante, yathā rūpyante | yadi ca paramāṇor digbhāgabhedah kalpyate, sprśtasyā-sprśtasya vā sāvayavatvaprasaṅgaḥ | no cet, sprśtasyāpy aprasaṅgaḥ ||
(*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 1.43d, ed. p. 33, 5–7)

And aggregates are not different from the atoms [composing them]. These [aggregates] indeed [that are] those [atoms] as aggregated touch each other, just as they are perceived (as *rūpa*). And, regarding an atom, if a difference of parts based on orientation is conceived, [then] there [would] be the consequence of having parts [whether] it is touched or not touched. And if not, then, also for what is touched, [the fact of having parts] does not follow.

Here Vasubandhu argues that aggregates are not a new ontological reality different from the atoms composing them, and thus, atoms must in fact touch each other. Moreover, if one conceives of an atom as having different parts based on orientation, then it will have parts whether or not it touches other atoms, as in the case of aggregates. But if in this case the Vaibhāṣikas still do not admit the property of having parts for atoms, then it will not follow for aggregates either, since they are nothing but those atoms. This is an undesirable consequence for their own thesis, since they indeed admit aggregates as having parts as well as those parts as being different based on orientation.¹⁹⁷

[each other], but, having no interstices, they are conceived as touching [each other],’ thus the Venerable [says]; and the view of the Venerable must be accepted. For, otherwise, regarding atoms that have interstices [between them], what would obstruct their movement into the void interstices, given that they are admitted as obstructing [each other]?

¹⁹⁶ Cf. *na sprśantīti kāśmīrakāḥ | kiṃ kāraṇam | yadi tāvat sarvātmanā sprśeyur miśrībhavayur dravyāṇi | athaikadeśena sāvayavāḥ prasajyeran | niravayavās ca paramāṇavaḥ | [...] katham idānīm niruttaraḥ prāptiḥ prāptaviṣayaḥ trayam ucyate | tad evaiśāṃ niruttaratvaḥ yad madhye nāsti kiñcit | api khalu saṅghātāḥ sāvayavatvāt sprśantīty adōṣaḥ |* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 1.43d, ed. p. 32, 13–15, 19–20). “The Kāśmīrians[, i.e., the Vaibhāṣikas from Kāśmīr,] [say] that [atoms] do not touch [each other]. For which reason? If indeed they touched [each other] completely [with all their form], the substances would become mixed. If [they touched] with one part, they would follow as having parts. And atoms do not have parts. [...] How, in this case, due to a continuous attainment, are the three [sense organs] said to ‘attain’ their object? This is indeed their continuity, that there is nothing in between [them]. And, moreover, aggregates touch [each other,] because they have parts. Therefore, there is no logical defect.”

¹⁹⁷ In commenting on this last part, Yaśomitra notes that the Vaibhāṣikas do not admit a difference of parts based on orientation as being a property of atoms, while they accept it for their aggregates. Cf. *atra sādhanam | na niravayavaḥ paramāṇuḥ | digbhāgabhedavattvāt | māśarāśivād iti | tad etad digbhāgabhedavattvaḥ nechanti vaibhāṣikāḥ | digbhāgabhedo hi saṅghātarūpāṇām eva kalpyate | evaṃ ca varṇayanti — dharmataiveyaḥ yat sapratighānām bhinnadeśatvaḥ | teṣāṃ nairantarye-*

The arguments found in the *Vīmśikā* are the target of Śubhagupta's refutation in the BASK. The concepts treated therein, along with those discussed in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (of which Śubhagupta was certainly aware), constitute the background of the statement of his view on atoms as well as his proof of their being *dravya*, particularly *ekadravya*.¹⁹⁸

5.3 Śubhagupta's Theory on the Aggregation of Atoms

In TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991, Kamalaśīla expands on the three different theses regarding the aggregation of atoms as referred to in TS 1989ab:

tatra kecid āhuḥ — parasparam saṃyujyante paramāṇava iti | sāntarā eva nityam na sprśantīty apare | niranantaratve tu sprśtasamjñēty anye |

In this respect, some say, “Atoms conjoin with each other;” others [say], “Indeed, having interstices, they never touch [each other];” [and still] others [say], “Having no interstices, there is, however, the idea (*saṃjñā*) of touching [each other].”

The third view reminds us of that of Bhadanta Vasumitra (cf. §5.2). The second view is likely being attributed to Śubhagupta¹⁹⁹ and also refers to that of the Vaibhāṣikas from Kaśmīr as described in *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 1.43d (cf. §5.2). According to Shastri (1967: 43 n. 91), Śubhagupta is a *sāntarāparamāṇuvādin*. In light of certain *kārikās* from the BASK (particularly 50, 52, 53 and 56),²⁰⁰ I would define Śubhagupta's position as follows: atoms

*nāvasthānād abhinnadeśatvaṃ mā bhūd iti sāntarāṇām api sapratighatvena gatiḥ pratibadhyata iti | (Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, ed. p. 85, 21–26). “In this respect, [this is] the proof: an atom is not partless, since [it] has a difference of parts based on orientation, like a heap of beans. Precisely this [property of an atom of] having a difference of parts based on orientation is not admitted by the Vaibhāṣikas. For the difference of parts based on orientation is imagined only with regard to those that have the nature of aggregates [of atoms]. And thus they explain, “This is indeed [their] nature, the fact that [atoms] that are in opposition [with each other] occupy different places. Let there not be their occupying non-different places because of being placed without interstices [(i.e., in spatial continuity)]. Therefore, the movement [of atoms,] though endowed with interstices, is obstructed by virtue of [their] being in opposition [with each other].” A similar concept is referred to in the BASK: *gaṇ śig daṇ nī ñe ba las || 'gros ldan gaṇ gi 'gros 'gag pa || des de'i sgrib pa rab bśad pa || cha śas gzan gyis ma yin no ||* (BASK 52). “Because of [its] vicinity with that (*yena*), it is spoken of obstruction by [an atom] of [another] moving [atom] whose movement is blocked, but not by virtue of another part.”*

¹⁹⁸ Cf., for example, *grib ma daṇ nī sgrib pa la || maṇ po'i mthu nī skye ba ltar || de bžin rdul phran mams la nī || re re nas nī gtan du min ||* (BASK 54). “As shadow and obstruction arise by force of many things, similarly atoms are never [arising] singly.”

¹⁹⁹ In the MAP, Kamalaśīla mentions Śubhagupta explicitly and quotes BASK 46 after presenting a thesis on atoms saying that they are endowed with interstices and surrounded by many homogeneous atoms; cf. MAP (ed. p. 51, 53). In the corresponding passage in the MAV, also Śāntarakṣita quotes BASK 46; cf. MAV (ed. p. 52, 2–5).

²⁰⁰ For BASK 50, see §5.5; for BASK 52, see n. 197; *ñi ma'i sgrib pa yod na nī || grib ma kun tu 'byun 'gyur gyi || grib ma ñi ma rdul gñis kyī || bar na gnas par mī rīgs so ||* (BASK 53). “If there is an obstruction of the sun, shadow will arise everywhere, but it is not logical that the shadow

are continuous and proximate, but do not touch each other. Similar to the Vaibhāṣikas from Kaśmīr, he sees their being continuous as having nothing between them (such as light) and as being in opposition to each other.

5.4 Śubhagupta's Response to the “*Digbhāgabhedavattva*”

Argument: **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* kk. 45cd, 46, 47, 48

Kamalaśīla refutes all three of the above-mentioned positions. First, he presents an argument based on an undesirable consequence (*prasaṅga*) derived from accepting the basic common thesis that atoms have a unitary nature, namely, that they are devoid of a difference of parts based on orientation (regardless of the way they are admitted as aggregating). This is because, if they were admitted as being devoid of that difference, their aggregation could not occur and they could not be located in space. In other words, they would be like immaterial entities. To explain this *prasaṅga*, he specifies that one atom endowed with a unitary nature can only face atoms occupying the same space. In this regard, he also presents a proof statement in which the logical reason is an essential property (*svabhāva*).²⁰¹ In other words, the pervasion between the fact of having the essential property of facing one atom with one nature-form and the property of occupying only one space is based on their factual identity. All atoms surrounding a certain atom have that *svabhāva*, since the atom in the middle, like all atoms, has *ex hypothesi* a unitary nature-form. Therefore, they all occupy the same space. But if the central atom is admitted as facing the other atoms with a different nature, then it would be endowed with parts based on orientation, exactly like aggregates. In sum, atoms, as aggregating, are not unitary and, in terms of being endowed with parts, are not different from their aggregates (cf. §5.1).

At this point, Kamalaśīla presents an objection by Śubhagupta, introduced as a quotation by him.²⁰² For this reason, this prose passage was considered by Hattori (and, presumably, also by Frauwallner) as part of the

stands in the middle of two atoms of the sun.” *phan tshun bdag ñid ma reg pa || cha śas med par mam gnas te || de phyir sa yi dkyil 'khor sogs || bsags pa las ni byuñ ba yin ||* (BASK 56). “[Atoms] do not touch each other’s nature-form [and] are established (**vyavasthita*) as being devoid of parts; therefore[, i.e., because they are devoid of parts and, hence, unitary,] they arise having aggregated, like in the sphere of earth.” BASK 56 is found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (ed. p. 59, 14–17) with a slight variant in *pāda* a (*ma reg par* instead of *ma reg pa*). In the latter case the translation of *pādas* a and b would be “[Atoms] are established as not touching each other’s nature-form [and as] devoid of parts.”

²⁰¹ Cf. TSP ad TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 167 and English Translation p. 246–247.

²⁰² This particular case is not easy to define according to Steinkellner’s classification system. It is introduced as a quotation from Śubhagupta, and some *kārikās* are quoted almost verbatim. Nonetheless, since these texts are in prose, they can hardly be regarded as **Ci**. More likely, they can be classified as lying somewhere between **T’** and **R**.

“autocommentary.”²⁰³ However, the passage is nothing other than a prose reformulation of *kārikās* from the BASK placed in the following order: 48, 45cd, 46;²⁰⁴ thus contradicting Frauwallner’s assumption that the TSP contains no paraphrases of verses from the BASK. The reference to *kārikās* in a non-sequential order seems to indicate that this passage was also constructed by Kamalaśīla for argumentative purposes. Moreover, also in the MAP, we find a passage constructed as a prose commentary on BASK 46 (cf. ed. p. 53) that differs from the one in the TSP.²⁰⁵ This is further evidence that, in the TSP, Kamalaśīla intentionally presented Śubhagupta’s views in the form of prose explanations.

Śubhagupta is reported as saying:

bhadantaśubhaguptas tu prāha — yathaikasvabhāvasyāsadadravyādivyāvṛttasyānekaṃ sāmānyam na tattvena kalpyate evam ihāpi paramāṇūnām anekamadhyavaritvād anekatvam kalpyate na bhūtārthena | tathā hi — na dikpadārtho nāmāsti kaṇādādikalpitah | tasyaikasvarūpatvād anekarūpaḥ pūrvādipratyaayo na syāt | kevalam aṇava eva paurvāparyeṇāvasthītā dikśabdavācyaḥ | tataś ca digbhāgabhedavattvād iti kevalam bahubhiḥ parivāraṇam evoktam syān na sāvayavatvam iti | (TSP ad TS 1989–1991)

Nevertheless, Bhadanta Śubhagupta states, “Regarding [a particular], the *svabhāva* [of which is] unitary, once it is excluded (*vyāvṛttasya*) from [what is] non-existing, as well as [from what is] a non-substance, etc., a manifold universal is conceptually formed, but not according to true reality. Similarly, also in this case, with regard to atoms, due to their being in the middle of

²⁰³ According to Hattori’s list of identifications, this passage corresponds (presumably as its commentary) only to BASK 46. Cf. Appendix §5 (no. 4).

²⁰⁴ As already mentioned (see n. 199), a verse corresponding to BASK 46 is quoted in the MAV (ed. p. 52, 2–5) and the MAP (ed. p. 53, 5–8). In the latter case, it is preceded by a quotation of *Vimśikā* 14ab (MAP, ed. p. 53, 2–3).

²⁰⁵ In the TSP, the commentary on BASK 46 is limited to the literal repetition in prose of the words, without adding any explanation; indeed, this offers very little in the way of a commentary. In the MAP, Kamalaśīla refers again to Śubhagupta by name quoting a prose passage. That passage has been found as corresponding to one in the *Abhisamayālaṅkāralokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* (ed. p. 632, 27–633, 6) by Ichigō (MAP, ed. p. 163 n. 1). In the same part, Śāntarakṣita presents two verses (introduced by *kha cig na re*) which Ichigō cannot trace in any work of Śubhagupta’s. Cf. *de bas na dños dan cig sos kyis rig pa’i don ma grub pa dan zhes bya ba la sogs pas ni slob dpon dge sruis na re | so so’i skye bo’i ses pa thams cad kyañ sñon po la sogs pa’i mnam pas ñe bar bsgyur bar gyur pa ma yin par jug ste | ses pa de la ni geig pa ñid ñams par thal bar mi ’gyur te | blo sna tshogs kyi no bo ñid ma yin pa’i phyir ro | | ses pa de la sñon po la sogs pa myoñ ba’i no bo ñid du mnam par b’zag pa gañ yin pa de ni sñon po la sogs pa myoñ ba’i no bo yin pa’i phyir yin gyi | sñon po la sogs pa’i no bor gyur pa’i phyir ni ma yin te | ’di ltar mnam pa ni dmigs pa ’dzin pa’i mnam pa kho na yin par brjod kyi | dmigs pa’i no bo ni ma yin no | sñon po la sogs pa phyi rol gyi lta bur snañ bar ses pa gañ yin pa de ni ses pa’i mnam par ma yin gyi | sñon po la sogs par rig pa’i ses pa ñams su myoñ na sgrub pa pos sñon po la sogs pa de lta bu’i no bor rtogs so zhes zer ba de ’di ñid kyis lan btab pa yin no zhes ston par byed do | |* (MAP, ed. p. 163, 1–13).

many [atoms], [the concept of] the manifoldness [of their nature-form] is conceptually constructed, but not as a real fact. To explain, [that which is] called the ‘category of orientation,’ [as] imagined by Kaṇāda and other [Vaiśeṣikas], does not exist. Since[, according to them,] this [category of orientation] is endowed with a unitary nature, with regard to it, a manifold nature — [like] the concept of east, etc. — could not occur.²⁰⁶ [However,] with the word ‘orientation,’ only atoms as placed in spatial continuity are expressed; and, therefore, ‘since [an atom] is endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation’ can only mean that [an atom] is surrounded by many [other atoms], not that [it itself] has parts.”

I shall introduce BASK 48, 45cd and 46 in the original order to provide an accurate idea of Śubhagupta’s argument:

rdul phran phyogs cha tha dad phyir || med ces smras gan de ma ’brel ||
’ga’ yis khyad par dan bcas pa’i || rdul la phyogs kyi sgrar bstan bya ||
 (BASK 45)²⁰⁷

What is said [by Vasubandhu], “Atoms are not real, since there is a difference of parts based on orientation” is incoherent (*ma ’brel/*asambaddha, *asaṅgata*). With the word “orientation,” one indicates atom[s] as being different through some [aspect].

de phyir phyogs cha’i khyad par gyis || de ni mañ pos yon bskor bar ||
brjod par zad kyi rdul mams ni || cha śas bcas pa’i bdag ñid min ||
 (BASK 46)²⁰⁸

Therefore, with “difference of parts based on orientation,” it is only said that they are surrounded by many [other atoms], but atoms do not have a nature endowed with parts.

rdul phran tshu rol nos na gcig || pha rol gzan mam gnas pa ni ||
tshu rol pha rol cha gñis kyi || rdul de gñis su thal ba med ||
 (BASK 47)

²⁰⁶ This argument is not found in the BASK. However, analogous arguments are used by Śāntarakṣita in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā to refute the existence of the category of time and space according to the Vaiśeṣikas: *viśiṣṭasamayodbhūtanaskāranibandhanam | parāparādivijñānam na kālān na dīśaś ca tat ||* (TS 628) *niraṃśaikasvabhāvatvāt paurvāparyādyasambhavaḥ | tayoh sambandhibhedāc ced evaṃ tau nīṣhalaṇu nanu ||* (TS 629). “The cognition of [something being] high and low, etc., is based on the mental attention (*manaskāra*) arisen from specific conventions. That is not due to time or space.” “Since these two[, i.e., space and time,] have a *svabhāva* partless and unitary, priority and posteriority are not possible. If [it is argued: that is] because of the difference of what is related to them [(i.e., space and time)], [it will be answered:] in this way, these two are useless.”

²⁰⁷ An identical verse is found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (ed. p. 60, 11–14) with a small variant in *pāda* b1 (*smra* instead of *smras*).

²⁰⁸ The verse is found identically in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (ed. p. 60, 15–18).

An atom is located with one [atom] on [its] surface on one side and another [atom] on [its surface on] the other side; there is no undesirable consequence of it being twofold by virtue of [having] two parts on this and the other side.

du ma'i dbus na 'dug pa'i phyir || du ma ñid du rnam rtog la ||
'di ltar ldog pa'i sgo dag nas || mañ po ñid du spyir rtog cin ||
 (BASK 48)

[An atom] is conceptually constructed as being manifold because it is in the middle of many [atoms]. In the same way, by means of exclusion, a universal (*spyi*/**sāmānya*) “manifoldness” is conceptually constructed.

Śubhagupta makes reference (both in the BASK and in its paraphrase by Kamalaśīla) to the *apoha* theory²⁰⁹ as a common standpoint, thereby confirming that he was influenced to some extent by Dharmakīrti's ideas (cf. §2.5).

Even though the arguments are very similar, they are clearly arranged in a different manner. In the TSP, the prose passage begins with the reference to the *apoha* theory (which in the BASK appears at the end), immediately emphasizing the main tenet of the argument, that is, conceptualization (namely, “manifoldness” and “orientation”) as opposed to the pure, direct apprehension of reality (i.e., partless unitary atoms). In fact, in both the TSP and the BASK the main point is that, with reference to atoms, which are *dravyas*, like all the other *śvalakṣaṇas*, “manifoldness” and “orientation” (or “space”) are just concepts that are superimposed on them. The concept of manifoldness (*anekatva*), as treated therein, contains an ambiguity. In both the TSP and the BASK, given the flow of the subsequent arguments, it appears primarily to refer to the manifoldness of the nature of atoms, that is, that they are truly unitary and arising together, but are conceptually determined as being manifold when aggregating. At the same time, it may also be referring to the fact of being many as a concept that is superimposed on atoms, since they occur all together.

In the BASK, Śubhagupta is trying to validate the occurrence of many atoms in space as aggregating, without admitting their being endowed with parts, i.e., with portions of their surface facing other atoms. The above-mentioned verses are part of the refutation of the *pūrvapakṣa* expounded in BASK 45ab, which clearly refers to Vasubandhu's argument as expounded in the *Vimśikā*, specifically in k. 14ab, but also to a summary of his proof

²⁰⁹ On the *apoha* theory, the “theory of exclusion,” first conceived by Dinnāga and further elaborated by Dharmakīrti, see (among others) Frauwallner 1932, 1933b, 1935; Katsura 1979; Hattori 1979; Herzberger 1986; Hayes 1988; Katsura 1991; Pind 1991; Dreyfus 1997; Hattori 2000; Dunne 2004. For a more recent contribution, see Siderits–Tillemans–Chakrabarti 2011.

against atoms as unitary.²¹⁰ Śubhagupta wants to highlight an incoherence in that argument: orientation is not something real, but rather only a concept, that is to say, something ultimately erroneous. Vasubandhu grounds his argument in something that is proven as existing only conceptually. The idea of “orientation” is related to our erroneous perception of particulars as objects; these are conceptually determined as such, based on their exclusion from other different and truly existing particulars. One directly apprehends only atoms, partless unitary *dravyas* that arise together. Subsequently, one conceptually determines them as objects, endowed with different aspects (i.e., properties), and, based on that, sees them as placed in space. Space is nothing but objects arranged next to each other; however, the latter, in their real nature, are nothing but atoms conceptually and erroneously determined as such. Indeed, what we call “orientation” is only atoms placed in spatial continuity.

In this way, also their being many and hence manifold is explained. Since they occur as many, arising together in support of each other and aggregating, they are conceptually determined as many, and their nature is established as manifold. However, from an absolute point of view, they are unitary.²¹¹

Moreover, once again (cf. §4.5) in the TSP, Kamalaśīla is explicitly reporting Śubhagupta as resorting to an argument that is not really found in the BASK, namely, disproving the category of direction, as conceived by the Vaiśeṣikas, stating that it cannot be one, since it has subdivisions like the notions of the east and other directions.

5.5 Temporal Continuity Versus Spatial Continuity:

Śubhagupta as Introduced in *Tattvasaṅgrahaṭīkā* ad

Tattvasaṅgraha 1989–1991 and **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 50–51

In response, Kamalaśīla clearly opposes Śubhagupta’s idea that atoms, from an absolute point of view, are unitary, while they are conceptually determined as situated in space and manifold, according to conventional truth. Since he admits atoms as ultimately partless according to absolute truth, his view that their spatial continuity is conventionally true is illogical and thus cannot follow. If atoms do not have a difference of parts, such as

²¹⁰ In fact, the property of a difference of parts based on orientation is also presupposed in the argument as expounded in *Vimśikā* 12ab. Cf. n. 185 and 191.

²¹¹ On a similar note, cf. *de las gzan pa la bltos na* || *no bo gzan gañ dper ’dzin pa* || *de der kho nas yod min te* || *tshu rol pha rol sogs dbye bzin* || (BASK 49). “Regarding one thing, the nature, which is conceptually determined in dependence on [some] other thing [different] from it, does not really exist in that [thing], like the difference of this and the other side, etc.” For this translation, see the original Sanskrit fragment: *tadanyāpekṣayānyasya yadrūpam awadhāryate | tad asat tatra tattvena pārāvārādibhedavad* || (*Abhisamayālaṅkāralokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā*, ed. Lee 2016 p. 53, 16–17).

high and low, they cannot be surrounded by other atoms and, hence, their multiplicity cannot be logically thought of as spatially extended. Moreover, as an undesirable consequence, he would have to accept that they are not different from mind and mental states, a point that the Vijñānavādin is indeed keen on demonstrating. And, if he admits spatial continuity for things that do not have parts, he must also admit it for immaterial things like mind and mental states.²¹²

The opponent (evidently Śubhagupta) reverses the argument. If mental instants, such as past, present and future, are admitted as continuous even though devoid of parts, the same must also hold true for atoms:

syād etat — yathā vartamānacittakṣaṇasyātītātānāgatābhyām cittakṣaṇābhyām kālakṛtanairantaryam asti, atha ca na vartamānacittakṣaṇasya kalāmuhūrtādivat sāvayavatvam evam aṇūnām saty api bahubhiḥ parivāraṇe na deśakṛtaṁ sāvayavatvam bhaviṣyati | (TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991)

Let the following be the case, “Just as there is temporal continuity (*nairantarya*) between the present mental instant and the two [adjacent] mental instants, the past and the future ones — yet certainly (*atha ca*) the present mental instant has no parts, like for instance *kalā* and *muhūrta* — similarly, atoms will not have spatial parts, in spite of being surrounded by many [other atoms].”

This passage is a patent reference to BASK 50 and 51, which are still part of the refutation of Vasubandhu’s proof that aggregating atoms must be endowed with parts. In this case, Śubhagupta is specifically countering the idea that continuity with other things is pervaded by the property of having parts. I shall consider these *kārikās* in their original context:

gal te mañ por ’dab chags phyir || *cha śas bcas par ’dod na ni* ||
skad cig sña phyi ’dab chags la || *ci phyir de dan ’dra mi ’gyur* ||
(BASK 50)

If, since [an atom] is continuous with many [other atoms], [it] is admitted as endowed with parts, [then] why is it not like that [also] regarding the instants, the preceding and the subsequent one, [which are] continuous?

śes pa’i skad cig gñis dag gis || *’dab chags yin yañ de la ni* ||
cha śas bcas gzugs mi ’dod liar || *rdul phran mams la’an de b’zin no* ||
(BASK 51)

²¹² Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 168 and English Translation p. 248.

As, even though [a cognition] is continuous with two instants of cognition,²¹³ it is not admitted as endowed with parts, likewise it will also be for atoms.

In the BASK, Śubhagupta's point is as follows. The argument "atoms are endowed with parts, since they are continuous with many [other atoms]" (*mañ por 'dab chags phyir*) is based on the pervasion of the two properties of "having parts" and "being continuous with other things." Accordingly, it would follow that also mental instants, which are admitted as continuous, are endowed with parts. This is an undesirable consequence for both the opponent and the proponent of that argument.²¹⁴ In conclusion, since Śubhagupta's opponent accepts the pervasion of "being continuous" and "being partless" regarding mental instants, he must also accept it for atoms.

In the TSP, the objection is intentionally formulated by Kamalaśīla in order to show that it has an internal logical defect. The opponent is reported as arguing that a present mental instant is endowed with temporal continuity (*kālakṛtanairantarya*) with the past and the future ones and has no parts (*na...sāvayavatva*); similarly, atoms would also be surrounded (*parivāraṇa*) by many other atoms but would not have spatial parts (*na deśakṛtaṃ sāvayavatvam*). In brief, Kamalaśīla emphasizes the distinction between the continuity existing between mental instants, which is temporal (*kālakṛta*) in nature, and the continuity, i.e., the fact of surrounding (*parivāraṇa*), existing between atoms, which is spatial (*deśakṛta*). While in the BASK the logical reason is the same in the two instances, namely, continuity without further qualifications, in the TSP there are two distinct logical reasons: spatial continuity as opposed to temporal continuity. In this sense, Śubhagupta's argument as reported in the TSP blatantly reveals itself as invalid. Since this passage is an obvious reference to BASK 50 and 51, it provides further evidence for Kamalaśīla's *modus argumentandi* of intentionally misrepresenting Śubhagupta's proof for argumentative purposes.

5.6 Kamalaśīla's Response

In BASK 50 and 51, Śubhagupta does not seem to be particularly interested in validating this specific point any further. It is just one of several arguments that he lists, one after the other, against Vasubandhu's claims in the *Vīṃśikā* (cf. §5.4). On the contrary, in the TSP, Kamalaśīla is especially keen on disproving this point in order to establish Vasubandhu's argument

²¹³ As we shall see in more detail, Kamalaśīla's answer to this in the TSP is based on PV Pratyakṣa 246, where Dharmakīrti discusses the concept of *mānasapratyakṣa* (or *manovijñāna*). Arguably, Śubhagupta is referring to *indriyavijñāna* and *manovijñāna* and has precisely this theory in mind when putting forward his objection. On these concepts, see English Translation n. 124 and 125.

²¹⁴ Moreover, despite not being explicitly stated, the logical reason will follow as inconclusive, since it is also present in the heterogeneous instance of mental instants, which are partless.

in *Vimśikā* 14ab, which is, in fact, quoted as a *siddhānta* at the end of the passage. The main goal is that of demonstrating that temporal continuity between mental instants is tenable as conventionally true, while spatial continuity between atoms is absurd.²¹⁵

Kamalaśīla's response can be subdivided into five points.

1. According to absolute truth, there cannot be continuity (*nairantarya*) between things that do not coexist. Ultimately, the present mental instant has no continuity with the future and past ones, since they are non-existent when the present instant exists. A real continuity (*paurvāparya*) with something that does not exist is logically untenable. As we will see, the kind of continuity meant here, which implies coexistence and is admitted by the opponent as a property of atoms, is specifically spatial continuity; this will be shown to be illogical. At the moment, however, Kamalaśīla merely states that continuity is not a real property of mental instants.²¹⁶
2. Temporal continuity can be admitted as conventionally true through causality, since cause and effect cannot coexist. Accordingly, instants that do not coexist can be conventionally admitted as following one another, i.e., as temporally continuous. In the same way, one conceptually conceives the existence of what was before through the observation of what comes after, just as the cause is inferred from the effect.²¹⁷
3. Proof through causality does not apply to atoms. In order to join and, hence, be endowed with spatial continuity (*deśakṛtapaurvāparya*), they cannot follow each other temporally, but must be coexistent. Otherwise the undesirable consequence of the impossibility of their aggregates would follow. Implicitly, Kamalaśīla also proves that the two kinds of continuity are different in nature and that, while the temporal is logically tenable, the spatial is not.²¹⁸
4. The proof of the tenability of causality²¹⁹ and, accordingly, of temporal

²¹⁵ On Kamalaśīla's and Śāntarakṣita's views on conventional truth, see Ichigō 1985b: LXI–LXXXII; cf. English Translation n. 65.

²¹⁶ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 169 and English Translation p. 249.

²¹⁷ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 169, 6–8 and English Translation p. 249.

²¹⁸ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 169 and English Translation p. 249.

²¹⁹ In the *Bhāvanākramas* (from a Madhyamaka perspective), Kamalaśīla deals with the subject of causality in order to prove its unreality according to absolute truth. Nevertheless, he argues that it is conventionally true: *nāpy anityāt | tatratītānāgatayor avastutvān na tāvat tato janma yuktam | ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt | nāpi vartamānāt | samānāsamānakālayos tata utpādāyogāt | tathā hi — na tāvat samānakālaṃ kāraṇam, kāraṇasvabhāvaṃ kāryasyāpi tatsamānakālabhāvitayā niṣpannatvāt | nāpi bhinnakālam | kālāntaravyavadhānenotpāde 'tītād evotpattiḥprasāṅgāt | avyavadhānenāpy utpāde sarvātmanā yady avyavadhānam tadaikasmīn eva kṣaṇe sarvakṣaṇānām anupraveśāt kalpasya kṣaṇamātrātāprasāṅgaḥ | yathā paramāṇoh (em.) paramāṇoh | sarvātmanā saṃyoge pīṇḍasyānumātrātāprasāṅgaḥ | athaika-deśeṇa, tadā kṣaṇasya sāvyavavatvaprasāṅgaḥ | svato 'pi notpadyante | nirhetukapakṣeṇāivāṣya pakṣasya*

continuity is spelled out:

- i) First of all, Kamalaśīla summarizes the well-known proof that things must have a cause; otherwise, they would always exist or not exist at all.²²⁰ The fact that things exist only at certain times is due to the fact that they depend on a cause.²²¹
- ii) After claiming the tenability of the previous demonstration of causality,²²² he commences to prove that, on this basis, the temporal continuity between two things must also be

*saṅghātāt | svātmāni ca kārītravirodhāt | nāpy ubhayataḥ | ubhayapakṣabhāvādoḥ sadvaya-prasaṅgāt | tasmāt paramārthato 'nutpannā evāmī bhāvāḥ | saṃvṛtyā tūtpādasya vidyamānatvān nāgamādivirodhaḥ | tathā cokaṭaḥ bhagavatā — bhāvā jāyante saṃvṛtyā paramārthe 'svabhāvakāḥ | nīḥsvabhāveṣu bhāveṣu bhrāntiḥ sā saṃvṛtir matā || iti | iyaṃ ca yuktir bhagavato 'bhīpretaiḥ sālīstambādau | svataḥ parata ubhābhyām ahetō ca janmanīśedhāt || (Bhāvanākrama I, ed. p. 11, 21–12, 15). “[The origination of things is] not even from an impermanent [cause]. In this respect, since a past [cause] and a future one are not real, the origination from them is indeed illogical, due to the undesirable consequence of [things] not having any cause. Nor is [it] from a present [cause], due to the illogicality of [both some thing] that is contemporaneous [and some thing] that is not contemporaneous arising from it. To explain, first of all, a cause [cannot] be contemporaneous because it would follow that also the effect, like the nature of the cause, would be completely produced as contemporaneous to it. Nor can [it] be at a different time since, [being] the arising [of the effect] with the interval of a different time, there would be the undesirable consequence of [its] arising indeed from a past [cause]. Arising also with no interval, if the absence of interval is total, then, since all instants would concentrate [themselves] into only one instant, there would be the undesirable consequence of a kalpa being reduced to only one instant. Like regarding an atom, if [there were] a total conjoining [with other atoms], there would be the undesirable consequence of a conglomerate consisting of only one atom. And [if the absence of an interval is] partial, then there would be the undesirable consequence of an instant having parts. [Things] do not originate by themselves either, since this thesis is included, indeed, in the thesis that [they are] devoid of a cause, and because there is the contradiction of activity (kāritra) regarding oneself. Not even from both[, i.e., from a cause and from itself,] because of the undesirable consequence of the two [series of] logical defects present in both theses. Therefore, from an absolute point of view, these things are, indeed, not originated. However, since origination exists from a conventional point of view, there is no contradiction with the scriptures (āgama), etc. And thus the Bhagavān said, ‘Things originate conventionally, [but] they are ultimately devoid of svabhāva. And that error [of origination] regarding things that are [indeed] devoid of svabhāva is regarded as conventional truth.’ (cf. Laṅkāvatārasūtra 10.429 — slightly different) And this reasoning of the Bhagavān is indeed intended in the Śālīstambasūtra and other [sūtras]; since there is the denial of the origination from itself, from another, from both and from a non-cause.” Cf. also the *Vajracchedikāṭikā, where Kamalaśīla attributes the thesis of cause and effect arising with an interval of a different time to the Vaibhāṣikas and the thesis of them arising without an interval to the Sautrāntikas: *dus tha dad na yaṇ de dus gzan gyis chod nas 'gyur te | dper na bye brag tu smra ba mams kyis mam par smin pa'i rgyu la rgyur 'dod pa lta bur 'gyur ba'am | ma chod pa las 'gyur te | dper na mdo ste pa dag rgyu dan 'bras bu 'zig pa dan skye ba ni sraṇ mda'i mthon dman ltar mñam mo zes zer ba ltar 'gyur graṇ na |* (*Vajracchedikāṭikā, ed. p. 396, 12–16).*

²²⁰ Cf. *nityaṃ sattvaṃ asattvaṃ vā 'hetor anyānapekṣaṇāt | apekṣāto hi bhāvanām kādācikatvasambhavaḥ* || (PV Svārthānumāna 35).

²²¹ Cf. TSP ad TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 169, 10–11 and English Translation p. 249.

²²² Cf. TSP ad TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 169, 11–13 and English Translation p. 249.

acknowledged as logical. He argues that, provided every being has a cause, it is not logical that cause and effect are contemporaneous, because, if they were, they would arise at exactly the same time. Then the cause, not existing before the arising of the effect, would be incapable of producing it, since something that does not exist has no capacity.²²³ By the same token, if the cause existed later, along with the arising of the effect, it would be devoid of its own proper function as a cause.²²⁴ Therefore, the cause is logically proven as preexistent to its effect²²⁵ and the temporal continuity between them must be admitted as conventionally true.²²⁶

iii) Finally, he resorts to Dharmakīrti's authority and quotes PV Pratyakṣa 246.²²⁷

5. The conclusion in Kamalaśīla's response emphasizes the difference between the two kinds of continuity, namely *kālakṛta* (temporal) and *deśakṛta* (spatial), implicitly proving that the objection is improperly formulated from a logical point of view. Additionally, he concludes that the absence of parts is logically proven *only* as being concomitant with temporal continuity. On the contrary, spatial continuity cannot

²²³ Cf. also *sadadhiṣṭhānaṃ hi sāmāthyam asataḥ katham syāt* | (PVV ad PV Pratyakṣa 246). On this, see English Translation n. 124.

²²⁴ Cf. also *paścāt kāryasamakālasya sato vā tatṛānupayogato vyāpārābhāvāt* | (PVV ad PV Pratyakṣa 246). On this, see English Translation n. 124.

²²⁵ A similar argument, though meant to deny the very possibility of a real cause as existing both as contemporaneous and at a different time with its effect, is found in the **Vajracchedikāṭikā*: *dus mñam pa dañ mi mñam pa las rgyur 'gal ba'i phyir phyogs gsum pa ltar yañ mi ruñ ste* | *'di ltar de rgyur 'gyur na ni 'bras bu dañ dus mñam pa'am dus tha dad par 'gyur grañ na* | *dus mñam pa las ni ma yin te* | *bdag gi de kho na rañ gi ma thob pa ni nus pa thams cad kyis ston bas 'bras bu la yañ shyor ba med pa'i phyir ro* | *bdag gi de kho na ni de'i rañ bžin ltar 'bras bu yañ de dañ dus mñam par thob pa'i bdag ñid kyi no bo kho na ste* | *'bras bu de la de shyor ba med do* || (**Vajracchedikāṭikā*, ed. p. 396, 5–11).

²²⁶ Cf. TSP ad TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 169, 11–13 and English Translation p. 251.

²²⁷ Cf. *yathoktam — asataḥ prāg asāmāthyāt paścāc cānupayogataḥ* | *prāgbhāvaḥ sarvavetūnām nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha* || *iti* | (TSP ad TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 169, 17–20 and English Translation p. 250–251). “According to what was said [by Dharmakīrti]: Because of the incapacity of [a cause] that does not exist before [the arising of the effect], and because [a cause] is devoid of use after [the arising of the effect], every cause pre-exists [its effect]. Therefore, the object [of mental perception] does not [arise] along with its own cognition[, i.e., mental perception].” In the context of the PV, the *kārikā* is intended to prove that the object of a mental perception, being the cause of its cognition (i.e., mental perception), precedes it, and hence is contemporary with sensory perception. As stated above, BASK 51 explicitly mentions instants of cognition following each other. Now, this could be a reference to *indriyavijñāna* and *manovijñāna*, and Kamalaśīla's mentioning PV Pratyakṣa 246 in relation to that objection could be proof of it. This verse proves temporal succession between mental perception and its object but also, indirectly, temporal succession between sensory perception (which cooperates with the object in producing *manovijñāna*) and mental perception. On this *kārikā* and the PVA as well as the PVV on it, see English Translation p. 250–251 and n. 124.

be admitted if it is not concomitant with the property of having parts. Hence atoms must be admitted as having parts.²²⁸

The passage ends with the quotation of *Vīmśikā* 14ab. As already seen, this is also referred to in BASK 45ab as the *pūrvapakṣa* to which BASK 50 and 51 are the response (along with other *kārikās*).

5.7 *Grāhya* Proven as Illogical: Conclusion of Argument A

The latter argument, along with a few others, is meant to prove finally that atoms do not have a unitary *svabhāva* and, consequently, do not have a manifold *svabhāva* either. Thus they are demonstrated to be non-existent.²²⁹ Furthermore, if atoms are not established as real, it is not tenable that external objects have a manifold *svabhāva*.

At the same time, it is not logical for external objects to be endowed with a unitary *svabhāva*.²³⁰ After stating this, Kamalaśīla briefly discusses and refutes the third thesis, referred to above as position (III) (in the TSP): a coarse thing not composed of atoms “cannot be logically admitted as one, since it is endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation, and because of the undesirable consequence, for instance, of everything shaking when there is, for example, the shaking of [only a] hand, etc.”²³¹ (cf. §3.4). This is the commentary on Śāntarakṣita’s TS 1997,²³² which, in contrast, discusses what is referred to above as position (b) (in the TS): an external object has a part-possessor (*avayavin*) as its characterizing feature.²³³

In TSP *ad* TS 1997, Kamalaśīla clearly intends to mark the conclusion of the first section of the *parīkṣā*. He defines this as being meant to prove that the *hetu* is established, the *hetu* being the non-cognition of the property of having a *svabhāva*, either one or many, with regard to external objects. This logical reason relates to the proof statement arguing that what does not have a *svabhāva*, either one or manifold, cannot be perceived as existent (or cannot be existent, cf. n. 90). In mentioning this proof statement in TSP *ad* TS 1997, Kamalaśīla specifically explains it as a demonstration of the unreality of an

²²⁸ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991, Sanskrit Text p. 170, 7–9 and English Translation p. 251.

²²⁹ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1995–1996, Sanskrit Text p. 172, 10–12 and English Translation p. 255.

²³⁰ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1997, Sanskrit Text p. 172, 19–173, 2 and English Translation p. 255.

²³¹ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1997, Sanskrit Text p. 172, 20–173, 1 and English Translation p. 255.

²³² Cf. *paramāṇor ayogāc ca na sann avayavī yataḥ | paramāṇubhir ārabdhāḥ sa parair upagamyate ||* (TS 1997). “Moreover, because an atom is illogical, the part-possessor is not existent, since the opponents admit it as being composed of atoms.”

²³³ Here one would expect Kamalaśīla to examine the corresponding view in his statement, i.e., position (II), “one, a part-possessor composed of them.” It is likely that Kamalaśīla regards this task as having already been fulfilled by investigating and refuting position (I), “many, distinct in [terms of] atoms.”

external object, i.e., of an external *grāhya*.²³⁴ Since the *grāhya* is demonstrated as not existing, the *grāhaka*, which is conceived of as being based on the former, does not exist either. Accordingly, he says that *viññaptimātratā* is proven by virtue of the illogicality of an external object (*arthāyogāt*), in other words, according to what is referred to above as Argument A.

6.

Features of Cognition
According to Śubhagupta

6.1 Śubhagupta as the Buddhist

Nirākāravādin par Excellence in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā

According to the explanation in the *pañjikā*, after having demonstrated Argument A, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla commence to establish Argument B (*saty api vā santānāntare grāhye grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt*) as evidence for *viññaptimātratā*.²³⁵ Kamalaśīla introduces Śāntarakṣita's TS 1998 as proving precisely this.²³⁶ The verse reads:

anirbhāsam sanirbhāsam anyanirbhāsam eva ca |
viññānāti na viññānaṃ bāhyam arthaṃ kathañcana ||

Being devoid of [the object's] appearance, [or] endowed with
[the object's] appearance [or], also indeed endowed with an
appearance different [from that of the object], a cognition does
not perceive an external object in any way.

In commenting on this verse, Kamalaśīla, listing the three theses, refers explicitly to the concept of *ākāras* of cognition. He argues that since it is illogical for cognition to apprehend external objects, regardless of the various ways that might occur, cognition is proven as always being self-aware. Given this, *viññaptimātratā* is established.²³⁷ Immediately thereafter,²³⁸ Kamalaśīla

²³⁴ Moreover, Kamalaśīla presents the *pūrvapakṣa* that introduces the whole chapter as opposing the idea of the pervasion between *jñānatva* and *grāhyagrāhakarāhitatva* through the demonstration of that *hetu* being unestablished.

²³⁵ Cf. *tad evam arthāyogād viññaptimātratām pratipādyā samprati grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt pratipādayan* [...] (TSP *ad* TS 1998). "Therefore, having demonstrated *viññaptimātratā* in this way — i.e., by virtue of the illogicality of the [external] object — now, in order to prove 'because, [in relation to cognitions,] the characteristics of [being an] apprehended and apprehender are absent' [...]."

²³⁶ At the end of the chapter, in the TS and the TSP this *kārikā* is presented as proving the pervasion between *jñānatva* and *grāhyagrāhakarāhitatva* and as a response to BASK 29, where Śubhagupta essentially regards the logical reason as inconclusive. Cf. TS 2081cd and TSP *ad* TS 2081, Sanskrit Text p. 219, 19; 220, 3–4 and English Translation p. 321–322.

²³⁷ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1998, Sanskrit Text p. 174, 1–4 and English Translation p. 256–257.

²³⁸ First Kamalaśīla explains the reason for a third thesis by mentioning Kumārila's point of view as found in ŚV Nirāmbanavāda 108.

deals with the actual demonstration of self-awareness of cognitions²³⁹ (TS 1999–2003 and TSP *ad* TS 1999–2003).²⁴⁰ Similar arguments are found in MAK 16–18.²⁴¹

According to the *pañjikā*, from TS 2004 Śāntarakṣita begins to refute the thesis that a cognition, which is devoid of the image of an external object, can apprehend that object (i.e., the *nirākāravāda*).²⁴² This refutation, by far the longest compared to those concerning the other two theses, ends with TS 2034²⁴³ and contains a large number of references to the BASK. In fact, in this refutation of the *nirākāravāda*, Śubhagupta must be regarded as the most significant target.

TS 2004,²⁴⁴ introduced by Kamalaśīla as a demonstration of the untenability of the *nirākāravāda*,²⁴⁵ refers to the opposite thesis, the *sākāravāda*²⁴⁶ as preferable. Here, Śāntarakṣita is indeed promoting the idea of a hierarchy of doctrines. The *nirākāravāda* is not simply rejected, but rather proven to be inferior to the opposite view, although this is admitted only provisionally.²⁴⁷ Analogously, at the end of the refutation, in TS 2033,²⁴⁸ Śāntarakṣita suggests that the only way to accept the cognition of an external object (which he will later refute) would be to at least admit images in

²³⁹ Kamalaśīla indicates TS 1999 as establishing that a self-aware cognition that apprehends external, insentient objects is illogical. Establishing this coincides with demonstrating the self-awareness of cognitions.

²⁴⁰ Cf. *evam svasamvedanam prasādhyā* [...] (TSP *ad* TS 2004). “Having proven self-awareness in this way [...]”

²⁴¹ To be precise, their Tibetan translation appears to correspond to TS 1999, 2000 and 2001. Ichigō (1985b: CXVI n. 3) also relates TS 2002abc1 to MAK 19ab. In fact, the MAV explicitly mentions the TS (as *de kho na bsdus pa*) and the *Paramārthavinīścaya* (as *don dam pa gtan la dbab pa*); see MAV (ed. p. 330, 13). This proves that the MAK must have been composed after the TS (and the *Paramārthavinīścaya*). By the same token, Funayama (2007: 192) notes that it is possible that Kamalaśīla composed the MAP after the TSP. In this respect, he mentions Mimaki 1982b: 221.

²⁴² Cf. TSP *ad* TS 2004, Sanskrit Text p. 175, 20–22 and English Translation p. 260.

²⁴³ Cf. TS 2034, Sanskrit Text p. 196, 18–19 and English Translation p. 290.

²⁴⁴ Cf. TS 2004, Sanskrit Text p. 175, 23–176, 2 and English Translation p. 260.

²⁴⁵ TS 2004 and TS 2005 correspond to MAK 20 and 21 (as well as TS 1359 and TS 1360, with some differences). Cf. Sanskrit Text.

²⁴⁶ In fact, TS 2004a refers to this as *nirbhāṣijñānapakṣa*.

²⁴⁷ In TS 2050, Śāntarakṣita quotes PV Pratyakṣa 432 and reverses the order of the half-verses. That *kārikā* in PV deals with the idea of the untenability of apprehending external objects by a cognition, mentioning the *sākāravāda* first. Cf. English Translation p. 301 n. 346.

²⁴⁸ See *mukhyato ’rtham na grhṇāti svabhāvavyavasthiteḥ | arthākāroparāgeṇa vīyogāc ca na bhaktītaḥ ||* (TS 2033). “[A cognition] does not apprehend [an external] object directly, since it is established in its own *svabhāva*; nor indirectly, by virtue of the impression – which is the image of the object – since[, according to you *nirākāravādin*, such impression] is illogical.” Here, Śāntarakṣita is saying as a final argument against the *nirākāravādin* that: (i) since every existing thing dwells in its own *svabhāva*, the direct cognition of an external object is untenable; and (ii) since the *nirākāravādin* does not admit the presence of an image in cognition (i.e., what is admitted by the *sākāravādin*), a secondary cognition of the object does not follow either.

cognitions. If the *nirākāravādin* is not ready to commit to this (and he certainly is not), he cannot prove the cognition of external objects.

Finally, in TSP *ad* TS 2034, after explicitly identifying Śubhagupta as his main opponent,²⁴⁹ Kamalaśīla equates the *nirākāravādin*, i.e., Śubhagupta himself, with *śuddhaśphaṭikasāṅkāśam arthākārair anāṅkitam | yair iṣṭam vedanam* (TS 2034abc) “those who admit cognition as resembling a pure crystal not stained by the images of objects.”²⁵⁰ Briefly, in the TSP, not only is Śubhagupta clearly presented as a *nirākāravādin*, but he is regarded as the Buddhist *nirākāravādin par excellence*.²⁵¹

6.2 Nature (*Svabhāva*) of Cognition:

**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* kk. 89, 84, 66, 81

Within the refutation of the *nirākāravāda*, Śubhagupta is first mentioned in relation to the verbatim quotation of BASK 89 (**Ci**), which is accompanied by a commentary.²⁵² In this case, as well as in some other cases, when they

²⁴⁹ He identifies Śubhagupta as the main opponent in TS 2033 and TS 2034 and even quotes BASK 87 verbatim. Cf. *sākārajñānapakṣe ca tannirbhāsasya vedyatā | tasyābhede ca saṃsādhya siddhasādhanaṭā bhavet ||* (TSP *ad* TS 2033c). “Moreover, in the thesis [that] a cognition [is] endowed with the image [of an object], the appearance of that [i.e., the object] is brought to awareness. And if the non-difference of this [i.e., the appearance] with its awareness [is] [that which is] to be proven, [then] there would be the fact of establishing that which has [already] been established.” Cf. *śes pa mam bcas phyogs la ni || de ltar snañ ba myoñ bya ñid || de dan tha dad min sgrub na || grub pa sgrub pa ñid du 'gyur ||* (BASK 87). The verse can be regarded as **Ci**.

²⁵⁰ Cf. *śuddhaśphaṭikasāṅkāśam arthākārair anāṅkitam | yair iṣṭam vedanam kaiścid idam tñ prati sādhanam ||* (TS 2034). “This is the proof against those who admit cognition as resembling a pure crystal, being unstained by the images of objects.” *idam iti dvividham api sādhanam nirākāravādinam prati yatas [...]* (TSP *ad* TS 2034). “‘This,’ that is to say, the proof, albeit twofold; since [this proof is] ‘against’ the upholder of the [thesis that] cognition [is] devoid of the image [of its object] [...]”

²⁵¹ However, in TSP *ad* TS 2019, in defining the *anākārajñānavādin*, Kamalaśīla quotes (non-verbatim) *Śābarabhāṣya ad* 1.1.5 (ed. p. 38, 3–4). See Sanskrit Text p. 183.

²⁵² In this case, Hattori identifies the verse but does not suggest that the prose passage is its commentary. Cf. Appendix 2 §5 (no. 13). There is correspondence between the Sanskrit verse and the Tibetan translation. Moreover, it is explicitly presented as a quotation from Śubhagupta. Accordingly, the verse can be considered to be **Ci**. Regarding the introductory prose passage, in this particular instance no striking evidence can be advanced against the conjecture that it is part of a lost autocommentary. Nonetheless, nothing goes against classifying it as a mere prose explanation of the verse written by Kamalaśīla himself, as in the case of various other passages. Here Kamalaśīla is also clarifying the reference to the subject of *ākāras* in cognition, which is not explicitly stated in the verse. In BASK 89, in fact, Śubhagupta is attacking the theory of cognition as endowed with the image of its object (*śes pa mam bcas phyogs/*sākārajñānapakṣa*). This is evident from the previous verses, where he states that the *sākārajñānavādin*, using the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, does not prove the non-difference between an object and its cognition; he rather establishes the non-difference of an image in cognition and its cognition. Since they do not admit a direct perception of an object, but rather the awareness of an image similar to it, with the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument the *sākārajñānavādins* prove what has already been demonstrated, i.e., the identity

discuss Śubhagupta's *nirākāravāda*, they do so by presenting verses from the BASK that deal with the refutation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument²⁵³ as found in Dharmakīrti's PVin.²⁵⁴ In TSP *ad* TS 2008, Kamalaśīla states:

*bhadantaśubhaguptas tv āha — vijñānam anāpannaviṣayākāram api
viṣayaṃ pratipadyate tatparicchedarūpatvāt | tasmān nāśaṅkā kartavyā
kathāṃ paricchinatti kiṃvat paricchinattīti | āha ca —*

*kathāṃ tadgrāhakam tac cet tatparicchedalakṣaṇam |
vijñānaṃ tena nāśaṅkā kathāṃ tat kiṃvad ity api | |*

iti | |

However, Bhadanta Śubhagupta states, “Despite being devoid of the image of [its] object, a cognition perceives [its] object because it is endowed with the nature of distinguishing it. Therefore, no objection should be raised like, ‘how does [a cognition] discriminate?’ [or,] ‘resembling what, does it [(i.e., a cognition)] discriminate?’” [Śubhagupta] states:

If [someone asks,] “How does this [(i.e., a cognition)] apprehend that [(i.e., an object)]?” [The reply will be that] a cognition has the characteristic of distinguishing it [(i.e., the object)]. Therefore, there [can] be no objection like, “how does this [apprehend that or,] also, resembling what does it [(i.e., a cognition)] apprehend that?”

And BASK 89 reads:

*de 'dzin byed de ji ltar ṣes | | de ni yoṅs su gcod pa yi | |
mtshan ṇid yin te de yi phyir | | de ni ji ltar ci 'dra ṣes | |
the tshom za bar mi bya'o | |*

between an image in a cognition and that cognition itself; cf. BASK 87–88. See also n. 249 and English Translation n. 304.

²⁵³ Kamalaśīla introduces part of this refutation in the TSP as a quotation by an opponent. He does so by means of a prose passage consisting of a paraphrase of BASK 72, 73 and 74 and a literal quotation of BASK 68. This is presented as a response to the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument as expounded in TS 2029–2030, and is listed by Hattori as a fragment of the “autocommentary”; cf. Appendix §5 (no. 6, 8 and 9). On this passage, cf. English Translation p. 282–283. On the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument in Dharmakīrti, see Iwata 1991 and bibliography in English Translation n. 251. An identical part of this prose passage, specifically the commentary on BASK 68, is found in the *Anekāntajayapatākā* (cf. Sanskrit Text n. yy). On BASK 68 and 72 and the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, cf. English Translation n. 261 and 265. BASK 72ab and BASK 68 are also quoted literally in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, along with a prose passage explaining the arguments therein. This looks like a synopsis of the arguments found in the TSP.

²⁵⁴ The topic of Śubhagupta's refutation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument as found in the TSP has already been treated in Matsumoto 1980a: 297–281 and McClintock 2010: 350–352. In particular, Matsumoto also analyzes the BASK and translates kk. 65–82. Due to time constraints and the existence of earlier in-depth studies on this topic, I have not undertaken a deep analysis of it in this Introduction.

Here Śubhagupta is simply stating that a cognition apprehends an object because it has the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), which coincides with its own nature (*rūpa*),²⁵⁵ of apprehending objects.²⁵⁶ In other words, it distinguishes the object because that is its *svabhāva*;²⁵⁷ there is no reason for any further investigation on how it does this.²⁵⁸ It is an apprehender because that is its nature, not by virtue of an activity. The cognition, as a *dharma*, is in fact devoid of activity and only conventionally talked about as having it.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁵ The term *paricchedalakṣaṇa*, in BASK 89 as quoted in the TSP, is explained as *paricchedarūpa* in the preceding prose passage (presented as Subhagupta's commentary on the verse) and in Śāntarakṣita's TS 2008 (introduced by Kamalaśīla as a response to that).

²⁵⁶ Analogously, see *viñānātīti viñānam* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 2.34ab, ed. p. 61, 23) and *viñānāty ālambanam iti viñānam kartari byuṭ* | (*Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, ed. p. 141, 17–18). With reference to this, see also n. 259 and TSP ad TS 2076–2077, Sanskrit Text p. 216, 19 and English Translation p. 317. Śāntarakṣita answers that one can safely say that a cognition has the nature of distinguishing an object only if the identity between the nature of distinguishing an object and that of being a cognition can be proven. Since this is not the case, a cognition is only proven as having the nature of being a cognition. Kamalaśīla explains this by arguing that a cognition can distinguish an object only if a relationship can be established between the two. Since no relation can be admitted, then this nature of distinguishing an external object is not proven regarding cognitions, and *viñaptimātratā* is established. On this, cf. also English Translation n. 173 and 176.

²⁵⁷ Cf. *svabhāva evaiṣāṃ svalakṣaṇam* | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 6.14cd, ed. p. 341, 11–12). Cox (1995: 139, 153 n. 27) mentions this passage to argue that intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) is the particular inherent characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) that is applied only to a specific *dharma* and to nothing else. Arnold (2005a: 19, 223–224 n. 16) also mentions this in his discussion on *svalakṣaṇa* in the Abhidharma.

²⁵⁸ Cf. *gaṇ gi tshē na mām śes don* || *yonis good tsaṃ du 'dod de'i tshē* || *śes paṣ ji ltar raṇ gi yul* || *rig par 'gyur śes smras ma 'brel* || (BASK 91). “Since a cognition is admitted as [having the nature of] mere discrimination of the object, then what is said, ‘how can the cognition know its object?’ is incoherent.”

²⁵⁹ Cf., for example: *mām śes de ni byed po mīn* || *dam pa'i don du bya ba'an mīn* || *rig pa tsaṃ du zad mod kyi* || *byed po nīd du sgro btags gsuṅs* || (BASK 92). “This cognition is not the agent, nor is there [any] activity ultimately. Although there is only a perception, [cognition] is metaphorically said to be the agent.” This verse is quoted in the *Blo gsal grub 'mtha* (ed. p. 68, 12–15). It has *byed pa* in *pāda* d, like all the other sources. On this cf. the previous objection by an opponent as well as Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's response, as introduced in TS 2006–2007 and TSP ad TS 2006–2007. As also mentioned by Kellner (2010: 219), in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, the Sautrāntikas are reported as saying that stating “perception perceives” (*viñānam viñānāti*) is only a conventional way of speaking, because *viñānam* is devoid of activity and is just a *dharma*. Kellner goes on by discussing the idea of the lack of activity in *dharma*s as utilized in Dīnāga's PS and PSV. Cf. *atra Sautrāntikā āhuḥ* | *kim idam ākāśaṃ khādyate* | *caḥsur hi pratītya rūpāni cotpadyate caḥsurviñānam* | *tatra kaḥ paśyati, ko vā drśyate* | *nirvyāpāraṃ hīdaṃ dharmamātraṃ hetuphalamātraṃ ca* | *tatra vyavahārārthaṃ cchandata upacārāḥ kriyante* | *caḥsur paśyati viñānam viñānātīti nātrābhiniṣṭavyam* | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 1.42c2d, ed. p. 31, 12–15). On a similar note, while discussing the Dārṣṭāntika model of perception, Cox (1988: 39) mentions another passage of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Cf. *yat tarhi “viñānam viñānāti” iti sūtra uktam kiṃ tatra viñānam karoti* | *na kiṃcit karoti* | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 9, ed. p. 473, 25–26). As already seen, the fact of admitting a lack of activity for *dharma*s cannot make us regard Śubhagupta univocally as a Sautrāntika.

Moreover, as stated in TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034, which refers to BASK 84,²⁶⁰ according to Śubhagupta there are two different ways of intending “awareness”:

śes pa myoñ bar ran bžin phyir || myoñ bar bya ba žes brjod do ||
yul ni rab tu snañ ba yi || śes pa skyed phyir myoñ ba yin ||
 (BASK 84)

A cognition is said [to be] brought to awareness, since it is endowed with the *svabhāva* of being an awareness. The object is brought to awareness because it generates a cognition having [its] appearance [as an object]²⁶¹ (**avabhāsañāna*).²⁶²

This verse is certainly meant to prove that, even though the word is the same, the term “awareness” is being used differently in these two cases.²⁶³ A cognition has the nature of “awareness” in the sense of being the apprehender. An object is brought to awareness in the sense of causing a cognition that has its form as an object. In other words, cognition is like light: it has the essence of illuminating an object, which is said to be illuminated. Accordingly, the cognitive process requires two elements to occur: cognition, which is the only apprehender, and an object (*viśaya*), which provides its form. He clearly maintains this also in BASK 66 while expressly refuting the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. A verbatim quotation of BASK 66

²⁶⁰ In TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034, one finds a prose passage, introduced as a quotation from an unidentified opponent, that contains clear references to and partial paraphrases of BASK 84–85 as well as a literal quotation of BASK 87. Hattori has considered this to be a fragment of the autocommentary. Cf. Appendix 2 §5 (no. 11). This can be considered another example of a prose explanation referring to Śubhagupta’s views as constructed by Kamalaśīla for the sake of his argument.

²⁶¹ The use of the term *snañ ba* (which has several corresponding Sanskrit terms, including *ākāra*; cf. Negi 2001: 3224) by a *nirākāravādin*, such as Śubhagupta, probably relates to the physical appearance of the object rather than to an image in cognition. Note that Cox (1988: 81 n. 92) argues that for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas and Saṅghabhadra, “*ākāra* means the discriminative function of insight. Thought and thought concomitants are also said to have an aspect (*sākāra*), but only by extension from association with insight, or in the sense that they perform their own activity in apprehending the object-support. This interpretation stands in sharp contrast to Vasubandhu’s concept of *ākāra* as thought and thought concomitants taking shape or taking an aspect consistent with the type or character of the object-support.” On this, cf. Kellner 2010: 220 n. 50 and bibliography found therein. She also refers to Dhammajoti (2007: 354) for the mention of the Chinese commentator Puguang, who distinguishes two meanings of *ākāra*, namely “comprehending activity” and “image.”

²⁶² Cf. TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034, Sanskrit Text p. 197, 3–5 and English Translation p. 290–291.

²⁶³ This verse follows the refutation of a Vijnānavāda argument expounded in BASK 83. Cf. *myoñ bar bya phyir mam śes las || don gžan ma yin gzuñ ba yi || cha bžin śes bsgrub smra ba gañ || de la gtan tshigs ma nes ñid ||* (BASK 83). “In that argument that is stated [as follows], ‘since it is brought to awareness, an object is not different from [its] cognition, like an apprehended part,’ the logical reason is inconclusive.”

(**Ci**)²⁶⁴ is found in TSP *ad* TS 2031, where Kamalaśīla defends precisely that argument:

nānyo 'sti grāhako jñānān nākṣadhīr viṣayair vinā |
ataś ca sahasaṃvittir nābhedān nīlataddhiyoḥ ||

There is no other apprehender besides cognition, [and] there is no sensory cognition without objects. And therefore, the [fact of] being aware [of them] together is not because of the non-difference of a blue [thing] and its cognition.

And BASK 66 reads:

śes pa las gzan 'dzin pa med | | yul med par ni dbaṅ blo med | |
de phyir lhan cig rig pas na | | snon po de'i²⁶⁵ blo gcig phyir min | |

This is also made clear in the immediately following *kārikā*, a verbatim quotation (**Ci**) of BASK 81,²⁶⁶ where cognition is compared to pure “light” since it has the nature of making its object known. For this reason, a cognition and its object depend on each other and are part of the same

²⁶⁴ The verses appear to correspond, except for *pāda* c2, where we find *sahasamvittir* in the TSP and *de phyir lhan cig rig pas na*/**sahasamvittir* in the BASK. This difference can be explained in different ways. I consider the Tibetan translation of the BASK as simply not literal in this case. I regard the variant *sahasamvittir* as correct in this context and the verse in the TSP as **Ci**. Even though referring to all sources (D P C N) as reading *lhan cig rig pas na*, Matsumoto (1980a: 297) makes the emendation: *lhan cig rig pa ni*. However, I see no convincing reasons to emend the Tibetan text as found in the BASK. Cf. English Translation p. 288 n. 287.

²⁶⁵ Here, based also on the TSP, I follow Matsumoto's emendation (1980a: 297). All sources, including M, read *snon po'i de*.

²⁶⁶ Cf. *pūrvikaiva tu sāmāgī sañjñānam viṣayaḥ kṣaṇam | sālōkarūpavat kuryād yena syāt sahavedanam ||* (TSP *ad* TS 2031). An identical verse is found in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* by Jitāri (ed. p. 12 n. 56), the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyaḥ* (ed. p. 23, 23–24) and the *Advaitabinduprakaraṇa* (ed. p. 351, 17–18) by Jñānaśrīmitra. Cf. *gaṇ gis lhan cig myoṅ 'gyur ba | | tshogs pa sna ma kho na las | | śes pa yul bcas skad cig ste | | snaṅ ba dan bcas gzugs b'zin no | |* (BASK 81). The same verse is also found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 67, 28–68, 2). Cf. also *tshogs pa sna ma nīd k'is ni | | śes dan yul gyi skad cig ma | | snaṅ bcas gzugs ni skyed byed b'zin | | gaṇ gis lhan cig myoṅ ba yin | |* (*Sahopalambhaniyamasiddhi*, ed. p. 261, 1–4) by Prajñākaragupta; *tshogs pa sna ma gaṇ yis las | | śes dan yul bcas skad cig ma | | skyed byed snaṅ bcas gzugs b'zin tu | | gaṇ yin pa yis lhan cig rtogs | |* (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* by Ratnākaraśānti, P 327b₈–328a₁). We find a slight difference in *pāda* b. In the BASK, the *Sahopalambhaniyamasiddhi* by Prajñākaragupta, and the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* by Ratnākaraśānti, the corresponding Sanskrit would be as follows: **sañjñānaviṣayaṃ kṣaṇam*. In metrical terms, this variant is equally acceptable. The variant found in the TSP is *sañjñānam viṣayaḥ kṣaṇam*, confirmed by its identical occurrence in Jitāri and Jñānaśrīmitra. They likely had in mind the stanza as found in the TSP and maybe quoted the BASK based on that, rather than the original work. Regarding the original Sanskrit of BASK 81, the matter is a bit more complicated. The Tibetan translation of the BASK differs from the quotation in the TSP. One might conjecture that this is another instance of Kamalaśīla misquoting the opponent. Alternatively, the Tibetan translation could be “unfaithful,” as already observed in BASK 66; cf. n. 264. However, exactly the same variant as found in BASK 81 also appears in Ratnākaraśānti's text, of which we do not have the original Sanskrit either. Given the sense of the stanza, I believe that the original Sanskrit of BASK 81 is the one found in the TSP and that the verse must accordingly be regarded as **Ci**.

causal complex that is that particular perceptual act. This is why, Śubhagupta concludes, cognition and its object are necessarily perceived together; that *niyama* is not because they are non-different.²⁶⁷ These ideas are explicitly introduced in a prose passage in TSP *ad* TS 2031 and presented as an objection by an unidentified opponent. This passage is presented as the comment on BASK 66 and BASK 81, which are literally quoted immediately after.²⁶⁸ This is further evidence of the above-mentioned style of Kamalaśīla, who presents his opponent's arguments in a plain prose explanation for the sake of clarity in his own argumentation.²⁶⁹

6.3 Features of Cognition as Based on the Ontological Nature of Its Object

As seen above (cf. §4.1), Śubhagupta considers there to be a close relationship between the nature of cognition, namely, its way of apprehending an object, and the ontological nature of external reality. As he says in BASK 66, there is no sense perception without an object; this object, with its real nature, determines the way it is apprehended by cognition. Śubhagupta argues that atoms are ultimately real in terms of being causally efficient. In this sense, they arise together, since they are together *dravya* in causing their own cognition.²⁷⁰ That is to say, since they arise all together,

²⁶⁷ This also appears to be a point against PVin *ad* 1.54ab: *na hi bhinnābhaśīve 'py arthāntaram eva rūpaṃ nīlasyānubhavāt tayohi sahopalambhaniyamād dvicandrādivat | na hy anayor ekākārānupalambhe 'nyopalambho 'sti | na caitat svabhāvaviveke yuktam, pratibandhakārānābhāvāt |* (PVin *ad* 1.54ab, ed. p. 40, 1–4). “For, even though they appear as distinct, the form of [something] blue is not indeed another object[, different] from the experiencing of [that] blue, because they are necessarily perceived together, like two moons. For, with reference to these two, there is no perception of the other when the image of one is not perceived. And this is not logical if there is a difference in nature [between these two], since there is not [that] cause [for their being perceived together] that is a relationship [between them.]” However, there is another kind of relationship between them, i.e., causality. The passage in the PVin is actually followed by an analogous objection, bringing forward light and visual forms as a heterogeneous instance. Cf. English Translation n. 284.

²⁶⁸ Matsumoto (1980a: 272 n. 15) presents this passage as an explanation of BASK 65–67, 81, which may have been a fragment of the autocommentary on the BASK. On this passage see also Matsumoto 1980a: 292. A passage commenting on BASK 81 is found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 68, 3–6). It does not resemble the passage from TSP *ad* TS 2031.

²⁶⁹ In this passage, Śubhagupta is reported as declaring that the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument is inconclusive, since that logical reason is dubiously excluded from a heterogeneous instance. A cognition and its object are different, but, because of their very nature, they are always perceived together. The *svabhāva* of a cognition is indeed that of apprehending the object, and the *svabhāva* of the object is indeed that of being apprehended by a cognition. Accordingly, the necessity of perceiving two things together is found along with their difference. Cf. TSP *ad* TS 2031, Sanskrit Text p. 194, 1–10 and English Translation p. 287–288.

²⁷⁰ Dharmakīrti, according to his (provisional) Sautrāntika viewpoint, also supports the idea that a cognition has the nature of grasping an object and that the object is grasped as it really is. On this, see PV *Pramāṇasiddhi*: *viśayagrahaṇaṃ dharmo vijñānasya yathāsti sah || grhyate so 'ya janako vidyamānātmaneti ca | eṣā prakṛtir [...]* (PV *Pramāṇasiddhi* 206cd–207abc1). When

they are necessarily apprehended as such. Their ontological interrelation outside of their cognition entails a synchronic grasping of them together by that cognition.²⁷¹ In the conceptual stage, however, they are determined as one thing, defined by properties; these are conceptual in nature and, as such, do not appear in sense perception and are erroneous. This is clearly stated in BASK 40.²⁷²

This view is also connected to Śubhagupta's idea of what constitutes a non-erroneous cognition. According to him, a non-erroneous cognition is a cognition that is reliable (*avisamvādin*).²⁷³ Being reliable is nothing but being here and now at the moment of its apprehension (or better said, in close continuity with that)²⁷⁴ of that specific, truly existing object.²⁷⁵ In other words, a reliable cognition is that which corresponds to its object, in terms of space and time, because it is caused by that object that is real. In his opinion,

discussing this, Eltschinger (2014: 300–302) refers also to Devendrabuddhi's commentary; cf. *de bas na yul dan yul can gyi dños po 'dod pa ñid kyis mam par šes pa'i chos yul 'dzin pa yin par brjod par bya'o* || *de ltar na 'di'i rañ bžin ni yañ dag pa'i yul gyi mam pa 'dzin pa yin no* || (PVP D 88a₃/P 101b₂). He also mentions a passage from the TSP influenced by this commentary (Eltchinger 2014: 303 n. 200): *tathā hi — viṣayaviśayibhāvam icchatā cittaṃ viṣayagrahaṇasvabhāvam abhyupeyam* | *anyathā viṣayañāyora na viṣayaviśayibhāvaḥ* | *arthagrahaṇasvabhāvatenaṅgikriyamāṇe yas tasya svabhāvas tenaivātmano 'mśo 'rthas tena gṛhyata iti vaktavyam* | *anyathā katham asau gṛhītaḥ syāt* | *yady asatākāreṇa gṛhyeta tataś ca viṣayaviśayibhāvo na syāt* | *tathā hi — yathā jñānaṃ viśayīkaroty arthaṃ na tathā so 'rthaḥ yathā so 'rtho na tathā taṃ viśayīkarotīti nirviśayāny eva jñānāni syuḥ* | *tataś ca sarvāpadārthāsiddhiprasaṅgaḥ* | *tasmād bhūtaṃ viśayākāragrahītāsya svabhāvo nija iti sthitaḥ* | *bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viśayasya kṣaṇikānātmādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat* | *tena nairātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eva cittaṃ nātmagrahaṇasvabhāvam* | (TSP ad TS 3337, ed. p. 1056, 21–1057, 5). On this, see also McClintock 2010: 213–214.

²⁷¹ Cf. PV Pratyakṣa 195–196 in n. 113 and Saccone 2015.

²⁷² Cf. *gcig gi sgrar brjod de dag ni* || *de dag la ni gcig med do* || *sgra yi don ni mam brtags te* || *dbañ po'i sems la mi snañ ño* || (BASK 40). “Those [(i.e., atoms)] are denoted by one word. [However,] they are not one. The object of a word, being conceptually constructed, does not appear in sensory cognition.”

²⁷³ For the concept of *avisamvāda* in Dharmakīrti, see the well-known passage in PV Pramāṇasiddhi: *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ* | *avisamvādanam* [...] (PV Pramāṇasiddhi 1abc). On this, among many others, cf. Dunne 2004: 273–297, 308–318, 374–381.

²⁷⁴ Cf. *gañ tshe šes pa dan don dag* || *sñā phyi kun tu 'byuñ de'i tshe* || *de dan 'dra phyir de min gi* || *dños su lhan cig myoñ ma yin* || (BASK 82). “Since cognitions and [their] objects always arise in continuity, then, the term ‘co-perception’ is [used,] because it is like that; however, in reality there is no co-perception [of them].” On the concept of the simultaneity of the sense organ, the external perceptual object and the resulting perceptual consciousness in the Sarvāstivāda theory of perception, see Cox 1988: 35, 75 n. 26, 27. As for the Dārṣṭāntika theory of perception, Cox (1988: 39) argues, “[...] actually, in the case of perception, as in all causal relations, there exists no distinct agent or cause possessing its own activity of producing a distinct effect. Instead, there is simply a stream of cause and effect (*hetuphalamātra*).” For a detailed and recent contribution on Abhidharma controversies on perception, cf. Dhammajoti 2007.

²⁷⁵ A similar concept is expressed in the *Nyāyabindu*: *yasyārthasya samnidhānāsamnidhānābhyām jñānapratibhāsabhedas tat svalakṣaṇam* | *tad eva paramārthasat* | *arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastu- naḥ* | *anyat sāmānyalakṣaṇam* | (*Nyāyabindu* 1.13–16).

hence, “being non-erroneous” and “being reliable” appear to coincide.²⁷⁶ This is not opposed to what Kamalaśīla himself accepts, even though for him that reliability is to be intended as the fulfillment of a desired causal efficiency and not (necessarily) as the proof of the existence of an external object.²⁷⁷

This view on the reliability of cognitions, expounded in BASK 7cd and 8,²⁷⁸ is referred to in TSP *ad* TS 2051. In TS 2051, Śāntarakṣita introduces an inference to prove the existence of external objects of cognition. Kamalaśīla presents this verse as a reference to Śubhagupta’s view and provides a prose passage with the characteristic of a commentary on it that is nothing but a loose reference to BASK 7cd and 8. In fact, there is no trace of such a verse (and inference) in the BASK.²⁷⁹ The inference states that a cognition can be established as being caused by an external, homogeneous object, because one can experience its form when that cognition is reliable.²⁸⁰ These parts can be brought forward as an example of

²⁷⁶ As Funayama (1999: 81) notes, equating “non-erroneous” and “reliable,” though clearly attested in Vinītadeva, was not his invention. This equation was likely made by the end of the seventh century by some followers of Dharmakīrti. This can be inferred by the presence of such a concept in one of the *pūrvapakṣas* of Maṇḍanamiśra’s *Vidhiivēka*. Cf. *kā punar iyaṃ bhrāntatā | [...] athārthakriyāsamvāditvaṃ abhrāntatvaṃ | yady arthanibandhanau sukhaduḥkhaṇprāpti-parihārau, upādānaparityāgāyogyavedanasya bhrāntatvaprasaṅgaḥ |* (*Vidhiivēka*, ed. p. 137,1–138,1).

²⁷⁷ As Funayama (1999: 79) observes, Kamalaśīla also admits the equivalence between “non-erroneous” and “reliable,” and holds reliability to be “the power of obtaining an object which is capable of the desired causal efficiency.” He states: *abhrāntam atrāvisaṃvāditvena draṣṭavyam | na tu yathāvasthītālambanākāratayā | anyathā hi yogācāramatenā lambanāsiddher ubhayanaya-samāśrayeṣṭasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasyāvyāpītā syāt | avisaṃvāditvaṃ cābhimatārthakriyāsamarthārthaprapaṇasaktiḥ | na tu prāpaṇam eva | pratibandhādīsamabhavāt |* (TSP *ad* TS 1311). This is a commentary on Śāntarakṣita’s definition of *abhrāntam* regarding perception: *keśaṇḍukādīvijñāna-nirvṛtyartham idaṃ kṛtam | abhrāntagrahaṇam tad dhi bhrāntatvān neṣyate pramā ||* (TS 1311). On this and the parallels with Vinītadeva’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, cf. Funayama 1999. The Sanskrit text is that found in Funayama 1999: 93. This passage is also quoted by McClintock (2003: 166 n. 76) while dealing with the view on non-erroneous perceptions in Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (McClintock 2003: 142–145). The idea that conformity to the desired causal efficiency does not entail the existence of an external object (but is rather due to the restriction of the immediately preceding cognition regarding its capacity to produce a specific effect) is also found in TSP *ad* TS 178.

²⁷⁸ Cf. *śes pa mi bslu ma ’khrul te || bslu ba dag ni ’khrul pa yin ||* (BASK 7cd) *yul dan dus dan mi gzan la || śes pa mi bslu gan yin pa || de ni mi ’khrul yin par śes || ma ’khrul mtshan nīd gzan med do ||* (BASK 8). “[According to us,] a reliable cognition is non-erroneous [and] the deceiving [ones] are erroneous.” “That which is the reliable cognition of [an object that is] not different [from it] with regard to space and time, this [must be] known as being non-erroneous. There is no other characteristic of ‘non-erroneous.’”

²⁷⁹ Nonetheless, Hattori considers it to be part of the autocommentary on BASK 7 (Appendix 2 §5 no. 16).

²⁸⁰ In the BASK, k. 7 and k. 8 are a response to the idea that, according to the Vijñānavāda, action is led by error since all cognitions are similar to dream state cognitions. This is a clear reference to the *Vimśikā*. Cf. *śes pa slu ba’i phyir ram ni || gzugs sogs ruñ ba ma yin phyir || dmigs pa med par ’gyur gran na || de gñis kyañ ni mi bzaiñ no ||* (BASK 4). “An [external] ālambana [of our cognitions] does not exist [according to Vasubandhu in the *Vimśikā*] because of [the instance of]

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla appearing to treat Śubhagupta openly as a Sautrāntika.²⁸¹ An explanation that is more consistent with Śubhagupta's *nirākāravāda* is that real objects are proven because, when we have real cognitions, we apprehend their forms. Moreover, one might safely maintain that, for Śubhagupta, the existence of external objects is proven by the fact that only certain representations are produced at certain times and in certain places.²⁸²

Accordingly, a reliable sense cognition apprehends a group of atoms together, but it is not provided with images of single atoms for two reasons: because they do not appear singly and because images in sense cognitions are finally proven to be illogical. In this respect, he states:

gañ gi blo la cha gcig gi || mām pa snañ ño źes smras pa ||
de ñi ñes par ri mo yi || gdiñ ba mthoñ ba ma gtogs so || (BASK 41)

He who says that the image of one part appears in a cognition certainly [can] not see a multi-colored rug.

la la dag tu gañ źig la || gzugs kyi mām pa gcig 'dzin pa ||
de yañ mtho dman rten pa yi || dbye bas bkra bar snañ ba yin ||
 (BASK 42)

[When,] in some cases, regarding something, one grasps one [single] image of the visual form (**rūpa*) [such as the single image of the blue part of a multi-colored rug], that too will have a variegated appearance by virtue of the difference of the *locus* [(i.e., that image)] in high and low [parts].

śes gcig snañ ba'i rdul phran gañ || phan tshun med na mi 'byuñ phyir ||
de la mām par bcad nas ñi || ji ltar re re snañ bar 'gyur || (BASK 43)

How can an atom, which appears in one [single] cognition, since [atoms] do not arise without one another, being separated [from the others], appear singly?

In these *kārikās*, Śubhagupta is providing an argument against the *sākāravāda*, which is proven as untenable. Since a cognition is admitted as unitary, a contradiction follows between that singularity and the commonly observed existence of variegated images, such as that of multicolored rugs.²⁸³

erroneous cognitions or because the visual forms, etc., are not logical. Also these two [arguments] are not good."

²⁸¹ See, for example, the similarity to the argument found in PV Pratyakṣa 320 against the Sautrāntika; cf. n. 137 and 138. On a similar note, cf. also Matsuoka 2014a.

²⁸² See the objection to his own thesis that Vasubandhu introduces: *yadi vijñaptir anarthā niyamo deśakālayoḥ | santānasyānīyamaś ca yuktā kṛtyakriyā na ca ||* (*Vīmśikā* 2). Cf. also TS 1977–1978 and TSP ad TS 1977–1978.

²⁸³ The idea of the incongruence between the singularity of an object of cognition and its variegated (*citra*) appearance is also discussed in PV Pratyakṣa 194 ff., where Dharmakīrti's (at least initial) goal is to defend the idea that perception can have aggregates of atoms as *ālambana* and still be non-conceptual in nature. He interprets and elaborates on PS 1.4cd

If cognition is unitary, it cannot be endowed with multiple images; if this is the case, however, how can one explain the normal experiencing of such variegated images? The only conclusion is that there are no images in sense cognitions, and the nature of such variegated appearances is just conceptual. A possible objection is then referred to in BASK 42: the multi-colored appearance of something, such as that of a rug, can be explained by several unitary cognitions occurring, whereby each has a single color as their object. It is not clear if he considers these cognitions to be arising simultaneously or one after the other in quick succession. However, given the manner of refutation, one might assume that they arise simultaneously. In any case, the answer is that a *regressus ad infinitum* would follow because even one single color would appear to be variegated, considering the differences between low and high parts.²⁸⁴ Finally, in BASK 43, he states that the image of a single atom appearing in a cognition is absurd, since atoms never arise by themselves and so they can never appear individually. Here, he appears to be responding to the possible objection that the cognition of one very subtle atom is indeed that smallest unitary cognition that allows for both the singularity of cognition and a variegated image. However, the smallest unitary image of one atom is not admitted, and therefore the existence of images in cognitions is disproven. This verse, which appears to follow as a conclusion from the previous arguments, is also connected to the subsequent *kārikā*, BASK 44 (cf. §4.1). These two verses represent the clearest expression of Śubhagupta's position on epistemology — that is, cognition is based on the ontological characteristics of reality.

To summarize, Śubhagupta argues for the singularity of cognition, which is not affected by the image of its object, but, like pure light, limits itself to apprehending that object, since this is its *svabhāva*. The object outside is atoms; they are many (but their manifoldness is only conceptually determined) and apprehended simultaneously with their partless nature by

(and *ṛtti*), where Diinnāga counters the objection that the Abhidharma statement that the five groups of cognitions have aggregates (*sañcita*) as an object-support contradicts the view of perception as being free from conceptuality, because a perception in that case would have a universal as its object (cf. Saccone 2015: 126–127 n. 57). In particular, the contradiction between a unitary cognition and a variegated image in it, which is expressed in PV Pratyakṣa 208, is indeed regarded by Dunne (2004: 112) as indicating Dharmakīrti's passage from (what he defines as) Dharmakīrti's External Realism to his Epistemic Idealism; cf. *citrābhāṣeṣu artheṣu yady ekatvaṃ na yujyate | saiva tāvāt katham buddhir ekā citrābhāṣinī* || (PV Pratyakṣa 208). For a different perspective on this, cf. Kellner 2011a. As a matter of fact, Śubhagupta's position on the aggregation of atoms seems to have been influenced by Dharmakīrti's view as expounded in PV Pratyakṣa 195–196, and found in Devendrabuddhi as well as Śākyabuddhi; on this, cf. Saccone 2015: 126–128. For a parallel view in Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla, see also §3.2 and n. 113.

²⁸⁴ The same kind of argument is used in the MAK, the MAV and the TSP to refute the thesis of many homogeneous cognitions arising simultaneously, with each having a single color as their object. Cf. §6.4.

sense perception. Subsequently, conceptual cognition erroneously determines them as objects endowed with certain properties, such as blue, resulting in the appearance of variegated objects, such as a multicolored rug.

6.4 Analogous Arguments Against the *Sākāravāda* in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*

The argument of the contradiction between a cognition that is admitted as unitary and images that are commonly observed as manifold is also found in the TS and the TSP (as well as in the MAK, MAV and MAP).²⁸⁵ There, immediately after having refuted the *nirākāravāda*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla begin to refute the *sākāravāda* as well, resorting to the same type of argument.²⁸⁶ In TS 2036 and 2037, and the related *pañjikā*,²⁸⁷ we read:

jñānād avyatiriktatvān nākārabahutā bhavet |
tataś ca tadbalenāsti nārthasaṃvedanasthitiḥ || (TS 2036)

Since [they] are no different from cognition, a multiplicity of images cannot [follow]. And, therefore, by force of this, [images] do not have the condition of [being] the awareness of [external] objects.

ākāravatyatiriktatvā jñāne cānekatā bhavet |
anyathā katham ekatvam anayoḥ parikalpyate || (TS 2037)

Moreover, since it is no different from images, there would be manifoldness regarding cognition. Otherwise, how [could] the unity of these two be thought of?²⁸⁸

²⁸⁵ With regard to the MAK, the MAV and the MAP, I will refer to corresponding verses and passages in the footnotes. For analogous arguments in the **Vajracchedikāṭikā* and the *Bhāvanākrama* I, see English Translation n. 308.

²⁸⁶ In fact, they also resort to a second type of argument: if a cognition were completely identical in form with its object, it would be a non-cognition; if that identity of form were only with some part, then every cognition would apprehend everything. Cf. TS 2038 and TSP *ad* TS 2038, Sanskrit Text p. 199 and English Translation p. 295. On this argument, cf. *sarvātmanā hi sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vrajet | sāmye kenacid aṃśena syāt sarvaṃ sarvavedanam ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 434).

²⁸⁷ To the same end, in TSP *ad* TS 2036–2037, Kamalaśīla also brings forward another argument: it is untenable for immaterial things, such as cognitions, to be placed in spatial continuity. However, only by conceiving them as being situated in space can the imagining of many cognitions serve the purpose of proving the truth of images really apprehending external objects. Cf. TSP *ad* TS 2036–2037, Sanskrit Text p. 199, 6–11 and English Translation p. 294–295. On this, cf. also MAK 49, English Translation n. 315.

²⁸⁸ TS 2036–2037 correspond to MAK 22–23; cf. Sanskrit Text. Referring to the latter verses, Tillemans (1983: 309, 311), while discussing the “neither-one-nor-many” argument, exemplifies what he calls principle 3 of Tsoṅ kha pa’s presentation of the argumentation in the MAK: if the parts were one with their part-holder, they would be all identical or the part-holder manifold.

jñānād ityādi | citrāstarāṇadarśane ekasmāj **jñānād avyaticrīkta-
tvāj** jñānasvarūpavad **ākārāṇām bahutā na** prāpnoti | **evam
ākārāvyaticrīktatvāj** jñānasyāpy **anekatā** prāpnoti | ye tu
manyante — samānājatīyāny api jñānāny ākārasaṅkhyāny eva bahūni
citrāstarāṇādiṣu yugapat samudbhavānty eva vijātiyārūpaśabdādijñānavad
iti | tataś ca prasāṅge siddhasādhyateti | teṣāṃ citrāstarāṇe yathā
nīlādayo bahava ākārah samvedyante | **evam ekākāre** 'pi sitādāv arvāgma-
dhyaparabhāgarūpā bahava ākārah iti tadātmakam tatrāpi jñānam
anekātmakam prāpnoti | iṣyate eveti cet | kim idānīm ekam jñānam
bhavātīti vaktavyam | yad anavayavāṇuviṣayam iti cet | tad etad anubha-
vaviruddham | na hi kvacid anavayavam anurūpaṃ bhāsamānam
ālakṣyate jñāne | [...] (TSP ad TS 2036–2037)

In seeing a multicolored carpet, “a multiplicity” “of images” can “not” follow, “since [they] are no different” “from a” unitary “cognition,” like [in the case of] the own-nature of a cognition. Similarly, also regarding cognition, “the manifoldness” follows “since it is no different from images.” However, [there are] those who think, “Cognitions, albeit homogeneous, numerous, precisely according to the number of the images, arise simultaneously in the case of a multicolored carpet, etc., as [it happens with] cognitions of sounds and visual forms, etc., which are heterogeneous [and arise simultaneously].²⁸⁹ And therefore, regarding the undesirable consequence [put forward by the opponent], there is the establishing of what is [already] established.” [Precisely] for them[, the reply will be the following]. As, with regard to a multicolored carpet, many images — such as a blue one — are brought to awareness, likewise, also with regard to a single image — such as a white one — there will be many images, [each] having the form of parts [situated] below, in the middle or above. Therefore, in this case too, the cognition [of a single white image], consisting of those [(i.e., images of different parts of that white image)], [will] follow as having a manifold nature.²⁹⁰ If [it is argued,] “[This] is indeed admitted,” [then the reply will be,] “One must

²⁸⁹ Cf. *gañ dag rigs mthun pa'i śes pa mams kyañ mam pa'i grañs bžin du ri mo'i gzi la sogs pa la lhan cig tu mañ du 'byun ste* | *gzugs dan sgra la sogs pa'i śes pa rigs mī mthun pa bžin no* [...] (MAV, ed. p. 94, 8–10). Kamalaśīla defines these as the upholders of the existence of an external object **bāhyārthavādins*; cf. *gañ dag ces bya ba ni phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba kha cig kho na ste* | (MAP, ed. p. 95, 14).

²⁹⁰ Cf. *de lta yin na dkar la sogs* || *mam pa sna gcig śes pa yañ* || *thog ma dbus mtha' tha dad pas* || *dmigs pa sna tshogs ñid du 'gyur* || (MAK 32). *ji ltar sñon po dan dkar po la sogs pa mam pa mañ po de bžin du gcig pur 'dod pa dkar po la sogs pa la yañ tshu rol dan* | *pha rol dan* | *dbuñ gi cha'i no bo'i mam pa mā po ñid de* | *de la yañ de'i bdag ñid kyi śes pa ñid du ma ñid du 'gyur ro* || (MAV ad MAK 32, ed. p. 96, 6–9).

say which one is the unitary cognition in this case.” If [it is argued that the unitary cognition is that cognition] that has the partless atom as [its] content,²⁹¹ [the reply will be that] precisely this is contradicted by direct experience, for nowhere can the partless form of an atom be seen, as appearing, in cognition. [...] ²⁹²

These arguments address the Sautrāntikas. In the MAP, Kamalaśīla calls them **bāhyārthavādins*,²⁹³ which is often a definition used for that school.²⁹⁴ In the TS and the TSP (but also in the MAK, MAV and MAP), this represents a further stage in the progression of the philosophical analysis of doctrines, that of refuting the *sākāravāda* as a way of apprehending an external object. The latter, which was proven as superior to the *nirākāravāda*, must now be abandoned. The aim is to prove that external objects are not apprehended in any way, and that cognition is, hence, devoid of the characteristic of apprehended and apprehender.

7.

Conclusion – Defining Śubhagupta’s Doctrinal Affiliation: *Kīm Prayojanam?*

As we have seen, in the BASK, Śubhagupta supports the *nirākāravāda* and is keen on refuting the *sākāravāda*. In particular — within this refutation — he also uses exactly the same arguments that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla use against the Sautrāntikas. I have aimed to highlight that his view regarding the nature and characteristics of cognition stands in the way of those who want to define him unequivocally as a Sautrāntika. On the other hand, I find it limiting as well as inaccurate to regard him merely as a Vaibhāṣika. The question arises as to whether or not in this particular case (and maybe in others) it is always possible to draw a sharp distinction between these two traditions, and as to whether or not doing so makes sense or helps us to understand better this author’s views (and that of others). I do not think it is possible, nor profitable, to try to establish conclusively the school to which Śubhagupta belonged. He shows a broad acquaintance with the doctrines of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition and, to some degree, adheres to them (especially as elaborated by Dharmakīrti), diverging, however, on some pivotal issues. His views, as found in the BASK, can be defined (in a manner of speaking) as “syncretic.” They reflect an attempt to provide an original ontological view of reality, which results in a similarly

²⁹¹ Cf. *du mar ’dod do ḥe na | ’o na gcig pur gyur pa gaṇ yin | gaṇ yan lag med pa’i rdul gyi yul ’dzin pa ste* | (MAV, ed. p. 96, 10–12).

²⁹² For the rest of the argumentation, cf. also **Vajracchedikāṭīkā*, English Translation n. 316.

²⁹³ Cf. n. 289.

²⁹⁴ On this, cf. n. 77 and 78.

interesting theory of cognition. It is especially important to investigate these views, because in the eighth century they must have been regarded as very convincing (and hence potentially dangerous) if Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla pay so much attention to him in one of the most important chapters of their TS and TSP (as well as devoting some attention to his ideas in the MAV and the MAP).

Śubhagupta was undoubtedly an ingenious philosopher, who provided an original contribution to the coeval philosophical debate. His importance is attested by the numerous references to the BASK (as well as other works of his) found in other authors, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. In spite of being generally disregarded by contemporary scholars, further investigation of his works is desirable in and of itself, and would also provide precious insight into the development of certain doctrines of the logico-epistemological tradition as well as the history of the Buddhist (and non-Buddhist) thought in the eighth century.

PART II

BAHIRARTHAPARĪKṢĀ

Manuscripts and Editions of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*

by Paolo Giunta

None of the collected manuscripts preserves both the TS text and the TSP text. I shall first describe the manuscripts related to the TS and then those related to the TSP, distinguishing their acronyms with the letter k (*kārikā*) or p (*pañjikā*).

1.

Manuscripts of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*

1.1 Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya

Granthabhaṇḍāra, Jaisalmer, no. 377 (Jk)¹

Manuscript on palm leaves, in *jainanāgarī* characters, consisting of 187 folios (numbered on the *verso*) with 4 to 7 lines per page. Each folio measures about 5 × 42 cm; folio no. 186 is missing. Muni Punyavijaya (1972: 160) has dated the manuscript to the first half of the 12th century and D. Śāstrī (Ś: *āmukham* 17) to the 11th–12th centuries.

Beginning: [siddha sign] *namo buddhāya || prakṛtīśobhayātmādivyā-
pārarahitaṃ calam | karmatatphalasambandhavyavasthādisamāśrayam |*

Colophon: *|| cha || cha || granthāgraṃ 3997 || cha || kamalaśī-
lasūtraṃ samāptaṃ iti || cha || maṅgalamahāśrīḥ || cha || śubhaṃ
bhavatu lekhaḥkaṇṭhakayoḥ || cha*

The writing area is divided into two parts, these delimited by four sets of three vertical lines at the two outer margins and on either side of an empty central rectangle. Slightly to the left of center, each page has a red circle around the binding hole. This circle is in an empty rectangular area. This area extends horizontally for the space of about six *akṣaras* and vertically over the height of the page, thus dividing the writing area into two parts.

The number of each folio is indicated in the margins of the *verso*: the middle of the left margin contains a numeric syllable (*akṣarapallī*)² written

¹ The description of this manuscript as well as Jp is mainly based on a digitized copy of black and white photocopies that I received from Prof. H. Krasser through Prof. R. Torella in 2005. For more details on how the originals were photocopied, see Muni Jambuvijaya (2000: 571–573). I would like to thank Hiroko Matsuoka for providing me color photographs of this manuscript as well as that of the TSP that she and Masahiro Ueda took at Jaisalmer's Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra in January 2012. These photographs have enabled more precise descriptions to be made concerning size, aspects of color and preservation status, and also provided a clearer view of certain graphic details.

vertically; in the middle of the right margin the same number is repeated in *jainanāgarī* digits. Both numbers are marked in red. When the manuscript's digitalization was undertaken at the Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatriya Granthabhaṇḍāra (beginning in 1998),³ Arabic numbers were added in pencil to both sides of each folio at the top of the empty area around the binding hole. The numbers on each *recto* are followed by the letter A, those on the *verso* by the letter B.

The end of each *kārikā* is generally marked by a double *danḍa* marked in red, this followed, starting from *kārikā* 310 (fol. 15v),⁴ by its number, also marked in red. After one hundred, the numbering is sometimes limited to every tenth *kārikā*. At the beginning of each chapter, the numbering begins again from one. The end of each chapter is marked by the title of the chapter inserted in most cases between two || *cha* ||, marked in red, this followed, as already mentioned, by the number of the last *kārikā*.

The chapters are distributed as follows:

<i>prakṛtiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 1v ₄ –3r ₆
<i>īśvaraparīkṣā</i>	fols. 3r ₆ –5v ₂
<i>dvitayaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 5v ₂ –6r ₅
<i>svābhāvika jagadvādaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 6r ₅ –7r ₄
<i>śabdabrahmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 7r ₄ –8v ₁
<i>puruṣaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 8v ₁ –9r ₅
<i>ātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 9r ₅ –17v ₃
<i>naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 9r ₅ –11v ₃
<i>mīmāṃsakakalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 11v ₃ –14v ₂
<i>kāpilakalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 14v ₂ –15v ₅
<i>digambaraparikalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 15v ₅ –16v ₃
<i>aupaniṣadikakalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 16v ₃ –17r ₂
<i>vātsīputrīyaparikalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 17r ₂ –17v ₃
<i>sthirabhāvaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 17v ₄ –23v ₆
<i>karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 24r ₁ –27v ₃
<i>dravyapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 27v ₃ –31v ₆
<i>guṇapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 31v ₆ –34v ₅
<i>karmapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 34v ₅ –35v ₃
<i>sāmānyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 35v ₃ –40v ₅
<i>viśeṣaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 40v ₅ –41r ₆
<i>samavāyapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 41r ₆ –43v ₁
<i>śabdārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 43v ₁ –61v ₂

² For descriptions of this system of numerical notation, see Kapadia (1936–1937), Bühler (2004: 97–101) and Muni Jambuvijaya (2000: 613–614).

³ Cf. Muni Jambuvijaya (2000: 571–573).

⁴ Before *kārikā* 310, only the *kārikās* 30, 40, 80, 93, 128, 152, 180, 200, 221 and 277 are numbered (with the numbering also taking into account the six introductory *kārikās* preceding the *prakṛtiparīkṣā*).

<i>pratyakṣaśaṅkṣaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 61 _{v2} –69 _{r2}
<i>anumānaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 69 _{r2} –75 _{r4}
<i>pramāṇāntaraparīkṣā</i>	fols. 75 _{r4} –86 _{v3}
<i>śabdavicāra</i>	fols. 75 _{r4} –77 _{r4}
<i>upamānavicāra</i>	fols. 77 _{r4} –80 _{r5}
<i>arthāpattiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 80 _{r5} –83 _{r3}
<i>abhāvavicāra</i>	fols. 83 _{r3} –85 _{v4}
{ <i>yuktyanupalabdihvicāra</i> } ⁵	fols. 85 _{v4} –86 _{r3}
{ <i>sambhāvicāra</i> }	fols. 86 _{r3} –86 _{r4}
{ <i>aitihyādivicāra</i> }	fols. 86 _{r4} –86 _{r5}
{ <i>sarveṣāṃ pramāṇānām saṃkṣepaṇa nirāsaḥ</i> }	fols. 86 _{r5} –86 _{v3}
<i>syādvādaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 86 _{v3} –90 _{v3}
<i>traikālyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 90 _{v3} –94 _{r3}
<i>lokāyataaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 94 _{r4} –99 _{v6}
<i>bahirarthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 99 _{v6} –106 _{r5}
<i>śrutiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 106 _{r5} –144 _{v3}
<i>svataḥprāmāṇyavādaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 144 _{v3} –159 _{v6}
<i>paratantrātīndriyadarśipuruṣaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 159 _{v6} –187 _{r5}

In the colophon, the total number of *kārikās* is given as 3997, hence 352 *kārikās* more than the 3645 found in the Śāstrī edition.⁶ This difference is due to numerous errors related to the numbering of individual *kārikās* as well as to the subtotals generally given at the end of each chapter. In particular, with regard to the counting of individual *kārikās* one can often find:

1. Two contiguous *kārikās* not bearing sequential numbers, with the second number higher than expected. For example in fol. 27_{v1}, *kārikā* 64 is followed by 72 (similar cases are: 74_{r3-4}, 77_{r3-4}, 91_{r4-5}, 106_{r5-v1}, 107_{v6}–108_{r1}, 128_{r4-5}, 159_{v2-3}, 175_{v4}, 185_{v4}; in 74_{r3-4} the leap forward in the numbering is due to the fact that the copyist overlooked a number of *kārikās*, which he then integrated into the lower margin;
2. The failure to count some *kārikās*, often because they were not copied at all (e.g., 99_{r2}, 119_{r6}, 173_{r3});
3. The same number being repeated for contiguous *kārikās* (e.g., fols. 65_{r6}–65_{v1});
4. The inclusion of *kārikās* copied twice by mistake.

In addition, regarding the subtotal of *kārikās* found at the end of each chapter, the number often does not correspond either to the actual number of *kārikās* or to the total that one would obtain taking into account all the counting errors of individual *kārikās*. For example, at the end of the *dravyapadārthaparīkṣā* (31_{v6}), the partial subtotal is given as 660, whereas

⁵ The titles between curly brackets are not found in the manuscript. They were created by Śāstrī (Ś), who also determined the related sections.

⁶ See §4.3.

according to the numbering of the individual *kārikās* it should be 680 and according to their actual number, 632.

Medial vowels are indistinctly written with a *pr̥ṣṭhamātrā* or using superscript signs. In the first line of each sheet, the superscript signs used to indicate *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*, *i* and *ī* are much larger than those in the following lines, taking advantage of the wider space available in the upper margin. For the same reason, in the first line of each sheet, the *anuvāra* is marked with a small circle, while in the subsequent lines with a simple point. A curly shaped mark is used to indicate those lines in the writing area that are short but present a complete text. This sign is inserted before the individual line, if the latter does not start near the left margin, or after it if the text ends before the right margin. If a space is not large enough for an entire *akṣara*, a strikethrough *daṇḍa* (when the space is very narrow) or a *u*-shaped sign (when the space is slightly wider) are inserted near the rectangular area left of the binding hole or in the right margin. In two cases (fols. 29v, 161v), space that is considered unsuitable for writing is filled with a series of S-like signs.

A second hand has written corrections, glosses, and additions to the text; these are usually at the upper and lower edges. They are generally followed by an × and a reference to the line number; the latter is counted from the top if the corrections, etc., are written in the upper margin, and from the bottom if they are written in the lower margin. In the lateral margins, minor corrections are found next to the line in question. Corrections that presuppose the insertion of text (for example, fols. 3v and 4r) are preceded by an ×; in the body of the text, the insertion point is indicated by a *kākapada* found in either the upper or lower interlinear space. In one case (69v), new text has been integrated directly by adding a line to the manuscript, this preceded by a curly shaped mark. Corrections that presuppose the replacement of text and glosses are preceded by two horizontal lines (=). In the body of the text, the *akṣara* to be replaced is marked by one or two horizontal lines placed in the upper and lower interlinear spaces. When a group of *akṣaras*, a word or more words are to be replaced or glossed, the horizontal lines are found in the interlinear spaces near the passage's first and last *akṣara*.

Text substitutions have often been made directly in the body text, written in the space of text that has been scraped away (see, among other places, pages 52r₅, 172r₅ and 199v₃) or by the correct *akṣara* being written in the interlinear space above the text to be corrected. *Akṣaras* that have been deleted by the corrector are marked with two vertical lines inserted in the upper interlinear space. Based on the handwriting, it seems that in one case (fol. 74r) the copyist himself corrected his work, writing an additional passage in the bottom margin of the folio.

1.2 Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina
Jñānamandira, Pāṭan, no. 6679 (Pk)⁷

Manuscript on paper, in *jainanāgarī* characters, consisting of 66 folios numbered on the *verso* and containing 17 lines per page. Each sheet measures 11.5 × 30.5 cm. The colophon dates the manuscript to 1436 (*saṃvat* 1492).

Beginning: || [siddha sign] | *namo buddhāya* || *prakṛtīśobhayā-
tmādīvyāpārarahitaṃ calam* | *karmatatphalasambandhavyavasthādisamā-
śrayam* || 1

Colophon: || *cha* || || *śrīḥ* || *kamalaśīlasūtram samāptam iti* ||
cha || *granthāgaram* 3997 || *cha* || || *śubham bhavatu* || || *saṃvat*
1492 *varṣe āśāḍhavadī 14 śukre lekhitā* || *cha* || *śrīḥ* || *cha* ||

For each sheet, the writing area (about 11.5 × 23 cm; with upper and lower margins measuring 1.5 cm wide) is delimited by two vertical red lines, one per margin. The left and right margins measure approximately 11.5 × 2 cm.

On the *recto* of each sheet, slightly to the left of center, there is a red circle, around which a rhomboidal area is left empty, this extending vertically from the seventh to the eleventh lines, and horizontally for the space of about six *akṣaras*. On the *verso*, along with the central circle and the rhomboidal space, there are two more red circles, one in each margin. At the top of the left margin the title *Kamalaśīlasūtram* is found. Inside the red circle in the right margin is found the number of the folio in *jainanāgarī* characters. These numbers are repeated and marked in red at the bottom of the same margin.

The end of each *kārikā* is generally marked by a double *daṇḍa* followed by its number marked in red. After 100 units as well as at the beginning of each chapter, the numbering starts again from 1. The end of each chapter is marked by its title followed by || *cha* || and, generally, by the total number of *kārikās*. Both the titles and numbers are marked in red.

The chapters are distributed as follows:

<i>prakṛtiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 1 _{v4} –2 _{r14}
<i>īśvaraparīkṣā</i>	fols. 2 _{r14} –3 _{r14}
<i>dvitayaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 3 _{r14} –3 _{v7}
<i>svābhāvīkajagadvādaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 3 _{v8} –4 _{r3}
<i>śabdabrahmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 4 _{r3} –4 _{v1}
<i>puruṣaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 4 _{v1} –4 _{v12}
<i>ātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 4 _{v12} –7 _{v16}

⁷ Manuscript photographed by the author in May 2007 at Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira of Pāṭan thanks to the permission of the library administrator, Mr. Yatin V. Shah. I am also grateful to Hiroko Matsuoka, who provided me with better quality photographs of the same manuscript.

<i>naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 4v ₁₂ –5v ₇
<i>mīmāṃsakakalpitātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 5v ₇ –6v ₁₀
<i>kāpilakalpitātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 6v ₁₀ –7r ₉
<i>digambaraparikalpitātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 7r ₉ –7v ₂
<i>aupanīśadikakalpitātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 7v ₂ –7v ₈
<i>vātsīputrīyaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 7v ₈ –7v ₁₆
<i>sthīrabhāvaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 7v ₁₆ –10r ₉
<i>karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 10r ₉ –11v ₂
<i>dravyapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 11v ₂ –13r ₄
<i>guṇapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 13r ₄ –14r ₅
<i>karmapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 14r ₅ –14r ₁₅
<i>sāmānyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 14r ₁₆ –16r ₁₁
<i>viśeṣaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 16r ₁₁ –16r ₁₇
<i>samavāyapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 16r ₁₇ –17r ₉
<i>śabdārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 17r ₉ –23r ₁₃
<i>pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 23r ₁₃ –25v ₁₅
<i>anumānaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 25v ₁₅ –28r ₃
<i>pramāṇāntaraparīkṣā</i>	fols. 28r ₃ –32r ₁
<i>śabdavicāra</i>	fols. 28r ₃ –28v ₉
<i>upamānavicāra</i>	fols. 28v ₉ –29v ₁₁
<i>arthāpattiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 29v ₁₁ –30v ₁₄
<i>abhāvavicāra</i>	fols. 30v ₁₄ –31v ₇
{ <i>yuktyanupalabdhivicāra</i> } ⁸	fols. 31v ₇ –31v ₁₂
{ <i>sambhāvicāra</i> }	fols. 31v ₁₂
{ <i>aitihyādivicāra</i> }	fols. 31v ₁₂ –31v ₁₃
{ <i>sarveṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ saṃkṣepena nirāsaḥ</i> }	fols. 31v ₁₃ –32r ₁
<i>syādvādaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 32r ₁ –33r ₁₄
<i>traikālyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 33r ₁₄ –34v ₆
<i>lokāyataparīkṣā</i>	fols. 34v ₆ –36v ₄
<i>bahīrarthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 36v ₄ –38v ₇
<i>śrutiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 38v ₇ –51v ₁₁
<i>svataḥprāmāṇyavādaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 51v ₁₁ –57r ₁₄
<i>paratantrātindriyadarśīpuruṣaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 57r ₁₄ –66v ₁₂

The manuscript has been conserved with sheets of Japanese paper.⁹ Due to the poor execution of this intervention the covering has often detached from the paper support, making entire pages (for example, page 17r), or parts of them, difficult to read or completely illegible.

The medial vowels are indistinctly written with a *pr̥ṣṭhamātrā* or using related superscript signs. In the first line of each sheet, the superscript signs used to indicate *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*, *i* and *ī* are much larger than those in the following lines, as they take advantage of the wider space available in the upper

⁸ See n. 5.

⁹ A covering was not applied on fols. 1, 4v and 59–66.

margin. For the same reason, in the first line of each sheet, some *anusvāras* are marked with a small circle, whereas in the subsequent lines they are marked with simple points. When the space near the right margin is not large enough for a full *akṣara*, a *daṇḍa* is inserted with a diagonal line starting from its foot and going down to the right.

Corrections, glosses and additions to the text are mostly found in the lateral margins, at the same height as the line they refer to, and are followed by the number of the line in which they should be inserted. If the corrections, etc., refer to a line on the top half of the sheet, this number is counted from the top; if they refer to a line on the lower half, the number is counted from the bottom. In a few cases, they appear in the upper margin at a spot corresponding to the insertion point and are followed by the reference line number.

Based on the handwriting, it would seem that the manuscript was corrected by at least two people. The first, possibly the copyist himself, puts an “x” in front of corrections that involve text being inserted (for example, fols. 5r and 53v) and indicates the insertion point in the body text with a *kākapada* written in the upper interlinear space. Corrections that replace text or glosses are preceded by two horizontal lines (=); the word to which they refer is also indicated by two horizontal lines (=) in the interlinear space above the first syllable.

The second corrector places two horizontal lines before both the gloss as well as correction and indicates the word to be glossed or corrected by inserting the same symbol (=) into the interlinear space above it (cf. fols. 4v and 29v). Some *akṣaras* have been deleted or corrected graphically with white paint (see 66r). It is not possible, however, to determine whether this type of correction can be attributed to the first, second or still another corrector.

The manuscript was identified as a copy of Jk based on the following elements:

1. There are no variants when compared to Jk. The manuscript agrees with Jk even when the latter offers clearly erroneous readings. Those cases where Pk deviates from Jk are due to copying errors or clear corrections;
2. Pk has the same glosses as Jk;
3. Although Pk also numbers the *kārikās* preceding 310, the same mistakes made by Jk in the various total calculations are also found in Pk. In the colophon, Pk names 3997 as the total number of *kārikās*;
4. The manuscript is the work of the same copyist as Pp, a manuscript that clearly depends on Jp.¹⁰ However, the manuscript is relevant

¹⁰ For the reasons leading to this conclusion, see the description of Pp. The relationship between the libraries of Pāṭan and Jaisalmer is also historically attested; under the reign of King Cālukya Ajayapāla (1174–1177), who was hostile to Jainism, Minister Udayana

because it is a witness of an earlier state of preservation of Jk that was better than the present one. It, thus enables the reading of parts of Jk that are illegible today.

1.3 Ācārya Śrī Kailāśasāgarasūri Jñānamandira –

Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Ārāḍhanā Kendra, Koba, no. 15081 (Kk)¹¹

Manuscript on paper, in *jainanāgarī* characters, consisting of 11 pages numbered on the *recto* and containing 12 lines per page. Each sheet measures 12.5 × 26.5 cm. Incomplete.

Beginning: *siddhaṃ namo buddhāya || prakṛtiśobhayātmādivyāpārara-hitaṃ valaṃ || karmatatphalasambandhavayavasthādisamāśrayam ||*

End: *prāṇādīnaṃ ca samvaṃdho yadi siddho || sahātmanābhav tadā-prasaṅgo yaṃ yudyeta || śrī rāmaḥ |*

The writing area (about 12.5 × 21.5 cm; upper and lower margins approximately 1.5 cm wide) is delimited by four pairs of vertical red lines, two per margin (about 12.5 × 2 cm).

At the top of the left margin of sheet 1r, a second hand has written *Kamalaśīla* and the folio number, which is repeated at the bottom of the right margin in a third hand. The same is found on all the *rectos* of the other folios; *Kamalaśīla* has been abbreviated with *ka.śī*.

The end of each *kārikā* is generally marked by a double red *daṇḍa*. *Kārikās* 40, 80, 93, 127, 152, 180 and 200 are also indicated with their respective number in red ink. The same color ink has generally been used to mark the end of chapters, this indicated by the title of the chapter preceded and followed by *|| cha ||*. The manuscript ends in the first half of the *pāda* d of *kārikā* 207 (fol. 11r₃), followed by *śrī rāmaḥ* written in red.

transferred many manuscripts from Pāṭan to Jaisalmer (Gandhi 1937: 33; Pingree 2001: 706). Based on this historical data and bearing in mind that the colophon in Pp explicitly states that the manuscript was copied in Pāṭan (Aṇahillapurapattana), it can be conjectured that (i) Pk and Pp are copies of two manuscripts originally preserved in Pāṭan but transferred to Jaisalmer after 1436; and (ii) that the copyist of Pk and Pp borrowed the Jk and Jp manuscripts from Jaisalmer and, having copied them in Pāṭan, brought them back to their original library. In the case of this second hypothesis, it can be speculated that the Jk and Jp manuscripts are the direct or indirect copy of two manuscripts transferred from Pāṭan to Jaisalmer under the reign of Ajayapāla and that their copying in Pāṭan was part of a wider plan of re-appropriating the manuscripts that had been moved to Jaisalmer. A comparative study of the manuscripts kept in the two libraries would undoubtedly contribute to the plausibility of these hypotheses.

¹¹ The description of this manuscript is based on the original, seen in the Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Ārāḍhanā Kendra. All the textual considerations refer to a photocopy of the same, which I obtained thanks to the permission of the library administrator, Mr. H. K. Dholakia.

It contains the following chapters:

<i>prakṛtiparikṣā</i>	fols. 1r ₈ –3r ₆
<i>īśvaraparikṣā</i>	fols. 3r ₆ –5v ₁
<i>dvitayaparikṣā</i>	fols. 5v ₁ –6r ₈
<i>svābhāvika jagadvādaparikṣā</i>	fols. 6r ₈ –7r ₆
<i>śabdabrahmaparikṣā</i>	fols. 7r ₆ –8r ₁₂
<i>puruṣaparikṣā</i>	fols. 8r ₁₂ –9r ₁₀
<i>ātmaparikṣā</i>	fols. 9r ₁₀ –11r ₃

The text, quite mistake-ridden and in a handwriting that gives the impression of uncertainty on the part of the copyist, has only three corrections, all relating to inversions of *akṣaras* (fol. 5r₉: °*klptāvanavasthā* for °*klptāvanavasthā*; fol. 4r₂: *taddṛṣṭāvinyāṭiyo* for *taddṛṣṭāv iti nyāyo*; and fol. 9v₁₁: °*abhiyadhākam* for °*abhidhāyakam*). The corrections are in a second hand and consist in the digits “2” and “1” being written in the interlinear space above the inverted *akṣaras*. The manuscript’s condition suggests that it was drafted recently, possibly commissioned by the same library in which it is kept. If this is the case, it does not date to before 1980 (the foundation year of the complex where the library is located).

The manuscript was identified as a copy of Jk mainly based on the following elements:

1. the point where it ends corresponds exactly with the end of Jk 10v;
2. only the *kārikās* numbered in Jk have a number (the only exception, *kārikā* 30, is numbered in Jk but not in Kk). Moreover, as in Jk, *kārikā* 127 bears the digit 128;
3. A comparison between the spaces left blank by the copyist of Kk and the parts of Jk that are difficult to read or completely illegible has revealed that in two cases (fols. 2r₃ and 2r₅), gaps in Kk correspond to parts where Jk is illegible. In three cases, the copyist failed to identify some of the consonant groups present in Jk,¹² either because their graphic rendering is slightly different from that of the same groups elsewhere in Jk or because of their complexity.¹³ Finally, in three cases (fols. 3r₅, 3r₈ and 4r₁), Kk attempts to restore illegible parts of Jk by offering variants that are not found in either Pk or the Tibetan translation; in any case, all are incorrect.¹⁴

¹² This is the case with 1v₆ and 2v₄, where the copyist failed to identify the consonant groups *jjā* and *śye*.

¹³ In 9r₂ the copyist leaves an empty space corresponding to the consonant group *mya*.

¹⁴ Specifically, *kārikā* 45d in Kk (fol. 3r₅) reads *kāryakāraṇatādibhaviṭi*, whereas in Pk (fol. 2r₁₄) it reads *kāryakāraṇatādīkam iti* (cf. Tib. *rgyu dan ’bras bu la sogs pa*); *kārikā* 47cd in Kk (fol. 3r₈) reads *buddhimaddhetuwaspaṃttadyathākalaśādīkam*, whereas in Pk (fol. 2r₁₅) it reads *buddhimaddhetugamyam tat tadyathākalaśādīkam* (cf. Tib. *de ni blo ldan rgyus bskyed bya || bum pa sogs bzün dbaṅ po ni*); *kārikā* 71a in Kk (fol. 4r₁₀) reads *vyatitu pratibandho ’smin* whereas in Pk (fol. 2v₁₅) it reads *yadi tu pratibandho ’smin* (cf. Tib. *gal te ’di la ’brel pa ni*).

2.

Manuscripts of the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*

2.1 Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya

Granthabhaṇḍāra, Jaisalmer, no. 378 (Jp)

Manuscript on palm leaves, in *jāinanāgarī* characters, consisting of 314 folios numbered on the *verso* and containing from 4 to 8 lines per page. Each sheet measures about 5.5 × 65 cm.¹⁵ Muni Punyavijaya (1972: 160) and D. Śāstrī (Ś: *āmukham* 17) date the manuscript, respectively, to the first half of the 12th century and to the 11th–12th century.

Beginning: [siddha sign] || *namo vītarāgāya* || *jñeyāmbhonidhi-*
manthanādadhigatais tattvāmṛtair yo jagajjātivyādhijarādidiḥkhaśamanaiḥ
kāruṇyato 'tarpayat | *tasmai tattvavidāṃvarāya jagataḥ śāstre prāṇamā-*
darāt | *tattvānām iha saṅgrāhe sphuṭatarā prārabhyate pañjikā* ||

Colophon: || *cha* || || *cha* || || *kamalaśīlābhidhanapustakaṃ*
samāptam iti || *cha* || || *cha* || || *cha* || || *maṅgalaṃ mahāśrīḥ* ||
cha || || *cha* || || *śubhaṃ bhavatu* || || *cha* || || || *cha* || || || *cha* ||

The manuscript is actually made up of parts of two manuscripts (referred to here as Jp¹ and Jp²), which are distinguished from one another mainly due to different types of support and graphic differences in the writing (see below).

In Jp¹ (= Jp fols. 141–235, 237–290, 293)¹⁶ the writing area is divided into three parts by rectangular areas left blank around the two binding holes. These areas extend horizontally for the space of about 4 to 7 *akṣaras* and vertically throughout the height of the page. The folio numbers are indicated in digits at the centers of the left (marked in red) and right margins of the *verso*.

Also in Jp² (= Jp fols. 1–140, 236, 291/292,¹⁷ 294–313), the writing area is divided into three parts by rectangular areas left blank around the two binding holes. They also extend horizontally for the space of about 4 to 7

¹⁵ See n. 1.

¹⁶ Probably due to the composite nature of the manuscript, the numbers in the left margins are sometimes different than those in the right. Here, the sheets are identified by the numbering in digits found in the right margin. Given the fact that the handwriting in the left and right margins is different, and the fact that the numbering in digits in the right margin proceeds without interruption through the entire manuscript, it was probably added after Jp¹ and Jp² were combined. The numbers found in the right margins were recently repeated in modern Arabic digits written in both rectangular areas on each page — these digits being followed from A on the *recto* and B on the *verso*. Since these numbers are not visible in the photocopy upon which this description is based, it can be deduced that they were added after 1998, the year the manuscript was first digitized (Muni Jambuvijaya 2000).

¹⁷ This folio has two numbers in the right margin. Double numbering of folios is quite common and usually the result of the scribe realizing a number has been missed in the manuscript's foliation (Kapadia 1936–1937: 175).

akṣaras and vertically throughout the height of the page. Unlike Jp¹, each of these three parts is delimited to the right and left by two (fols. 35–140, 236, 291/292, 294–313) or three (fols. 1–34) vertical lines. In the latter case, the vertical lines may be one (fols. 2v–9) or two (fols. 1–2r and 10–34) per side. Furthermore, on fols. 1–2r, 19v, 22r–25v and 33r–34r the space separating the two sets of vertical lines is filled in red. The folio numbers, marked in red, are indicated by both numeric syllables (*akṣarapallī*),¹⁸ these written vertically in the center of the left margin of each *verso*, and digits, in the middle of the right margin of each *verso*.

The manuscript is complete. The chapters are distributed as follows:

<i>prakṛtiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 13r ₆ –29v ₆
<i>īśvaraparīkṣā</i>	fols. 29v ₆ –37v ₄
<i>ubhayaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 37v ₄ –38v ₅
<i>svābhāvikāvādaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 38v ₅ –40v ₂
<i>śabdabrahmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 40v ₂ –43v ₄
<i>ṣuraparīkṣā</i>	fols. 43v ₄ –45r ₁
<i>ātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 45r ₁ –63v ₆
<i>naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparīkalpitātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 45r ₁ –51r ₄
<i>mīmāṃsakakalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 51r ₄ –56v ₃
<i>kāpilakalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 56v ₃ –58v ₅
<i>digambaraparīkalpitātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 58v ₅ –60v ₁
<i>aupaniṣadikātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 60v ₁ –61v ₃
<i>vātsīputrīyātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 61v ₃ –63v ₆
<i>sthīrabhāvaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 63v ₆ –77r ₄
<i>karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 77r ₄ –84r ₁
<i>dravyapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 84r ₁ –94r ₁
<i>guṇapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 94r ₁ –104r ₁
<i>karmapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 104r ₁ –105v ₃
<i>sāmānyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 105v ₃ –114v ₄
<i>viśeṣaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 114v ₄ –115r ₆
<i>samavāyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 115r ₆ –118r ₄
<i>śabdārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 118r ₄ –150v ₂
<i>pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 150v ₂ –162r ₈
<i>anumānaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 162r ₈ –171r ₂
<i>pramāṇāntarbhāva</i>	fols. 171r ₂ –186v ₂
<i>śabdavicāra</i>	fols. 171r ₂ –174r ₅
<i>upamānavicāra</i>	fols. 174r ₅ –177v ₁
<i>arthāpattiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 177v ₁ –181v ₃
[<i>abhāvavicāra</i>] ¹⁹	fols. 181v ₃ –185r ₇
{ <i>yuktyanupalabdhi</i> vicāra} ²⁰	fols. 185r ₇ –185v ₅

¹⁸ See n. 2.

¹⁹ The titles between square brackets are found in the TS but not in the TSP.

²⁰ See n. 5.

{ <i>sambhāvavicāra</i> }	fols. 185 _{v5} –185 _{v6}
{ <i>aithyādivicāra</i> }	fols. 185 _{v6} –185 _{v8}
{ <i>sarveṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ saṃkṣepaṇa nirāsaḥ</i> }	fols. 185 _{v8} –186 _{v2}
<i>syādvāda-parīkṣā</i>	fols. 186 _{v2} –191 _{v6}
<i>traikālyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 191 _{v6} –196 _{r7}
<i>lokāyata-parīkṣā</i>	fols. 196 _{r7} –205 _{v2}
<i>bahīrārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 205 _{v2} –214 _{v6}
<i>śruti-parīkṣā</i>	fols. 214 _{v6} –253 _{v8}
<i>svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 253 _{v8} –271 _{v7}
[<i>paratantrātindriyadarśīpuruṣaparīkṣā</i>]	fols. 271 _{v7} –313 _{r1}

The fact that this manuscript was originally two is also indicated by two folios on which text is repeated. One case is a folio of Jp¹ that has been inserted among fols. 141 and 142 (henceforth referred to as X). This X is numbered in the left margin with the digit 145; it contains the text already found on the fols. 139_{v5}–140_{v6}, and it ends exactly where fol. 140 ends. The second case is once again a folio of Jp¹ which has been inserted between fols. 239 and 240 (henceforth Y). Y is numbered in the left margin with the digit 241 and it contains exactly the same text found on fol. 236. One must note that fol. 236 belongs to Jp² and is numbered, on the left, with the *akṣarapallis* corresponding to the number 241.²¹ These two folios have not been included in the numbering in digits found on the right margins of all other folios.²²

If Jp¹ X and Y are compared with the corresponding folios in Jp², it can be seen that:

1. In both manuscripts, the medial vowels are alternatively written with a *pr̥ṣṭhamātrā* or using the superscript signs;
2. In the first lines of the Jp¹ folios, the superscript signs used to indicate *e* and *o* are quite conspicuous, with lines rising diagonally to the left from the extreme left of the superscript sign. Moreover, some *anusvāras* are marked with small circles. In contrast, in the first lines of the Jp² folios, there are no differences with respect to the following lines except for a few *anusvāras* written as small circles;
3. Vowels at the beginning of words or in composition are written differently between the Jp¹ and Jp² folios (see, for example, *nu*: Jp¹ X_{r7}, Jp² 140_{r4}; *yu*: Jp¹ X_{r7}, Jp² 140_{r4}; *stu*: Jp¹ X_{r6}, Jp² 140_{r3});
4. In Jp¹, palatal sibilants are written with the same character as the

²¹ This is the position of the fols. X and Y according to the photocopy of the manuscript on which this description is based (cf. n. 1). In the photographs taken by Matsuoka and Ueda, fols. X and Y appear to have been pulled out and photographed separately as not to interrupt the continuity of the folios' numbering.

²² Considering that one folio bears two numbers (291/292), based on the numbering found in the right margins, the total number of folios is 313. This number is mentioned in both (1972) and Muni Jambuvijaya (2000).

dental sibilants, whereas in Jp² they are written with their own *akṣara* (see, for example: Jp¹ X_{r5}: °sca°, Jp² 140r₂: °sca°; Jp¹ Y_{v6}: *sabde*, Jp² 236v₇: *sabde*);

5. In Jp¹ the composition between consonants, or between consonants and semi-vowels, is generally developed horizontally, whereas in Jp² it is developed vertically (see, for example, *kṣa*: Jp¹ Y_{r7}, Jp² 236r₇; *tka*: Jp¹ X_{r7}, Jp² 140r₄; *tma*: Jp¹ X_{v3}, Jp² 140v₂; *tya*: Jp¹ Y_{r1}, Jp² 236r₁; *tva*: Jp¹ Y_{r7}, Jp² 236r₇; *bda*: Jp¹ Y_{v6}, Jp² 236v₇; *vya*: Jp¹ Y_{r1}, Jp² 236r₁);
6. In addition to what has been said regarding the use of color to mark the folio numbers: in Jp¹ the curly-shaped filler marks at the end of each row are marked in red; in Jp² red ink is used for: the curly-shaped filler marks at the end of each row, the area around the string holes, the S-shaped filler marks in the text body, the first syllable of each *pratīka* and the first syllable of the related commentary, and the *cha* that precedes the title of each chapter;
7. The following variants can be found:

Jp ¹		Jp ²	
X _{r1}	arthāntaraparavṛttavastu°	139v ₅	arthāntaraparavṛttāvastu°
”	°darśanadvārāyatattvāt	”	°darśanadvārāyatattvāt
X _{r1-2}	tādātmenāropitatvāt	”	tādātmyenāropitatvāt
X _{r2}	hetvartha ityādi	139v ₆	hetvartha ityādi pūrvavad iti
”	°viśiṣṭānāhetuyatrā°	”	°viśiṣṭānāhetuyatrā°
”	yojayanīyam	”	yojanīyam
X _{r3}	so katham pratibimbādhigame	139v ₇	sā katham pratibimbādhigame
”	pratipadyata ityata āha	”	pratipadyata ityatrāha
”	°pratibimbātmakam tathā hi vijātīya°	”	°pratibimbātmakam{tva} tathā vijātīya°
X _{r4}	agonivṛttir anyatvamityāditi	140r ₁	agonivṛttir anyatvam ityādi
X _{r5}	viśeṣabuddhir	140r ₂	viśeṣabuddhir
”	pratikṣepasāha°	”	pratikṣepamātra°
X _{r6}	tasmā viśeṣaṇabhāve	140r ₃	tat tasmād viśeṣaṇabhāve
”	vyāvṛttiś cāvyatiriktāvastunaḥ	”	vyāvṛtti āvyatiriktāvastunas
X _{r7}	anupakāraḥ	140r ₄	anupakāraḥ
	viśeṣaṇasyāyogāt		viśeṣaṇatvāyogāt
X _{v1}	°viśeṣābhāvaḥ	140r ₅	°viśeṣābhāvas
”	yadyapi{syā}vyāvṛttitaddhetor	”	yadyapi vyāvṛttitaddhetor
X _{v2}	yadā cāśabda{syā}vācyatvān	140v ₁	yadā cāśabdavācyatvān
”	tathā hi yadvyaktīnām avācyatvādityasiddham tathā hi yadvyaktīnām avācyatvam asmābhir	”	tathā hi yadvyaktīnām avācyatvam asmābhir

Xv ₅₋₆	etad eva spaṣṭīkurvann āha	140v ₄	etam eva spaṣṭīkurvann āha
Xv ₇	bhaviṣyatūtyenekāntaḥ	140v ₅	bhaviṣyatūtyanekāntaḥ
Yv ₃	sarvatra buddhīnām iti	236v ₃	sarvabuddhīnām iti
”	bhinnanirbhāsādityasya	236v ₄	bhinnanirbhāsādityetasya
”	°virodhaś caitat tu	”	°virodhaś cetyetat tu
”	atha kasmāloka ity	”	a[tha]kasmāloka ity
”	bhedād ityanena tādātmya°	”	bhedād ityanena tadātmya°
Yv ₄	gotvaṃ nityam ityādi	236v ₅₋₆	gotvaṃ nityatvam ityādi
Yv ₅	nityenenasyāsiddhatām āha	236v ₆	nityasyāsiddhatām āha
”	anenāpi	”	anenāpi saṃbandhādityasya
”	nityasaṃbandhādityasya		
”	tasmād arthe saṃmukhāneka°	”	tasmā[darthe]saṃmukhāneka °
Yv ₆	kvi śabde	236v ₇	kva śabde
”	bhaviṣyatādi nāśakāraṇam iti	”	bhaviṣyatūti nāśakāraṇam iti
Yv ₇	gakārotyatvetyādi	236v ₈	gakārotyantetyādi

Corrections, glosses and additions can be attributed to two different hands. They are mainly found in the upper and lower margins, followed by the line number to which they refer. They are marked indiscriminately with two horizontal lines (=) or a ×. The same sign is used to indicate the insertion point in the text body. However, while × is inserted only once, in either the upper or lower interlinear space, when two horizontal lines are used, these appear in either the upper or lower interlinear space or in both. In both Jp¹ and Jp² *akṣaras* have been deleted by means of two vertical lines (‘‘) inserted directly above them. In Jp², entire words have been deleted by placing them between marks similar to round brackets. Moreover, full sentences have been deleted by circling them. It is probable that the second corrector of Jp¹ is also the second corrector of Jp². The same person can be attributed with having written the folio numbers in the right margins and inserted a number of *avagrahas* (S), double *daṇḍas* (| |), *daṇḍas* (|) semi-*daṇḍas* (|) directly into the text body.

A more detailed paleographic analysis will determine the chronological order of Jp¹ and Jp² or whether they are contemporary. At first sight, the poorer state of conservation of certain Jp¹ folios leads one to believe that Jp¹ is older than Jp². If this were to be the case, together with the fact that two folios lack the numbering found in the right margins of the other folios, there are two possible hypotheses:

1. The whole manuscript consists of parts of an original (Jp¹) and parts of a copy (Jp²) that were combined after the latter was written (since text is found in both parts that correspond exactly, such as the folio inserted between fols. 239–240); or

2. The folios of Jp² are copies of the most damaged folios of Jp¹ and replaced them to restore the manuscript.

The second hypothesis is more likely, since there is no other manuscript of TSP known, such as the “negative” of Jp, which could be used to support hypothesis 1.

2.2 Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina

Jñānamandira, Pāṭan, no. 6680 (Pp)²³

Manuscript on paper, in *jainanāgarī* characters, consisting of 260 folios numbered on the verso and containing 17 lines per page. Each sheet measures about 11.5 × 30.5 cm. The colophon dates the manuscript to 1436 (saṃvat 1492).

Beginning: [siddha sign] || *hrim namo vītarāgāya* || *jñeyambhoni-dhimanthanād abhigatais tattvāmṛtair yo jagajjātiviyādhiarādidiḥkhaśama-naiḥ kārunyato 'tarpayat* | *tasmai tatvavidāṃvarāyajagataḥ śāstre praṇa-myādarāt tattvānām iha saṅgrahe sphuṭatarā prārabhyate pañjikā* || 1

Colophon: *kamalaśīlābhīdhānapustakaṃ samāptam iti* || *cha* || || *śubhaṃ bhavatu* || *cha* || || *kalyāṇam astu* || *cha* || || *maṅgalam astu* || *cha* || || *dīrghāyur astu* || *cha* || || *cha* || *śrīḥ* || *cha* || || *cha* || *śrīḥ* || *cha* || *saṃvat 1492 varṣe kārttikavadi 3 tṛtīyāyām ravivāsare śrīmad aṇahillapurapattane*

With regard to how the manuscript is subdivided, how colored ink is used, and the numbering of the folios, the manuscript is identical to Pk. However, the numbers inside the red circles in the right margins of the *verso* of the folios do not correspond to those found in the lower left corner of the same margin. The first numbering starts from 67, the second from 1. This suggests that Pp was originally a single codex with Pk, in which the numbering within the circles ends with 66. If the handwriting and colophons in Pk and Pp are compared, it seems that both were the work of the same copyist, who finished writing Pp three months after Pk.

The *pratīkas* are generally marked in red, as are the end of the chapters, which are indicated with the title preceded and followed by || *cha* ||.

The chapters are distributed as follows:

<i>prakṛtiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 7v ₉ –16v ₅
<i>īśvaraparīkṣā</i>	fols. 16v ₅ –22r ₁₇
<i>ubhayaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 22r ₁₇ –23r ₁₅
<i>svābhāvīkavādaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 23r ₁₅ –25r ₁

²³ Like Pk, I photographed this manuscript in May 2007 at Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira of Pāṭan thanks to the permission of the library administrator, Mr. Yatin V. Shah. I am grateful to Hiroko Matsuoka for having provided me with better quality photographs.

<i>śabdabrahmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 25 _{r1} –27 _{v5}
[<i>puruṣaparīkṣā</i>] ²⁴	fols. 27 _{v5} –28 _{v5}
<i>ātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 28 _{v5} –43 _{v4}
<i>naīyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 28 _{v5} –33 _{r1}
<i>mīmāṃsakakalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 33 _{r1} –37 _{v4}
<i>kāpilakalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 37 _{v4} –39 _{r15}
<i>digambaraparikalpītātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 39 _{r16} –40 _{v14}
<i>aupaniṣadikātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 40 _{v14} –41 _{v6}
<i>vātsīputrīyātmaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 41 _{v6} –43 _{v4}
<i>sthīrabhāvaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 43 _{v4} –53 _{v12}
<i>karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 53 _{v12} –59 _{r7}
<i>dravyapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 59 _{r7} –66 _{v6}
<i>guṇapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 66 _{v6} –73 _{r17}
<i>karmapadārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 73 _{r17} –74 _{v11}
<i>sāmānyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 74 _{v11} –82 _{r16}
<i>viśeṣaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 82 _{r16} –82 _{v16}
<i>samavāyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 82 _{v17} –85 _{r14}
<i>śabdārthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 85 _{r14} –110 _{v6}
<i>pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 110 _{v6} –120 _{v16}
<i>anumānaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 120 _{v16} –128 _{v2}
<i>pramāṇāntarbhāva</i>	fols. 128 _{v2} –142 _{r15}
<i>śabdavicāra</i>	fols. 128 _{v2} –131 _{r16}
<i>upamānavicāra</i>	fols. 131 _{r16} –133 _{v11}
<i>arthāpattiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 133 _{v11} –138 _{r3}
[<i>abhāvavicāra</i>]	fols. 138 _{r3} –142 _{r15}
{ <i>yuktyanupalabdhi</i> vicāra} ²⁵	fols. 141 _{r14} –141 _{v12}
{ <i>sambhāv</i> vicāra}	fols. 141 _{v12} –141 _{v14}
{ <i>aitihyā</i> divicāra}	fols. 141 _{v14} –141 _{v17}
{ <i>sarveṣāṃ pramāṇānām saṃkṣepena nirāsaḥ</i> }	fols. 141 _{v17} –142 _{r15}
<i>syādvādaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 142 _{r15} –146 _{v12}
<i>traikālyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 146 _{v12} –151 _{r3}
<i>lokāyataparīkṣā</i>	fols. 151 _{r3} –160 _{r5}
<i>bahīrarthaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 160 _{r5} –169 _{r14}
<i>śrutiparīkṣā</i>	fols. 169 _{r14} –209 _{v1}
<i>svataḥprāmānyaparīkṣā</i>	fols. 209 _{v1} –227 _{v16}
[<i>paratantrātindriyadarśipuruṣaparīkṣā</i>]	fols. 227 _{v16} –260 _{v4}

Like Pk, this manuscript underwent a process of conservation,²⁶ albeit only partially and of better quality than that of Pk. Nevertheless, fols. 106, 112–114, 126–127, 148, 165 and 168–169 contain quite large gaps due to damage to the margins or the support having ripped.

²⁴ See n. 19.

²⁵ See n. 5.

²⁶ There is no covering on fols. 100v, 101v–109v, 151r–167v, 229r–241v.

This manuscript also shares with Pk how it indicates medial vowels, the superscript signs in the first row of each folio being wider, and the use of filler strikethrough *daṇḍas*. To indicate gaps, blank spaces have been left in the manuscript copy that are as long as the missing text.

Corrections, glosses and additions to the text are found in all margins; they are followed by the number of the line to which they refer. Based on the handwriting, it seems that the manuscript was corrected by at least three persons, the first having possibly been the copyist himself. All three correctors place an × before additions and mark the insertion point with a *kākapada*, this generally written in the interlinear space above the line in question. Glosses have two horizontal lines [=] before and sometimes also after; two horizontal lines are also inserted in the interlinear space above the word being glossed. This is also how corrections of one or more *akṣaras* are indicated. For replacing text, the third corrector often writes directly into the body of the text, inserting the correction in the interlinear space immediately above the text to be corrected. In many cases corrections were made directly to the text body after the text needing correction was covered with white ink.

The manuscript has been identified as a copy of Jp based on the following elements:

1. There are no variants between Pp and Jp; as with Pk, any differences can be attributed to copying errors or obvious corrections. Where Jp¹ and Jp² overlap, the manuscript agrees with Jp²;
2. Where Jp is illegible or corrupt, Pp has empty spaces (see, for example, Pp 235r–236r with Jp 279v–280r);²⁷
3. The glosses that can be attributed to the copyist are also found in Jp.

Regardless of this, the manuscript is still useful since it presents Jp when its state of preservation was better than it is now.

2.3 Other Manuscripts

There are two more recorded manuscripts of the TSP:

1. Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Kāgajakā Granthabhaṇḍāra, Jaisalmer, no. 1188 (Jp3) — Manuscript on paper, 338 folios of about 12.5 × 28 cm and dated 1927 (śaṃvat 1983). It is recorded in Muni Punyavijaya (1972: 276). However, as confirmed by Hiroko Matsuoka (personal communication, 2012), it has not been present in the library since 2000 (cf. Muni Jambuvijaya 2000), so it was not possible to consult it directly.
2. Academy of Sciences, Asian Museum, St. Petersburg, Ms. VIII, 10 (Sp) — This manuscript consists of 1524 folios (measuring 21 x 18 cm)

²⁷ This, along with point 1, suggests that Jp already consisted of both Jp¹ and Jp² at the time of Pp being written.


collected in 5 volumes (1 fols. 1–325; 2 fols. 326–613; 3 fols. 614–913; 4 fols. 914–1221; 5 fols. 1222–1542), in *devanāgarī* characters. Based on the colophon,²⁸ it dates to approximately 1908 (*saṃvat* 1964; Mironov 1914: 314). Unfortunately it was not possible to get a copy of this manuscript either.

However, as Śāstrī (Ś: *āmukham* 17–18) states in relation to Jp3 and Mironov (1914: 314) states for Sp, these manuscripts are not particularly accurate copies of Jp.

3.

Stemma Codicum

Based on the above, the stemma codicum of the TS and the TSP manuscripts could be the following:



4.

Printed Editions

- 4.1 *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*, ed. by Embar Krishnamacharya, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30–31, 2 vols., Central Library, Baroda 1926 (K)

The edition is based on a single TS manuscript (Pk) and a single TSP manuscript (Pp), the only ones available at the time of publication. It thus does not present a critical apparatus. The editor's interventions are made directly into the text body, where corrections, conjectures (the latter generally followed by “?”) and additions are found in round brackets. However, there are some corrections that have not been marked as such. Moreover, in most cases the paucity of manuscript material upon which the edition is based made it impossible to fill gaps in the TSP; in the few cases

²⁸ *kamalaśīlābhīdhānapustakam samāptam iti || śubham bhavatu | kalyāṇam astu || 1 || līpīkṛtaṃ vyāsānwayasamudrūtaśāstrivararāvatamallāṅgajāṇitamallaśarmmaṇā śrīkharataragacchasya bṛhadupāsare paṇ. pra. śrīyutavṛddhicandrajīttacchīyalakṣmīcandrajītkānām sinnidhau (!) || samāptim paphānedam talasaṅgrahapūṃjikākhyam (!) pustam nidhyartunandagege (?) varṣe śrāvaṇāsitatrayodaśyām śānivāsa-rānvitāyam || śubham śrīr astu ||*

where this has been done, it is merely by conjecture. The TS and TSP texts are combined, with the stanzas presented along with their commentary.

The edition was reprinted in 1984 (vol.1) and 1988 (vol.2), but other than a few corrected typographical errors, the reprint does not differ from the first edition.

4.2 *The Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita*
 with the “*Pañjikā Commentary of Śrī Kāmalaśīla*,
 ed. by Swāmi Dwārikādās Śāstrī, Bauddha Bhāratī
 Series 1–2, 2 vols., Bauddha Bhāratī, Vārāṇasī 1968 (Ś)

According to Śāstrī’s introduction (Ś: *āmukham* 17–18), the edition was prepared using almost all available materials: Jk, Jp, Pk and Pp, K and the Tibetan translation (although it is not mentioned which edition of the Tibetan canon was used). This has made it the reference edition of the TS and the TSP. Despite the presence of critical notes, however, in many cases it is difficult to know where and how the editor has intervened in the text unless one directly consults the textual sources to which he refers. If notes are present, they only record variants that differ from the accepted text. They do not indicate whether the accepted text is found in one of the manuscripts, has been deduced based on the Tibetan translation, is a correction or a conjecture, or is a variant found in K. Moreover, there are cases in which Śāstrī has changed the text without mentioning it. In such cases, it is impossible to recognize that these parts of the text, passages which seem to be evenly attested in the manuscript tradition, are in fact non-existent. In addition, he sometimes records as variants of Pk variants that are actually found in K. By comparing Pk and K, we realize that such variants are tacit corrections of Krishnamacharya. For this reason, it seems that Śāstrī did not consult Pk directly, but rather considered K a faithful transcription of Pk whenever Krishnamacharya did not add corrections or conjectures in round brackets.

Śāstrī’s edition has been published four times (1968, 1988, 1997 and 2006). In the first and third, the TS and TSP texts have different graphic layout. In the first edition the two texts are separate, but in the third they are combined, with the stanzas presented along with their commentary. At times the two printings also offer different readings (mostly due to typos in the third).

4.3 Numbering in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* Editions

Krishnamacharya’s edition has one *kārikā* more than the 3645 of Śāstrī’s edition. The difference is due to the fact that Krishnamacharya reads TS 525c as *kāryasya vā bhavet tadvat* instead of *kārye ’thavā bhāve tadvat* and therefore considers the *pratīka* “*athavā bhāve*” as related to a lost verse that he

counts as 526. Śāstrī has corrected this error. However, his explanation is in turn incorrect. Given that Krishnamacharya does not indicate the mistake as his own conjecture or correction, Śāstrī believes that it was found in the Pāṭan manuscript (the only one available to Krishnamacharya), thus attributing the mistake to the copyist. He therefore concludes that there are no missing verses in the TS, since this is not recorded in the Tibetan translation either. Accordingly, from TS 527, the numbering of the verses in Krishnamacharya's edition is one more than in Śāstrī's edition. However, Śāstrī also offers a reading of TS 525c that is not attested by any manuscript (*kārye 'tha bhāve vā*), whereby he too, just as Krishnamacharya did, leaves the *pratīka* “*athavā bhāve*” an orphan.

Symbols and Abbreviations¹

1.

Sigla Related to the Sources Used in the Critical Edition

BASK	<i>*Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā</i> (Śubhagupta): (a) D: 4244, tshad ma, <i>že</i> 189b ₃ –196b ₁ ; (b) P: 5742, tshad ma, <i>že</i> 199b ₈ –207b ₇ ; (c) M: Mikogami E. (ed.). Śubhagupta no <i>Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā</i> . <i>Ryūoku daigaku ronshū</i> 429. 1986. 2–44.
Gā	Gaekwad's Oriental Series Edition (K) as quoted in Ś
Jai	Jaisalmer Manuscripts as quoted in Ś
Jk	<i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> (Śāntarakṣita): (<i>Tattvasaṅgrahasūtra</i>) Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra, Jaisalmer, no. 377. (Fols. 99v ₆ –106r ₅)
Jk ^g	glosses as found in Jk
Jp	<i>Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā</i> (Kamalaśīla): (<i>Tattvasaṅgraha- pañjikāvṛttī</i>) Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra, Jaisalmer, no. 378. (Fols. 205v ₂ –214v ₆)
Jp ^g	glosses as found in Jp
K	Krishnamacharya's Editio Princeps of the <i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> (Śāntarakṣita) and <i>Tattvasaṅgraha- pañjikā</i> (Kamalaśīla): Krishnamacharya E. (ed.). <i>Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla</i> , 2 vols. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30–31. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1926. (Repr. vol. 1, 1984; vol. 2, 1988) (Corresponding <i>kārikā</i> numbers are one higher than those found in Ś as well as my edition.)

¹ These are used in the Sanskrit Text as well as the English Translation.

K conj.	conjectures in K, i.e., parts that are enclosed in parentheses ² and followed by ?
K em.	emendations in K, i.e., parts that are enclosed in parentheses
Pā	Pāṭan Manuscripts as quoted in Ś
Pk	<i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> (Śāntarākṣita): (<i>Tattvasaṅgrahasūtra</i>) Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, Pāṭan, no. 6679. (Fols. 36v ₄ –38v ₇)
Pk ^g	glosses as found in Pk
Pp	<i>Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā</i> (Kamalaśīla): Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, Pāṭan, no. 6680. (Fols. 160r ₅ –169r ₁₄)
Pp ^g	glosses as found in Pp
Ś	Śāstrī's Edition of the <i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> (Śāntarākṣita) and the <i>Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā</i> (Kamalaśīla): Śāstrī D. (ed.). <i>Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarākṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Śrī Kamalaśīla</i> , 2 vols. Bauddha Bhārati Series 1–2. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.
T _{1D}	D 4266, tshad ma, <i>ze</i> 71b ₆ –76a ₃ .
T _{1P}	P 5764, tshad ma, <i>'e</i> 86b ₃ –91b ₄ .
T _{2D}	D 4267, tshad ma, <i>'e</i> 109b ₇ –130b ₂ .
T _{2P}	P 5765, tshad ma, <i>ye</i> 147b ₄ –171a ₁ .
TS/TSP (other chapters, aside from the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā)	Ś edition

² In my Sanskrit Text they have been changed into { ... }.

2.

Editorial Conventions:
Symbols and Abbreviations

.	illegible part of an <i>akṣara</i>
..	illegible <i>akṣara</i>
...	indicates omitted parts between portions of the Tibetan text
,	separates readings (both accepted and non-accepted) which differ slightly from each other so as not to result in a different variant
;	separates readings which differ
]	separates the accepted readings, emendations, or conjectures from the non-accepted ones
<< >> (regardless of whether or not followed by ?)	encloses <i>akṣaras</i> or parts of them that are difficult to read because of damage, stains, erasure, etc.; or <i>akṣaras</i> which are not clearly, or only partially, ³ written due to a mistake by the scribe, overlapping with other letters, etc.
()	in the critical apparatus, encloses Tib. and is preceded by the abbreviation of the related sources (e.g., T _{1P} , T _{2D} , etc.) among the accepted readings, encloses the orthographic form in which some variants are given in the manuscripts (e.g., <i>anusvāra</i> instead of homorganic nasal, s instead of ś for Jk/Jp, etc.); these generally follow the abbreviations of the manuscripts where they are found; in the case of both manuscripts having the same form, this follows both their abbreviations; if that form is only found in Pk/Pp, the parentheses enclose also the related abbreviation

³ At times, in all the manuscript sources, the scribes write *akṣaras* by mistake, do not finish writing them, but do not delete them.

[]	in the Sanskrit text, encloses the pagination of manuscripts and editions
	in the English Translation, encloses parts of text that are supplied to facilitate understanding
{ }	encloses emendations/conjectures as found in K
?	when it follows readings found in K, indicates conjectures (it is present also in K)
/ (regardless of whether or not followed by ?)	separates two equally possible readings of the same <i>akṣara</i> as a result of difficulty in determining which of two similarly written <i>akṣaras</i> the scribe intended
(ill. <i>circa</i> ± <i>akṣaras</i>)	indicates an illegible portion of the text where the actual number of syllables is not known
=	corresponds to
*	precedes possible Sanskrit reconstructions of a Tibetan translation
§	precedes the paragraph numbers of the Introduction for cross-references within the Introduction itself and/or other parts of the book
§ §	encloses possible interpolations
† †	<i>cruces desperationis</i> enclose a portion of the edited text which is not conclusively established
◇	among the accepted variants, separates the readings found in primary sources (i.e., manuscripts or Tibetan) from those found in printed editions
a, b, c, d, etc.	first <i>pāda</i> , second <i>pāda</i> , etc.
^a , ^b , ^c , ^d , etc.	Latin alphabetic notes related to parallel texts
^α , ^β , ^γ , ^δ , etc.	Greek alphabetic notes related to the discussion of the variants

ac	<i>ante correctionem</i>
Cf./cf.	<i>confer</i>
<i>codex descriptus</i> (<i>pl. codices descripti</i>)	a manuscript which is a copy of another extant manuscript
<i>codex unicus</i> (<i>pl. codices unici</i>)	a manuscript which is the only extant witness of a text
conj.	conjecture
<i>contra metrum</i>	(mostly in the sense of <i>hypometrical</i>) indicates a reading which, if accepted, would go “against” the rhythmic structure of the verse
D	sDe dge edition (see Bibliography)
deest	omitted in/absent in
<i>dittography</i>	an instance of erroneous repetition of one or more <i>akṣaras</i> and/or one or more words by the scribe
ed.	edition
em.	emendation; when em. is followed by \diamond as well as the abbreviations of one of the printed editions or both, the emendation was already found in them
<i>eye-skip</i>	an instance of unintentional and erroneous skipping of the eye by the copyist when reading from one <i>akṣara</i> or word to another which is not the next one
g ¹ , g ² , g ³ , etc.	notes related to the edited text of the glosses as found in the manuscripts (the critical edition of which is provided in the related section)
<i>haplography</i>	an instance of erroneous reduction by the copyist of two identical <i>akṣaras</i> (or groups of them) to only one
<i>infra</i>	indicates a reference to following passages when specific paragraph numbers cannot be given

lapsus calami

a miswriting

no.

number

P

Peking edition (see Bibliography)

pc

*post correctionem**r**recto*

s.v.

sub voce – under the specified word*signe-de-renvoi*

symbol marking a place where a correction or insertion is to be made (in the Sanskrit text, it refers to the symbol = to mark the word or sentence to which a gloss refers to)

supra

indicates a reference to different previous passages where specific paragraph numbers cannot be used

Tib.

Tibetan translation (if the editions differ, it contains the variants in parentheses and followed by the abbreviations D and P)

*v**verso*

Xk/Xp

indicates manuscript(s) that precede Jk/Jp, whether or not those may be regarded as a direct copy of it

^{1, 2, 3, 4}

numerical notes related to the variants, both accepted and non-accepted

Prolegomenon

1.

Critical Edition

The Sanskrit text has been transliterated into Roman characters, presenting the verses along with the related commentary. The layout is that found in K.

Kārikā numbering follows that of Ś. Numbers have been placed after the verses and appear without the abbreviation TS. Verses have been divided into two lines, one per half-verse. When necessary, half-verses have been further subdivided into the two *pādas*.

When possible, the commentary has been subdivided into smaller parts that correspond to single *kārikās*, which are indicated at the end of each part by the abbreviation “TSP *ad* TS” followed by the corresponding *kārikā* number. The English Translation is also presented in the same manner. *Pratīkas* and words deriving from the *mūla* text in the commentary appear in bold.

Choice and utilization of punctuation (*daṇḍas* and commas) and *avagrahas* is according to my best judgment. *Sandhi* has been standardized. Words have been divided without dissolving conjuncts. When needed, hyphenation has been used based on the Sanskrit *akṣaras*.

Quotations of verses or half-verses from other works are indented.

In the critical edition I have followed the following criteria.

There are four different series of notes:¹

1. Numerical notes (Arabic numbers) relate to the listing of all variants, both accepted and non-accepted.
2. Greek alphabetic notes relate to the discussion of chosen variants as well as problems, evaluation of different choices, etc.
3. Latin alphabetic notes relate to parallel passages/verses found in other works or elsewhere in the same works.
4. g-Notes relate to the glosses.

Changes of folios, *recto* and *verso*, and lines for the manuscripts as well as pages of the printed editions are indicated within square brackets throughout the text.

Variants are recorded in the notes of the critical apparatus exactly as found in the sources, including *sandhi* and orthographic differences. The gemination of *t* after *r* has been normalized in the text, but it has been kept in the variants in the apparatus, if present in the sources. The variants of the manuscripts are *always* given with the orthographic form in which they are found (e.g., *anusvāra* instead of homorganic nasal, *s* instead of *ś* for Jk/Jp),

¹ See also 2. Editorial Conventions: Symbols and Abbreviations in Symbols and Abbreviations.

appearing after the siglum/sigla and between parentheses. Different uses of punctuation (*daṇḍas* and commas) and *avagrahas* in the sources have not been considered as separate variants in the apparatus. Insertions of *avagraha* have been recorded only when added in Jp^{pc}.

Avagraha is not used consistently in the manuscripts; and is virtually absent in Jp. Accordingly, I regard some emendations/readings containing the *avagraha* as also supported/found in the manuscript sources, even though they are not actually present in it.

With reference to *sandhi*, deviations from the standard are not recorded in the notes, unless the variants are referred to for other purposes.

The order of the sigla among the accepted readings is based on the order importance of the Sanskrit source (i.e., Jk/Jp, Pk/Pp, K, Ś). A diamond sign (◊) separates the sigla of the manuscripts from those of the printed editions. Among the non-accepted readings, the sigla are listed based on either their similarity to the accepted reading or on the importance of the source. Tibetan, unless supporting an emendation/conjecture, is generally listed last.

Pā and Gā are not recorded in the exact literal form in which they are found in Ś, but rather based on the form of the variants in the same note.

2.

Tibetan Translations

The Tibetan translations were made by Guṇākaraśrībhadra and Źi ba 'od for the TS, and Devendrabhadra and Grags 'byor śes rab for the TSP.

The Tibetan text is presented in Roman transliteration. In the critical edition, translations are referred to only when they confirm a variant or may suggest the presence of a different original reading in Xk/Xp. Otherwise, when the Sanskrit text is simply translated differently than I would expect, the Tibetan translation is referred to in the English translation. In the edition, when they neither confirm nor contradict the preceding variants, readings from the Tibetan translations are separated by a semi-colon. At times, when a variant is found only in the printed editions (and, hence, not in a manuscript source), the Tibetan readings are given to show whether or not that variant is somehow justified.

Reconstructions of the Sanskrit readings which may correspond to Tibetan variants have been attempted only when feasible. They are preceded by an asterisk (*).

Except in a very few cases, a critical edition of the Tibetan text is not presented. While I am aware that some differences in the readings of the two editions (P and D) could be resolved by simply emending the text, such cases are not indicated.

3.

Post Correctionem

Interventions of the corrector have been omitted if they do not result in a new variant, i.e., those interventions which were included only with the intention to make *akṣaras* clearer (e.g., signs meant to make vowels or consonants more evident). This is especially the case with the underscript *u*. Additionally, amendments that were made by the same scribe have been recorded as corrections.

The wavy sign appearing above the *akṣaras* in the manuscripts (which occurs only a few times, usually as a sign of the vowel *ā*) has been recorded as a correction only when it had been added subsequently (though by the same scribe).

4.

Homographic *Akṣaras*
and Orthography

The *akṣaras na/ta* and *ca/va* are sometimes homographic; the choice of one or the other as a variant has been based on my best judgment. The *akṣaras sa/ma* are sometimes homographic; only a few significant occurrences have been recorded in the apparatus.

In Jp (and in one occurrence in Pp) double *j* is always reduced to one single *j*. These are not reported as separate variants. Moreover, in all the cases where a double *j* is expected, I have regarded the single *j* in the manuscript as double, but have recorded it in the literal form as it is found (i.e., one *j*). The same phenomenon of “degemination” is present for *d* in a few instances as well (e.g., *etadeśavitānena* in Jp206r7; *tadvāreṇā* in Jp207r3). These have not been recorded in the apparatus either, except when the corrector has amended them.

Aside from the above-mentioned scribal peculiarities, I have recorded all the variants that are found in the manuscripts, including those that are evidently scribal errors.

In Jp, the *akṣara śa* is mostly written as *sa*. At times, the copyist amends *sa* as *śa*. Given their general equivalence in the manuscript, such corrections have not been recorded as separate variants. In Jp, *rūpa* is often written as *rupa*; at times, it was corrected. This has not been recorded either.

5.

Jk/Jp²

Jk/Jp are in fact *codices unici*, dated approximately to the 11th or 12th century and of which Pk/Pp are *codices descripti*. For this reason, I regard Jk/Jp as the most important manuscript source. In spite of their nature as *codices descripti*, Pk/Pp are, nevertheless, useful in order to understand some variants that are not transparent in Jk/Jp, e.g., *post correctionem* variants that are not totally clear.

6.

Pk/Pp

Pk/Pp are *codices descripti* of Jk/Jp, dated to 1436 (*saṃvat* 1492) in the colophon. As was proved by Giunta (see Manuscripts and Editions of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*), Pp is a direct copy of Jp (and Pk of Jk). In Pp, some different variants are due simply to the miscopying of Jp. This is especially the case with the *virāma* in Jp, which is often mistaken for an underscript *u*.

Some portions of Pp are not easily readable. In the critical apparatus, parts of Pp are indicated as not clearly readable only when necessary or when the variants are discussed for other reasons.

7.

K

All the readings that are found in K and are followed by a question mark are indicated as “conj.” Those which are found between brackets are denoted as “em.” Krishnamacharya based his edition only on Pk/Pp. Therefore, whenever the edition differs from them, he has clearly emended the text without mentioning it. I do not refer to these variants as “em.”

8.

Other

With very few exceptions, I have also recorded different readings that are typos in the printed editions, particularly in Ś.

² For an extensive description of all the manuscripts of the TS and the TSP, see Manuscripts and Editions of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*.

9.

Pā/Gā

I have reported variants that are found in Ś as “Pā” and “Gā” in order to show that Ś does not always quote K, Pk and Pp correctly. In particular, regarding Pk and Pp, Śāstrī mostly records readings that are present in K, assuming that this is a faithful copy of them.

10.

Parallel Passages

Only verbatim (or almost verbatim) quotations from other texts (or the same texts) are recorded as parallel passages/verses in the critical apparatus (see Latin alphabetic notes). With reference to the BASK, all quotations that are classified³ as (i) – and most (ii) and (iii) – have been considered as such.

The Sanskrit/Tibetan texts of parallel passages/verses are fully given only when they present differences (however minimal) or when they are extant in Tibetan translation only. Otherwise, when they are found identically in the TS and the TSP, only the abbreviation/title followed by the *kārikā* number, edition page number, etc., are referred to in the footnotes. The Sanskrit/Tibetan texts of parallel passages are presented according to a specific edition. Quotations in the TS and the TSP have not been emended according to the readings found in the “original” text.

In the Latin alphabetic notes, I have also included some passages/verses that are not found identically (or almost identically) in the TS and the TSP, but are similar or even paraphrased in some parts of them; they are preceded by “cf.” Indirect references to other works are also recorded in the footnotes in the English Translation.

When parallel passages/verses are found in several works, the references are generally listed chronologically. Sanskrit originals always precede the Tibetan translations, unless from works by the same authors (i.e., Śāntarakṣita or Kamalaśīla) or a direct translation (i.e., the BASK).

With reference to the *Ślokavārttika*, due to the numerous quotations of *kārikās* coming from this text, two editions, ŚV₁ and ŚV₃, accompanied by two different commentaries (by Pārthasārathi Mīśra for ŚV₁ and by Umbeka Bhaṭṭa for ŚV₃), have been referenced and compared.⁴ When verses completely correspond to *kārikās* from the *Ślokavārttika*, only the abbreviation and the verse number appear in the footnotes. In many cases, however, our authors quote *pādas* c and d of one verse, followed by *pādas* a and b of the subsequent one. In those cases, the Sanskrit text of the verses is presented in

³ On this classification, see Introduction §2.1.

⁴ The order that was chosen for the Bibliography is independent of the dating of the commentators. As a matter of fact, Umbeka Bhaṭṭa chronologically precedes Pārthasārathi Mīśra.

its entirety. The references to the two editions are listed based on the similarity with the quotation as found in the TS or the TSP. At times, I have also referred to ŚV₂ (an edition accompanied by Sucaritamīśra's commentary).

11.

Glosses

Glosses are given with the same orthographic form as in the manuscripts.

Bahirarthaparīkṣā

Sanskrit Text

1. Introduction

[Jp205_{v2} Pp160_{r3} K550 Ś670 T_{2P}147b₄ T_{2D}109b₇] pratibimbādisannibham^{1a} ity
etatpratītyasamutpādaviśeṣaṇasama[Pp160_{r6}]rthanārtham^{2a} [T_{2D}110a] idānīm³
vijñānavā[Jp205_{v3}]dam⁴ upakṣipati⁵ | tatra vijñaptimātram evedam traidhātu-
kam^b | tac ca vijñānaṃ pratisattvaṃ⁶ santānabhedād anantam⁷ |
aviśuddhaṃ cānadhigatatattvānām⁸ | viśuddhaṃ [Pp160_{r7}] ca⁹ prahīṇa-
varaṇānām^{10b} | pratikṣaṇaviśārāru¹¹ ca sarvaprāṇabhṛtām¹² jāyate^{13y} | na tv
ekam evāvīkāri yathopaniṣadvādinām iti¹⁴ vijñānavādinām bauddhānām
matam |

¹ °bimbā° Jp (°bimbā°) T_{2D} T_{2P} (gzugs brñan) ◇ Ś] °vivā° Pp K Pā Gā

² etat° em. ◇ Ś] etat | | Jp, etat | Pp K; T_{2D} T_{2P} (de ni gzugs brñan la sogs pa lta bu yin zes bya ba'i)

³ idānīm Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁴ °vādām Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (smra ba) ◇ Ś] °vādīdam Pp K Pā Gā

⁵ upakṣipati Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś Pā Gā] upakṣipatti Jp^{ac}

⁶ °sattvaṃ Jp (°satvaṃ)] °sattva° Pp (°satva°) K Ś

⁷ °bhedād a° Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (tha dad pa'i phyir) ◇ K] °bhedā° Ś

⁸ ānadhigatatattvānām em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (de kho na ñid ma rtogs pa mams la) ◇ K Ś]
°ānadhigatatattvānām Jp Pp

⁹ ca Jp^{ac} ◇ K Ś] ca | Jp^{pc} Pp

¹⁰ āvaraṇānām Jp T_{2P} (bsgrib pa) T_{2D} (sgrib pa)] °ācaraṇānām Pp K Ś

¹¹ °viśārāru Jp (°viśārāru) Pp] °viśārāru K Ś

¹² °prāṇa° Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (srog chags) ◇ K Ś] °prā<<bhṛ?>>na° Pp

¹³ jāyate Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (skye ba yin)] ājāyate Jp^{ac}; oajāyate Pp K Ś

¹⁴ iti Jp^{ac} ◇ K Ś] iti | Jp^{pc} Pp

^a In spite of the evidence of Jp and Pp, I prefer the em. in Ś because of similarity with some parallel passages. Cf., e.g., *calam ity etadviśeṣaṇasamarthanārtham* (Jp63_{v6} [TSP ad TS 350, referring to TS 1b]); *kammataṭṭhalasambāṇḍhavyavasthādisamāśrayam ity etatsamarthanārtham* (Jp77_{r4} [TSP ad TS 476, referring to TS 1cd]); *aññiyasāpi nāmsena misrībhiūtāparātmakam ity etatsamarthanārtham* (Jp186_{v2} [TSP ad TS 1708, referring to TS 3cd]); *asaṃkrāntim ity asya samarthanārtham* (Jp191_{v6} [TSP ad TS 1785, referring to TS 4a]); *svatamtrasrutiniḥsaṃga ity etatsamarthanārtham* (Jp214_{v6} [TSP ad TS 2084, referring to TS 5a]).

^β See *aprahīṇāvaraṇa* (TSP ad TS 2047).

^y In Jp the *virāma* belonging to the *akṣara* placed in the line immediately above may look like the superscript sign of the *o* in *oajāyate*. Pp reads it like this. I regard the stroke below the *mātrā* in the first *ā* of *ājāyate* as a sign of erasure by the corrector.

^a TS 4b.

^b Cf. *cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam* (*Daśabhūmikasūtra*, ed. p. 32, 9). See, e.g., *vijñaptimātram traidhātukam* (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 22, 23–24); *kham ssum pa 'di ni sems tsam mo* (MA 156b₃). A similar passage is also found in other texts, see, e.g., *vijñaptimātram evaitad* (*Vimśikā* 1a); *vijñaptimātram evedam* (*Vimśikā* 1a, Ruzsa–Szegedi 2015); *vijñaptimātram evedam* (*Trīṃśikā* 27a).

[Pp160_{r6}] tatrābhyām^{g1} prakārābhyām vijñaptimātratābhīṣṭā — bāhyasya pṛthivyādisvabhāvasya grāhyasyābhāve grāhakatva[Jp205_{v4}]syāpy¹⁵ a[š671]bhā-vāt | saty api vā santānāntare grāhye¹⁶ [Pp160_{r9}] grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇa-vaidhuryāt¹⁷ |

tatra prayogaḥ — yad^{g2} yaj jñānaṃ tat tad grāhyagrāhakatvadvarahitaṃ jñānatvāt pratibimba[T_{2P}148a]jñānavat | jñānaṃ cedam svasthanetrā-[Pp160_{r10}]dijñānaṃ vivādāspadībhūtaṃ iti svabhāvahetuḥ | na cāvyaṁtīr asya hetor mantavyā | tathā hi — na tāvat pṛthivyādir¹⁸ bāhyārtho 'sya¹⁹ grāhyo vidyate tasyaikā[Pp160_{r11}]nekasvabhāvaśūnyatvāt | pra[Jp205_{v5}]yogaḥ — yad^{g3} ekānekasvabhāvaṃ na bhavati²⁰ na tat sattvena grāhyaṃ prekṣāvatā yathā²¹ vyomotpalam | ekānekasvabhāvarahitās ca parābhima[Pp160_{r12}]tāḥ pṛthivyādaya iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ^{g4} | tṛtīyārāśyantarābhāvenaikatvā-nekatvābhyām sattvasya vyāptatvād vyāpyavyāpakabhāvanupapattiḥ | viparyaye²² bādhaḥ²³ pramā[Pp160_{r13}]ṇam iti nānaikāntikatānantarasya²⁴ hetoḥ | nāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvāt | [T_{2D}110b] atrā[Jp205_{v6}]sya hetor asiddhatām udbhāvan | yac cokatam^{25,26} — bhūtāny eva na santīti nyāyo 'yaṃ para [Pp160_{r14}]iṣyatām^c iti | asyāḥ²⁷ pratijñāyāḥ pratyakṣādivirodham ādarśayan | prathamasya hetor avyāptim eva²⁸ pratipādayitum para āha — **yadi jñānātirekenetyādi** |

¹⁵ grāhakatvasyā° Jp ◇ K Ś] grāhakatvasyo° Pp

¹⁶ santānāntare grāhye Jp (saṁtānāntare grāhye) | satānāntare grāhye Pp; santānāntare K Ś T_{2D} T_{2P} (rgyud gžan yod na)

¹⁷ grāhyagrāhaka° Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (gzun ba dan 'dzin pa'i) ◇ K Ś] grāhakatva° Pp^{ac}; grāhaka° Pp^{pc}

¹⁸ pṛthivyādir Jp] pṛthivyādi° Pp K Ś T_{2P} (sa la sogs pa'i); T_{2D} (la sogs pa'i)

¹⁹ bāhyārtho 'sya Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] bāhyārthosya Jp^{ac}

²⁰ na bhavati Jp ◇ K Ś] na .. bhavati Pp

²¹ yathā Pp ◇ K Ś] yatho Jp

²² viparyaye Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (bzlog em.] zlog pa la) ◇ K Ś] viparye Jp^{ac}

²³ bādhaḥ Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] *bādhaḥ T_{2D} T_{2P} (gnod pa can gyi...ma yin pa)

²⁴ ānantarasya Jp^{pc} Pp (°ānantarasya) T_{2D} T_{2P} (de ma thag pa'i) ◇ K Ś] °ānāntarasya Jp^{ac}

²⁵ yac co° Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (gan yan) | yatho° Pp K Ś

²⁶ °oktam Jp (°oktam) ◇ K Ś] °oktam .. Pp

²⁷ asyāḥ em.] asyāś ca Jp Pp K Ś; deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

²⁸ avyāptim eva Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] avyāptim meva Jp^{ac}

^c TS 1887cd.

^{g1} grāhyagrāhakatvābhyām Jp^g Pp^g

^{g2} vivādāspadībhūtaṃ svasthanetrādijñānaṃ grāhyagrāhakatvarahitaṃ jñānatvāt Jp^g Pp^g

^{g3} parābhimatāḥ pṛthivyādaya na sattve grāhyā bhavaṁti ekānekasvabhāvaśūnyatvāt Jp^g Pp^g. In Pp the gloss indicates 7 as the reference line number (which deals with a different argument), even though it is in fact placed in correspondence with the correct line, i.e., 11.

^{g4} sattvena grāhyatvaṃ vyāpyam tasya vyāpakam ekānekasvabhāvatvaṃ tasyānupalabdhiḥ Jp^g Pp^g. In Pp the gloss indicates 6 as the reference line number, instead of 12 where the *signe-de-renvoi* = which corresponds to it is found.

2.

Argument A:

Grāhyāyogāt

2.1 Pūrvapakṣa

[Jk99_{v6} Pk36_{v4} T_{1P}86b₃ T_{1D}71b₆]

yadi jñānātirekeṇa nāsti bhūtacatuṣṭayam |

tat kim etan nu²⁹ vicchinnaṃ [Jk100_{r1}]vispaṣṭam ava[Pk36_{v5}]bhāṣate | | 1964 | |

[K551 Pp160_{r13}] **vicchinnaṃ** ity anena jñānād vyatiriktasya grāhyasya
siddhim³⁰ ādarśayati | **vispaṣṭam** ity anena tu pratyakṣataḥ^{31δ} | | TSP *ad*
TS 1964 | |

etad eva prasaṅgena draḍhayann āha [Jp205_{v7}] — **tasyaivam** ityādi |³²

tasyaivaṃ pratibhāse 'pi nāstitopagame sati |

cittasyāpi kim astitve pramāṇaṃ bhavatāṃ bhavet | | 1965 | |

2.2 Refutation of External Objects as *Grāhya*[Pp160_{r16}] **bhāsamāna**^{33ε} [T_{2P}148b] ityādinā pratividhatte |bhāsamānaḥ kimātmāyaṃ bāhyo 'rthaḥ pratibhāṣate [T_{1D}72a] |pa[Pk36_{v6}]ramāṇusva[Jk100_{r2}]bhāvaḥ kiṃ

kiṃ vāvayavilakṣaṇaḥ | | 1966 | |

na tāvat paramāṇūnām ākāraḥ prativedyate |

niraṃśānekamūrtānām^{3435ζ} pratyayāprativedanāt | | 1967 | |vyapetabhāgabhedā hi [Pk36_{v7}] bhāseran paramāṇavaḥ |

²⁹ etan nu em. ◇ K Ś] *etat tu* Jk Pk

³⁰ siddhim Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *siddhis* Jp^{ac}

³¹ *pratyakṣataḥ* Jp Pp] *pratyakṣatām* K Ś

³² *ityādi* | Jp Pp] *ityādinā* K Ś

³³ *bhāsamāna* em. ◇ K Ś] *nāsamāna* Jp Pp

³⁴ *niraṃśāneka*[°] Jk (*niraṃśāneka*[°]) ◇ K Ś] *niraṃśāneka*[°] Pk

³⁵ *°mūrtānām* em. ◇ K conj. (*°mūrtābha{nām.}?*) Gā] *°mūrtānām* Jk^{ac}, T_{1D} T_{1P} (*lus can*); *°mūrtābha*[°] Jk^{pc} Pk Ś

^δ In Pp the *visarga* is very similar to an *ā-mātrā*, the variant being very similar to *pratyakṣatā*.

^ε K reads *ityādinā* instead of *ityādi* (see n. 32) and adds the *akṣara bha* (based on TS 1966a), without mentioning it. Ś blindly follows K.

^ζ *°mūrtābha*[°], *lectio difficilior*, could equally be admitted but TSP and T_{2D} T_{2P} seem not to support this variant. Both the variants *mūrtānām* and *mūrtānām* are likely. T_{2D} T_{2P} may validate both. However, *mūrtānām* is supported by TSP *ad* TS 1967 and TSP *ad* TS 1971. See *niraṃśānām aneṣām aṇūnām mūrtānām* (TSP *ad* TS 1967) and *niraṃśānekamūrtānām pratyayāprativedanāt* (TSP *ad* TS 1971).

nā[_{jk100r3}]nyathādhyakṣatā teṣām
 ātmākārāsamarpaṇāt || 1968 ||

tatra pratyakṣasiddho 'rtho bāhyo bhavann aneko vā paramāṇuśo bhinno³⁶
 bhavet, eko vā tair ārabdho³⁷ 'vayavī, sthūlo 'nāra[_{Pp160r12}]bdho veti³⁸ pakṣāḥ
 || TSP *ad* TS 1966 ||

tatra **na tāvad** ādyaḥ, **niraṃśānām anekeṣām**³⁹ aṇūnām **mūrtānām**
 §grāhakasya⁴⁰ **pratyayasyaṇprativedanāt** | nityaṃ sthūlākārasyaiva⁴¹
 jñānasyānubhūyamāna[_{Pp160v1}]tvāt | [Š672] yad vā⁴² **pratyaye** teṣām **apra-**
vedanā[_{Jp205v8}]**d**⁴³ iti saptamyantasya⁴⁴ pāṭho 'samastaḥ⁴⁵ | prayogaḥ⁴⁶ —
 yaḥ⁴⁷ pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye na pratibhāsate svenākāreṇa, na sa
 pratyakṣatve[_{Pp160v2}]na grahītavyaḥ, yathā gagananalinam | na pratibhāsate
 ca pratyakṣābhimate⁴⁸ pratyaye sthūlākāropagrāhiṇi paramāṇur aneko
 mūrta iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ⁴⁹ | ātmākā[_{Pp160v3}]rapratibhāsītvena pratyak-
 ṣatvasya⁴⁷ vyāptatvāt || TSP *ad* TS 1967 ||

[_{Jp206r1}] tām eva vyāptim pratipādayann āha — **vyapetetyādi** || TSP *ad* TS
 1968 ||

athāpi syāt — samuditā evotpadayante vinaśyanti ceti siddhāntān [Pp160v4]
 naikaikaparamāṇupratibhāsa iti yathoktaṃ⁴⁸ bhadantaśubhaguptena —

³⁶ *paramāṇuśo bhinno* Jp Pp (*paramāṇuśo bhinno*) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rdul phra rab tha dad pa*) *paramāṇuto 'bhinno* K Ś

³⁷ *ārabdho* Jp^{ac} ◊ K Ś *ārabdhau* Jp^{pc} Pp

³⁸ 'vayavī, sthūlo 'nārabdho ve° Jp Pp (*vayavī sthūlo anārabdho ve°*) ◊ K Ś T_{2D} T_{2P} (*yan lag can rags pa gciḡ gam | ma brtsams pa*)

³⁹ *niraṃśānām anekeṣām* em. T_{2D} T_{2P} (*cha med pa'i...du ma'i*) ◊ K Ś *niraṃśānām anekam eṣām* Jp, *niraṃśānām anekam eṣām* Pp

⁴⁰ *grāhakasya* Jp Pp ◊ K Ś deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁴¹ *sthūlākārasyaiva* Jp Pp ◊ K] *sthūlākārasyaiva* Ś

⁴² *yad vā* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*yañ na*) ◊ Ś deest K Pā Gā

⁴³ *apra-* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś *epra-* Jp^{ac}

⁴⁴ *saptamyantasya* em. ◊ K Ś *saptamyāntasya* Jp Pp

⁴⁵ 'samastaḥ Jp Pp ◊ K Ś T_{2D} T_{2P} (*bsdu bar bya*)

⁴⁶ *ca pratyakṣā°* ◊ K Ś *ca* | *pratyakṣā°* Jp; *ca* | <<'>>*pratyakṣā°* Pp

⁴⁷ *pratyakṣatvasya* em. partly based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*mñon sum ñid la*) *pratyakṣasya* Jp Pp K Ś

⁴⁸ *°oktaṃ* Jp^{pc} T_{2D} (*ji skad du*) ◊ K Ś *°oktaṃ* | Jp^{ac} Pp T_{2P} (*ji skad du* |)

⁴⁹ *sthūlo 'nārabdho* appears to be confirmed by TSP *ad* TS 1997: *anārabdhaḥ paramāṇubhiḥ sthūla*.

⁴⁶ Jp^{pc} has a correction regarding the *sandhi*: *prayogo* for *prayogaḥ* in Jp^{ac}.

⁴⁵ *paramāṇur aneko mūrtiḥ pratyakṣagrāhyo nāsti pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye svenākāreṇa tasyāpratibhāsa-mānatvāt* Jp^g Pp^g

⁴⁶ *pratyakṣābhimateṇaikaparamāṇor astitvaṃ vyāpyaṃ pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye svenākāreṇāpratibhāsamānatvaṃ vyāpakam tasyānupalabdhiḥ* Jp^g Pp^g

pratyekaṃ na hi cāṇūnām⁴⁹ svātantryeṇāsti⁵⁰ sambhavaḥ |
 ato 'pi [T_{2D} 111a] paramāṇūnām ekaikāpratibhāsanam ||^d
 iti [Pp160v₃] tad etad anuttaram iti darśayann āha — **sāhityenāpīti** |
 sāhityenāpi jātās te svarūpeṇaiva bhāsinah |
 tyajanty anamśārūpatvaṃ
 na ca tāsu^{51*} daśā[Pk36v₈]sv amī || 1969 ||
 tāsu daśāsv⁵² iti sahitāvasthāsu || TSP *ad* TS 1969 ||
 kiṃ ca yadi niraṃśāḥ paramāṇavo na tarhi [K552] mūrtā [Jp206r₂] ity
 abhyupagantavya[Pp160v₆]m iti svavacanavirodhaṃ pratijñāyām āha |
 labdhāpacayaparyantaṃ rūpaṃ teṣāṃ samastī ce[Jk100r₄]t |
 kathaṃ nāma na te 'mūrtā⁵³ bhaveyur vedanādivat || 1970 ||
labdhāpacayetyādi – labdho 'pacayaparyanto yena **rūpeṇa** svabhā-
 vena [T_{2P}149a] tat tathoktam | etad uktaṃ bhavati⁵⁴ — yady apacīyamānā-
 [Pp160v₇]vayavavibhāgenāpacīyamānasvabhāvā⁵⁵ na bhavanti | yadi niraṃśā
 iti yāvat | tadā na mūrtā **vedanādivat** siddhyanti viśeṣābhāvāt || TSP *ad*
 TS 1970 ||
 [Ś673] **tulyetyādinā** bha[Pp160v₈]dantaśubhaguptasya^{56λ} pariḥaram āśaṅkate |
 tulyāparakṣaṇotpādād yathā nityatvavibhramah [T_{1P}87a] |

⁴⁹ *pratyekaṃ na hi cāṇūnām* em.] *hi pratyekaṃ na cāṇūnām* Jp^{ac}; *pratyekaṃ na cāṇūnām* Jp^{pc} Pp Ś;
 **aṇūnām...* | *pratyekaṃ...na* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rdul phran mams kyī...* | | *re re...ma yin*); *pratyekaparamāṇūnām*
 K Pā Gā

⁵⁰ *svātantryeṇā* Jp^{pc} Pp (*svātantryeṇā*°) ◇ K Ś] *svātantryeṇā*° Jp^{ac}

⁵¹ *na ca tāsu* em. ◇ *na cettā{na ca tā?}su* K conj. Gā] *na cet tāsu* Jk Pk Ś

⁵² *tāsu daśāsv* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gnas skabs de mams su*) ◇ K Ś] *tāsu dasvāsv* Jp; *tāsu dayasvāsv* Pp

⁵³ *te 'mūrtā* Jk Pk (*temūrtā*) T_{1D} T_{1P} (*de dag lus med*) | *te mūrtā* K Ś

⁵⁴ *uktaṃ bhavati* Pp ◇ K Ś] *uktaṃ bhavati* Jp

⁵⁵ °*svabhāvā* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °*svabhāva* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁶ *bhadanta*° Jp ◇ K Ś] *bhadante* Pp

^λ *Pāda a*, as found in Jp^{pc}, Pp, and Ś, lacks a syllable (I would exclude the presence of a hiatus therein). In Jp^{ac}, instead, one finds *hi* at the beginning of the verse, which is stylistically unlikely to be there. Based on the style of the TSP, it seems also unlikely that *hi* follows *yathoktaṃ bhadantaśubhaguptena*. Therefore, one can conjecture that the scribe has misplaced it and that it should appear in the middle of the verse, following the negative particle *na*.

* The em. *ca* may also be suggested by T_{1D} T_{1P} where a corresponding translation for *cet* is absent.

^λ In Pp, the scribe most likely reads *u*, in the *aṣṣara su* written above, as an *e-mātrā* related to the *aṣṣara ta*. Therefore, he writes *bhadante* instead of *bhadamta*.

^d *rdul phran mams ni re re nas* || *rañ dbañ 'byuñ ba mi srid do* || | *de phyir phra rab rdul mams ni* || | *re re snañ bar mi 'gyur ro* || (BASK 44).

[Pk36v₉] avicchinnasajātīyagrahe cet sthūlavibhramah^μ || 1971 || |^c

sa hy āha — **yathā** sadṛśāparā**parakṣaṇo**[Jp206r₃]**tpādād**⁵⁷ vipralabdhasya gr̥hīte 'pi pratyakṣeṇa śabdādau **nītyatvavibhrama**[Pp160v₉]**s** tathā paramāññānām **avicchinnadeśānām** **sajātīyānām**⁵⁸ yugapad grahaṇe **sthūla** iti mānaso **vibhramo** bhavati | tataś ca niraṃśānekamūrtānām pra[Pp160v₁₀]tyayāprativedanād^f ity asiddho hetur iti || TSP *ad* TS 1971 ||

svavyāpāretyādinā dūṣaṇam āha |

svavyāpārabalenaiva pratyakṣam⁵⁹ janaye[Jk100r₃]d yadi |
na parāmarśavijñānaṃ kathaṃ te 'dhyakṣagocarāḥ || 1972 ||

[Pk36v₁₀] kṣaṇikā⁶⁰ iti bhāvās ca niścīyante pramāṇataḥ⁶¹ |
aṇavas tv iti gamyante⁶² kathaṃ pītasitādayaḥ || 1973 ||

sūkṣmapracayarūpaṃ hi sthūlatvād ā[Jk100r₆]dyacākṣuṣam⁶³ |
parvatādi[Pk36v₁₁]vad atrāpi samasty eṣānumeti^{64v} cet || 1974 ||

sthūlatvaṃ vastudharmo hi siddhaṃ dharmidvaye 'pi na |
na hy asty avayavī sthūlo nāṇavaś ca tathāvidhāḥ || 1975 ||

[Jk100v₁] atha deśavitānena sthi[Pk36v₁₂]tarūpaṃ tathoditam |
tathāpi bhrāntavijñānabhāsirūpeṇa saṃśayaḥ || 1976 ||

vaitathyāt sa tathā no ced vyatireke prasādhite⁶⁵ |

[Jk100v₂] tasmād atīśayaḥ ko 'sya
kāryasaṃvādanaṃ yadi || 1977 ||

[Pk36v₁₃] kāryāvabhāsivijñānasamvāde 'pi nanūcyate⁶⁶ |
sāmarthyaniyamād⁶⁷ dhetoḥ

⁵⁷ °sadrśāparāparakṣaṇo° Jp (sadrśāparāparakṣaṇo°) Pp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} ('dra ba'i skad cig gzan dan gzan) ◇ K]

°sadrśāparāparakṣaṇo° Pp^{ac}; °sadrśāparāpakṣaṇo° Ś

⁵⁸ sajātīyānām Jp ◇ K Ś] sajātīyānām Pp

⁵⁹ pratyakṣam Jk ◇ K Ś] pratyakṣa Pk

⁶⁰ kṣaṇikā Jk ◇ K Ś] kṣaṇiko Pk

⁶¹ pramāṇataḥ Jk Pk ◇ K Ś] *'numānataḥ T_{1D} T_{1P} (tjes su dpag pas)

⁶² gamyante Jk (gamyante) ◇ K Ś] <<gmyam>>te Pk

⁶³ ādyacākṣuṣam Jk Pk (ādyacākṣuṣam) ◇ K Pā Gā] bāhyacākṣuṣam Ś T_{1D} T_{1P} (phyi rol mig gis gzun bya nī)

⁶⁴ samasty e° Jk] samastv e° K Ś; samaste° Pk

⁶⁵ prasādhite Jk Pk, T_{1D} T_{1P} (rab tu bsgrub par gyis)] 'prasādhite K Ś

⁶⁶ nanūcyate Jk Pk ◇ K Pā Gā] na tūcyate Ś; *ucyate T_{1D} T_{1P} (brjod pa yin)

⁶⁷ sāmarthya° Jk ◇ K Ś] sāmarthyē Pk

^μ sthūla° is snon po ñid/*ñilatva° in BASK 35. Cf. also T_{1D} T_{1P}: rigs pa.

^v evā° em. for eṣā° is also possible.

^c 'dra ba'i skad cig gzan 'byun phyir || ji ltar rtag pa ñid 'khrul ltar || rgyun chags rigs mthun 'dzin pa la || snon po ñid du 'khrul pa skye || (BASK 35).

^f TS 1967cd.

sa ca⁶⁸ sambhāvyate 'nyathā || 1978 ||

[K553] **svavyāpārabalenaiveti**⁶⁹ līṅgāgamavyāpārānapekṣam⁷⁰ ity avadhā-
[Pp160v11]raṇena⁷¹ darśayati | tathā hi — **pratyakṣam** aviśe[Up206r4]ṣeṇotpa-
nnam api sat, yatraivāmśe yathāparigrhītākāraparāmarśam⁷² janayati, sa
eva pratyakṣa iṣyate vyavahārayogya[Pp160v12]tayā⁷³ | yatra⁷⁴ tu **na janayati**
tad grhītam apy agrhītaprakhyam | tataś ca nāsiddho hetuḥ⁷⁵ | yataḥ
pratyayāprativedanād ity atra pratyakṣābhimate [T2D111b] pratyaye
parāmarśaheṭv apratibhā[Pp160v13]sanād ity ayam artho 'bhipretaḥ⁷⁶
|| TSP ad TS 1972 ||

yac cōktam⁷⁷ — sthūla iti mānasa eṣa⁷⁸ vibhramaḥ iti tad apy asamyak |
tathā hi — pra[Up206r3]māṇenāṇau siddhe sati⁷⁹ syād vibhramavyavasthā |
[T2P149b] yathā kṣaṇikatvasya pramā[Pp160v14]ṇena siddhatvān⁸⁰ nityatvagraho
bhrānto vyavasthāpyate⁸¹ | na ca tathā⁸² [Ś674] pramāṇena paramāṇavaḥ
siddhās teṣāṃ eva vicāryamāṇatvāt | na ceyam sthūlabhrrāntir mānasi
spaṣṭapratibhā[Pp160v15]sanāt | na ca vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭākāro^h yuktaḥ
sāmānyākārasyāspaṣṭatvāt⁸³ | na ca sāmānyākāram antareṇa vikalpo yuktaḥ
|| TSP ad TS 1973 ||

syād etat — a[Up206r6]nityatādivad aṇa[Pp160v16]vo 'pi siddhā⁸⁴ eva pramāṇataḥ

⁶⁸ sa ca Jk Pk ◊ K Ś] *sarvam T1D T1P (thams cad)

⁶⁹ svavyāpārabalenaiveti Jp^{ac} Pp] svavyāpārabalenaiveti | Jp^{pc} K Ś

⁷⁰ līṅgāgamavyāpārānapekṣam em. based on T2D (rtags dan luñ gis bya ba la ltos pa med par) ◊ K Ś]
līṅgāgamavyāpārānapekṣam Jp Pp^{pc}, līṅgāgamavyāpārānapekṣam Pp^{ac}; T2P (rtag dan luñ gis
bya ba bltos pa med par)

⁷¹ avadhāraṇena Jp ◊ K em. (avadhāra{ne}na) Ś] avadhāraṇana Pp; °vadhāraṇa Pā

⁷² yathā° Jp Pp] yathā K Ś

⁷³ °yogya° Jp^{pc} Pp (yo<<gya>>) ◊ K Ś] °yogye Jp^{ac}

⁷⁴ yatra Jp ◊ K Ś] patra Pp

⁷⁵ hetuḥ Jp (hetur) ◊ K Ś] hetu Pp

⁷⁶ 'bhipretaḥ Jp Pp (bhipretaḥ) ◊ K Ś] *anabhipretaḥ T2D T2P (mñon par 'dod pa ma yin)

⁷⁷ yac co° Jp T2D T2P (gañ yañ) ◊ K Ś] yatho° Pp

⁷⁸ eṣa Jp Pp ◊ K Ś] *eva T2D T2P (ñid)

⁷⁹ sati Jp ◊ K Ś] sa . ti Pp

⁸⁰ siddhatvān ◊ K Ś] siddhattvā° Jp Pp

⁸¹ vyavasthāpyate Pp ◊ K Ś] vyavasthāpyatai Jp

⁸² na ca tathā Jp ◊ K Ś] na ca <<pra>> tathā Pp

⁸³ °spaṣṭatvāt Jp Pp T2D (mi gsal ba yin pa'i phyir) ◊ K Ś] °spaṣṭatvāt T2P (gsal ba yin pa'i phyir)

⁸⁴ siddhā Jp^{pc} Pp^{pc} ◊ K Ś] siddha Jp^{ac} Pp^{ac}

[‡] The variant *sarvam that is found only in T1D T1P, and is metrically acceptable, could be possible.

^o eva em. for eṣa is possible.

^g sthūla iti mānaso vibhramo bhavati (TSP ad TS 1971).

^h Cf. na vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsītā (PV Pratyakṣa 283ab; PVin 1.32ab).

| tathā hi — yad⁸⁷ yat⁸⁵ sthūlaṃ tat tat **sūkṣmapracayātmakam**, yathā parvatādayaḥ | sthūlaṃ **cādyacākṣuṣam**⁸⁶ avayavidravayam⁸⁷ iti svabhāva-hetuḥ | cākṣuṣagrahaṇa[Pp160v₁₇]m acākṣuṣasya dvyāṇukāder vyavacchedāya || TSP *ad* TS 1974 ||

tatra yadi sthūlatvād iti pāramārthikam **sthūlatvaṃ**^{88π} **vastudharmam** āśrityocyate hetuḥ, tadā sādhyadharmini drṣṭāntadharmini ca **dharmi**[Jp206r₇ Pp161r₁]**dvaye** **'pi** prativādinō **na siddham** sthūlatvam iti śtadā⁸⁹ hetur asiddho drṣṭāntas ca⁸⁹ sādhanavikalāḥ || TSP *ad* TS 1975 ||

atha yad etad **deśavitānena** pratibhāsamānam avicāraramaṇīyam āgopālādi[Pp161r₂]prasiddham **rūpam** sthūlatvenocyate |^{90σ} tadā **bhrānte** **'pi** svapnādijñāne paramāṇupracayam antareṇāpi tathāpratibhāsi**rūpam**⁹¹⁹² astīti hetor anaikān[Jp206r₃]tikatā || TSP *ad* TS 1976 ||

athābhrāntatve [T_{2D}112a] satīti vi[Pp161r₃]śeṣaṇam upādīyate⁹³ tadā vijñāna-vādinam⁹⁴ prati [T_{2P}150a] svasthanetrādijñānākārasya⁹⁵ yāvat svapnā-dijñānākārād **vyatireko** viśeṣo na **prasādhyate** tāvan na kvacid⁹⁶ abhrāntatvaṃ [Pp161r₄] siddham iti viśeṣaṇam apy asiddham | syād etat — asty e[Jp206v₇]va svasthanetrādijñānasya svapnādijñānād arthakriyāsaṃvādena viśeṣa iti || TSP *ad* TS 1977 ||

tatra ko 'yam arthakriyāsaṃvādo nāma | yadi [Pp161r₃] bāhyārthaprāptiḥ⁹⁷ sā na siddhā bāhyārthāsiddhes⁹⁸ tasyaiva sādhyatvena prastutatvāt | athābhimatārthakriyā**āvabhāsi**jñānam⁹⁹ evārthakriyāsaṃvādas tadāyam

⁸⁵ yad yat Jp^{pc} (yat yat) T_{2D} T_{2P} (gañ dan gañ) ◇ K Ś] ya yat Jp^{ac}; yatra yat Pp

⁸⁶ *ādyacākṣuṣam* Jp Pp ◇ K Pā Gā] *bāhyacākṣuṣam* Ś, T_{2D} (mig giṣ gzuñ bar bya ba phyi rol gyi), T_{2P} (mig gi gzuñ bar bya ba phyi rol gyi)

⁸⁷ *dravyam* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁸⁸ *pāramārthikam sthūlatvaṃ* em. partly based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (don dam pa'i rags pa ñid)] *pāramārthikam sthūlatvaṃ* ca Jp Pp K Ś

⁸⁹ *drṣṭāntas ca* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (dan dpe) ◇ K Ś] *drṣṭāntasya* Jp Pp

⁹⁰ *sthūlatvenocyate* | em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (rags pa ñid du brjod)] *sthūlatvād ity ucyate* Jp^{ac} Pp K; *sthūlatvād ity ucyate* | Jp^{pc} Ś

⁹¹ *tathā*° Jp Pp] *tathā* K Ś

⁹² °*bhāsi*° Jp Pp^{pc}] °*bhāsi* K Ś; °*bhāsa*° Pp^{ac}

⁹³ *upādīyate* Jp Pp ◇ K] *upādīyateḥ* Ś

⁹⁴ *vijñānavādinam* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *vijñānavādinā* Jp^{ac}

⁹⁵ °*netrādijñānā*° Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (mig la sogs pa'i mam par ses pa'i) ◇ K] °*netrājñānā*° Ś

⁹⁶ *kvacid* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *kacid* Jp^{ac}

⁹⁷ *bāhyārtha*° Jp Pp ◇ K] *bāhyārtha*° Ś

⁹⁸ *bāhyārthāsiddhes* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] T_{2D} T_{2P} (phyi rol gyi don grub par bya ba'i phiyir)

⁹⁹ °*arthakriyāvabhāsi*° em. ◇ K] °*arthakriyāvabhāsi*° Ś; °*arthakriyāvabhāsi*° Jp (lapsus calamī) Pp

π *ca* is likely an interpolation.

σ *tadā*, found in Jp as well as in T_{2D} T_{2P}, is likely an early interpolation.

σ *sthūlatvenocyate* mirrors *tathoditam* in TS 1976b.

⁸⁷ *ādyacākṣuṣam avayavidravayam sūkṣmapracayātmakam sthūlatvāt* Jp^g Pp^g

anyathāpi¹⁰⁰ bāhyārthā[ś675 Pp161_{r6}]lambanam an[_{p206v2}]tareṇāpi **sambhāvyata** iti | tathā¹⁰¹ hetor anaikāntikataiva |

katham anyathāpi sambhāvyata ity āha — **sāmarthyaniyamād dhetoṛ** iti | hetoḥ samanantarapratyayasya sām[_{p161r7}]marthyabhedaniyamāt | kaścid eva hi samanantarapratyayaḥ kiñcid vijñānaṃ janayitum samartho na sarvaḥ sarvam | yathā bhavatām¹⁰² bāhyo 'rtha¹⁰³ iti tata eva niyamaḥ siddhaḥ | | TSP *ad* TS 1978 | |

[K554] **tulyam** ityā[_{p161r8}]dinā¹⁰⁴ sumater¹⁰⁵ digambarasya matenāprativedanād ity a[_{p206v3}]sya hetor asiddhatām udbhāvayati |

tulyaṃ rūpaṃ yadā grāhyam atulyaṃ [_{jk100v3}] naiva grhyate |
aṇūnāṃ dvayarū[_{pk36v14}]patve tadā kiṃ nopapadyate | | 1979 | |

tat sāmānyaviśeṣātmarūpatvāt sarvavastunaḥ |
[_{T1D72b}] tulyātulyasvarūpatvād dvirūpā aṇavaḥ smṛtāḥ | | 1980 | |

samānaṃ tatra yad rū[_{jk100v4}]paṃ tad akṣajñānagocaram |
[_{pk36v15}] ekākāram ato jñānam aṇuṣv evopapadyate | | 1981 | |

asamānaṃ tu yad¹⁰⁶ rūpaṃ yogipratyakṣam¹⁰⁷ iṣyate |
iti durmatayaḥ kecit kalpayanti samākulam | | 1982 | |

sa hy evam āha **sāmānyaviśeṣātmavāt sarv**apadārthānāṃ **tulyātulyarūpeṇa** [_{p161r9}] **dvirūpāḥ** paramāṇavaḥ | **tatra samānaṃ**¹⁰⁸ **yad rūpaṃ tad** indriyair grhyate **nāsamānam** | tataś **caikākāram** vijñānam **aṇuṣv** aviruddham iti [_{T2P150b}] pratyakṣasiddhāḥ¹⁰⁹ paramāṇava itī [_{T2D112b}] | **sa**[_{p161r10}] **mākulam** ity apratiṣṭham | ekasyāpi rūpasya niścitasyābhāvāt¹¹⁰ | | TSP *ad* TS 1980–1982 | |

nanu ca dvirūpaṃ vastv itī niścitarūpam u[_{p206v4}]ktam eva | satyam uktam

¹⁰⁰ *anyathāpi* Pp ◇ K Ś] *anya . thāpi* Jp

¹⁰¹ *tathā* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de lta na yañ*)

¹⁰² *bhavatām* em.] *bhavatā* Jp Pp K Ś; T_{2D} T_{2P} (*khyed cag gis*)

¹⁰³ *bāhyo 'rtha* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *bāhyortha* Jp^{ac}

¹⁰⁴ *tulyam ityādinā* em. ◇ K Ś] *tulyetyādinā* Jp Pp

¹⁰⁵ *sumater* em. ◇ K Ś] *samater* Jp Pp

¹⁰⁶ *yad* Jk Pk T_{1D} T_{1P} (*gañ*) ◇ K] *tad* Ś

¹⁰⁷ *yogipratyakṣam* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *deest* Jk^{ac}

¹⁰⁸ *samānaṃ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *sāmānām* Jp^{ac}

¹⁰⁹ *°siddhāḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *°siddhā* Jp^{ac}

¹¹⁰ *niścitasyā°* Jp^{ac}] *pratiniścitasyā°* Jp^{pc} Pp K Ś

† In Jp^{ac}, above the *akṣara thā*, one finds a hook that faces right, perhaps a superscript sign for *r*. In Jp^{pc} that sign is erased and one hook facing left is added.

° The variant *niścitasyā°* has been chosen in accordance with *niścitarūpam* (TSP *ad* TS 1983) and is partly confirmed by T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ñes pa*).

ayuktaṃ tūktam iti darśa[Pp161_{r11}]yann āha¹¹¹ |

dve hi rūpe [Jk100_{v5} T_{1r}87b] kathaṃ [Pk36_{v16}] nāma

yukte ekasya vastunaḥ |

dve tadā vastunī prāpte aparaspararūpataḥ || 1983 | |

parasparātmatāyāṃ tu taddvairūpyaṃ virudhyate |

viśeṣaś copalabhyeta cakṣurādibhir indri[Pk36_{v17}]yaiḥ || 1984 | |

tathā hi — dvābhyāṃ rūpābhyāṃ **vastuno**¹¹² 'nyā[ś676]nyatvād¹¹³ **dve** eva **vastunī prāpte** rūpadvayasyaiva kevalasyāparasparasvabhāvatvāt¹¹⁴ | tataś ca naikasya dvirūpatvaṃ yuktaṃ¹¹⁵ |

ekasmād vā va[Pp161_{r12}]stuno rūpadvayasyāvyatirekād ekavastusvarūpavad rūpadvayasya parasparātmakataiveti kathaṃ ekaṃ dvirūpaṃ syāt | kiṃ ca sāmānyarūpāvyatirekād viśeṣarūpasyo[Pp161_{r13}]palambhaprasaṅgaḥ¹¹⁶ | tataś ceyam asaṅkirṇā vyavasthā na prāpnoti — **samānaṃ rūpaṃ akṣajñānagocarō 'samānaṃ tu yogipratyakṣaṃ iṣyata** iti | | TSP *ad* TS 1983–1984 | |

kiṃ ca ekaṃ¹¹⁷ dvirūpaṃ iti na ke[Pp161_{r14}]valam etat parasparavyāhatam | idaṃ tu vyāhatataraṃ¹¹⁸ yat parasparaviruddharūpadvayātmakam ekaṃ¹¹⁹ iti darśayati — [K555] **paraspāretyādi** |

[Jk100_{v6}] parasparaviruddhātma

caikarūpaṃ¹²⁰ kathaṃ bhavet |

tathā hi — tulyātulye rūpe parasparapa[Pp161_{r15}]rihārasthitalakṣaṇe¹²¹ tat

¹¹¹ āha Jp Pp ◇ K] āha — dve hītyādi Ś

¹¹² vastuno Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (dhos po'i) ◇ K] vastuto Ś

¹¹³ 'nyānyatvād Jp^{pc} Pp (nyānya) ◇ K Ś] nyanyatvād Jp^{ac}; *nanyatvād T_{2D} T_{2P} (g'zan ma yin pa'i phyir)

¹¹⁴ °āparasparasvabhāvatvāt em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (phan tshun no bo ma yin pa'i phyir), °syāparāparasya {syāparasparasva°?} bhāvāt K conj.] °āparāparasya bhāvāt Jp Pp Ś; °parasvabhāvat Gā

¹¹⁵ °twaṃ yuktaṃ em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (ñid rigs pa)] °twaṃ muktaṃ Jp (lāpsus calami) Pp; °twaṃ uktaṃ K Ś

¹¹⁶ °opalambha° Jp^{pc} Pp (°opalambha°) ◇ K] °opālambha° Jp^{ac}; °olambha° Ś

¹¹⁷ ekaṃ Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] ekaṃ Jp^{ac}

¹¹⁸ vyāhatataraṃ em. T_{2D} T_{2P} (ches cher 'gal ba yin) ◇ K Ś] avyāhatataraṃ Jp Pp

¹¹⁹ ekaṃ Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (gcig) ◇ K] deest Ś

¹²⁰ parasparaviruddhātma caika° em.] parasparaviruddhātma caikaṃ Jk^{pc}; parasparaviruddhātma cai . kaṃ Jk^{ac}; parasparaviruddhātma caikaṃ Pk; parasparaviruddhātmanaika° K; parasparaviruddhātmanaikaṃ Ś, T_{1P} (phan tshun 'gal ba'i bdag ñid kyis | |...gcig tu); T_{1D} (phan tshun 'gal ba'i bdag ñid kyi | |...gcig tu); °naika° Pā Gā

¹²¹ °lakṣaṇe Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °lakṣaṇa Jp^{ac}

Φ Tib. has a *pratīka* here, see T_{2D} T_{2P} (gañi phyir ji ltar zes bya ba la sogs pa). Ś adds it in the Sanskrit text.

χ See *vastunaḥ* (TS 1983b).

Φ °āparasparasvabhāvatvāt mirrors *aparaspararūpataḥ* in TS 1983d.

Φ *muktaṃ* in Jp is likely a *lapsus calami* for *yuktaṃ* in Xp.

αα The em. is mirrored in the commentary, where *ca* is commented on with *kiṃ ca* and *parasparaviruddhātma* with *parasparaviruddharūpadvayātmakam*.

katham tadā[Jp206v6]tmakam **ekaṃ bhavet** |

saṃvitteś ced¹²² ityādinā kumārīlamatam āśaṅkate |

saṃvitteś ced^{123ββ} viruddhānām

ekasmin nāpy asambhavaḥ^{124γ} || 1985 ||

ekākāraṃ bhaved¹²⁵ ekam iti neśvarabhāṣitam |ⁱ

tathā hi ta[Pk37r1]d upetavyaṃ

yad yathaivo[Jk101r1]palabhyate || 1986 ||^j

sa hy āha — **ekasmin** vastuni parasparaviruddhānām ākārāṇā[Pp161r16]m
asambhava ity etan **nā**sti | kasmāt | saṃvitteḥ kāraṇāt | tathā¹²⁶ hi —
ekākāreṇaivaikena vastunā bhavitavyam iti neyam ājñā rājñām [T2p151a] kiṃ
tu **yad yathopalabhyate**¹²⁷ **tat tatha**ivābhyu[Pp161r17]pagantavyam,
pratītinibandhanatvād vastuvyavasthāyāḥ | ekānekākārā [T2d113a] ca [Jp206v7]
sattārūpādibhedataḥ pratītir bhavanti¹²⁸ samupalabhyate | tasmāt tathaiva
vyavasthāpyata iti || TSP ad TS 1985–1986 ||

tan ne[Pp161v1]tyādinā¹²⁹ pratividhatte |

tan nāsato 'pi saṃvitteḥ kambupītādirūpavat |

viruddhadharmasaṅgāt tu

nānyad bhedasya lakṣaṇam || 1987 ||

evaṃ sati na kiñcid vijñānaṃ bhrāntaṃ syād [Ś677] bhedavyavahārocche-
daprasaṅgaś ca | atha bādhyamānatvāt kasyacid bhrāntatvaṃ syāt |
tadaikasminn anekavijñānaṃ bādhyamānaṃ [Pp161v2] katham abhrāntaṃ
bhavet || TSP ad TS 1987 ||

¹²² *saṃvitteś ced* em. based on *saṃvitteś ced* Jk Pk T2D (*gal te rig byed phyir*) [*saṃvitteś ce*° Jp K Ś; *saṃvitte*° Pp; T2P (*gal te rigs byed phyir*)

¹²³ *saṃvitteś ced* Jk Pk] *saṃvitteś ca* K Ś; **saṃvitteḥ* T1D T1P (*rig phyir*)

¹²⁴ *viruddhānām ekasmin nāpy asambhavaḥ* Jk^{pc} (*viruddhānām ekasmin nāpy asambhavaḥ*) ◇ K Ś] *viruddhā*<<tmānām>> *bhavaḥ* Jk^{ac}; *viruddhātmām* <<ṇām>> *ekasmin nāpy asambhavaḥ* Pk

¹²⁵ *bhaved* Jk Pk ◇ Ś] *na ce*{*bhave?*}*d* K conj.

¹²⁶ *kāraṇāt* | *tathā* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *kāraṇātatha* Jp^{ac}

¹²⁷ *yad yatho*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *yad yathā* Jp^{ac}; T2D T2P (*gal te ji ltar*)

¹²⁸ *bhavanti* Jp Pp^{pc} (*bhavanti*) ◇ K Ś] *bhavanti* a° Pp^{ac}

¹²⁹ *netyādinā* Jp ◇ K Ś] *netyātyādinā* Pp

ββ The *pratīka* found in Jp is *saṃvitteś ce*° (copied as *saṃvitte*° in Pp), whereas the *pratīka* in T2D (and T2P, if emended) is *gal te rig byed phyir*. T1D T1P have *rig phyir*. Accordingly, the variant *saṃvitteś ced*, present in Jk and Pk, is found only in T2D and not in T1D T1P.

γ In Jk, the scribe may have started copying *viruddhātma* from the stanza before (TS 1985a) and then corrected it in *viruddhānām*.

ⁱ *saṃvitteś ca viruddhānām ekasmin nāpy asambhavaḥ* | *ekākāraṃ bhaved ekam iti neśvarabhāṣitam* || (ŚV3 ŚūV 219); *saṃvitteś ca viruddhānām ekasminn api sambhavaḥ* | *ekākāraṃ bhaved ekam iti neśvarabhāṣitam* || (ŚV1 ŚūV 219).

^j ŚV2 ŚūV 220ab; *tathaiva tad upetavyaṃ yad yathaivopalabhyate* || (ŚV1 ŚūV 220ab; ŚV3 ŚūV 220ab).

evaṃ tāvad aṇūnāṃ na^{130δ} pratyakṣato^{g8} nāpy anumānataḥ¹³¹ siddhir iti |
na bāhyārthā[_{Pp206v8}]pahnave pratyakṣavirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ¹³² | nāpi hetor
asiddhatā |

2.3 Proof Denying the Existence of Atoms

idānīm para ekānekasvabhāva[_{Pp161v3}]rahitatvād ity asya hetoḥ sandigdha-
siddhatām udbhāvayann āha — **mā bhūd** ityādi |

mā bhūt pramāṇataḥ siddhir¹³³ aṇū[_{Pk37r2}]nām astu saṃśayaḥ |
abhāvaniśca[_{Jk101r2}]yas tv eṣāṃ¹³⁴
kathaṃ prekṣāvatām bhavet | | 1988 | |

saṃyuktam ityādinā pratividhatte |

saṃyuktaṃ dūradeśasthaṃ nairantaryavyavasthitam |
ekāṇvabhīmukhaṃ¹³⁵ rūpaṃ
yad aṇor madhyavartinaḥ | | 1989 | |^k
aṇvanta[_{Pk37r3}]rābhimukhyena¹³⁶ tad eva yadi kalpyate |
praca[_{Jk101r3}]yo bhūdharādīnām evaṃ sati na yujyate | | 1990 | |^l
[K556] aṇvantarābhimukhyena rūpaṃ ced anyad iṣyate |
kathaṃ nāma bhaved ekaḥ
para[_{Pk37r4}]māṇus tathā satī | | 1991 | |^m

prayogaḥ^{g9} — yad ekānekasvabhāvarahitaṃ tad asadvyavahārayogyam,
yathā [Pp161v4] viyadabjam | ekānekasvabhāvara[_{Jp207r1}]hitāś ca parābhimatāḥ
paramāṇava iti svabhāvahetuḥ |

¹³⁰ na em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (ma [grub]) ◇ K em. ({na}) Ś] deest Jp Pp Pā

¹³¹ nāpy anumānataḥ Jp ◇ K em. (nāpy anumāna{taḥ}°) Ś] anumā<<na/ta>>h Pp; nāpy anumāna° Pā

¹³² pratyakṣavirodhaḥ pratijñāyāḥ Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] pratyakṣavirodhapratijñāyā Jp^{ac}

¹³³ siddhir Jk ◇ K Ś] siddhid Pk

¹³⁴ abhāvaniścayas tv e° Jk T_{1D} (med pa yi | |...ñes pa) T_{1P} (med pa yis | |...ñes pa) ◇ K em.
(abhāva{niścaya}s tv e°) Ś] abhāvas tv e° Pk (contra metrum); abhāvas te° Pā

¹³⁵ ekāṇva° Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] ekāṇa° Jk^{ac}

¹³⁶ °ābhimukhyena Jk Pk^{pc} ◇ K Ś] °ābhimukhyona Pk^{ac}

^{δ8} Jp^g explains the absence of na by indicating the word nāpi as a case of kākāṣṣagolakanyāya, or also kākāṣṣagolakanyāya. This does not exclude that na was present in Xp.

^k 'byar ba dañ ni bskor ba 'am | | bar med mam par gnas kyañ ruñ | | dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la | |
bltas pa'i rañ bžin gañ yin pa | | (MAK 11).

^l rdul phran gžan la blta ba yañ | | de ñid gal te yin brjod na | | de lta yin na de lta bu | | sa chu la sogs
rgyas 'gyur ram | | (MAK 12).

^m rdul phran gžan la lta ba dños | | gal te gžan du 'dod na ni | | rab tu phra rdul ji lta bur | | gcig pu cha
sas med par 'gyur | | (MAK 13).

^{g8} kākāṣṣagolakanyāyena nāpiśabdaḥ pratyakṣato 'numātaś cety ubhayatra saṃbadhyate Jp^g Pp^g

^{g9} parābhimatāḥ paramāṇavo 'sadvyavahārayogyā ekānekasvabhāvatvāt Jp^g Pp^g

na cāsiddho hetur iti mantavyam | tathā¹³⁷ hi — ekatvaṃ¹³⁸ tāvad aṇūnām asiddhaṃ bhūddharādipracitarūpāṇām [Pp161v₅] digbhāgabhedasya vidyamānatvāt | tam eva digbhāgabhedam bhūddharādyupacayānyathā-nupapattyā¹³⁹ paramāṇūnām [T_{2P}151b] prasañjayann ekatvaniṣedhaṃ tāvad āha — **saṃyuktaṃ dūradeśasthaṃ** ityādi |

ta[Pp161v₆]tra kecid āhuḥ — parasparaṃ saṃyujyante paramāṇava iti | sāntarā eva nityaṃ na [Jp207r₂] sprśantūty apare | nirantaratve tu sprśta-saṃjñety anye |

[T_{2D}113b] tatraitasmin pakṣatraye 'pi **madhyavartinah** paramāṇor¹⁴⁰ [Pp161v₇] bahubhiḥ¹⁴¹ parivāritasya yadi digbhāgabhedo na syāt tadā cittacaitasika-kalāpasyeva¹⁴² **pracayo na** syād anamśatvāt |

tathā hi — yenaika**rūpeṇaikāṇvabhimukho** madhyavartī [Pp161v₈] paramāṇus tenaivāparaparamāṇvabhimukho¹⁴³ yadi syāt tadā parivārakā[ṣ678]ṇām aṇūnām ekadeśatvaprasaṅgāt **pracayo** [Jp207r₃] **na** syāt |

prayogaḥ^{144g10} — yad ekarūpaparamāṇvabhi[Pp161v₉] mukhasvabhāvaṃ¹⁴⁵ tad ekadeśaṃ yathā tasyaiva pūrvadeśasthitaḥ paramāṇur ekaprāsādā-bhimukhapūrvaprāsādavad¹⁴⁶ vā^{147g11} | ekarūpaparamāṇvabhimukhasvabhā[Pp161v₁₀]vās¹⁴⁸ ca sarve parivāryāvasthitāḥ¹⁴⁹ paramāṇava iti svabhāva-hetuḥ | ataḥ pracayo na syāt | athā**nyena rūpeṇ**ābhimukhas tadā digbhāgabhedasya vidyamānatvād gha[Pp161v₁₁]ṭikādivad¹⁴⁹ ekatvaṃ na prāpnoti |

bhadantaśu[Jp207r₄]bhaguptas tu prāha — yathaikasvabhāvāsyaśada-dravyādivyāvṛttasyānekaṃ sāmānyaṃ na tattvena kalpyate¹³ evam

¹³⁷ *tathā* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *tarthyā* Jp^{ac}

¹³⁸ *ekatvaṃ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *ekaraṃ* Jp^{ac}

¹³⁹ *bhūddharā*° Pp ◇ K Ś] <<bhū?>>dhavā° Jp

¹⁴⁰ *paramāṇor* Jp (*paramāṇoh*) ◇ K Ś] *paramāṇā* Pp

¹⁴¹ *bahubhiḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *bahubhi* Jp^{ac}

¹⁴² *cittacaitasika*° Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*sems dan sems las 'byun ba'i*)] *cittacaittādi*° K Ś

¹⁴³ °*āparāparamāṇv*° Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] °*āparāparamāṇv*° Pp; °*āparāṇv*° Jp^{ac}

¹⁴⁴ *prayogaḥ* Jp (*prayogo*) ◇ K Ś] *prayogo* .. Pp

¹⁴⁵ °*svabhāvaṃ* Jp Pp^{pc}] °*svarūpabhāvaṃ* Pp^{ac}; °*svarūpaṃ bhavet* K; °*svabhāvaṃ bhavet* Ś; °*svarūpaṃ* Pā Gā

¹⁴⁶ *ekaprāsādā*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *ekaprasādā*° Jp^{ac}; **eka*° T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gcig la*)

¹⁴⁷ *vā* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*'am*) ◇ S] *ca* K Pā Gā

¹⁴⁸ °*svabhāvās* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °*svabhāvās* Jp^{ac}

¹⁴⁹ *ghaṭikādivad* Jp Pp ◇ Ś] *ghaṭādivad* K; *ghaṭādivattvaṃ* Pā Gā

^{g10} *madhyaparamāṇoh parivāraṇaṃ kṛtvāvasthitāḥ paramāṇava ekadeśasthāḥ prāpnuvanti ekarūpaparamāṇvabhimukhasvabhāvatvāt* Jp^g Pp^g

^{g11} *dr̥ṣṭāntadvayaṃ* Jp^g Pp^g

^{g12} *parivāraṇaṃ pūrvam iti vākye* .. Jp^g

^{g13} *na tattvenāsti* Jp^g Pp^g

ihāpi paramāñūnā[Pp161v12]m anekamadhyavartitvād^{150ee} anekatvaṃ kalpyate
na bhūtārthena^{g14} |ⁿ tathā hi [T_{2P}152a] — na dikpadārtho nāmāsti kaṇḍādādi-
kalpitaḥ | tasyaikasvarūpatvād anekarūpaḥ¹⁵¹ pūrvādipratyayo na syāt |
ke[Pp161v13]valam aṇava¹⁵² eva paurvāparyeṇāvasthitā dikśabdavācyaḥ |^o tatas
ca digbhāgabhedavattvād iti [Jp207r3] kevalaṃ bahubhiḥ¹⁵³ parivāraṇam
evoktaṃ syān na sāvayavatvam iti |^p

tad eta[Pp161v14]d asamyak | tathā hi — niravayavatvāc cittasyevāñūnām¹⁵⁴¹⁵⁵
paramārthato nordhvādhobhāgāḥ [T_{2D}114a] santūti bahubhiḥ parivāraṇam eva
na syāt, cittacaitasikādivat¹⁵⁶ | tatas ca pari[Pp161v15]vārakāñām añūnām
paramārthenābhāvāt kathaṃ taddvāreṇānekamadhyavartitvaṃ yenāneka-
tvaṃ¹⁵⁷ deśakṛtaṃ kalpyeta |

athāsaty api paramārthata ūrdhvādho[Jp207r6]bhāgavattve bahubhiḥ¹⁵⁸
[Pp161v16] parivāraṇam syāt |^{tarhi}¹⁵⁹ cittacaittānām api syāt | tatas ca
paramāñuvac cittādīnām api deśasthatvaṃ syāt | no cet | paramāñūnām
api na syāt | tatas ca pracayo na syā[Pp161v17]c cittādivad ity ekāntaḥ |

syād etat — yathā vartamāna[K557]cittakṣaṇasyāñūnāgatābhyām¹⁶⁰ⁿⁿ
cittakṣaṇābhyām¹⁶¹ kālākṛtanairantaryam asti, [Jp207r7] atha ca na¹⁶²

¹⁵⁰ *anekamadhya*^o em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*du ma'i bar na*)] *aneka*^o Jp Pp K Ś

¹⁵¹ *aneka*^o Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *anekasya* Jp^{ac}

¹⁵² *aṇava* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *āṇava* Jp^{ac}

¹⁵³ *bahubhiḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *bahubhi* Jp^{ac}

¹⁵⁴ *cittasye*^o Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *citasye*^o Jp^{ac}

¹⁵⁵ *añūnām* ◇ K Ś] *añūnā* Jp Pp

¹⁵⁶ *cittacaitasikādivat* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] *cittacaittādivat* K Pā Gā

¹⁵⁷ *ānekatvaṃ* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] **ekatvam* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*geig nīd du*)

¹⁵⁸ *bahubhiḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *bahubhi* Jp^{ac}

¹⁵⁹ *tarhi* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *deest* Jp^{ac} T_{2D} T_{2P}

¹⁶⁰ *cittakṣaṇasyā*^o Jp^{pc} Pp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*sems kyi skad cig*) ◇ K Pā Gā] *cittalakṣaṇasyā*^o Jp^{ac} Pp^{ac} Ś

¹⁶¹ *cittakṣaṇābhyām* Jp^{pc} T_{2D} (*sems kyi skad cig dag*), T_{2P} (*sems kyi skad cig dag dan*) ◇ Ś]
cittalakṣaṇābhyām Jp^{ac} Pp K Pā Gā

¹⁶² *na* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ma yin pa*) ◇ Ś] *deest* Pp K Pā Gā

^{ee} Cf. *du ma'i dbus na* (BASK 48a).

^{zz} In Jp^{pc} *tarhi* is preceded by the symbol =, which usually precedes the glosses. In Pp, the scribe interprets it as a correction and inserts the word in the text. It is not found in T_{2D} T_{2P}. Accordingly, this may be regarded as an interpolation.

ⁿⁿ *°kṣaṇa*^o (instead of *°lakṣaṇa*^o) is confirmed by T_{2D} T_{2P} and BASK 50–51.

ⁿ Cf. *du ma'i dbus na 'dug pa'i phyir* | | *du ma nīd du mam rtog la* | | *'di ltar ldog pa'i sgo dag nas* | | *mañ po nīd du spyir rtog ciñ* | | (BASK 48).

^o Cf. *'ga' yis khyad par dan bcas pa'i* | | *rdul la phyogs kyi sgrar bstan bya* | | (BASK 45cd).

^p Cf. *de phyir phyogs cha'i khyad par gyis* | | *de ni mañ pos yons bskor bar* | | *brjod par zad kyi rdul mams ni* | | *cha śas bcas pa'i bdag nīd min* | | (BASK 46). A parallel *kārikā* is also found in MAV: *tha dad phyogs nas mañ po dag* | | *'ga' la kun nas bskor tsam du* | | *brjod par zad kyi rdul de ni* | | *cha śas bcas pa'i bdag nīd min* | | (MAV, ed. p. 52, 2–5).

^{g14} *na tattvavṛtyā* Jp^g Pp^g

vartamānacittakṣaṇasya¹⁶³ [Pp^{162r1}] kalāmuhūrtādivat¹⁶⁴ sāvayavatvam evam
aṇūnām saty api bahubhiḥ parivāraṇa na deśakṛtaṃ [Ś679] sāvayavatvaṃ
bhaviṣyati⁹ |

tad etad asamyak [T_{2P}152b] | na hi vartamānacittakṣaṇasya¹⁶⁵
pūrvotta[Pp^{162r2}]rābhyaṃ nairantaryaṃ paramārthato 'sti¹⁶⁶ tadānīm taylor
asattvāt | [Jp^{207r6}] na cāsatā saha paurvāparyaṃ bhāvikaṃ yuktaṃ kevalaṃ
sahabhūtayor na kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'stūti taddvāreṇa parikalpa[Pp^{162r3}]sa-
mutthāpitaṃ¹⁶⁷ pūrvāparayoḥ kṣaṇayoḥ sattvaṃ prākpaścādbhāvat¹⁶⁸ |
[Jp^{207v1}] na caivam aṇūnām deśakṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ parikalpitaṃ
pracayābhāvaprasaṅgāt | kiṃ ca na tāvad ahetukatvaṃ [Pp^{162r4}] bhāvānām
yuktimaṇ nityaṃ sattvādiprasaṅgād^r iti | yo 'pi [T_{2D}114b] saṃvṛtatvaṃ
bhāvānām pratipannas tenāpy avaśyaṃ sarvabhāvānām sahetukatvaṃ
eṣṭavyam | satī ca sahetukatve, na tāvat sama[Pp^{162r5}]kāle kāryakāraṇe
yukte | prāk kāryotpatteḥ¹⁶⁹ kāraṇasyāsattvenāsāmartyāyāt | paścād api
kārye samutpanne hetor anupayogāt | ataḥ prā[Jp^{207v2}]gbhāvaḥ sarvahetū-
nā[Pp^{162r6}]m avaśyaṃ aṅgikartavyaḥ |

yathoktam —

asataḥ prāg asāmartyāyāt paścād cānupayogataḥ |
prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnām nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha ||^s

iti |

tad evaṃ niraṃśatve¹⁷⁰ 'pi sarvabhāvānām [Pp^{162r7}] nyāyato 'vasthitaṃ

¹⁶³ °cittakṣaṇasya Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} (sems kyi skad cig) T_{2P} (sems kyi skad cig ma) K Ḍ Ś] °cittalakṣaṇasya Jp^{ac}

¹⁶⁴ kalāmuhūrtādivat Jp Ḍ Ś] kakalāmuhūrtādivat Pp (dittography); {na} kalāmuhūrtādivat K em.; na
kalādimuhūrtavat Gā

¹⁶⁵ °cittakṣaṇasya Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (sems kyi skad cig) Ḍ Ś] °cittalakṣaṇasya Jp^{ac} Pp K Jai

¹⁶⁶ °ārthato 'sti Jp^{pc} Pp Ḍ K Ś] °ārthato sti Jp^{ac}

¹⁶⁷ parikalpa° Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (brtags pas)] parikalpya K Ś

¹⁶⁸ prāk° Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (sna ma dan)] prāk K Ś

¹⁶⁹ prāk kāryotpatteḥ Jp^{ac}] nāpi prākkāryotpatteḥ Jp^{pc} Pp K Ś; *kāryotpatteḥ T_{2D} T_{2P} ('bras bu skye ba las)

¹⁷⁰ niraṃśatve Jp (niraṃsatve) Ḍ K Ś] niraṃ<<ra>>satve Pp (dittography)

⁶⁶ In Pp, kaka° is an instance of dittography. K emendates the first ka as na (in fact supplying the negative particle which is missing in Pp and present in Jp).

^u nāpi prāk kāryotpatteḥ em. is also possible.

⁹ Cf. śes pa'i skad cig gñis dag gis || 'dab chags yin yan de la ni || cha śas bcas gzugs mi 'dod ltar || rdul
phran mams la'añ de bžin no || (BASK 51).

^r Cf. nityaṃ sattvaṃ asattvaṃ vā 'hetor anyānapekṣaṇāt | apekṣāto hi bhāvānām kādācikatvasambhavaḥ ||
(PV Svārthānumāna 35).

^s asataḥ prāg asāmartyāyāt paścād cānupayogataḥ | prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnām nāto 'rthaḥ svadhiyā saha ||
(PV Pratyakṣa 246). Cf. paścād cānupayogataḥ | (PV Pratyakṣa 246b, ed. Miyasaka 1971–1972: 74).

kālākṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ¹⁷¹ deśākṛtaṃ tu kathaṃ syād yadi sāvayavatvaṃ¹⁷² na syād iti codyate |

athāsaty api sāvayavatte deśākṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ syāt | cittacai[Pp162_{r9}]ttānām¹⁷³ api syād aviśeṣād ity uktam | mūrtatvakṛ[Pp207_{v3}]to 'sti viśeṣa iti cet | na,¹⁷⁴ tad [T_{2P}153a] evāsiddham asati sāvayavatte¹⁷⁵ | kevalaṃ paryāyeṇa sāvayavatvaṃ¹⁷⁶ evoktaṃ syān [Pp162_{r9}] nānyo viśeṣa iti yat kiñcid etat |

tasmāt sarvabhāvānām nyāyye¹⁷⁷ kālākṛte paurvāparye sati¹⁷⁸ yad etad aparaṃ adhikaṃ kasyacid¹⁷⁹ deśākṛtaṃ paurvāparyaṃ tat sā[Pp162_{r10}]vayavatvaṃ¹⁸⁰ antareṇa na sambhava¹⁸¹ti yuktam uktam |

digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvaṃ na yujyate¹⁸¹ |[†]

ity alaṃ vistareṇa | | TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991 | | [Ś680]

atra kecid āhuḥ — ta eva¹⁸² [Pp207_{v4}] tarhy añīyāmsaḥ prade[Pp162_{r11}]śāḥ¹⁸³ santu paramāṇavaḥ | tatrāpy¹⁸⁴ avayavakalpanāyāṃ punar api pradeśānām¹⁸⁵ evāṇutvaṃ bhaviṣyati | yadi param anavasthaiva syān¹⁸⁶ na tu punaḥ sāvayavatvaprasaṅgena śakyate [Pp162_{r12}] 'hūnām prajñaptisattvaṃ āpādayitum | athāpi [T_{2D}115a] prajñaptisattvaṃ, evam api niyamenaiṃ prajñaptiupādānam aṅgikartavyam | yat tat prajñaptiupādānam tasyaiva paramāṇutvaṃ bhavi[Pp162_{r13}]ṣyati | athāsattvaṃ evāṇūnām sādhyate, evam api di[Pp207_{v5}]gbhāgabhedād¹⁸⁷ ity asiddhatvaṃ hetoḥ | na hi kharaviśāṇādayo¹⁸⁸ 'tyantāsantaḥ¹⁸⁹ pūrvādīdigbhāgabhedavanto bhavanti | nāpīdaṃ pra[Pp162_{r14}]saṅgasādhanam digbhāgabhedasyānabhyupagatatvād iti |

¹⁷¹ *paurvāparyaṃ* em. ◊ K Ś] *paurvāparyaṃ* Jp Pp

¹⁷² *sāvayavatvaṃ* Jp ◊ K Ś] *sādhayavatvaṃ* Pp

¹⁷³ °*cāittānām* Jp^{pc} ◊ Ś] °*cāitanām* Jp^{ac}; °*caityānām* Pp; °*caityānām* K

¹⁷⁴ *na* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *na nna* Jp^{ac}

¹⁷⁵ *asati sāvayavatte* Jp ◊ K Ś] **sati sāvayavatte* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*cha śas dan beas pa ñid yin na*); *asati sādhayavatte* Pp

¹⁷⁶ *sāvayavatvaṃ* Jp ◊ K Ś] *sādhayavatvaṃ* Pp

¹⁷⁷ *nyāyye* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *nyāyyene* Jp^{ac}

¹⁷⁸ *sati* Jp Pp ◊ K Ś] **asati* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ma yin na*)

¹⁷⁹ *kasyacid* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *kasyaci* Jp^{ac}

¹⁸⁰ *sāvayavatvaṃ* Jp ◊ K Ś] *sādhayavatvaṃ* Pp

¹⁸¹ *yujyate* Pp (*yujyata*) ◊ K Ś] *yūjyata* Jp

¹⁸² *ta eva* Jp Pp ◊ Ś] *evaṃ* K Pā Gā

¹⁸³ *pradeśāḥ* Jp (*pradesāḥ*) ◊ K Ś] *pradeśaḥ* Pp

¹⁸⁴ *tatrāpy* Jp Pp ◊ K Ś] **tathāpi* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de lta na yai*)

¹⁸⁵ *pradeśānām* Pp ◊ K Ś] *pradesānām* Jp

¹⁸⁶ *syān* Jp Pp] *deest* K Ś

¹⁸⁷ °*bhāgabhedād* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*cha'i dbye ba yod pa'i phyir*) ◊ K Ś] °*bhāgabhedād* Jp Pp

¹⁸⁸ *kharā*° Jp ◊ K Ś] *svara*° Pp

¹⁸⁹ 'tyantāsantaḥ Jp^{pc} (*tyantāsantaḥ*) Pp (*tyantāsaṃtaḥ*) ◊ K Ś] *tyantāḥ santaḥ* Jp^{ac}

[†] *digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvaṃ na yujyate* | *chāyāvṛti kathaṃ vānyo na piṇḍaś cen na tasya te* | | (*Vimśikā* 14).

atra pratividhānam āha — **apetetyādi** |

apetabhāgabhedas ca yaḥ parair aṇur iṣya[_{Jk101r4}]te |
tatraiveyaṃ kṛtā cintā nāniṣṭhāsambhavas^{190kk} tataḥ || 1992 ||

bhāgānām¹⁹¹ paramāṇutvam aṅgikurvanti te yadā |
sva[_{Pk37r3}]pratijñācyutis teṣāṃ tadāvaśyaṃ prasajyate || 1993 ||

[_{T1D73a}] prasaṅgasādhanaatvena nāśrayā[_{Jk101v1}]siddhateha¹⁹² ca |
parābhyupetayogādibalād
aikyaṃ hy apohyate [_{T1P88a}] || 1994 ||

tad evaṃ sarvapa[_{Pk37r6}]kṣeṣu naivaikātmā sa yujyate |
ekāniṣpattito 'nekasvabhāvo 'pi na sambhavī || 1995 ||

asanni[_{Jk101v2}]ścayayogyo 'taḥ paramāṇur vipaścītām |
ekānekasvabhāvena śūnyatvā[_{Pk37r7}]d viyadabjavat || 1996 ||

[K558] avaśyaṃ hi pariniṣṭhitarūpaṃ kiñcid vastu paramāṇutvena
tadvādinān[_{Pp162r13}]gīkartavyam | anyathā hy anavasthāyām anavadhārita-
rūpatvād anupākhyatvam eva svayaṃ pratipāditam syāt | tataś
ce[_{Jp207v6}]ṣṭasiddhir eva parasya kṛtā syāt | tasmād yad eva pariniṣci-
[_{Pp162r16}]tarūpaṃ¹⁹³ [_{T2P153b}] tvayā vyavasthāpitam aṇutvena¹⁹⁴ **tatraivā**napā-
śritānavasthāvikalpe yadā **cintā** kriyate tadā katham anavasthā¹⁹⁵ syād |
yadi param anavasthāyā svābhyupagamavirodhaḥ [_{Pp162r17}] kṛtaḥ¹⁹⁶ syāt | na
tu parasya kiñcid aniṣṭam āpāditam | etāvataiva¹⁹⁷ hi¹⁹⁸ parasyeṣṭasiddheḥ
prasaṅgasādhanam evedam | na **cāsiddhatā** heto[_{Jp207v7}]ḥ | tathā hi —
pareṇa paramāṇūnām saṃyuktatvam nai[_{Pp162v1}]rantaryaṃ tathā bahubhiḥ
sāntaraiḥ parivāraṇam¹⁹⁹ [Ṣ681] cety abhyupagatam²⁰⁰ | anyathā katham
pracayo²⁰¹ bhavet, tataś ca yady api digbhāgabhedo vācā nābhyupagatas
tathāpi saṃyuktatvādidharmā[_{Pp162v2}]bhyupagamabalād evāpatati | [_{Jp207v8}]

¹⁹⁰ *cintā nāniṣṭhāsambhavas* Jk^{pc} Pk (*cintā nāniṣṭhāsambhavas* **nāniṣṭhāsambhavas* T_{1D} T_{1P} (*thug med srid pa min*)) *cintāniṣṭhāsambhavas* Jk^{ac} (*contra metrum*); *cintā nāniṣṭhāsambhavas* K Ś

¹⁹¹ *bhāgānām* Jk Pk ◊ K Ś] **bhāgānām* T_{1D} T_{1P} (*dños mams kyī*)

¹⁹² °*āsiddhateha* Jk^{pc} Pk (Pk °*āsīd*<<dh>>*ateha*) ◊ K Ś] °*āsiddhatety āha* Jk^{ac} (*contra metrum*)

¹⁹³ *pariniṣcitārūpaṃ* em. based on T_{2P} (*ñes pa'i ño bo*) [*pariniṣcitam* Jp Pp; T_{2D} (*ñes pa'i ño bo ñid kyis*); *pariniṣṭhitam* K Ś

¹⁹⁴ *aṇutvena* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *āṇutvena* Jp^{ac}

¹⁹⁵ *anavasthā* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *avanavasthā* Jp^{ac}

¹⁹⁶ *kṛtaḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *kṛta* Jp^{ac}

¹⁹⁷ *etāvataiva* Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*'di tsaṃ ñid kyis*) ◊ K Ś] *etāvat eva* Jp^{ac}

¹⁹⁸ *hi* Jp ◊ Ś] *deest* Pp K Pā Gā

¹⁹⁹ *parivāraṇam* Jp ◊ K Ś] *parivāreṇa* Pp

²⁰⁰ *abhyupagatam* Jp ◊ K Ś] *abhyupagamam* Pp

²⁰¹ *pracayo* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rgyas par*) ◊ Ś] *ca pratyayo* K Pā Gā

^{kk} Tib. seems to interpret *nāniṣṭhāsambhavaḥ* as *na+aniṣṭhā+sambhavaḥ* instead of *na+aniṣṭhā+asambhavaḥ*, which is the most likely interpretation of it.

na hy asaty ūrddhvādhobhāgādidiḡbhāgabhedo²⁰² [T_{2D}115b] saṃyuktatvādi-
pakṣatrayaṃ yuktaṃ cittādivad ity uktam |

yac cōktaṃ — aṇuprajñapter avaśyaṃ upādānaṃ aṅgīkarta[Pp162v₉]vyam,
yat tad upādānaṃ sa eva paramāṇur bhaviṣyatīti | [Jp208r₁] tad atrāsty eva
mithyāśāstraśravaṇacintanāhitavāsanāparipāke²⁰³²⁰⁴ vātāyanādireṇuprati-
bhāsā^{g15} buddhir aṇubhrānter ni[Pp162v₄]bandhanam | na hi yat
prajñaptyaiva²⁰⁵ tad eva kāraṇaṃ yuktaṃ aprajñaptisattvaprasaṅgāt,
anyathāmaprajñapter ātmaiva kāraṇaṃ syāt, na skandhāḥ | tataś cāṇuvad
ātmapratiṣedho 'pi na syā[Pp162v₃]t |

evaṃ tāvad ekatvaṃ²⁰⁶ paramāṇūnām asiddham | tadasiddhau nāpy
anekatvaṃ [T_{2P}154a] siddham,²⁰⁷ tatsandohātmakatvāt²⁰⁸ tasyeti nāsiddho
'ṇūnām abhāvavyava[Jp208r₂]hāre²⁰⁹ sādhanō hetuḥ ||TSP *ad* TS 1992–
1996||

evaṃ tāvad bāhyārthasyānekaśvabhāvarahita[Pp162v₆]tvaṃ²¹⁰ prasādhayedā-
nīm ekasvabhāvarahitatvaṃ prasādhayann āha — **paramāṇor ayogāc**²¹¹
cetyādi |

paramāṇor ayogāc ca na sann avayavī yataḥ |

paramāṇubhir ārabdhaḥ sa parair upagamyate || 1997 ||

[K559] yair apy anārabdhaḥ paramāṇubhiḥ²¹² sthūla²¹³ iṣṭas teṣāṃ so 'pi para-
māṇuvad diḡbhāgabhi[Pp162v₇]nnavād eko na yuktaḥ pāṇyādikampāda²¹⁴

²⁰² °bhāgādidiḡbhāgabhedo Jp ◇ Ś] °bhāgādibhedo T_{2D} P K Pā Gā; *°bhāgādidiḡbhede T_{2D} T_{2P} (*cha la sogs pa'i phyogs kyi dbye ba*)

²⁰³ mithyāśāstra° Jp^{pc} Pp (*mithyāśāstra*°) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*log pa'i bstan bcos*) ◇ K Ś] mithyājñānasāstra° Jp^{ac}

²⁰⁴ °paripāke Jp^{pc}] °paripāko Jp^{ac} Pp K Ś

²⁰⁵ yat prajñaptyaiva em. based on yatprajñaptyaiva Jp] yatprajñaptiā ca Pp; ya{ta}tprajñaptiā ca K em.; yatprajñaptiā ca Ś; tatprajñaptiā Gā; T_{2D} T_{2P} (*btags pa gaṇ yin pa*)

²⁰⁶ ekatvaṃ Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] evakatvaṃ Jp^{ac}

²⁰⁷ tadasiddhau nāpy anekatvaṃ siddham Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de ma grub pas na du ma ṇid kyan ma grub ste*) ◇ Ś] deest Pp K Pā Gā

²⁰⁸ °sandohā° Jp^{pc} (°saṃdohā°)] °saṃdehā° Jp^{ac} Pp, °sandeḥā° K Ś

²⁰⁹ °vyavahāre Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] °vyavacāre Pp; °vyavahāhāre Jp^{ac}

²¹⁰ °ānekaśvabhāva° em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*du ma'i ran b'zin*) ◇ K Ś] °ānekatvabhāva° Jp Pp

²¹¹ ayogāc Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] ayogo° Jp^{ac}

²¹² paramāṇubhiḥ em. ◇ K Ś] paramāṇabhi Jp; paramāṇubhi Pp

²¹³ sthūla Jp (*sth<<ū>>la*) ◇ K Ś] sthala Pp

²¹⁴ pāṇyādi° Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*lag pa la sogs pa*) ◇ K Ś] panyādi° Jp^{ac}

^{g15} gavākṣa Jp^g Pp^g

sarvakampādiprasaṅgāc ca^{215u} | spaṣṭatvād bahuśaś carcitatvān^{216λλ} na
pṛthak tasya dūṣaṇam uktam |

tad evaṃ²¹⁷ bāhyārthābhāvavyavahārasādhane²¹⁸ [Pp162v₈] yad ekāneka-
[Jp208r₃]svabhāvaṃ na bhavatītyāda^v prayoge²¹⁹ nāsiddho²²⁰ hetur iti siddho
bāhyasya pṛthivyāder grāhyasyāsadvavahāraḥ | tadasiddhau^{g16} grāhaka-
tvam api jñāna[Pp162v₉]sya tadapekṣaṃ²²¹ kalpitaṃ nāstīti siddhā^{222µµ} vijñapti-
mātratā [T_{2D}116a] | | TSP ad TS 1997 | |

3.

Argument B:

Grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt

[Ś682] tad evam arthāyogād²²³ vijñaptimātratām pratipādyā samprati
grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt prati[Pp162v₁₀]pādayann āha — **anirbhā-**
sam ityādi |

a[Jk101v₃]nirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsam anyanirbhāsam eva ca |
vijā[Pk37r₈]nāti na vijñānaṃ^{224vv}
bāhyam arthaṃ kathañcana | | 1998 | | ^w

²¹⁵ *prasaṅgāc ca* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dañ...thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyin*) [*prasaṅgāt* Pp K Ś

²¹⁶ *carcita*° Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dpyad pas*) [*carvita*° K Ś

²¹⁷ *evaṃ* Jp ◊ K Ś] *eva* Pp

²¹⁸ °*ārthābhāvavyavahāra*° Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*don med pa'i tha sñad du*) ◊ Ś] °*ārthāvyavahāra*° Pp K Pā Gā

²¹⁹ *prayoge* Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*sbyor ba la*) ◊ K Ś] *prayogo* Jp^{ac} Pp

²²⁰ *nāsiddho* Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ma grub pa ma yin pa*) ◊ K Ś] *na siddho* Jp^{ac}

²²¹ *tadapekṣaṃ* ◊ K Ś] *tadapekṣa*° Jp Pp

²²² *siddhā* Jp ◊ K Ś] *siddham* | Pp

²²³ °*yogād* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] °*yogod* Jp^{ac}

²²⁴ *vijñānaṃ* em. partly supported by T_{1D} T_{1P} (*mam par śes pas*) [*va*°/*ca jñānaṃ* Jk; *ca jñānaṃ* Pk K Ś

^{λλ} Watanabe Shōkō (1985: 157) suggests that *dpyad zin* corresponds to *carcita*. Negi (2002: 3343 s.v.), based on Ś, brings forward this very passage as an example of the correspondence between *dpyad pa* and *carvita*.

^{µµ} It looks like Jp^{pc} might originally have had the variant *siddham* | that was then erased.

^{vv} In the present context the two terms *jñāna* and *vijñāna* are mostly used interchangeably. *Vijñāna* is found immediately following: *vijñānaṃ jadārūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate* | (TS 1999ab). However, *jñāna* is present in *nirbhāṣijñānapakṣe* (TS 2004a) and in Kamalaśīla's commentary to this verse. Additionally, Kamalaśīla paraphrases TS 1998 with the words: *anirbhāsaṃ jñānaṃ na bāhyam arthaṃ vijñānāti* (TSP ad TS 2035). See *vijñānāti na vijñānaṃ* (TSP ad TS 3645).

^u Cf. *pānyādīkampe sarvasya kampaprapṛpter virodhinaḥ* | *ekasmin karmaṇo 'yogāt syāt pṛthak siddhir anyathā* | | (PV Pramāṇasiddhi 84).

^v *yad ekānekasvabhāvaṃ na bhavati na tat sattvena grāhyaṃ prekṣāvatā yathā vyomotpalam* | (TSP ad TS 1964).

^w *anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsam anyanirbhāsam eva ca* | *vijñānāti na vijñānaṃ bāhyam arthaṃ kathañcana* | | (TSP ad TS 3645, ed. p. 1130, 12–13).

^{g16} *tasya dravyāder arthasya* Jp^g Pp^g

na nirākāreṇa nāpi sākāreṇa nāpi viṣayākārād anyākāreṇa bāhyasya
gra[_{Pp208r_d}]haṇaṃ yuktam anyaś ca prakāro nāsti | tasmād ā[_{Pp162v₁₁}]tma-
saṃvedanam eva sadaiva jñānaṃ saty api bāhye santānāntara itī siddhyati²²⁵
vijñaptimātratā |

kaiścid anyākāram api jñānam anyākārasyārthasya saṃvedakam iṣṭaṃ yathā
ki[_{Pp162v₁₂}]la pītākāram api jñānaṃ śuklaśaṅkhagrāhīti²²⁶ | [_{T_{2P}154b}] yathāha
kumārilaḥ —

sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam |
janmany ekaṭra bhinne vā tadā²²⁷ kālāntare 'pi ca ||^x
ity [_{Pp162v₁₃}] atas tṛtīyaṃ pakṣān[_{Jp208r₃}]taram āśaṅkitam | | TSP *ad* TS 1998 | |

3.1 Proof of the Self-Awareness of Cognitions

nanu cātmasaṃvedane 'py ete 'nirbhāsādayo vikalpāḥ²²⁸ kasmān nāvata-
rantūty āha — **vijñānam** ityādi²²⁹ |

vijñānaṃ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate |
iyam evātmasaṃvittir asya yājaḍarū[_{Jk101v_d}]patā || 1999 | |^y
na hi grāhyagrāhakabhāvenātmasaṃveda[_{Pp162v₁₄}]nam²³⁰ abhipretam | kiṃ
tarhi svayaṃprakṛtyā prakāśātmatayā nabhastalavartyālokavat²³¹ | | TSP *ad*
TS 1999 | |

atha kasmād grāhyagrāhakabhāvena neṣyata ity āha — **kriyākārakabhā-**
venetyā[_{Pp162v₁₅}]di |

kriyākāraka[_{Pk37r₉}]bhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu |

²²⁵ *siddhyati* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *siddhyoti* Jp^{ac}

²²⁶ *śukla*^o Jp (*sukla*^o) Pp ◇ K | *mukla*^o Ś

²²⁷ *tadā* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de'i tše*) | *sadā* K Ś

²²⁸ *vikalpāḥ* Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś | *vikalpā* Jp^{ac} Pp

²²⁹ *vijñānam ityādi* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *deest* Jp^{ac}

²³⁰ *grāhyagrāhaka*^o em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gzun ba dan 'dzin pa'i*) | *grāhaka*^o Jp (*eye-skip*) Pp K Ś

²³¹ *ālokavat* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *ākolokavat* Jp^{ac}

^x Jp^{pc} has a stroke above the syllable *ta* (as to delete it) and one at the end of the word *tadā*. K and Ś emend the text with *sadā*, not confirmed by T_{2D} T_{2P}. *Tathā*, as in ŚV Nirālambanavāda 108d1, could be preferable.

^y *sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam | janmany ekaṭra bhinne vā tathā kālāntare 'pi vā ||* (ŚV₁ Nirālambanavāda 108; ŚV₃ Nirālambanavāda 108). Cf. *svapnādīpratyaye bāhyaṃ sarvathā na hi neṣyate | sarvatrālambanaṃ bāhyaṃ deśakālānyathātmakam ||* (TSP *ad* TS 250, ed. p. 129, 12–13 = ŚV₁ Nirālambanavāda 107cd–108ab; ŚV₃ Nirālambanavāda 107cd–108ab).

^y *mam śeś bems po'i rañ b'zin las || bzlog pa rab tu skye ba ste || bems min rañ b'zin gañ yin pa || de 'di'i bdag ñid śeś pa yin ||* (MAK 16); *vijñānaṃ jaḍarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate | iyaṃ evātmasaṃvittir asya yā jaḍarūpatā ||* (*Bodhicaryāvatāra* pañjikā *ad* 9.20, ed. p. 190, 11–12); *iyam evātmasaṃvittir asya yā jaḍarūpatā ||* (*Sākārasiddhiśāstra*, ed. p. 471, 7); *Tarkarahasya* (ed. p. 47, 20–21); *Tarkabhāṣā* (ed. p. 23, 13–14); *Tarkasopāna* (ed. p. 283, 18–19).

ekasyānaṃśarūpasya traīrūpyānupapattitaḥ ||2000||^z
 tad asya bodharūpatvād yuktam tāvat svavedanam |
 parasya tv artharūpa[Pk37r10]sya
 tena saṃveda[Jk102r1]naṃ²³² katham ||2001||^{aa}
 [K560] **traīrūpyam** — vedyavedakavittibhedena ||TSP *ad* TS 2000–2001||
 athāpi syād bāhyasyāpy ātmasaṃvittivad²³³ vinaiva grāhya[Jp208r6]grāhaka-
 bhāvena saṃvittir bhaviṣyaty āha — **na hi tadrūpam** ityā[Pp162v16]dī |
 na hi tadrūpam anyasya yena tadvedane param |
 saṃvedyeta^{bb} vibhinnatvād
 bhāvānām paramārthataḥ ||2002||
 yady apy asadādivyāvṛtṭyā sadādirūpam ekaṃ [Ś683] bhāveṣu kalpyate
 tathāpi tasya pratipadārthānām²³⁴ paramārthato bhedād ekatvam nāsty
 evety²³⁵ [T2D116b] āha — **paramārthata** iti ||TSP *ad* TS 2002||
 syād e[Pp162v17]tad yadi nāma vibhinno²³⁶ bāhyo 'rtho jñānāt²³⁷ tathāpi vedyo
 bhaviṣyati jñānavad ity āha — **bodharūpatayetyādi** |
 bodharūpatayotpatter jñānaṃ [Pk37r11] vedyam hi yujyate |
 na tv artho bodha utpannas
 tad asau [Jk102r2] vedyate katham ||2003||

3.2 Refutation of the *Nīrākāravāda*

evam svasaṃvedanam²³⁸ prasādhyā bāhyasyedānīm yathā ni[Jp208r7]rākāreṇa
 [Pp163r1] jñānena vedanam ayuktam²³⁹ tathā²⁴⁰ pratipādayann āha —
nirbhāsītyādi |
 nirbhāsijñānapakṣe tu taylor bhede 'pi tattvataḥ |

²³² *saṃvedanam* Jk^{pc} Pk ◊ K Ś] *saṃveda* Jk^{ac} (*contra metrum*)

²³³ °*saṃvittivad* ◊ K Ś] °*saṃvittivat* | Jp Pp

²³⁴ *pratipadārthānām* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dños po re re la*)] *pratipādanārtham* Jp Pp K Ś

²³⁵ *nāsty* e° Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *nāste*° Jp^{ac}

²³⁶ *vibhinno* Jp] *bhinno* Pp K Ś

²³⁷ *jñānāt* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *jñānā* Jp^{ac}

²³⁸ *svasaṃvedanam* Jp Pp ◊ Ś] *svasaṃdavenam* K

²³⁹ *vedanam ayuktam* ◊ K Ś] *vedanam* ayuktan Jp Pp

²⁴⁰ *tathā* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de ltar*) ◊ K Ś] *tathāpi* Jp Pp Jai

^z *gcig pa cha med ran bžin la* || *gsum gyi ran bžin mi 'thad phyir* || *de yi ran gi rig pa ni* || *bya dan byed pa'i dños por min* || (MAK 17); *kriyākārakabhedena na svasaṃvittir asya tu* | *ekasyānaṃśarūpasya traīrūpyānupapattitaḥ* || (Bodhicaryāvatāraṇāṅgikā ad 9.20, ed. p. 190, 13–14); *kriyākārakabhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu* || (Sākārasiddhiśāstra, ed. p. 471, 8); *Tarkarahasya* (ed. p. 47, 22–23).

^{aa} *de'i phyir 'di ni śes pa yi* || *ran bžin yin pas bdag śes ruñ* || *don gyi ran bžin gžan dag la* || *de yis ji ltar śes par 'gyur* || (MAK 18).

^{bb} *de yi ran bžin gžan la med* || *gañ gis de śes gžan yañ śes* || (MAK 19ab).

pratibimbasya tād rūpyād
bhāktam syād api veda[Pk37r12]nam | | 2004 | | cc
yena tv iṣṭam na vijñānam arthākāroparāgavat |
tasyāyam api [Jk102r3] naivāsti²⁴¹
prakāro bāhyavedane | | 2005 | | dd

pratibimbasyeti jñānākārasya | **tād rūpyād** ity arthasārūpyāt²⁴² | **bhāktam** ity amukhyam | **ayam**²⁴³ **apī** ity amukhya[Pp163r2]s tād rūpyād upakalpitaḥ | | TSP *ad* TS 2004–2005 | |

[T2p155a] athāpi syād yathā khaḍgo hastyādikaṁ chinatti²⁴⁴ yathā vā vahnir²⁴⁵ dāhyam dahati na caite khaḍgādayo hastyādirūpās tathā jñānam aprati[Jp208v1]pannaviṣayākā[Pp163r3]ram²⁴⁶ api viṣayam paricchetsyatīti | etat **syān matir** ityādināśaṅkate²⁴⁷ |

syān matir dantidāhyāder yathāsijvalanādayaḥ |
a[Pk37r13]tād rūpye 'pi [T1p88b] kurvanti
chedadāhādī²⁴⁸ adas tathā | | 2006 | |

chedadāhādīty²⁴⁹ etad apekṣya **dantidāhyāder** iti ṣaṣṭhī²⁵⁰ | **ada** iti etaj jñānam | ādiśabdena pradīpādayo [Pp163r4] nīlādīnām yathā²⁵¹ prakāśakā ityādi grhyate | | TSP *ad* TS 2006 | |

tad idam ityādinottaram āha [K561] |

tad idaṁ viṣamaṁ yasmāt te tathotpattihe[Jk102r4]tavaḥ |
santas tathāvidhāḥ siddhā
na jñānam²⁵² janakaṁ tathā | | 2007 | |

²⁴¹ *naivāsti* Jk ◇ K Ś] *naivasti* Pk

²⁴² *arthasārūpyāt* | Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*don dan 'dra ba las*) ◇ Ś] *artha*^o Jp^{ac}; *sārūpyāt* | Pp K Pā Gā

²⁴³ *bhāktam ity amukhyam* | *aya*^o Jp^{pc} Pp (*bhāktam ity amukhyam* | *aya*^o) T_{2D} T_{2P} ◇ K Ś] *deest* Jp^{ac}

²⁴⁴ *chinatti* Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *chinnati* Jp^{ac}; *chinnatti* Pp

²⁴⁵ *vahnir* Jp ◇ K Ś] *vahni*^o Pp

²⁴⁶ *viṣayā*^o Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *viṣaya*^o Jp^{ac}

²⁴⁷ *ādināśaṅkate* Jp^{ac} (*ādināśaṅkate*) Pp (*ādināśaṅkate*) *ādinā* | *śaṅkate* Jp^{pc}, *ādinā śaṅkate* K Ś

²⁴⁸ *cheda*^o ◇ K Ś] *cheda*^o Jk Pk

²⁴⁹ *cheda*^o ◇ K Ś] *cheda*^o Jp Pp

²⁵⁰ *chedadāhādīty etad apekṣya dantidāhyāder iti ṣaṣṭhī* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] *deest* T_{2D} T_{2P}

²⁵¹ *yathā* Jp Pp] *yathā*^o K Ś

²⁵² *jñānam* Jk ◇ K Ś] *jñāna*^o Pk

^{cc} *nirbhāsijñānapakṣe hi grāhyād bhede 'pi cetasaḥ* | *pratibimbasya tād rūpyād bhāktam syād api vedanam* | | (TS 1359); *śes pa mam bcas phyogs la ni* | | *dios su de gñis tha dad kyan* | | *de dan gzugs brñan 'dra bas na* | | *gdags pa tsam gyi tshor ba ruñ* | | (MAK 20).

^{dd} *yena tv iṣṭam na vijñānam arthasārūpyabhājanam* | *tasyāyam api naivāsti prakāro bāhyavedane* | | (TS 1360); *don gyi mam pas bsgyur ldan pa'i* | | *mam śes su žig mi 'dod pa* | | *de la phyi rol rig pa yi* | | *mam pa 'di yan yod ma yin* | | (MAK 21).

khadḡādayo hi hastyādīnām utpā[§684]dakā^{g17} eva **santo** chedakāditvena^{253oo}
 prasiddhāḥ | tathā hi — khadḡādīdhā[Pp163r₃]rābhīghāte viśiṣṭasandhaya²⁵⁴
 gajāḥ samupa[Jp208v₂]jāyante tathā ca²⁵⁵ vahnīsamparkād indhanam
 aṅgārādirūpam^{256g18} | evaṃ ghaṭādayo 'py ālokavaśāj jñānajanāyogyā
 bhavanti na tv evaṃ jñānena [Pp163r₆] viśayasya kaścīd upakāraḥ kriyate |
 kiṃ tu viśayenaiva vijñānam viśiṣṭam²⁵⁷ upajanyata iti katham akiñcitkaram
 tasya vedakam bhavet | na ca²⁵⁸ tatkāryatvam eva tadvedakatvam²⁵⁹
 vijñānasye[Pp163r₇]ti yuktaṃ kalpayitum | mā bhūc cakṣurādivedakatvam²⁶⁰
 apy asyeti^{g19} | | TSP *ad* TS 2007 | |

bhadantaśubhaguptas tv āha — vijñā[Jp208v₃ T_{2D}117a]nam anāpannaviṣa-
 yākāram²⁶¹ api²⁶² viśayaṃ pratipadyate tatparicchedarūpatvāt²⁶³ | [Pp163r₈]
 tasmān nāśaṅkā kartavyā katham paricchinatti²⁶⁴ kiṃvat paricchinattīti²⁶⁵ |
 āha ca —

katham tadgrāhakam^{266πg20} tac^{g21} cet
 tatparicchedalakṣaṇam²⁶⁷ | ²⁶⁸
 vijñānam tena [T_{2P}155b] nāśaṅkā
 katham tat kiṃvad i[Pp163r₉]ty api | |^{cc}

²⁵³ chedakāditvena em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (gcod par byed pa la sogs pa ñid du)] dāhakāditvena Jp Pp K Ś

²⁵⁴ viśiṣṭa° Jp (viśiṣṭa°) Pp ◇ K Ś] *viśiṣṭa° T_{2D} T_{2P} (khyad par can gyi)

²⁵⁵ ca em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (dan)] deest Jp Pp K Ś

²⁵⁶ aṅgārā° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] aṅgarā° Jp^{ac}

²⁵⁷ viśiṣṭam Jp (viśiṣṭam) T_{2D} T_{2P} (khyad par) ◇ Ś] viśpaṣṭam Pp K; Pā Gā (viśpaṣṭa°)

²⁵⁸ ca Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (yañ) ◇ K Ś] deest Jp^{ac}

²⁵⁹ tadvedakatvam Jp Pp ◇ K] tadvekatvam Ś

²⁶⁰ °vedakatvam Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °vedakātvam Jp^{ac}

²⁶¹ anāpanna° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] annāpanna° Jp^{ac}

²⁶² °ākāram api Jp Pp ◇ K] °ākārapi Ś

²⁶³ tatpariccheda° Pp ◇ K Ś] tatparicheda° Jp

²⁶⁴ paricchinatti ◇ K Ś] parichinnati Jp^{ac}; parichinatti Jp^{pc} Pp

²⁶⁵ paricchinatti° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] paricchinnati° Jp^{ac}

²⁶⁶ tadgrāhakam ◇ K] tatgrāhakam | Jp Pp, tad grāhakam Ś

²⁶⁷ tac cet tat° Jp ◇ K Ś] tac cet tat tat° Pp (contra metrum)

²⁶⁸ °lakṣaṇam | Jp^{pc} (°lakṣaṇam |) Jp^{ac} (°lakṣaṇam) ◇ K Ś] °lakṣaṇa° Pp

^{oo} For the correspondence between *gcod par byed pa* and *chedaka*, see Negi 1995: 1138 (s.v.).

^{ππ} In Jp and Pp, at times, the non-application of the rules of *sandhi* indicates a *caesura*.

^{cc} de 'dzin byed de ji ltar zes | | de ni yonś su gcod pa yi | | mtshan ñid yin te de yi phyir | | de ni ji ltar ci 'dra zes | | the tshom za bar mi bya'o | | (BASK 89).

^{g17} chedadāhādeḥ Jp^g

^{g18} samupajāyata iti sambandhaḥ Jp^g Pp^g

^{g19} prati hetor na yuktaṃ kalpayitum iti sambandhaḥ Jp^g Pp^g

^{g20} artha Jp^g Pp^g. In Pp^g the gloss is placed immediately above the word to be glossed.

^{g21} jñānam Jp^g Pp^g. In Pp the gloss indicates 6 as reference line number and the *signe-de-renvoi* = is inserted therein above the word *kiṃ tu*. However, a sign of correction (?) and the number 6 are found immediately above *tat*. This is perhaps to indicate the right reference of the gloss.

iti ||

tad atrāha — **tatparicchedetyādi**²⁶⁹ |[T_{1D}73b] tatparicchedarūpatvaṃ [Pk37_{r1d}] vijñānasyopapadyate |jñānarūpaḥ²⁷⁰ paricchedoyadi²⁷¹ grāhyasya sambhavet²⁷² || 2008 ||anyathā tu paricchedarū[Pk102_{r5}]paṃ jñānam iti sphuṭam |

vaktavyaṃ na ca nirdiṣṭam

ittham arthasya veda[Pk37_{r15}]nam || 2009 ||

siddhe hi vyatiriktārthaparicchedātmakatve śatiḥ sarvam etat syāt, tad²⁷³ eva tu na siddham | tathā hi — na jñānaṃ sattāmātre[Pp163_{r10}]ṇa paricchinna[Up208_{v4}]tti²⁷⁴ sarvaparicchedaprasaṅgāt | nāpi tatkāryatayā cakṣurāder api paricchedāpatteḥ²⁷⁵ | na ca sākārateṣṭā yena tādrūpyād api bhāktaṃ²⁷⁶ bhavet²⁷⁷ tatsaṃvedanam²⁷⁸ | [Pp163_{r11}] tasmād²⁷⁹ **grāhyasya** yaḥ **paricchedaḥ** sa **yadi jñānarūpo** bhavet, evaṃ jñānasyārthaparicchedarūpatvaṃ²⁸⁰ bhavet | **anyathā** katham arthaparicchedarūpatvaṃ jñānasyeti spaṣṭam abhi[Pp163_{r12}]dhīyatām²⁸¹ | tatas cārthasya paricchedād vyatirekāḥ²⁸² jñānātmataiva jāteti [Up208_{v5}] siddhā vijñaptimātratā |

[Ś685] syād etat — ko 'py asya viśeṣo 'sti yenārtham eva paricchinatti²⁸³ | sa²⁸⁴ cedanta[Pp163_{r13}]yā nirdeṣṭuṃ na śakyata ity āha — **na ca nirdiṣṭam ittham arthasya vedanam** iti | bhavatīti viśeṣaḥ |

yady apy asādhāraṇaṃ vastu sarvam eva nirdeṣṭuṃ na śakyate tathāpy udbhāvanāsaṃ[Pp163_{r14}]vṛttyā⁰⁰ kathyata eva | anyathā hi rūpādīnām²⁸⁵ api viśeṣo na vaktavyaḥ syāt | **na**²⁸⁶ **cettham** anavadhāritena

²⁶⁹ *tatparicchedetyādi* Jp K Ś | *tatparicchedetyādi* Pp

²⁷⁰ °*rūpaḥ* Jk^{pc} Pk ◊ K Ś | °*rūpa*° Jk^{ac}

²⁷¹ *yadi* Jk Pk ◊ K Ś | **yadā* T_{1D} T_{1P} (*gan tshe*)

²⁷² *sambhavet* Jk^{pc} Pk (*sambhavet*) ◊ K Ś | *sambhavāt* Jk^{ac}

²⁷³ *syāt tad* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś | *syātad* Jp^{ac}

²⁷⁴ *paricchinatti* Jp^{pc} ◊ K Ś | *paricchinatti* Jp^{ac}; *parichinatti* Pp

²⁷⁵ °*āpatteḥ* Jp Pp^{pc} ◊ K Ś | °*āpatte* Pp^{ac}

²⁷⁶ *api bhāktaṃ* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*kyañ...btags par*) | *avibhaktaṃ* K Pā Gā; *abhāktaṃ* Ś

²⁷⁷ *bhavet* Jp^{pc} ◊ K Ś | *bhave* Jp^{ac} Pp

²⁷⁸ °*saṃvedanam* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rig pa*) | °*saṃvedakam* Pp, °*saṃvedakam* K Ś

²⁷⁹ *tasmād* Jp ◊ K Ś | *tatasmād* Pp (*ditlography*)

²⁸⁰ °*pariccheda*° Pp ◊ K Ś | °*paricheda*° Jp

²⁸¹ *abhidhīyatām* Jp Pp | *abhidhīyate* K S

²⁸² *vyatirekāḥ* em.] *vyatirekāṃ* Jp^{ac}; *vyatirekāṃ u* Jp^{pc} Pp; *vyatirekāṃ tu* K Ś

²⁸³ *paricchinatti* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś | *paricchinatti* Jp^{ac}

²⁸⁴ *sa* Jp ◊ K conj. (*na{sa?}*) Ś | <<*sa/na*>> Pp; *na* Pā

²⁸⁵ *rūpā*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś | *rapā*° Jp^{ac}

²⁸⁶ *na* Jp Pp ◊ K Ś | *deest* T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁰⁰ Negi 1998: 1734 (s.v.) mentions only this passage from TSP *ad* TS 2008–2009 as proof of the correspondence between the Tib. *btags pa'i kun rdzob* and *udbhāvanāsaṃvṛtti*.

rūpe[Jp208v6]ṇā**rthasya** samvedanam jñānam iti vispaṣṭam asaṁśayaṁ
nirdiṣṭam bha[Pp163r13]vati | tasmād [T2D117b] ani[K562]rūpitenā rūpeṇa
 bhāvavyavasthāne suvyavasthitā bhāvā²⁸⁷ iti yat kiñcid etat ||TSP *ad*
 TS 2008–2009||

syād etat [T2P156a] — paricchedyārthābhāve²⁸⁸ kasyāsau paricchedo²⁸⁹ bhaved
 ity āha — **pa**[Pp163r16]**ricchedaḥ sa kasyetyādi** |

paricchedaḥ sa kasyeti na ca paryanuyogabhāk |

paricchedaḥ²⁹⁰ sa tasyātmā sukhādeḥ sātātādivat ||2010||

ātmaiva hi **sa tasya** prakāśātmatayā **pariccheda**²⁹¹ ity ucyate | yathā
sukhādeḥ [Jp208v7] **sātāteti** na hi sukhasyeti vyatirekanirdesaṁātreṇa
 ta[Pp163r17]to 'nyā sātātā²⁹² bhavet | tasmād yady api nīlasya²⁹³ paricchedaḥ
 pītasyeti vā²⁹⁴ vyatirekīva vyapadeśas²⁹⁵ tathāpi svabhāva eva sa tathā
 nīlādirūpeṇa prakāśamānas ta[Pp163v1]thocyate²⁹⁶ [Jp209r1] svasamvedanarūpa-
 tvāj jñānasya ||TSP *ad* TS 2010||

atha ko 'yaṁ svasamvidartho yadbalāt tathocyata ity āha — **svarūpetyādi** |

svarūpave[Jk102r6]danāyānyad vedakam na vyapekṣate |

na cā[Pk37r16]viditam astīdam

ity artho 'yaṁ svasamvidāḥ | |2011||^{σσff}

vyāpṛtam ityādinā **svarūpavedanāyānyan nāpekṣa**[Pp163v2]ta²⁹⁷ ity atra
 kumārīlasya²⁹⁸ codyam āśāṅkate |

vyāpṛtam hy arthavittau ca nātmānam jñānam ṛcchati |

²⁸⁷ *bhāvā* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *bhāva* Jp^{ac}

²⁸⁸ *paricchedyā*^o Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} (*gcad par bya ba*) T_{2P} (*bcad par bya ba*) ◇ K Ś] *pariccheda*^o Jp^{ac}

²⁸⁹ *paricchedo* Pp ◇ K Ś] *parichedo* Jp

²⁹⁰ *paricchedaḥ* Jk ◇ K Ś] *parichedaḥ* Pk

²⁹¹ *pariccheda* Pp ◇ K Ś] *paricheda* Jp

²⁹² 'nyā sātātā Jp Pp (*anyā sātātā*) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*sim pa nīd...gṛān du*)] 'nyā sā tathā K; 'nyatā sātātā Ś; sā tathā Pā Gā

²⁹³ *nīlasya* Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] <<nī>>nīlasya Pp^{ac} (*ditto*graphy)

²⁹⁴ vā T_{2D} T_{2P} (...gṛi) ◇ K Ś] cā^o Jp Pp

²⁹⁵ *vyāpadeśas* Jp (*vyāpadesas*) ◇ K Ś] *vya*<<va>>*padeśas* Pp

²⁹⁶ 'mānas tatho^o Jp Pp (Pp 'māna<<s ta>>tho^o)] 'mānatvāt tatho^o K em. ('mānatvā{t ta}tho^o) Ś; 'mānatvāstatho^o Jai; 'mānatvātho^o Pā

²⁹⁷ *nāpekṣata* em. based on *nāpekṣyata* Jp Pp] *na vyapekṣata* K Ś

²⁹⁸ *kumārīlasya* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gṛān nu ma len gṛi*)] *kumārīlas* Jp Pp, *kumārīlas* K Ś

^{σσ} In Jk, this *kārikā* has the number 49 (exactly like the following one), instead of 48.

^{ff} *svarūpavedanāyānyad vedakam na vyapekṣate* | *na cāviditam astīti so 'rtho 'yaṁ svasamvidāḥ* || (*Tarkasopāna*, ed. p. 283, 21–22).

tena²⁹⁹ prakāśakatve 'pi bodhāyānyat pratīkṣate³⁰⁰ || 2012 || |^{gg}
 sa hy āha — yady api³⁰¹ jñānaṃ prakāśātmakaṃ³⁰² tathāpy
 ātmaprakāśanāya param ape[Ś686]kṣate³⁰³ | **na** tu svayam **ātmānam**
ṛcchati pratipadyate tasyārtha[Pp163v₃]prakāśana eva vyāpṛtatvāt | na hy
 ekatra vyāpṛtasya tadaparityā[Jp209r₂]genānyatra³⁰⁴ tadaiva vyāpāraṇaṃ
 yuktaṃ || TSP *ad* TS 2012 || |
 atra pradīpena vyabhicāritāṃ³⁰⁵ āśaṅkya pakṣāntaram āha —
īdṛ[Pp163v₄]**śam** ityādi |

[Jk102v₁] īdṛśaṃ vā prakāśatvaṃ [Pk37r₁₇]
 tasyārthānubhavātmakaṃ |
 na cātmānubhavo 'sty asyety
 ātmano na prakāśakaṃ || 2013 || |^{hh}

nanu³⁰⁶ cāsaty ātmaprakāśātmakatve bāhyaparakāśakatvaṃ apy asya katham
 vyavasthāpyata ity āha — **satī**tyādi |

sati prakāśakatve ca vyavasthā dr̥śyate yathā |
 rūpādaḥ cakṣurādīnāṃ
 tathā[Jk102v₂]trāpi bhaviṣya[Pk37v₁]ti³⁰⁷ || 2014 || |ⁱⁱ

yathā cakṣurādīnāṃ rūpādaḥ viṣaye **prakāśaka**[Pp163v₅]**tv**avyavasthā-
 nam asaty apy ātmaprakāśakatve³⁰⁸ **tathā**[T_{2P}156b]**trāpi** jñāne **bhaviṣyati**
 || TSP *ad* TS 2014 || |

[K563 T_{2D}118a] syād etat — kim ity ātmānam antaraṅgaṃ pa[Jp209r₃]rityajya

²⁹⁹ *tena* Jk Pk ◇ Ś] *tataḥ* K Pā Gā

³⁰⁰ *pratīkṣate* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *pratīkṣyate* Jk^{ac}

³⁰¹ *yady api* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *yapi* Jp^{ac}

³⁰² *prakāśātmakaṃ* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gsal ba'i bdag ñid*) ◇ K Ś] *prakāśātmakatvaṃ* Jp^{ac}; Jp^{pc}
prakāśātmakatvaṃ Jp^{pc}; *prakāśātmakatvaṃ* Pp

³⁰³ *apekṣate* em. ◇ K Ś] *apekṣyate* Jp Pp; **nāpekṣate* T_{2D} (*ltos pa med pa yin*), T_{2P} (*bltos pa med pa yin*)

³⁰⁴ *tadaparityāgenā*^o Jp^{pc} Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *tadaparityāgonā*^o Jp^{ac}; *ubhayatadaparityāgenā*^o Pp^{ac}

³⁰⁵ *vyabhicāritāṃ* Jp ◇ Ś] *vyabhicāratāṃ* Pp; *vyabhicāritāṃ* K

³⁰⁶ *nanu* Jp Pp ◇ Ś] *na tu* K

³⁰⁷ *bhaviṣyati* Jk ◇ K Ś] *bhaviṣyapi* Pk (*lapsus calami*)

³⁰⁸ *ātmaprakāśakatve* Pp ◇ K Ś] *ātmaprakāśatve* Jp

^{rr} For the correspondence between *gsal ba'i bdag ñid* and *prakāśātmaka*, see also Negi 2005: 7346 (s.v.).

^{gg} *vyāpṛtaṃ cārthasaṃvittau jñānaṃ nātmānam ṛcchati* | *tena prakāśakatve 'pi bodhāyānyat pratīkṣyate* || (ŚV₁ ŚūV 184); *vyāpṛtaṃ cārthasaṃvittau jñānaṃ nātmānam ṛcchati* | *tena prakāśakatve 'pi bodhāyānyat pratīyate* || (ŚV₂ ŚūV 184); *vyāpṛtaṃ cānyasaṃvittau jñānaṃ nātmānam ṛcchati* | *tena prakāśakatve 'pi bodhāyānyat pratīkṣate* || (ŚV₃ ŚūV 184).

^{hh} ŚV₁ ŚūV 185; ŚV₃ ŚūV 185.

ⁱⁱ ŚV₁ ŚūV 186; *sati prakāśakatve 'pi vyavasthā dr̥śyate yathā* | *rūpādaḥ cakṣurādīnāṃ tathātrāpi bhaviṣyati* || (ŚV₃ ŚūV 186).

bāhyam eva prakāśayatīty āha — **prakāśakatvam** i[Pp163v6]tyādi |

prakāśakatvaṃ bāhye 'rthe³⁰⁹ śaktyabhāvāt tu nātmani |^{jj}

kim ity ātmaprakāśane śaktir³¹⁰ nāstūty āha — **śaktiś ca sarvabhāvānām** ityādi |

śaktiś ca sarvavastūnām³¹¹^{oo}

naiva³¹² paryanuyujyate || 2015 ||^{kk}

yathāha —

agnir dahati nākāśaṃ ko 'tra paryanuyujyatām |^{ll}

iti || TSP *ad* TS 2015 ||

nanu cetyādinā prati[Pp163v7]vidhatte |

nanu cārthasya saṃvittir³¹³ jñānam evābhidhīyate |

tasyām [Pk37v2] tadā[Jk102v3]tmabhūtāyām

ko vyāpāro 'paro bhavet || 2016 ||

yad uktam — vyāpṛtaṃ hy arthavittāy^{mmm} iti tad asaṅgatam | na hy arthavittir anyā jñānāt | tathā hi — vittir³¹⁴ upalabdhir arthapratītir vijñaptir iti **jñānam evai**[Jp209r2]taiḥ paryāyair **abhidhī**[Pp163v6]**yate** | **tasyām**³¹⁵ cārthavittau³¹⁶ **tadātmabhūtāyām** jñānātmabhūtāyām³¹⁷ kīdrśo 'paro jñānasyārthasaṃvedanātmako **vyāpāro bhaved** ātmyavyatirikto³¹⁸ yenārthavittau vyā[Pp163v9]pṛtaṃ iti syāt³¹⁹ | na cātmany eva vyāpṛtir³²⁰ yuktā³²¹ || TSP *ad* TS 2016 ||

[Ś687] syād etat — jñānātmatvam evārthavittēḥ kathaṃ siddhaṃ yena

³⁰⁹ *bāhye 'rthe* Jk T_{1D} (*phyi rol don la*) ◇ Ś] *bāhyo 'rtha* Pp; *bāhyo 'rthe* K Pā Gā; deest T_{1P}

³¹⁰ *śaktir* Jp (*śaktir*) ◇ K Ś] *śakti* Pp

³¹¹ *sarvavastūnām* Jk] *sarvabhāvānām* K Ś; (ill. *circa* 4 akṣaras)<<naṃ>> Pk

³¹² *naiva* Jk Pk^{pc}] *nai* Pk^{ac}; *naivam* K Ś

³¹³ *saṃvittir* Jk^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *saṃvitti*^o Jk^{ac}; *saṃvitti* .. r Pk

³¹⁴ *vittir* Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *vattir* Pp^{ac}

³¹⁵ *tasyām* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *tasyā* Jp^{ac}

³¹⁶ *cā*^o Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *cā*^o Pp^{ac}

³¹⁷ *jñānātmabhūtāyām* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*śes pa'i bdag ñid du gyur pa na*) ◇ K] deest Ś

³¹⁸ *ātmya*^o Jp Pp ◇ K] *ātmany a*^o Ś

³¹⁹ *syāt* Jp ◇ Ś] *yāvat* Pp; *bhavet* K Pā Gā

³²⁰ *vyāpṛtir* Jp ◇ K Ś] *vyāvṛtir* Pp (*laṣus calamī*)

³²¹ *yuktā* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *yukta* Jp^{ac}

^{oo} Even though the *pratīkas* in Jp and Pp indicate *sarvabhāvānām*, I choose *sarvavastūnām* since it is the variant attested in Jk. K is based on Pk, which is illegible. Accordingly, he likely refers to the *pratīka* in Pp. Ś copies it. *dños po mams kyi* in T_{1D} T_{1P} can be translating either variant.

^{jj} ŚV₁ ŚūV 187ab; ŚV₃ ŚūV 187ab.

^{kk} Cf. *śaktir eṣaiva bhāvānām sā kim paryanuyujyate* | (PVA *ad* PV Pratyakṣa 256cd, ed. p. 316, 9).

^{ll} *vahnir dahati nākāśaṃ ko 'tra paryanuyujyatām* | (ŚV Ākṛtīvāda 29ab); (PVA *ad* PV Pramāṇasiddhi 9cd, ed. p. 35, 7).

^{mmm} TS 2012a; ŚV ŚūV 184a.

paryāyatā jñānārthasaṃvittyor ity āha | **arthasyā**_[Pp163v10] **nubhavo rūpam**
ityādi |

arthasyānubhavo rūpaṃ³²² tac ca jñānātmakaṃ³²³ yadi |
tad arthānubhavātmataṃ jñāne yuktaṃ na cāsti tat || 2017 ||
upetārthapari_[Pk37v3] tyāgaprasaṅgāt tasya tu svataḥ |
_[Jk102v4] jāte 'py anubhavātmate
nārthavittih prasiddhyati³²⁴ || 2018 ||

arthasyānubha_[Jp209r3] **vo**³²⁵ 'vaśyaṃ **rūpaṃ** svabhāvo 'ṅikartavyaḥ |
anyathā kathaṃ tatra jñānaṃ vyāpriyeta | na hy asati śaśaviṣāṇādau³²⁶
kasyacid vyāpāraṇaṃ _[Pp163v11] yuktaṃ | tataś **ca tad** arthānubhavātmakaṃ
rūpaṃ svabhāvo **yadi** jñānād avyatiriktaṃ³²⁷ bhavet tadā **jñāne**
'rthānubhavātmakatvam | yat tad uktaṃ³²⁸ — īdṛśaṃ vā prakā-
śatvaṃ³²⁹ tasyārthānubhavā_[Pp163v12]tmakaṃ³³⁰ ity ity tad yuktaṃ syāt |
kadācin nirbadhyamāno³³¹ 'rthānubhavād _[T2P157a] avya_[Jp209r6]tiriktaṃ³³²
jñānaṃ³³³ abhyupagacched api para ity āha — **na cāsti tad** iti |
ta_[Pp163v13] **j**^{g22} jñānād avyatiriktatvaṃ³³⁴ anubhavasya | **upeto 'rtho**
'bhyupagato jñānasyātmasaṃvedanavirahalakṣaṇas _[T2D118b] tasya **parityā-**
gaprasaṅgaḥ³³⁵ | jñānasyārthānubhavāvyatirekābhyupagame³³⁶ _[Pp163v14]
svasaṃvittipra_[K564]saṅgāt |

syād etat — nārthānubhavātmavāj jñānasya prakāśakatvaṃ iṣṭam | kim

³²² *rūpaṃ* Jk ◇ K Ś] r . (ill. circa 1 akṣara) Pk

³²³ *tac ca jñānātmakaṃ* Jk T_{1D} T_{1P} (*de yañ śes bdag ñid*) ◇ K em. ({*tac ca jñā*}nātmakaṃ) Ś] (ill. circa 3 akṣaras)nātmakaṃ Pk; ...nātmakaṃ Pā

³²⁴ *prasiddhyati* Jk (*prasidhyati*) ◇ K Ś] *prasi*(ill. circa 2 akṣaras) Pk

³²⁵ *arthasyānubhavo* em. ◇ K Ś] *arthānubhavo* Jp Pp

³²⁶ *śaśaviṣāṇādau* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ri boñ gi rva la sogs pa la*) ◇ K Ś] *saśaviṣāṇādau* Jp Pp

³²⁷ *avyatiriktaṃ* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] **vyatiriktaṃ* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*tha dad par*)

³²⁸ *uktaṃ* em. ◇ K Ś] *ukta* Jp Pp

³²⁹ *prakāśatvaṃ* Jp^{ac} (*prakāśatvaṃ*) ◇ K Ś] *prakāśa<<ka>>twam* Jp^{pc}, *prakāśakatvaṃ* Pp

³³⁰ *ānubhavātmakaṃ* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*don ñams su myoñ ba'i bdag*) ◇ K Ś] *ānubhavātmarthiyāt* |
jñānasya prakāśakatvaṃ i .. kam Pp (*dittography/eye-skip*)

³³¹ *nirbadhyamāno* em. ◇ K] *nirvyadhyamāno* Jp Pp; *nirbadhyamamāno* Ś

³³² *avyatiriktaṃ* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] **vyatiriktaṃ* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*tha dad*)

³³³ *jñānaṃ* Pp ◇ K Ś] *jñānaṃ* Jp

³³⁴ *avyatiriktatvaṃ* em. ◇ K, Pā Gā (**riktatvaṃ*)] *avyatiriktaṃ* Jp Pp; *atiriktaṃ* Ś; T_{2D} T_{2P} (*tha dad pa ñid kyī*)

³³⁵ *parityāga*° Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *parityāgaḥ* Jp^{ac} Pp

³³⁶ *ānubhavāvyatirekābhyupagame* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] **anubhavavyatirekābhyupagame* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ñams su myoñ ba las tha dad par khas len na*)

Φ In Pp, the scribe reproduces by mistake a portion of text that is found in the line below (Jp209r6).

ⁿⁿ TS 2013ab; ŚV ŚūV 185ab.

^{g22} *rūpaṃ* Jp^g Pp^g

tarhy anubhavātmavād eva ke[_{p209r7}]valād ity āha — **tasya tu svata** ityādi
| tasya jñā[_{p163v15}]nasya yady apy anubhavātmakatvam³³⁷ eva kevalam
jātaṃ nārthānubhavātmakatvam | tathā ca³³⁸ nīlasyeyam saṃvittir na
pītasetyādibhedenārthasaṃvittir na siddhyet || TSP *ad* TS 2017–2018 ||

kim iti na siddhyed i[_{p163v16}]ty āha — **na hi tatretyādi** |

na³³⁹ hi tatra parasyāsti pratyāsattir nibandhanam |
yathā sākāravijñānapakṣe
'rthapratibimba[_{p37v4}]kam [T_{1r89a}] || 2019 ||

parasyeti — anākārajñānavādinaḥ | yasyedaṃ darśanam ākāravān bāhyo
'rtho nirākārā³⁴⁰ buddhir^{oo} iti || TSP *ad* TS 2019 ||

[Ś688] īdṛṣaṃ vā prakā[_{p209r8}]śatvaṃ tasyārthānubhavā[_{p163v17}]tmakam^{pp} ity
atrāha — **prakṛtyetyādi**³⁴¹ |

prakṛtyā jaḍarūpatvān nāsyā[_{j102v5}]tmānubhavo yadi |
jñānasamvedanābhāvān³⁴²
naṣṭo 'rthānubhavas³⁴³ tadā³⁴⁴ || 2020 ||

yadi vijñānaṃ jaḍarūpatayātmānaṃ³⁴⁵ na saṃvedayate **tadā** tasya svato
'pratyakṣatve **'rthānubhavo** 'py apratyakṣatayā **naṣṭaḥ**³⁴⁶ syāt || TSP *ad*
TS 2020 ||

syād eta[_{p164r1}]t — yadi nāma jñānaṃ apratyakṣam arthānubhavo 'pi³⁴⁷ kim
ity apratyakṣo³⁴⁸ bhavet | na hi rūpasyāpratyakṣatve śabdasyāpy apra-
tyakṣatā syād ity āha — **arthasyānubhavo**³⁴⁹ **nā**[_{p164r2}]**metyā**[_{p209v1}]di |

arthasyānubhavo nāma³⁵⁰ jñānaṃ evābhidhīyate |

³³⁷ *anubhavā*° em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ñams su myoñ ba'i*) ◇ K Ś] *abhavā*° Jp Pp

³³⁸ *ca* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*yañ*) ◇ K em. ({*ca*}) Gā] deest Jp Pp Ś

³³⁹ *na* Jk ◇ K Ś] (ill. circa 1 *akṣara*) Pk

³⁴⁰ *nirākārā* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *narākārā* Jp^{ac}

³⁴¹ *prakṛtyetyādi* Jp ◇ K Ś] *prakṛtyetyādi* Pp

³⁴² °*saṃvedanā*° Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] °*saṃvedana*° Jk^{ac}

³⁴³ °*bhāvān naṣṭo 'rthānubhavas* Jk (°*bhāvān naṣṭor*thānubhavas) T_{1D} (*med pa na* || ...*don gyi ñams myoñ 'jig*) °*bhā*(ill. circa 4 *akṣaras*)nubhavas Pk; °*bhāvāt parārthānubhavas* K Ś; deest T_{1P}

³⁴⁴ *tadā* Jk^{pc} Pk T_{1D} (*de tshe*) ◇ Ś] *tathā* Jk^{ac} Gā, *tadā*{*thā*? } K conj.; deest T_{1P}

³⁴⁵ °*rūpatayā*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °*rūpātayā*° Jp^{ac}

³⁴⁶ *naṣṭaḥ* Jp Pp ◇ Ś] *neṣṭaḥ* K conj. (*na*{*i*? }*ṣṭaḥ*), T_{2D} T_{2P} (*mi 'thad*); *iṣṭaḥ* Pā

³⁴⁷ °*bhavo 'pi* Jp^{pc} Pp (Pp °*bha*<<*v*>>°*opi*) ◇ K Ś] °*bhavopā* Jp^{ac}

³⁴⁸ *apratyakṣo* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] **pratyakṣo* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*mñon sum du*)

³⁴⁹ *arthasyānubhavo* Jp Pp ◇ K] *arthasyānubhave* Ś

³⁵⁰ *nāma* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *nātma* Jk^{ac}

^{oo} *ākāravān bāhyo 'rtho nirākārā buddhir iñ vacanāt* (TSP *ad* TS 252, ed. p. 130, 6–7); *nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ* | *ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ* | (Śābarabhāṣya *ad* 1.1.5, ed. p. 31, 3–4); *nirākārā no buddhiḥ, ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ* [...] (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* by Jitāri, ed. p. 2 n. 7).

^{pp} TS 2013ab; ŚV ŚūV 185ab.

tasyāprasiddharū[Pk37_{v3}]patve^{351xx}

prasiddhis tasya kā parā || 2021 ||

[T_{2P}157b] na hi jñānasyānyad rūpaṃ nirdhārayāmo 'nyatrārthānubhavāt³⁵² |
anirdhārayantaḥ³⁵³ †§svavācam† anyatvaṃ³⁵⁴ niścayaṃ³⁵⁵ vyavaharantaḥ³⁵⁶
svaparān³⁵⁷ vipralabhemahi | **tasya** jñā[Pp164_{r3}]nasyā**prasiddharūpatve**
satī **prasiddhis**³⁵⁸ **tasyārthānubhava**sya **kā parā** bhavet | naiva kācit
|| TSP *ad* TS 2021 ||

athāpi syāj jñānāntareṇa tasya siddhir bhaviṣyatīty āha —
jñānāntareṇetyā[Pp164_{r3}]di |

[T_{1D}74a] jñānāntare[Jk102_{v6}]nānubhave

so 'rthaḥ svānubhave satī³⁵⁹ |

na siddhaḥ³⁶⁰ siddhyasaṃsiddheḥ

kadā siddho bhavet punaḥ || 2022 ||

tajjñānājñānājātau³⁶¹ ced asiddhaḥ svātma[Pk37_{v6}]saṃvidi |

paraṃsaṃvidi siddhas tu sa³⁶² ity etat subhāṣitam || 2023 ||

[K565] siddher jñānasyāsiddhiḥ³⁶³ | [T_{2D}119a] na hy aprasiddhavyaktikaṃ³⁶⁴
vyaktam iti yujyate³⁶⁵ | [Jp209_{v2}] tathā hi — na tāvad arthasya
svānubhavakāle 'pi siddhis tadabhivyaktisvabhāvasyānubhava[Pp164_{r3}]sya
tadānīm asiddhatvāt | **kadā** tasya siddhir bhaviṣyatīti vaktavyam | TSP *ad*
TS 2022 ||

³⁵¹ °āprasiddharūpatve Jk^{pc}] °āprasiddhirūpatve Jk^{ac} Pk K Ś

³⁵² °mo 'nyatrārthānubhavāt em. ◇ K] mo nyatrārthānubhāvāt Jp^{ac}; moḥ <<'>>nyatrārthānubhāvāt Jp^{pc};
mo 'nyatrārthānubhāvāt Pp Ś; °nubhavāt Pā Gā

³⁵³ anirdhārayantaḥ Jp^{pc} Pp (anirdhārayamtaḥ) ◇ K Ś] anirdhārayamta Jp^{ac}

³⁵⁴ svavācam anyatvaṃ Jp Pp ◇ Ś] svavācam anyatvaṃ {svabhāvam anyam tam?} K conj.; svabhāvam
anyam tam Gā; T_{2D} T_{2P} (gṛān nīd du...†sion du 'gro ba†)

³⁵⁵ niścayaṃ em. ◇ K Ś] niścaya° Jp Pp

³⁵⁶ vyavaharantaḥ Jp^{pc} Pp (vyavaharamtaḥ) ◇ K Ś] vyavaharamta Jp^{ac}

³⁵⁷ svaparān em. ◇ K conj. (svaparānu{n?}) Ś] svaparān u Jp Pp Pā

³⁵⁸ prasiddhis Jp^{pc} Pp (Pp prasiddhiḥ) ◇ K Ś] prasiddhirthas Jp^{ac}

³⁵⁹ satī Jk ◇ K Ś] (ill. circa 2 akṣaras) Pk

³⁶⁰ na siddhaḥ Jk T_{1D} T_{1P} (ma grub) ◇ Ś] (ill. circa 2 akṣaras) ddhaḥ Pk; pra{a?}siddhaḥ K conj.; prasi-
ddhaḥ Pā; asiddhaḥ Gā

³⁶¹ tajjñānājñāna° Jk^{pc} (<<ta>>jñānājñāna°) T_{1P} (de śes śes) ◇ K Ś] na jñānājñāna° Pk; jñānājñāna°
Jk^{ac} (contra metrum); *tajjñāna° T_{1D} (de yi śes)

³⁶² sa Jk^{pc} ◇ K Ś] na Jk^{ac} Pk

³⁶³ °āsiddhiḥ Jp Pp T_{2D} (ma grub pa) T_{2P} (ma grub) ◇ Ś] asiddheḥ K Pā Gā

³⁶⁴ na hy aprasiddha° Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (ma grub pa ni...ma yin)] tasya prasiddha° Pp; pra{a?}siddha° K
conj.; na hy asiddha° Ś; prasiddha° Pā; asiddha° Gā

³⁶⁵ yujyate Jp Pp ◇ Ś] {na} yujyate K conj. Gā

xx °āprasiddharūpatve is mirrored in the commentary. See *tasya jñānasyāprasiddharūpatve* (TSP *ad* TS 2021).

tajjñānājñānajatāv³⁶⁶ arthajñānājñānotpattikāle³⁶⁷ siddhir bhaviṣyatīti
cet | **etad** ati[Š689]**subhā**[Pp164r₆]**ṣitam** | yo hi³⁶⁸ nāma svānubhava-kāle na
siddhaḥ sa katham anyānubhava-kāle³⁶⁹ setsyatīti || TSP *ad* TS 2023 ||

siddhyatu nāma yady anavasthā na bhavet | sā [Pp209v₃] tu durvāreti
darśayann āha — **ta**[Pp164r₇]**syāpy anubhava** ityādi |

[Jk103r₇] tasyāpy anubhave 'siddhe³⁷⁰

prathamasyāpy³⁷¹ asiddhatā |

tatrānyasaṃvidutpattāv anavasthā prasajyate || 2024 ||

tasyeti dvitīyasyārthajñānājñānasya | **prathamasyety** arthānubhavasya |
asiddhateti³⁷² nāsyā siddhir astīty asiddhas tadbhāvo³⁷³ 'siddhatā |

kiṃ [Pp164r₈] ca yadi jñānāntareṇānubhavo 'ṅgīkriyate tadā tatrāpi jñānāntare
smṛtir utpadyata eva jñānājñānam³⁷⁴ mamotpannam³⁷⁵ iti | tasyāpy
apareṇānubhavo va[Pp164r₉]ktavyaḥ, na hy ananubhūte smṛtir yu[Pp209v₄]ktā |
tataś cema³⁷⁶ jñānamālāḥ³⁷⁷ ko 'nanyakarmā [T_{2P}158a] janaya-tīti vaktavyam |
na tāvad arthaḥ, tasya mūlajñānaviṣayatvāt³⁷⁸ | [Pp164r₁₀] nāpīndriyālokaḥ,
tayoś³⁷⁹ cakṣurjñāna³⁸⁰ evopayogāt | nāpi nirmittā, sadāsattvādiprasaṅgāt
|| TSP *ad* TS 2024 ||

saiva pūrvadhīr uttarottarām buddhiṃ janaya-tīti ce[Pp164r₁₁]d ity³⁸¹ āha —
gocarāntaretyādi³⁸² |

gocarāntarasañcāras ta[Pk37v₇]thā na syāt sa cekṣyate |^{q9}

³⁶⁶ °jñānājñāna° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | °jñānājñāna° Jp^{ac}

³⁶⁷ °kāle em. partly based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dus su*) ◇ K Ś | °kāle 'pi Jp Pp; *kali* Pā Gā

³⁶⁸ *hi* Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś | *ha* Pp^{ac}

³⁶⁹ *katham anyānubhava°* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ji līar g'zan nāms su myōn ba'i*) ◇ K conj. (*katham asvā{nyā?}nubhava°*) Gā | *katham asvānubhava°* Jp^{pc} Pp Ś; *kathasvānubhava°* Jp^{ac}

³⁷⁰ *anubhave 'siddhe* Jk^{pc} (*anubhavesiddhe*) T_{1D} T_{1P} (*nāms myōn ma grub na*) ◇ Ś | *anubhavesiddhi* Jk^{ac}; *anubhave*(ill. circa 2 *akṣaras*) Pk; *anubhave { 'siddhe? }* K conj.; *anubhave...Pā*

³⁷¹ *prathamasyā°* Jk ◇ K Ś | (ill. circa 3 *akṣaras*)syā° Pk

³⁷² °ānubhavasya | *asiddhate°* em. ◇ K em. (°ānubhavasya | {*a*}*siddhate°*) Ś, **asiddhate°* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ma grub pa nīd*) | °ānubhavasya^{sti} *siddhate°* Jp^{ac}; °ānubhavasya *siddhate°* Jp^{pc} Pp Pā

³⁷³ *tadbhāvo* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de'i dños po nī*) ◇ K Ś | *tadabhāvo* Jp; *tadabhāve* Pp

³⁷⁴ °jñānam Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*śes pa*) ◇ K Ś | °jñāne Jp^{ac} Pp

³⁷⁵ *mamotpannam* Jp ◇ K Ś | *manotpannam* Pp (*lāpsus calamī*)

³⁷⁶ °emā Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*'di dag*) ◇ K Ś | °emām Jp^{ac}

³⁷⁷ °mālāḥ em. ◇ K Ś | °mālām Jp; °mālo Pp

³⁷⁸ °jñānaviṣayatvāt Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | °jñānaṣayatvāt Jp^{ac}

³⁷⁹ *tayoś* Pp ◇ K Ś | *tayo* Jp

³⁸⁰ *cakṣur°* Jp^{ac} Pp ◇ K | *cakṣu°* Jp^{ac}; *cajñur°* Ś

³⁸¹ *ced ity* Jp Pp ◇ Ś | *ced* K Pā Gā

³⁸² *gocarāntaretyādi* Jp^{pc} (*gocarāntaretyādi*) Pp ◇ K Ś | *gocarāntaretyādi* Jp^{ac}

¶ anyānubhava° corresponds to *parasamvidi* in TS 2023c.

^{q9} viṣayāntarasañcāras tathā na syāt sa ceṣyate || (PS 1.12cd). Cf. *tatrāpi hi smṛtīviṣayāntarasañcāras tathā na syāt sa cekṣate ityādyācāryasiddhāntaṃ muktavādhikadoṣābhidhānāya* | Vibhūticandra's Glosses (*ad* PV Pratyakṣa 484, ed p. 261 n. 5).

gocarāntarasañcāre
 yad antyaṃ tat svato [Jk103r₂] 'nyataḥ || 2025 ||
 na siddham asya cāsiddhau³⁸³ sarveṣāṃ apy asiddhatā |
 ataś cāndhyam³⁸⁴ aśeṣasya jagataḥ samprasajyate³⁸⁵ || 2026 ||
 an[Pk37v₈]tyasya tu svataḥ siddhāv anyeṣāṃ api sā dhruvam |
 jñānatvād anyathā³⁸⁶ naiṣāṃ
 jñānatvaṃ³⁸⁷ [Jk103r₃] te³⁸⁸ ghaṭādivat || 2027 ||

evaṃ hi viṣayāntarasañcāro na prāpnoti | tathā hi — pūrvapūrvā
 buddhir uttarottarasya jñā[Jp209v₃]nasya viṣayabhāvenāvasthitā pratyāsannā
 co[Pp164r₁₂]pādānakāraṇatayā,³⁸⁹ tām tādṛśīm antaraṅgikāṃ tyaktvā katham
 śca³⁹⁰ bahiraṅgam arthaṃ gṛhṇīyāt | [T_{2D}119b] na cāpy arthaḥ sannihito 'pi³⁹¹
 tām pratibaddhum³⁹² [K566] samarthas tasya bahiraṅgatvāt |

[Pp164r₁₃] atha bahiraṅgo 'pi san pratibadhnīyāt tadā na kadācit kaścid
 buddhim³⁹³ anubhavet | tathā hi — na sā³⁹⁴ kācid avasthāsti yasyām artho
 na sannihita³⁹⁵ iti smṛtir a[Jp209v₆ Pp164r₁₄]py ucchinā syād anubhavābhā-
 vāt³⁹⁶ |

kiṃ ca ye³⁹⁷ 'tītādivikalpā³⁹⁸ viṣayasannidhānam antareṇa bhavanti teṣāṃ
 sañcārakāraṇābhāvād³⁹⁹ vikalpaparamparāyām ā saṃ[Pp164r₁₃]sāram avasthā-
 nān na kasyacid arthacintā syāt |

bhavatu nāmārthāntarasañcāro 'nupapadyamāno⁴⁰⁰ 'pi | tathāpi yat tad

³⁸³ *na siddham asya cāsiddhau* Jk ◇ Ś | *na* (ill. circa 4 akṣaras) *cāsiddhau* Pk; *na si* {*ddhyet tasya cā*} *siddhau* K em., *na siddhyet tasya cāsiddhau* Gā; *na si*...*siddhau* Pā

³⁸⁴ *cāndhyam* em. ◇ K Ś | *cāndhyam* Jk Pk

³⁸⁵ *samprasajyate* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś | *prasajyate* Jk^{ac} (*contra metrum*)

³⁸⁶ *jñānatvād anyathā* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś | (ill. circa 6 akṣaras) Jk^{ac}

³⁸⁷ *jñānatvaṃ* Jk ◇ K Ś | (ill. circa 2 akṣaras) *tvam* Pk

³⁸⁸ *te* Jk Pk ◇ Ś | *syād* K Pā Gā; **vaḥ* T_{1D} T_{1P} (*khyed cag la*)

³⁸⁹ *copādāna*^o Jp ◇ K Ś | *caipādāna*^o Pp

³⁹⁰ *ca* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś | *deest* T_{2D} T_{2P}

³⁹¹ *sannihito* 'pi Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś | *sannihito sma* 'pi Pp^{ac}

³⁹² *pratibaddhum* em. based on *pratibaddhum* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gegs byed par*) | *pratiraddhum* Pp; *pratiroddhum* K Pā Gā; *pratiboddhum* Ś

³⁹³ *buddhim* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*blo*) ◇ K conj. (*vr* {*dbu*?} *ddhim*) Ś | *vṛddhi*^o Pp Pā

³⁹⁴ *sā* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de ni*) ◇ Ś | *deest* K Pā Gā

³⁹⁵ *sannihita* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *sannihitā* Jp^{ac}

³⁹⁶ *anubhavābhāvāt* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ñams su myon ba med pa'i phyir*) ◇ K | *ananubhavābhāvāt* Ś

³⁹⁷ *kim ca ye* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gzan yan gan dag*) ◇ K Ś | *kim cāyam* Pp

³⁹⁸ *°vikalpā* Jp ◇ K Ś | *°vikalpo* Pp; **°vikalpa*^o T_{2D} T_{2P} (*nam par rtog pa'i*)

³⁹⁹ *sañcārakāraṇā*^o Jp^{pc} Pp (*sañcārakāraṇā*^o) ◇ K Ś | *cārakāna*^o Jp^{ac}

⁴⁰⁰ *nupapadyamāno* Jp (*nupapadyamāno*) Pp ◇ K | *nupadyamāno* Ś

^{ωω} Here, *gegs byed par* likely translates *pratibaddhum*, as shown below by the correspondence between *gegs byed pa yin pa* and *pratibadhnīyāt*. Negi (1993: 493 s.v.) brings forward this very passage as an instance of the correspondence between *gegs byed par* and *pratiroddhum*.

antyaṃ jñānaṃ^{401aaa} tat kenānubhūyeta vaktavyam |

[Ś690] a[Pp164_{r16}]thāpi⁴⁰² syāt saivottarā buddhir arthāntaragrāhiṇī⁴⁰³ pūrvāṃ dhiya[Jp209_{v7}]m⁴⁰⁴ arthaṃ cobhayaṃ api grhṇātīti |

tad etad asamyak⁴⁰⁵ | tathā hi — yadā⁴⁰⁶ śabdajñānād anantaraṃ rūpagrāhi jñānaṃ [Pp164_{r17}] bhavati tadā tasmin rūpagrāhiṇī⁴⁰⁷ jñāne śabdajñānasya pratibhāsāt tadārūḍhasyāpi⁴⁰⁸ śabdasya pratibhāsaḥ prāpnoti | [T_{2P}158b] yasyāpi^{g23} nirākārajñānaṃ tasyāpi na śabda[Pp164_{v1}]grahaṇam antareṇa tadgrāhakasya⁴⁰⁹ grahaṇam yuktam, na hi daṇḍagrahaṇam antareṇa tadgrāhakasya daṇḍino grahaṇam [Jp209_{v6}] nyāyyam⁴¹⁰ iti rūpagrāhiṇī śkaṣur^gjñāne⁴¹¹ śabdasyāpi pra[Pp164_{v2}]tibhāsaḥ syāt | tathā cintājñāne 'py akārādiviṣayiṇī^{412βββ} yathoktanītyābhlilāpadvayaṃ⁴¹³ ekasminn akrameṇa^{414g24} syāt | tathā hi — yadekārācintā-samanantaram a[Pp164_{v3}]kāraṃ cintayati tadā tadakārācintājñānaṃ ikārāgrāhakam api cintayatīti svajñānasamārūḍhasyēkārābhlilāpasyākārābhlilāpini⁴¹⁵⁴¹⁶ jñāne prati[Jp210_{r1}]bhāsaḥ prā[Pp164_{v4}]pnoti | kiṃ ca sarvaṃ eva vastu vāradvayaṃ⁴¹⁷ pratibhāseta svajñānakāle svajñānajñānakāle ca bhāsanāt⁴¹⁸ | na caivaṃ pratibhāso 'stīty [T_{2D}120a]

⁴⁰¹ *yat tad antyaṃ jñānaṃ* Jp (*yat tad antyaṃ jñānaṃ*) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*mtha' śes pa gaṇ yin pa*) | *yat tad atyaṃ jñānaṃ* Pp; *yat tad anyajñānaṃ* Ś; *yat tad anyaj jñānaṃ* K; *yad anyaj jñānaṃ* Pā Gā

⁴⁰² *athāpi* Jp Pp ◊ Ś | *atha* K Pā Gā

⁴⁰³ *arthāntaragrāhiṇī* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*don gzan 'dzin pa'i [blo sna ma]*) | *arthāntaragrāhiṇī* Jp^{pc} Pp K Ś; *thāntaragrāhiṇī* Jp^{ac}

⁴⁰⁴ *dhiyam* Jp Pp ◊ K | *dhimay* Ś

⁴⁰⁵ *tad etad asamyak* Jp Pp ◊ K Ś | *deest* T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁴⁰⁶ *yadā* Jp Pp ◊ K Ś | *deest* T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁴⁰⁷ *tasmin rūpa* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś | *tasmin* | *pa* Jp^{ac}

⁴⁰⁸ *tadārūḍhasyā* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de la snaṇ ba'i*) | *tadā rūḍhasyā* K Ś

⁴⁰⁹ *tadgrāhakasya* Jp K Ś | *tadugrāhakasya* Pp

⁴¹⁰ *nyāyyam* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś | *nyāyyam* Jp^{ac}

⁴¹¹ *caṣur* Jp ◊ K Ś | *caṣu* Pp; *deest* T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁴¹² *akārā* em. T_{2D} T_{2P} (*yi ge a la*) ◊ K Pā Gā | *ākārā* Jp Pp Ś

⁴¹³ *ābhlilāpa* Jp ◊ K | *ābhlilāpaḥ* Pp; *ābhlilāsa* Ś

⁴¹⁴ *ekasminn akrameṇa* Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gcig la rim ma yin par*) ◊ Ś | *ekasmin krameṇa* Jp^{ac}; *ekasminn u krameṇa* Pp; *ekasminn u kta krameṇa* K em.; *nnuktakrameṇa* | *akrameṇa yugapad ity arthaḥ* | Gā

⁴¹⁵ *samārūḍhasyē* Jp ◊ K Ś | *samāmārūḍhasyē* Pp

⁴¹⁶ *ākārābhlilāpini* Jp ◊ K Ś | *ākārābhlilāpini* Pp

⁴¹⁷ *vāradvayaṃ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś | *vāra* Jp^{ac}

⁴¹⁸ *svajñānajñānakāle ca bhāsanāt* em. partly based on *ca bhāsanāt* Jp (*eye-skip*) T_{2D} (*dan ran gi rig pas śes pa'i dus su snaṇ ba'i phyir*) | *vabhāsanāt* Pp K Ś; **svajñānakāle ca bhāsanāt* T_{2P} (*dan ran gi śes pa'i dus su snaṇ ba'i phyir*)

^{aaa} *yat tad anyaj jñānaṃ* (em. in K) is also possible.

^{βββ} *akārā* (em. in K, also partially supported by T_{2D} and T_{2P}) is confirmed by the following occurrences of *akāra*.

^{g23} *mate* Jp^g

^{g24} *yugapat* Jp^g

ayuktam⁴¹⁹yy uttarayā⁴²⁰ buddhyā dvayor⁴²¹ grahaṇam |
 athāpi syād e[Pp164v₅]kam⁴²² antyaṃ jñānam ananubhūtam asmṛtaṃ cāstāṃ
 ko doṣaḥ syād ity āha — [Jp210r₂] **gocarāntarasañcāra** ityādi⁴²³ |
 svasaṃvitter anabhyupagamān na svataḥ siddhaḥ, nāpi⁴²⁴ parataḥ
 anava[Pp164v₆]sthādoṣāt | tasyāntyasya**āsiddhau**⁴²⁵ satyāṃ pūrvakasyāpy
 asiddhiḥ,⁴²⁶ apratyakṣopalambhakatvāt | tataś cārthasyāpy asiddhir iti na
 kadācit kiñcid apy⁴²⁷ upalabhyeta | tataś **cāndhya**[Pp164v₇]**m** āyātam
aśeṣasya⁴²⁸ **jagataḥ** |
 ath**āntyasya**⁴²⁹ yathoktadoṣabhayāt svasaṃvittiyā⁴³⁰ [Š691] **svata** eva siddhir
 abhyupagamya tadā tadvad eva [Jp210r₃] sarvasya jñānatvāviśeṣāt⁴³¹
 svasaṃvi[Pp164v₈]d astu | [T_{2P}159a] prayogaḥ — yaj jñānaṃ tad
 ātmabodhaṃ⁴³² praty anapekṣitānyavyāpāraṃ⁴³³ jñānatvād antyajñā-
 navat⁴³⁴ | jñānaṃ ca vivādāspadibhūtaṃ jñānaṃ iti svabhāvahetuḥ |
 anya[Pp164v₉]thā hi yat svato na siddhaṃ⁴³⁵ tasya **ghaṭādivaj** jaḍarūpatayā⁴³⁶
 jñānatvam eva hiyete bādhakaṃ pramāṇam | | TSP *ad* TS 2025–2027 | |
 satī prakāśakatve⁴³⁷ vyavasthā dṛśyate⁴³⁸ yathe^{rr}ty atrā[Pp164v₁₀]ha⁴³⁹ —
vijñānaṃ janayad ityādi |
 vijñānaṃ janayad rūpe cakṣus tasya prakāśakam |

⁴¹⁹ *ayuktam* em. ◇ K Ś] *amuktam* Jp (*lapsus calami*) Pp

⁴²⁰ *uttarayā* em. ◇ K Ś] *uttarāyā* Jp Pp

⁴²¹ *dvayor* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *dveyor* Jp^{ac}

⁴²² *syād ekam* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *syāt dekam* Jp^{ac}

⁴²³ *ityādi* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*śes hya ba la sogṣ pa*) ◇ Ś] *iti* K Pā Gā

⁴²⁴ *siddhaḥ, nāpi* em. ◇ Ś] *siddham* | *nāpi* Jp; *siddha nāpi* Pp; *siddhatā, {nā}pi* K em., *siddhatā nāpi* Gā; *siddhatāpi* Pā

⁴²⁵ °*āntyasya*° Jp Pp (°*āntyasya*°) °*āntasya*° K Ś

⁴²⁶ °*āpy asiddhiḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °*āpyisiddhaḥ* Jp^{ac}

⁴²⁷ *apy* Jp ◇ Ś] *abhy*° Pp; deest K Pā Gā

⁴²⁸ *aśeṣasya* Jp (*aśeṣasya*) Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *aśaiṣasya* Pp^{ac}

⁴²⁹ °*āntyasya* Jp^{pc} Pp (*āntyasya*) °*āntasya* K Ś; °*ātyasya* Jp^{ac}

⁴³⁰ *svasaṃvittiyā* Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *svasaṃvittyo* Jp^{ac} Pp

⁴³¹ *jñānatvā*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *jñānatva*° Jp^{ac}

⁴³² *ātma*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *ātmyā*° Jp^{ac}

⁴³³ °*ānya*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °*ānyayā*° Jp^{ac}

⁴³⁴ *antyajñānavat* Jp Pp (*amtyajñānavat*) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*mtha'i śes pa b'zin*) ◇ K] deest Ś

⁴³⁵ *siddham* Jp (*siddham*) ◇ Ś] *siddhas* Pp K

⁴³⁶ *jaḍarūpatayā* Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2P} (*bems po'i no bo 'ñid kyis*) ◇ K Ś] *jaḍarūpatayā* Jp^{ac}; T_{2D} (*gzugs kyi yul can gyi*)

⁴³⁷ *prakāśakatve* Jp (*prakāśakatve*) Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} ◇ K] *prakāśakatve* ca Ś

⁴³⁸ *dṛśyate* Jp (*dṛśyate*) ◇ K Ś] *dṛśyete* Pp

⁴³⁹ *atrā*° Jp Pp (Pp *atr*<ā°>) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*'di la*) deest K Ś

yy *amuktam* in Jp is likely a *lapsus calami* for *ayuktam* in Xp.

rr *satī prakāśakatve* ca *vyavasthā dṛśyate yathā* | (TS 2014ab); ŚV ŚūV 186ab.

na tu tasyāvabo[Pk37_{v9}]dhatvāt taj jñānenāsyā kopamā || 2028 ||
 [K567] rūpaviśayam **vijñā**[Jp210_{r4}]**nam janayac**⁴⁴⁰⁸⁸⁸ **cakṣū**⁴⁴¹ rūpasya
prakāśakam ucyate | vijñānam **tu** na kiñcid rūpe karoti⁴⁴² virūpasyaiva⁴⁴³
 janakatvāt⁴⁴⁴ | [Pp164_{v11}] na cākurvāt kiñcit prakāśakam yujyate 'tiprasaṅgāt |
tat⁴⁴⁵ tasmāt |⁴⁴⁶ **upamā** sādrśyam || TSP *ad* TS 2028 ||

yatsaṃvedanam eva syād yasya saṃvedanam⁴⁴⁷ dhruvam |
 tasmād avyatiriktaṃ [Jk103_{r4}] tat tato vā na vibhidyate || 2029 ||

yathā nīladhiyaḥ svā[Pk37_{v10}]tmā dvitīyo vā yathodupaḥ |
 nīladhīvedanam cedam nīlākārasya vedanam⁴⁴⁸ || 2030 ||

yatsaṃvedanam ityādinā nīladyākārataddhiyor abhedasāadhanāya nirākā-
 rajñā[Pp164_{v12}]navādinam prati pramāṇayati |

yasya [T_{2D}120b] **saṃvedanam** — yatsaṃvedanam, tad eva **yatsaṃveda-**
nam^{449eee} — yasya saṃvedanam⁴⁵⁰ niyamena, nānyat | tasmāt [Jp210_{r3}]
 prathamayacchabdavācyād abhinnaṃ kṛtam ekāntena tad dvī[Pp164_{v13}]tīya-
 yacchabdavācyam⁴⁵¹ | yad vā viparyāyeṇābhedaḥ sādhyah | etad uktaṃ
 bhavati — yad yasmād⁴⁵² aprthaksaṃvedanam⁴⁵³ eva⁴⁵⁴ tat⁴⁵⁵ tasmād
 abhinnaṃ **yathā nīladhī**⁴⁵⁶ svasvabhāvāt⁴⁵⁷ | **yathā vā** taimi-
 rikajñāna[Pp164_{v14}]pratibhāsi⁴⁵⁸ **dvitīya uḍupaś** candramāḥ | **nīla-**
dhīvedanam cedam itī pakṣadharmopasaṃhāraḥ | [T_{2P}159b] dharmy
 atra⁴⁵⁹ nīlākārataddhiyau | tayor abhinnatvaṃ sādhyadharmah | yathoktaḥ

⁴⁴⁰ *janayac* Jp (*janayat*) ◊ K Ś] *janayata* Pp

⁴⁴¹ *cakṣū* Jp ◊ K Ś] *cakṣu*° Pp

⁴⁴² *karoti* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *karo* Jp^{ac}

⁴⁴³ *virūpasyaiva* Jp Pp ◊ K Ś] **tadrūpasyaiva* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gzugs űid de*)

⁴⁴⁴ *janakatvāt* em. based on <<jñā/ja>>*nakatvāt* Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*skyed par byed pa'i phyr*)
 <<jñā/jā>>*nakatvāt* Jp^{ac}, *jñānakatvāt* Pp K Ś

⁴⁴⁵ *tat* Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*des na nī*), *ta* Jp^{ac}; deest K Ś

⁴⁴⁶ *tasmāt* | Jp^{pc} Pp (*tasmād*) ◊ K Ś] *tasmād u* Jp^{ac}

⁴⁴⁷ *saṃvedanam* Jk ◊ K Ś] (ill. *circa* 1 *aḥsara*)*vedanam* Pk

⁴⁴⁸ *vedanam* Jk (*vedanam*) ◊ Ś] *ve*(ill. *circa* 2 *aḥsaras*) Pk; *vedanāt* K Pā Gā

⁴⁴⁹ *tad eva yatsaṃvedanam* em.] *tad eva ya*<<*n na/t ta*>> | *saṃvedanam* Jp^{ac}, *tad eva ya*<<*n na/t ta*>> *saṃvedanam* Jp^{pc}, *tad eva yan na saṃvedanam* Pp Ś; *tad eva* K Pā Gā

⁴⁵⁰ *saṃvedanam* em. ◊ K Ś] *saṃvedana*° Jp Pp

⁴⁵¹ *dvitīya*° em.] *dvitīyam* Jp Pp K Ś

⁴⁵² *yad yasmād* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gañ žig gañ las*) ◊ K em. ({*yat*} *yasmād*) Gā] *yasmād* Jp Pp Ś

⁴⁵³ *aprthak*° Pp ◊ K Ś] *aprthak* | Jp

⁴⁵⁴ *eva* em. ◊ K Ś] *evā* Jp Pp

⁴⁵⁵ *tat* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *ta* Jp^{ac}

⁴⁵⁶ *nīladhī* em. ◊ K Ś] *nīladhī*° Jp Pp

⁴⁵⁷ *svasvabhāvāt* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *svabhāvāt* Jp^{ac}

⁴⁵⁸ °*pratibhāsi* Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*snañ ba'ñ*) ◊ Ś] °*pratiḍubhāsi* Jp^{ac} Pp; °*pratibhābāsi* K Pā Gā

⁴⁵⁹ *atra* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *annu* Jp^{ac}

⁸⁸⁸ In Jp, the *virāma* below the letter *t* is hardly readable.

^{eee} The *aḥsara na/ta* in Jp is most likely a *lapsus calami*/misunderstanding of a *virāma* in Xp.

sahopalambhaniyamō [Pp164_{v15}] hetuḥ | [Jp210_{r6}]^ੴ īdṛśa evācāryāye sahopa-
lambhaniyamād ityāda^{ss} prayoge hetvartho 'bhipretaḥ |

[Ś692] tatra bhadantaśubhaguptas tv āha — viruddho 'yaṃ hetuḥ, yasmāt

sahaśabdaś ca loka 'smin [Pp164_{v16}] naivānyena⁴⁶⁰ vinā kvacit |
viruddho 'yaṃ tato⁴⁶¹ hetur yady asti saḥavedanam | |^{tt}

iti | | tad etad asamyak⁴⁶² | yasya vipakṣa eva bhāvaḥ⁴⁶³ sa viruddho hetuḥ |
na cāsyā vipakṣa eva bhāvaḥ⁴⁶⁴ sapakṣe [Pp164_{v17}] 'pi bhāvāt | [Jp210_{r7}] tathā hi
— candradvayasya sahopalambhābhīmāno 'sti loka na ca tayoṛ bhedo 'sti
paramārthataḥ |

atha ca saha⁴⁶⁵ śasīdvayam upalabhāmaha iti⁴⁶⁶ vaktāro bhavanti | evam
ihā[Pp165_{r1}]pi | jñānād avyatiriktam api bahir iva bhāsamānam⁴⁶⁷ ākāraṃ
dvitīyaṃ kṛtvā kalpitabhedanibandhanaḥ sahaśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ | na hi
sarvaḥ [Jp210_{r8}] śābdo vyavahāro yathāvastunive[Pp165_{r2}]śī yena sahaśabda-
prayogamātreṇa vastupratibaddhasya līngasyānyatvaṃ syād yato viruddho
hetur bhavet |

punaḥ⁴⁶⁸ sa evāha — yadi [T_{2D}121a] sahaśabda ekārthas tadā hetur asiddhaḥ |
tathā [Pp165_{r3}] hi — naṭacandra[Jp210_{v1}]mallaprekṣāsu na hy ekenaivopa-
lambhaḥ^{uu} | nīlāder nāpi⁴⁶⁹ nīlatadupalambhāyora ekenaivopalambhaḥ |
tathā hi — nīlopalambhe 'pi tadupalambhānām anyasantānaga[Pp165_{r4}]tānām

⁴⁶⁰ loka 'smin naivānyena Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (jig rten 'di na...gzan...med] lokesmin naivānena Jp^{ac}; loka
'nyas<<m>>in naivānena Pp; loka 'nyo{syā?}n naivāne{nye?}na K conj.; loka 'nyasmin naivānena Ś
(contra metrum); nyannaiwā° Pā; nyasmānnaivānyena Gā

⁴⁶¹ tato Jp^{ac} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (de'i phyr) ◇ K Ś] tadā Jp^{pc}

⁴⁶² etad asamyak Jp Pp ◇ Ś] etasamyak K Gā

⁴⁶³ bhāvaḥ Jp^{ac} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (yod pa) ◇ K Ś] deest Jp^{pc}

⁴⁶⁴ eva bhāvaḥ Jp^{ac}] evābhāvaḥ Jp^{pc}; evaḥ Pp (eye skip); eva K Ś

⁴⁶⁵ saha Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁴⁶⁶ śasīdvayam upalabhāmaha iti Jp (sasīdvayam <<u>>palambhāmaha iti) Matsuoka 2011] sasīdvayam
upalambhāsaha iti Pp; śasīdvayopalambhāt saheti K Ś; T_{2D} T_{2P} (kho bos zla ba gñis dmigs so zes bya bar)

⁴⁶⁷ bhāsamānam Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] tāsamānam Jp^{ac}

⁴⁶⁸ punaḥ Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] puna Jp^{ac}

⁴⁶⁹ | nīlāder nāpi Jp Pp] nīlādeḥ | nāpi K Ś

ੴ Jp^{pc} has a long line which is the literal transcription of the whole Jp210_{r6} (even though the
reference line number indicated therein is 7) containing a few corrections which I mention as
post correctionem. Pp does not take into account those corrections.

൬൬ Hattori (1960: 399 n. 3), probably based only on BASK, also suggests loka 'smin naivānyena.
Matsumoto (1980a: 272 n. 10) presents it as one of Hattori's readings.

^{ss} sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ | (PVin 1.54ab).

^{tt} jig rten 'di na lhan cig sgra | | gzan med par ni 'ga' na'an min | | gal te lhan cig myoñ yod na | | de phyr
gtan tshigs 'gal ba'an yin | | (BASK 71).

^{uu} Cf. gal te lhan cig sgra gcig don | | de ltas gzan la ma grub ñid | | thun moñ gi ni dños po la | | gcig pus ji
ltar mthoñ ba yin | | (BASK 72).

anupalambhāt | [K568] yadā ca [T_{2P}160a] sarvaprāṇabhṛtām⁴⁷⁰ sarve
cittakṣaṇāḥ sarvajñenāvaśīyante tadā katham ekenaivopalambhaḥ⁴⁷¹ siddhaḥ
syāt^{vv} | kiṃ cānyopalambhaniṣedhe⁴⁷² saty eko[Pp165r₃]palambhaniyamah
siddhyati | na cānyopalambhapraṭiṣedhasambhavaḥ⁴⁷³ svabhāvavipra-
kṛṣṭasya vidhipraṭiṣedhā[Jp210v₂]yogāt^{ww} | atha sahaśabda ekakālavivakṣayā
tadā —

buddhavijñeya[Pp165r₆]cittena⁴⁷⁴ cittacaittaiś⁴⁷⁵ ca sarvathā |
anaikāntikatā⁴⁷⁶ hetor ekakālavivakṣayā⁴⁷⁷ | |^{xx}

yathā kila buddhasya bhagavato yad vijñeyam santānāntaracittam tasya
buddhajñānasya ca sahopalam[Pp165r₇]bhaniyamo 'sty atha⁴⁷⁸ ca nānātvam |
tathā cittacaittānām saty api sahopalambhe naikatvam ity ato 'naikāntiko
hetur iti |^{yy}

tad etat⁴⁷⁹ sarvam asamyak | na hy atraikenaivopalambha⁴⁸⁰
e[Pp165r₈]kopalambha [Jp210v₃] ity ayam artho 'bhipretah⁴⁸¹ | kiṃ tarhi
jñānajñeyayoḥ parasparam eka evopalambho na prthag iti | ya eva hi [Ś693]
jñānopalambhaḥ sa eva jñeyasya | ya eva jñeyasya sa [Pp165r₉] eva jñānasyeti
yāvat | na ca naṭacandramallaprekṣāsu kaścij jñānopalambho 'sti⁴⁸² yo na

⁴⁷⁰ *sarvaprāṇabhṛtām* Jp (*sarvaprāṇabhṛtām*) Pp (*sar<<v>>vaprāṇabhṛtām*) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*srog chags thams cad kyī*) ◇ Ś] *sattvaṃ prāṇabhṛtām* K Pā Gā

⁴⁷¹ °opalambhaḥ Jp^{pc} Pp (°opalambhaḥ) ◇ K Ś] °palambha° Jp^{ac}

⁴⁷² °niṣedhe Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °nīpradhe Jp^{ac}

⁴⁷³ °praṭiṣedha° Pp ◇ K Ś] °prati | | ṣedha° Jp^{ac}; °prati | ṣedha° Jp^{pc}

⁴⁷⁴ *buddhavijñeya°* Jp Pp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*sañs rgyas mkhyen par bya*) ◇ K] *buddhavijñeya°* Pp^{ac}; *buddhavijñajñeya°* Ś (*contra metrum*)

⁴⁷⁵ *cittacaittaiś* em. ◇ K Ś] *cittacaittaiś* Jp Pp

⁴⁷⁶ *anaikāntikatā* Jp Pp (*anaikāntikatā*) °ānaikāntikatā K Ś

⁴⁷⁷ *ekakālavivakṣayā* | Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dus gcig brjod par 'dod pa yis*) ◇ Ś] deest K Pā Gā

⁴⁷⁸ °niyamo 'sty atha Jp Pp] °niyamo 'py asty eva Ś; °niyame 'ḥpy a}sty eva K em.; *°niyame 'pi T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ñes pa yin pa na yañ*); *niyame 'sty eva* Pā

⁴⁷⁹ *tad etat* Jp ◇ K Ś] *tad eva tat* Pp

⁴⁸⁰ *atraikenaivopa°* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *atraikenepa°* Jp^{ac}

⁴⁸¹ *bhipretah* Jp (*bhipretah*) ◇ K Ś] (ill. circa 1 akṣara) *bhipretah* Pp

⁴⁸² 'sti Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *sti* Jp^{ac} Pp

⁰⁰⁰ Hattori (1960: 399) also suggests the em. *sarvaprāṇabhṛtām*.

^{vv} Cf. *gal te thams cad mkhyen pa yi* | | *ye śes śes bya sems kun na* | | *de tshes gcig pu kho na yis* | | *dmigs pa grub pa gañ du brjod* | | (BASK 73).

^{ww} Cf. *gžan gyis dmigs pa 'gog pa ni* | | *tshad ma min pas mi grub ste* | | *rañ bžin bskal pa yin pas na* | | *de phyir the tshom ma grub bo* | | (BASK 74).

^{xx} *dus gcig tu ni brjod 'dod pas* | | *sañs rgyas mkhyen bya'i sems dan ni* | | *sems dan sems byuñ mams kyis kyañ* | | *kun tu gñan tshigs ma ñes 'gyur* | | (BASK 68). Cf. T_{2D} T_{2P}: *dus gcig brjod par 'dod pa yis* | | *sañs rgyas mkhyen par bya sems dan* | | *sems dan sems las byuñ mams kyis* | | *kun du gñan tshigs ma ñes so* | |.

^{yy} Cf. *tathā hi buddhasya bhagavato yad vijñeyam santānāntaracittam tasya buddhavijñānasya ca sahopa-*
lambhaniyamo 'sti | *atha ca nānātvam ity anaikāntikah* | *tathā cittacaittānām api sahopalambhaniyamo*
'stity anaikāntika evāgamasiddham etad iti | (*Anekāntajayapatākā* 5, ed. p. 60, 4–61, 3).

jñeyopalambhātmakaḥ⁴⁸³ | jñeyopalambho vā na jñānopalambhātmaka⁴⁸⁴
 [T_{2D}121b Pp165_{r10}] iti kuto 'siddhatā | nāpi sandigdhāsiddhatā⁴⁸⁵ | tathā hi —
 yad evātmasaṃvedanaṃ jñānasya tad [T_{2P}160b] evārthasye[pp210_{v4}]ti pareṇāpi
 bāhyārthavādināṅgīkṛtam | etenaikasyaivo[Pp165_{r11}]palambha ekopalambha
 ity evaṃ vikalpya yo 'siddhatādoṣa uktaḥ sa tatpakṣānaṅgīkṛter evāpāsto⁴⁸⁶
 draṣṭavyaḥ |

na ca buddhasya bhagavataś cittena parasantānavartinaś cittakṣaṇā⁴⁸⁷
 [Pp165_{r12}] avasīyante⁴⁸⁸ | tasya bhagavataḥ sarvāvaraṇavigamena grāhyagrā-
 hakakalāṅkarahitavāt⁴⁸⁹ | yathoktam —

grāhyaṃ na tasya grahaṇaṃ na tena jñānāntaragrāhyatayāpi śūnyaḥ |^{zz}
 i[pp210_{v3}]ti⁴⁹⁰ | akṣū[Pp165_{r13}]ṇavidhānaṃ⁴⁹¹ tv ādhipatyamātreṇa | yathoktam —

pūrvapraṇidhānāhitasatatānābhogavāhi parakāryam^{aaa}

iti sarvārthakāritvāt sarvajña iṣyata iti vakṣyati | tasmān nāsiddhatā [Pp165_{r14}]
 hetor iti |⁴⁹²

nanu cācāryadharmakīrtinā viṣayasya jñānahetutayopanidheḥ⁴⁹³ prāg
 upalambhaḥ paścāt saṃvedanasyeti ced^{bbb} ity evaṃ⁴⁹⁴ pūrvapakṣam
 ādarśayatā⁴⁹⁵ ekakālārthaḥ [pp210_{v6}] sa[Pp165_{r15}]haśabdo 'tra darśito⁴⁹⁶ na tv
 abhedārthaḥ⁴⁹⁷ | ekakāle hi vivakṣite kālābhedopadarśanaṃ⁴⁹⁸ parasya

⁴⁸³ °opalambhātmakaḥ Jp Pp (°opalambhātmakaḥ) | °opalambhakaḥ K Ś

⁴⁸⁴ °opalambhātmaka Jp (°opalambhātmaka) Pp (°opalambhā<<tma>>ka) | °opalambhaka K Ś

⁴⁸⁵ sandigdhā° Jp Pp^{pc} (saṃdigdhā°) ◇ K Ś | saṃdigdhā° Pp^{ac}

⁴⁸⁶ °āpāsto Jp ◇ K Ś | °āyāsto Pp; *spaṣṭo T_{2D} T_{2P} (gṣal bar)

⁴⁸⁷ cittakṣaṇā Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (sems kyī skad cig) ◇ K Ś | cittalakṣaṇā Jp^{ac}

⁴⁸⁸ avasīyante Jp (avasīyamte) ◇ Ś | avasīyate Pp K

⁴⁸⁹ grāhyagrāhaka° Jp Pp ◇ K | grāhyāgrāhaka° Ś

⁴⁹⁰ śūnyaḥ | iti Jp (śūnya iti) Pp (śūnya iti) | śūnya° i{mi?}ti K conj.; śūnyam° iti Ś

⁴⁹¹ akṣūna° Jp Pp | akṣuṇṇa° K Ś

⁴⁹² sarvārthakāritvāt sarvajña iṣyata iti vakṣyati | tasmān nāsiddhatā hetor iti Jp Pp ◇ K Ś | deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁴⁹³ °opanidheḥ em.] °opanidhiḥ Jp Pp K Ś; T_{2D} T_{2P} (ñe ba na)

⁴⁹⁴ evaṃ Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (de ltaṛ) ◇ K | eva Ś

⁴⁹⁵ ādarśayatā Jp^{pc} (ādarśayātā) Pp ◇ K Ś | ādarśatā Jp^{ac}

⁴⁹⁶ darśito Jp (darsito) ◇ K Ś | darśi . o Pp

⁴⁹⁷ abhedā° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | ābheda° Jp^{ac}

⁴⁹⁸ kāla° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | kālāḥ Jp^{ac}

^{zz} grāhyaṃ na tasya grahaṇaṃ na tena jñānāntaragrāhyatayāpi śūnyam | tathāpi ca jñānamayaḥ prakāśaḥ
 pratyakṣapakṣasya tavāvīr āsīt | | (Anekāntajayapātākā 5, ed. p. 61, 7–62, 4); grāhyaṃ na tasya grahaṇaṃ
 [na] tena jñānāntaragrāhyatayāpi śūnyaḥ | tathāpi ca jñānamayaḥ prakāśaḥ pratyakṣapakṣas tu tavāvīr āsīt | |
 (Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda, ed. p. 137, 23–24).

^{aaa} Amṛtakaṇikā (ed. p. 70, 2). Cf. yadi pūrvapraṇidhānāhitasatatānābhogavāhinī deśanā syāt tadā ko
 virodhaḥ | (Sarvajñasiddhi, ed. p. 22, 34–35).

^{bbb} viṣayasya vijñānahetutayopanidheḥ prāg upalambhaḥ paścāt saṃvedanasyeti cet | (PVin ad 1.54cd, ed.
 p. 40, 11–12).

yuktaṃ na tv abhede satīti cet |

na | kālabhedasya vastubhedena vyāptatvāt | kā[Pp165_{r16}]labhedopadarśa-
nam⁴⁹⁹ upalambhanānātvapratipādanārtham⁵⁰⁰ eva sutarāṃ yuktaṃ |
vyāpyasya vyāpakavyabhicārāt | nāpi buddhavi[Jp210_{v7}]jñeyacittenānai-
kāntiko hetuḥ | na hi tatraikopalām[Pp165_{r17}]bhaniyamo 'sti^{501m} pṛthak pṛthak
sarvair eva svasya cittasya⁵⁰² saṃvedanāt | ata eva cittacaitair na vyabhi-
cārah⁵⁰³ | teṣāṃ api pratyekam ātmana eva saṃvedanāt |

athavā bhavatu [Jp210_{v8}] bha[Pp165_{v1}]gavaccittena paracittasya⁵⁰⁴ saṃvedanaṃ
[T_{2p}161a] tathāpi nānaikāntikatā | niyāmena vyāvartitatvāt | [T_{2D}122a] yayor⁵⁰⁵
hi parasparam upalambhanānātvam api sambhavati [Jp211_{r1}] tan niyāmena
vyāvartitam | [Pp165_{v2}] na tu punar upalambhānāṃ santānakālabhedena⁵⁰⁶
svalakṣaṇa[K569]nānā[Š694]tvam⁵⁰⁷ | tenāyam artho bhavati — yadupa-
lambha eva yasyopalambho nānyo 'pīti | na ca bhagavajjñānopalambha
evānyasantānagata[Pp165_{v3}]cittopalambho⁵⁰⁸ nāpy anyasantānagatacittopa-
lambha eva bhagavajjñānopalambhaḥ | †api tv anyo⁵⁰⁹ 'pi | pṛthak svasya†
svasyāpi⁵¹⁰ cittasya saṃvedanāt | ata eva na rūpālokair vyabhicā-
[Pp165_{v4}]rah | kevalasyāpy ālokasya⁵¹¹ darśanāt | [Jp211_{r2}] rūpasyāpy
ālokarahitasya kaiścit prāniviśeṣair upalambhāt⁵¹² | tasmād vipakṣe
bhāvāsambhavān⁵¹³ nānaikāntiko hetuḥ⁵¹⁴ | | TSP ad TS 2029–2030 | |

⁴⁹⁹ *kālabhedopadarśanam* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dus tha dad du bstan pa ni*) ◇ K em.
(*kāla{bhedopa}darśanam*) Gā] *kāladarśanam* Jp, *kāladarśanam* Ś; *kāla<<darśa>> .. m* Pp

⁵⁰⁰ *upalambha*° Jp^{ac} Pp^{pc} (*upalambha*°) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dmigs pa*)] *upalambhe* Jp^{pc} Pp^{ac}, *upalambhe* K Ś

⁵⁰¹ °*aikopalambhaniyamo* 'sti Jp (°*aikopalambhaniyamo sti*) T_{2D} (*gcig la dmigs pa nes pa yod pa*) ◇ K em.
(°*aikopalambha{niyamo}*'sti) Ś] °*aikopalambha*(ill. circa 3 *aḥśaras*)*sti* Pp; **sahopalambhaniyamo* 'sti T_{2P}
(*lhan cig dmigs pa nes pa yod pa*); *lambhasti* Pā

⁵⁰² *svasya cittasya* Jp^{pc} Pp] *svasya citasya* Jp^{ac}; T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rañ rañ*); *tasya cittasya* K; *cittasya* Ś

⁵⁰³ *cittacaitair na vyabhicārah* Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*sems dan sems las byun ba mams kyiś...khrul ba ma yin te*)]
citacaiter na vyabhicāres Jp^{ac}; *cittacai* *cāras* Pp; *cittaviparyayavicāras* K Pā Gā; *cittacaitair*
vyabhicārah Ś

⁵⁰⁴ *paracittasya* Jp Pp ◇ K] *paricittasya* Ś

⁵⁰⁵ *yayor* Jp ◇ K Ś] *ya .. r* Pp

⁵⁰⁶ °*kāla*° Jp Pp] °*kāle* K Ś

⁵⁰⁷ *svalakṣaṇanānātvam* em. ◇ Ś] *svalakṣaṇānānātvam* Jp Pp; *svalakṣaṇā{nām}* *nānātvam* K em.;
svalakṣaṇānām nānātvam Gā

⁵⁰⁸ °*santānagatacitto*° Pp (°*santānagatacitto*°) ◇ K Ś] °*saṃtātagatacito*° Jp^{ac} (*lapsus calami*); °*saṃtātaga-*
tacitto° Jp^{pc}

⁵⁰⁹ *anyo* Jp Pp K Ś] **nānyo* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gžan du ni ma yin te*)

⁵¹⁰ *svasya svasyā*° Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rañ rañ gi*)] *tv asya svasyā*° K Ś

⁵¹¹ *ālokasya* Jp] *āloka*° Pp K Ś

⁵¹² *upalambhāt* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *upalambhā* Jp^{ac}

⁵¹³ *bhāvā*° Jp ◇ K Ś] *bhāvāt* Pp

⁵¹⁴ *hetuḥ* | Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *hetu* | Jp^{ac}; *hetu* Pp

^m Given the context, the variant **sahopalambhaniyama* found in T_{2P} is also feasible. See English Translation n. 278.

syād etat — yady a[Pp165v₃]pi vipakṣe sattvaṃ na niścitaṃ sandigdhaṃ tu |
 tataś cānekānta eva⁵¹⁵ hetuḥ sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvāt⁵¹⁶ | tathā hi —
 viṣayaviṣayibhāvena⁵¹⁷ niyatatvād anyathāpi sahopalambha[Pp165v₆]niyamaḥ
 sambhavaty eva | yato jñānasya grāhaka eva svabhāvo viṣayagrahaṇa-
 dha[Jp211r₃]rmakatvāt⁵¹⁸ | tasya⁵¹⁹ viṣayasyāpi tadgrāhya eva svabhāvaḥ |
 tayoś caikasāmāgryadhīnatvān nityaṃ sa[Pp165v₇]habhāvitā⁵²⁰ | na ca
 sahotpādāviśeṣe⁵²¹ 'pi cakṣurādīnāṃ viṣayatvaprasaṅgas tathāvidha-
 svabhāvābhāvāt | tathā hi — sāmāgryā [T_{2D}161b] nīlādiviṣayādhyavasāya-
 rūpam eva jñānaṃ ja[Pp165v₈]nyate, na cakṣurādyadhyavasāyarūpam⁵²² |
 nīlādir api tu tadadhyavasāyamānarūpo janitaḥ, na cakṣurādir iti | āha ca —

nānyo 'sti grāha[Jp211r₄]ko jñānān
 nākṣadhī[Pp165v₉]r⁵²³ viṣayair vinā |
 [T_{2D}122b] ataś ca sahasaṃvittir⁵²⁴
 nābhedān nīlataddhiyoḥ⁵²⁵ | |
 pūrvikaiva tu sāmāgrī sajjñānaṃ⁵²⁶ viṣayakṣaṇam |

⁵¹⁵ *cānekānta eva* Jp (*cānekānta eva*) | *cānaikānta eva* Ś; *cānekānta* Pp; *cānaikānto* K; *naikānto* Pā Gā

⁵¹⁶ *vīpakṣa*° Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*mi mthun pa'i phyogs la*) ◇ K Ś | *vīpakṣayā* Jp^{ac}; *vīvakṣa*° Pp

⁵¹⁷ *viṣayaviṣayi*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *viṣayaviṣaya*° Jp^{ac}

⁵¹⁸ *dharmakatvāt* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *dharmakatvā* Jp^{ac}

⁵¹⁹ *tasya* Jp Pp | *tasya* | K Ś T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de'i... ||*)

⁵²⁰ *sahabhāvitā* Jp Pp | *saha bhāvitā* K Ś

⁵²¹ *ca sahotpādā*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *cahotpādā*° Jp^{ac}

⁵²² *cakṣur*° Jp ◇ K Ś | *cekṣur*° Pp

⁵²³ *nākṣadhīr* em. partly supported by T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dbañ blo...med*) | *nākṣudhīr* Jp Pp; *cākṣuṣair* K Ś; *ccakṣurdhī*° Jai

⁵²⁴ *saha*° Pp ◇ K Ś | *sahe*° Jp

⁵²⁵ *nābhedān nīlataddhiyoḥ* ◇ K Ś | *nābhedānīlātaddhiyoḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp; *nābhedānīlātaddhiyo* Jp^{ac}; T_{2D} T_{2P} (*sñio dan de blo gcig ma yin*)

⁵²⁶ *sajñānaṃ* Jp Pp (<<sa/ma>>jñānaṃ) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*śes bcas*) | *tajñānaṃ* Ś; *prajñānaṃ* K Pā Gā

xxx Hattori (1960: 399 n. 2), probably based only on the BASK, also suggests the em. *nākṣadhīr*. Shastri (1967: 9) suggests *cākṣuṣair*. See BASK 66 (*dbañ blo med*). With reference to correspondences between *dbañ* [*po'i*] *blo* and *akṣadhīr* in the TSP, see Negi 2002: 3964 (s.v.).

λλλ Cf. *de phyir lhan cig rig pas na* || (BASK 66c) **sahasamvitter*? Cf. Introduction n. 264.

μμμ Cf. *sñon po de'i blo gcig phyir min* || (BASK 66d).

vvv Hattori (1960: 399 n. 5) also suggests the em. *sajñānaṃ*. Matsumoto (1980a: 272 n. 13) presents it as one of Hattori's readings. This reading is also present in Jitāri's *Vijñapti-mātratāsiddhi* as well as *Kṣāṇabhaṅgādhyāya* and *Advaitabinduṣprakarāṇa* by Jñānaśrīmitra (cf. *infra*). On this, see Introduction n. 266.

ccc *śes pa las gzan 'dzin pa med* || *yul med par ni dbañ blo med* || *de phyir lhan cig rig pas na* || *sñon po de'i blo gcig phyir min* || (BASK 66).

sālokarūpavat⁵²⁷ kuryād⁵²⁸ yena syāt sahave[Pp165v₁₀]danam | | ddd
 iti | ⁵²⁹ atrāha — **na jñānātmetyādi**⁵³⁰ |
 na jñānātmā parātmeti nīladhīvedane katham |
 nī[_{103r3}]lākārasya saṃvittis
 taylor no ce[_{37v11}]d abhinnaṭā | | 2031 | |

na hi vyatiriktasya pratibandham⁵³¹ antareṇa sahopalambhaniyamo yukto
 'tiprasaṅgāt | na cātra vyatiriktasya saṃvedane [Pp165v₁₁] kaścit pratibandho
 'sti | tathā hi — pratibandho bhavan bhave[_{211r3}]t tādātmyaṃ tadutpattir
 vā | na tāvat tā[₆₉₅]dātmyam atra pareṇeṣṭaṃ tasyaiva sādhyatvāt | nāpi
 tadutpatteḥ⁵³² sahavedanaṃ⁵³³ sahabhūta[_{165v12}]yoḥ⁵³⁴ kāryakāraṇabhāvā-
 bhāvāt⁵³⁵ | cakṣurādīnām apy upalabdhiprasaṅgāc⁵³⁶ ca |
 nāpi pūrvasāmagrīvaśād yaugapadyamātreṇa viṣayaaviṣayibhāvaś⁵³⁷ cittacai-
 ttānām⁵³⁸ cakṣurādī[_{165v13}]nām ca parasparaṃ viṣayaaviṣayitvaprasaṅgāt |
 nāpi sāmāgryā pratīniyataviṣayaaviṣayirūpeṇa⁵³⁹ janita[_{211r6}]tvān nātipra-
 saṅga iti yuktaṃ vaktuṃ⁵⁴⁰ viṣayaaviṣayitvasyaiva vi[_{165v14}]cāryamāṇa-
 tvenāsiddhatvāt | siddhe hi pratibandhe viṣayaaviṣayibhāvo⁵⁴¹ yukto yāvata
 sa eva viṣayaaviṣayibhāvavyavasthāyām⁵⁴² pratibandho vicāryate [T_{2p}162a] | na
 ca tādātmya[_{165v15}]tadutpattivyatire[₅₇₀]keṇāparaḥ⁵⁴³ pratibandho 'sti yato

⁵²⁷ *sāloka*° Jp Pp ◇ Ś] *sā* {*ā?*} *loka*° K conj.

⁵²⁸ *kuryād* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *kuryod* Jp^{ac}

⁵²⁹ *iti* | Jp Pp K] deest Ś

⁵³⁰ *na jñānātmetyādi* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *na jñānotmetyādi* Jp^{ac}

⁵³¹ *pratibandham* Jp Pp (Pp *pratibandham*) ◇ K] *pratibandhanam* Ś

⁵³² *nāpi tadutpatteḥ* Jp Pp ◇ K] *nāpi tadutpatte* Ś; **nāpi tadutpattiḥ* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de las byun ba yan ma yin te*)

⁵³³ *sahavedanaṃ* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] **sahavedana*° T_{2D} T_{2P} (*lhan cig rig pa'i*)

⁵³⁴ *sahabhūtayoh* Jp Pp ◇ Ś] *saha bhūtayoh* K

⁵³⁵ **kāraṇabhāvābhāvāt* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rgyu...dños po med pa'i phyir*) ◇ K] **kāraṇabhāvāt* Ś

⁵³⁶ *upalabdhi*° Jp ◇ K Ś] *apalabdhi*° Pp

⁵³⁷ *viṣayaaviṣayi*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *viṣayaaviṣayī* Jp^{ac}

⁵³⁸ *cittacaittānām* Jp^{pc} ◇ Ś] *cittacaittānām* Jp^{ac}; *cittacaittānām* Pp K

⁵³⁹ **viṣayaaviṣayi*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] **viṣayaaviṣayī* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁴⁰ *vaktuṃ* Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*brjod par*) ◇ K Ś] deest Jp^{ac}

⁵⁴¹ *viṣayaaviṣayi*° Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *viṣayaaviṣayī* Jp^{ac}; *viṣayaṃ viṣayi*° Pp

⁵⁴² *viṣayaaviṣayi*° Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *viṣayaaviṣayī* Jp^{ac}; *viṣayaṃ viṣayi*° Pp

⁵⁴³ *tādātmya*° Jp ◇ K Ś] *tādā .. tmya*° Pp

ddd *gañ gis lhan cig myon 'gyur ba* | | *tshogs pa sna ma kho na las* | | *śes pa yul bcas skad cig ste* | | *snañ ba dan bcas gzugs bžin no* | | (BASK 81); *pūrvikaiva tu sāmāgrī saññānam viṣayaakṣaṇam* | *sālokarūpavat kuryād yena syāt sahavedanaṃ* | | (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* by Jitāri, ed. p. 12 n. 56); *Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhīyāya* (ed. p. 23, 23–24) and *Advaitabinduṣaṅgāraṇa* (ed. p. 351, 17–18). Cf. *tshogs pa sna ma nūd kyis ni* | | *śes dan yul gyi skad cig ma* | | *snañ bcas gzugs ni skyed byed bžin* | | *gañ gis lhan cig myon ba yin* | | (*Sahopalambhaniyamasiddhi*, ed. p. 261, 1–4); *tshogs pa sna ma gañ yis las* | | *śes dan yul bcas skad cig ma* | | *skyed byed snañ bcas gzugs bžin tu* | | *gañ yin pa yis lhan cig rtogs* | | (*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* by Ratnākaraśānti, P 327b₈–328a₁).

viṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ⁵⁴⁴ siddhyet | nāpi tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṃ viṣayaviṣayibhāvo⁵⁴⁵ yukta iti vicāritam | a[[p211r7]to na vyatī[Pp165v16]riktasya kathaṃ cit sahopalambho 'stūti⁵⁴⁶ [T2D123a] kutaḥ sandigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatā⁵⁴⁷ hetoḥ || TSP *ad* TS 2031 ||

dviṭīyam api sākāratāsiddhaye sādhanam āha^{g25} — **saṃvedanam idam** ityādi |

saṃvedanam idaṃ sarvaṃ na cārthāntaragocaram [T1P89b] |

[Jk103v1] saṃvedanasvabhāvatvāt⁵⁴⁸

svātmasaṃvedanam⁵⁴⁹ yathā || 2032 ||

yad yat saṃve[Pp165v17]danam tat taj jñānān nārthāntaraviṣayaṃ **yathātmasaṃvedanam** | saṃvedanam cedam nīladyākārasyeti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ | arthāntaragocarativiruddhenāna[[p211r8]r]rthāntaragocaratvena⁵⁵⁰ saṃve[Pp166r1]danasya vyāptatvāt || TSP *ad* TS 2032 ||

tām eva vyāptiṃ sādhayann āha — **mukhyato 'rtham** ityādi |

mukhyato 'rtham na gr̥hṇāti⁵⁵¹

svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ⁵⁵² [Jk103v2] |

arthākā[Pk37v12]roparāgeṇa⁵⁵³ viyogāc ca na bhaktiḥ || 2033 ||

śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśam arthākārair⁵⁵⁴ anaṅkitam |

yair iṣṭam vedanam kaīścid idaṃ tān prati sādhanam || 2034 ||

nirvyāpāratvāt sarvadharmāṇām⁵⁵⁵ na paramārthataḥ kasyacit kenacid grahaṇam | kevalam prakāśarūpatayā ta[Pp166r2]thāprathamānam vijñānam ātmano grāhakam ucyate | na caivam⁵⁵⁶ **mukhya**[[p211v1]to 'rthasya

⁵⁴⁴ *viṣayaviṣayi*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *viṣayaviṣayī* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁴⁵ *viṣayaviṣayi*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *viṣayaviṣayī* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁴⁶ 'stīti Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *stīti* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁴⁷ 'vipakṣa° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] 'vipatākṣa° Jp^{ac}

⁵⁴⁸ *saṃvedanasvabhāvatvāt* Jk T_{1P} (*rig pa'i ran bžin ŋid kyi phyir*) ◇ Ś] *saṃvedanasva* Pk; *saṃvedanam ca* {*nīlasya*} K em.; T_{1D} (*rig pa'i ran bžin ŋid kyi rig*); 'vedanam ca... Pā; 'vedanam ca *nīlasya* Gā

⁵⁴⁹ *svātma*° Jk ◇ K Ś] .. *tma*° Pk

⁵⁵⁰ 'ānarthāntara° Jp ◇ K Ś] 'āmarthāntara° Pp (*lapsus calami*)

⁵⁵¹ *gr̥hṇāti* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *gr̥hāti* Jk^{ac}

⁵⁵² 'sthiteḥ Jk Pk^{pc} ◇ K Ś] 'sthite Pk^{ac}

⁵⁵³ *arthā*° Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *artha*° Jk^{ac}

⁵⁵⁴ *arthākārair* Jk^{pc} Pk^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *arthākārīr* Jk^{ac}; *arthākārer* Pk^{ac}

⁵⁵⁵ 'dharmaṇām Pp ◇ K Ś] 'dharmanām Jp

⁵⁵⁶ 'aivam Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de ltar*) 'aiva Pp K Ś

^{g25} *nīladyākārasya saṃvedanam jñānān nārthāntaram saṃvedanāt* Jp^g Pp^g. In Jp and Pp the *signe-de-renvoi* is not found.

grāhakam jñānam yuktaṃ sarvabhāvanāṃ **svasvabhāvavyavasthi-teḥ**⁵⁵⁷ | na hi tadātmā yaḥ so 'parasyāpi |

syād etat — na hi mu[Pp166r3]khyato yādṛśaṃ⁵⁵⁸ jñānasyātmasaṃvedanam tādṛg⁵⁵⁹ evārthasyeṣṭam | kiṃ tarhi svābhāsa-jñānanajanakatvam evārthasya saṃvedyatvam^{fff} | tatas ca yadi mukhyaṃ saṃvedanam hetutvenopādīyate tadā heto[Pp166r4]r asiddhatā | athāpi [T2P162b] yathākathañcit saṃvedanaśabdavācya[ś696]tā sāmyāt tathāpi na⁵⁶⁰ tathāvidhād iṣṭasiddhiḥ | na hi gośabdasāmyād [Jp211v2] vāgādīnām⁵⁶¹ viśānitvasiddhiḥ^{ggg} |

atha jñānārūḍhaṃ nī[Pp166r5]lādyākāraṃ dharminam āśritya sākāra-jñānapakṣe dvividho⁵⁶² 'pi hetur abhipretas⁵⁶³ tadā siddhasādhyaṭā | yathoktam —

sākārajñānapakṣe ca tannirbhāsaḥ sadyatā |

tasyābhede⁵⁶⁴ ca saṃsādhye

[Pp166r6] siddhasāadhanatā bhavet | |^{hhh}

ity etat sarvaṃ bhadantaśubhaguptasya codyam āśaṅkyāha [T2D123b] — **arthākāroparāgeṇetyādi** | **arthākāro** 'rthasadrśaś cāsāv uparāgo nirbhāsaś ce[Jp211v3]ty⁵⁶⁵ **arthākā**[Pp166r7]**roparāgaḥ** | **idam** iti dvividham api sādhanaṃ nirākāravādinam **prati** yatas tena na siddhasādhyaṭā nāpy upacāreṇānyasya⁵⁶⁶ saṃvedanam asty upacāranibandhanābhāvāt | |TSP ad TS 2033–2034 | |

3.3. Refutation of the *Sākāravāda*

[K571] evaṃ [Pp166r8] tāvad anirbhāsaṃ jñānam na bāhyam arthaṃ vijānātīti pratipāditam | nāpi sanirbhāsaṃ iti dvitīyaṃ pakṣam āśritya pratipādayann

⁵⁵⁷ vyavasthiteḥ T_{2D} T_{2P} (gnas pa'i phyir) ◇ K Ś] vyavasthite Jp Pp

⁵⁵⁸ yādṛśaṃ em. ◇ K Ś] yādṛśa° Jp, yādṛśa° Pp

⁵⁵⁹ tādṛg em. ◇ K Ś] tā<<g>> Jp Pp

⁵⁶⁰ na Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁵⁶¹ vāgādīnām Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (ñag la sogs pa mams)] gavayādīnām K Pā Gā; rāsabhādīnām Ś

⁵⁶² dvividho Jp ◇ K Ś] dvi<<dhi>>dho Pp

⁵⁶³ abhipretas Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] abhipretās Jp^{ac}

⁵⁶⁴ tasyābhede em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (de ni tha mi dad) ◇ K Ś] tasyā<<be/ve>>de Jp, tasyāvede Pp

⁵⁶⁵ nirbhāsaś cety Jp ◇ K Ś] nirbhāsaś ca<<ty>> Pp

⁵⁶⁶ upacāreṇa° Jp Pp ◇ K] ucāreṇa° Ś

eee Cf. sarve bhāṅh svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ | (PV Svārthānumāna 40ab).

fff Cf. śes pa myon bar ran bzin phyir | | myon bar bya ba zes brjod do | | yul ni rab tu snan ba yi | | śes pa skyed phyir myon ba yin | | (BASK 84).

ggg Cf. myon bar bya ba'i sgrar 'dra yañ | | de yi don ni tha dad ñid | | dper na ba lan ñid kyi phyir | | ba lan ñag la sogs pa mams | | de bzin mam par mi 'grub phyir | | (BASK 85).

hhh śes pa mam bcas phyogs la ni | | de ltar snan ba myon bya ñid | | de dan tha dad min sgrub na | | grub pa sgrub pa ñid du 'gyur | | (BASK 87).

āha — **astu tarhī**tyādi⁵⁶⁷ | ⁵⁶⁸

astu tarhi⁵⁶⁹ sasārūpyam⁵⁷⁰ [Jk103v3]

vijñānam [Pk37v13] bāhyavedakam |

tasyāpi sarvathāyogān na yuktā vedakasthitiḥ || 2035 ||

na hi bhāvika [Pp166r9] ākāro yuktaḥ, yatas tadvaśād arthavyavasthānam syāt
| na cā[Pp211v4]likēnākāreṇārthaḥ⁵⁷¹ saṃvidito bhavet, bhrānte 'pi jñāne
tathāvidhasya bhāvāt || TSP *ad* TS 2035 ||

katham alikātva[Pp166r10]m ākāraṇām⁵⁷² iti cet | āha — **jñānād** ityādi |

jñānād avyatiriktatvān nākārabahutā bhavet [T1D74b] |

tataś ca tadbaleṇāsti nārthasaṃvedanasthitiḥ || 2036 || |⁵⁷³

ā[Pk37v14]kāravvyatiriktatvā⁵⁷³ jñāne cānekatā⁵⁷⁴ bhavet |

anyathā katham ekatva[Jk103v5]m

anayoḥ parikalpyate || 2037 || |⁵⁷⁵

citrāstaraṇadarśane⁵⁷⁵ ekasmā jñānād **avyatiriktatvāj** jñānasvarūpa-
vad⁵⁷⁶ [T2P163a] **ākāraṇām bahutā na** prāpnoti | evam **ākārā**[Pp166r11]**vya-**
tiriktatvāj⁵⁷⁷ jñānasyāpy **anekatā** prāpnoti |

ye tu manyante — samāna[§697]jātīyāny api jñānāny⁵⁷⁸ ākārasaṅkhyāny eva
bahūni [Pp211v5] citrāstaraṇādiṣu yugapat samudbhavanty eva vi[Pp166r12]jātīya-
rūpaśabdādījñānavad⁵⁷⁹ ityādi iti | tataś ca prasaṅge siddhasādhyateti | teṣāṃ

⁵⁶⁷ *tarhī*° em. ◇ K Pā Gā] *na hī*° Jp Pp Ś

⁵⁶⁸ *astu tarhītyādi* em. ◇ K] *astu nahītyādi* Jp Pp Ś

⁵⁶⁹ *tarhi* Jk Pk ◇ K Pā Gā] *na hi* Ś

⁵⁷⁰ *sasārūpyam* Jk ◇ K Ś] *samārūpyam* Pk (*lapsus calami*)

⁵⁷¹ °*ālikēnākāreṇā*° Jp Pp T2D T2P (*brdzun pa'i mam pas*)] °*ālikēna sākāreṇā*° K Ś

⁵⁷² *ākāraṇām* Jp^{pc} Pp T2D T2P (*mam pa mams*) ◇ Ś] *ākāraṇām* Jp^{ac}; *sākāraṇām* K Pā Gā

⁵⁷³ *ākārā*° Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *ākārā*° Jk^{ac} **ākārā*° T1D T1Q (*mam pa dan [tha dad pa'i phyir]*)

⁵⁷⁴ *cā*° Jk Pk T1D T1P ('*ai*)] *vā*° K Ś

⁵⁷⁵ *citrā*° Jp Pp T2D (*khra bo*) ◇ K] *cittā*° Ś; T2P (*khro bo*)

⁵⁷⁶ °*svarūpavad* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °*svarūpa evad* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁷⁷ °*avyatiriktatvāj* em. partly based on T2D T2P (*tha mi dad pa'i phyir*) ◇ K Ś] °*avyatiriktā*° Jp Pp

⁵⁷⁸ *jñānāny* Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *jñānājñāny* Pp^{ac}

⁵⁷⁹ °*śabdādi*° Jp (°*sabdādi*°) Pp T2D T2P (*sgra la sogs pa'i*) ◇ K] °*śabda*° Ś

⁵⁷³ In Jk, TS 2036 is repeated twice (*ditto*graphy).

⁵⁷⁷ See *ākāravvyatiriktatvāj jñāne* (TS 2037a). The degemination of *jj* to *j* is a peculiarity of the scribe in Jp (which I generally do not record). Therefore, one could assume that the intended reading there is °*avyatiriktāj* (instead of °*avyatiriktā*°). Nevertheless, I cannot but record the variant as it is found. This is likely one of those instances where Jp blindly follows Jp.

⁵⁷⁵ *śes gcig tha dad ma yin pas* || *mam pa mañ por mi 'gyur te* || *de phyir de yi mthu yis ni* || *don śes 'gyur bar b'zag pa med* || (MAK 22).

⁵⁷⁶ *mam pa mams dan ma bral bas* || *mam śes gcig pur mi 'gyur ro* || *de lta min na 'di gñis la* || *gcig ces ji skad brjod par bya* || (MAK 23).

⁵⁷⁹ *gañ dag rigs mthun pa'i śes pa mams kyañ mam pa'i grañs b'zin du ri mo'i g'zi la sogs pa la lhan cig tu mañ du 'byun ste* | *gzugs dan sgra la sogs pa'i śes pa rigs mi mthun pa b'zin no* (MAV, ed. p. 94, 8–10).

citrāstarane⁵⁸⁰ yathā nīlādayo bahava ākārāḥ saṃvedyante | evam
ekā[Pp166r13]kāre 'pi sitādāv arvāgmadyaparabhāgarūpā⁵⁸¹ bahava ākārā iti
tadātmakam tatrāpi jñānam anekātmakam prāpnoti^{III} | iṣyata eveti cet | kim
idānīm ekaṃ jñānam bhavatī[Jp211v6 Pp166r14]ti⁵⁸² vaktavyam | yad anavaya-
vānuviṣayam⁵⁸³ iti cet^{mmmm} | tad etad anubhavaviruddham | na hi kvacid
anavayavam aṇurūpaṃ bhāsamānam ālakṣyate jñāne | [T2D124a] na
cāpy⁵⁸⁴ amūrtānām paurvāparyā[Pp166r15]vasthānam deśakṛtaṃ yuktaṃ,
yena tasya satyatāprasiddhaye⁵⁸⁵ 'nekajñānakalpanā⁵⁸⁶ sādhvī syāt |
deśavitānapratibhāsasyālīkatve katham ākārāṇām satyatā syāt | na hi
deśa[Pp166r16]vitānāvasthitanīlādipratibhāsavyatirekeṇā[Jp211v7]nyo nīlādir⁵⁸⁷
jñānākāraḥ⁵⁸⁸ saṃvedyate | ato 'nekajñānakalpanāvaiyarthyaṃ⁵⁸⁹ eva
|| TSP *ad* TS 2036–2037 ||

dūṣaṇāntaram⁵⁹⁰ āha — **sarvātmanetyādi** |

sarvātmanā ca sārūpye jñāne 'jñānādītā bhavet |

sāmye kenacid aṃśe[Pk37v15]na

sarvaṃ⁵⁹¹ syāt sarvavedakam | | 2038 | |ⁿⁿⁿ

[Pp166r17] **ajñānatā** jaḍarūpatvam | **ādi**śabdena na sarāgatā na⁵⁹² sadveṣa-
tetyādi grhyate | | TSP *ad* TS 2038 | |

3.4 Refutation of the *Anyākāravāda*

[K572] anyanirbhāsam ity etat⁵⁹³ [T2P163b] tṛtīyaṃ pakṣāntaram āśrityāha —
anyākāram apītyādi |

⁵⁸⁰ *citrāstarane* em. T_{2D} T_{2P} ◇ K Ś | *citrāstarane yeṣāṃ citrāstarane* Jp Pp Jai

⁵⁸¹ *arvāgmadya*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *arvāmadhya*° Jp^{ac}

⁵⁸² *bhavatīti* em. ◇ K Ś | *bhava*<<nti/tci>>ti Jp Pp

⁵⁸³ *anavayavā*° Jp ◇ K Ś | *anaveyavā*° Pp

⁵⁸⁴ *cā*° Jp Pp ◇ Ś | *vā*° K Pā Gā

⁵⁸⁵ *°prasiddhaye* Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś | *°prasiddheye* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁸⁶ *°jñāna*° Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś | *°jñāna*° Pp^{ac}

⁵⁸⁷ *nīlādir* Jp | *nīlādi*° Pp K Ś

⁵⁸⁸ *°ākāraḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *°ākāra* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁸⁹ *°vaiyarthyaṃ* Pp ◇ K Ś | *°vaiyartham* Jp^{pc}; *°vaiyarthām* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁹⁰ *dūṣaṇā*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *dūṣaṇā*° Jp^{ac}

⁵⁹¹ *sarvaṃ* Jk (*sarva*<<ṃ>>) ◇ K Ś | *sarva* Pk

⁵⁹² *sarāgatā na* Jp ◇ K Ś | *sarāgatā* <<'>>na Pp

⁵⁹³ *etat* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | *eta* Jp^{ac}

^{III} *jī līar ṣṇon po dañ dkar po la sogs pa mām pa mañ po de b'zin du gcig pur 'dod pa dkar po la sogs pa la yañ tshu rol dañ | pha rol dañ | dbuñ gi cha'i no bo'i mām pa mañ po ñid de | de la yañ de'i bdag ñid kyi śes pa ñid du ma ñid du 'gyur ro.* (MAV, ed. p. 96, 6–9).

^{mmmm} *du mar 'dod do že na | 'o na gcig pur gyur pa gañ yin | gañ yan lag med pa'i rdul gyi yul 'dzin pa ste.* (MAV, ed. p. 96, 10–12).

ⁿⁿⁿ *sarvātmanā hi sārūpye jñānam ajñānatām vrajet | sāmye kenacid aṃśena syāt sarvaṃ sarvavedanam | |* (PV Pratyakṣa 434).

anyākāram api jñānaṃ katham anyasya ve[_{jk104r1}]dakam |
sarvaḥ syāt sarvasaṃvedyo na hetuś ca niyāmakaḥ || 2039 ||

athāpi syā[_{Pp166v1}]t⁵⁹⁴ — yaj jñānaṃ yena janitaṃ tat tasyaiva⁵⁹⁵
saṃvedakaṃ⁵⁹⁶ bhavet | tena na **sarvaḥ sarvasaṃvedyo** bhaviṣyatīty
ā[_{jp211v8}]ha — **na hetuś ca niyāmaka** iti | cakṣurādīnām api
saṃvedyatvaprasaṅgād⁵⁹⁷ iti bhā[_{Pp166v2}]vaḥ | | TSP *ad* TS 2039 | |

[Ś698] **yathā hī**tyādīnā bhadantaśubhaguptasya pariḥāram āśaṅkate |

yathā⁵⁹⁸ hi bhavatām jñānaṃ nirākāram ca tattvataḥ [_{Pk37v16}] |
vetti cābhūtam ākāram
bhūtam arthaṃ⁵⁹⁹ tathaiva cet | | 2040 | |^{ooo}

sa hy āha — **yathaiva bhavatām** vijñānavādīnām vijñānaṃ paramārthato
nirākāram abdhātukanakākāśaśuddhiva[_{Pp166v3}]c^{g26} chu[_{jp212r1}]ddhir⁶⁰⁰
iṣyata^{PPP} iti vacanāt | atha **ca** tam **ākāram vetti tathā** bāhyam apīti
| | TSP *ad* TS 2040 | |

atrāha — **asādhāraṇam** ityādi |

asādhāraṇam e[_{jk104r2}]vedaṃ svarūpaṃ cittacaittayoḥ |
saṃvedanaṃ⁶⁰¹ tato 'nyeṣāṃ
na mukhyaṃ tat kathaṅcana | | 2041 | |

ekasāmagryadhīnatvaṃ kā[_{Pk37v17}]ryakāraṇatādi vā⁶⁰² |
samāśritya bhaven nāma
bhāktam bhūtasya vedanam⁶⁰³ | | 2042 | |

[_{jk104r3}] nīrūpasya⁶⁰⁴ svabhāvasya⁶⁰⁵ naikasāmagryadhīnatā |

⁵⁹⁴ *syāt* Jp^{pc} (*syā<<d>>*) ◊ K Ś] *syā* Jp^{ac}; *syāh* Pp

⁵⁹⁵ *janitaṃ tat tasyaiva* Jp^{pc} Pp ◊ K Ś] *janitatasyaiva* Jp^{ac}

⁵⁹⁶ *saṃvedakaṃ* Jp ◊ K Ś] *saṃvedanakaṃ* Pp

⁵⁹⁷ *saṃvedyatva*^o Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rig par bya ba ñid du*) ◊ K] *sarvasaṃvedyatva*^o Ś

⁵⁹⁸ *yathā* Jk T_{1D} T_{1P} (*ji ltar*) ◊ K Ś] *tathā* Pk

⁵⁹⁹ *arthaṃ* Jk Pk T_{1D} T_{1P} (*don*) ◊ Ś] *sarvaṃ* K Pā Gā

⁶⁰⁰ *abdhātukanakākāśaśuddhivac chuddhir* Jp (*a<<bdhā>>tukanakākāśasuddhivac chuddhir*^o), T_{2D} T_{2P}
(*chu kham sger dan nam mkha' mams | dag pa bžin du dag par*)] *adhātukanakākāśaśuddhivac chuddhir*
Pp; *adhātukanakākāśaśuddhivad buddhir* K Ś

⁶⁰¹ *saṃvedanaṃ* Jk ◊ K Ś] *savedanaṃ* Pk

⁶⁰² *vā* Jk Pk T_{1D} T_{1P} (*'am*) ◊ Ś] *ca* K Pā Gā

⁶⁰³ *vedanam* Jk^{pc} Pk (*vedanam*) ◊ K Ś] *vedakaṃ* Jk^{ac}

⁶⁰⁴ *nīrūpasya* Jk] *nīrūpyasya* Pk K Ś

⁶⁰⁵ *svabhāvasya* Jk^{pc} Pk (<<*sva*>>*bhāvasya*) ◊ Ś] .. *bhāvasya* Jk^{ac}; *tu bhāvasya* K Pā Gā; T_{1D} T_{1P}
(*dnos po nē*)

^{ooo} *ji ltar khyod kyi śes pa ni | | yañ dag tu na mam med kyañ | | yañ dag min mams myoñ ba ltar | | kho
bo'i yañ dag don de bžin | |* (BASK 101).

^{PPP} *Madhyāntavibhāga* 1.16cd.

^{g26} *nirmala* Jp^g

na cānyat tena naivāsti

gaṇam apy asya vedanam [T_{1P}90a] | |2043| |

na hy abhūtasya mukhyam⁶⁰⁶ saṃvedanam asti | tathā hi — yad eva prakā[Pp166v₄]śātmakam **asādhāraṇam** ahaṅkāraśpadam sātādirūpeṇa prathate **rūpam** ātmā cittacaittānām tad eva teṣām⁶⁰⁷ saṃvedanam mukhyam | **tato** jñānātmano **'nyeṣām** abhūtākārāṇām⁶⁰⁸ **na** [Pp166v₅] **tan mukhyam saṃvedanam** yuktam | teṣām abhūtātadvā eva [T_{2D}124b] |

nāpi **gaṇam**⁶⁰⁹ upacāranimittābhāvāt⁶¹⁰ | tathā hi [Jp212r₂] — **ekasāmagryadhīnatvaṃ kāryakāraṇa**bhāvo **vādi**śabdena⁶¹¹πππ sārūpyam etad u[Pp166v₆]pacāranibandhanam bhavet | na cābhūtasyaitat sarvam asti | **na cānyad** asty upacāranimittam | kevalam avidyāvaśād aviśayam [T_{2P}164a] evābhūtākāropadarśakam jñānam bhrāntam jāya[Pp166v₇]te | |TSP *ad* TS 2041–2043| |

sa⁶¹² eva tarhi vibhramo 'satyākārasaṃvedane upacāranimittam bhaviṣyatīti cet | atrāha — **atha vetyādi** |

[Pk38r₁] atha vābhūtam ākāraṃ vettīti vyapadiśyate |

vibhramān na hi tattvena

vetti nirvi[Jk104r₄]śayaṃ hi tat | |2044| |

tvayāpi⁶¹³ yadi vījñānam evambhūtasya vedakam |

vibhramād ucyate prāptam⁶¹⁴

vyaktam [Pk38r₂] nirviśayaṃ tava | |2045| |

[K573] [Ś699] **tad** iti abhūtākāraviśayatvenoktam⁶¹⁵ jñānam⁶¹⁶ | tathā [Jp212r₃] hi [Pp166v₈] — paramārthatō nābhūtākāro 'sti vedyas tasya hi vidhinā vedyatvopagame bhūtadvaprasaṅgāt | |TSP *ad* TS 2044–2045| |

punaḥ sa^{g27} evāha —

⁶⁰⁶ *mukhyam* Jp] *mukhya*° Pp K Ś

⁶⁰⁷ *teṣām* Jp Pp ◇ K] *teṣā* Ś

⁶⁰⁸ °*ākārāṇām* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °*ākārāṇām* Jp^{ac}

⁶⁰⁹ *gaṇam* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *goṇam* Jp^{ac}

⁶¹⁰ °*ābhāvāt* Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] °*ābhāvā* Jp^{ac} Pp

⁶¹¹ °*bhāvo vā*° em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} ('*am...dīos po*) and partly on °*bhāvā* | Jp^{ac} (*eye-skip?*)] °*bhāvā* | Jp^{pc} Pp; °*bhāvah*, K Ś

⁶¹² *sa* Jp ◇ K Ś] *su* Pp

⁶¹³ *tvayā*° Jk Pk ◇ K Ś] T_{1D} T_{1P} (*der*)

⁶¹⁴ *prāptam* Jk Pk] *vyāptam* K Ś

⁶¹⁵ *abhūtākāraviśaya*° em. supported by T_{2D} T_{2P} (*yañ dag pa ma yin pa'i mam pa'i yul*) *abhūtākārāviśaya*° Jp Pp K Ś

⁶¹⁶ *jñānam* Jp (*jñānan*) Pp (*jñāna*<<ṃ>>) ◇ K] *jñāna* Pp; *jñām* Ś; deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

πππ Here, *vā*° corresponds to *vā* in TS 2042b2.

^{g27} *subhagupta* Jp^g Pp^g

sākāraṃ⁶¹⁷ tan nirākāraṃ tulyakālam atulyajam | [Pp166v₉]
iti bauddhe⁶¹⁸ 'pi vijñāne kiṃ na cintā pravartate ||^{qqq}

iti | yathā sākārādivijñānena⁶¹⁹ nārthasya grahaṇaṃ yuktam iti cintā kriyate
tathā bhagavato 'pi jñānenā[Pp166v₁₀]rthasya grahaṇaṃ prati kiṃ na kriyate^{g28}
ity atrāha — **sākāram** ityādi |

sākāraṃ tan nirākāraṃ yuktaṃ nānyasya vedakam |
iti bauddhe⁶²⁰ 'pi vijñā[Jk104r₅]ne
na⁶²¹ tu cintā pravartate || 2046 ||

na hi bhagavato jñānaṃ ta[Jp212r₄]sya grāhakam iṣyate yenātrāpi cintā kriye-
ta | yāvatā tasya sarvāvaraṇa[Pp166v₁₁]vigamān na grāhyagrāhakavikalpo
'stūṣṭam || TSP *ad* TS 2046 ||

nanu ca yady api bāhyo 'rtho⁶²² nāsti grāhyas tathāpi cittāntaram asty eva
santānāntaravartī tad bhagavajjñānasya kim iti grāhyaṃ [Pp166v₁₂] na bha-
vet ||^{rrr} atrāha — **anyarāgādīti** |⁶²³

anyarāgādisaṃvittau⁶²⁴ tatsārūpyasamudbhavāt |
prāpnoty ā[Pk38r₃]vṛttisadbhāva aupalambhikadarśane || 2047 ||

anyasantānavartirāgādīsaṃvedanaṃ hi yadi paraṃ⁶²⁵ sārūpyād eva
yuktam, nānyathā,⁶²⁶ atiprasaṅgāt [T_{2D}125a] | [Jp212r₅] tataś ca yadi sarvātmanā
sārūpyaṃ [Pp166v₁₃] tadā bhagavato 'pi jñānaṃ raktaṃ syāt | [T_{2P}164b] evaṃ
satī kleśāvaraṇaṃ aprahīṇaṃ syād ity **āvṛttisadbhāvaḥ prāpnoti** |
upalambhena carantīty **aupalambhikāḥ** | teṣāṃ **darśane** mate |
ya[Pp166v₁₄]d vā **aupalambhike** bhagavato **darśane** jñāne⁶²⁷ 'bhyupaga-
myamāne⁶²⁸ satīty ayam arthaḥ |

⁶¹⁷ *sākāraṃ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *sakāraṃ* Jp^{ac}

⁶¹⁸ *bauddhe* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *bauddhā* Jp^{ac}

⁶¹⁹ *sākārādivijñānena* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] **sākāreṇa* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*mam pa dan bcas pas*)

⁶²⁰ *bauddhe* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *bo ..* Jk^{ac}

⁶²¹ *na* Jk Pk ◇ K Ś] **naḥ* T_{1D} T_{1P} (*kho bo cag ni*)

⁶²² *bāhyo 'rtho* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *bāhyortho* Jp^{ac}

⁶²³ *anyarāgādīti* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *anyarāgādīti anyarāgādīti* Jp^{ac}

⁶²⁴ *saṃvittau* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *saṃvittu* Jk^{ac}

⁶²⁵ *yadi paraṃ* Jp Pp] *yadi, paraṃ* K Ś

⁶²⁶ *nānyathā* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] **anyathā* T_{2P} (*de lta ma yin na*) T_{2D} (*de lta ma yin*)

⁶²⁷ *jñāne* Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] *deest* T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁶²⁸ *'bhyupagamyamāne* Jp^{pc} (*abhyupagamyamāne*) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*khas len pa na*) ◇ K Ś] *abhyupagamyē māne* Jp^{ac} Pp

^{qqq} *mam pa bcas sam ci nam med* || *dus mñam mi mñam las skyes śes* || *sañs rgyas mkhyen la'an ci yi*
phyir || *byis pa rab tu 'jug mi byed* || (BASK 95).

^{rrr} Cf. *thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes kyi* || *myoñ bar bya ba rgyud gžan la* || *bsgos pa'i chos mams gañ dag*
yin || *de dag gis kyañ ma ñes te* || *rtogs med ji ltar thams cad mkhyen* || (BASK 86).

^{g28} *cintā* Jp^g Pp^g

athaikadeśena sārūpyaṃ tathāpi dvayākārasyāprahīnatvā⁶²⁹ jñeyāvara-
ṇasadbhāvaḥ [Pp166v₁₃] prāpnoti grāhyākārakalaṇ[_{212r}]kitatvāt⁶³⁰ | tathā hi
— ekasya dvairūpyaṃ bhāvikam ayuktam iti tad avaśyaṃ [ś700] bhrāntaṃ
vyavasthāpanīyam | tataś ca bhrāntibījasya dauṣṭhulyasyāprahāṇād⁶³¹ppp
apra[_{166v}]hīṇāvaraṇa eva bhagavān syāt⁶³² || TSP *ad* TS 2047 ||

yadi na kiñcij jānāti kathaṃ tarhi sarvajñaḥ⁶³³ syād ity āha — **kalpapāda-
pavad** ityādi |⁶³⁴

[K574] kalpapādapavat sarvasaṅkalpapavanair muniḥ |
[_{104v}] akampyo⁶³⁵ 'pi karoty eva
lokānām arthasampadam || 2048 ||
tenādarśanam apy āhuḥ
sarve⁶³⁶ sarvavidam⁶³⁷ [P_{38r}] jīnam |
anābhogena niḥśeṣasarvavitkāryasāadhanāt⁶³⁸ttt || 2049 ||

adarśanam iti nāsyā darśanam upalambho 'stūty a[_{166v}]darśanaḥ |
pūrvapraṇidhāna[_{212r}]balād **anābhogena** kalpataruvad⁶³⁹ yathābhavyam
aśeṣajagadarthasampādanāt sarvajñaṃ **āhur** nopalambhabalāt⁶⁴⁰ | svabhā-
vāntarasya sarvathāpy upalambhā[_{167r}]yogāt || TSP *ad* TS 2048–2049 ||

⁶²⁹ *dvayā*° Jp Pp] *dvya*° K Ś

⁶³⁰ °ākārakalanīkita° Jp^{pc} Pp (°ākārakalanīkita°) Jp^{ac} K Ś] °ākārakalanīkita° Jp^{ac}

⁶³¹ °sya dauṣṭhulyasyā° Jp^{ac} *dauṣṭhulyasya T_{2D} T_{2P} (gnas nan len)] °sya dauṣṭhālyasyā° Jp^{pc};
°syādaṣṭhālyasyā° Pp; °syādaṣṭhulyasyā° Ś; °syādaṣṭhālyasyā° K Pā Gā

⁶³² *bhagavān syāt* | Pp Jp K Ś] *bhagavān* | *syāt* | Jp

⁶³³ *sarvajñaḥ* Jp K Ś] *sarvajñaḥ* | Jp; *sarvajña* Pp

⁶³⁴ *kalpapādapavad ityādi* | Jp Jp K Ś] *kalpapāda*<<pa/ya>>*vad ityādi* | Pp

⁶³⁵ *akampyo* Jp^{pc} Pk (Pk *akampyo*) T_{1D} (*mi bskyod*) T_{1P} (*ma bskyod*)] *aka*<<ṃṣye?>> Jk^{ac}; *akampye* Ś;
akampo K Pā Gā

⁶³⁶ *sarve* em. Jp K Pā Gā] *sārvam* Jk Pk; *sarvam* Ś

⁶³⁷ *sarvavidam* Jk Pk (*sarvavidam*) T_{1D} T_{1P} (*thams cad mkhyen pa ni*) Jp K] *sarvam idam* Ś

⁶³⁸ °sāadhanāt Jk^{ac} T_{1D} T_{1P} (*bṣgrub phyir*)] °sambhavāt Jk^{pc} Pk, °sambhavāt K Ś

⁶³⁹ *kalpataruvad* Jp^{pc} T_{2D} (*dpag bsam gvis śin ltar*) T_{2P} (*dpag bsam śin ltar*) Jp K conj. (*kalpata-
bha*{ru?}>*vad*) Ś] *kalpatabhavet* Jp^{ac}; *kalpatabhavat* Pp Pā

⁶⁴⁰ *nopalambhabalāt* Jp Jp K Ś] *nopa*<<pa>>*lambhabalāt* Pp (*ditlography*)

ppp See Negi 2001: 2922 (s.v.). Spelled also as *dauṣṭhūlya*, see Edgerton 1953: 272 (s.v.); and
**dauṣṭhulyam*, see *Mahāvīyutpatti* 2102 (20) (ed. vol I, p. 158).

σσσ The reading *sārvam*, found in Jk and Pk, which is an attribute of the Buddha, could be
equally possible. Nonetheless, Xk likely had *sarve* (with a *prṣṭhamātrā* for the *e*) to which an
anusvāra was subsequently added. Note that T_{1D} T_{1P} has *thams cad kyi*/**sarva*° as an attribute
qualifying *niḥśeṣasarvavitkāryasāadhanāt*.

ttt °*sāadhanāt* is mirrored in the commentary. Cf. °*sampādanāt* (TSP *ad* TS 2049).

4.

Rejection of the *Pramāṇas*
Proving External Objects

evaṃ bāhyārthanīṣedhakam pramāṇam abhidhāya tatsādhakam parapraṇī-
tam apākartum⁶⁴¹ āha — **dhiya** ityādi |

[T_{1D}75a] dhiyo 'sitādirūpa[Jk104v₂]tve

sā tasyānubhavaḥ katham⁶⁴² |

dhiyaḥ sitādirūpatve bāhyo 'rthaḥ kiṃpramāṇakaḥ || 2050 ||^{sss}

tathā hi — pratyakṣato [Pp212v₁] bāhyārthasiddhiḥ⁶⁴³ syād anumānato vā
[Pp167r₂], anyasya pramāṇasya sato 'traivāntarbhāvāt | tatra na tāvat
pratyakṣataḥ | tathā hi — pratyakṣābhimatena jñānena nirākāreṇa
vārthasya grahaṇam syāt sākāreṇa vā [T_{2P}165a] | na tāva[Pp167r₃]n nirākāreṇa
[T_{2D}125b] pratyāsattinibandhanābhāvāt | **dhiyo 'sitādirūpatve** sati **sā** dhīs
tasyārthasyānubhavaḥ katham bhavet | naiva⁶⁴⁴ bhaved⁶⁴⁵ iti
prāguktam | atha⁶⁴⁶ sākāreṇa [Pp167r₄] tadā⁶⁴⁷ nīladyākārasyaivaikasya
jñānagatasyopalām[Pp212v₂]bhād bāhyo 'rthaḥ parokṣa eva bhaven na
pratyakṣaḥ | na hi dve nīle kadācit saṃvedyete | ekaṃ jñānapratibimbakam
aparam⁶⁴⁸ ta[Pp167r₃]darpakam ity evaṃ tāvan na pratyakṣataḥ siddhiḥ
|| TSP *ad* TS 2050 ||

[Ś701] anumānatas tarhi siddhir astv iti cet | atra bhadantaśubhaguptaḥ
pramāṇayati^{g29} — yo jñānākāraḥ sa saṃvāditve sati
tathāvidhāparapadā[Pp167r₆]rthajanitas^{ttt} tadyathā grāhaka ākāraḥ |⁶⁴⁹
jñānākāraś cāyam aviṣṭendriyasya⁶⁵⁰ nīlādipratibhāsaṃśeṣaḥ
saṃvā[Pp212v₃]dīti svabhāvahetuḥ | tad idam āśaṅkate — **nīlādītyādi** |

nīlādi[Pk38r₃]pratibhāsyasya saṃvāditvena sādhyate |

jñānākāratayā tulyajātīyāj janma bodhava[Jk104v₃]t | | 2051 | |

⁶⁴¹ *apākartum* em. partly based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*bsal ba'i phyir*) ◇ Ś] *upākartum* Jp Pp K, °*upā*° Pā Gā

⁶⁴² *katham* Jk Pk (*katham*) T_{1D} T_{1P} (*ji ltar*) ◇ K] deest Ś (*contra metrum*)

⁶⁴³ °*siddhiḥ* Pp (*siddhi*<<h>>) ◇ K Ś] °*siddhi* Jp

⁶⁴⁴ *naiva* Jp Pp ◇ K] *neva* Ś

⁶⁴⁵ *bhaved* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *naved* Jp^{ac}

⁶⁴⁶ *atha* Jp ◇ K Ś] *ātha* Pp

⁶⁴⁷ *tadā* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de'i tše*) ◇ Ś] *ta*<<tā/thā>> Pp; *tathā* K Pā Gā

⁶⁴⁸ *aparam* Jp ◇ K Ś] *apara*° Pp

⁶⁴⁹ *ākāraḥ* | Pp (*ākāro*) ◇ K Ś] *ākārā* Jp^{ac}; *ākāre* | Jp^{pc}

⁶⁵⁰ °*endriyasya* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °*endriyasyadi* Jp^{ac}

^{sss} *dhiyo nīlādirūpatve bāhyo 'rthaḥ kiṃpramāṇakaḥ | dhiyo 'nīlādirūpatve sa tasyānubhavaḥ katham* || (PV Pratyakṣa 432). In the quotation the two half-verses have been transposed.

^{ttt} Cf. *śes pa mi bslu ma 'khrul te* | | *bslu ba dag ni 'khrul pa yin* | | (BASK 7cd); *yul dan dus dan mi gžan la* | | *śes pa mi bslu gan yin pa* | | *de ni mi 'khrul yin par śes* | | (BASK 8abc).

^{g29} *aviṣṭendriyasya nīlādipratibhāsa tathāvidhāparapadārthajanitaḥ saṃvāditve sati jñānākāratavāt* Jp^s Pp^s

saṁvā[Pp167_{r7}]**ditvene**ūtthambhūtalakṣaṇe tṛtīyā |^{uuu} saṁvāditvenopalakṣi-
tā yā jñānākāratā tayā hetubhūtayā jñānākārasya **tulyajātiyāj janma**⁶⁵¹
sādhya | **bodhavad** grāha[Pp167_{r9}]kākaravad ity arthaḥ || TSP *ad* TS
2051 ||

[K575] **bāhyārthetyā**dinā dūṣaṇam āha |

bāhyārthaprāpaṇam yadvā tatsāmarthyam yadiṣyate |

saṁvāditvam asiddham tad

bahirarthā[Pk38_{r6}]palāpinaḥ⁶⁵² || 2052 ||

arthakriyāvasāye cet pratyaye hetuteṣyate |

saṁvāditvam tathāpy e[Pk104_{v4}]tan

nirālambe 'pi⁶⁵³ śakyate⁶⁵⁴ || 2053 ||

tatra yadi **bāhyārthaprāpaṇam** tatprapāṇaśaktir^{655g30} vā saṁvāditvam
hetuviśeṣaṇam abhipretaṁ tadā **bahira**[Pp167_{r9}]**rthāpalāpino** vijñā-
[Pp212_{v4}]ptimātratāvādinā **tad asiddham** ity anyatarāsiddho⁶⁵⁶ hetuḥ⁶⁵⁷
[T_{2P}165b] || TSP *ad* TS 2052 ||

athābhimat**arthakriyā**vabhāsi**pratyayahetutvam saṁvāditvam**⁶⁵⁸ iṣṭam |
tadā [Pp167_{r10}] viparyaye bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanāt sandigdghavipakṣa-
vyāvṛttikatety anaikāntiko hetuḥ, **nirālambe 'pi** jñāne [T_{2D}126a] tathāvidha-
saṁvāditvāvirodhāt || TSP *ad* TS 2053 ||

a[Pp167_{r11}]virodham eva samarthayitum āha — **yathā bāhyajalādīnām**
iti |

yathā bāhyajalādīnām⁶⁵⁹ sāmārthyanīyam⁶⁶⁰ mataḥ |

[Pk38_{r7}] jñāneṣv api tathāiveti⁶⁶¹

sandigdghavyatirekatā⁶⁶² || 2054 ||

⁶⁵¹ *janma* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *janmā* Jp^{ac}

⁶⁵² °*āpalāpinaḥ* Jk ◇ K Ś] °*āpalāyinaḥ* Pk; T_{1D} T_{1P} (*smyon la*)

⁶⁵³ *nirālambe 'pi* Jk (*nirālambeḥ*) ◇ K Ś] *nirālambe* <<ti?>> *pi* Pk; T_{1D} T_{1P} (*mig med la*)

⁶⁵⁴ *śakyate* em. supported by T_{1D} T_{1P} (*śrid*) ◇ K Pā Gā] *śamkyate* Jk Pk, *śaṅkyate* Ś

⁶⁵⁵ *tatprapāṇa*° em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de thob par*)] *tatpramāṇa*° Jp Pp K Ś

⁶⁵⁶ *anyatarā*° Jp ◇ K Ś] *anyatamrā*° Pp; **anyatara*° T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gañ yañ ruñ ba la* [*grub pa*])

⁶⁵⁷ *hetuḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *het . ḥ* Jp^{ac}

⁶⁵⁸ *saṁvāditvam* Pp ◇ K Ś] *saṁvāditvaṁ* Jp

⁶⁵⁹ °*jalā*° Jk ◇ K Ś] °*jālā*° Pk

⁶⁶⁰ *sāmārthya*° Jk^{pc} Pk] *sa* ... Jk^{ac}; *sāmārthyam* K Pā Gā; *sāmārthye* Ś

⁶⁶¹ *tathāiveti* Jk] *tathāivaite* Pk; *tathāivaite* K; *tathāivaiti* Ś; *tathāivete* Pā Gā

⁶⁶² *sandigdghavyatirekatā* Jk Pk (*sandigdghavyatirekatā*) T_{1D} T_{1P} (*ldog ṇid the tshom za*) ◇ Ś] *saṁvido*
'*vyatirekatā*{*naḥ*?} K conj.; *saṁvido* 'vyatirekatā Pā; *saṁvido* 'vyatirekatā *naḥ* Gā

^{uuu} *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.3.21.

^{g30} *pariccheda* Jp^g. In Jp the *signe-de-renvoi* is not found.

[§702] anumāpratibhāsena⁶⁶³

spaṣṭaṃ⁶⁶⁴ sādharma[_{Jk104v5}]no 'py ayam |

spaṣṭaṃ hutāsanādīnām rūpaṃ tena samaṃ na hi || 2055 ||

kiṃ cānu[§702]mānājñānapratibhāsa⁶⁶⁵sya saty api nirā[_{Jp212v5}]lambatve samvāditvam astūti niścita⁶⁶⁶vipakṣa[_{Pp167r12}]dbhāvāt prameyatvādivat **spaṣṭā** sādharma⁶⁶⁷ānaikāntikatā hetuḥ |

syād etat — asiddhā nirā⁶⁶⁸lambanatānumānavikalpasyety āha — **spaṣṭaṃ hutāsanādīnām** ityā[_{Pp167r13}]di | prayogaḥ — yad^{g31} yadākāraśūnyaṃ na tat tadviśayam, yathā rūpājñānaṃ na śabdaviśayam | bāhyākāraśūnyaṃ cānumānājñānaṃ^{665g32} iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ^{g33} | na cāsiddho [Pp167r14] hetuḥ | tathā hi — **spa**[_{Jp212v6}]**ṣṭaṃ hutāsanādīnām** yat tad **rūpaṃ** na tat **tenā**numānājñānākāreṇa⁶⁶⁶ **samaṃ** tulyaṃ tasyāspaṣṭa⁶⁶⁷tvāt | anyathā hi yathā pratiṣṭhitena tārṇapārṇādibhedā[_{Pp167r13}]to⁶⁶⁷ rūpeṇa pratyakṣājñāne⁶⁶⁸ pratyavabhāsate, tathaivānumānājñāne 'pi bhāseta | yāvata⁶⁶⁹ pratiṣṭhitaṃ rūpaṃ utsrjya gamakānugasāmānyarūpeṇaiva^{vvv} bhāseta parokṣo⁶⁶⁹ [Pp167r16] vahnnyādir⁶⁷⁰ anumāne | na [Jp212v7] caikasyākāradvayaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣātmakaṃ [T_{2P}166a] parasparaviruddhaṃ yuktam⁶⁷¹ iti prāk pratipāditam | nāpi viruddho hetuḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt | nāpy anai-⁶⁷²[Pp167r17]kāntiko 'tiprasaṅgāt⁶⁷² || TSP *ad* TS 2054–2055 ||

prameyatvādihetubhya⁶⁷³ ityādinodyotakarasya [Jp213r] pramāṇāny āśaṅkate | [K576]

⁶⁶³ *anumāpratibhāsena* Jk ◊ K Ś] *anumāpratibhāsena* Pk

⁶⁶⁴ *spaṣṭaṃ* em. partly based on T_{1D} T_{1P} (*gsal bar*)] *spaṣṭaḥ* Jk Pk K Ś

⁶⁶⁵ °*ānumānājñānaṃ* Jp Pp ◊ Ś] °*ānumānamānaṃ* K; °*numāna*° Pā Gā

⁶⁶⁶ *na tat tenā*° em. ◊ K Ś] *nattatamā*° Jp^{ac} (*lapsus calami*); *na tattatamā*° Jp^{pc}; *na tattātāmā*° Pp

⁶⁶⁷ °*pārṇā*° em. ◊ K Ś] °*pārṇā*° Jp, <<*pārṇā*>> Pp

⁶⁶⁸ *pratyakṣa*° Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*mñon sum gvi*)] *pratyakṣe* Jp^{ac} Pp K Ś

⁶⁶⁹ *parokṣo* Jp (*paro*<<*kṣ*>>°) Pp (*pa*<<*roṣo*>>°) ◊ K] *parokṣe* Ś

⁶⁷⁰ *vahnnyā*° em. based on *vahyā*° Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*me la sogs pa*)] *bāhyā*° Pp K Ś

⁶⁷¹ *yuktam* Jp ◊ K Ś] *yu . ktaṃ* Pp

⁶⁷² °*tiprasaṅgāt* Jp^{pc} Pp ('*tiprasaṅgāt*) ◊ K Ś] *tiprasaṅgāt* Jp^{ac}

⁶⁷³ *prameyatvādihetubhya* conj. ◊ K Ś] *prameyatvādiḥ* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gṣal bya ñid sogs*)

^{vvv} Cf. *gamakānugasāmānyarūpeṇaiva tadā gatiḥ* | (PV Pratyakṣa 61ab).

^{g31} *anumānājñānaṃ na vahnivīśayaṃ vahnnyākārasūnyatvāt* Jp^g. *anumānājñānaṃ na vahnivīśayaṃ bāhyākārasūnyatvāt* Pp^g. In Pp the gloss indicates 5 as the reference line number (exactly like in Jp) instead of 12 where the *signe-de-renvoi* and the actual referred passage are found.

^{g32} *aspaṣṭākāratvāt* Jp^g Pp^g

^{g33} *anumānasya vahnivīśayatvaṃ vyāpyaṃ tadākāratvaṃ vyāpakam tasya viruddhaṃ tadākārasūnyatvaṃ tasyopalabdhīḥ* Jp^g Pp^g. In Pp the gloss indicates 5 as the reference line number (exactly like in Jp) instead of 13 where the *signe-de-renvoi* and the actual referred passage are found.

prameyatvādi[Pk38r₈]hetubhyaḥ

[T_{1P}90b] santānāntaracittavat⁶⁷⁴_{uuu} |

āntarānubhavād bhinnam deśavicchedabhāsi cet || 2056 ||

sa hy āha — yad etad⁶⁷⁵ **deśaviccheda**pratibhāsi⁶⁷⁶ nīlādikaṃ tad **āntarānubhavā**[Pp167v₁]**d bhinnam** prameyatvāt | anityatvāt | kāryatvāt⁶⁷⁷ | pratyayatvāt | hetumattvāt⁶⁷⁸ | yathā **santānāntaracittam** iti [T_{2D}126b] || TSP *ad* TS 2056 ||

atrāpi vya[Jk105r₁]bhicāritvaṃ⁶⁷⁹ svarūpeṇāśya⁶⁸⁰ cetasaḥ |

[Ś703] tathā pītadvicandrādyair⁶⁸¹_{φφφ}

asva[Pk38r₉]sthanayanekṣitaiḥ⁶⁸² || 2057 ||

atrāpīti⁶⁸³ sarveṣv eva hetuṣu⁶⁸⁴ **vyabhicāritvaṃ** anaikāntikatvaṃ⁶⁸⁵ [Jp213r₂] ān[Pp167v₂]tarānubhave⁶⁸⁶ 'pi prameyatvādīnām sadbhāvāt | **tathā**⁶⁸⁷ taimirikādījñāne pratibhā[Ś703]sibhir **dvicandrādyair** anaikāntikatā | prameyatvaṃ tu dvicandrādīnām dvicandrādītivikalpa[Pp167v₃]kajñānaviśayatayā draṣṭavyam | na ca yasmin vijñāne te bhāsante tadapekṣayā teṣām arthādhimokṣābhāvāt⁶⁸⁸_{xxx} | yad āha —

⁶⁷⁴ °vat em. ◇ Ś] °vūt Jk Pk K; T_{1D} T_{1P} (*gṛān*)

⁶⁷⁵ etad Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] etā Jp^{ac}

⁶⁷⁶ °viccheda° Pp ◇ K Ś] °vicheda° Jp

⁶⁷⁷ kāryatvāt Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś T_{2D} T_{2P} ('bras bu yin pa'i phyir') deest Jp^{ac}

⁶⁷⁸ hetumattvāt Jp^{pc} Pp (*hetumatvāt*) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rgyu dan ldan pa'i phyir*) ◇ K Ś] deest Jp^{ac}

⁶⁷⁹ vyabhicāritvaṃ Jk^{ac} Pk ◇ K Ś] vyabhicārotvaṃ Jk^{pc}

⁶⁸⁰ svarūpeṇā° Jk^{pc} T_{1D} T_{1P} (*ran gi no bo*)] rūpeṇā° Jk^{ac} (*contra metrum*); carūpeṇā° Pk; na rūpeṇā° K Ś

⁶⁸¹ tathā pītadvi° Jk Pk] tathāpi tad dvi° Ś, T_{1D} T_{1P} (*dan || de bṣin... || ...gñis... 'khrul*); tathāpi{hī?}taddvi° K conj.; tathāpi Pā; tathā hi Gā

⁶⁸² asva° Jk ◇ K Ś] asva<<m°>> Pk

⁶⁸³ atrāpīti Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁶⁸⁴ hetuṣu Pp ◇ K Ś] hetuṣū Jp

⁶⁸⁵ an° Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] <<e>>n° Pp^{ac}

⁶⁸⁶ āntarānubhave Jp^{pc} (*ām̐tarānubhave*) Pp (<<ā>>ṃtarānubhave) ◇ K Ś] am̐tarānubhave Jp^{ac}

⁶⁸⁷ tathā Jp ◇ Ś T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de bṣin du*)] yathā Pp K Gā

⁶⁸⁸ arthādhimokṣābhāvāt Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*don du ṣen pa med pa'i phyir*)] arthādhi{ga}mo{'kṣābhāvāt K; arthādhigamaḥ, arthādhimokṣābhāvāt Ś; °arthādhimokṣā° Pā Gā

_{uuu} °vat is mirrored in the commentary; cf. *yathā* (TSP *ad* TS 2056).

_{φφφ} TSP *ad* TS 2057 refers just to *dvicandrādyair*. However, TSP *ad* TS 2058 refers to *pītadvicandrādījñāne*.

_{xxx} Negi (2003: 5204 s.v.) brings forward this passage (and the following one) as an instance of the correspondence between *ṣen pa* and *adhimokṣa*.

keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣata^{689www} iti || TSP *ad* TS 2057 ||

a[Pp167v₄]**nyathetyā**dinā kumārīlasya matena vyabhicāraṇīṣayasyāsiddhim⁶⁹⁰
āśānkate |

anyathā bāhya evārthaḥ [Jk105r₂] saṃvedyaś ced ihocyate |
ākāro bhāsamāno 'sau na tadarthātmako nanu || 2058 ||

sa caivaṃ bhāsamānatvād vi[Pk38r₁₀]jñānena pravedyate |
bāhyasya tu nijaṃ rūpaṃ naivaṃ tatrāvabhāṣate⁶⁹¹ || 2059 ||

[Jk105r₃] abhāsamāno vedyas⁶⁹² ca kathaṃ nāmopapadyate |
taṃ ca vetty⁶⁹³ anyathā ceti
parasparavi[Pk38r₁₁]rodhi ca || 2060 ||

ata eva svavedyatvaṃ duḥśādhyaṃ⁶⁹⁴ naiva cetasām |
ātmabhūtāvabhāṣasya
tadā⁶⁹⁵ [Jk105r₄] saṃvittidarśanāt || 2061 || ☐☐☐

[Ś704] tasmād buddhir iyaṃ bhrāntā⁶⁹⁶
kalpayanty artham eva na |
ka[Pk38r₁₂]lpayaty anyathā santaṃ
tenātmānam avasyati⁶⁹⁷ || 2062 ||

[Jp213r₃] sa hy āha — **ihā** pītadvicandrādijñāne vyabhicāraṇīṣayatveno-
panyaste⁶⁹⁸ **bāhya eva** śaṃ[Pp167v₅]khādir⁶⁹⁹ **arthaḥ** pītādirūpeṇālambyate |
tato vyabhicāro na siddha iti |

atrāha — **ākāra** ityādi | ayam atra saṅkṣepārthaḥ — ya ev**ākāro** yasmiṃ
jñāne pratyavabhāṣate [Pp167v₆] sa [T_{2P}166b] eva tena saṃvedyata iti yuktam |

⁶⁸⁹ *keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ* Jp (*keśādir nnārtho 'narthādhimokṣata*) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*skra śad la sogs don min te || don du zen pa med phyr ro*) ◇ Ś] *ke<<śā>>dinātho <<'>>narthādhimokṣata* Pp; *keśādinā yo 'na{nāyanā?}rthādhī{ga}mo{'}kṣata* K conj./em.; *keśādinā yo 'narthādhimokṣataḥ* Jai Pā; *keśādinā yo 'nāyanārthādhigamo 'kṣataḥ* Gā

⁶⁹⁰ *vyabhicāra*° Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*'khrul pa'i*) ◇ K Ś] *vyabhicārī* Jp^{ac}

⁶⁹¹ *bāhyasya tu nijaṃ rūpaṃ naivaṃ tatrāvabhāṣate* Jk Pk ◇ K Ś] *deest* T_{1D} T_{1P}

⁶⁹² *vedyas* Jk Pk^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *vedyasyaś* Pk^{ac}

⁶⁹³ *vetty* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *ve . y* Jk^{ac}

⁶⁹⁴ *duḥśādhyaṃ* Jk Pk ◇ K Pā Gā] *duḥśādhyaṃ* Ś

⁶⁹⁵ *tadā* Jk Pk ◇ T_{1D} T_{1P} (*de tshē*)] *tathā* K Ś

⁶⁹⁶ *bhrāntā* Jk (*bhrāntā*) ◇ K Ś] *bhrāntām* Pk

⁶⁹⁷ *avasyati* Jk] *avaśyati* Pk Ś; *avaśyati* {*veṣate?*} K conj.; *aveṣate* Gā

⁶⁹⁸ °*opanyaste* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ñe bar bkod pa la*)] °*opanyasto* Pp K Ś

⁶⁹⁹ *saṅkhādir* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*duñ la sogs pa'i*) ◇ K Ś] *saṃkhyādir* Jp Pp

☐☐☐ In Pk, this *kārikā* has the number 99 (exactly like the following one) instead of 98.

^{www} *pramāṇaṃ dvividhaṃ meyvadvividhyāc chaktyaśaktitaḥ | arthakriyāyām keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 1, ed. Franco-Notake 2014 p. 29). Cf. *mānaṃ dvividhaṃ viśayadvividhyāc chaktyaśaktitaḥ | arthakriyāyām keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 1); *mānaṃ dvividhaṃ meyvadvividhyāc chaktyaśaktitaḥ | arthakriyāyām keśādir nārtho 'narthādhimokṣataḥ ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 1, ed. Miyasaka 1971–1972 p. 42) (*contra metrum – hypometrical*).

anyathā hi sarvaṃ jñānaṃ sarvaviśayaṃ⁷⁰⁰ syāt | tasmāt⁷⁰¹
 pratibhāsamānatvena [K577] saṃvedyatvaṃ vyāptam | na ca pītā[Pp213r₄]kāre
 jñāne śuklākāraḥ pratibhā[Pp167v₇]sate dṛśyābhimatasyānupalabdher iti
 vyāpakasya pratibhāsamānatvasya nivṛttau vyāpyasyāpi⁷⁰² saṃvedya-
 tvasya⁷⁰³ nivṛttir iti | prayogaḥ — yo [Ś704] yasminn^{g34} ākāro⁷⁰⁴ na
 pratibhāstate [Pp167v₈] na sa⁷⁰⁵ tena⁷⁰⁶ saṃvedyaḥ | yathā śabdajñāne na
 rūpam | na pratibhāstate ca pītākāre jñāne⁷⁰⁷ śuklaśaṅkharūpam iti^{g35}
 vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ | **taṃ ca vetṭī**ty anena svavacanavirodham
 ā[Pp167v₉]ha | **ata eveti** prasaṅgena svasaṃvi[Pp213r₅]tīm sādhayati | tena yaj
 jaiminiyair iṣtam — apratyakṣā no buddhir nirākārā ce^{xxx}ti tad apāstaṃ
 bhavati | **tasmād** [T_{2D}127a] ityā[Pp167v₁₀]dinopasaṃhāraḥ | **kalpayantī**
 satī | **artham evānyathā santaṃ** vidyamānaṃ⁷⁰⁸ **kalpayatī**ty etan
neti⁷⁰⁹ sambandhaḥ | anena ca kumārilocatam pratiśedhati || TSP ad TS
 2058–2062 ||

athetyādinā [Pp167v₁₁] kumārilasayaiva pramāṇamālām āha |

atha yad grāhakaṃ rūpe⁷¹⁰ tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā |
 [Jk105r₅] tatsaṃvittā^{ββββ} asaṃvite
 rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā | | 2063 | | γγγγγγ

⁷⁰⁰ *sarva*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *sarvaṃ* Jp^{ac}

⁷⁰¹ *tasmāt* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de lta bas na*) ◇ Ś] deest K Pā Gā

⁷⁰² *vyāpyasyāpi* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*khyab par bya ba...yañ*)] *vyāpyasya*° Pp; *vyāpyasya* K Ś

⁷⁰³ *saṃvedyatvasya* Jp ◇ K em. (*saṃvedya{tvasya}*) Ś] *saṃvedyatva*° Pp; T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rig pa*); *saṃvedya*° Pā

⁷⁰⁴ *ākāro* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K] *ākāre* Ś **ākāre* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rnam pa [gañ] la*); *kāro* Jp^{ac}

⁷⁰⁵ *sa* Jp^{pc} K ◇ Ś] *ca* Pp; deest Jp^{ac}

⁷⁰⁶ *tena* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*des*)] deest Jp (*eye-skip*) Pp K Ś

⁷⁰⁷ *jñāne* Jp Pp ◇ Ś] *jñāte* K

⁷⁰⁸ *vidyamānaṃ* Jp Pp T_{2D} (*bdog pa*) T_{2P} (*bdog par*) ◇ Ś] deest K

⁷⁰⁹ *etan neti* Jp Pp ◇ Ś] *evaṃ neti* K Pā Gā; deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁷¹⁰ *rūpe* Jk Pk ◇ K Ś] *[*yad...*] *rūpaṃ* T_{1D} T_{1P} (*no bo [gañ]*)

ωωωω For a similar correspondence between *bdog pa* and *vidyamāna* in the TSP, see Negi 2000: 2513 (s.v.).

αααα The reading *rūpaṃ*, which is metrically acceptable and confirmed by Tib as well as ŚV ŚūV 172c, seems not to be confirmed by the TSP.

ββββ In Pk, the scribe appears to repeat the *akṣara tsaṃ* in the form of a gloss to make it clearer. However, the reference line number appears to be 6.

γγγγ In Jk and Pk, starting from here, the *kārikās* are numbered from 1 onward.

xxx Cf. *nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ* | (*Śābarabhāṣya* ad 1.1.5, ed. p. 31, 3). See English Translation n. 377.

yyy *tasmād yad grāhakaṃ rūpaṃ tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā* || (ŚV₃ ŚūV 172cd); *tasmād yad bhāsaṃ rūpaṃ tadgrāhyāt tasya bhinnatā* || (ŚV₁ ŚūV 172cd); *tatsaṃvittāḥ asaṃvite rasādigrāhakaṃ yathā* | (ŚV₁ ŚūV 173ab; ŚV₃ ŚūV 173ab).

^{g34} *pītākāre jñāne śuklaśaṅkharūpaṃ na saṃvedyaṃ tasya tatrāpratibhāsamānatvāt* Jp^g Pp^g

^{g35} *tena saṃvedyatvaṃ vyāpyaṃ tatra pratibhāsamānatvaṃ vyāpakam tatra pratibhāsamānatvaṃ tasyopala-*
bdhiḥ Jp^g Pp^g

grāhyaṃ tadgrāha[Pk38_{r13}]kāc caivaṃ⁷¹¹ tat parāmr̥ṣatā yataḥ |
na parāmr̥ṣyate 'vaśyaṃ [T_{1D}75b]
rasādigrāhakādivat ||2064||^{ḍḍḍzzz}

dvayaṃ paraspareṇaiva bhinnam sā[Jk105_{r6}]dhyam rasādivat |
aikarūpyeṇa⁷¹² vājñānāt⁷¹³_{EEEE}
santānāntara[Pk38_{r13}]buddhivat ||2065||^{ṣṣṣaaaa}

[Ś705] jñānam svāmśam na gṛhṇāti jñānotpatteḥ⁷¹⁴ svaśaktivat |
grāhyatvapratīṣedhaś ca dvayahīnā hi vāsanā ||2066||^{bbbb}

cai[Jk105_{v1}]trajñānam tadudbhūta-
jñānāmśagrāhyabodha[Pk38_{r13}]kam |
jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat
tasya dehāntarodbhavam ||2067||^{ṇṇṇṇcccc}

yad etad **rūpe**⁷¹⁵ **grāhakam** jñānam **tat** tasmāt **tadgrāhyād**⁷¹⁶ rūpād
bhinnam, tasya rūpasya **saṃvittau** [Jp213_{r6}] satyām tasyā^{g36} **saṃvitter**
yathā rasādigrāhakam [Pp167_{v12}] ||TSP *ad* TS 2063||

yadvā — **grāhyaṃ** rūpādi svagrāhakād bhinnam **tad** grāhakam
parāmr̥ṣatā yato yasmān **na parāmr̥ṣyate** | yathā **rasādigrāhakāt**
||TSP *ad* TS 2064||

⁷¹¹ °aivam Jk Pk T_{1D} T_{1P} (*de bñin*) ◇ K] °aiva Ś

⁷¹² aikarūpyeṇa Jk^{ac}] aikyarūpeṇa Jk^{pc} Pk K Ś

⁷¹³ vājñānāt T_{1D} T_{1P} (*yañ na...mi śes phiyir*) ◇ K Ś] cājñānāt Jk, <<cā/vā>>jñānāt Pk

⁷¹⁴ °otpatteḥ Jk Pk^{pc} ◇ K Ś] °otpatte Pk^{ac}

⁷¹⁵ rūpe Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] *rūpa° T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gzugs*)

⁷¹⁶ °grāhyād Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K] °grāhyā° Pp^{ac}; °grāhyād Ś

^{ḍḍḍ} In Pk, starting from here, the *kārikās* are numbered from 1 onward.

^{EEEE} Cf. *vijñānāt* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 175a).

^{ṣṣṣ} In both Jk and Pk, this *kārikā* has the number 2110.

^{ṇṇṇṇ} In Pk, this *kārikā* is not followed by any number.

^{zzz} *grāhyaṃ tad grāhakāc caiva tatparāmr̥ṣatā yataḥ* || (ŚV₁ ŚūV 173cd); *grāhyaṃ tad grāhakād bhinnam tatparāmr̥ṣatā yataḥ* || (ŚV₃ ŚūV 173cd); *na parāmr̥ṣyate 'vaśyaṃ rasādigrāhakam yathā* | (ŚV₁ ŚūV 174ab; ŚV₃ ŚūV 174ab).

^{aaaa} *dvayaṃ paraspareṇaivaṃ bhinnam sādhyam rasādivat* || (ŚV₁ ŚūV 174cd; ŚV₃ ŚūV 174cd); *ekarūpyeṇa cājñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat* | (ŚV₃ ŚūV 175ab); *ekarūpyeṇa vijñānāt santānāntarabuddhivat* | (ŚV₁ ŚūV 175ab).

^{bbbb} *jñānam svāmśam na gṛhṇāti jñānotpatteḥ svaśaktivat* || (ŚV₁ ŚūV 175cd; ŚV₃ ŚūV 175cd); *grāhyatvapratīṣedhaś ca dvayahīnā hi vāsanā* | (ŚV₃ ŚūV 176ab); *grāhyatvapratīṣedhaś ca dvayahīnā hi vāsanā* | (ŚV₁ ŚūV 176ab).

^{cccc} *caitrajñānam tadudbhūtajñānāmśagrāhyabodhakam* || (ŚV₁ ŚūV 176cd; ŚV₃ ŚūV 176cd); *jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat tasya dehāntarodbhavam* | (ŚV₁ ŚūV 177ab; ŚV₃ ŚūV 177ab).

^{g36} *jñānasya* Jp^g

atha vā — **dvayaṃ** rūpādi tadgrāhakaṃ ca **parasparavi**[Pp167v13]**bhinnam**⁷¹⁷ ekataraparāmarśe saty aparāparāmarśanād⁷¹⁸ [T_{2P}167a] **rasarūpādivat** | ekatvenāparijñānād **vā santānāntaracittavat**⁷¹⁹ ||TSP *ad* TS 2065||

atha vā — na **svāṃsagrāhakaṃ jñānaṃ jñānād** utpannatvāt | [Pp167v14] **vāsa**[Jp213r7]**nākhyā**⁷²⁰ ca jñāna[§705]**śaktiḥ**⁷²¹ | evaṃ jñānasya **grāhyatva-pratiśedho**⁷²² 'pi kartavyaḥ | tadyathā — jñānāṃśo na jñānagrāhyo jñānād utpannatvāt, vāsanāvat⁷²³ | katham a[K578]sminn anantare⁷²⁴ [Pp167v15] prayogadvaye⁷²⁵ 'pi sādhyadharmānvito dṛṣṭāntaḥ siddha ity āha — **dvayahīnā hi vāsaneti** | dvayena grāhyagrāhakatvena ||TSP *ad* TS 2066||

atha vāparaḥ⁷²⁶ prayogaḥ — na **caitrajñānaṃ**⁷²⁷ caitrajñāno-[Pp167v16]**dbhūtajñānāṃśasya bodhakaṃ jñānatvāt** | **yadvat tasya** caitrajñā[Jp213r8]nodbhūtajñānāṃśasya maitrādi**dehāntarodbhavaṃ**⁷²⁸ jñānam ||TSP *ad* TS 2067||

apṛthagvedanād ityādinā dūṣaṇam āha |

apṛthagvedanāt pūrvaṃ tatraiva⁷²⁹ pratipāditāt⁷³⁰ |

aikarūpyāparijñānaparyanteṣu

[T_{1P}91a] na [Jk105v2] siddhatā ||2068|| 0000

apṛthagveda[Pp167v17]**nād** iti nīlataddhiyoḥ⁷³¹ sahopalambhaniyamād

⁷¹⁷ °bhinnam Jp (°bhinnam) ◇ K Ś] °bhinna Pp

⁷¹⁸ aparāparāmarśanād Jp^{ac} (aparāparāmarśanāt) T_{2D} T_{2P} (gṛān mi rtog pa'i phyir)] aparāmarśanāt Jp^{pc}, aparāmarśanāt Pp; a{parasyā}parāmarśanāt K em.; aparāparāmarśanāt Ś; aparāmarśanāta Pā; aparasyāparāmarśanāt Gā

⁷¹⁹ °citta° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °cita° Jp^{ac}

⁷²⁰ vāsanākhyā T_{2D} T_{2P} (bag chags ṣes bya ba'i) ◇ K conj. (vāsanākhye{khyā?}) Gā] vāsanākhye Jp Pp Ś

⁷²¹ jñānaśaktiḥ Jp (jñānaśaktiḥ) Pp ◇ K Ś] T_{2D} T_{2P} (ṣes pa'i nus pa bṣin no)

⁷²² grāhyatva° Jp ◇ K Ś] grāhyasya Pp

⁷²³ vāsanāvat em.] tadvad | vāsanāvat Jp, tadvat=vāsanāvat Ś; T_{2D} (ṣes pa'i nus pa bag chags bṣin); T_{2P} (nus pa bag chags bṣin); deest K Pā Gā

⁷²⁴ anantare Jp^{pc} (anaṃtare) ◇ K Ś] naṃtare Jp^{ac}; . <<na>>ntare Pp

⁷²⁵ prayogadvaye T_{2D} T_{2P} (gtan tshigs gñis po) ◇ K Ś] prayogādvaye Jp Pp

⁷²⁶ āparaḥ em. ◇ K Ś] 'para° Jp Pp

⁷²⁷ caitra° em. partly supported by T_{2P} (nag pa'i)] cait° Jp; cai<<ta>>° Pp, caitaj° K Ś; T_{2D} (nag po'i)

⁷²⁸ °dehāntaro° Jp (dehāntaro) ◇ K Ś] °dehāntare Pp

⁷²⁹ tatraiva em. partly supported by T_{1D} T_{1P} (de ṇid)] tad atra Jk K Ś, tad a<<tra/pa>> Pk; tasyaiva em. Matsuoka 2014

⁷³⁰ °pāditāt Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] °pādanāt Jk^{ac}

⁷³¹ °dhiyoḥ Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] °dhiyo Jp^{ac}

0000 In Pk, this kārīkā is not followed by any number.

apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasiddhyatī^{ddd}dy atah^{g37} svasaṃvitpra-
sādhana⁷³² **pratipādītād** [T_{2D}127b] abhedasya nīlataddhiyoḥ [Pp168r_l]
prasādhitatvād **aikarūpyāpari**[Jp213v_l]**jñānaparyantā**⁷³³ⁱⁱⁱ hetavo⁷³⁴ **na**
siddhāḥ || TSP *ad* TS 2068 ||

sa bahir ityādinā paraḥ siddhim udbhāvayati⁷³⁵ |

sa bahirdeśasambaddha [Pk38r_{l6}] ity anena nanūcyate |
grāhyākārasya saṃvittir⁷³⁶ grāhakānubhavād ṛte || 2069 || ^{eeee}

ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ | **sa bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ**^{737kkkk} pratyakṣam
upa[Pp168r₂]labhyata^{fff} ity anena granthena bhāṣyakṛtā [T_{2P}167b] śābareṇa^{g38}
grāhyasaṃvittir⁷³⁸ **grāhakānubhavād** vināpiti^{gggg} pratipāditaṃ | tataś
ca tatsaṃvittā⁷³⁹ asaṃvitter^{740hhhh} ity etat siddham || TSP *ad* TS 2069 ||

[Ś706] dvitīyādayo 'pi [Pp168r₃] hetavaḥ katham siddhā ity ata āha — **na**
smarāmītyādi |

[Ś706] na smarāmi mayā ko 'pi grhīto 'rthas tadeti ca |
smaranti grāha[Jk105v₃]kotpādamaṃ
grāhyarūpaviva[Pk38r₁₇]rjitam || 2070 || ^{lllllllll}
tasmād abhinna⁷⁴¹tyāṃ ca grāhye 'pi smaraṇam bhavet |

⁷³² *svasaṃvit*^o Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *svasaṃcit*^o Jp^{ac}

⁷³³ *aikarūpyā*^o em. ◇ K Ś] *ekarūpyā*^o Jp Pp

⁷³⁴ *hetavo* Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] ... *vo* Pp^{ac}

⁷³⁵ *udbhāvayati* em. ◇ K Ś] *adbhāvayati* Jp Pp

⁷³⁶ *saṃvittir* Jk Pk ◇ K] *saṃvitter* Ś

⁷³⁷ *°sambaddhaḥ* em. ◇ K Ś] *°sambandhaḥ* Jp, *sambandhaḥ* Pp

⁷³⁸ *°saṃvittir* Jp ◇ K Ś] *°saṃvitti*^o Pp

⁷³⁹ *tatsaṃvittā* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de rig* *pa*) ◇ Ś] *saṃvittā* K Pā Gā

⁷⁴⁰ *asaṃvitter* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *asaṃvittor* Jp^{ac}

ⁱⁱⁱ See *aikarūpyāparijñānaparyanteṣu* (TS 2068cd1).

^{kkkk} I choose the variant *°sambaddhaḥ* in accordance with the variant as found in the *mūla* text.

^{lllll} In Pk, this *kārikā* is not followed by any number.

^{ddd} P^{vin} 1.54cd; TSP *ad* TS 1351 (ed. p. 490, 21–22).

^{eeee} *sa bahirdeśasambaddha ity anena nirūpyate | grāhyākārasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād ṛte ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 79; ŚV₃ ŚūV 79).

^{fff} *nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ | ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ | sa hi bahir bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate |* (Śābarabhāṣya *ad* 1.1.5, ed. p. 31, 3–4); *nirākārā buddhiḥ; ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ; sa ca bahirdeśasambandho viśpaṣṭam upalabhyata iti* (TSP *ad* TS 979, ed. p. 385, 18–19); *nirākārā no buddhir ākāravān bāhyo 'rthaḥ pratyakṣaś ca sa hi bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyakṣeṇopalabhyata iti* (*Vijñaptimātra-tāṣidhi* by Jitāri, ed. p. 2 n. 7).

^{gggg} *grāhyākārasya saṃvittir grāhakānubhavād ṛte ||* (TS 2069cd); ŚV ŚūV 79cd.

^{hhhh} TS 2063c; ŚV ŚūV 173a.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ *na smarāmi mayā ko 'pi grhīto 'rthas tadeti hi | smaranti grāhakotpādamaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitam ||* (ŚV₃ ŚūV 83); *na smarāmi mayā ko 'pi grhīto 'rthas tadeti hi | smaranti grāhakotpādagrāhyarūpavivarjitam ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 83).

^{g37} *grāṇthāt* Jp^g Pp^g

^{g38} *śābarasvāminā* Jp^g Pp^g

grāhakasmṛtisadbhāve tatra tv eṣaiva⁷⁴¹ gr̥hyate || 2071 || |iii|

anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ siddhaivaṃ bhiḥ^[Pk105v₁]nnatā tayoh |^{kkkk}

evaṃ ca ^[Pk38v₁] hetavo 'py ete

prasiddhāḥ sādhyadharmiṇi | | 2072 ||

grāhyāsmaraṇe 'pi grāhakasmṛtir dr̥ṣṭā | yadi ca ^[Jp213v₂] **tasmād** grāhakād
ekāntena grāhyasyābhinnatā syāt tadā **grāhye 'pi** ^[Pp168r₁] **smaraṇam**
bhavet, grāhakavat | na ca bhavati | tasmād bhinnayogakṣematvād
bhinnau grāhyagrāhakau |

syād etat — bhavaty eva grāhye 'pi smaraṇam ity āha —
grāhakasmṛtisadbhāva i^[Pp168r₃]tyādi | **tatre**ti grāhakasmṛtisadbhā-
vakāle | **eṣa eva**⁷⁴² grāhaka⁷⁴³ eva gr̥hyate na grāhyam ity evakāro⁷⁴⁴ [K579]
bhinnakramaḥ | **anvayavyatirekābhyām** iti grāhyagrāha^[Jp213v₃]kasmara-
^[Pp168r₆]ṇayor bhāvābhāvābhyām | tathā hi — grāhakasmaraṇabhāve⁷⁴⁵ 'pi
grāhyasmṛter abhāvaḥ | | TSP *ad* TS 2070–2072 ||

aprasiddhopalambhasyetyādinā⁷⁴⁶ pratividhatte |

aprasiddhopalambhasya nārthavittih prasiddhyati |

tan na grāhyasya saṃvittir⁷⁴⁷ grāhakānubhavād ṛte | | 2073 ||

sa bahirdeśasambandhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyata^{llll} ^[Pp168r₇] ity asyānaikānti-
katām⁷⁴⁸ āha — **asvasthetyādi** |

^[Jk105v₅] asvasthalocanair dr̥ṣṭam

^[Pk38v₂] tathā pītādy apekṣyate⁷⁴⁹ |

niṣkr̥ṣṭam⁷⁵⁰ grāhakāṃśac ca

saṃvedyam na tathā param | | 2074 ||

⁷⁴¹ eṣaiva em.] *evaiṣa* Jk Pk K Ś

⁷⁴² eṣa eva Jp^{ac} Pp ◊ K Ś] *eṣa sa ca* Jp^{pc}

⁷⁴³ grāhaka Jp Pp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} ('*dzin pa*) ◊ K Ś] *dr̥ṣṭāṃtagrāhaka* Pp^{ac}

⁷⁴⁴ evakāro Jp^{pc} ◊ K Ś] *evakārā* Jp^{ac} Pp

⁷⁴⁵ °smaraṇabhāve Jp Pp ◊ K Ś] *°smaraṇābhāve T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dran pa med par*)

⁷⁴⁶ *aprasiddho*° Jp ◊ K Ś] *apratīsiddho*° Pp

⁷⁴⁷ *saṃvittir* Jk ◊ K Ś] *saṃvitti*° Pk

⁷⁴⁸ °ānaikāntikatām Jp Pp (°ānaikāntikatām) K] °ānaikāntikam Ś

⁷⁴⁹ *apekṣyate* em.] *apekṣate* Jk Pk; *avekṣyate* K Ś

⁷⁵⁰ *niṣkr̥ṣṭam* Jk^{pc} Pk (Pk *niṣkr̥ṣṭa* <<*m*>>) ◊ K Ś] *ni .. ṣṭam* Jk^{ac}; T_{1D} T_{1P} (*gsal por*)

iii *tasmād abhinnatāyām ca grāhye 'pi smaraṇam bhavet* | *grāhakasmṛtinirbhāsāt tatrāpy eṣaiva gr̥hyate* ||
(ŚV₁ ŚūV 84); *tasmād abhinnatāyām ca grāhye 'pi smaraṇam bhavet* | *grāhakasmṛtinirbhāsāt tatrāpy eṣaiva*
dr̥ṣyate || (ŚV₃ ŚūV 84).

kkkk ŚV₁ ŚūV 85cd; ŚV₃ ŚūV 85cd.

llll *sa bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ pratyakṣam upalabhyate* (TSP *ad* TS 2069a); *sa hi bahirdeśasambaddhaḥ*
pratyakṣam upalabhyate (Śābarabhāṣya *ad* 1.1.5, ed. p. 31, 4).

niṣkṛṣṭam⁷⁵¹_{μμμμ} ity^{g39} atra chedaḥ | **tatheti** yathā satyābhimatam⁷⁵²
pītādi bahirdeśasambaddham viśpaṣṭam upalabhyate | tathā kāmālā-
 dyu[Pp168_{r1}]pahatanayanopalabdhām⁷⁵³ api samikṣyate⁷⁵⁴ | [T_{2D}128a] yadi
 nā[Jp213_{v4}]ma samikṣyate tataḥ kim ity⁷⁵⁵ āha — **grāhakāṃśāc** ca⁷⁵⁶
saṃvedyam **neti** chedaḥ | [T_{2P}168a] **grāhakāṃśā**[ś707]**d**⁷⁵⁷ iti
niṣkṛṣṭam⁷⁵⁸_{vvvv} ity adhyāhāryam | **saṃve**[Pp168_{r1}]**dyam** **neti** bhavati
 śeṣaḥ | tenāyam artho bhavati — tac ca pītādi taimirikādyupalabdhām
 grāhakāṃśān⁷⁵⁹ **niṣkṛṣṭam**⁷⁶⁰ pṛthak saṃvedyam na bhavati | atha ca
 bahirdeśa[Pp168_{r10}]sambaddham upalabhyate | tasmād anaikāntikam etat |
tathā param iti satyābhimatam api pītādi | anena vicchi[Jp213_{v5}]nnaspa-
 ṣṭapratibhāsamātreṇa⁷⁶¹ dvayor api sāmyam yoja[Pp168_{r11}]yati || TSP *ad*
 TS 2074 ||

na smarāmi mayā ko 'pī^{mmmm}ty atrāha — **alakṣitetyādi** |

[ś707] alakṣitaviśeṣā ca grāhyarūpe⁷⁶²_{zzzz} ca sā smṛtiḥ |
 sarvato bhinnarūpe^{g1K} tu
 na [Jk105_{v6}] sābhyāsādyasambhavāt || 2075 ||

anena grāhakasmarāṇe grāhyāsmaraṇasyāsiddhim⁷⁶³ āha |

syād etat — yadi grāhye **sā smṛtiḥ**⁷⁶⁴ kim ity **ala**[Pp168_{r12}]**kṣitaviśeṣā**
 bhavati | yāvatā yathaiva tad grāhyam **sarvataḥ** sajātīyavijātīyād⁷⁶⁵
 bhinnam tathaiva tat smaret | evaṃ hi tadviśayatā tasyāḥ syāt | anyathā

⁷⁵¹ *niṣkṛṣṭam* ◇ K Ś] *nikṛṣṭam* Jp Pp; T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gsal bar nes pa*)

⁷⁵² *yathā satyā*^o Jp^{ac} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ji ltar bden par*) ◇ K Ś] *yathā 'satyā*^o Jp^{pc}

⁷⁵³ *opalabdhām* Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *opalabdhīm* Pp^{ac}

⁷⁵⁴ *samikṣyate* Jp Pp] *samikṣyeta* K Ś; *samikṣye* Jai

⁷⁵⁵ *kim ity* Pp ◇ K Ś] *kim itity* Jp

⁷⁵⁶ *āṃśāc* ca Jp^{pc} (*āṃśāc ca*) Pp ◇ K Ś] *āṃśāca* Jp^{ac}

⁷⁵⁷ *grāhakāṃśād* Jp (*grāhakāṃśād*) Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] *grākāṃśād* Pp^{ac}

⁷⁵⁸ *niṣkṛṣṭam* Jp (*niṣkṛṣṭam*) ◇ K Ś] *nikṛṣṭam* Pp; T_{2D} T_{2P} (*bton nas*)

⁷⁵⁹ *grāhakāṃśān* Jp^{pc} (*grāhakāṃśān*) Pp ◇ K Ś] *grāhakāṃśā*^o Jp^{ac}

⁷⁶⁰ *niṣkṛṣṭam* ◇ K Ś] *nikṛṣṭam* Jp Pp; T_{2D} T_{2P} (*bton nas*)

⁷⁶¹ *pratibhāsa*^o Jp^{ac} Pp ◇ K Ś] *pratibhāse* Jp^{pc}

⁷⁶² *grāhyarūpe* em. based on T_{1D} T_{1P} (*gzun ba'i no bo la*)] *bāhyarūpe* Jk Pk K Ś

⁷⁶³ *grāhya*^o Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} (*gzun ba mi...*) T_{2P} (*bzun ba mi...*) ◇ K Ś] *grāhya*^o Jp^{ac}

⁷⁶⁴ *smṛtiḥ* Jp Pp K Ś T_{2P} (*dran pa*)] **āsmṛtiḥ* T_{2D} (*dran pa med pa*)

⁷⁶⁵ *vijātīyād* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *vijātīyad* Jp^{ac}

_{μμμμ} See *niṣkṛṣṭam* (TS 2074c).

_{vvvv} Negi (1998: 1747–1748 s.v. “*bton pa*”) brings forward this very passage as an instance of correspondence between *bton nas* and *niṣkṛṣṭam*.

_{zzzz} *grāhyarūpe* is commented on with *grāhye* in TSP *ad* TS 2075.

_{mmmm} TS 2070a; ŚV ŚūV 83a.

^{g39} *viśpaṣṭam iti pāṭhaḥ* Jp^g Pp^g

^{g1K} *sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛtte viśeṣe* Jk^g Pk^g

katham a[Pp213v₆]gr̥hṇatī⁷⁶⁶ tad bhedaṃ [Pp168r₁₃] tadviśayā bhavet | atipra-
saṅgād ity āha — **sarvata** ityādi |

etat uktaṃ bhavati — na tāvad vikalpasya yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇa-
sāmarthyam tasyāvastuviśayatvāt | kevalam ta[Pp168r₁₄]thābhūtapadārthā-
nubhavalād yatraivārthitvādayo⁷⁶⁷ niścayahetavaḥ santi tatra tadākārā-
dhyavasāyī⁷⁶⁸ smārtaḥ pratyayo nirviśaya eva | paramārthataḥ
svapratibhāse 'na[Pp168r₁₅]rthe 'rthādhyavasā[Pp213v₇]yena pravṛtter bhrānta
eva sarvo jāyate | tasya tv adhyavasāyavaśena⁷⁶⁹ viśayavyavasthā, [T_{2P}168b] na
paramārthataḥ | na ca grāhyādhyavasāyaḥ smṛter api vidyate kevalam
[Pp168r₁₆] tathāvidhābhyaśapāṭavādarapratyāsatti[K580]tāratamyādikāraṇābhā-
vād⁷⁷⁰ alakṣitaviśeṣā bhavati | yena smaraṇāntarād⁷⁷¹ viśiṣyate || TSP *ad*
TS 2075 ||

syād etat — katham avasiyate grā[Pp168r₁₇]hyādhyavasāyo 'trāsti smṛter ity
āha — **gr̥hīta** i[Pp213v₈]tyādi |

[Pk38v₃] gr̥hīta iti ko 'py evaṃ nānyathā smaraṇam bhavet |

śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśaṃ⁷⁷²

vedyate⁷⁷³ smaraṇam⁷⁷⁴ na [Jk106r] ca || 2076 ||

[Ś708] kambupītādivijñānair hetvoḥ⁷⁷⁵ paścimayor api |

anaikāntikatā vyaktaṃ di[Pk38v₄]g eṣānyatra sādhanē || 2077 ||

[T_{2D}128b] yadi hy anupalakṣitaviśeṣaṃ⁷⁷⁶ grāhyam api sā smṛtir nādhya-
vasyet⁷⁷⁷ | tadā **ko 'pi gr̥hīta ity evam** api sāmānyā[Pp168v₁]kāreṇa⁷⁷⁸
grāhyapratyavamarśane na pravarteta | na cāpi kevalo grāhyākārānaṅkita-
mūrtitayā⁷⁷⁹ grāhakaḥ **śuddhasphaṭikasāṅkāśaḥ**⁷⁸⁰ smaryate⁷⁸¹ | [Jp214r]

⁷⁶⁶ *agr̥hṇatī* Pp ◇ K Ś] *a .rhnatī*° Jp

⁷⁶⁷ *yatraivā*° em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gaii kho na la*) ◇ K Ś] *yathaiwā*° Jp Pp

⁷⁶⁸ *tadākārā*° Jp^{ac} Pp ◇ K Ś] *tadākārā*° Jp^{pc}

⁷⁶⁹ *adhyavasāya*° Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*žen pa'i*) ◇ K Ś] *adhyavasāyatva*° Jp^{ac}

⁷⁷⁰ *ādara*° Jp Pp] *āder a*° K Ś

⁷⁷¹ *smaraṇā*° Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *smaraṇa*° Jp^{ac}

⁷⁷² *saṅkāśaṃ* em. ◇ K Pā Gā] *saṅkāśe* Jk Pk Ś

⁷⁷³ *vedyate* Jk Pk ◇ K Ś] **vidyate* T_{1D} T_{1P} (*yod pa*)

⁷⁷⁴ *smaraṇam* Jk^{pc} Pk ◇ K Ś] *smaraṇān* Jk^{ac}

⁷⁷⁵ *hetvoḥ* em. partially based on T_{1D} T_{1P} (*gtan tshigs...gñis po*) ◇ Ś] *hetoh* Jk K; *heto*° Pk

⁷⁷⁶ *anupalakṣitaviśeṣaṃ* Jp ◇ K Ś] <<anu>> *palakṣitaviśe* .. m Pp

⁷⁷⁷ *nādhyavasyet* Jp ◇ K Ś] <<nādh>> t Pp

⁷⁷⁸ *gr̥hīta ity evam api sāmānyā*° Jp ◇ K Ś] *g i m* . (ill. circa 4 akṣaras) Pp

⁷⁷⁹ *grāhyā*° Jp Pp ◇ K] *grāhya*° Ś

⁷⁸⁰ *sphaṭika*° Jp Pp ◇ K] *sphaṭija*° Ś

⁷⁸¹ *smaryate* Jp ◇ K Ś] .. *yate* Pp

yenocyate [Ś708] smaranti⁷⁸² grāhakotpādaṃ⁷⁸³ grā[Pp168v₂]hyarūpavivarjitaṃ⁷⁸⁴ⁿⁿⁿⁿ iti | tasmāt tatsmaraṇe tadasmaraṇam asiddham⁷⁸⁵ |

yau ca jñānotpatter jñānatvādg⁴⁰ itīmau paścīmau hetū tayoh pīṭaśaṅkhādijñānena⁷⁸⁶ vyabhicāraḥ | tathā hi — yathā⁷⁸⁷ pīṭaśaṅkhādijñānaṃ⁷⁸⁸ jñānotpannam api sat [Pp168v₃] svāmśaṃ pītādyākāraṃ grhṇāti | yathā ca jñānam api sat jñānāmśasya pītāder⁷⁸⁹ grāhyasya bodhakam bhavati tathānyad apīti vyabhicāritā hetvoḥ [Jp214r₂] | sādhitam ca pīṭaśaṅkhādī[Pp168v₄]jñānasya nīrāmbanātvaṃ | ata evātmagatasya pītādyākārasya vedanāt svasaṃvedanaṃ siddham ity etad api pratipāditam | **eṣā dig** iti | **anyatrāpi** bahirarthasādhane paropa[Pp168v₅]nyaste | **eṣā dūṣaṇadik** |

yad uktaṃ pareṇa — katham advayaṃ sādhyatveneṣṭam | kiṃ bhāsamānasya [T_{2P}169a] nīlādyākārasya jñānarūpasya⁷⁹⁰ cānubhasiddhasyābhāvāt | katham idaṃ nāma yojyate [Pp168v₆] | tathā sati sarvā[Jp214r₃]bhāvaprasaṅgaḥ⁷⁹¹ syāt |

atra vaktavyam — na sarvābhāvo yasmāt⁷⁹² svavyatiriktasya grāhyasya pṛthivyādeḥ svalakṣaṇato 'sattvāt, santānāntarasya tu grāhyarū[Pp168v₇]peṇābhāvād grāhyākārasūnyam⁷⁹³ | tadapekṣya prakalpitaṃ tu yad vijñānasya kartṛtvaṃ vijñānātīti vijñānam⁰⁰⁰⁰ iti kṛtvā tasyābhāvād grāhakākārasūnyam na tu vijñānasva[T_{2D}129a Pp168v₈]lakṣaṇasyāpi sarvasya sarveṇābhāvāt | tathā [Jp214r₄] coktam —

nīlapītādi yaj jñānād⁷⁹⁴ bahirvad avabhāṣate |

⁷⁸² smaranti Jp (smaraṃti) ◇ K Ś] ... t . Pp

⁷⁸³ grāhakotpādaṃ Jp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] grāhakotpada° Jp^{ac}; ... ko ... Pp

⁷⁸⁴ grāhya° Jp ◇ K Ś] .. hya° Pp

⁷⁸⁵ asiddham Jp (asiddham) ◇ K Ś] asiddhem Pp

⁷⁸⁶ °śaṅkhādijñānena Jp^{ac} (°saṃkhādijñānena) T_{2D} T_{2P} (duñ la...la sogs pa'i śes pas)] °śaṃkhādijñānena Jp^{pc}; deest Pp K; °śaṅkhādijñāne na Ś

⁷⁸⁷ pīṭaśaṅkhādijñānena vyabhicāraḥ | tathā hi yathā Jp] pīṭaśaṅkhādijñāne na vyabhicāraḥ, yathā Ś; T_{2D} T_{2P} (duñ la ser po la sogs pa'i śes pas 'khrul pa yin te | 'di ltar); deest Pp K; deest Pā Gā (vyabhicāraḥ, yathā)

⁷⁸⁸ °śaṅkhādijñānaṃ Jp^{ac} Pp (°śaṃkhādijñānaṃ) ◇ K Ś] °śaṃkhādijñānaṃ Jp^{pc}; deest Pā

⁷⁸⁹ pītāder Jp ◇ K Ś] pītāde° Pp

⁷⁹⁰ jñānarūpasya Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] jñānasya Pp^{ac}

⁷⁹¹ °ābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ em. ◇ K Ś] °ābhāvāḥ prasamgaḥ Jp^{pc} Pp; °ābhāvāḥ prasamga Jp^{ac}; *°ābhāvāḥ T_{2D} T_{2P} ([thams cad] med par)

⁷⁹² yasmāt Jp Pp ◇ K Ś] deest T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁷⁹³ °śūnyam T_{2D} T_{2P} (ston pa yin) ◇ K Ś] °śūnya° Jp, °śūnya° Pp

⁷⁹⁴ jñānād Jp Pp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (śes las) ◇ Ś] jñānad Pp^{ac}; jñāne K Pā Gā

nnnn smaranti grāhakotpādaṃ grāhyarūpavivarjitaṃ || (TS 2070cd); ŚV ŚūV 83cd.

0000 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad 2.34ab (ed. p. 61, 23).

^{g40} Jp^g here indicates with numbers 1 and 2 that jñānottpatteḥ is the first *hetu* and jñānatvāt the second.

tan na satyam⁷⁹⁵ ato nāsti vijñeyam tattvato bahiḥ | | PPPP

tadapekṣā ca⁷⁹⁶ sam[Pp168v9]vitter matā yā kartṛrūpatā |
sā na satyam ataḥ samvidadvayeti⁷⁹⁷ vibhāvvyate | | qqqq

iti | evaṃ ca kṛtvā, ayam api prajñāpāramitāpāṭhaḥ sunīto bhavati vijñānam
vijñā[Pp168v10]nasvabhāvena śūnyam lakṣaṇaśūnyatām upādāyēti^{TTTT} | | TSP ad
TS 2076–2077 | |

5.

Conclusion

[Ś709] evaṃ yad yaj jñānam⁷⁹⁸ ityāda^{SSSS} maule prayoge hetoḥ
sādhye[Jp214r3]na vyāptiṃ prasādhyopasaṃharati | **vivādāspadam** ityā-
[Pp168v11]di⁷⁹⁹ |

[Ś709] vivādāspadam⁸⁰⁰ [T1D76a] ārūḍham

vijñānatvād ato manaḥ⁸⁰¹⁰⁰⁰⁰ |

advayaṃ vedyakartṛtṛvavi[Jk106r2]yogāt pratibimbavat | | 2078 | |

⁷⁹⁵ *tan na satyam* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de* | | *mi bden*) [*tatra satyam* Jp Pp K; *atra satyam* Ś

⁷⁹⁶ *ca* Jp^{PC} Pp ◊ K Ś] *sa* Jp^{ac}

⁷⁹⁷ °*ti* Jp] *pi* Pp, °*pi* K Ś

⁷⁹⁸ *yad yaj jñānam* Jp Pp (*yadyajjñānam*) T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gaṇi daṇi gaṇi mam par śes pa*) ◊ Ś] *yady ajñānam* K Pā Gā

⁷⁹⁹ *vivādāspadam ityādi* K Ś] *vivādāspadam ityādi* Jp Pp

⁸⁰⁰ *vivādāspadam* Jk^{PC} ◊ K Ś] *vivā* .. *padam* Jk^{ac}; *vivā* . *dāspadam* Pk

⁸⁰¹ *manaḥ* Jk ◊ K] *mana/taḥ* Pk; *mataḥ* Ś; deest T_{1D} T_{1P}

0000 *Manaḥ* and *matam* (em.) are equally possible. TSP does not refer to *manaḥ* and has, instead, *iṣṭam* in °*advayaṃ iṣṭam*; arguably a synonym to comment on *matam*. However, *manaḥ* is also regarded as a synonym of *vijñāna* (cf. *cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānam ekārtham*, *Abhidharmakośa* 2.34ab1) and may be used there simply for metrical reasons. This could explain why Kamalaśīla comments on it with *vijñāna* without mentioning *manaḥ*. In T_{2D} T_{2P}, the pratika referring to this verse has *yid*/**manaḥ*. See *de phyir rtsod pa'i gžir gyur yid* | | *ces bya ba la sogs pa smos so*. T_{1D} T_{1P} do not mention *yid*.

PPPP *nīlapītādi yaj jñānād bahirvad avabhāṣate* | *tan na satyam ato nāsti vijñeyam tattvato bahiḥ* | | (*Anekāntajayapatākā* 5, ed. p. 82, 7–8); *śio daṇi ser sogs naṇ śes las* | | *phyi rol bžin du snaṇ 'gyur ba* | | *de bden ma yin de phyir gyi* | | *de ṇid du ni med ces bya* | | (PVT D ñe 204a–204b₁).

qqqq *tadapekṣayā* [*contra metrum?*] *ca samvitter matā yā kartṛrūpatā* | *sāpy atattvam ataḥ samvidadvayeti vibhāvvyate* | | (*Anekāntajayapatākā* 5, ed. p. 82, 9–10); *de ltos byed pa po'i no bo* | | *rig par 'dod pa gaṇ yin pa* | | *de yaṇ de ṇid min de'i phyir* | | *myoṇ ba gñis med ces ṇes 'gyur* | | (PVT D ñe 204b₁).

TTTT Untraced. Cf. *prajñāpāramitāyām cōktaṃ* — *rūpaṃ subhūte rūpasvabhāvena śūnyam yāvad vijñānam vijñānasvabhāvena śūnyam iti svalakṣaṇaśūnyatām upādāyēti* | (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 10, 16–17); *rgyal ba bskyed ma las kyaṇ rgyal bas ji skad du mshan ṇid stoṇ pa ṇid kyi phyir mam par śes pa'i bar du mam par śes pa'i no bo ṇid kyi stoṇ no žes gsuṇis pa lta bu'o* | | (MAV, ed. p. 198, 12–15).

SSSS *yad yaj jñānam tat tad grāhyagrāhakatvadvayarahitām jñānatvāt pratibimbajñānavat* | (TSP ad TS 1964).

[K581] **vivādāspadaviśeṣaṇenaitad**^{802g41} āha — svasthanetrādivijñānam atra viśeṣaḥ sādhyadharmī na sarvaḥ | sāmānyam tu vijñānatvād iti hetuḥ | tena na⁸⁰³ pratijñārthaikadeśatā [Pp168v12 T2p169b] hetor iti | **vedyakartṛtvavi-yogād**⁸⁰⁴ ity advayatvaviśeṣaṇam | vedyakartṛtvadvayavirahēṇādvayam iṣṭam | na tu sarvathābhāvād ity arthaḥ | **pratibimbavad** iti viśayiṇi viśa[Pp168v13]yo[Jp214r6]pacārāt pratibimbajñānam pratibimbasābdenoktam | yadvā^{g42} — saptamyantād vatiḥ kartavyaḥ | tena jñānam eva sāmārthyād ādheyatayā labhyate | na cāsiddho hetur bhedāntara[Pp168v14]pratikṣepeṇa svabhāvasyaiva tathā nirdeśān na jñātṛtvasya | nāpi viruddhaḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt | | TSP *ad* TS 2078 | |

nanu cetyādinā paro dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatām udbhāvayati |

nanu ca pratibimbe 'pi jñānam sālambanam matam |

[Pk38v3] cakṣūraśminivṛttau hi

svamukhādes tathekṣaṇāt | | 2079 | | ππππ

[T2D129b] yasmān nā[Pp168v13]yanā rāsmayo darpaṇāditalapratihatā nivartamā-[Jp214r7]nāḥ svamukhādinā sambadhyante tatas te tathā mukhādipratītihetavo bhavanti | ataḥ **svamukhāder** eva **tathā** darpaṇā[Pp168v16]dyantargatā-dirūpeṇekṣaṇam⁸⁰⁵ bhavati | tataś ca na pratibimbajñānam grāhyagrāhaka-dvayarahitam⁸⁰⁶ siddham | | TSP *ad* TS 2079 | |

nābhimukhyenetyādinā pratividhatte |

nābhimukhyena [T1p91b] taddṛṣṭeḥ svamukhādes tathekṣaṇam |

pramā[Jk106r3]ṇadeśabhedādīdṛṣṭeś

cānyapadārthavat | | 2080 | | ρρρρ

na svamukhādes tathekṣaṇam ābhi[Pp168v17]**mukhyena** tasya svamukhāder⁸⁰⁷ darśanāt | **taddeśapramāṇavarṇādibhedena dṛṣṭeś ca na svamukhādes ta**[Jp214r8]**theṣaṇam** iti sambandhaḥ | **anyapa-dārthavad** iti śabdādīpadārthavat |

⁸⁰² *vivādāspadaviśeṣaṇenaitad* em. ◇ K Ś] *vivādāpadaviśeṣaṇetad* Jp^{ac}; *vivādapadaviśeṣaṇenaitad* Jp^{pc}; *vivādāpadaviśeṣaṇenaitad* Pp^{ac}; *vivādapadaviśeṣaṇenaitad* Pp^{pc}

⁸⁰³ *na* Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ma yin*) ◇ K Ś] *deest* Jp^{ac}

⁸⁰⁴ °*viyogād* Jp^{pc} T_{2D} T_{2P} (*dañ bral phyiṛ*) ◇ K Ś] °*yogād* Jp^{ac} Pp

⁸⁰⁵ °*antargatādi*° Pp (°*aṃtargatādi*°) ◇ K Ś] °*aṃtargatādi*° Jp

⁸⁰⁶ °*rahitam* Jp Pp^{pc} ◇ K Ś] °*ra .. tam* Pp^{ac}

⁸⁰⁷ *svamukhāder* Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rañ gi byad la sogs pa*) ◇ Ś] *svasukhāder* K Pā Gā

ππππ In Pk, this *kārikā* is not followed by any number.

ρρρρ In Jk, this *kārikā* has the number 19 (exactly like the following one), instead of 18.

^{g41} *vivādāspadaviśeṣaṇeneti pāṭhaḥ* Jp^g Pp^g. This is a correction inserted as a gloss.

^{g42} *pratibimba iva pratibimbavat* Jp^g Pp^g

etad [T_{2P}170a] u[P_P169_r]_lktam [Ś710] bhavati — yadi⁸⁰⁸ mukhādigrāhakam
 tajjñānam syāt, tadā yathaiva tanmukhādi vyavasthitam tathaiva gr̥hṇīyāt |
 na hy anyākārasya⁸⁰⁹ jñānasyā[P_P214_v]_lnyad grāhyam yuktam atiprasaṅgāt |
 yāvata [P_P169_r]₂ dakṣiṇābhimukhasthito darpaṇatalam nibhālayann uttarābhi-
 mukham svamukham paśyati | tathālpīyasi⁸¹⁰ darpaṇatale mahato 'pi
 svamukhasyālpapratibimbakam upalabhya[P_P169_r]₃te | tathā darpaṇatala-
 sambaddham dūrādhaḥpraviṣṭam ivekṣyate | na ca tāvad bahalam tad
 ādarśatalam⁸¹¹ nāpi mukhādi tatsambaddham | tathā vimalasalile sarasi
 taṭāntasthitaśākhi[P_P169_r]₄śikhariṇām⁸¹² pratibimbāny adho[P_P214_v]₂gataśākhā-
 diśikharaśekharāṇy⁸¹³ upalabhyante na ca te tathāsthitāḥ | tasmāt prati-
 bimbajñānam na⁸¹⁴ svamukhādigrāhakam tadvilakṣaṇapratibhāsitvā[P_P169_r]₅t,
 śabdajñānavat | | TSP *ad* TS 2080 | |

[K582] bhadantaśubhaguptas tv āha —

dhīmātratve ca⁸¹⁵ [T_{2D}130a] saṃsādhye
 yaj jñānatvādisādhanam⁸¹⁶ |
 vijātiyāviruddhatvāt sarvaṃ śeṣavad ucyate | |^{tttt}

iti tam praty āha — **vijñānatvam** ityādi [P_P169_r]₆ |

vijñānatvam prakā[P_K38_v]₆śatvam tac ca grāhye⁸¹⁷ nirāspadam |
 anirbhāsādyayogena vyāptis tenāsyā niścita | | 2081 | |
 śaktāv anantare jñāne grāhyām[J_K106_r]₄śe viṣayasthitiḥ |
 tāttvikī neṣyate 'smābhis
 tena [P_K38_v]₇ sā na samarthyate⁸¹⁸ | | 2082 | |^{σσσσ}
 vijñaptimātratāsiddhir dhīmadbhir vimalīkṛtā |

⁸⁰⁸ *yadi* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*gal te*) ◇ Ś] *ya* .. Pp; {*yadi*} K em.; deest Pā

⁸⁰⁹ *anyākārasya* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *anyākārāsyā* Jp^{ac}

⁸¹⁰ *tathālpīyasi* Jp^{pc} Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de b'zin du...sin tu chun ba'i*) ◇ K] *tathālpayasi* Jp^{ac}; *yathālpīyasi* Ś

⁸¹¹ *tad ā°* Jp Pp] **tadā°* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*de'i tshé*); *tathā°* K Ś

⁸¹² °*śikhariṇām* em. ◇ K Ś] °*śikheriṇām* Jp; °*śikhiriṇām* Pp

⁸¹³ °*śekharāṇy* ◇ K Ś] °*sekhara*<<ny/py>> Jp; °*sekharaḥpy* Pp

⁸¹⁴ *na* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} (*ma yin*) ◇ Ś] deest Pp K Pā Gā

⁸¹⁵ *dhīmātratve ca* Jp Pp, **dhīmātratve* T_{2D} T_{2P} (*blo tsam ñid ni...la*)] *dhīmātratvena* K Ś

⁸¹⁶ °*sādhanam* Jp Pp ◇ K] °*sānam* Ś

⁸¹⁷ *grāhye* Jk Pk ◇ K Ś] **bāhye* T_{1D} T_{1P} (*phyi rol la*)

⁸¹⁸ *sā na samarthyate* Jk^{pc} Pk T_{1D} T_{1P} (*de ni ma bsgrubs*)] *sā na sāmathyata* Jk^{ac}; *mānam samarthyate* K Ś

^{σσσσ} In Pk, this *kārikā* has the number 20 (exactly like the following one) instead of 19.

^{tttt} *blo tsam ñid du bsgrub pa la* | | *śes phyir la sogs bsgrub pa gan* | | *mi mthun rigs dan mi 'gal phyir* | | *thams cad lhag dan bcas śes bya* | | (BASK 29).

asmābhis taddiśā yātaṃ^{819TTTT} paramārthaviniścaye || 2083 || |^{UUUU}
 [Jk106_{r3}] bahirarthaparīkṣā⁸²⁰
 pūrvam eva hy anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsaṃ ityādinā^{UUUU} vyāpteḥ⁸²¹ prasādhī-
 tatvān nānaikāntiḥ^[Jp214_{v3}]ko hetuḥ⁸²² | ācāryadiñnāgapādair ālambanapratya-
 yavyavasthārtham uktam —
 yad an^[Pp169_{r7}]tarjñeyarūpaṃ⁸²³ tu bahirvad avabhāsatē |^{VVVV}
 so 'rtho⁸²⁴ vijñānarūpatvāt⁸²⁵ tatpratyayatayāpi ca | |^{WWW}
 iti | anena hi grāhyāmśe viṣayavyavasthā pratipādītā | [T_{2P}170b]
 punar apy uktam —
 atha [Pp169_{r8}] vā
 śaktyarpaṇāt kramāt^{826XXXX}
 krameṇāpi so 'rthābhabhāsaḥ svānurūpakāryotpattaye śaktiṃ vijñānādhā-
 rām⁸²⁷ karotīty avirodha^{YYYY} iti |
 anenānantarajñāne svānurūpa^[Pp169_{r9}]kāryo^[Jp214_{v4}]tpattinimittasaktisamarpa-
 ṇāt⁸²⁸ kāraṇatvaṃ⁸²⁹ tasya pratibhāsasya samarthitam | [Ś711]

⁸¹⁹ *yātaṃ* em. ◇ K Ś] *cālaṃ* Jk Pk Jai; T_{1D} T_{1P} (*bskyed par byas*)

⁸²⁰ *bahirarthaparīkṣā* Jk Pk] *iti bahirarthaparīkṣā* K; deest Ś

⁸²¹ *vyāpteḥ* Jp Pp^{ac} ◇ K Ś] *vyāpte* Pp^{pc}

⁸²² *hetuḥ* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *hetu* Jp^{ac}

⁸²³ *antarjñeya*^o Jp (*amtarjñeya*^o) ◇ K Ś] *amtarjñeya*^o Pp

⁸²⁴ *so 'rtho* Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś] *sortho* Jp^{ac}

⁸²⁵ *vijñāna*^o em. partially based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rnam śes*) ◇ K em. ({*vi*}*jñāna*^o) Ś] *jñāna*^o Jp Pp (*contra metrum*)

⁸²⁶ *kramāt* conj.] deest Jp (*eye-skip*) Pp K Ś T_{2D} T_{2P}

⁸²⁷ *°ādhārām* em. based on T_{2D} T_{2P} (*rten can*)] *°ācārām* Jp Pp K Ś

⁸²⁸ *°otpatti*^o Jp^{ac} (?) ◇ K Ś] *°otpattir* Jp^{pc} (?) Pp

⁸²⁹ *kāraṇatvaṃ* Jp T_{2D} T_{2P} ◇ Ś] *kāraṇatvaṃ* ca Pp K

TTTT Here, I follow the em. by K, even though it is not supported by Jk. However, the variant *alam*, found in Jk (and, accordingly, in Pk), seems to me less likely. McClintock (2010: 90 n. 243), based on D, proposes the em. *jātam*.

UUUU In Jk, this *kārikā* has the number 121.

UUUU *anirbhāsaṃ sanirbhāsaṃ anyanirbhāsaṃ eva ca* | *vijñānāti na vijñānaṃ bāhyam arthaṃ kathaṇcana* || (TS 1998).

VVVV *Brahmasūtrasāṅkarabhāṣya* (ed. p. 471, 4); *yad antarjñeyarūpaṃ tad bahirvad avabhāsatē* | (*Nyāyamañjarī* 9, ed. p. 508, 2).

WWW *nañ gi śes bya'i no bo ni* || *phyi rol ltar snañ gañ yin de* || *don yin mam śes no bo'i phyir* || *de rkyen ñid kyañ yin phyir ro* || (ĀP 6).

XXXX *nus pa 'jog phyir rim gyis yin* || (ĀP 7b). Cf. *tad uktam śaktyarpaṇāt kramād iti* (*Nyāyaratnākara*, ed. p. 222, 32); *na ca śaktyarpaṇadvārā krameṇālambanaṃ bhavet* || (ŚV₃ ŚūV 158cd); *na ca śaktyarpaṇadvārāṃ krameṇālambanaṃ bhavet* || (ŚV₁ ŚūV 158cd).

YYYY *yañ na* | *rim gyis kyañ yin te* || *don du snañ ba de ni rañ snañ ba dan mthun pa'i bras bu skyed par byed pa'i nus pa mam par śes pa'i rten can byed pas mi 'gal lo* || (ĀPV ad ĀP 7b, ed. p. 160, 16–20).

atra tenaiva bhadantena dūṣaṇam uktam —

yady apīndriyavijñapter⁸³⁰

grā[Pp169_{r10}]hyāmśaḥ kāraṇam⁸³¹ bhavet |

atadābhatayā tasyā nākṣavad viṣayaḥ sa tu || ^{zzzz}

ityādinā | atrāha — **śaktāṅ**⁸³² ityādi | **śaktāṅ**⁸³³ **anantare jñāna** iti vyadhikaraṇe⁸³⁴ saptamyau | **ananta**[Pp169_{r11}]**re jñāna** iti samanantarapratyaye⁸³⁵ ālayākhye yā śaktis tathāvidhārthapratibhāsapratyaya[Jp214_{v5}]samarthitā | **tāttvikī neṣyata** iti | yataḥ paramāṇvāder vyatiriktasyāḷambanātvaṃ [Pp169_{r12}] na yujyata iti vistareṇa⁸³⁶ pratipādyācāryeṇa⁸³⁷ mā bhūt sarvathāḷambanapratīṣedhe pratītibādhā | tathā⁸³⁸ āḷambanādhipatisamanantarahetupratyayatvalakṣaṇāś⁸³⁹ catasraḥ pra[Pp169_{r13}]tyayatā⁸⁴⁰ iti sūtre vacanād [T_{2D}130b] abhyupetaḥ bādhāpīti avirodhapratipādanāya⁸⁴¹ yathāvidhā āḷambanapratyayo 'bhipretaḥ sūtre loka ca tathā pratipā[Jp214_{v6}]ditaṃ samvṛ[Pp169_{r14}]tītyā | na paramārthataḥ | paramārthatas tu nirāḷambanāḥ⁸⁴² sarva eva pratyayā iti | [TSP ad TS 2081–2083] |

bahirarthaparīkṣā⁸⁴³

⁸³⁰ °vijñapter Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | °vijñapta Jp^{ac}

⁸³¹ kāraṇam em.] karaṇam Jp Pp K Ś

⁸³² śaktāṅ Jp^{pc} (śaktāṅ) Pp ◇ K Ś | śaktāṅ Jp^{ac}

⁸³³ śaktāṅ Jp^{pc} (śaktāṅ) Pp ◇ K Ś | śaktāṅ Jp^{ac}

⁸³⁴ vyadhikaraṇe Jp Pp | vyadhikaraṇa° K S

⁸³⁵ samanantara° Jp Pp (samanāntara°) ◇ K | samantara° Ś

⁸³⁶ vistareṇa Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} ◇ Ś | vistareṇa {pratipāditam} K em.; pratipāditam Gā

⁸³⁷ pratipādyācāryeṇa Jp Pp T_{2D} T_{2P} (slob dpon gyis...bstan nas) ◇ Ś | pratipādyā{ditaṃ cā.}cāryeṇa K conj.; pratipāditam cācāryeṇa Gā

⁸³⁸ tathā Jp^{pc} Pp ◇ K Ś | tethā Jp^{ac}

⁸³⁹ °pratyayatvalakṣaṇāś Jp Pp ◇ Ś | °pratyayatva{sva.}lakṣaṇāś K conj.; pratyayasvasvala° Gā

⁸⁴⁰ pratyayatā Jp Pp | pratyayitā K S

⁸⁴¹ °pratipādanāya Jp Pp ◇ K | °pratipādānāya Ś

⁸⁴² nirāḷambanāḥ Jp^{pc} Pp^{pc} (nirāḷambanāḥ) ◇ K Ś | nirāḷambanāḥ Jp^{ac}; nirāḷambanā Pp^{ac}

⁸⁴³ bahirarthaparīkṣā Jp Pp | iti bahirarthaparīkṣā K Ś

^{zzzz} Cf. dbaṅ po mam par rig pa'i rgyu || phra rab rdul dag yin mod kyi || der mi snañ phyir de'i (de D) yul ni || rdul phran ma yin dbaṅ po b'zin || (ĀP 1). Cf. yady apīndriyavijñapteḥ kāraṇam paramāṇavaḥ | atadābhatayā nāsyā akṣavad viṣayo 'navaḥ || (PVA ad PV Pratyakṣa 294, ed. p. 336, 5).

Glosses¹

g¹

grāhyagrāhakatvābhīyām

g²

vivādāṣpadibhūtaṃ svasthanetrādījñānaṃ grāhyagrāhakatvarahitaṃ jñānatvāt

g³

parābhimatāḥ prthivīyādayo na sattve grāhyā bhavānti ekānekasvabhāvābhāvāt

g⁴

sattvena grāhyatvaṃ vyāpyaṃ tasya vyāpakaṃ ekānekasvabhāvatvaṃ tasyānupalabdhiḥ

g⁵

paramāñur² aneko mūrttaḥ pratyakṣagrāhyo³ nāsti pratyakṣābhimate⁴ pratyaye svenākāreṇa⁵ tasyāpratibhāsamānatvāt

g⁶

pratyakṣābhimatānekaparamāñor⁶ astitvaṃ vyāpyaṃ⁷ pratyakṣābhimate⁸ pratyaye svenākāreṇāpratibhāsamānatvaṃ vyāpakaṃ tasyānupalabdhiḥ

g⁷

ādyaacakṣuṣaṃ avayavidravayaṃ sūkṣmapracayātmakaṃ sthūlatvāt

g⁸

kākāksagolakanyāyena nāpiśabdāḥ pratyakṣato 'numātaś cety ubhayatra sambadhyate⁹

g⁹

parābhimatāḥ¹⁰ paramāñavo 'sadvyavahārayogyā ekānekāsvabhāvatvāt

g¹⁰

madhyaparamānoḥ parivāraṇaṃ kṛtvāvasthitāḥ paramāñava ekadeśasthāḥ prāpnuvaṃti ekarūpaparamāñvabhīmukhasvabhāvatvāt

g¹¹

drṣṭāntadvayaṃ

¹ The glosses are given with the same orthographic form as in the manuscripts.

² *paramāñur* Jp^g Pp^{gpc} | *paramā*<<ñu>>r Pp^{gac}

³ *pratyakṣa*° Jp^{gpc} Pp^g | *pratyakṣa*° Jp^{gac}

⁴ *pratyakṣā*° Jp^g | .. <<tyakṣā>>° Pp^g

⁵ °*ākāreṇa* Jp^g | °*ākā* .. *ṇa* Pp^g

⁶ °*paramāñor* Jp^{gpc} Pp^{gpc} | °*paramāñur* Jp^{gac} Pp^{gac}

⁷ *vyāpya*<<ñi>> Jp^g | *vyāpya*° Pp^g

⁸ °*ābhimate* Jp^g | °*ābhimata*° Pp^g

⁹ Jp^g explains the absence of the *na* indicating the word *nāpi* as a case of *kākāksagolakanyāya*, also known as *kākāksagolakanyāya*, the maxim of the crow's eyeball. Since crows were popularly believed to have only one eye, going from one cavity to the other, this maxim is used to indicate a word that appears only once in a sentence, but refers to two portions of it.

¹⁰ *parābhimatāḥ* Jp^{gpc} Pp^g | *parāmābhimatāḥ* Jp^{gac}

g12

parivāraṇaṃ pūrvam iti vākye ..

g13

na tattvenāsti

g14

na tattvavṛttyā

g15

*gavākṣa*¹¹

g16

*tasya dravyāder*¹² *arthasya*

g17

*cchedadāhādeḥ*¹³

g18

samupajāyata iti saṃbandhaḥ

g19

prati hetor na yuktaṃ kalpayitum iti saṃbandhaḥ

g20

*artha*¹⁴

g21

jñānaṃ

g22

*rūpaṃ*¹⁵

g23

*mate*¹⁶

g24

*yugapat*¹⁷

g25

*nīlādyākārasya saṃvedanaṃ jñānān nārthāmtaraṃ*¹⁸ *saṃvedanāt*

g26

*nirmala*¹⁹

¹¹ *gavākṣa* Jp^g] Pp^g¹² *dravyāder* Jp^{gpc} Pp^g] *dra .. vyāder* Jp^{gac}¹³ *cchedadāhādeḥ* Jp^g] deest Pp^g¹⁴ *'rtha* Jp^g] *'tha* Pp^g¹⁵ *rūpaṃ* Jp^g] .. *paṃ* Pp^g¹⁶ *mate* Jp^g] deest Pp^g¹⁷ *yugapa* <<*i*>> Jp^g] deest Pp^g¹⁸ *°āmtaraṃ* Jp^g] *°āmtara* <<*saṃ*>> Pp^g¹⁹ *nirmala* Jp^g] deest Pp^g

g²⁷*śubhagupta*²⁰g²⁸*cintā*²¹g²⁹*aviplutendriyasya*²² *nīlādipratibhāsa*²³ *tathāvidhāparapadārthajanitaḥ*²⁴ *saṃvāditve*²⁵
*sati*²⁶ *jñānākāratvāt*²⁷g³⁰*pariccheda*²⁸g³¹*anumāñajñānaṃ na vahniviśayaṃ vahnīyākārasūnyatvāt* Jp^{g29}
anumāñajñānaṃ na vahniviśayaṃ bāhyākārasūnyatvāt Pp^gg³²*aspaṣṭākāratvāt*³⁰g³³*anumānasya vahniviśayatvaṃ vyāpyaṃ tadākāratvaṃ vyāpakaṃ tasya viruddhaṃ*
*tadākārasūnyatvaṃ tasyopalabdhiḥ*g³⁴*pītākāre jñāne śuklaśaṃkharūpaṃ*³¹ *na saṃvedyaṃ tasya tatrāpratibhāsamānatvāt*³²g³⁵*tena saṃvedyatvaṃ vyāpyaṃ tatra pratibhāsamānatvaṃ vyāpakaṃ tatra*
*pratibhāsamānatvaṃ tasyopalabdhiḥ*³³g³⁶*jñānasya*³⁴

²⁰ *śubhagupta* Jp^g] <<śu>> ... pta Pp^g

²¹ Pp^g refers to line 8 instead of line 10 where, indeed, the *signe-de-renvoi* of the gloss is found. Likely, the scribe wanted to refer to the line where BASK 95 (which contains the word *cintā*) is found.

²² *aviplutendriyasya* Jp^g] <<aviplutendriyasya>> Pp^g

²³ *nīlādipratibhāsa* Jp^g] *nīlādi*<<pratibhāsa>>. Pp^g

²⁴ *tathāvidhāparapadārthajanitaḥ* Jp^g] <<dhā>>.. .. <<dārthajanitaḥ>> Pp^g

²⁵ *saṃvāditve* Jp^g] <<saṃvāditve>> Pp^g

²⁶ *sati* Jp^g] <<sati>> Pp^g

²⁷ *jñānākāratvāt* Jp^g] <<jñānā>> Pp^g

²⁸ *pariccheda* Jp^g] deest Pp^g

²⁹ Perhaps this sentence was originally part of the text. In that case, it should be regarded as a correction and not a gloss.

³⁰ *aspaṣṭākāratvāt* Jp^g] Pp^g

³¹ *śuklaśaṃkha* ° em.] *śuklaśaṃkhaṃ* Jp^g Pp^g

³² *tatrāpratibhāsamānatvāt* Jp^g] (ill. circa 10? *akṣaras*) Pp^g

³³ *tasyopalabdhiḥ* Jp^g] (ill. circa 5? *akṣaras*) Pp^g

³⁴ *jñānasya* Jp^g] (ill. circa 3 *akṣaras*) Pp^g

g37

grāṁthāt

g38

śabarasvāminā

g39

*viśpaṣṭam iti pāṭhaḥ*³⁵

g1K

*sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛtte*³⁶ *viśeṣe*³⁷

g40

Jp^g here indicates with numbers 1 and 2 that *jñānottpatteḥ* is the first *hetu* and *jñānatvāt* the second.

g41

*vivādāśpadaviśeṣaṇeneti pāṭhaḥ*³⁸

g42

*pratibimba*³⁹ *iva pratibimbavat*

³⁵ *pāṭhaḥ* Pp^g, *pā* Jp^g

³⁶ *sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛtte* Jk^g] *sajātīya*<<*vi*jātīyavyā>> Pk^g

³⁷ *viśeṣe* Jk^g] Pk^g

³⁸ *pāṭhaḥ* Pp^g, *pā* Jp^g

³⁹ *pratibimba* Pp^g] *pratibimbe* Jp^g

Investigation of External Objects

English Translation

1.

Introduction

“Similar to a reflection, etc.” (TS 4b): in order to establish this qualification of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, [Śāntarakṣita] at this point introduces the [viewpoint of the] Vijñānavāda. According to this [tradition], these three worlds are nothing but *vijñaptimātra*¹ [(mere cognition)]² and this *vijñāna* is infinite because there are various mental continuums, one for each being. [The *vijñāna*] is either impure for those who have not realized the truth, or pure for those whose obstacles (*āvaraṇa*) have been removed. Moreover, it originates as perishable at every moment for each living being,³ and not truly as one, unchangeable [reality] as the followers of the *Upaniṣads* [maintain]. This is[, in brief,] the view of the Vijñānavāda Buddhists.

In this [doctrine,] *vijñaptimātratā* is admitted [as tenable] through the following two ways [of reasoning]:⁴ [(Argument A)] because, if an external apprehended [object], having the nature of earth and so on, is absent,⁵ [then] the state of being an apprehender is also absent [from cognition];⁶ or [(Argument B)] because, [in relation to cognitions,] even if there were an apprehended⁷ in a different mental continuum [(i.e., an internal

¹ This refers to a common formulation of this Vijñānavāda view, starting with the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (cf. Sanskrit Text). For a discussion of this quotation (reconstructed into Sanskrit by Lévi; cf. *vṛtti* on *Vimśikā* 1, ed. p. 3, 1–2 and n. 1) from that *sūtra* in the *Vimśikāvṛtti*, see Ruzsa–Szegedi 2015: 135 n. 10.

² On the translation of this term, see Introduction n. 19.

³ Cf. Tib. *mam par śes pa de yan de kho na ñid ma rtogs pa mams la sems can re re'i rgyud tha dad pa'i phyir mtha' med pa dan ma dag pa yin la* | (deest P) *sgrib pa (bsgrib pa P) spañs pa mams kyi ni dag pa dan skad cig re re la tha dad par srog chags thams cad la sbye ba yin* [...]. “And this *vijñāna*, for those who have not realized the truth, is infinite — because there are various mental continuums, one for each being — and [also] impure. Moreover, for those whose obstacles have been removed, it is pure and originates as perishable at every moment for all living beings [...].”

⁴ Here, Jp and Pp have a gloss defining these two ways as the conditions of apprehended and apprehender.

⁵ Cf. Tib. *sa la sogs pa'i ran bžin gyi gzuñ bar bya ba'i phyi rol med pa ñid kyi gzuñ bar bya ba med na* [...]. “If the apprehended is absent due to the absence of [any] external [object] to be apprehended, of the nature of earth, etc. [...].”

⁶ Cf., e.g., *asati grāhye grāhako na yukto grāhakasya grāhyāpekṣatvāt* | (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 18, 16–17).

⁷ Here, Kamalaśīla argues that he does not also deny the existence of other mental continuums, that is, their reality outside one's own cognitions. Nevertheless, those are not perceivable, and a cognition does not apprehend anything with the false conditions of “apprehended” and “apprehender.” This interpretation is based on the Sanskrit text, “*saty api vā santānāntare grāhye*,” where “*grāhye*” is a variant found in Jp, but not in Tib. I have also

apprehended)], the characteristics of [being an] apprehended and apprehender are absent.⁸

In this regard, the proof statement (*prayoga*) is [as follows]. Every cognition (*jñāna*) is devoid of the two conditions of apprehended and of apprehender, [precisely] because it is cognition, like the cognition of a reflection; and this sense cognition, of a healthy person,⁹ which is the subject of dispute is [indeed] a cognition. This is a logical reason as essential property (*svabhāvahetu*),¹⁰ and this logical reason cannot be considered as being devoid of pervasion (*vyāpti*).¹¹ To explain (*tathā hi*), first of all, earth and the like, being external object[s] apprehended by this [(i.e., a cognition)], do not exist, since they are devoid (*śūnya*) of *svabhāva*,¹² either one or many.¹³ The proof statement is [as follows]. That which is not endowed with a *svabhāva*, either one or many, cannot be apprehended — by a judicious man¹⁴ — as being real, such as a lotus in the sky.¹⁵ And earth and the other [elements], [which are] admitted by the opponents [as real], are devoid of *svabhāva*, either one or

translated *saty api* as an unreal conditional, despite its most common translation being a concessive clause. Matsuoka (2014a: 298) follows Tib. and provides a different interpretation; see Matsuoka 2014a.

⁸ Regarding these two arguments, see Introduction §3.1.

⁹ For a discussion of the meaning of the terms *svastha* and/or *svāsthya*, see Pecchia 2015: 190. She also quotes Minoru Hara (1995: 66), noting that, according to him, it seems to relate to the mental aspect rather than the physical aspect of one's existence.

¹⁰ With regard to the concept of *svabhāvahetu* (and, more generally, *svabhāva*), cf. Introduction n. 88.

¹¹ Here, the logical reason is “because it is cognition” (*jñānatvāt*). Kamalaśīla wants to prove its pervasion with the property to be proven (*sādhya*), that is, “being devoid of the two conditions of apprehended and apprehender” (*grāhyagrāhakatvadvyarahitātva*). In order to do that, he will prove the ontological truth of external objects being devoid of *svabhāva*, either one or many.

¹² A cognition can never be found along with the opposite of the *sādhya*, i.e., as having a *grāhya*, such as the elements admitted by the opponents, since these do not exist, as they are devoid of *svabhāva*.

¹³ Regarding the “neither-one-nor-many” argument, cf. *bdag dan gzan smra'i dnos 'di dag || yañ dag tu na gcig pa dan || du ma'i rañ bžin bral ba'i phyir || rañ bžin med de gzugs brñan bžin ||* (MAK 1). Cf. also *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā: niḥsvabhāva amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ | ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat ||* (*Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*, ed. p. 173, 17–18). See also Tillemans 1983.

¹⁴ The judicious (*prekṣavat*) person is indicated by McClintock (2010: 58 and other places) as the ideal audience for the TS and the TSP. Throughout their works, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla address such a person — who represents a certain standard of rationality — as the audience best suited to understanding their arguments and, accordingly, acknowledging (as well as confirming) their truth. Such a person, she says, must be regarded as an eminently rational individual, respecting “some version of the laws of contradiction and the excluded middle.” On this term, see Eltschinger 2014: 195 n. 17, 219–234; Eltschinger 2007b: 137–150. Cf. Introduction, §2.4 and n. 65.

¹⁵ This is the statement of the pervasion between being endowed with a *svabhāva*, either one or many (*ekānekasvabhāvatva*), and being perceived as real (*sattvena grāhyatva*), which is tantamount to being real (*sattva*). Cf. also (from a Madhyamaka perspective): *gañ gcig dan du ma'i no bo ñid dan bral ba de ni don dam par no bo ñid med de | dper na nam mkha'i padma ji lta ba bžin la |* (**Vajracchedikāṭikā*, ed. p. 272, 13–15). “What is devoid of *svabhāva*, either one or many, is — ultimately — devoid of *svabhāva* in the same way as a lotus in the sky.”

many. Therefore, [in this proof,] the non-cognition of the pervading [property] (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) [is the logical reason]. Since, due to the absence of another third option (*rāśi*),¹⁶ real existence (*sattva*) is pervaded either by the [property of] being one or [of] being many, there is a logical incongruity (*anupapatti*) in the relation between the pervaded (*vyāpya*) [property] and the pervading (*vyāpaka*) [property] [in the case of earth, etc.].¹⁷ A *pramāṇa* disproves (*bādhaka*) [the presence of the logical reason] in the opposite [of the property to be proven (*sādhya*)]; therefore, the immediately [preceding] logical reason is not inconclusive (*anaikāntika*); nor is it contradictory, since it is present in homologous instances (*sapakṣa*).

In this regard, the opponent, highlighting that this logical reason is unestablished [with reference to earth and the other elements], and regarding what was said [in TS 1887cd] — “let the axiom that elements indeed do not exist be admitted [by you] as superior”¹⁸ — showing that this thesis (*pratijñā*) is contradicted by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) as well as by the other [*pramāṇas*], in order to demonstrate precisely the non-pervasion of the first logical reason,¹⁹ states [the verse] beginning with “if the four elements.”

¹⁶ For another possible translation of this passage, see McClintock 2010: 350 n. 753. Here Kamalaśīla intends that, since *ekatva* and *anekatva* are mutually exclusive, there is no third option, because the negation of one necessarily implies the affirmation of the other. On this, see *nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ — anyonyaparihāreṇa sthiter anyatvatattvayoh pakṣayoh | yau hi paraspara-parihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇau tayor ya ekaḥ pratiśedhaḥ so 'paravidhināntariyakah | parasparaparihāreṇa vānyatvatattve vyavasthite, anyatarasvabhāvavyavacchedenānyatarasya paricchedāt | tasmān nāsti tṛtīyārāśi-sambandhaḥ ||* (TSP *ad* TS 1303–1304, ed. p. 476, 24–477, 4). McClintock (2010: 59 n. 134) introduces this passage as an example of the implementation of the law of the excluded middle. In this respect, Tillemans (1983: 310 n. 15) also mentions the MAV: *geig pu'i bdag ñid dan du ma'i bdag ñid ni phan tshun spañis te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid yin pas phuñi po gzan sel to |* (MAV, ed. p. 188, 12–13).

¹⁷ Here, Kamalaśīla is clearly stating the *vyāpti* between being existent and being either one or many. Accordingly, with reference to earth, etc., since there is the non-cognition of the pervader, i.e., being one or many, the relationship between those two does not logically follow.

¹⁸ Here, Kamalaśīla is quoting a passage from the Lokāyataparīkṣā, in which he maintains that, through the implementation of reasoning (*yukti*), *vijñaptimātratā* is established as superior to the views of the Cārvākas. Cf. TS 1887 and TSP *ad* TS 1885cd, 1887 (ed. p. 649, 18–23). On this passage, see Introduction n. 99.

¹⁹ That is the non-pervasion between the *hetu*, “because it is cognition” (*jñānatvāt*) and the *sādhya*, “being devoid of the conditions of apprehended and apprehender” (*grāhyagrāhakatvadvyarahitatva*).

2.

Argument A:

Grāhyāyogāt

2.1 Pūrvapakṣa

1964. If the four elements are no different from cognition, then why in fact do they distinctly appear as being separate [from it]?²⁰

With the [word] “separate” [the opponent] shows that the apprehended is established as [being] different from cognition, while by the [word] “distinctly” [he means] “through direct perception.” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1964 ◇

In order to confirm this by [advancing] an undesirable consequence (*prasaṅga*), [the opponent] states [the verse] beginning with “if these.”

1965. If these, in spite of appearing in such a manner, are admitted as non-existent, [then] which *pramāṇa*, according to you, [may] also [prove] the existence of the mind?²¹

2.2 Refutation of External Objects as *Grāhya*²²

[Śāntarakṣita] rebuts with [the verse] beginning with “with which nature.”

1966. With which nature does this external object manifest, when appearing [in direct perception]? Having atoms as [its] *svabhāva* or having the part-possessor as [its] characterizing feature?²³

²⁰ Kamalaśīla portrays the opponent as aiming to establish that the non-cognition of a *svabhāva*, either one or many, is not established with reference to the four elements and, therefore, the external object cannot be treated as non-existent. Kamalaśīla’s final conclusion, at the end of this section, will be that the logical reason is established and that treating an external object as non-existent is proven.

²¹ The opponent tries to show the undesirable consequence of the Vijñānavāda point of view regarding external objects. If the Vijñānavādins argue that direct perception cannot prove the existence of the four elements, in spite of distinctly apprehending them, then they do not admit it as a means of trustworthy awareness, since a *pramāṇa* is defined as perceiving a real thing as it is. Moreover, as a further negative consequence of their standpoint, the Vijñānavādins would also need to find a means of valid cognition to prove the existence of the mind.

²² This part is related to the proof of the absence of *sādhakapramāṇa*.

²³ Here, Śāntarakṣita is introducing two possible theses regarding the nature of external objects appearing in cognition: having either (i) atoms as their *svabhāva*, or (ii) the part-possessor (*avayavin*) as their characterizing feature. At the beginning of the ĀPV, Dinnāga also mentions atoms and their aggregates (*de ’dus pa*) as possible external object-supports of sensory perceptions. On this, cf. Introduction §3.3, 3.4.

1967. First of all, the form of atoms is not specifically brought to awareness (*prativedyate*),²⁴ since, in cognition, there is no specific awareness (*prativedana*)²⁵ of [atoms being] devoid of parts, many and corporeal.²⁶

1968. For atoms should appear as being devoid of [any] difference of parts, otherwise they cannot be perceived at all, since they do not bestow their own form.²⁷

In this respect, the positions [to be considered] are [as follows]. An object that is established by direct perception, provided that it is external, could be: (I) many, distinct in [terms of] atoms; (II) one, a part-possessor composed of them; (III) coarse, not [being] composed [of atoms].²⁸ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1966 ◇

Among these, “first of all,” the first one is “not” [tenable] “since there is no specific awareness” by an apprehending²⁹ “cognition” [(i.e., interpreting the compound as containing a genitive)] “of” atoms [which are] “devoid of parts, many [and] corporeal,” since cognitions are always experienced as being endowed only with coarse images (*ākāra*).³⁰ Or else [the second interpretation is as follows.] If one reads [the word *pratyaya* as] ending in the seventh case [(i.e., the locative) and] not compounded (i.e., *pratyaye* ‘*prativedanāt*’),³¹ [then the meaning will be:] “since there is no specific awareness’ of them in a ‘cognition.’” The proof statement is [as follows]. [An atom] that does not appear with its own form in a cognition that is admitted as direct perception cannot be considered as [being] directly perceived, like a

²⁴ I generally translate the root *vid-* and all its derivatives with “awareness” and related terms (“to bring to awareness,” etc.)

²⁵ Kamalaśīla comments on the term *prativedana* with the word “appearance” (*pratibhāṣana*). Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1972. Regarding this term in PV Pratyakṣa 320 as well as the PVA and PVV, cf. Introduction §4.1 as well as n. 137 and 138.

²⁶ I translate the term *mūrta* as either “corporeal” or “material.”

²⁷ Atoms must appear according to their own partless nature in cognition in order to be considered as “perceived.” Here, also based on Kamalaśīla’s interpretation, Śāntarakṣita is stating the pervasion between the property of appearing according to their own image (*ātmākārapratibhāṣitva*) and the property of being directly perceived (*pratyakṣatva*).

²⁸ With reference to this, as well as a comparison between the TSP and *Vimśikā* 11 and *vṛtti*, cf. Introduction §3.3, 3.4.

²⁹ “Apprehending” (*grāhakasya*) may be considered as an interpolation and is missing in Tib.

³⁰ The Sanskrit term *ākāra* has been translated differently by various scholars, the most common translations being “image,” “aspect” or “form.” Here, I will be referring to it mainly as “image,” but at times also as “form,” depending on whether the term refers to the physical aspect of the object itself or to its phenomenal appearance in cognition. In a few occurrences, I have also translated it as “aspect” (especially with reference to the aspect of apprehended or apprehender).

³¹ Here Kamalaśīla offers two interpretations based on two possible readings of the text, either as a genitive *taṭpuruṣa* compound (*pratyayāprativedanāt*), or not as a compound and with a locative (*pratyaye* ‘*prativedanāt*’).

lotus in the sky.³² And an atom that is manifold [and] corporeal does not appear in a cognition that is admitted as direct perception, which grasps [only] coarse forms. [In this proof,] the non-cognition of the pervading [property is the logical reason,] because the fact of being directly perceived is pervaded by the fact of appearing with its own form.³³ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1967 ◇

In demonstrating precisely this pervasion, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “for atoms.” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1968 ◇

However, this might be the [objection] (*athāpi syāt*), “By virtue of the axiom (*siddhānta*) ‘they arise and vanish only [when and in the condition of being] aggregated,’ atoms do not appear [independently,] one by one. As was said by Bhadanta Śubhagupta:

Moreover, atoms do not indeed arise one by one, independently [from one another]. For this reason also, atoms do not appear [in cognition] one by one.” (BASK 44)³⁴

In order to prove that this very [statement by Śubhagupta] is not a proper response, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “although [they arise].”

1969. Although [they arise] in combination [with other atoms, as Śubhagupta maintains], these arisen [atoms] appear verily with their own form, and do not lose their [property of] being endowed with a partless nature-form (*rūpa*)³⁵ in those conditions [of composition].³⁶

“In those conditions” [means] in the states of composition. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1969 ◇

³² McClintock (2010: 81) refers to this passage as a (negative) statement by Kamalaśīla of the idea that “perception occurs when a causally efficacious particular produces an image of itself in awareness. This image, insofar as it is the effect of a causally efficacious particular, possesses similarity (*sārūpya*) with its cause, and this is what allows us to classify perception as non-erroneous (*abhvānta*).” She (2010: 81 n. 213) also mentions TS 1261cd–1262 (Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā).

³³ An atom that is directly perceived must appear with its own form. On this paragraph, cf. Introduction §4.1.

³⁴ Regarding this verse as **Ci** for BASK 44 as well as its meaning in this context and in the BASK, cf. Introduction §4.1.

³⁵ For the translation of *rūpa*, here and in other contexts, see Introduction n. 134.

³⁶ Śāntarakṣita argues that if atoms are admitted as real substances, then they must appear according to their partless nature in cognition also when aggregating, unless they lose their singularity under those conditions. Precisely this point will be proved further by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. To elaborate, when aggregating, atoms are endowed with a difference of parts and, therefore, necessarily lose their partless nature; there is no cognition of their unitary nature. However, according to Śubhagupta, atoms as substances are always distinguished through their *śvalakṣaṇa* by at least one type of cognition, and they are as such even when arising all together; cf. BASK 37 in Introduction §4.4.

Furthermore, one must admit that, if atoms are devoid of parts, then they are not material (*mūrta*).³⁷ [Śubhagupta,] therefore, says the contradiction of his own statements in the initial thesis (*pratijñā*).

1970. If [it is argued that] the nature-form of those [(i.e., atoms)] has reached the limit of divisibility [and are, therefore, devoid of parts], [the reply will be:] how can they possibly not be immaterial (*amūrta*), like sensations, etc.?

“*Labdhāpacayaparyantam*” [is a *bahuvrīhi*;] in such a manner, that “nature-form” (*rūpa*), i.e., *svabhāva* — with which [atoms] have “reached” the “limit of divisibility” — is defined. The point is as follows: if [atoms] do not have a *svabhāva* that is diminished due to being divided into parts that are [also] diminished³⁸ — that is to say, if they are devoid of parts (*niraṃśa*) — then they are not established as being material, “like sensations, etc.,” because there is no difference [from immaterial things].³⁹ ♦ TSP ad TS 1970 ♦

[Śāntarakṣita] advances (*āśaṅkate*) the [potential] response of Bhadanta Śubhagupta with [the verse] beginning with “if [Śubhagupta argues that,] just as.”

1971. If [Śubhagupta argues that,] just as there is the error of permanence due to the arising of similar, successive instants, [then] there is[, similarly,] the error of [something being] coarse⁴⁰ when one apprehends spatially continuous and homogeneous [atoms]. (BASK 35)⁴¹

For [Śubhagupta] states, “For a deluded person, ‘due to the arising of similar, successive instants,’ ‘there is the error of permanence’⁴² with regard to sound, etc., even though he apprehends [sound, etc.,] through direct perception. In the same way, the mental ‘error’ that [something is] ‘coarse’ arises when atoms that occupy ‘continuous’ places [and] are ‘homogeneous’ are apprehended simultaneously. And therefore, the logical reason — that is,

³⁷ Cf. Tib. *gžan yañ gal te rdul phra rab mams cha med pa yin na | ’o na lus can [...]*. “Furthermore, if atoms are devoid of parts, then they are material. [...]”

³⁸ Cf. Tib. *gal te phra ba’i yan lag gi mam par dbye bas phra ba’i ran bžin ma yin par mi ’gyur na ste |*. “If they are not devoid of *svabhāva* that is diminished due to being divided into parts that are [also] diminished.”

³⁹ Kamalaśīla maintains that Śubhagupta contradicts his own initial thesis here. If atoms are admitted as having reached the limit of divisibility, then they are thought of as being devoid of parts. However, if atoms are conceived of as being the smallest unit of matter, then they must, necessarily, aggregate in order to constitute objects, which extend in space. This is the characteristic that differentiates corporeal things from incorporeal ones. Nevertheless, if atoms are admitted as being devoid of parts, they cannot aggregate. If they cannot aggregate, they do not differ from incorporeal things at all. Hence, there follows the *prasaṅga* that atoms are incorporeal, like the immaterial *skandhas*, and cannot be the smallest unit of space or matter.

⁴⁰ Cf. Tib. *rigs pa ’khrul pa yin*. Here, the Sanskrit text has *sthūlavibhrama*.

⁴¹ On TS 1971 as **T** for BASK 35 and its meaning, cf. Introduction §4.1 and §4.2.

⁴² Tib. here has *rtog pa ñid du*.

‘since, in cognition, there is no specific awareness of [atoms being] devoid of parts, many and corporeal’ (TS 1967cd) — is unestablished (*asiddha*).”⁴³
 ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1971 ◇

[Śāntarakṣita] states the refutation (*dūṣaṇa*) with [the verse] beginning with “if direct perception, by force of its own activity alone.”

1972. If direct perception, by force of its own activity alone, cannot generate a cognition that is reflective awareness (*parāmarśavijñāna*), how can those [atoms] be perceptible objects?⁴⁴

1973. Additionally, things are ascertained as being “instantaneous” by means of a *pramāṇa* [(i.e., inference)], but how can what is yellow or white, etc., be understood as being [an image of] “atoms”?⁴⁵

1974. If [Śubhagupta argues that] [what is] visible at first indeed consists of an accumulation of subtle things since it is

⁴³ With reference to this as a part of the “autocommentary” and its meaning, see Introduction §4.1 and Saccone 2014: 389–390.

⁴⁴ Regarding BASK 35, as referred to in TS 1971, Śāntarakṣita opposes the idea that atoms cannot be considered as apprehended if the perception of them, by force of its own activity, does not cause the conceptual cognition: “this is an atom.” Here, Śāntarakṣita further elaborates on what I have called the Vijñānavāda “Epistemic Proof.” On this, cf. BASK 34 in Introduction n. 157 and Introduction §4.2 (as well as other places).

⁴⁵ This same objection is introduced in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā, where Kamalaśīla introduces Śāntarakṣita as showing the opponents (i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas) how to properly object to their own argument, which is brought forward from a Sautrāntika (or, as Kamalaśīla refers to it, a *bahīrarthavāda*) point of view. Cf. *etāvat tu bhaved atra katham eṣām anīścaye | nīlādi paramāṇūnām ākāra iti gamyate ||* (TS 590). “However, in this case, [the objection] may be of this kind: without their ascertainment, how can a blue thing, etc., be understood as [being] an image [related to] atoms?” In this case, Śāntarakṣita responds that, since a cognition is admitted as having an object, and since there is a contradiction between a coarse thing and that singularity that is a requirement for some thing to be a *viśaya* of a cognition, one is only left with the possibility of admitting atoms as that object. Kamalaśīla specifies that the *bahīrarthavādin* is left with that possibility, since he does not admit the absence of an object of cognitions; i.e., he does not accept *vijñaptimātratā*, which (he and Śāntarakṣita suggest) is the most reasonable thing to admit in that case. Cf. *tad apy akāraṇam yasmān nīlaj jñānam agocaram | nācikaṣṭhūlavīṣayam sthauṛyāikatvavirodhataḥ ||* (TS 591). “Also this is a bad reason, since this cognition [of an image of a blue thing] is not devoid of an object and does not have one coarse thing as [its] object, since there is a contradiction between coarseness and singularity.” Furthermore, *tad apīti paramāṇūnām vivekenālakṣaṇam yat tad akāraṇam paramāṇugata-nīlādyagrahaṇasyānyato ’pi nīścayotpatteḥ | tathā hīdam jñānam aṇīśayam tāvad bahīrarthavādinā satā naiveṣṭavyam anyathā hi vijñānamātratādarśanam eva syāt |* (TSP *ad* TS 591, ed. p. 245, 22–246, 10). “‘Also this,’ i.e., that which is the non-distinguishing of atoms as distinct, is a bad reason with reference to the non-apprehension of a blue [thing,] etc., as [an image] belonging to atoms, because the ascertainment arises also from other [reasons]. To explain, this cognition is not at all admitted, first of all, as being devoid of an object by someone who is a *bahīrarthavādin* since, otherwise, precisely the theory of *vijñānamātratā* would be [admitted].” On this, cf. Saccone 2016: 185–186 n. 79.

coarse, such as a mountain, [then,] also in this case[, i.e., with reference to atoms and their aggregates], there is this inference,⁴⁶

1975. [the reply will be that,] concerning both property-bearers (*dharmīn*), coarseness is, indeed, not established as a property of real things (*vastudharma*), for there is neither a coarse part-possessor, nor are atoms of this nature [(i.e., coarse).]⁴⁷

1976. If [it is argued that] something having a form extending in space (*deśavītānena*) is called thus⁴⁸ [(i.e., coarse), then the reply will be that,] nevertheless, there is a doubt because of [the instance of] the forms appearing in an erroneous cognition.

1977. If [the opponent argues that] that (*sa*) [(i.e., an image related to the cognition of the dream state, etc., [*svapnādijñānākāra*])]⁴⁹ is not as such [(i.e., an aggregate of subtle things)], since it is illusory,⁵⁰ [then, the reply will be that this is possible only] if [a] difference (*vyatireka*) is proven. [However, for a Vijñānavādin,] what is the superiority of this [(i.e., an image related to the waking state)] in relation to that [(i.e., an image

⁴⁶ An unidentified opponent, most likely Śubhagupta, is introduced here as providing the inference that would, given the observation of coarse things, prove the existence of atoms. This inference is not found in the BASK. However, given the flow of the argument in that part of the TS (and the TSP), I believe that Śāntarakṣita (and Kamalaśīla) intends this *kārikā* as a possible objection by Śubhagupta, and introduces it as a logical device in order to refute also the very possibility of an inference that might prove the reality of atoms. On TS 1974 and TSP, cf. §4.5.

⁴⁷ Here, Śāntarakṣita is saying that “since it is coarse” is not a good logical reason because the property of coarseness is not admitted by the opponent (the Vijñānavādin) as a property of real things, regarding either property-bearer. This idea is further elaborated on in Kamalaśīla’s commentary. In the argument, the two property-bearers, *sādhya*dharmīn and *dr̥ṣṭānt*dharmīn, are “what is visible at first,” i.e., the coarse aggregate and the mountain. Nevertheless, Śāntarakṣita mentions the atoms and the part-possessor as those things that do not have the property of coarseness for the opponent (i.e., himself). Moreover, atoms are not admitted as coarse by the proponent either — this is a shared viewpoint — and he does not admit a coarse thing as a real thing. In the TS and the TSP, one of the arguments against the reality of a coarse part-possessor is that it is formed by an agglomeration of subtle things, which are, by nature, indivisible. Therefore, it would be a *locus* (*āśraya*) of contradictory properties (*viruddhadharma*) and, as such, not real. Cf. *viruddhadharmabhāve vā nānātvam anuśajyate* || (TS 593cd). *na caikasya parasparaviruddhadharmādhyāso yuktah, atiprasaṅgāt* | (TSP ad TS 593, ed. p. 246, 15–16). On *viruddhadharmādhyāsa*, see Kyuma 1999: 228. On this, cf. also n. 93.

⁴⁸ Cf. Tib. *de b’zin ’byuñ*, “it has arisen thus,” for *tathoditam*.

⁴⁹ Here, one would expect a *tad*, as referring to *bhṛāntavijñānabhāsirūpa*, instead of *sa*. Following the commentary, I think that *sa* refers to *svapnādijñānākāra*.

⁵⁰ As we shall see, in BASK 7cd–8 Śubhagupta responds to his opponent, a Vijñānavādin (most likely Vasubandhu), saying that there must be a difference between erroneous and non-erroneous cognitions. Cf. n. 350 and Introduction §6.3 and n. 278.

related to the dream state)]?⁵¹ If [you, opponent, state that] it is the conformity to the effect (*kāryasaṃvādana*),⁵²

1978. it will, indeed, be replied (*nanūcyate*)⁵³ that, however (*ca*), also in the case of the conformity of a cognition that reflects the effect, this [conformity to the effect that the opponent has just mentioned] is possible otherwise [(i.e., without an external object)], since the cause has a restriction (*niyama*)⁵⁴ in [its] capacity [for producing a certain effect].⁵⁵

With the [particle *eva* in the sense of] “restriction,” [Śāntarakṣita intends to] show that “by force of its own activity alone” [means] “independently of the activity of reasoning (*liṅga*) and the scripture(s) (*āgama*).”⁵⁶ To explain, when there is a “direct perception,” even if [it is admitted as having] arisen in an undifferentiated way (*aviśeṣa*), only that part, with regard to which it generates “the reflective awareness” of the form as it was apprehended, may be admitted as being directly perceived according to the capacity to be treated (*vyavahārayogyatā*)⁵⁷ [as directly perceived]. However, that [thing], with regard to which [direct perception] does “not generate” [such reflective awareness], in spite of being apprehended, is as if [it were] non-apprehended. And, therefore, the logical reason is not unestablished because, with regard to this — i.e., “since there is no specific awareness” (TS 1967d) — the intended meaning is [the following], “since there is no

⁵¹ “Superiority” (*atiśaya*) is accompanied by “of this” (*asya*). *Aśya* would naturally appear to refer to the closer of two things, namely the image related to the cognition of the dream state, etc. (*svapnādijñānākāra*), which is mentioned immediately before. This part is not commented on in the TSP, even though the term “distinction” (*viśeṣa*) used there, which also qualifies “difference” (*vyatireka*), seems to refer to it. In this sense, given that *atiśaya* signifies “superiority,” and also considering the commentary — where the genitive is used regarding “an image related to the sense cognition of a healthy person” (*svasthanetrādijñānākāraśya*), and the ablative is used regarding “an image related to the cognition of the dream state, etc.” (*svapnādijñānākārāt*) — I translate *asya* as “of this [(i.e., image related to the waking state)]” and *tasmāt* as “regarding to that [(i.e., image related to the dream state)].”

⁵² Here, *saṃvāda* (or *saṃvādana*) is translated as “conformity.” In other parts, the term is translated as “reliability.”

⁵³ Here, *nanūcyate* introduces the *siddhānta* by Śāntarakṣita. For a similar use, see Dravya-padārthaparīkṣā: *nanv ityādīnā prativīdhatte* | (TSP *ad* TS 595, ed. p. 247, 8). This is an answer to the immediately preceding objection: *tad etan nanu cetyādīnā śāṅkate* | (TSP *ad* TS 594, ed. p. 246, 23).

⁵⁴ *Niyama* has been translated as both “restriction” and “necessity.”

⁵⁵ According to the sources, in this verse, there are two metrically acceptable readings: **sarvam*, present in the Tibetan text; and *sa ca*, present in Jk. Kamalaśīla’s commentary may appear to support both of them, leaving some ambiguity as to the interpretation of the verse.

⁵⁶ For a discussion of the translation of *āgama* as scripture(s), see Eltschinger 2007a: 17–20.

⁵⁷ Cf. Śāntarakṣita’s discussion on *vyavahāra* in MAK 76–77; see Kajiyama 1978: 130.

appearance [of atoms] in a cognition admitted as direct perception [and acting as the] cause of a reflective awareness.”⁵⁸ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1972 ◇

Moreover, what was [previously] said [by Śubhagupta] — “this mental error that [something is] coarse arises” (TSP *ad* TS 1971) — is not correct either. To explain, [only] if the atom were established through a *pramāṇa*,⁵⁹ could an error [(such as a coarse image)] be established. Like[, for example,] the apprehension of the permanence [of an entity] is established as erroneous since [its] momentariness is proven through a *pramāṇa*. And atoms are not equally established through a *pramāṇa*, because it is precisely them that are under investigation. Moreover, this error of [an entity being] coarse is not mental [at all,] since [it] appears vividly. And it is not tenable that [that] which belongs to a conceptual construction can be endowed with a vivid image, because a universal image (*sāmānyākāra*) is not vivid.⁶⁰ Moreover[, finally,] it is not tenable that a conceptual construction be devoid of universal images.⁶¹ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1973 ◇

Let the following be the case (*syād etat*): “Atoms are also, indeed, established through a *pramāṇa*, [exactly] like impermanence, etc. To explain, everything that is coarse consists of an ‘accumulation of subtle things,’ like mountains and so on, and ‘[what is] visible at first,’ a part-possessing substance, is a coarse [entity]. This is a logical reason as essential property. The apprehending (*grahaṇa*) of the visible is in order to ascertain the non-visible — for example, a dyad of atoms.”⁶² ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1974 ◇

⁵⁸ Here, Kamalaśīla comments that for some thing to be considered as apprehended, its perception must be the cause of a conceptual cognition, such as “this is that thing,” according to the particular aspect that was perceived. Given that, it is apt to be treated as such. On this, cf. Introduction §4.2.

⁵⁹ Tib. has *’di tshad mas* instead of *pramāṇenānu*.

⁶⁰ Cf. Tib. *spyi’i mam pa can ni mi (mi deest P) gsal ba yin pa’i phyir ro* |. “Because what is endowed with a universal image is not vivid.”

⁶¹ Here, Kamalaśīla refers to TSP *ad* TS 1971, where Śubhagupta is reported as stating, “the mental error that [something is] coarse arises” (*sthūla iti mānaso vibhramo bhavati*). His refutation of that point is twofold. First, Kamalaśīla argues that Śubhagupta is employing a circular argument, trying to prove the existence of atoms while at the same time assuming it. He claims that atoms are established because there is the error of determining a coarse form in apprehending them. However, there is no *pramāṇa* proving them (as is the case with momentary entities). Secondly, Kamalaśīla maintains that a coarse thing cannot be a mental error, because it appears vividly; and a concept cannot appear vividly, since it is not the object of direct perception. On this, cf. Saccone 2014: 392–393. This type of argument is common.

⁶² Here, Kamalaśīla elucidates the argument “everything that is coarse consists of an agglomeration of subtle things” — this is the statement of the *vyāpti*. The *pakṣadharmatā* is as follows: the property that is the *hetu* (i.e., coarseness) belongs to the property-bearer (i.e., “what is visible at first” [*ādyacākṣuṣa*]). Kamalaśīla comments on the latter using the words “part-possessing substance” (*avayavidraya*). Moreover, he adds that the perception of the visible makes us infer the non-visible. These last two elements recall the Vaiśeṣika atomic theory, and it appears that Kamalaśīla is purposefully equating Śubhagupta with them. On this, cf. §4.5 and Saccone 2015: 112–113.

[Kamalaśīla argues that,] in this respect, if with [the phrase] “since it is coarse” the logical reason is stated based on an ultimately real “coarseness” qua “property of real things,”⁶³ then coarseness “is not established” for the adversary “concerning both property-bearers,” i.e., the *sādhya* and the *dṛṣṭāntadharmin*. Therefore, the logical reason is unestablished and the example is lacking the *probans* (*sādhanavikala*).⁶⁴ ◇ TSP ad TS 1975 ◇

“If [it is argued that]” any “form” that appears as “extending in space,” that is satisfying so long as it is not analyzed (*avicāraramaṇīya*), [and] that is commonly accepted (*prasiddha*) [by everyone] — down to the shepherds, etc. — is defined as being coarse,⁶⁵ [the reply will be that] then, in the dream state cognition, etc., in spite of being “erroneous,” there are “forms” appearing as such [(i.e., coarse),] also without an agglomerate of atoms. Therefore, the logical reason is inconclusive.⁶⁶ ◇ TSP ad TS 1976 ◇

[Kamalaśīla argues that,] now, if the qualification (*viśeṣana*) [of the *hetu*] “when it is non-erroneous” is employed [by the opponent],⁶⁷ then, according

⁶³ Cf. Tib. *de'i phyir 'dir gal te rags pa'i phyir zes bya ba'i dños po'i chos la brten nas don dam pa'i rags pa ñid gtan tshigs su brjod na* [...]. “Therefore, in this respect, if, based on a property of real things[, i.e.,] “since it is coarse,” an ultimately real coarseness is stated as the logical reason [...].”

⁶⁴ Kamalaśīla maintains that, from an absolute point of view, the property of coarseness is not admitted by the opponent (i.e., himself) as being a property of either property-bearer. Given the preceding passage, with “property-bearers” he is referring to “what is visible at first” and “a mountain.” Accordingly, the logical reason “since it is coarse” is unestablished, and missing in the example, which can hardly be brought forward as a *sapakṣa*. However, Śubhagupta does not admit the property of coarseness as ultimately real, since he regards it as a conceptual image.

⁶⁵ Here, Kamalaśīla portrays the opponent (probably Śubhagupta) as resorting to the idea of correct conventional reality (*saṃvṛti*) because it is cognitively presented, though satisfying only insofar as no analysis of reality is undertaken (*avicāraramaṇīya*). On that level of correct conventional reality, coarse things are observed and generally accepted (*prasiddha*) by everyone, even shepherds, whose vision of things is simple. Therefore, conventionally speaking, the property of coarseness is established as belonging to things. Ichigō (1985b: LXII) notes that Kamalaśīla distinguishes between two kinds of conventional truth, *mūlhyāsaṃvṛti* and *tathyaṣaṃvṛti* — the first being that of mere verbal conventions, and the second, dependent origination and causal efficiency, known even to a cowherd. On the other hand, Śāntarakṣita admits only one type of *saṃvṛti*, the true one, and describes it as: (i) agreeable as long as it is not investigated critically; (ii) characterized by arising and decay; and (iii) having causal efficiency. Cf. *ma brtags gcig pu ñams dga' žiñ* || *skye dan 'jig pa'i chos can pa* || *don byed pa dag nus mams kyi* || *rañ bžin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs* || (MAK 64). In this sense, Ichigō (1985b: LXIV–LXV) also adds that for Śāntarakṣita conventional truth “is nothing but mind-only.” Cf. *rgyu dan 'bras bur gyur pa yañ* || *śes pa 'ba' žig kho na ste* || *rañ gis grub pa gañ yin pa* || *de ni śes par gñas pa yin* || (MAK 91).

⁶⁶ The logical reason is present also in the case of dream states — we perceive things as coarse, although they are not composed of atoms. Therefore, the *hetu* is proved as being present also in the heterogeneous instances (*vipakṣa*), and it is therefore inconclusive.

⁶⁷ Wanting to avoid it being inconclusive, the opponent has added the qualification “when it is non-erroneous” to the *hetu*; namely, the logical reason is not simply *sthūlatvāt*, but rather *abhrāntatve sthūlatvāt*. In other words, the logical reason is admitted when the cognition is non-erroneous. In this case, the *vyāpti* between the *hetu* (the coarseness) and the *sādhyā* (the fact of being an aggregate of subtle things) again holds true.

to a Vijñānavādin, until the “difference” (*vyatireka*), i.e., the distinction, between an image belonging to the sense cognition of a healthy person and an image belonging to the cognition of the dream state, etc., is dis-“proven,” the non-erroneousness is not established in any case. Therefore, [that] qualification [of the *hetu*] is not established either.

Let the following be the case:⁶⁸ “[Nevertheless,] because of [its] conforming to causal efficiency⁶⁹ (*arthakriyāsamvāda*),⁷⁰ there is, indeed, a distinction[, i.e., a superiority,]⁷¹ of the sense cognition of a healthy person as compared with the cognition of the dream state, etc.” ♦ TSP *ad* TS 1977 ♦

In this respect, what actually is this conformity to causal efficiency? If (*yadi*) [(i) the intended meaning is] the attainment (*prāpti*)⁷² of the external object, [then] this [attainment] is not established, because there is no proof of the external object,⁷³ since precisely this [external object] is the subject under discussion as the *sādhya*. However, if (*atha*) [(ii) the conformity to causal efficiency is nothing but the cognition “that reflects” the desired causal efficiency (*abhimatārthakriyā*),⁷⁴ then this [conformity] “is possible” also “otherwise,” i.e., also without an external object as an object-support [of the cognition].⁷⁵ Thus, the logical reason is inconclusive indeed.

⁶⁸ The opponent introduced here is most likely Śubhagupta.

⁶⁹ Quoting Nagatomi (1967–1968: 55–57), Dunne (2004: 260) points out that the term *arthakriyā* ranges between a telic meaning (“purposeful action”) and a causal one (“causal efficiency”), even though “Dharmakīrti’s philosophy probably would not support an interpretation of *arthakriyā* solely in terms of either extreme.” For the sake of convenience, here I shall use the translation “causal efficiency.”

⁷⁰ With regard to the concept of *arthakriyā*, cf. (among others) Nagatomi 1967–1968; Steinkellner 1971; Mikogami 1979; Katsura 1984; Kanō 1991; Halbfäß 1997; Dreyfus 1997; Dunne 2004; Kyūma 2011; Inami 2012 and Inami 2013.

⁷¹ Here, “distinction” (*viśeṣa*) comments on (and qualifies) “superiority” (*atīśaya*).

⁷² This may refer to the specification of *pramāṇa* as having *prāpanaśakti*, i.e., the capacity to make the cognizer attain an intended goal without him necessarily attaining it (*na tu prāpanam eva*) (present in Devendrabuddhi’s PVP *ad* PV *Pramāṇasiddhi* 1 [P 3a_g–3b₂] and Śākyabuddhi’s PVT on PV *Pramāṇasiddhi* 1 [P 88b₇–89a₁]). For these quotations, see Funayama 1999: 83. This concept was also elaborated on by Dharmottara in the *Nyāyabīndutīkā*. For that concept in Dharmottara, cf. also Krasser 1991, vol. 1: 54, 106; vol. 2: 52–53, 94–95; Krasser 1995: 264–268. For Kamalaśīla’s definition of *avisamvāditva* as *abhimatārthakriyāsamarthārthaprapaṇaśakti*, see Introduction n. 277.

⁷³ Cf. *phyi rol gyi don grub par bya ba’i phyir* [...]. “Because the external object is to be proved [...].”

⁷⁴ The term *arthakriyāsamvāda* is introduced by Kamalaśīla with reference to the word *kāryasamvādana* used by Śāntarakṣita. Śāntarakṣita argues that conformity to the effect (*kāryasamvādana*) may also be merely the conformity of a cognition endowed with the appearance of the effect; consequently, there is no need to postulate an external object in order to explain that. Kamalaśīla, commenting on this, clearly admits *arthakriyāsamvāda* as a property of a cognition, saying that conformity to the causal efficiency is nothing but the fact of a cognition being endowed with the image of the desired causal efficiency.

⁷⁵ The two theses, regarding what is intended by *arthakriyā*, are introduced by *yadi* and *atha*, respectively. Perhaps they are intended differently. For example, the second thesis could be considered as an objection. On Kamalaśīla’s conception of “erroneousness” as equating to

[If someone asks,] how is it also possible otherwise? [As a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states, “since the cause has a restriction in [its] capacity.”⁷⁶ That is, “since the cause,” i.e., the immediately preceding and homologous cognition,⁷⁷ “has a restriction” “in” the variety of “[its] capacity [to produce a certain effect].” For only a [specific,] immediately preceding and homologous cognition is capable of producing a [specific] cognition; it is not that every [immediately preceding and homologous cognition] produces every [cognition] — [exactly] like the external object, in your opinion.⁷⁸ Precisely for this reason, the restriction is established (*siddha*).⁷⁹ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 1978 ♦

He highlights the unestablishedness of this logical reason — [that is,] “since there is no specific awareness” (TS 1967d) — according to Sumati

“non-reliability” (*avisamvāditva*), and the meaning of the latter as non-implying the existence of an external object, cf. also TSP *ad* TS 1311; see Introduction n. 277.

⁷⁶ Tib. here adds *gtan tshigs so*.

⁷⁷ Cf. Tib. *rgyu'i (ni D) mtshuñs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen te | mtshuñs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen gyi (gyis P) nus pa'i khyad par nes pa'i phyir [...]*.

⁷⁸ Here, Kamalaśīla is reversing the view of his opponent (most likely Śubhagupta) regarding the non-erroneousness of a cognition. Śubhagupta maintains that the non-erroneousness of a cognition consists in its correspondence, in terms of space and time, with the external object that is its cause. Cf. BASK 7–8 and Introduction §6.3. Therefore, according to him, the external object is proved by the fact that only some representations are produced at a certain time and in a certain place. Kamalaśīla rebuts that one does not need the external object in order to admit the restriction regarding the occurrence of a certain cognition. One particular preceding cognition can generate only one specific following cognition, exactly as an external object generates its own cognition. Therefore, there is no need to admit the existence of an external object in order to explain the necessary occurrence of certain representations at a certain place and time. According to Kamalaśīla, the *arthakriyāsaṃvāda* is the occurrence of a fixed causal relationship between certain cognitions and distinguishes the veridical perceptions from the erroneous ones. Moreover, if Śubhagupta admits the *samanantaraḥpratyaya* as a condition for a cognition, then there is no need to admit the existence of an external object since that *pratyaya*, being of the same nature as the cognition, is more immediate than the object. On the same note, cf. also *kasyacit kiñcid evāntarvāsanāyāḥ prabodhakam | tato dhiyām vīṇiyamo na bāhyārthavyapekṣayā ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 336). On this verse as well as the commentary by Manorathanandin, see Arnold 2008; Ratié 2014.

⁷⁹ Sarachchandra (1976), discussing precisely this topic, suggests that Śāntarakṣita is not a pure “idealist” — or, more precisely, that he is not a faithful follower of Vasubandhu. According to him, his view is not a denial of the existence of material objects, but rather “a recommendation for the use of *vijñāna* (awareness) terminology for referring to material objects.” He maintains that, for Śāntarakṣita, *arthakriyā* is an essential criterion for distinguishing a veridical perception from an erroneous one, and the *arthakriyāsaṃvāda* is the presentation to one’s own consciousness of further crucial representations, expected from the initial one. According to him, Śāntarakṣita’s main goal is to define an external object in terms of representations, not to deny its existence. Sarachchandra (1976: 87) does not distinguish between the views of the two philosophers, except when Kamalaśīla clarifies or adds to his master’s viewpoint.

Digambara's⁸⁰ view,⁸¹ with [the verse] beginning with “when the common nature.”⁸²

179. When the common nature (*rūpa*) is apprehended [and] the specific one is not apprehended, since atoms have a double nature, then why is [their apprehension] not tenable?

180. Therefore,⁸³ since every thing is endowed with [both] a universal (*sāmānya*) own-nature and a particular (*viśeṣa*) one, atoms are thought of (*smṛta*) as being endowed with two natures, because they have a common nature and a specific one.

181. Of these, the general nature is the object of sense cognition. Therefore, precisely with regard to [many] atoms, cognition is tenable as having a unitary image.

182. However, the specific nature is accepted as being an object of perception for the *yogin* (*yogipratyakṣa*).⁸⁴ Thus some unwise persons⁸⁵ think confusedly.⁸⁶

⁸⁰ “*Sumati Digambara*” is also mentioned in TSP *ad* TS 1264 (ed. p. 463, 17). Only “*Sumati*,” instead, is mentioned several times throughout the TSP, in the Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā and the Syādvādaparīkṣā. According to Balcerowicz (personal communication 2014, 2017), “*Sumati*” refers to a particular Jaina logician, albeit the appellation is not unique to any specific Jaina philosopher. In this way, Kamalaśīla may theoretically refer to any of a (rather) few Jaina logicians who formulated those theories. Bhattacharya determines his dates to be approximately 670–720 A. D. (Bhattacharya 1926: XCII). Shastri (1980: 88) notes that, in the AP and ĀPV, Diñnāga could refer to Sumati's views (even though the philosopher does not mention him). Cf. *kha cig 'dus pa'i nam pa dag | sgrub pa yin par 'dod par byed |* (ĀP 3ab) *don thams cad ni nam pa du ma can yin pas de la nam pa 'ga' 'zig gis mñon sum ñid du 'dod do | rdul phra rab mams la yañ 'dus par snañ ba'i śeś pa bskyad pa'i rgyu'i dños po yod do ||* (ĀPV *ad* ĀP 3ab, ed. p. 159, 1–3).

⁸¹ The Sanskrit text reads *aprativedanāt*, while the logical reason (which is referred to throughout the Bahirarthaparīkṣā) is *pratyayāprativedanāt* (TS 1967d). Its Tibetan translation is found in other parts of the chapter (TSP *ad* TS 1967, TSP *ad* TS 1971, TSP *ad* TS 1972) as *śeś pa rig pa med (pa'i) phyir* or *śeś pa so sor rig pa med pa'i phyir*. Accordingly, either Tib. supplies *śeś pa* as a translation for *pratyaya*, which is not found in the extant Sanskrit sources, or the Sanskrit text is corrupted at that point. The Sanskrit word “*matena*” seems to be missing; D and P read an instrumental (*nam mkha'i gos can legs pa'i blo gros kyis*), instead of a genitive, for *sumater digambarasya*. One would expect something like *lugs kyis*, which appears to be a common translation in the TSP (see Negi 2004: 6654 s.v.). D reads *rigs pa* instead of *rig pa*.

⁸² Tib. refers to *rdul phran gñis kyī* as a *pratika*.

⁸³ Cf. Tib. *gañ tshe/*yadā*.

⁸⁴ Śubhagupta too admits that atoms are perceived by beings endowed with special faculties (*blo ldan/*dhīmat*), and must therefore be admitted as real. Cf. BASK 59, 60, 64. On this, see Introduction n. 161. On *yogipratyakṣa* in a Buddhist context, see Eltschinger 2014: 320–324; cf. also the bibliography therein (2014: 320 n. 263).

⁸⁵ The Sanskrit word used here is “*durmatayaḥ*,” which is likely a pun with reference to the name of the philosopher, i.e., Sumati.

⁸⁶ Regarding this, cf. also *saty apītyādinā sumater matam āśaṅkate* (TSP *ad* TS 1723–1724) *saty apy ekasvabhāvatve dharmabhedo 'tra siddhyati | bhedasamsthāvirōdhaś ca yathā kāraṇaśaktiṣu ||* (TS 1723) *na dṛṣṭe 'nupapannaṃ ca tatsāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ | aikāntye 'pikṣyate bhedalokayātrānuwarttanam ||* (TS 1724). Furthermore: *nanv ityādinā sumateś codyam āśaṅkate* (TSP *ad* TS 1754–1756) *nanu yenātmanā vastu*

For [Sumati Digambara] states the following, “‘Since’ ‘every’ thing ‘is endowed with [both] a universal own-nature and a particular one,’ atoms ‘are endowed with two natures,’ a ‘common’ one and a ‘specific’ one. ‘Of these,’ ‘the general’ ‘nature’ is apprehended by the senses [while] the ‘specific nature’ is not [apprehended by them]. And therefore, ‘with regard to [many] atoms,’ a cognition ‘having a unitary image’ is not contradicted. Hence, atoms are established through direct perception.” “Confusedly” means “with no ground,” since even a unitary nature [of atoms] is not ascertained.⁸⁷ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 1980–1982 ♦

[Sumati Digambara could object,] “Surely, moreover, it was stated that the ascertained nature is [indeed one] thing having two natures.” “What was stated is true, but [it] was stated with no basis in logic (*ayuktam*).” In order to demonstrate [this,] [Śāntarakṣita] states [the following.]

1983. How can it possibly be logical for one thing indeed to have two natures? Then there would be two things since one does not [have] the other’s nature.

1984. Or, if one does have the other’s nature, [then] the fact of that [(i.e., one thing)] having two natures is contradicted, and the particular [nature] would be perceived by the senses, like the eyes, etc.⁸⁸

To explain, since, due to [having] two natures, [one] “thing” possesses one and the other,⁸⁹ “there would be” in fact “two” “things.” [This is] because, [in the case] of one single [thing] indeed endowed with two natures, there is not the condition of one having a nature [that is the same as that] of the other. And, therefore, it is illogical that one [thing] be endowed with two natures.

samānāparavastunaḥ | vyāvṛttaṁ tat sajjātiyais tenaiva sadṛśaṁ yadi || (TS 1754) *viññāyeta vijātiyair api tulyatayā tadā | tasyātmāno ‘viśiṣṭatvān na ca taj jñāyate tathā ||* (TS 1755) *sajjātiyāsamāno ‘pi tasmād yena bhavaty ayam | ātmanā tat samānaś ca tayoṃ bhedaḥ svabhāvayoh ||* (TS 1756).

⁸⁷ Sumati Digambara aims to prove that the logical reason “since there is no specific awareness” is, regarding atoms, not a good proof of their being unreal. According to him, one thing has two natures; the specific one, being atomic, and the common one, being that of an aggregate of atoms. The atomic nature is not perceptible, in spite of its being real. It is the object of *yogipratyakṣa*, that is, the object of an extra-ordinary perception. The nature as an aggregate is perceived by ordinary men. Therefore, their general nature, i.e., their form as an aggregate, is the reality according to which atoms are perceived, their perceivable nature; hence, it is tenable that they appear as a unitary image. On this account, the logical reason, i.e., the fact of not perceiving them separately, does not prove their non-existence.

⁸⁸ On a similar note, cf. *paraśparasvabhāvatve syāt sāmānyaviśeṣayoh | sākāryaṁ tattvato nedaṃ dvairūpyam upapadyate ||* (TS 1721) *paraśparāsvabhāvatve ‘py anayor anuṣajjate | nānātvam evaṃ bhāve ‘pi dvairūpyam nopapadyate ||* (TS 1722).

⁸⁹ Cf. Tib. *dnos po’i no bo* (bos D) *gñis las gzan ma yin pa’i phyir* [...]. “Since it is not different from two natures of [one] thing [...]”

Or else,⁹⁰ since the two natures are not distinct from the one single thing, each of these two natures indeed possesses the other's nature, just like the individual nature of [this] single thing. Therefore, how could one [thing] be endowed with two natures? Moreover, the undesirable consequence of perceiving the particular nature [would follow] because of [its] not being distinct from the general nature. And, consequently, this separate condition [of the two natures] — [that] “‘the general’ ‘nature’ is ‘the object of sense cognition,’ [but,] however, the specific’ one ‘is accepted as being an object of perception for the yogin’” — does not follow.⁹¹ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 1983–1984 ♦

Moreover, [with the verse] beginning with “furthermore, how can [one thing],” [Śāntarakṣita] demonstrates that not only does the [thesis] “one [thing] has two natures” contain [two terms] contradicting each other, but that this — i.e., [something] consisting of two natures that contradict each other being unitary — is even more contradictory.

1985ab Furthermore, how can [one thing] that is endowed with mutually contradictory [natures] be [only] one?⁹²

To explain, [each of] the two natures — common and specific — has [its] property established by mutual exclusion (*parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇa*).⁹³ Then, “how” “can” [a thing] consisting of these [two natures] be “one”?

[Śāntarakṣita] advances [a possible objection, following] Kumāriḥ's view with [the verse] beginning with “if [it is argued that,] because of cognition.”

1985cd. If [it is argued that,] because of cognition, it is not even impossible for contradictory [aspects to exist] within one single [thing]. (ŚV ŚūV 219ab)

⁹⁰ “Or else” (*vā*) comments on the word “or” (*tu*) in TS1984a.

⁹¹ Cf. *tatra prathame pakṣe sāmānyaviśeṣayoh parasparasvabhāvatve sāṅkaryam syāt | tataś cedam sāmānyam ayaṁ viśeṣa iti vibhāgaḥ bhāvāt paramārthata ekasya vastuno dvairūpyam nopapadyate* | (TSP *ad* TS 1721–1722, ed. p. 596, 15–17).

⁹² Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla argue that the idea of two natures in one thing is illogical, since they would either be different from each other and there would, accordingly, be two things, or they would have the same nature, and hence there would be just one nature, not two. This would also result in the undesirable consequence of the particular nature being perceived. Moreover, that thesis is even more contradictory. Not only does the notion “two natures in one thing” contain contradictory elements, but these two natures, common and specific, also precisely exclude each other. Accordingly, how can something having those natures be admitted as having one nature, i.e., being one?

⁹³ Dharmakīrti defines two kinds of *virodha*: “impossibility of coexistence” (*sahānavasthāna*) and “having the property established by mutual exclusion” (*parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā*). The former concerns two things that cannot coexist, like a sensation of cold and a sensation of heat; i.e., they are contrary to each other. The latter relates to a concept and its negation, e.g., *nīyatva* and *anīyatva*. Cf. *dvividho hi padārthānām virodhaḥ* (Nyāyabindu 3.72) *avikalakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvad virodhagatīḥ* (Nyāyabindu 3.73) *śītoṣṇasparśavat* (Nyāyabindu 3.74) *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatayā vā bhāvābhāvat* (Nyāyabindu 3.75). Cf. Kyuma 1999. *Parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇa* is found many times in the TSP.

1986ab. “A single [thing] can be endowed with [only] one aspect (*ākāra*).” This is not a saying of the Lord. (ŚV ŚūV 219cd)

1986cd. What is perceived in a particular manner must surely be admitted accordingly.⁹⁴ (ŚV ŚūV 220ab)

For [Kumārila] states, “It is ‘not’ true that it is ‘impossible’ for mutually ‘contradictory’ aspects to be ‘within one single’ thing. Why? Because of cognition. To explain, ‘a single thing must be endowed with only one aspect.’ This is not an edict of kings. However, ‘what’ ‘is perceived’ ‘in a particular manner,’ ‘that’ must be admitted ‘accordingly,’ since the determination of a thing is dependent on [its] cognition; and the cognition, [when] arising, is perceived as having one or many images based on the difference between, for example, existence (*sattā*) and forms[, respectively]. Therefore, [the thing] is determined accordingly.” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1985–1986 ◇ [Śāntarakṣita] rebuts with [the verse] beginning with “this cannot be.”

1987. This cannot be, due to the [existence of] cognition[s] also of [something] that is non-existent, like the form of a yellow conch,⁹⁵ etc. However, difference has no other characteristic aside from association with a contradictory property.

If that were the case, no cognition could be erroneous and there would be the undesirable consequence of stopping to treat [something] as being different (*bhedavyavahāra*). If a [cognition] can be erroneous because it is contradicted [by another cognition], then how can many cognitions that are contradicted [by each other], regarding [only] one thing, be non-erroneous? ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1987 ◇

Thus, indeed, there is no establishing [the existence of] atoms, neither through direct perception nor through inference. As for denying the [reality

⁹⁴ In this regard, cf. also *svapratyayānukāro hi bahvākāreṣu vastuṣu | nirdhāraṇe bhaved dhetur nāpūrvākārakalpane ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 216) *tathā dīrghaghaṭatvādaḥ bhinnāpekṣānibandhanā | ākārabhedasampattir aviruddhā bhaviṣyati ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 217) *nānekākārasaṃviter nirākāratvakalpanā | yuktā, pratītibhedāt tu bahvākāratvasambhavaḥ ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 218). Kumārila says that an object can be determined according to various properties due to the difference of its cognitions. The same object is perceived in a different manner according to the conditions of its apprehension; at a particular moment, it is perceived according to a certain form or property, leaving aside all other possible aspects. Furthermore, some contradictory qualities, like being tall or short, can belong to the same object, but are not found in it at the same time. For example, a man is only known as taller than another man or shorter than a tree through a comparison between them. Therefore, the existence of multiple aspects in an object is tenable, since various ways of perceiving it account for those different properties and, whenever one of those is perceived, the others are not. One thing is perceived only in a particular manner and it must be acknowledged accordingly.

⁹⁵ The yellow conch is a metaphor of an erroneous sense cognition. It refers to people affected with jaundice, who were thought of as perceiving a white conch shell as yellow because of the presence of bile in the sclera. Xanthopsia is, nonetheless, a very rare side effect of jaundice.

of] external object[s], there is no contradiction of the thesis (*pratijñā*) through direct perception, nor is the logical reason unestablished.

2.3 Proof Denying the Existence of Atoms⁹⁶

Now, highlighting the dubious unestablishedness of the logical reason “since it is devoid of a *svabhāva*, either one or many,”⁹⁷ the opponent states [the verse] beginning with “let there not be.”

1988. Let there not be establishing [the existence] of atoms through the *pramāṇas*, but let there [still] be (*astu*) doubt regarding [the existence of] atoms. However, how could judicious persons ascertain their non-existence?⁹⁸

[Śāntarakṣita] rebuts with [the verse] beginning with “[regardless of whether atoms are] conjoined.”

1989–1990. [Regardless of whether atoms are] conjoined, situated at a distance [or] placed in continuity [with other atoms], if the very nature-form (*rūpa*) — which faces [only] one atom — of an atom that is in the middle is conceived (*kalpyate*) as facing other atoms, [then,] this being the case, an accumulation [of atoms,] such as mountains, is not tenable.

1991. If the nature-form as facing other atoms is admitted as different, [then,] this being the case, how can an atom possibly be unitary?⁹⁹

The proof statement is [as follows]. What is devoid of a *svabhāva*, either one or many, is apt to be treated as non-existent, such as a lotus in the sky; and atoms, admitted [as real] by the opponents, are devoid of a *svabhāva*, either one or many. This is a logical reason as essential property.

Furthermore, one ought not to think that the logical reason is unestablished. To explain, [it is] precisely (*tāvat*) the singularity of atoms

⁹⁶ This part relates to the statement of the *bādhakapramāṇa*. With reference to this whole section, cf. Introduction §5.

⁹⁷ Cf. T_{2D}: *gcig dan du ma'i ran bžin yin pa'i phyir/*ekānekasvabhāvatvād*. “Since it has a *svabhāva*, both one and many.”

⁹⁸ After having denied the establishment of atoms through the *pramāṇas*, now Śāntarakṣita is expected to provide an argument affirmatively proving their unreality; specifically, an ontological argument that demonstrates the establishedness of the logical reason “since it is devoid of a *svabhāva*, either one or many.” In doing so, he must address the *prekṣāvān*, the wise person, as the arbiter of the tenability of the argument. That person needs this other kind of proof to have certainty regarding the non-existence of atoms. The following argument, which was already found in the *Vimśikā*, is based on the existence of a difference of parts based on orientation for atoms that are admitted as aggregating. With reference to this section, see Introduction §5.1, 5.2.

⁹⁹ Cf. Tib. *rdul phran gcig pu cha śas ni || med pa ru ni ji ltar 'gyur ||*. “How can one atom be devoid of parts?”

[that] is not established, since a difference of parts based on orientation exists for those [things] endowed with the nature (*rūpa*) of accumulations [of atoms], such as mountains, etc.¹⁰⁰ Applying to (*prasaṅgīyan*) atoms precisely that difference of parts based on orientation, because the [existence of their] accumulations, such as mountains, [would] otherwise be logically incongruous, [Śāntarakṣita] states precisely the denial of [their] singularity with [the verse] beginning with “[regardless of whether atoms are] conjoined, situated at a distance.”¹⁰¹

In this respect, some say, “Atoms conjoin with each other;” others [say], “Indeed, having interstices, they never touch [each other];” [and still] others [say], “Having no interstices, there is, however, the idea of touching [each other].”¹⁰²

In this regard — regarding all of these three theses — if an atom “that is in the middle” [and] surrounded by many [other atoms] had no difference of parts based on orientation, then there would “not” be an “accumulation” [of atoms,] [just] like [there is not] for a bundle of [single entities such as] mind and mental states, because [that atom] would not have parts.¹⁰³

To explain, if an atom that is in the middle [of many atoms] could face all the others precisely with that singular “nature-form” with which it “faces [only] one atom,” then there would “not” be an “accumulation” of the surrounding atoms because of the undesirable consequence of their occupying the same space.

The proof statement is [as follows]. That which is endowed with the essential property of facing an atom provided with a unitary nature-form

¹⁰⁰ Here Kamalaśīla appears to have in mind the Vaibhāṣikas, who admit that atoms are not endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation, while their aggregates are endowed as such. Regarding this, cf. Introduction §5.2, particularly *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* ad 1.43d in n. 197.

¹⁰¹ With reference to this, cf. Introduction §5.1. With reference to the criticism regarding external objects, one finds similar arguments in the *Bhāvanākramas*. Cf. *tatra ye tāvad rūpiṇo ghaṭādayas te ’nuśo vibhinnarūpatvān naikasvabhāvāḥ | aṇūnām pūrvāparasthitānām pūrvādidighāgatvena vibhidyamānānām asiddhatve nāpy aṇusañcayātmakatvenānekasvabhāvo yuktaḥ | na caikānekasvabhāvavyatirekenāparaḥ kaścīd bhāvasvabhāvo ’stīti niḥsvabhāvā evāmī paramārthataḥ svapnādyupalabdharūpādivad rūpiṇo bhāvāḥ |* (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 12, 17–21). “Among these, first of all, those that are material, such as pots, etc., are devoid of a unitary *svabhāva* since they are divided into atoms. Nor is it logical that [they have] a manifold *svabhāva* as consisting of an agglomeration of atoms, since atoms that are placed in spatial continuity [and] are divided as having parts based on orientation, such as east, are unestablished. And, aside from one *svabhāva* or many *svabhāva*, there is no other *svabhāva* of entities. Therefore, from an absolute point of view, these material things are indeed devoid of *svabhāva*, like the forms, etc., perceived in the dream state, etc.” In this respect, see also **Vajracchedikāṭīkā* (ed. p. 273, 5–11).

¹⁰² On this, see Introduction §5.3.

¹⁰³ Here, Kamalaśīla is highlighting the *prasaṅga* of the opponents’ thesis — that is, if one atom is admitted as being devoid of a difference of parts based on orientation (that is, as unitary), it cannot aggregate; accordingly, it cannot be situated in space. It would therefore be similar to mental entities. On this, cf. Introduction §5.4.

occupies only one space, as [it is with] the atom [that is] situated in front of that very [atom], or a building [that is placed] in front of and faces only one building.¹⁰⁴ And all atoms positioned as surrounding [another single atom] are endowed with the essential property of facing an atom [that is] provided with a unitary nature-form. This is a logical reason based on essential property.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, there cannot be an accumulation [of atoms].¹⁰⁶ And [what] if [the atom] faces [the other atoms] with a “different” “nature-form”? Then, the singularity [of an atom] does not follow, since[, in this case,] there is a difference of parts based on orientation, like, for example, a small water-jar.¹⁰⁷

Nevertheless, Bhadanta Śubhagupta states,¹⁰⁸ “Regarding [a particular,] the *svabhāva* [of which is] unitary, once it is excluded from [what is] non-existing, as well as [from what is] a non-substance, etc.,¹⁰⁹ a manifold universal is conceptually formed, but not according to true reality. Similarly, also in this case, with regard to atoms, due to their being in the middle of many [atoms], [the concept of] the manifoldness [of their nature-form] is conceptually constructed (cf. BASK 48),¹¹⁰ but not as a real fact.¹¹¹ To explain, [that which is] called the ‘category of orientation,’ [as] imagined by Kaṇāda and other [Vaiśeṣikas], does not exist. Since[, according to them,]

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Tib. *dper na de ñid śar gyi* (gyis P) *yul na gnas pa’i rdul phra rab gcig la bltas pa lta bu’am* | *śar gyi khañ bzañs* (bzññ P) *lta bu’o* | |. “Like [an atom] facing one atom situated in front of that very [atom]; or like a building [situated] in front.”

¹⁰⁵ The proof argument is the following. The pervasion of the logical reason (i.e., the property of having the essential property of facing an atom provided with only one nature-form) and the *sādhya* (i.e., the property of occupying one place) is based on their non-difference. With regard to this, cf. Introduction §5.4.

¹⁰⁶ On Vasubandhu’s analogous arguments, cf. Introduction §5.2.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Introduction §5.1. In short, the argument is intended to prove that atoms should be admitted as being endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation, exactly like pots, i.e., their aggregates. Here, Kamalaśīla’s aim is probably also that of refuting the Vaibhāṣika view, according to which atoms are not endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation, while their aggregates are. Atoms are assumed by the opponents to be the smallest unit of matter; as such, they are admitted as *dravya*, that is, indivisible. Nonetheless, in order to aggregate and create material objects, they must be endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation, i.e., they cannot be thought of as being *ekadravya*. On the other hand, if one were to accept an atom as an indivisible substance and, hence, endowed with only one form, there would be the undesirable consequence that the surrounding atoms would occupy only one place, that is, they would not be able to aggregate. Therefore, to be what they are expected to be, i.e., the smallest unit of matter, individual atoms must be endowed with parts and, consequently, cannot be a substance. However, since an atom cannot be *dravya*, it cannot be that smallest unit either; therefore, it is not real.

¹⁰⁸ On Śubhagupta’s response, cf. Introduction §5.4.

¹⁰⁹ On *apoha*, see n. 163 and bibliography in Introduction n. 209.

¹¹⁰ See BASK 48 in Introduction §5.4.

¹¹¹ Both in the BASK and in its paraphrase in the TSP, Śubhagupta makes reference (or is reported as making reference) to the *apoha* theory as a common standpoint, thereby confirming his being, at least partly, a follower of Dharmakīrti’s views. Cf. Introduction §5.4.

this [category of orientation] is endowed with a unitary nature, with regard to it, a manifold nature — like the concept of east, etc. — could not occur.¹¹² [However,] with the word ‘orientation,’ only atoms as placed in spatial continuity are expressed (cf. BASK 45cd);¹¹³ and, therefore, ‘since [an atom] is endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation’ can only mean that [an atom] is surrounded by many [other atoms], not that [it itself] has parts (cf. BASK 46).¹¹⁴

[Kamalaśīla argues that] precisely this is not correct. To explain, since, according to absolute truth, atoms are devoid of parts, like the mind, they do not have high and low parts. Therefore, [an atom] cannot be surrounded by many [other atoms, just] like, for example, mind and mental states [cannot either]. And hence — since, according to absolute truth, there are no surrounding atoms — how is it possible, according to this, [for one atom] to stay in the middle of many [other atoms], by virtue of which the manifoldness [of atoms] can be conceived of as spatial?¹¹⁵

If [it is argued that,] even though, according to absolute truth, [atoms] are not endowed with high and low parts, many [of them] can[, nevertheless,] surround [one single atom],¹¹⁶ then [the reply will be that the same must be true] also with regard to mind and mental states. And hence, also mind, etc., would be situated in space, exactly like an atom. If not, [then] it also would not be possible for [many] atoms [to surround one single atom]. And, therefore, there cannot be an accumulation [of them], [just] like [there cannot be an accumulation] of mind, etc. This is conclusive.¹¹⁷

Let the following be the case,¹¹⁸ “Just as there is temporal continuity between the present mental instant and the two [adjacent] mental instants, the past and the future ones — yet certainly (*atha ca*) the present mental instant has no parts, like for instance *kalā* and *muhūrta*¹¹⁹ — similarly, atoms will not have spatial parts, in spite of being surrounded by many [other atoms].”¹²⁰

¹¹² See analogous arguments in TS 628–629 in Introduction n. 206.

¹¹³ Cf. BASK 45cd in Introduction §5.4.

¹¹⁴ Cf. BASK 46 in Introduction §5.4. This *kārikā* is also quoted in the MAV and MAP. Cf. Introduction n. 199.

¹¹⁵ If the opponent admits that, ultimately, atoms have no parts, then being spatially located cannot be logically admitted from a conventional point of view either. Cf. Introduction §5.5.

¹¹⁶ Here, Tib. has *dbus ma la*. “[One single atom] that is in the middle.”

¹¹⁷ Here, Kamalaśīla proves his point through a *prasaṅga*. If atoms are admitted as aggregating even though they do not have parts, then the same will hold true for mind and mental states. If the opponent is not ready to accept that, then he will have no grounds to support his own thesis. Cf. Introduction §5.5.

¹¹⁸ Here, he introduces an objection by Śubhagupta.

¹¹⁹ Tib. lacks *kalā*. Cf. *yud tsam la sogs pa bžin du*.

¹²⁰ This passage is intended as an objection brought forward by Śubhagupta, and refers to BASK 50 and 51. There, the philosopher aims to refute the criticism according to which atoms must be endowed with parts in order to aggregate. He is, in essence, reversing the

[Kamalaśīla argues that]¹²¹ precisely this is not correct since, according to absolute truth, there is no continuity between the present mental instant and the preceding and following ones because the [latter] two do not exist exactly in this [present] moment. Furthermore, continuity with something that does not exist is not logically tenable as real; however, by means of this [reasoning]: “there cannot be a cause-effect relationship between two co-existing things,” the existence of the two instants — the preceding and following one — is conceptually formed (*parikalpasamutthāpita*), like the earlier and later absence.¹²² However, the spatial continuity of atoms cannot be conceptually constructed in this way[, i.e., through the above-mentioned argument,] because of the undesirable consequence of the absence of the accumulation. Furthermore, it is not indeed logically tenable that things are causeless since[, otherwise,] there would be the undesirable consequence of their always existing, etc.[, i.e., or non-existing].¹²³ [Reasoning like this,] also one who has realized the conventional nature (*saṃvṛtatva*) of things must necessarily admit that every thing has a cause. And, first of all, if [every thing] has a cause, [then] it is not tenable that cause and effect are simultaneous, because the cause, due to its non-existence, is incapable [of producing the effect] before the effect arises. Also after [the arising of the effect, the existence of the cause along with it is not tenable], because the cause is devoid of use once the effect has [already] arisen. Therefore, it must necessarily be admitted that every cause pre-exists [its effect].¹²⁴

argument — that is, if mind and mental states are admitted as continuous, albeit devoid of parts, then why should that not also be true for atoms? On this, cf. Introduction §5.5.

¹²¹ For a systematic analysis of this paragraph, see Introduction §5.6.

¹²² Cf. *prāg bhūtvā hy abhavan bhāvo 'nitya ity abhidhīyate* || (PV Pratyakṣa 110cd). “For a thing that, having existed before, does not exist [afterwards] is called ‘impermanent.’” *prāg bhūtvā hi bhāvaḥ paścād abhavan anitya ity abhidhīyate na tu bhāva ity eva | tathā dhvaṃsa evānityatā sā cānupa-labdhiṅgañjānumānagamyā* | (PVV ad PV Pratyakṣa 110cd, ed. p. 150, 9–10). “For a thing that, having existed before, does not exist afterwards is called ‘impermanent,’ but it is not indeed [called] ‘existence.’ Thus, impermanence is just perishing and that, being generated by [that] *liṅga* that is the non-cognition, is understood through inference.” Cf. also *prāk paścād apy abhāvas cet sa evānityatā na kim | śaṣṭhyādyayogād iti ced antayoḥ sa katham bhavet* || (PV Pratyakṣa 112).

¹²³ Cf. *tato bhāvanām ahetukatvān nityam sattvam asattvam vā syāt* | (HBT, ed. p. 164, 13–14); *nityam sattvam asattvam vā 'hetor anyānapekṣanāt | apekṣāto hi bhāvanām kādācitkatvasambhavaḥ* || (PV Svārthānumāna 35). On the illogicality of things being devoid of cause, cf. also *na tāvad ahetukaḥ kādācitkatvadarśanāt | kāraṇanirapekṣā hi viśeṣābhāvād utpādakālavat sadā sarvatraiva ca bhāvāḥ kim na bhavyeḥ | abhāvakālād aviśeṣād vā, utpādakāle 'pi naiva bhavyeḥ | evaṃ tāvan na nirhetuko yuktah* | (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 11, 7–9).

¹²⁴ The argument of the preexistence of causes regarding their effects is treated in the PVP, PVA and PVV as follows. Cf. *de ltar na 'di la don med pa'am yod pa rgyur 'gyur ro 'zes mam par rlog pa 'ñid 'byun bar 'gyur grañ | de la re 'zig med pa ni ma yin te | med pa snar nus med phyir dan | 'bras bu skyed par byed pa'i dus las snar med pas ji ltar 'bras bu bskyed par 'gyur | med par ni 'bras bu thams cad mñon par sgrub pa'i nus pa dan bral ba'i mtshan 'ñid can yin pa'i phyir ro | yod pa yan ma yin no | ci'i phyir 'ze na | phyis kyan 'ne bar mi sbyor phyir | 'bras bu skyed par byed pa'i dus na rgyu grub pa de'i tsho 'bras bu yan de dan mtshun par than cig grub pas 'ne bar mi sbyor ba'i phyir ro | 'bras bu las rgyu mams thams cad snar yod par gdon mi za bar 'dod par bya'o | de ltar na | de phyir ran blo bcas don min* | (PVP D 202a–202b₃).

According to what was said [by Dharmakīrti]:

Because of the incapacity of [a cause] that does not exist before [the arising of the effect], and because [a cause] is devoid of use after [the arising of the effect], every cause pre-exists [its effect]. Therefore, the object [of mental perception] does not [arise]

“Therefore, in this respect, regarding an object, there would occur the consideration of whether the cause is non-existent or existent. Between these, first of all, it is not non-existent, due to the lack of capacity before [the arising of the effect] of a [cause that is] non-existent; and how can [something] that does not exist before the time of generating an effect [in fact] generate [that] effect? For, being non-existent, [it] would have the characteristic of being devoid of the capacity to produce every effect. Also, it cannot be existent. Why so? Because of [its] inutility also after [the arising of the effect]. At the time of generating the effect, the cause is existent [and], at that time, also the effect [is existent]. Because of the uselessness of [a cause] since it exists at the same time as that [effect], all causes must necessarily be admitted as preexisting the effects. For this reason, ‘therefore, the object [of mental perception] does not [arise] along with its own cognition[*i.e.*, mental perception].’” Cf. *na hīndriyavijñānenāsamānakālo manovijñānārthaḥ | tasya manovijñānāt pūrvakālatāt | hetur viṣayo na ca hetoḥ phalena samānakālāt | phalena samānakālātāyāṃ hi prāg asatvāṃ asataś cāsāmarthyam prāk | paścāt kāryakāle sāmāthyam iti cet | karmakāle kāryasya vidyamānatvād vyartham sāmāthyam | evaṃ hi sa kāryasya kālo yadi tadā kāryasya sattvam | tasmāt prāg eva sattvaṃ sarvahetūnām | ato 'rtho hetur na phalabhūtasvagrāhakajñānasamānakālabhāvī |* (PVA ad PV Pratyakṣa 246, ed. [no. 247] p. 306, 15–19). “For the object of mental perception is not [existing] at a different time from sense perception because it [*i.e.*, the object of mental perception,] temporally precedes mental perception. The object is the cause [of its own cognition,] and there is no contemporaneity of the cause with [its] effect. For, there being the contemporaneity [of the cause] with [its] effect, [the cause] would not exist before [the arising of its effect] and there is the incapacity of what does not exist before [the arising of its effect]. And if [one argues that] there would be the capacity [of a contemporary cause] after, at the moment of the [arising of the] effect, [it will be answered that] at the moment of the object [of that action], the capacity is useless since [at that point] the effect [already] exists. For, this being the case, if that is the moment [of the arising] of the effect, then there is the existence of the effect. Therefore, all the causes indeed exist before [their effects]. [And] therefore, the object is the cause [and] is not existing at the same moment as [that] cognition apprehending it, which is the effect.” Cf. also the PVV: *kāryotpatteḥ prāg asatas tatrāsāmarthyāt | sadadhiṣṭhānaṃ hi sāmāthyam asataḥ katham syāt | kāryotpatteḥ paścāt sataḥ kāraṇavyāpārād vā paścāt kāryasamakālasya sato vā tatrānupayogato vyāpārābhāvāt | kāryāt prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnām iti sthītam | viṣayaś ca jñānānām nākāraṇam atiprasaṅgāt | ato viṣayaḥ kāraṇātmakaḥ svadhiyā svāmbanadhiyā saha na bhavati | pūrvabhāvitve ca viṣayasya tatkalendriyajñānasahakāritā yuktamatī |* (PVV ad PV Pratyakṣa 246, ed. p. 193, 9–14). “Because of the incapacity, regarding that [arising of the effect], of [a cause] that does not exist before the arising of [its] effect — how is the capacity, [which is] indeed based on existence, of something non-existent possible? [And] because of the uselessness, *i.e.*, the absence of function, regarding that [arising of the effect] of something that exists after the arising of the effect, either after [its] functioning as a cause or as existing at the same time as the effect, it is established that there is the pre-existence of all causes [before their] effects. Moreover, the object of cognitions is not [there] causelessly, because of an overextension [that is to say, every cognition would know everything]. Therefore, the object [of mental perception], which has the nature of a cause, does not exist along with its cognition[*i.e.*, that is, mental perception,] *i.e.*, with the cognition having it as an object-support. Furthermore, since the object exists before [the mental perception], it is logically admitted that it cooperates with the sense perception [that arises] at the same time.”

along with its own cognition[, i.e., mental perception].
(PV Pratyakṣa 246)¹²⁵

“Therefore, in this way, it has been established through reasoning (*nyāya*) that all things, albeit devoid of parts, have temporal continuity. However, how can their spatial [continuity] be possible if [they] have no parts?”¹²⁶ This is the objection [against Śubhagupta].

If [it is argued that] even though [things] are not endowed with parts, there can[, nevertheless,] be spatial continuity, [then, the reply will be that,] as previously stated,¹²⁷ [if that were the case, such a continuity would belong] also to mind and mental states, since there is no difference.¹²⁸ If [the opponent states that] the difference is due to the corporeity [of atoms], [the reply will be,] “no, exactly this is unestablished if [things] are not endowed with parts.” Merely with a synonym[, i.e., with the word “corporeity,”] precisely the fact of having parts can be expressed. There is no other difference. That is all.

Therefore, even though the temporal continuity of all things is tenable,¹²⁹ [regardless of] whatever different [and] additional spatial continuity some thing [may] have, that is not possible without having parts. This was logically stated.

The singularity of that which is endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation is not tenable.¹³⁰ (*Vimśikā* 14ab)

¹²⁵ The quotation is from PV Pratyakṣa 246. In that context (PV Pratyakṣa 239–248), Dharmakīrti deals with *mānasapratyakṣa* (or *manovijñāna*). *Mānasapratyakṣa* has *indriyavijñāna* as its *samanantarapratyaya*, and is brought into being by the cooperation of the latter and the objective *datum* (*artha*), which is not the same as the *indriyavijñāna*, but one existing at a second moment, and is its *ālambana*. PV Pratyakṣa 246 is the answer to an objection put forward in the preceding stanza (k. 245) and aims to prove that the object (*artha*) of mental perception, as a cause of the latter, precedes it and, accordingly, is contemporary with sense perception and cooperates with it in producing mental perception. Cf. also n. 124.

¹²⁶ Cf. Tib. *de'i phyir de ltar dños po thams cad rigs pas mam par g'zag pa'i cha med pa ñid yin na yañ gal te cha dan bcas pa ñid du ma gyur na yul dan dus kyis byas pa'i sñā ma dan phyi ma dag tu ji ltar 'gyur [...]*. “Therefore, in this way, regarding all things, even though the absence of parts is established through logic, if [they] are not endowed with parts, how can [both] spatial and temporal continuity be [tenable]?[...].”

¹²⁷ Kamalaśīla here is referring to a previous passage in his own commentary. Cf. p. ... and Introduction §5.5.

¹²⁸ Cf. Tib. *ci ste cha dan bcas pa ñid ma yin na yañ sems dan sems las byuñ ba mams kyañ dus kyis byas pa'i sñā ma dan phyi ma dag tu 'gyur te | khyad par med pa'i phyir ro źes bstan zin to |*. “If [it is argued that] even though [things] are not endowed with parts, the temporal continuity would be correct also with regard to mind and mental states, because there is no difference. Thus it is said.”

¹²⁹ Cf. Tib. *dños po thams cad kyi dus kyis byas pa'i sñā ma dan phyi ma (ma'i D) rigs pa ma yin na [...]*. “Even though the temporal continuity of all things is not tenable [...].”

¹³⁰ This part ends with a famous quotation by Vasubandhu, which appears in a section of the *Vimśikā* dealing with the confutation of the atomic theory, particularly as upheld by the

Away with any further discussion! ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991 ◇

In this respect, some people say,¹³¹ “Then, let the atoms be just the finest¹³² portions of space! Also with reference to those [finest portions of space], imagining [that they have] parts, once again, there will [likewise] be the atomicity of precisely [these further] portions of space. If at all (*yadi param*), there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*; certainly (*punaḥ*), however, the conceptual reality (*prajñaptisattva*) of atoms cannot be proven by virtue of the undesirable consequence of [their] having parts.¹³³ Even if the conceptual reality [of an atom is admitted,] [then,] also in this case, a foundation (*upādāna*) for the concept must indeed necessarily be admitted. Anything whatsoever that is the foundation of the concept, precisely this will be endowed with an atomic nature. [Moreover,] if [it is] the very non-existence of atoms [that] is being established, [then,] also in this case, the logical reason ‘since it is endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation’ is not established. For that which is absolutely non-existent, like the horns of a donkey,¹³⁴ for example, is not endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation, such as east. Nor can this be a *prasāṅgasādhana*, since[, with regard to atoms,] a difference of parts based on orientation is not admitted [by us].”¹³⁵

Vaibhāṣikas from Kaśmīr. Śubhagupta makes reference to this *kārikā* in BASK 45ab. Cf. Introduction §5.2, §5.4, §5.6.

¹³¹ Here, Kamalaśīla is probably talking about the Vaibhāṣikas. Specifically, this may be a reference to Saṅghabhadra, who defines an atom as a portion of matter so small that it cannot be divided any further, neither physically nor by reasoning. Cf. *Nyāyānusāra* as quoted in La Vallée Poussin 1923: 144–145 (n. 3) and Anacker 2005: 127. The concept of irreducibility as a condition for being ultimately real and, hence, *dravyasat*, is found in a famous passage from *Abhidharmakośa*: *yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat | ghaṭārthavat saṃvṛtisat paramārthasad anyathā* || (*Abhidharmakośa* 6.4, ed. p. 334).

¹³² I take *anīyāmsaḥ* in the sense of a superlative relative.

¹³³ Cf. Tib. *cha śas dan bcas pa ṅid du thal ba ni ma yin no* ||. “There is not the undesirable consequence of [their] having parts.”

¹³⁴ Cf. T_{2D}: *gtan tshigs med pa’i boṅ bu’i rva la sogs pa la* |.

¹³⁵ The opponent (likely a Vaibhāṣika) says that, if the purpose of the argument is to prove the non-existence of atoms, then the argument is weak, because the logical reason “since it is endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation” is unestablished. It appears to be referring to the unestablishedness in being pervaded (*vyāpyatvasiddha*), since the property of having parts is not known to be accompanied by the *sādhya*, that is, the property of being non-existent. In fact, he aims to prove the non-pervasion between the logical reason and the property to be proven by means of the example of a donkey’s horns, where the *sādhya*, i.e., the absolute non-existence, is found along with the opposite of the logical reason. For something absolutely non-existent is not endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation. However, the opponent also considers the logical reason as unestablished in the subject since, as already seen, the Vaibhāṣikas do not admit the difference of parts based on orientation as a property of atoms (and hence as a valid logical reason). Cf. Introduction §5.2. Furthermore, precisely for the latter reason, the opponent continues by saying that the argument cannot be a *prasāṅgasādhana* either. Since they do not admit that difference regarding atoms, for them the undesirable consequence of their non-existence cannot follow. In reality, Jp and Pp here have the variant *digbhāgābhedaṭ*. However, if one accepted that reading in a passage such as this, i.e.,

Regarding this [objection], [Śāntarakṣita] counters [with the verse] beginning with “additionally, precisely regarding an atom.”

1992. Additionally, precisely regarding an atom, which the opponents admit as not having a difference of parts,¹³⁶ the following consideration is made: “the *regressus ad infinitum* is not impossible.” Therefore,¹³⁷

1993. whenever they admit the atomic nature of the parts, then[, consequently,] for them, the deviation from [their own] thesis necessarily follows.¹³⁸

1994. Moreover, here there is not the [defect of the logical reason] being unestablished for the subject of the inference as a *prasaṅgasādhana*,¹³⁹ for the singularity [of atoms] is, indeed, denied by means of [their] joining, etc., [that is] admitted by the opponent.¹⁴⁰

1995. Therefore, thus, in each of the [above-mentioned] theses, it [i.e., an atom]) is not at all tenable as being endowed with a singular nature. Since [an atom] does not come forth as unitary, [it] cannot be endowed with a manifold *svabhāva* either.

1996. Hence, for wise men, an atom is apt to be ascertained as non-existent, since it is devoid of a *svabhāva*, either one or many, just like a lotus in the sky.

For the advocate of that [(i.e., the existence of atoms)] must necessarily admit some thing that has a definite nature as an atom. For otherwise[, if he does not admit it], [there being] a *regressus ad infinitum*, since [an atom] is not endowed with an ascertained nature, only the fact of [an atom] not being observable itself would be proven; and, as a result, the admitted proof would be in the opponent’s favor. Therefore, when “the consideration” is made

meant to prove the reality of atoms, the argument would follow as being in favor of the upholder of their non-existence. For the logical reason “since they are not endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation,” which the opponent (Vaibhāṣika) admits as a property of atoms, is also present in the example of the donkey’s horns, i.e., along with the property of being absolutely non-existent and, therefore, will prove the absolute non-existence of atoms.

¹³⁶ Here, T_{1D} has one extra *pāda*: *rdul phran du ni ji ltar ’gyur* ||.

¹³⁷ Cf. Tib. *de phyir thug med srid pa min* ||. “Therefore, the *regressus ad infinitum* is impossible.”

¹³⁸ If they admit the atomicity of the parts they fall into a *regressus ad infinitum*. Accordingly, the contradiction of their thesis follows, since they will never be able to find an ascertained atomic nature that is indivisible.

¹³⁹ Tib. has *gtan tshigs* instead of *prasaṅgasādhana*.

¹⁴⁰ Śāntarakṣita argues that the property-bearer under discussion is that entity that is devoid of parts and is admitted by the adversary as an “atom.” Therefore, if this adversary admits an atom as aggregating in order to constitute the material space, he must also acknowledge that it is endowed with parts. Hence, the confutation of his own thesis necessarily follows.

“precisely regarding that” ascertained nature that you have established as an atom, since [for you there is] the notion of not having resorted to a *regressus ad infinitum*, then how is a *regressus ad infinitum* possible? If at all, by virtue of the *regressus ad infinitum*, there is the contradiction of what you yourself admit. However, something [that is] not admitted by [your] opponent is not demonstrated.¹⁴¹ For, to this extent, this is indeed a *prasaṅgasādhana* regarding the proof (*siddhi*) admitted by the opponent. Moreover, there is not “the being unestablished” of the logical reason. To explain, the opponents admit that atoms “are conjoined [with each other], [or] are continuous [or], similarly, are surrounded by many [other atoms] endowed with interstices.” (cf. also TS 1989ab); otherwise, how could they aggregate? And, therefore, even if a difference of parts based on orientation is not admitted [explicitly] in words, this follows (*āpatati*) nonetheless by force of admitting a property such as, for example, the fact of conjoining [with each other]. For, if [atoms] are not endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation, for example, high and low parts, [then] the three theses — that is, [that] “[atoms are] conjoined, etc.” (cf. TS 1989ab) — are not tenable, just as, for example, mind [and mental states, not being endowed with high or low parts, cannot logically conjoin with each other, etc.], as has already been stated.

In addition, regarding what was previously stated — “one must necessarily admit a foundation for the concept of an atom, whatever the foundation may be, that will be nothing but the atom [itself]” (cf. non-verbatim TSP *ad* TS 1992–1996) — this is none other than the following. The foundation of the error of [the concept of] atom is a cognition having the appearance of one grain of dust [floating] through a window, etc., since there is the maturation of imprints deposited by listening to and reflecting upon false scriptures; for it is not logically tenable that precisely that [thing] that indeed [occurs in our minds] due to [its] concept is the cause [of it,] because of the undesirable consequence of the absence of a conceptual reality.¹⁴² Otherwise, the self itself would be the cause of its

¹⁴¹ Kamalaśīla explains that the opponent, the upholder of an atomistic view, must determine some ascertained nature as an “atom.” This can be established only if he avoids a *regressus ad infinitum*. In fact, this is precisely what the opponent claims — that he can ascertain such a nature without resorting to that *regressus*. Accordingly, if he then tries to avoid the logical impasse through resorting to a *regressus*, he ends up proving the proponent’s thesis, namely, that atoms are never found as being real. For, by means of that *regressus*, he will never be able to ascertain an atomic nature. Certainly, he will not be able to demonstrate something refuted by the proponent.

¹⁴² If every thing of which we have a concept were the cause of that concept, then it would be real inasmuch as it is a cause. Accordingly, the idea of a mere conceptual existence (as opposed to an absolutely real existence) would not be there.

concept, not the *skandhas*. And, therefore, as with an atom, there could not be denial of the self as well.¹⁴³

In this manner, first of all, the singularity of atoms is unestablished. If this is unestablished, [their] manifoldness is also unestablished, since the latter consists of a conglomeration (*sandoha*) of those [unitary things].¹⁴⁴ Therefore, the logical reason [that is] a proof regarding treating atoms as absent is not unestablished. ♦ TSP *ad* TS 1992–1996 ♦

Having, in this way, proven thus far that an external object is devoid of a manifold *svabhāva*, now, in order to prove that it is [also] devoid of a unitary *svabhāva*, [Śāntarākṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “moreover, because an atom is illogical.”

1997. Moreover, because an atom is illogical, the part-possessor (*avayavin*) is not existent, since the opponents admit it as being composed of atoms.

Also for those who admit [the existence of] one coarse [thing that is] not composed of atoms, also the latter, like an atom, cannot be logically admitted as one, since it is endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation, and because of the undesirable consequence, for instance, of everything shaking when there is, for example, the shaking of [only a] hand, etc.¹⁴⁵ Since this is evident, as it has been investigated many times, there will not be a separate confutation of the latter [theory regarding a coarse thing].

Therefore, thus, in the proof statement, “that which is not endowed with a *svabhāva*, either one or many,” etc. (TSP *ad* TS 1964)¹⁴⁶ — [used as a] proof

¹⁴³ Cf. Tib. *de lta yin dan rdul phra rab bžin du bdag gdags par yañ mi 'gyur ro* ||. “And, therefore, like the atom, there could not be the concept of the self either.”

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *ekasya kasyacit svabhāvasyāśiddhāv anekarūpatāpy ayuktimatī* | *ekasamūharūpatwād anekasya* | (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 13, 9–10); *gañ gcig pa'i ran bžin du mi 'thad pa de du ma'i bdag ñid du khas blañs pa ni rigs pa ma yin pa ñid de* | *'di ltar du ma ni gcig bsags pa'i mtshan ñid do* | (MAV, ed. p. 172, 12–14).

¹⁴⁵ This argument is put forward by Dharmakīrti in his PV: *pānyādikampe sarvasya kampaṇāpṛāpter virodhinaḥ* | *ekasmin karmaṇo 'yogāt syāt prthak siddhir anyathā* || (PV *Pramāṇasiddhi* 84). “Because of it being illogical that an action [occurs] within a unitary thing, since the movement of the whole [body] [would follow] when a hand, etc., moves, which [fact] is contradicted [by our experience], there should be a separate establishment in another way.” This intends to refute the existence of a part-possessor, unitary real entity being separate from and spreading over its parts, which theory is mainly held by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika school. The argument being that, if the whole is regarded as one substance, it cannot be the *locus* of contradictory properties like movement and non-movement. Hence, if one part moves, the entire thing has to move, which is against one’s own experience; otherwise, the moving part would be considered as something different, and the part-possessor, being endowed with parts, would not be unitary. This argument is mentioned here with regard to a coarse thing that is not composed of atoms. Cf. Introduction §3.4.

¹⁴⁶ See “That which is not endowed with a *svabhāva*, either one or many, cannot be apprehended — by a judicious man — as being real, such as a lotus in the sky. And earth and the other [elements], [which are] admitted by the opponents [as real], are devoid of *svabhāva*,

for treating an external object as being absent — the logical reason is not unestablished. Hence, the treatment of an external [object] — i.e., an apprehended [object], such as the earth, etc. — as non-existent is established. If the [condition of being apprehended] is unestablished, then, regarding a cognition, there is not the condition of apprehender either — [the latter being] conceptually constructed as dependent on the [former]. Thus, *vijñaptimātratā* is established.¹⁴⁷ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1997 ◇

3.

Argument B:

*Grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt*¹⁴⁸

Therefore, having demonstrated *vijñaptimātratā* in this way — i.e., by virtue of the illogicality of the [external]¹⁴⁹ object — now, in order to prove “because, [in relation to cognitions,] the characteristics of [being an] apprehended and apprehender are absent” (TSP *ad* TS 1964), [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “being devoid of [the object’s] appearance.”

1998. Being devoid of [the object’s] appearance, [or] endowed with [the object’s] appearance, [or] also indeed endowed with an appearance different [from that of the object], a cognition does not perceive an external object in any way.

The apprehension of an external [object] is logically untenable, [regardless of whether it is assumed to occur] by [a cognition] devoid of [the object’s] image, by [a cognition] endowed with [the object’s] image, or by [a cognition] endowed with an image different from the image of the object; and there is no other way [besides these].¹⁵⁰ Therefore, cognition is always

either one or many. Therefore, [in this proof,] the non-cognition of the pervading [property] (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) [is the logical reason].” (TSP *ad* TS 1964).

¹⁴⁷ This is the end of Argument A. Cf. Introduction §5.7.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Argument B, Introduction §3.1, 6.1.

¹⁴⁹ Tib. has *phyi rol*/**bāhya*.

¹⁵⁰ In commenting on Śāntarakṣita’s term *nirbhāsa*, Kamalaśīla frames the discussion in terms of *ākāras* of cognitions. Cf. Introduction §6.1. On this, see also **Vajracchedikāṭikā*, where the theses are listed in a different order. Cf. *’di ltar gzan dag gis don gyi dños po nam par śes pa dan tha dad pa don dam par dod pa de ni re žig mñon sum du mi ’grub ste | don gzan la śes pas ’dzin pa mi rigs pa’i phyir ro | don la śes pas ’dzin pa nam pa dan bcas pa’am | nam pa med pa’am | gzan gyi nam pa’am phyogs gsum du ’gyur grañ na |* (**Vajracchedikāṭikā*, ed. p. 268, 20–269, 4). “To explain, those real things, [which] are ultimately admitted by the opponents as separate from [their own] cognitions, are indeed not established as directly perceived. For it is not logical that a cognition apprehends a different object. The apprehension of an [external] object by a cognition can be [regarded as occurring] according to the three [different] theses: endowed with [its] image; devoid of its image; or endowed with a different image.”

nothing but self-awareness (*ātmasaṃvedana*), even though there is a different external mental continuum. Thus, *vijñaptimātratā* is established.¹⁵¹

Some admit that cognition, though having one image, is aware of an object having another[, different] image, as [has been] said, “Cognition, though having a yellow image,¹⁵² apprehends a white conch shell.” As Kumārila states:

In every case, an external object-support, different in [terms of] space and time, in [this] very life or in a different one and, on those occasions, also at a different time [is the object of an erroneous cognition, such as a dream, etc.]¹⁵³ (ŚV Nirālambanavāda 108)

Therefore, a third different thesis is advanced.¹⁵⁴ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1998 ◇

3.1 Proof of the Self-Awareness of Cognitions

[One may object by saying that,] however, even if there is self-awareness [regarding cognitions], why are the alternatives — such as “being devoid of [the object’s] appearance” (TS 1998) — not appropriate? Therefore, [as a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “cognition arises.”

1999. Cognition arises as distinct from [those things that are] endowed with an insentient (*jada*) nature. [Its] self-awareness (*ātmasaṃvitti*) is precisely as follows: the fact of its[, i.e., of

¹⁵¹ Cf. *nānyo ’nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo ’paraḥ | grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate ||* (PVin 1.38); *nānyo ’nubhāvyas tenāsti tasya nānubhavo ’paraḥ | tasyāpi tulyacodyatvāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 327).

¹⁵² Cf. n. 95 on jaundice.

¹⁵³ Tib. here is somewhat different: *skye ba gcig po de la ni || yul du gzan gyi bdag ñid kyi (kyis P) || phyi rol thams cad du dmigs te || de’i tshes dus gzan du yan yin ||*. “In this single life, [some] external [thing], different in [terms of] space, is perceived in every case, then it is also in another time.” Cf. *taddeśo vānyadeśo vā svapnajñānasya gocaraḥ | alātacakre ’lātaṃ syāc chīghrabhramaṇasaṃskṛtaṃ ||* (ŚV Nirālambanavāda 109). *gandharvanagare ’bhrāṇi pūrvadṛṣṭaṃ grhādi ca | pūrvānubhūtatoyam ca raśmitaptoṣaram tathā ||* (ŚV Nirālambanavāda 110). According to Kumārila, a cognition is always based on an external object, hence it is based on something real that is situated outside of it. Erroneous cognitions are founded on real external objects that have been experienced in the past. For example, an erroneous cognition that perceives water where there is none is based on a real object (i.e., the water) that existed at another time and was correctly perceived through its cognition. The erroneous perception is also grounded on a real external saline soil heated by the sun. Similar is the case of the mirage of the city of the Gandharvas, which is based on previously experienced houses and real clouds. Accordingly, as maintained by Kumārila, in the dream state and erroneous states of mind, one always has cognitions of external objects that have been previously perceived.

¹⁵⁴ Śāntarakṣita puts forward three theses, and Kamalaśīla feels the need immediately to explain why a third option is introduced.

cognition,] being endowed with a non-insentient (*ajāda*) nature.¹⁵⁵

For self-awareness [of cognition] is not intended with the conditions of apprehended and apprehender, but rather as having, by its own nature, the nature of light, like the light abiding in the firmament.¹⁵⁶ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 1999 ◇

If [the opponent asks,] “why is [self-awareness] not admitted with the conditions of apprehended and apprehender?” then, [as a reply, Śāntarākṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “however, its self-awareness.”

2000. However, its self-awareness is not [admitted] on the basis of the relationship of *kriyā* and *kāraka*,¹⁵⁷ since it is not logical for a single thing whose nature is devoid of parts to have three natures.¹⁵⁸

2001. Therefore, since this [(i.e., cognition)] is endowed with the nature of knowledge, [then its] self-awareness (*svavedana*) is logical indeed. However, how can this [(i.e., cognition)] be aware of (*saṃvedana*) [something] different [that is] endowed with the nature of an [external] object?¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ Cf. MAK 16; see Sanskrit Text. This definition of *svasaṃvedana* refers to the fact that cognitions are, by their very nature, different from non-sentient objects, insofar as they are sentient. As Williams (1998: 21) puts it, “Consciousness is to be understood structurally as ‘not-insentience.’” On this, see Williams 1998: 21 ff. By quoting this verse, Arnold (2005b: 95) suggests that Śāntarākṣita here defines *svasaṃvitti* as *whatever it is* in virtue of which a cognition can be constitutively distinguished from non-sentient objects. On this, see Arnold 2005b: 94–97.

¹⁵⁶ The nature of cognition is like light spreading in the sky. It spreads throughout the firmament, even if there are no objects in it to be illuminated. In the same way, cognition is pure light by itself, and does not need any apprehended (or apprehender) to manifest itself.

¹⁵⁷ On a similar note, see Kumāṛila’s objection; cf. *naitad asti tvayaikaṃ hi grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ iṣyate | na caikasyaivam āmatve dṛṣṭāntaḥ kaścid asti te |* (ŚV₁ SūV 64). “This is not [true.] For, you admit the apprehender and the apprehended as [being] one, but, regarding one thing having a nature in this way, you [can]not [put forward] any example.” Furthermore, Pārthasārathi Miśra says: *yad etad bhavatoktam — ekam eva jñānaṃ grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ ceti tat kiṃ kriyākarmatvābhiprāyaḥ? uta karaṇakarmatvābhiprāyaḥ? āhosvit kartṛkarmatvābhiprāyaḥ? sarvathā na sambhavati |* (*Nyāyaratnākara*, ed. p. 205, 6–8). “[Regarding] what is stated by you: cognition is only one, both apprehended and apprehender, is that intended as the action being the object? Or, is it intended as the instrument being the object? Or, rather, is it intended as the agent being the object? In any case it is impossible.” The objection states that a cognition cannot be aware of itself. Specifically, it is based on a linguistic-grammatical claim — that the agent and the object cannot be one and the same. There is no instance that can prove their identity. To this kind of objection, Śāntarākṣita answers that self-awareness does not signify an action by which a cognition, as a *grāhaka*, apprehends itself as its *grāhya*; instead, the self-awareness of cognitions means that a cognition itself is endowed with the nature of awareness and (as we shall see in TS 2011) does not require anything else to be known. With reference to cognition perceiving its own image and that of its object, see Diñnāga (PS 1.11–12 and PSV, ed. p. 4, 20–5, 14) in n. 220 and 225.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. MAK 17; see Sanskrit Text.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. MAK 18; see Sanskrit Text.

“Three natures,” i.e., according to the distinction of cognized, cognizer and cognition. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2000–2001 ◇

However, this might be the [objection], “Also regarding the external [object], as in the case of self-awareness, without [there] indeed [being] the relationship between apprehended and apprehender, there will[, nonetheless,] be awareness.”¹⁶⁰

Therefore, [as a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “for the nature of this [(i.e., cognition)].”

2002. For the nature of this [(i.e., cognition)] does not belong to something else [(i.e., an object)], by means of which — while it[self] being brought to awareness — it would [also] bring something different to awareness¹⁶¹ because, ultimately, existing things are distinct [from one another].¹⁶²

Even if, regarding existing things, through exclusion from [what is] non-existing, etc., a common (*eka*) nature of existence, etc., is imagined (*kalpyate*), nonetheless, there is no commonness (*ekatva*) at all, due to the difference in that [(i.e., common nature)] for each real thing ultimately.¹⁶³ Therefore, [Śāntarakṣita] states, “ultimately.” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2002 ◇

Let the following be the case, “If indeed an external object is distinct from cognition, it will, nonetheless, be brought to awareness, like cognition.”

[As a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “for it is logical that a cognition.”

2003. For it is logical that a cognition be brought to awareness, since it arises as having the nature of knowledge. However, an [external] object has not arisen as knowledge (*bodha*); therefore, how can the latter be brought to awareness?

¹⁶⁰ A cognition does not cognize itself as an apprehender that apprehends itself; it simply manifests itself. Analogously, an object could be admitted as simply manifesting without admitting any apprehender or its being an apprehended.

¹⁶¹ Cf. MAK 19ab; see Sanskrit Text.

¹⁶² Things are distinct by their own-nature, each established in itself. No thing has a nature that, when this thing is brought to awareness, results in the knowing of something different. Accordingly, a cognition cannot know an external object.

¹⁶³ This is a clear reference to the theory of *apoha*. Actually existing things, i.e., *svlakṣaṇas*, are truly different from each other. Nonetheless, they can be conceived of by means of their general conceptual nature, such as, for example, blue. This occurs when the images that they produce are excluded from all other images produced by heterogeneous things, that is to say, by virtue of the exclusion of all non-blue things. Cf. *sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ | svabhāvoparabhāvābhyām yasmād vyāvṛtibhāgināḥ ||* (PV Svārthānumāna 40) *tasmād yato yato ṛthānām vyāvṛtis tannibandhanāḥ | jātibhedāḥ prakalpyante tadviśeṣāvagāhināḥ ||* (PV Svārthānumāna 41). “Since all things, because [they] are, by nature, established in their own-nature, partake of the exclusion from similar and dissimilar [things], therefore, from whatever [other object] the exclusion of the objects [occurs], different universals, based on those [exclusions], are conceived [as] penetrated by those differences.”

3.2 Refutation of the *Nirākāravāda*

Having proven self-awareness in this way, now, in order to prove how awareness of an external [object] by a cognition devoid of an image is illogical, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “however, according to the thesis.”

2004. However, according to the thesis that a cognition is endowed with [the object’s] appearance, even though the two [(i.e., the object and the cognition)] are different in reality, there can [nonetheless] be an awareness [of the external object], albeit secondary,¹⁶⁴ because of the sameness of form of the reflection [with the object].¹⁶⁵

2005. But, for him who does not admit a cognition as having the impression (*uparāgavat*) of the object’s form, even this [secondary] way of being aware of the external [object] is not at all [possible].¹⁶⁶

“Of the reflection,” i.e., of the image in cognition; “because of the sameness of form,” i.e., because of the similarity of form with the object; “secondary,” i.e., indirect; “even this,” i.e., indirect, [as it is] imagined (*upakalpita*) due to the sameness of form. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2004–2005 ◇

However, this might be the [objection], “As a sword cuts an elephant, for example, or as a fire burns a combustible, and still these swords, etc., do not have the nature of an elephant, etc.; in the same way, a cognition will discriminate the object, even though it does not acquire the object’s image.” [Śāntarakṣita] advances this [objection] with [the verse] beginning with “the [following] idea might be [argued].”

2006. The [following] idea might be [argued] (*syān matih*): in the same way that a sword or flame, etc., cuts [or] burns, etc., an elephant [or] a combustible, etc., even though there is no identity of nature-form, so [it] is [for] this[i.e., a cognition].

[The compound] “an elephant [or] a combustible, etc.” is a sixth [case (i.e., genitive)], dependent on “cuts [or] burns, etc.”¹⁶⁷ “This,” i.e., this cognition. “In the same way that lamps, etc., are illuminating of a

¹⁶⁴ A cognition apprehends only the image of a thing, not the thing itself. Accordingly the cognition will be indirect. Cf. Tib. *gdags pa tsam gyis*. “Through mere conception.”

¹⁶⁵ Cf. MAK 20; see Sanskrit Text.

¹⁶⁶ Here Śāntarakṣita is introducing his refutation of the *nirākāravāda* by asserting the [provisional] superiority of the *sākāravāda*, in terms of it better accounting for the apprehension of an external object. Cf. Introduction §6.1. Cf. MAK 21; see Sanskrit Text.

¹⁶⁷ It is not uncommon for Kamalaśīla to give such pedantic grammatical explanations. Considering it an interpolation, because of its absence in Tib., might be unwise.

blue [thing,] etc.,” and so on, is understood by the word “etc.” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2006 ◇

[Śāntarakṣita] states the response with [the verse] beginning with “precisely this is unsuitable.”

2007. Precisely this is unsuitable (*viśama*)¹⁶⁸ since those [things] — insofar as they are the cause of the arising [of their objects] in that way — are commonly accepted with such nature [of cutter, etc.]; a cognition is not the producer [of its object] in this way.

For swords, etc., “insofar as they are” indeed the producer¹⁶⁹ of [cut] elephants and so on, are commonly accepted as cutters, etc. To explain, when there is the striking with the sharp edge of a sword, etc., elephants manifest with severed joints; and likewise, due to contact with fire, firewood [appears] with the nature of charcoal, etc. In the same way, also pots, etc., by force of light, become able to generate [their own] cognitions but, in this way, a cognition does not give any assistance (*upakāra*) to the object.¹⁷⁰ Nevertheless, precisely by means of [its] object (*viśaya*), a cognition originates as being distinct. Therefore, how can this [(i.e., a cognition)], which is not able to do anything [with respect to the object], be aware of it? Moreover, it is not logical to imagine that being aware of that [(i.e., an object)] for a cognition [consists of] nothing but [its] being the effect of that [(i.e., the object)]. Let there not be also the fact that this [(i.e., cognition)] is aware of sense organs.¹⁷¹ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2007 ◇

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Tib. *gañ phyir de dan 'di mtshuñs min* [...].

¹⁶⁹ Cf. Jp^s *chedadāhādeḥ*. “Of the cutting, the burning, etc.”

¹⁷⁰ In the case of cutting and burning, for example, the instrument determines the nature of the object. Here, Kamalaśīla argues that a sword is determined to be “the cutter” and an elephant is generated as endowed with severed limbs (namely, as “the [thing] cut”) when the action of cutting occurs. However, a cognition does not determine the nature of the object in this way, since cognition is not an instrument (or an action) that changes a material object. Moreover, it cannot give any assistance to the object as a producer of its own cognition.

¹⁷¹ Here, Kamalaśīla is arguing that a cognition is observed as being determined by its object and, accordingly, arises as distinct from other cognitions. The object determines the cognition, while the cognition does nothing with regard to the object. Accordingly, a cognition cannot be considered as a cognizer through the activity of cognizing in the same way that a sword is a “cutter” through the action of cutting. Additionally, this fact of being a cognizer cannot even be explained through a cause-effect relationship, since otherwise a cognition would also be aware of the sense organs. Therefore, the objection is pointless, since cognition is not a *janaka* in the same way as a sword, etc., is. The illogicality of the idea that the cause-effect relationship is enough to account for the cognition of an object is suggested also by Dīnāga; cf. *dbañ po mam par rig pa'i rgyu* || *phra rab rdul dag yin mod kyī* || *der mi snañ phyir de'i yul ni* || *rdul phran ma yin dbañ po bzñ* || (ĀP 1). “Even if atoms [might] be a cause of a sense perception, atoms are not its object — like the sense organs — since they do not appear in that [perception].” On Dīnāga’s discussion of external *ālamānas* of cognitions, see Introduction §3.4. For ĀP 1, see also TSP *ad* TS 2082.

However, Bhadanta Śubhagupta states, “Despite being devoid of the image of [its] object, a cognition perceives [its] object because it is endowed with the nature of distinguishing it. Therefore, no objection (*āśaṅkā*) should be raised like, ‘how does [a cognition] discriminate?’ [or,] ‘resembling what, does it [(i.e., a cognition)] discriminate?’”

[Śubhagupta] states:

If [someone asks,] “How does this [(i.e., a cognition)] apprehend that [(i.e., an object)]?” [The reply will be that] a cognition has the characteristic of distinguishing it [(i.e., the object)]. Therefore, there [can] be no objection like, “how does this [apprehend that or,] also, resembling what does it [(i.e., a cognition)] apprehend that?”¹⁷² (BASK 89)

Therefore, regarding this, [Śāntaraṅkṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “cognition is logically established.”

2008. Cognition is logically established as having the nature of distinguishing that [(i.e., the external object)], [only] if the distinguishing of an apprehended [object] can be found as having the nature of cognition.

2009. But, otherwise, one must clearly state that cognition is endowed with the nature of distinguishing. However, the awareness of an object is not indicated in this way.¹⁷³

For, [regarding cognition,] if the fact of having the nature of distinguishing an object different (*vyatirikta*) [from itself] were established, [then] all this could be [tenable]; but [it is] precisely this [which] is not established. To explain, a cognition¹⁷⁴ cannot distinguish [an object] by [its own] mere existence, since the undesirable consequence would follow that it [(i.e., the cognition)] would distinguish all [objects, not only that specific one.] Nor [can a cognition distinguish an object] due to being its effect, since it would follow that [that cognition] would also be able to distinguish the sense organs.¹⁷⁵ Nor is [a cognition] admitted [by you] as being endowed with the image [of its object], by virtue of which, albeit through the sameness of form, the awareness of that [(i.e., the object)] could be secondary. Therefore, “if” “the distinguishing” “of an apprehended” can be [proven as]

¹⁷² Cf. Introduction §6.2.

¹⁷³ This responds to Śubhagupta’s claim that a cognition distinguishes an object, since it has the nature of discriminating it. Śāntaraṅkṣita counters that, only if the distinguishing of an apprehended object is proved as having the same nature as the cognition, can the cognition be determined as having the nature of distinguishing an external object. However, if this is not the case, then Śubhagupta can even say that a cognition has the nature of distinguishing, but he will never show that it has the nature of apprehending an external object.

¹⁷⁴ Tib. has *žes pa* instead of *žes pa*.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. also n. 171.

“having the nature of cognition,” in this way, cognition will have “the nature of distinguishing” the object. “Otherwise,” let it be clearly stated [by you, Śubhagupta], “how is a cognition endowed with the nature of distinguishing an object?” And, therefore, owing to [its] difference from the distinguishing of the object, only the nature of being a cognition manifests.¹⁷⁶ Hence, *vijñaptimātratā* is established.¹⁷⁷

Let the following be the case, “There is some specific characteristic (*viśeṣa*) of this [(i.e., a cognition)], by virtue of which [it] distinguishes precisely [its] object. However, that [(i.e., the specific characteristic)] cannot be indicated by means of identity.”¹⁷⁸ Therefore, [Śāntarakṣita] states, “however, the awareness of an object is not indicated in this way.” The [word] “*bhavati*” is to be supplied.

Even if a non-common thing (*vastu*) cannot be described completely, one can nevertheless indeed talk (*kathyate*) about it on the basis of the conventional truth of manifestation (*udbhāvanā*).¹⁷⁹ For otherwise, even in the case of *skandhas*, one would not be able to talk about their specific characteristics. “However,” a cognition being the awareness “of an object” is

¹⁷⁶ Kamalaśīla counters as follows. If a cognition could apprehend its object only by merely existing, i.e., without any kind of relationship with it, then there would be no necessity for a certain cognition to determine precisely that object that is its actual content. In other words, every cognition would determine every thing, and not only that object of which it is the cognition. Therefore, in order for a cognition to be established with the nature of distinguishing its object, a relation must be admitted between the two. If the relationship were causal in nature, then, since the eyes and the other sense organs are also the cause of a cognition, it would follow that one would be able to perceive them as well. However, this is not the case. This apprehension cannot be secondary either, as with the *sākāravāda*, namely through an image of that object arising in cognition. Here, Kamalaśīla is asserting the superiority of the latter over the *nirākāravāda*. In the *sākāravāda* there is, at least, a secondary relation, through sameness of form, between a cognition and an object that bestows its image on it. Instead, in the *nirākāravāda* there is no admitted relationship between the two. Accordingly, this cannot account for the fact that a certain cognition perceives only one certain object and not everything. Moreover, since there is no admitted relationship between a cognition and its object, a cognition is not proved as having the nature of distinguishing the object. That being the case, the mere existence of cognitions, with no corresponding apprehended objects, is proved. In other words, *vijñaptimātratā* is established.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Tib. *de lta yin dan don yon su gcod pa las ma gtogs pa'i śes pa'i bdag nīd tha mi dad par grub pa'i phyir mam par rig pa tsam nīd du grub po* ||. “And, thus, since the nature of cognition other than the distinguishing of the object is established as non-different, *vijñaptimātratā* is established.”

¹⁷⁸ One cannot indicate particulars through identity, because that relates to concepts and concepts relate to universal images (*sāmānya*).

¹⁷⁹ *Udbhāvanā*, manifestation, is one of the three aspects of *saṃvṛti*. It is the attempt to express, through words and concepts, the inexpressible absolute. The definition is found in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* and *bhāṣya*: **prajñaptipratipattitas tathoddbhāvanayodāram** | *trividhā hi saṃvṛtiḥ prajñaptisaṃvṛtiḥ | pratipattisaṃvṛtiḥ | udbhāvanāsaṃvṛtiś ca* | (*Madhyāntavibhāga* and *bhāṣya*, ed. p. 41, 9–12). In these works and the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* of Sthiramati (ed. p. 123–125), *saṃvṛti* is defined as *vyavahāra*; this is divided into three aspects: *prajñaptisaṃvṛti*, *pratipattisaṃvṛti* and *udbhāvanāsaṃvṛti*. On this, cf., e.g., Nagao 1991: 16–17.

“not”¹⁸⁰ “indicated” distinctly, i.e., undoubtedly, “in this way,” i.e., with a non-ascertained nature. Accordingly, entities [would be] accurately (*su*) determined when there is the determination of entities by means of a non-ascertained (*anirūpita*) nature.¹⁸¹ This is all one has to say!”¹⁸² ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2008–2009 ◇

Let the following be the case, “If there is no object to be distinguished, of what could be that distinguishing?” [As a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “additionally, ‘of what [could] that distinguishing be.’”

2010. Additionally, “of what [could] that distinguishing be?” is not entitled to be an inquiry [able] to refute [our] statement (*paryanuyogabhāṇ*). That distinguishing is the [very] nature of that [(i.e., cognition)], like, for example, the delightfulness of joy, etc.

For nothing but [its] “nature” is called “that” “distinguishing” “of that [(i.e., of cognition)]” *qua* shining light. Similar to “the delightfulness” “of joy, etc.,” that is to say, delightfulness cannot, indeed, [follow] as different from that [(i.e., joy)] due to the mere verbal expression of a difference, such as “of joy.”¹⁸³ Therefore, even if there is the statement “the distinguishing of a blue [thing]” or “of a yellow [thing],” as if [this statement] were endowed with a distinction [between the two], nevertheless, that (*sa*) [distinguishing], [which] shining (*prakāśamāṇaḥ*) in this way (i.e., with the form of blue, etc.) is said in that way [(i.e., “distinguishing of blue,” etc.)], is nothing but the nature (*svabhāva*) [of cognition], since cognition is endowed with the nature of self-awareness. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2010 ◇

[One may ask,] “What is the meaning of self-awareness, by virtue of which it is called as such?”

[As a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “the meaning of self-awareness.”

2011. The meaning of self-awareness is as follows: [a cognition] does not depend on another knower (*vedaka*) for the knowledge of its own-nature, and yet it [(i.e., cognition)] is not unknown.

¹⁸⁰ Here Tib. does not have “not.”

¹⁸¹ This is the statement of the *prasaṅga*.

¹⁸² Śubhagupta must clearly show that a cognition has the ascertained nature of distinguishing an object. Even if that particular nature is not completely definable through words, it can still somehow be expressed through concepts and language. However, if he cannot show such an ascertained nature, then cognition is not established as having the nature of distinguishing an object, and only its being an awareness is proved. In other words, *viñaptimātratā* is established.

¹⁸³ According to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, distinguishing is the very nature of a cognition, since it is endowed with the nature of light. Even though one can use two words to indicate the same thing, it does not mean that they indicate two different things. For example, one can say “joy” or “delightfulness,” but in reality those two terms refer to the same thing. The same, identical real thing can be expressed through different words, each expressing an aspect of that thing as differentiated by other heterogeneous things.

Regarding the [claim that] [a cognition] “does not” require “another” [knower] “for the knowledge of its own-nature,” [Śāntarakṣita] advances an objection by Kumārila with [the verse] beginning with “however, being indeed engaged.”

2012. However, being indeed engaged in the awareness of an object, cognition is not directed towards itself. Therefore, although it illuminates [objects], it requires something else for [its own] cognition. (ŚV ŚūV 184)¹⁸⁴

For [Kumārila] states, “Even if cognition has the nature of light, [that is, it illuminates objects, it] nevertheless requires something else for its own illumination. However, it is ‘not’ ‘directed towards,’ i.e., perceives, ‘itself’ (*ātmānam* means *svayam*),¹⁸⁵ since it [(i.e., cognition)] is engaged only in illuminating objects. For it is not tenable that [a cognition] engaged in [illuminating] one thing can, at the same time, be engaged in another thing without abandoning that [(i.e., the first thing)].” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2012 ◇

In this respect, after having advanced the [possible objection of its] being endowed with deviation (*vyabhicāritā*), because of [the instance of] a lamp,¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Here, Kumārila maintains that cognition is always, and only, concerned with the illumination of an object. It cannot apprehend itself at the same time, since it is absurd that one thing that is active in perceiving an object might be able to cognize a second object without abandoning the first one. This verse is preceded by the following arguments: *nānyathā hy arthasadbhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ sann upapadyate | jñānam cen nety ataḥ paścāt pramāṇam upajāyate ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 182) *na cāpy apratibandhena kevalena graho bhavet | viśiṣṭakāraṇābhāve 'py artho naivānubhūyate ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 183). According to him, cognition cannot be proved through *pratyakṣa*, since it is an action (*kriyā*). It can be proved only through *arthāpatti*, implication (which is considered by him as a *pramāṇa*). One experiences apprehended objects, but can infer the act of cognition through the fact that an object is now perceived, whereas before it was not. In other words, something must be admitted to explain the change of the object from its being unapprehended to being apprehended. On this, cf. also n. 390. This verse, in its Tibetan translation, is also found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 128, 20–23).

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Tib. *ran gi bdag ŋid*. “Its own self.”

¹⁸⁶ The lamp can be adduced by the opponent (a Vijñānavādin) as an example of one thing being endowed with both the properties of “illuminating other things” and “being illuminated by itself.” In other words, it is an instance endowed with deviation, in which one finds the logical reason (the fact of illuminating another thing) as well as the opposite of the *sādhyā* (the *sādhyā* being the property of non-illuminating itself). Earlier in the ŚV ŚūV, Kumārila discusses the *dṛṣṭānta* of fire, etc., in a different sense. Cf. *agnyādayo ghaṭādīnām prasiddhā ye prakāśakāḥ | na te prakāśyarūpā hi prakāśasyānapekṣaṇāt ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 65) *grāhyavat tu yadā teṣāṃ tadākaṣaṇ grāhakaṃ matam | akṣagrahaṇakāle tu grāhikā dhīr bhaviṣyati ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 66). “For fire and so on, which are commonly accepted as illuminating pots, etc., do not [also] have the nature of being illuminated, because they do not need a light [in order to be illuminated].” “However, when they are apprehended, then the sense organs are considered as [their] apprehender; but when the sense organs are apprehended, a cognition will be [their] apprehender.” This follows from the previous *kārikā*, where Kumārila states that one and the same thing cannot have the characteristic of both apprehended and apprehender, as it is implied (according to him) in the theory of the *svasamvedana*. Cf. n. 157. Here, fire is taken as an example of something that illuminates objects, but is not, at the same time, illuminated,

[Kumārila] states another thesis [in the verse] beginning with “or [one can argue as follows].”

2013. Or [one can argue as follows]: [regarding cognition,] such fact of illuminating consists in its directly experiencing an object.¹⁸⁷ However, it [(i.e., cognition)] does not directly experience itself; therefore, it is not the illuminator of itself. (ŚV ŚūV 185)

[One can argue,] “However, if [a cognition] is not endowed with the nature of illuminating itself, how can it also be determined as illuminating external [objects]?” [Kumārila] replies [with the verse] beginning with “additionally, in the same way.”

2014. Additionally, in the same way as [the] determination of the eyes, etc. — concerning the fact of [their] illuminating¹⁸⁸ — is observed (*dṛśyate*) with regard to visual forms, etc., likewise, [this] will also be in this case [(i.e., in the case of cognition)]. (ŚV ŚūV 186)¹⁸⁹

“In the same way as,” “of the eyes, etc.,” “with regard to visual forms, etc.,” i.e., with regard to [their own] object, there is the determination “concerning the fact of [their] illuminating,” even though they are not endowed with the nature of illuminating themselves, “likewise” [this] “will be” “also” “in this case,” i.e., in the case of cognition.¹⁹⁰ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2014 ◇

Let the following be the case, “Why [should cognition] illuminate [an object] outside alone, departing from itself, which is inside and close at hand (*antaraṅgam*)?”¹⁹¹ [As a reply, Kumārila] states [the verse] beginning with “[cognition] illuminates.”

2015ab. [Cognition] illuminates an external object, but not itself, because it does not have the capacity (*śakti*) [to do so]; (ŚV ŚūV 187ab)¹⁹²

because it does not need something else to illuminate it. Hence, it is the agent of the action of illuminating, but it is not the patient of that action at the same time. Moreover, when the fire is apprehended, the eyes are the apprehender and so forth.

¹⁸⁷ Tib. has *de don bdag ñid ñams myoñ na* instead of *tasyārthānubhavātmakam*.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. *gal bar byed pa ñid yin pas* | |. “Since [the eyes, etc.] are illuminating.”

¹⁸⁹ This verse is missing in T_{1P}.

¹⁹⁰ Here Kamalaśīla suggests that the argument put forward by Kumārila must be understood as follows: eyes and other sense organs are commonly accepted as having the capacity of illuminating, i.e., making known, their own objects, because it is observed that these are illuminated; that is, forms are seen, sounds are heard, etc. This is accepted even though sense organs cannot illuminate themselves; that is, the eye cannot see itself, the ear cannot hear itself, etc. Analogously, a cognition will illuminate external things, but not itself.

¹⁹¹ This is an objection against Kumārila. I translate the word *antaraṅgam* with a hendiadys.

¹⁹² This half-verse is missing in T_{1P}.

Why does [cognition] not have the capacity to illuminate itself? Accordingly, [as a reply, Śāntarakṣita]¹⁹³ states [the words] beginning with “and the capacity.”

2015cd. and the capacity of all things cannot be questioned at all.¹⁹⁴

As [Kumārila] states:

Fire burns, not ether. Who would be questioned about this?
(ŚV Ākṛtivāda 29ab)¹⁹⁵

◇ TSP *ad* TS 2015 ◇

[Śāntarakṣita] counters with [the verse] beginning with “[one may object that] surely, nothing but cognition.”

2016. [One may object that] surely, nothing but cognition is called “awareness of an object.”¹⁹⁶ If this [i.e., the awareness of an object] is endowed with the [same] nature (*ātmabhūta*) as that [i.e., cognition], which other activity (*vyāpāra*) could [it] have?¹⁹⁷

What was said [with reference to cognition], “being indeed engaged in the awareness of an object,” (TS 2012a; ŚV ŚūV 184a) is not appropriate, since the awareness of an object is no different from cognition. To explain, “nothing but” “cognition” “is called” by the [following] synonyms: awareness (*vitti*), perception (*upalabdhi*), cognition of an object (*arthapratīti*) and representation (*viññapti*).¹⁹⁸ Moreover, “if this,” i.e., the awareness of an object, “is endowed with the [same] nature as that,” i.e., is endowed with the [same] nature as cognition, with regard to cognition, which sort of “other” “activity,” consisting in the awareness of an object, “could [it i.e., cognition] have” [that is] different from its own [activity as cognition] (*ātmyavyatirikta*), [and] by virtue of which it can be “engaged” in the “awareness of an object”? Moreover, an activity [directed] towards one’s own self is not logically established.¹⁹⁹ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2016 ◇

¹⁹³ One would expect *sa* to refer to Kumārila. However, Kamalaśīla is most likely implying that it is Śāntarakṣita who is providing that answer. This notwithstanding, the statement is perfectly in line with Kumārila’s argument in the first half of the verse.

¹⁹⁴ On a similar note, cf. *nityaṃ kāryānumeyā ca śaktiḥ kim anuyujyate* | (ŚV Śābdanīyatādhikaraṇa 44ab).

¹⁹⁵ Cf. also PVA *ad* PV Pramāṇasiddhi 9cd (ed. p. 35, 7); see Sanskrit Text. Cf. *na hi svabhāva bhāvānām paryanuyogam arhanti kim agnir dahaty uṣṇo vā nodakam iti* | *etāvat tu syāt kuto ’yaṃ svabhāva iti* | (PVSV *ad* PV Svārthānumāna 167ab, ed. p. 84, 19–21).

¹⁹⁶ For this translation, I follow the commentary.

¹⁹⁷ In its Tibetan translation, this verse is also found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (ed. p. 129, 12–15) introduced by the sentence “*ji skad du Tshad ma’i de kho na ñid bsdus pa las*.”

¹⁹⁸ On the translation of the word *viññapti*, see Introduction n. 18 and 19.

¹⁹⁹ If the awareness of an object has one and the same nature as a cognition, then the cognition, being as such, is, at the same time, also an awareness of an object. This awareness cannot be regarded as another activity in which the cognition, while performing its own

Let the following be the case, “How can it be established that the awareness of an object indeed has the nature of cognition, by means of which there is the synonymy between cognition and awareness of an object?” [Śāntarākṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “the direct experiencing of an object is a nature.”

2017. The direct experiencing of an object is a nature, and if that [nature] had the nature of cognition, then (*tad*), with regard to a cognition, [the fact of] having the nature of directly experiencing an object would be tenable. But, it is not [so].

2018. However, due to the undesirable consequence of abandoning the admitted (*upeta*) object (*artha*), the awareness of an object is not established, even though its [(i.e., cognition’s)] having the nature of directly experiencing is generated by itself.

“The direct experiencing of an object” must necessarily be admitted as a “nature” (*rūpa*), i.e., *svabhāva*. Otherwise, how could a cognition be engaged in it? For the activity of some thing on a non-existing thing — like, for example, a hare’s horn — is not logical. “And” therefore, “if” “that”²⁰⁰ nature, i.e., *svabhāva*, endowed with the nature of directly experiencing an object, were able to be non-distinct from cognition, then [there would be], “with regard to a cognition,” “[the fact of] having the nature of directly experiencing an object.” Additionally, what was [previously] said — “Or [one can argue as follows]: [regarding cognition,] such fact of illuminating consists in its [(i.e., cognition’s)] directly experiencing an object” (TS 2013ab; ŚV ŚūV 185ab) — could be logical. Pressed (*nirbadhyamāna*), the adversary could, at times, even acknowledge cognition as non-different²⁰¹ from the direct experience of an object. Therefore, [Śāntarākṣita] states, “but, it is not [so].” “It,”²⁰² i.e., the fact that directly experiencing [an object] is non-different²⁰³ from cognition. “The admitted object,” that is to say, with reference to cognition, the admitted characteristic of being devoid of self-awareness. [There would] be “the undesirable consequence of abandoning” this, due to the undesirable consequence of the self-awareness of cognition, if

activity as such, could be engaged, because the two are identical. Accordingly, Kumāṛila’s objection that a cognition cannot be engaged in two activities (i.e., being aware of an object and being aware of itself) at the same time is not tenable. Cf. Tib. *bdag ñid la bya ba dan ldan par rig pa ma yin no* ||. “Moreover, there is no awareness that is active towards itself.” Tib. should likely be emended to *rigs pa*.

²⁰⁰ Cf. Tib. *de’i*. “its.”

²⁰¹ Cf. Tib. *tha dad*. “Different.”

²⁰² Jp and Pp have here a gloss for “it” as referring to *rūpa*, nature.

²⁰³ Cf. Tib. *tha dad pa ñid kyi* [...]. “The fact that ... is different [...].”

the latter is admitted as non-different²⁰⁴ from directly experiencing an object.²⁰⁵

Let the following be the case, “The fact of illuminating, with regard to a cognition, is not admitted since this [(i.e., cognition)] is endowed with the nature of directly experiencing an object. However, [it is] rather [admitted] because of having the nature of experiencing[, which is] independent (*kevala*).”²⁰⁶ Therefore, [Śāntarakṣita] states, “‘however’ ‘its’ [being endowed with the nature of experiencing is generated] ‘by itself,’” etc. Even if “its,” i.e., cognition’s, having the nature of directly experiencing is generated independently (*kevala*),²⁰⁷ [it] does not have the nature of directly experiencing the object. Moreover, in this way, the awareness of an object cannot be established by virtue of a difference like, for example, “this is an awareness of a blue [thing] and not of a yellow [thing].” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2017–2018 ◇

“Why can it not be established?” Therefore, [as a reply,] [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “for, in this [thesis], according to the opponent.”

2019. For, in this [thesis], according to the opponent, the immediate proximity (*pratyāsatti*) is not [admitted as] a cause, like the reflection of an object is in the thesis of cognition endowed with images.

“According to the opponent,” that is, according to the upholder of the thesis that cognition is devoid of images; whose doctrine is the following (*idam*): an external object is endowed with forms (*ākāra*), [while] cognition is devoid of them (cf. *Śābarabhāṣya ad* 1.1.5).²⁰⁸ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2019 ◇

²⁰⁴ Cf. Tib. *tha dad par* [...]. “As different [...].”

²⁰⁵ The opponents, Kumārila and his followers, must admit the “experiencing of an object” as a specific real nature, because otherwise it would not be possible for a cognition to be engaged in it, since there is no activity related to non-existent things. A cognition can have the nature of experiencing an object only if the two things are one and the same. Only under these circumstances could Kumārila safely say that “[regarding cognition,] such fact of illuminating consists in its experiencing the object” (ŚV₁ ŚŪV 185ab). Since the opponent could even be led to acknowledge the non-difference between experiencing an object and being cognition, Śāntarakṣita highlights that this is not the case. Moreover, if the opponent admits that non-difference, for him the undesirable consequence of having to acknowledge the self-awareness of cognition would follow, since a cognition would then apprehend itself while simultaneously experiencing its object.

²⁰⁶ Cf. Tib. *ñams su myoñ ba’i bdag ñid gsal ba yin pa ’ba’ žig gi phyir ro* [...]. “Because having the nature of experiencing is [indeed] only the [fact of] illuminating [...].”

²⁰⁷ Here, “independent” refers to the fact that a cognition experiences the object because it has the nature of doing that. In other words, it is purely the agent of that experiencing, irrespective of the object that is experienced.

²⁰⁸ The same passage is quoted in TSP *ad* TS 252 (ed. p. 130, 6), followed by *iti vacanāt*, and in Jitāri’s *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (ed. p. 2 n. 7). This is a reference to *Śābarabhāṣya ad* 1.1.5 (ed. p. 31, 3–4); cf. Sanskrit Text. Similar passages are also found in TSP *ad* TS 2069 (as a slightly more

“Or [one can argue as follows], [regarding cognition,] such fact of illuminating consists in its directly experiencing an object.” (TS 2013ab; ŚV ŚūV 185ab) Regarding this, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “if that [(i.e., cognition)] cannot directly experience itself.”

2020. If that [(i.e., cognition)] cannot directly experience itself since, by its own-nature (*prakṛtyā*), it is endowed with an insentient nature, then the direct experiencing of an object will be lost, because there is no awareness of cognition [itself].²⁰⁹

“If” cognition, being endowed with an insentient nature, is not aware of itself, “then,” regarding it, since it is not directly perceived by itself, also “the direct experiencing of an object” would be “lost,” as being not directly perceived.²¹⁰ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2020 ♦

Let the following be the case, “If, indeed, cognition is not directly perceived, why should the direct experiencing of an object not be directly perceived either? For, given the fact that a visual form is not perceived, it cannot [follow] that sound is not perceived either.” Therefore, [as a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states, [the verse] beginning with “nothing but cognition.”

2021. Nothing but cognition is called “direct experiencing of an object.” If that [(i.e., cognition)] is not endowed with an established nature, which other establishment could there be regarding the [direct experiencing of an object]?²¹¹

For, regarding a cognition, we do not ascertain another nature, other than direct experience of the object. Not ascertaining [it], [*†svavācam*†]²¹² treating the difference [between the direct experiencing of an object and cognition] as certain, we would be deceiving ourselves and the opponents.²¹³ If “that,” i.e., cognition, “is not endowed with an established nature” —

extensive quotation from *Śābarabhāṣya ad* 1.1.5, which is explicitly mentioned) as well as TSP *ad* TS 979 (ed. p. 385, 18–19); cf. Sanskrit Text.

²⁰⁹ If, according to Kumāṛila, a perception, by its own-nature, cannot perceive itself, then, being devoid of that capacity of perceiving itself, it will not be able to experience the object either. However, precisely the latter was admitted by Kumāṛila who, therefore, would be contradicting himself. This is the undesirable consequence of his thesis.

²¹⁰ Cf. Tib. *don ṅams su myoñ ba yañ mñon sum ma yin pa ṅid du yañ mi ’thad do* ||. “And the experiencing of the object is not admitted as also being non-perceived.”

²¹¹ Here, Śāntarakṣita argues that if the experiencing of an object and the cognition have the same nature, and the latter is endowed with a non-established nature, it would follow that the former cannot be established either.

²¹² In the translation of this sentence, the term *svavācam*, present in Jp, has been omitted. Tib. does not have it, instead featuring the word *ñon du ’gro ba/ *pūrvaka, *pūrvāṅgama*, which is also problematic. I regard *svavācam* as a possible interpolation.

²¹³ Cf. Tib. *gžan ṅid du nes par (pa D) †ñon du ’gro ba† nes par ma (deest P) gzun (bzun D) bar tha sñad byed na ci ltar rañ dañ gžan dag slu bar byed* [...]. “If, not ascertaining the difference [between direct experiencing of an object and cognition] as certain, we would treat [it as such], how would we deceive ourselves and the opponents?”

[*aprasiddharūpatve sati*, a locative absolute] — “which other” “establishment” could there be “regarding that,” i.e., regarding the direct experiencing of an object? None at all. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2021 ◇

However, this might be the [objection], “The establishment (*siddhi*) of that [direct experience of the object] will be through another cognition.” Therefore, [as a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “if the direct experiencing [of the object].”

2022. If the direct experiencing [of the object] is [established] through another cognition, that object is not established when there is its own direct experiencing, since there is no establishment of [its] establishment[; then] when can [it] ever be established?²¹⁴

2023. If [it is argued that,] when the cognition of the cognition of that [(i.e., the object)] arises, this will not be established in its own awareness, but rather established in the awareness of another [thing],²¹⁵ [the reply will be that] this is wise speech.²¹⁶

There is no establishment (*siddhi*) of the establishment, i.e., of the cognition [of the object]. For it is not logical that what manifests [and] is unestablished (*aprasiddhavyaktika*) is manifested. To explain, there is no establishment at all of the object, even in the moment “of its own direct experiencing,” because in that moment, the experiencing — which is endowed with the *svabhāva* of manifesting that [(i.e., the object)]²¹⁷ — is not established. [Then] one must say, “when” will that [(i.e., the object)] be established? ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2022 ◇

“If [it is argued,]” “‘when the cognition of the cognition of that [(i.e., the object)] arises,’ i.e., in the moment of the arising of the cognition of the cognition of the object,²¹⁸ [the object] will be established,” [the reply will be that] “this” is extremely “wise speech.” For, how will that [(i.e., the object)] — that is not, indeed, established in the very moment of experiencing it —

²¹⁴ This verse, in its Tibetan translation, is also found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 129, 17–20) introduced by the sentence “*ji skad du Tshad ma'i de kho na ñid bsdus pa las.*”

²¹⁵ Here, the opponent is suggesting that an object is not established at the moment of its own apprehension because its cognition cannot establish itself. Instead, the object is established by a second cognition, which has its apprehension as an object. In other words, the object is not known in the perception that has it as a *grāhya*, but is rather established in another perception, which has its *grāhaka* as an object.

²¹⁶ Cf. *upalabhyate samvedanam anyeneti cet | sa tāvad viśayaḥ svopalambhakāle na siddhaḥ sidder asiddheḥ | anyopalambhakāle tu siddha ity upalambhe 'pi tadā na siddho 'nyadā viparyaye siddha iti svyāhṛtam* | (PVin *ad* 1.54cd, ed. p. 41, 6–8).

²¹⁷ Cf. Tib. *de'i gsal ba ñams su myon ba'i ran bžin* [...]. “The *svabhāva*, which is the experiencing that manifests that [object] [...]”

²¹⁸ Cf. Tib. *ran gi šes pa'i šes pa sbye (skyes P) ba'i dus su* [...]. “In the moment of the arising of the cognition of its own cognition [...]”

be established in the moment of experiencing another [thing (i.e., in the moment of experiencing its cognition)]? ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2023 ◇

Let [this] be established (*siddhyatu*), if you like (*nāma*), [only] if a *regressus ad infinitum* can be not possible. However, this is difficult to avoid (*durvāra*). In order to demonstrate this, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “since the direct experiencing of this.”

2024. Since the direct experiencing of this [(i.e., the second cognition)] is also not established, the first [(i.e., the experiencing of the object)] is not established either. If, regarding it [(i.e., the second cognition)], another awareness arises, a *regressus ad infinitum* will follow as an undesirable consequence.²¹⁹

“Of this,” i.e., of the second [cognition], which is the cognition of the cognition of the object. “The first,” i.e., the direct experiencing of the object. [The abstract] “*asiddhatā*” [can be explained as follows]: unestablished (*asiddha*) is that [thing] regarding [which] there is no establishment (*siddhi*); its state (*bhāva*) is *asiddhatā*.

Furthermore, if the direct experiencing [of the object (i.e., the first cognition)] is admitted [as occurring] by another cognition, then, also with regard to that other cognition, a memory will certainly arise[, namely that,] “the cognition of the cognition arose for me.”²²⁰ [Then,] also with regard to

²¹⁹ Here, Śāntarakṣita refers to PS 1.12ab, namely, the *prasaṅga* of a *regressus ad infinitum* as the first argument brought forward by Dīnāga to prove the self-awareness of cognitions. However, Śāntarakṣita’s statement of the argument is different. A second cognition cognizing the first one is not established in turn since, like any other cognition, it cannot establish itself. It therefore follows that there can be no establishment of the first cognition, and, consequently, the object cannot be established either. However, if it is admitted that that second cognition is cognized by a third cognition, the defect of a *regressus ad infinitum* will follow. In PSV *ad* PS 1.11ac, Dīnāga aims to prove that a cognition has two forms, that of the object and its own (cf. n. 220). The following proof of self-awareness relates to the fact that a cognition is also aware of itself while apprehending an object. For Dīnāga’s statement of the *regressus ad infinitum*, see n. 220. While discussing *svasaṃvitti* and, particularly, PS 1.9a, Hattori (1968: 101) also mentions the theory of the *anuvyavasāya* by the Naiyāyikas as a second cognition that cognizes the first one. He mentions *Nyāyabhāṣya*: *sarvatra ca pratyakṣaviśaye jñātur indriyeṇa vyavasāyaḥ, paścān manasānuvyavasāyaḥ* (*Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4, ed. p. 11, 13). As we will see, while defending the *svasaṃvitti* of all cognitions, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla refer to the PS. For an analysis of the proof of *svasaṃvedana* in the PS and PSV, see particularly Kellner 2010.

²²⁰ Here, Kamalaśīla, in commenting on Śāntarakṣita’s stanza, introduces a slightly different argument based on a *regressus ad infinitum*. This reminds us of Dīnāga’s in the PS. Cf. **jñānāntareṇānubhave ’niṣṭhā** *anavastheti tajjñāne jñānāntareṇānubhūyamāne | kasmāt | tatrāpi hi smṛtiḥ* | *yena hi jñānena tajjñānam anubhūyate, tatrāpy uttarakālaṁ smṛtir dṛṣṭā | tatas tatrāpy anyena jñānenānubhave ’navasthā syāt* (PS 1.12ab and PSV. Sanskrit text in Kellner 2011b: 416, which includes corrections of the PSV; see Kellner 2010: 214 n. 32). “When [a cognition] is experienced by another cognition, there is a *regressus ad infinitum*.’ *Regressus ad infinitum*, i.e., when the cognition of that [object] is experienced by another cognition. Why?

that [other cognition], one must necessarily say[, i.e., admit as a consequence,] that it has been directly experienced by another [further cognition], since [the arising of] a memory with regard to something not experienced²²¹ is not tenable. And, therefore, one must state what [*kartṛ*] generates these chains of cognitions, without being the object (*karma*) of

‘Because also regarding the latter there [would be] a memory.’ Also regarding that cognition by which, indeed, the cognition of that [object] is experienced, a memory [would be] observed subsequently. Therefore, if also regarding the latter [second-order cognition] there is the experiencing by another[, third,] cognition, there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*.” One remembers not only the object but also its cognition and, since the latter does not experience itself, it must be experienced by another cognition. Then they will remember also this other cognition, which must have been previously experienced by a third that is also remembered, and so on. As noted by Kellner (2011b: 417), this *regressus ad infinitum* is based on a few assumptions that are problematic. First of all, it is admitted that cognitions are subsequently remembered, which fact philosophers like Kumārila do not accept. Secondly, cognitions that are remembered must have been experienced earlier. Finally, high-order cognitions, that is cognitions of cognitions, are remembered as well. As seen previously, here Dīnāga wants to prove that a cognition has two forms — the form of the object and its own form as a cognition — and is self-aware. Its own form coincides with its image as apprehending objects.

He says: *viśaya-jñānatajñānaviśeṣāt tu dvirūpatā* | *viśaye hi rūpādau yaj jñānam tad arthasvābhāsam eva* | *viśaya-jñāne tu yaj jñānam tad viśayanurūpajñānābhāsam svābhāsam ca* | *anyathā yadi viśayanurūpam eva viśaya-jñānam syāt svarūpaṃ vā, jñāna-jñānam api viśaya-jñānenāviśiṣṭam syāt* | *na cottarottarāṇi jñānāni pūrvaviśayābhāsanī syuḥ, tasyāviśayatvāt* | *ataś ca siddham dvairūpyam jñānasya* | ***smṛter uttarakālaṃ ca*** | *dvairūpyam iti sambandhaḥ* | *yasmāc cānubhavottarakālaṃ viśaya iva jñāne ’pi smṛtir utpadyate, tasmād asti dvirūpatā jñānasya svasaṃvedyatā ca* | *kiṃ kāraṇam* | ***na hy asāv avibhāvite*** | | *na hy ananubhūtarthavedanasmṛti rūpādismṛtīvat* | (PS 1.11 and PSV, ed. p. 4, 20–5, 6). “There are two images [in cognition] due to the difference between the cognition of an object and the cognition of that [cognition of an object].’ For the cognition regarding an object, such as the visual form, has, indeed, the image of the object and that of itself. However, the cognition regarding the cognition of an object has the image of a cognition similar to the object and its own image. Otherwise, if the cognition of an object were either only similar to the object or having [only] its own image, [it would follow that] the cognition of the cognition, for its part, would not be distinct through the cognition of the object. And the further subsequent cognitions would not have the image of a preceding [temporally] remote object, because that [object] is not the object [of those subsequent cognitions]; and, therefore, cognition is established as having two images. ‘And, because of [the existence of] a memory afterwards,’ [cognition] has two images. This is the syntactic connection. Moreover, since, also regarding a cognition, a memory arises after the experiencing [of an object], like regarding the object, [it can,] therefore, [be concluded that] cognition has two images[, i.e., the image of the object and the image of itself,] and is self-aware. Why so? ‘For this does not regard [something] unperceived.’ For there is no memory of an awareness of an object that has not been experienced, just like [there is no] memory regarding a visual form, etc.” For an English translation and analysis of Dīnāga’s arguments for self-awareness in PS 1.11 and the PSV, see Kellner 2010: 209–213 and 2011b: 414–415.

²²¹ Kellner (2010: 213) notes that Dīnāga does not explain why experience is a precondition for memory. She (2010: 213 n. 30) quotes Dharmakīrti’s PV as stating that a memory of a previously unexperienced cognition is like determining other people’s cognitions. Cf. *smṛtir bhaved atīte ca sāgrhīte kathaṃ bhavet* | *syāc cānyadhīparicchedābhinnarūpā svabuddhidhīḥ* | | (PV Pratyakṣa 179). Cf. Tib. *ñams su myon ba la ni* [...]. “Something experienced [...].”

something else.²²² First of all (*tāvat*), it is not the [external] object, since that is the object of the primary cognition [in the chain]; nor is it the sense faculties and light, since these two are involved only in visual cognitions.²²³ Not even [this chain of cognitions] is devoid of cause, because of the undesirable consequence, for example, of its always existing.²²⁴ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2024 ◇

If [someone argues that] it is just the preceding cognition [that,] each [time,] generates [its] subsequent cognition, then, [as a reply to that,] [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “moreover, in the same way, there could not be the movement.”

2025–2026. Moreover, in the same way (*tathā*),²²⁵ there could not be the movement to other contents [of cognition]; yet still that [(i.e., the movement)] is observed. (PS 1.12cd)²²⁶ There

²²² Cf. *jñānāntareṇānubhavo bhavet tatrāpi ca smṛtiḥ | dṛṣṭā tadvedanaṃ kena tasyāpy anyena ced imām ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 511) *mālām jñānavidāṃ ko 'yaṃ janayaty anubandhinīm | pūrvā dhīḥ saiva cen na syāt sañcāro viśayāntare ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 512). While discussing PS 1.12ab1, Hattori (1968: 111) refers to this passage in the TSP as well as to PV Pratyakṣa 511–512ab. He also mentions ŚV SūV 187cd, 188.

²²³ The eyes may be the agent of a series of visual cognitions; here, however, other kinds of cognitions, i.e., tactile, etc., are also involved and, regarding these, it is not possible for the eyes to be the agent.

²²⁴ Kamalaśīla's statement of the argument based on the *regressus ad infinitum* is as follows. If, regarding the direct cognition of an object (i.e., cognition no. 1), a cognition that cognizes it (i.e., cognition no. 2) is admitted, then the opponent must accept the arising of a memory in the form of “I remember the arising of the cognition of the cognition of that object.” He is implying that, when one remembers something, they remember also the cognition of that thing, not the object alone. However, if cognition no. 2 is remembered, it must have been experienced, since one cannot remember something unless they experience it. Therefore, cognition no. 2 must also be admitted as experienced by another, third cognition, since it cannot do so by itself and since there is no memory of something unexperienced. This would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*. Therefore, the opponent must say which one is the cognizer (*kartr*) of this chain of cognitions without itself being the object (*karma*) of any other cognition. It cannot be the object itself, as that, in fact, is the object of the first cognition; it cannot be light and the sense faculties, since those would explain only visual cognitions. Finally, it cannot be causeless since, otherwise, these chains would always (or never) exist.

²²⁵ Śāntarakṣita is clearly referring to PS 1.12cd. Cf. *tatas tatrāpy anyena jñānenānubhave 'navasthā syāt | viśayāntarasañcāras tathā na syāt sa ceśyate || tasmād avāṣyaṃ swasamvedyatā jñānasyābhyupeyā ||* (PS 1.12cd and PSV, ed. p. 5, 11–14). “Therefore, if there is the experiencing by another, [third,] cognition also with reference to it[, i.e., the second cognition], there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. ‘In the same way, there could not be the movement to other contents [of cognition], and yet that [movement] is admitted.’ Therefore, the self-awareness of cognitions must necessarily be admitted.” He is analyzing the second argument brought forward by Dinnāga in order to prove the self-awareness of cognitions (the first one being related to the *regressus ad infinitum*, which is referred to differently in the two works). Here, as well as in the PS, *tathā* must be intended as a connector between the two kinds of arguments.

²²⁶ If the opponent's view is taken to its undesirable consequence, it follows that our life would be spent entirely in an endless chain of cognitions concerned with only one object; there would be no space for another object to become the content of other cognitions. Still, it is

being the movement to other contents [of cognition], that which is the final [cognition] is neither established by itself nor by another [cognition] and, if this is unestablished, all the [other cognitions] will be unestablished as well; and blindness of the entire world will follow from this.²²⁷

2027. However, if the final [cognition] is established by itself, the [self-establishment] will certainly (*dhruvam*) be there also with regard to the other [cognitions], because they are cognitions [as well]. Otherwise, according to you (*te*), these [other cognitions] are not[, in fact,] cognitions, like pots and so on.²²⁸

Indeed, in this way, “the movement to other” objects [of cognition] does not follow. To explain, each preceding cognition is determined as the object

observed that we apprehend several distinct objects, not only one. Therefore, the opponent’s theory is untenable, since it is also contrary to common experience.

²²⁷ Another undesirable consequence of the opponent’s view is the blindness of the entire world. Since the shifting to other objects of cognition is observed, it follows that the final cognition of that chain of cognitions that establishes all of them (as well as the object) would be left unestablished. For the subsequent cognition, which is able to establish the final cognition in the chain, would be engaged with the new object, not with establishing that final cognition. This being the case, that final cognition would also not establish the other cognitions, and the object would remain unknown. In brief, no one could know anything. In their Tibetan translation, TS 2025cd–2026 are found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (ed. p. 129, 21–130, 3) introduced by the sentence “*ji skad du Tshad ma’i de kho na ñid bsdus pa las.*” In the PVin, Dharmakīrti introduces a slightly different argument, where the undesirable consequence is the blindness of the world if perceptions are left unestablished. As noted by Kellner (2011b: 420–422), in PVin 1.54cd, he introduces a “knowledge-requirement of cognition,” namely, cognition needs to be known to exercise its function. In other words, knowing its perception is a necessary condition for knowing the object. If a cognition is not known by itself, then it will be by another. This will bring about a *regressus ad infinitum*, which has the consequence of nobody being able to perceive anything and the world being blind. On the other hand, if one admits such an outcome, i.e., a perception perceiving itself and the others in the chain, then all perceptions will be as such, insofar as they are all identical in being cognitions. Cf. ***apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasidhyati*** || (PVin 1.54cd) *na hi viśayasattayā viśayopalambhah, kiṃ tarhi tadupalambhasattayā | sā cāprāmāṇikā na sattānibandhanān vyavahārān anurūṇaddhi | tadaprasiddhau viśayasyāpy aprasiddhir ity astaṅgataṃ viśvaṃ syāt, sato ’py asiddhau sattāvvyavahārāyogyatvāt | tasmān nānupalabhamāṇaḥ kasyacit saṃvedanaṃ vedayate nāma kiñcit* || (PVin ad 1.54cd, ed. p. 41, 1–5) [...] *anyenāpi saṃvedanopalambhe so ’py asiddhaḥ saṃvedanaṃ na sādhayatīty upalambhāntarānugamaḥ | tan na tāvad ayaṃ puruṣaḥ kañcid arthaṃ pratyety upalambhaniṣṭhāṃ pratīkṣamāṇaḥ | ekāsiddhau sarvāsiddheḥ | na copalambhānām utpattiṇiṣṭhety andhamūkaṃ jagat syāt | kvacin niṣṭhāyāṃ sa svayam ātmānaṃ viśayākāraṃ ca yugāpāda upalabhata iti tadanye ’pi tathā syuḥ | viśeṣahetvabhāvāt* | (PVin ad 1.54cd, ed. p. 41, 8–13). On these passages, and for their English translation, see Kellner 2011b: 419–423.

²²⁸ If the opponent is led to admit that the final cognition is self-revealing, then he must also admit this for all the other cognitions in the chain, since they are all cognitions. It is not possible for things that have the same nature to be endowed with different characteristics. Unless he wants to deny the status of “cognition” to every preceding cognition, he must admit that they are all self-established and, therefore, there is no need for such a chain. Thus, the self-awareness of cognitions is proved.

of each following cognition and is immediately proximate [to it], inasmuch as it is [its] material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*).²²⁹ [Accordingly,] how could it perceive an external (*bahiraṅga*) object after having abandoned such an internal (*antaraṅgika*) [preceding cognition]?²³⁰ Additionally, also the object, albeit immediately contiguous (*sannihita*), is not able to stop that [(i.e., the preceding cognition)] either, since it is external.

If the [object] — being present, even though external — could stop [it,] then no one would ever be able to experience a cognition.²³¹ To explain, there is not any condition in which an object is not immediately contiguous. Accordingly, memory would also be eliminated since there would be no direct experiencing.²³²

Furthermore, no one would [even] be concerned as to [whether or not] an external object [exists] because the permanence of the concepts concerning past [things,] etc. — which occur without the immediate closeness of an object (*viśaya*) — [would] last as long as the *samsāra*, since there [would be] [just] a succession of concepts due to the absence of a cause of movement [to another object].²³³

We do grant (*bhavatu nāma*) the movement to another object,²³⁴ even though [this] is not logically possible[, if one accepts your thesis].²³⁵ One must, nevertheless, say, which [cognition] can experience whatever the final cognition may be?

²²⁹ *Upādānakāraṇa* is the material cause as opposed to the *sahakāripratyaya*, supporting conditions. It is, for example, the seed as the cause of the sprout, rather than the soil, water, etc.

²³⁰ Cf. Tib. *de 'dra ba spaṅs nas ji ltar mi ñe ba'i don 'dzin par byed pa yin* |. “ [And] how could it perceive a non-proximate object, after having abandoned such as that [preceding cognition]?” On this argument, cf. also *ātmani jñānajanane svabhāve niyatām ca tām | ko nāmānyo vibadhnīyād bahiraṅgo 'ntaraṅgikām* || (PV Pratyakṣa 514).

²³¹ On this, cf. *bāhyaḥ sannihito 'py arthas tām vibanddhūḥ hi na prabhuḥ | dhiyaṁ nānubhavet kaścid anyathārthasya saṁnidhau* || (PV Pratyakṣa 515).

²³² If an object, which is present, even though external, could prevent a third cognition from experiencing the immediately preceding one (i.e., the second), then no one could ever experience a cognition, since, if the chain of cognitions is stopped, the original cognition (i.e., the direct experience of the object) would be left unestablished. This is because there are no conditions in which other perceptual objects are not also present, for example a sound along with a visual cognition. If these other objects were able to stop the cognition of one specific object, there could never be any cognitions. Moreover, memory would be excluded, since it is based on a preceding *anubhava*, i.e., a direct experience of an object, and that experience would be impossible.

²³³ Cf. *atītādivikalpānām yeṣāṁ nārthasya saṁnidhiḥ | saṁcārakāraṇābhāvād utsīdeḥ arthacintanam* || (PV Pratyakṣa 517).

²³⁴ This is a comment on *gocarāntarasāñcāre* (TS 2025c). “There being the movement to other contents [of cognition].”

²³⁵ Cf. Tib. *don gzan la 'pho ba mi 'thad pa yin du chug mod* |. “We grant, indeed, that the shifting to another object is not logically possible.”

However, this might be [argued], “Precisely that subsequent cognition apprehends both the preceding cognition, which apprehends the other object, as well as the [new] object.”

Precisely this is not correct. To explain, when a cognition that apprehends a visual form occurs immediately after a cognition [that apprehends] a sound, then the manifestation of the sound — albeit having arisen [in awareness] in the [cognition that apprehends the sound] — would follow in the cognition that apprehends the visual form, because the cognition [apprehending] the sound would manifest [itself] in it. Also according to him [who admits] cognition as being devoid of images, apprehending the apprehender of a [sound] without apprehending the sound [itself] is not logical,²³⁶ for it is not logical to apprehend a staff-bearer that holds that [(i.e., a staff)]²³⁷ without apprehending the staff [itself]. Therefore, in a visual cognition that apprehends visual forms, there could be the appearance of a sound as well.²³⁸ In the same way, also in the case of conceptual cognitions (*cintā*) having the vowel “a,” etc., as an object[, that is, in the case of language], two words (*abhilāpa*) could synchronically exist in one, according to the above-mentioned rule (*nīti*). To explain, when one thinks of the vowel “a” immediately preceding the thought of the vowel “i,” then he thinks the cognition of the thought of the vowel “a” as also apprehending the vowel “i.” Therefore, it follows that the appearance of the expression of the vowel “i,” having risen (*samārūḍha*) [to awareness] in its own cognition, is in the cognition endowed with the expression of the vowel “a.” Furthermore, every single thing could appear twice since it would appear in

²³⁶ According to the *nirākāravādin*, one perceives a form that belongs to an external object; there is no perception of the form of the cognition, i.e., of the cognizer (*grāhakākāra*), since such a form does not exist for him. In fact, cognition is devoid of images; only objects are endowed with forms.

²³⁷ *Daṇḍin*, “staff-bearer,” is a classic example of *dravyaśabda*, a word denoting a substance. This is one of the five kinds of verbal designations expressed in Diñnāga’s PSV: *dravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viśānīti* | (PSV *ad* 1.3d, ed. p. 2, 11–12). On this passage in the PSV, cf. Hattori 1968: 25; 83–85. Hattori (1968: 83–84) points out that Diñnāga adopts his classification from the Vaiyākaraṇas, who distinguish four categories, but do not mention *dravyaśabda* (*Mahābhāṣya*, ed. p. 19, 20–21). As for the latter classification, he states that Diñnāga bases it upon *Mahābhāṣya*, ed. p. 1,6 ff. The quotation from the PSV is found in TSP *ad* TS 1223cd (ed. p. 452, 20). On this passage, cf. Funayama 1992: 77, particularly n. 121 for citation and reuse of the quotation in other texts. The idea is that a *dravyaśabda* entails the kind of relationship — suggested by the suffix *-in* — between the thing to which the name is applied and another thing. The reference here is to *viśayin*, cognition, as being endowed with an object (*viśaya*).

²³⁸ If the awareness of a new object is the same awareness that perceives the *grāhaka* of the preceding object, then, since one cannot apprehend that *grāhaka*-cognition of an object without apprehending the object itself, there would be the undesirable consequence of both a visual and an auditory object belonging to the same cognition. In other words, when a visual perception immediately follows an auditory one, that very cognition that perceives the *grāhaka* of the sound will also perceive the visual form arising at that moment. This is, of course, illogical, since a cognition can be either visual or auditory.

the moment of its own cognition and in the moment of the cognition of its own cognition. However, there is no such [twofold] appearance. Hence, the apprehending of two things [(i.e., the preceding cognition along with another object)] by the subsequent cognition is not logically tenable.²³⁹

However, this might be the [objection], “Let one final cognition be non-experienced and non-remembered, what defect could there be [with this?]” Therefore, [Śāntarākṣita] states, “there being the movement to other contents,” and so on. (TS 2025cd) Since the self-awareness [of cognition] is not admitted, [this final cognition] is not established by itself, nor is it established by another [cognition], since the defect of a *regressus ad infinitum* [would follow]. “If” this final [cognition] “is unestablished” — [*asiddhau satyām*, a locative absolute] — the preceding one will be unestablished as well²⁴⁰ since [it] has a non-perceived perceiver. And, therefore, the object will also be unestablished. Hence, nothing could ever be perceived. “And,” consequently, “the entire world” would fall into “blindness.”

Moreover, if, due to concern over the previously mentioned defect, the “final [cognition]” is admitted as being established merely “by itself” — by virtue of self-awareness — then, precisely like this, let the self-awareness of all of them be [admitted], since, with regard to being a cognition, there is no difference [among them]. The proof statement [is as follows]. A cognition does not depend on the activity of anything else for its own cognition, because it is a cognition, like the final cognition [of the series]; and the cognition that is the subject of dispute is a cognition. This is a logical reason as essential property. For, otherwise, that [(i.e., a cognition)] that is not established by itself, by virtue of having an insentient nature — like pots and so on — would be deprived of the very nature of cognition. Thus, a *pramāṇa* disproves [the presence of the logical reason in the opposite of the *sādhya*] (*bādhakapramāṇa*).²⁴¹ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2025–2027 ♦

“In the same way as [the] determination [of the eyes, etc.,]²⁴² concerning the fact of [their] illuminating, is observed [with regard to visual forms, etc.]”

²³⁹ The undesirable consequence of the opponent’s view is introduced as follows: the cognition of the thought of the vowel “a” cannot establish itself; therefore it requires the following cognition in order to be known. However, the following cognition is also the thought of the vowel “i.” Accordingly, this cognition will have two contents: the *grāhaka* of the thought of the vowel “a” and the thought of the vowel “i,” which is its *viśaya*. At the same time, every single thing will follow as appearing twice. It will appear in the cognition perceiving it as a *viśaya* and in the subsequent cognition, which perceives its *grāhaka*.

²⁴⁰ Cf. Tib. *sña ma sña ma yañ ma grub ste* |. “Every preceding cognition will be unestablished as well.”

²⁴¹ The pots and so on, which depend on something else for their own cognition, are not cognitions. Thus, the *pramāṇa* proves the relationship of identity between the property of being a cognition and that of not depending on anything else for its own cognition. It does so by demonstrating the absence of the logical reason where the opposite of the *sādhya* is present.

²⁴² Tib. here adds *mig la sogs pa*. “Regarding the eyes, etc.”

(TS 2014ab; ŚV ŚūV 186ab) In this respect, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “generating a cognition.”

2028. Generating a cognition regarding a visual form, an eye is [said to be] illuminating²⁴³ it. However, [a cognition is] not [illuminating], because it is sentient (*avabodha*). Hence, which is the similarity between that [(i.e., an eye)] and a cognition?

“An eye,” “generating” “a cognition” having a visual form as [its] object, is said [to be] “illuminating” a visual form. “However,” a cognition does nothing with regard to a visual form, since it has the nature of generator only regarding something that is immaterial;²⁴⁴ and doing nothing is not tenable as illuminating, because an overextension (*atiprasaṅga*) [would follow.] “Hence,” i.e., therefore. “Similarity,” i.e., likeness (*sādṛśya*). ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2028 ◇

2029. [If] the awareness of X (*yasya saṃvedanam*) is, necessarily, nothing other than the awareness of Y (*yatsaṃvedanam*), [then,] X is necessarily²⁴⁵ (i) non-distinct from Y, or else, (ii) not different from it,

2030. like (i) the own-nature of the cognition of a blue [thing] (which is non-distinct from itself), or else, like (ii) the second moon [(i.e., *uḍupa*)]. And this awareness of the image of a blue [thing]²⁴⁶ is[, indeed,] the awareness of the cognition of a blue [thing].²⁴⁷

In order to prove the non-difference between the image of a blue [thing], etc., and the cognition of it,²⁴⁸ [Śāntarakṣita] demonstrates [this] against the upholder of the [thesis that a] cognition is devoid of the image [of its object] by means of [the verse] beginning with “[if] the awareness of X.”

“The awareness of X” (*yasya saṃvedanam*), i.e., *yatsaṃvedanam*, exactly that and nothing else, is “the awareness of Y” (*yatsaṃvedanam*), i.e., *yasya saṃvedanam*. [Then,] “X,” i.e., what is expressed by the second word “*yat*”

²⁴³ Here, Tib. has *gsal byed min*. “Non-illuminating.”

²⁴⁴ Cf. Tib. *gzugs ñid de skyed par byed pa’i phyir ro* |. “Since it is [endowed with the nature of] generating precisely that form.”

²⁴⁵ *Dhruvam* in *pāda* b is an example of *kākāṅṣigolakanyāya*, also known as *kākāṅṣagolakanyāya*, the maxim of the crow’s eyeball. Since crows were popularly believed to have only one eye, going from one cavity to the other, this maxim is used to indicate a word that appears only once in a sentence, but refers to two portions of it.

²⁴⁶ This is the subject, which is parallel to *yasya saṃvedanam*.

²⁴⁷ This is the predicate, which is parallel to *yatsaṃvedanam*.

²⁴⁸ Here, Kamalaśīla intends this argument (namely, the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument) as a demonstration of the non-difference between an image and its awareness. In the statement of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument as referred to by Kamalaśīla in the immediately following passage, Dharmakīrti talks about the non-difference between blue (*nīla*) and its cognition (*taddhī*). Cf. *infra*.

[(i.e., *yasya*)] is conclusively understood to be non-different “from Y,” i.e., from what is expressed by the first word “*ya*” [(i.e., *ya*)]. Or else,²⁴⁹ otherwise, the non-difference is the *sādhya*. The point is as follows. That awareness that is non-separate from a thing (*yasmāt*) is non-different from it (*tasmāt*), “like” “the cognition of a blue [thing]” [is non-distinct] from its own *svabhāva*. “Or else” “like” “the second moon” (*uḍuḥ* means *candramas*), which appears in a cognition of someone suffering from dimness [of vision].²⁵⁰ The *pakṣadharmā* is summarized (*pakṣadharmopasaṃhāra*) with [TS 2030c, namely,] “and this [awareness of the image of a blue (thing)] is[, indeed,] the awareness of the cognition of a blue [thing].” Here, the property-bearers are the image of a blue [thing] and its cognition. Their being non-different is the property to be established. The “necessity of being perceived together” (*sahopalambhaniyama*), as [previously] stated, is the logical reason. The intended meaning of the logical reason [put forward] in the argument of the master [(i.e., Dharmakīrti)] — i.e., “because of the necessity of being perceived together” (*sahopalambhaniyamāt*) etc. (PVin 1.54ab)²⁵¹ — is, indeed, of this sort.

In this respect, however, Bhadanta Śubhagupta states that this logical reason is contradictory, since:

Moreover, the word ‘together,’ in common [linguistic] usage, is nowhere [used] without [there being] another [thing]. Therefore, if there is [the fact of] being perceived together, this logical reason is contradictory.²⁵² (BASK 71)²⁵³

²⁴⁹ This is a comment on *vā* in TS 2029d.

²⁵⁰ On *timira*, see Tillemans 1990: vol. I 236 n. 156, 275–276 n. 370. For the identification of floaters with *timira* disease, see Chu 2004: 131 n. 67.

²⁵¹ Cf. PVin 1.54ab; see Sanskrit Text. Dharmakīrti also deals with the topic in PV Pratyakṣa: *sakṛt saṃvedyamānasya nīyamena dhīyā saha | viśayasya tato 'nyatvaṃ kenākāreṇa sidhyati ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 387) *bhedas ca bhrāntivijñānair dṛṣyetendāv ivādvaye | saṃvittinīyamo nāsti bhinnayor nīlapātayoḥ ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 388) *nārtho 'saṃvedanaḥ kaścīd anartham vāpi vedanam | dṛṣṭaṃ saṃvedyamānam tat tayoḥ nāsti vivekitā ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 389) *tasmād arthasya durvāraṃ jñānakālāva-bhāsināḥ | jñānād avyatiṛekitvaṃ [...]* (PV Pratyakṣa 390abc). “With regard to an object that is brought to awareness, necessarily simultaneously with [its] cognition, by virtue of which image is its being different from that [cognition] established? Moreover, [their] difference can be seen by people having erroneous cognitions, like when two moons are [actually] one. There is no necessity of being aware of two distinct [things, like] blue and yellow. There is no object that is not brought to awareness, or else an awareness, even though devoid of an object, is [always] observed as being brought to awareness. Hence, there is no difference between those two [(i.e., the object and its awareness)]. Therefore, the non-difference of an object that appears at the moment of [its] cognition from [that] cognition follows necessarily [...]” On these verses, cf. Vetter 1964: 73–74; Eltschinger 2005: 166 and n. 34. Iwata (1991 vol. 1: 15–18) also mentions PV Pratyakṣa 333–335. On the topic, see Matsumoto 1980a; Iwata 1991; Taber 2010; Kellner 2011b: 419–424; Matsuoka 2011; Matsuoka 2014b.

²⁵² Śubhagupta refutes Dharmakīrti’s argument showing that the logical reason, *sahopalambhaniyamāt*, is contradictory, because the word “together” (*saha*) is used only when two separate things are intended. Therefore, the logical reason is proved as being present in the

Precisely this is not correct. The logical reason is contradictory when it is present only in heterogeneous instances (*vipakṣa*). However, this [*hetu*] is not present only in heterogeneous instances, because [it is] present also in homologous instances. To explain, in common usage, there is the erroneous conception of the co-perception²⁵⁴ of two moons; but, ultimately, there is no difference between them.²⁵⁵

Additionally, if [it is argued that] there are those who say, “we perceive two moons together,” [the reply will be that] in this case too it is like this. The word “together” is used based on an imagined difference — thinking as a second one of an image that appears as if it were external, though it is no different from [its] cognition. For not every linguistic interaction is according to the state of matter,²⁵⁶ whereby, through the mere use of the word “together,” there would be the diversity of an evidential verbal expression (*liṅga*) connected with some thing, because of which the logical reason would be contradictory.²⁵⁷

heterogeneous instances, i.e., in the case of two things being distinct. By the same token, this logical reason cannot be present in the instances homologous to the subject, where the *sādhya*, i.e., the non-difference, can be found; on the contrary, it is always and only found with the opposite of the *sādhya*.

²⁵³ According to Matsumoto (1980a: 270 n. 21), the meaning of this verse is explained in the *Anekāntajayapatākā*: *sahopalambhaniyamād ity ayam tāvad viparyayasādhakatvād viruddhaḥ, sahasābdasyārthāntareṇa vinā prayogādarśanāt, sahopalambhād eva bhīmatvaṃ nīlasya taddhiyaḥ | iti viparyaya-siddhiḥ |* (*Anekāntajayapatākā* 5, ed. p. 57, 3–5). “‘Because of the necessity of being perceived together,’ indeed this [logical reason] is contradictory, because it establishes the opposite [of the *sādhya*]. Since one never observes the use of the word ‘together’ without another object, precisely because of [their] being perceived together, the difference between a blue [thing] and its cognition is [established]. Therefore, the opposite [of the *sādhya*] is established.” BASK 71, in its Tibetan translation, is also found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (ed. p. 130, 12–15), with a variant in *pāda* d (*‘di gal lo* instead of *‘gal ba’an yin*). As noted by Matsumoto (1980a: 269 n. 30), Haribhadra Sūri refers to this verse again in the following: *loke ca nārthāntareṇa vinā sahasābdhaprayogo dṛṣṭa iti katham ayam ekārthavācako yuktārūpaḥ syāt |* (*Anekāntajayapatākā* 5, ed. p. 59, 8–9).

²⁵⁴ The term *sahopalambha* is mostly translated as “co-perception.” The term *sahopalambhaniyama*, instead, is translated as “the necessity of being perceived together.”

²⁵⁵ In common linguistic usage, when referring to the two moons perceived by a person affected by eye disease, one uses the word “together,” in spite of knowing that the two moons do not exist. Therefore, it is not true that this word can only be used when two actually existing things are implied.

²⁵⁶ On the idea that language does not reflect the reality of things, cf., for example: *vaktṛvyāpāraviśayo yo ’rtho buddhau prakāśate | prāmāṇyaṃ tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam ||* (PV *Pramāṇasiddhi* 2). The meaning of words is never connected with something real, existing externally. They cannot indicate the true reality of *śvalakṣaṇas*, since the latter can be apprehended only by perception. Instead, a word makes reference only to a mental image present in the mind of the speaker, and it is a *pramāṇa* only insofar as it conveys the linguistic intentions of the speaker, not because it indicates the true reality of things. For translations of this verse, cf. Franco 1997: 54 n. 21 and Dunne 2004: 382.

²⁵⁷ Kamalaśīla’s argument is meant to prove that Śubhagupta’s objection is not valid, because: (i) regarding the example of the two moons, the use of the word *saha* is based on an imagined difference, with reference to a second moon that, in reality, is non-distinct from its cognition;

Furthermore, that very [Bhadanta Śubhagupta] states,²⁵⁸ “If the word ‘together’ means ‘one,’ then the logical reason is unestablished.”²⁵⁹ To explain, in the case of public sights of dancers, the moon or wrestlers, there is not a perception by only one [individual]²⁶⁰ (cf. BASK 72);²⁶¹ nor, with reference to a blue [thing], etc., is there the perception by only one of a blue [thing] and its perception. To explain, because, even though there is the perception of a blue [thing], there is no perception of the [other] perceptions of it relating to other mental continuums; and, since (*yadā*) the omniscient [Buddha] knows every mental instant of every living being, then how can the perception by only one be established? (cf. BASK 73).²⁶² Moreover, the necessity of being perceived by [only] one (*ekopalambhaniyama*) is established [only] if there is the denial (*niṣedha*) of [there occurring] a perception by another [being]. However, it is not possible to deny the perception by another [being], since it is illogical to affirm or deny [something that is] essentially remote (*svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa*)²⁶³ (cf. BASK 74).²⁶⁴ [Moreover,] if the word ‘together’ is [used] as intending ‘synchronically,’ then:

and (ii) words are grounded in conceptualization and do not reflect the reality of things. Moreover, some of them do not necessarily indicate the state of matter even in a conventionally true way. Accordingly, one cannot infer the real existence of some thing because of the use of one certain word that defines it, and employing the word “together” does not necessarily imply the presence of two different objects. Therefore, the logical reason cannot be considered contradictory.

²⁵⁸ The following argument is a paraphrase of BASK 72–73–74 and includes a literal quotation of BASK 68. Cf. Introduction §6.2.

²⁵⁹ The reason is unestablished as it is not proved that a blue thing and its perception are endowed with the property of being perceived by only one person. He continues by adducing some examples in which things are in fact apprehended by many perceptions (belonging to many mental continuums), not just one. Moreover, the Buddha himself is admitted as perceiving every mental instant of every living being (thereby including that single perception by only one person that would be admitted by the opponent). Therefore, in the case of blue, etc., its perception cannot be experienced by just one individual. On this, see also Matsumoto 1980a: 292–290. Kataoka (*Nyāyamañjarī* Vijnānādvaitavāda, ed. p. 34, 9) quotes this passage as referred to by Bhaṭṭa Jayanta.

²⁶⁰ Cf. Tib. *lta ba po gcig kho nas dmigs pa* [...]. “A perception by only one seer [...].”

²⁶¹ Cf. *gal te lhan cig sgra gcig don || de ltaḥ gžan la ma grub ṅid || thun mon gi ni dños po la || gcig pus ji ltar mthon ba yin ||* (BASK 72). “If the word ‘together’ means one, [the logical reason] is therefore unestablished for the adversary. With regard to a common thing, how is the observation by only one (*gcig pu/*eka*) [individual possible]?” Matsumoto (1980a: 294) translates (*gcig/*eka*) as “same.” The first two *pādas* are quoted in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’*: *gal te lhan cig sgra gcig don || de lta’an gžan la (las P) ma grub ṅid || (Blo gsal grub mtha’*, ed. p. 131, 12–13).

²⁶² Cf. *gal te thams cad mkhyen pa yi || ye śes śes bya sems kun na || de tshes gcig pu kho na yis || dmigs pa grub pa gaṇ du brjod ||* (BASK 73). “If every mind is cognized by the cognition of the Omniscient [Buddha], then, where is it stated that a perception by only one [individual] is established?”

²⁶³ Eltschinger (2014: 193) translates this term as “out of cognitive reach, in terms of intrinsic nature.”

²⁶⁴ Cf. *gžan gyis dmigs pa ’gog pa ni || tshad ma min pas mi ’grub ste || raṇ bžin bskal pa yin pas na || de phyir the tshom ma grub bo ||* (BASK 74). “The negation of the perception by another is not

Because of [the instances of] a mind known by the Buddha or mind and mental states, in every respect, as intending ‘synchronically’ the logical reason is inconclusive. (BASK 68)²⁶⁵

In the same way, as there is truly the necessity of being perceived together and, certainly, dissimilarity between a mind belonging to another continuum known by the Bhagavān Buddha and the cognition of the Buddha [himself], similarly, [also] mind and mental states, even though they are perceived together, are not one. Therefore, the logical reason is inconclusive.”²⁶⁶

All this is incorrect. For, in this case, this meaning, i.e., “one-perception [means] perception by only one” is not intended. However, [the meaning is] rather [that] there is only one perception of the cognition and the cognized — mutually, not separately. The point is as follows. What is, indeed, the perception of a cognition is precisely [also the perception] of the cognized. [And] what is, indeed, [the perception] of a cognized is precisely [also the perception] of the cognition.²⁶⁷ And, in the case of public sights of dancers, the moon or wrestlers, there is no perception of a cognition that is not endowed with the nature of perception of the cognized; nor [is there] perception of a cognized [that is] not endowed with the nature of perception of the cognition. Therefore, why is the [logical reason] unestablished?²⁶⁸ Moreover, there is not even a dubious unestablishedness (*sandigdhasiddhatā*).

established because of the absence of a *pramāṇa* [to prove it,] since [that perception] is essentially remote. Therefore, there is a dubious non-establishment.” The direct perception (and consequently the inference) cannot establish or refute the existence of perceptions in other mental continuums. Every perception can establish itself, but cannot go beyond itself to establish the existence of another perception.

²⁶⁵ The Tibetan translation of this verse is found identically in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 131, 21–24).

²⁶⁶ If the word “*saha*” means “synchronically,” then the logical reason will be inconclusive, since it also applies to two instances that are heterogeneous to the subject, namely, things that are different from each other yet perceived simultaneously. This is the case with the Buddha perceiving every mental instant belonging to the continuums of other sentient beings, as well as minds and mental states. On this passage and the parallel passage found in *Anekāntajayapatākā*, see Matsumoto 1980a: 271 n. 16, 292.

²⁶⁷ This passage, *jñānājñeyayoh parasparam eka evopalambho na prthag iti | ya eva hi jñānopalambhaḥ sa eva jñeyasya | ya eva jñeyasya sa eva jñānasyeti yāvat*, is quoted in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'*: *śes pa dan śes bya dag ni phan tshun gcig pa nīd du dmigs pa yin gyi logs śig tu ni ma yin no || des na śes pa dmigs pa gañ yin pa de kho na śes bya dmigs pa yin la | śes bya dmigs pa gañ yin pa de kho na śes pa dmigs pa yin no źes slob dpon Ka ma la śi las gsuñs pa'i phyir [...]* (*Blo gsal grub mtha'*, ed. p. 132, 4–7). The author quotes Kamalaśīla within a passage concerning the debate on the *sahopalambhaniyama* thesis. Specifically, according to Mimaki (1987–1988: 280 and n. 22), he provides the quotation in order to refute BASK 59–60, two verses connected with the perception of atoms by the Bodhisattva of the eighth stage (*bhūmi*).

²⁶⁸ Matsumoto (1980a: 278) notes that this paragraph is found almost identically in the PVinT. As a matter of fact, it is slightly different. Cf. *gar dan gyad la lta ba la sogs pa mams la gañ śes bya dmigs par mi 'gyur ba'i śes pa ni 'ga' yañ yod pa ma yin no || de bas ni śes bya mi dmigs par śes pa dmigs pa'am || śes pa mi dmigs par śes bya dmigs pa ni 'ga' yañ yod pa ma yin no śes mam pa gśan nīd 'gog pa yin gyi | dmigs pa thams cad la tha dad pa nīd 'gog pa ni ma yin no ||* (PVinT 185b₃₋₅).

To explain, also the opponent who upholds the [theory of the existence of] external objects²⁶⁹ admits that precisely that which is the self-awareness of cognition is [the cognition] of an object.²⁷⁰ Imagining this — that “one-perception is the perception of only one thing [analyzing the compound with a genitive, i.e., *ekasyaivopalambha*]” — the [opponent] should consider that defect of unestablishedness, which was [previously] stated, as being discarded, since [he] certainly does not admit the [other] thesis.²⁷¹

Additionally, the mental instants existing in other mental continuums are not determined by the mind of the Bhagavān Buddha, because that Bhagavān is devoid of the stains [of the false concepts] of apprehended and apprehender, due to the cessation of all obstacles. According to what was said:

For him there is no apprehended nor apprehension, therefore

²⁶⁹ Here the opponent is most likely Śubhagupta, even though a reference to other non-Buddhist opponents may also be implied. The definition as *bāhyārthavādin* may just be a general reference to the fact of defending a theory of the existence of external objects of cognitions. On the term “*bāhyārthavāda*” and its connection with the Sautrāntika, see Introduction n. 20, 77, 78 and 289.

²⁷⁰ Tib. has *de ñid kyī don yin no* for *tad evārthasya*. According to Matsumoto (1980a: 285), here Kamalaśīla is referring to the Sautrāntika point of view that the result of a cognition is self-cognition, as explained in PV Pratyakṣa 341–353 and PVin 1.41–43 (ed. p. 36, 7–37, 12).

²⁷¹ According to Kamalaśīla, the intended meaning is not “by one,” but rather that there is only one, identical perception, which is that of both the apprehender and the apprehended together — the apprehension of one is always also the apprehension of the other. In every moment of one’s own life, with regard to the objects of one’s own awareness, one does not apprehend two images, one belonging to the external object and the other belonging to its perception, but rather only one. In this sense, the logical reason cannot be regarded as unestablished because also in the case of public sights, each person experiences only one perception of the apprehended and apprehender together. Even for the opponent, this is undoubtedly the case. Since he admits that a cognition is cognized as apprehending an object, he will also acknowledge that there is only one perception and not two (i.e., one of the apprehended and one of the apprehender). Subhagupta, in fact, discusses the logical reason as meaning *ekasyaivopalambha* in BASK 77–79 (for their translation, see Appendix 4), pointing out that a cognition cannot be known by itself and cannot be the mere cognition of an object; rather, the two of them, both cognition and object, are part of the same causal complex that makes the object known. According to Matsumoto (1980a: 286), this passage in the TSP is the answer to Śubhagupta’s argument as expounded in BASK 74 (cf. n. 264). His interpretation of the passage is as follows. If the opponent (Śubhagupta) intends the logical reason as unestablished due to the interpretation of *ekopalambha* as *ekasyaivopalambha*, then for the Vijñānavādins that is not valid, because they do not admit that interpretation. Rather, Kamalaśīla maintains that there is an identical perception of an object as well as its cognition. Moreover, since the opponent admits the thesis that every cognition of an object is self-cognition of the cognition, he also accepts that identity and the logical reason as established. According to Matsumoto, Kamalaśīla is treating Śubhagupta as a Sautrāntika. The whole argument, however, is introduced as being aimed at the upholder of cognitions being devoid of the image of external objects.

[He is] devoid also of apprehensibility by another cognition.²⁷²

However, the complete execution is only by virtue of the innate power (*ādhipatyā*).²⁷³ According to what was said, “Action for the other’s sake flows perpetually and effortlessly, produced by the preceding vows.”

[Śāntarakṣita] will state, “[The Buddha] is admitted as being omniscient, since he acts for the sake of all beings (*sarvārthakāritvāt*)” (cf. *karoty eva lokānām arthasamṣadam* TS 2048c2d).²⁷⁴ Therefore, the logical reason is not unestablished.

[Śubhagupta objects,] “However, the Master Dharmakīrti — who expounds the *pūrvapakṣa* with the following, ‘and if [it is argued that], at first, there is the perception of an object because of its proximity, since it is the cause of the cognition, and then, [subsequently, the perception] of the awareness’ (PVin *ad* 1.54cd)²⁷⁵ — shows that, in this [passage], the word ‘together’ means ‘synchrony’ and not ‘non-difference.’ For, if ‘synchronical’ is intended, it is logical for the adversary to put forward a difference of time, but not if there is a non-difference.”²⁷⁶

[The reply will be that,] no, [it is not like this,] since a difference of time is pervaded by a difference of things. Putting forward a difference of time in order to prove the manifoldness of perceptions is very logical indeed because, with reference to the pervaded [property], there is non-deviation with the pervading [property].²⁷⁷ Neither is the logical reason inconclusive because of [the instance of] a mind known by the Buddha. For, in this case, there is not the necessity of one perception [if we interpret *ekopālabha* as a

²⁷² Cf. Tib. *de la gzun (bzun P) bya med cin ’dzin pa yod ma yin || de phyir ses pa gzan gyis gzun (bzun P) bya na yan ston ||*. The verse could equally be translated as: “For him there is no apprehended, by him there is no apprehension; [He is] also devoid of apprehensibility by another cognition.” This verse in its Tibetan translation is found identically in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* (ed. p. 133, 14–15).

²⁷³ Here, I follow the translation by McClintock (2010: 38, 355).

²⁷⁴ According to McClintock (2010: 353 n. 764), this refers to TS 2048–2049. She also notes that Kajiyama (1965a: 9 n. 1) regards this passage as an affirmation of solipsism, which is contradictory to earlier statements in the same chapter. She points out that Kajiyama (1965a: 10 n. 2) indicates it as written from the perspective of absolute truth, while the others are stated from the perspective of the relative truth.

²⁷⁵ For an English translation and analysis of this passage, cf. Kellner 2011: 420.

²⁷⁶ An opponent, likely Śubhagupta, referring to Dharmakīrti as an authority, argues that *saha* must necessarily mean “synchronical.” Since the *pūrvapakṣa* is focused on the difference of time between an object and its cognition (and not on an ontological difference), it would make no sense for Dharmakīrti to respond to such an objection by adducing an unrelated property, such as their ontological non-difference. For Dharmakīrti’s reply to the above-mentioned *pūrvapakṣa* in PVin *ad* 1.54cd, see Kellner 2011b: 420–423.

²⁷⁷ Kamalaśīla answers that it is very much logical to advance a difference of time as evidence in order to prove an ontological difference between things. Since the difference of time is pervaded by the ontological difference of things, there is no deviation; namely there are no things existing in different times that are identical. Hence, also if *saha* means synchronical, what is proved is that two things perceived at the same time are non-different.

karmadhāraya],²⁷⁸ since indeed everyone is individually aware of their own mind. Therefore, there is indeed no deviation (*vyabhicāra*) because of [the instance of] mind and mental states since those too are individually aware of themselves.²⁷⁹

Or else[, as an alternative interpretation,] we grant (*bhavatu*) the awareness of another's mind by the Bhagavān's mind. Nevertheless, there is no inconclusiveness, because [the awareness of another's mind by the Buddha and the awareness of his own mind] are necessarily separate. For, [in the case] of two [perceivers] of which also the diversity of perception reciprocally occurs,²⁸⁰ the [awareness] is necessarily separate. However, instead, regarding the perceptions [themselves], there is not a difference in terms of [their] particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) due to a difference of time or continuum.²⁸¹ Therefore, the meaning is as follows, "The perception of X is nothing other than the perception of Y[, i.e., that perception of X], nothing else."²⁸² And the perception of a mind relating to another continuum is not at all [the same as] the perception of the Bhagavān's cognition, nor is the perception of the Bhagavān's cognition [the same as] the perception of the mind relating to another continuum at all, †[...]†²⁸³ because of the

²⁷⁸ Here, Kamalaśīla is responding to BASK 68. There, one finds the term *sahopalambhaniyama* (as meaning "the necessity of being perceived simultaneously") and not *ekopalambhaniyama*. T_{2P} reads *lhan cig dmigs pa nes pa/*sahopalambhaniyama* instead of *ekopalambhaniyama*.

²⁷⁹ There is no inconclusiveness if one considers the instance of the Buddha apprehending all mental instants of every continuum, since the logical reason intended as *ekopalambhaniyama* (where *ekopalambha* is a *karmadhāraya*), meaning "the necessity of one perception," does not apply in that case. In fact, when the Buddha perceives other minds, there is not just one perception, because the mental instants are also perceived by each single mind separately. In other words, there is more than one perception, each of them in turn being a perception of the cognized as well as of the cognition. By the same token, with reference to mind and mental states, there is no one single perception of them, since they are also perceived separately. Therefore, there is no deviation. The opponent cannot prove that the property that is the *ekopalambhaniyama* is found along with the property of being different, i.e., the opposite of the *sādhyā*. According to Matsumoto (1980a: 278), a passage that "corresponds almost word for word" to this paragraph can be found in the PVinT. As a matter of fact, it is slightly different. Cf. *gañ yañ bcom ldan 'das kyi ses bya dan thug la lhan cig dmigs pa nes pa yod kyañ | tha dad pa med pa ni ma yin no zes smras pa de ni mi rigs te | gañ gi phyir de la ni lhan cig dmigs pa nes pa ñid med de | tha dad pa ñid du rgyud gzan gyis rañ gi sems dmigs pa'i phyir ro | de ñid kyi phyir sems dan sems las byun bas kyañ 'khrul par 'gyur ba ma yin te | de dag rnams kyañ so sor bdag ñid yañ dag par rig pa'i phyir ro ||* (PVinT 185b₅₋₇).

²⁸⁰ Cf. Tib. *gañ dag phan tshun dmigs pa sna tshogs pa ñid srid pa gañ yin pa [...]*.

²⁸¹ Every perception is identical with its *svalakṣaṇa*, while things of which there are two separate perceptions are necessarily different.

²⁸² Cf. TS 2029ab.

²⁸³ This part of the text may be corrupted, perhaps even at a very early stage, before the Tibetan translation. The Sanskrit text here reads: *api tv anyo 'pi | prthak svasya svasyāpi cittasya samvedanāt*. "But yet it is also different, because of the awareness of each [one's] own mind separately, too." Tib. has *'on kyañ gzan du ni ma yin te | rañ rañ gi sems so sor rig pa'i phyir ro |*. "But yet it is also non-different, because of the awareness of their respective mind separately." Given the previous argument, one would expect the adversative conjunction to be followed by

awareness also of one's own mind. Therefore, there is no deviation because of [the instance of] visual forms and light, since light is experienced also by itself [(i.e., without visual forms)], and since visual forms are perceived in the absence of light by some beings. Accordingly, since the presence [of the logical reason] does not occur in the heterogeneous instance, the logical reason is not inconclusive.²⁸⁴ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2029–2030 ◇

Let the following be the case, “Even if the presence [of the logical reason] is not ascertained in the heterogeneous instance, it is dubious nonetheless²⁸⁵ and, therefore, the logical reason is indeed inconclusive, because of [its] dubious exclusion from the heterogeneous instance (*sandigdhavīpakṣavyāvṛtti*). To explain, because [they are] restricted (*niyata*) [to each other] as being an object (*viśaya*) and its cognition (*viśayin*), the necessity of being perceived together is indeed possible also otherwise, because the *svabhāva* of a cognition is nothing but [that of being an] apprehender, due to [its] having the property of apprehending the object; moreover, the *svabhāva* of that object is nothing aside from [the being] apprehended by that [(i.e., the cognition)]; and since these two are dependent on one [causal] complex (*sāmagryadhīna*),

“non-different,” like in Tib. An emendation like *nānyo* is possible. However, the subsequent logical reason explains why they are different, and not why they are non-different. A possibility could be that a gloss of the kind “*api tu nānyo 'pi*” entered the text at an early stage and was, accordingly, translated by Tib. This being the case, the logical reason *prthak svasya svasyāpi cittasya samvedanāt* would be the explanation of what precedes, namely the statement of the difference between the perception of the Bhagavān's cognition and the perception of the mind belonging to another continuum. At the same time, here one would also indeed expect a declaration of their non-difference, inasmuch as they are always and only experienced together as being the *grāhya* and *grāhaka* of the same cognition. In fact, what follows indicates that there is no deviance in consideration of the light and visual forms, since they are also experienced separately and not always together. Note that K tries to solve the incongruence by emending the first *svasya* with *tv aśya*. Ś follows him. I do not find that emendation plausible, nor useful. Perhaps conjecturing a text where the two sentences were inverted, namely, “*prthak svasya svasyāpi cittasya samvedanāt | api tu nānyo 'pi*,” would better suit the whole argumentation. However, this is not very likely.

²⁸⁴ Cf. *rūpālokayos tu tajjñānotpādanayogyatāpratīlambhalakṣaṇo 'sti pratibandha indriyayogyatotpattilakṣaṇo veti nānāloko rūpopalambhaḥ syāt kāryasya kāraṇāvyabhicārāt | nāntarīyakatayālokaḥ saha rūpeṇa grāhyalakṣaṇatvād grhyeta* | [ed.: *na vā*; Tib. (Vetter 1966: 96, 2): *yañ na*] *kevalasyāpy ālokasya darśanād anālokasya vā rūpasya kaiścit prāṇiśeṣair iti na tayor api sahopalambhaniyamah | nīlākārasamvedanayos tu nīyama eva* | *na sa nānātve yuktah nīlapīṭavat* || (PVin *ad* 1.54ab, ed. p. 40, 4–10). “However, with reference to visual forms and light, there is a relationship characterized by obtaining the ability of producing the [visual] cognition of those [visual forms] or else characterized by the arising of the ability [of perceiving that visual form] of the sense organs. Therefore, there cannot be perception of visual forms without light, since there is no deviance of the effect with the cause. Light can be apprehended as inherent along with visual forms, since it has the characteristic of being apprehended. Since light is observed also by itself, or since visual forms are observed by certain beings in absence of light, therefore, there is no necessity of being perceived together of either of the two[, i.e., light and visual forms,]. However, there is, indeed, [this] necessity with reference to a blue form and [its] awareness; and this is not logical if there is a difference [between them], like [that of] blue and yellow.”

²⁸⁵ But cf. T_{2D}: *the tshom za ba ni ma yin no* | |. “It is not dubious.”

they always appear together. Moreover, although there is no difference regarding [the fact of] arising together, there is not the undesirable consequence of the eyes, etc., being an object [of cognition], since they lack that sort of essence. To explain, by virtue of the [causal] complex, a cognition is generated only as determining (*adhyavasāya*) an object, such as a blue [thing], etc., but not as determining the eyes and so on. Moreover, a blue [thing], etc., is generated as being determined by that [cognition], [while] the eyes and so on are not.²⁸⁶ Additionally, [Śubhagupta] says:

There is no other apprehender besides cognition, [and] there is no sensory cognition without objects. And therefore, the [fact of] being aware [of them] together²⁸⁷ is not because of the non-difference of a blue [thing] and its cognition. (BASK 66)

But [it is] precisely the preceding (*pūrvikā*) [causal] complex [that] can make the instant of the object cognized, in the same way that a visual form [is lit up] by light, by which there can be [their] being brought to awareness together.”²⁸⁸ (BASK 81)

In this respect, [Śāntarākṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “the nature of cognition.”

2031. “The nature of cognition is not the nature of something else;” [accordingly,] in being aware of the cognition of a blue [thing], how can there be the awareness of the form of a blue

²⁸⁶ Śubhagupta objects that there is a doubt regarding the presence of the logical reason in a dissimilar case. A cognition and its object are different, the cognition having the nature of being the awareness of the object and the object having the nature of being the object of the cognition. Accordingly, they must be perceived together because they are part of that same causal complex that is that perception, not because they are identical. With reference to this, cf. Introduction §6.2. Matsumoto (1980a: 272–271 n. 15) refers to this passage as a possible fragment of the autocommentary and notes that similar arguments are found in the *Anekāntajayapatākā*. Cf. *na cābhedasya sahopalambhaniyamasya ca vyāpyavyāpakabhāvaḥ, anyathāpy asyāvirodhāt jñānajñeyatatsvabhāvatvata eva nīyamopapattēḥ, jñānasyārthagrahaṇasvabhāvasya sataḥ svasamviditarūpatvāt citrasvabhāvatayā tathātvāvirodhāt, arthasya ca jñānaviviktatayā tathā tathā tadgrāhyasvabhāvatvāt | ity api sahopalambhaniyama upapadyata eva, tadyogyatālakṣaṇapratibandha-sāmarthyād iti* | (*Anekāntajayapatākā* 5, ed. p. 63, 6–12). Cf. also *gzan yan nes pa'i rgyu mtshan yod pas bye brag yod < pa? > la lhan cig dmigs par nes pa gzugs dan snan ba bz'in no* || [...] *nes pa'i rgyu mtshan yod de | tshogs pa gcig pa'i dba'i ŋid yin no* | (*Sahopalambhaniyamasiddhi*, ed. p. 260, 24–26 [...] p. 260, 28–29). For an analysis of this passage, see also Matsumoto 1980a: 292.

²⁸⁷ Cf. *de phyir lhan cig rig pas na* || *sion po de'i blo gcig phyir min* || (BASK 66cd). If one were to accept the reading *rig pas*, the translation would be, “and therefore, [the logical reason] ‘since there is an awareness [of them] together’ does not [mean] ‘because of the non-difference of the blue [thing] and its cognition.’” Cf. Tib. *de lta yin dan lhan cig rig* || *sio dan de blo gcig ma yin* ||. Matsumoto (1980a: 297) emends to *lhan cig rig pa ni*. On this, cf. Introduction n. 264.

²⁸⁸ On this, cf. Introduction §6.2 and n. 266. Matsumoto (1980a: 293) translates this as follows: “Only the preceding aggregate of causes produces the moment of the object occurring together with the cognition, just as it produces the color occurring together with the light, which makes the simultaneous perception possible.”

[thing], if there is not, indeed, a non-difference of these two
[(i.e., the awareness and the form of a blue thing)]?²⁸⁹

For, with regard to something different, the necessity of being perceived together is not logical without [admitting any invariable] relation (*pratibandha*) [between them], because of an overextension. And, in this case, in being aware of something different, there is no [invariable] relation. To explain, provided there is an [invariable] relation, it can be either identity (*tādātmya*) or production (*tadutpatti*). Firstly, identity is not admitted by the adversary in this case, because precisely this is the *sādhya*;²⁹⁰ nor is [the fact of] being aware [of them] together because of production, since there is no relationship of cause and effect between two things arising together²⁹¹ and because of the undesirable consequence of the perception of the eyes, etc., as well.

Nor by force of the preceding [causal] complex will the relationship between “object” and “cognition” be [admitted] by virtue of mere simultaneity due to the [resulting] undesirable consequence of mind and mental states, as well as the eyes, etc., being the object and cognition of one another. Nor is it logical [for Śubhagupta] to state that “there is no overextension, because [they are] generated as an object and a cognition restricted [to each other] (*pratiniyata*) by virtue of the [causal] complex,” because precisely [this] fact of being an object and a cognition is unestablished, inasmuch as it is being investigated. For, provided that the [invariable] relation is established, the relationship between an object and a cognition is logical, inasmuch as precisely this [invariable] relation is investigated (*vicāryate*) in establishing the relationship of an object and a cognition. Additionally, there is no other [invariable] relation apart from identity and production, due to which the relationship between object and cognition could be established. And it is not ascertained that the relationship between object and cognition is logical, neither by virtue of identity nor by virtue of production. Therefore, there is in no way any co-perception of something different.²⁹² So why is the logical reason endowed with a dubious exclusion from the heterogeneous instances? ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2031 ◇

²⁸⁹ Tib. is slightly different: *gal te tha mi dad yin na || śes pa'i bdag űid gzan bdag min || śes bya sñon po'i blo rig ni || des sñon (sno D) mam pa ji ltar rig ||*.

²⁹⁰ The identity between the two, awareness and a blue thing, would imply accepting a blue thing as an image in cognition. However, precisely this is not admitted by the *nirākāravādin* and is, indeed, that which is being disputed here.

²⁹¹ This argument has already been established in TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991, where Kamalaśīla, making reference to Dharmakīrti, proves that cause and effect cannot be simultaneous. Cf. also Introduction §5.6.

²⁹² Śubhagupta admits that, regarding an object and its cognition, one can conventionally talk about co-perception, since they arise in continuity. However, that co-perception is ultimately not real. Cf. BASK 82; see Introduction n. 274.

[In the verse] beginning with “and all this awareness [that was previously discussed],” [Śāntarākṣita] states also the second proof (*sādhana*) in order to establish that [a cognition] is endowed with images.

2032. And all this awareness [that was previously discussed] (*saṃvedanam idaṃ sarvaṃ*) has no other object[, distinct from itself,] as [its] content (*gocara*), because it has the *svabhāva* of awareness, like self-awareness.²⁹³

Every [thing] that is awareness has no other object (*artha*) besides cognition as [its] content (*viśaya*), “like” “self-awareness” (*ātmasaṃvedana*); and this [awareness] of the image of a blue [thing], etc., is awareness (*saṃvedana*).²⁹⁴ Therefore, there is the cognition of the [entity that is] pervaded by what is contradictory (*viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*), since awareness is pervaded by the fact of not having another object as [its] content, which is[, in turn,] contradicted by the fact of[, indeed,] having another object as [its] content.²⁹⁵ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2032 ♦

To precisely prove this pervasion, [Śāntarākṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “[a cognition] does not apprehend.”

2033. [A cognition] does not apprehend [an external] object directly (*mukhyataḥ*), since it is established in its own *svabhāva*; nor indirectly (*bhaktitaḥ*), by virtue of the impression (*uparāga*) — which is the image of the object — since[, according to you, *nirākāravādin*, such impression] is illogical.

2034. This is the proof against those who admit cognition (*vedana*) as resembling a pure crystal, being unstained by the images of objects.

Since, according to absolute truth, every *dharma* is devoid of activity (*vyāpāra*), there is[, therefore,] no apprehending of anything by anything; but rather, [there is] only cognition — arising thus with the nature of light — [that] is said [to be] apprehending itself. And, thus, it is not logical for a cognition to apprehend an object “directly,” “since” every thing “is established in its own *svabhāva*.”²⁹⁶ For what is the nature of a thing [(e.g., a cognition)] is not also [the nature] of another [(e.g., an object)].

Let the following be the case,²⁹⁷ “[The awareness] of an [external] object is not admitted at all as being of the [same] kind of which the self-awareness

²⁹³ This verse, in its Tibetan translation, is found in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 122, 1–4).

²⁹⁴ On this, cf. also BASK 83–84 in Introduction §6.2 and n. 263.

²⁹⁵ A cognition that apprehends an external object, i.e., that has something different from itself as an object, cannot be regarded as a cognition. For the essential property of being an awareness is identical to the essential property of not having another object as its content.

²⁹⁶ Every real thing is established in its own *svalakṣaṇa* and is different from anything else. See also PV Svārthānumāna 40; see n. 163.

²⁹⁷ This introduces Śubhagupta's objection.

of cognition is [admitted, i.e.,] directly. Rather, however, with regard to an [external] object, the fact of being brought to awareness consists only in the fact of generating a cognition that has its own form [as an object] (cf. BASK 84).²⁹⁸ And, therefore, if direct awareness is employed as the logical reason, then the logical reason is unestablished. Even if [it is said that] somehow [they are] expressed by the word ‘awareness’ (*saṃvedana*), because of [their] being the same, the desired proof, nevertheless, does not [occur] based on [a sameness] of this kind. For, because of the sameness of the word ‘go,’ words etc., are not established as having horns[, like oxen]” (cf. BASK 85).²⁹⁹

If, according to the thesis that cognition [is] endowed with the image [of its object], the logical reason is admitted, albeit twofold³⁰⁰ — referring to the property-bearer, which is the image of [something] blue, etc., that has risen (*ārūḍha*) [to awareness] in cognition — then, there will be the establishing of what is [already] established. As [Bhadanta Śubhagupta] says:

Moreover, in the thesis [that] a cognition [is] endowed with the image [of an object], the appearance of that [(i.e., the object)] is brought to awareness (*vedya*). And if the non-difference of this [(i.e., the appearance) with its awareness] is [that which is] to be proven, [then] there would be the fact of establishing that which has [already] been established.” (BASK 87)

²⁹⁸ Śubhagupta claims that there are two different kinds of awareness being discussed here. Cf. BASK 84 in Introduction §6.2.

²⁹⁹ Here, Śubhagupta refers to Dharmakīrti. Cf. *jātyantare prasiddhasya śabdasaṃvādanadarśanāt | na yuktam sādhanam gotvād vāgādīnām viśāṇivat ||* (PV Pramāṇasiddhi 15). On this see, e.g., *vāgādīnām gotvād gośabdavācyaivāt |* (PVV ad PV Pramāṇasiddhi 15, ed. p. 15, 8). Śubhagupta argues that, even though self-awareness and awareness as the apprehension of something are both expressed by the word “awareness,” they are not the same. Cf. *myoñ bar bya ba’i sgar ‘dra yañ || de yi don ni tha dad ñid || dper na ba lañ ñid kyī phyir || ba lañ ñag la sogs pa mams || de bzin mam par mi ‘grub phyir ||* (BASK 85). “Even though there is similarity regarding the word ‘brought to awareness,’ the objects [referred to by] that [word] are indeed different, since, for example, due to being ‘go’ [(i.e., to both being expressed by the same word, ‘go,’)] cows, words, etc., are not established [as being] of such kind[, i.e., similar].” He wants to argue here that the sameness of the word does not always correspond to the sameness of things. The Sanskrit term ‘go’ can refer to both a cow and speech. However, words and cows do not share the same nature. Therefore, that argument, assuming the identity between *svasaṃvedana* and every *saṃvedana* due to the similarity of the words, is not valid. Cf. also *na cānapekṣitatattvānugamāc chabdamātrasāmyāt sādhyasiddhir yuktā | gośabdavācyaatāmātreṇa vāgādīnām viśāṇitvānumitiprasaṅgād iti cet |* (*Īśvarasādhanaśāstra*, ed. p. 34, 5–7).

³⁰⁰ In the BASK, here, Śubhagupta is discussing the logical reason “since it is brought to awareness” (*myoñ bya ba phyir*) found in BASK 83a. He does not make any reference to a twofold logical reason. In the passage, as introduced by Kamalaśīla, Śubhagupta may be referring to the logical reason “because it has the *svabhāva* of awareness” as being twofold in the sense of awareness having the double meaning of awareness of an object (*arthasaṃvedana*) and self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*). Alternatively, he may be intending it as there being two logical reasons: “because of the necessity of being perceived together” and “because it has the *svabhāva* of awareness” mentioned, respectively, in TS 2029–2030 and TS 2032.

Advancing this entire preceding [possible] objection by Bhadanta Śubhagupta, [Śāntarakṣita] states, “nor indirectly, by virtue of the impression,” etc. (TS 2033cd) “*Arthākāroṇparāga*” [is a *karmadhāraya*:] it is both an “image of the object,” i.e., similar to the object, and an impression, i.e., an appearance. “This,” that is to say, the proof, albeit twofold (see TS 2033);³⁰¹ since [this proof is] “against” the upholder of the [thesis that] cognition [is] devoid of the image [of its object],³⁰² there is, therefore, neither the establishing of what is [already] established,³⁰³ nor the awareness of something else metaphorically, since it lacks the foundation (*ñibandhana*) of the metaphor.³⁰⁴ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034 ♦

3.3. Refutation of the *Sākāravāda*

Thus, indeed, it is demonstrated that “being devoid of [the object’s] appearance, a cognition does not perceive an external object” (see TS 1998). In order to demonstrate that neither does [a cognition that is] endowed with [the object’s] appearance — thus referring to the second thesis [as expressed in TS 1998] — [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “let, in that case, a cognition.”

2035. Let, in that case, a cognition endowed with similarity of form [with an object] be the apprehender of an external [object]. Since this too is illogical in every way, the condition of [there being an] apprehender [of an external object] is not logical.

It is not at all logical that an image is real, since, by force of that, there would be the determination of an object; and an object cannot be brought to

³⁰¹ Here, Kamalaśīla is simply saying that Śāntarakṣita is using the word *idam* even though he is referring to two different kinds of arguments in the previous *kārikā*. These are “since it is established in its own *svabhāva*” and “since[, according to you *nirākāravādin*, such impression] is illogical.” According to Matsumoto (1980a: 268 n. 45), instead, Kamalaśīla is alluding to the two kinds of reasons previously expounded, *sahopalambhaniyamāt* and the reason “*gsal śin rig pa’i rtags*” (discussed in TS 2032).

³⁰² Cf. Tib., which adds *lta ba* (bas D) *yin pa*.

³⁰³ The proof contradicts the *nirākāravādin*, who does not admit that a cognition apprehends objects secondarily, through the apprehension of their images. Accordingly, it does not follow that the proof aims to prove what is already established, that is, the non-difference between the image of an object and its cognition.

³⁰⁴ In the BASK, Subhagupta goes on to claim that this secondary cognition of an external object through its image, which the *sākāravādin* admits, is not a real apprehension of the external object. Hence, through this, one can at most prove the non-difference between an image in cognition and its cognition, but certainly the non-difference between an object and its cognition cannot be established. Cf. *gzugs dan ’dra ba’i byed pa’i don* || *’bras bu’i sgo nas myoñ byar ’dod* || *de dños myoñ bya ma yin pas* || *tha dad min par mi ’gyur ro* || (BASK 88). “The object that causes [an image] similar to [its] form is admitted as being brought to awareness by means of [that] effect. [However,] since that [external] thing is not brought to awareness, it would not be non-different [from its cognition].”

awareness through a false image because this kind [of image] is also present in an erroneous cognition[, where there are no corresponding objects].

◇ TSP *ad* TS 2035 ◇

If [it is argued,] “How can images be false?” [As a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “since [they] are no different.”

2036. Since [they] are no different from a cognition,³⁰⁵ a multiplicity of images cannot [follow]. And, therefore, by force of this, [images] do not have the condition of [being] the awareness of [external] objects.³⁰⁶

2037. Moreover, since it is no different from images, there would be manifoldness regarding cognition. Otherwise, how [could] the unity of these two be thought of?³⁰⁷

In seeing a multicolored carpet, “a multiplicity” “of images” can “not” follow, “since [they] are no different” “from a” unitary “cognition,” like [in the case of] the own-nature of a cognition. Similarly, also regarding a cognition, “the manifoldness” follows “since it is no different from images.”³⁰⁸

³⁰⁵ Cf. Tib. *shel las*. “From the crystal.”

³⁰⁶ Here, Śāntarakṣita (and Kamalaśīla in the commentary) claims two different things: (i) that images in cognition cannot correspond to real external objects, and (ii) that images in cognition are ultimately false. If an image is real, it must determine a real object. False images do not determine real objects, because in erroneous cognitions there are false images that correspond to no objects at all. However, a real image determining real objects must be admitted as truly manifold, because it is observed that images are variegated. In this case, there is a resulting contradiction between the singularity of a cognition and the multiplicity of real images. On these arguments, cf. Introduction §6.4.

³⁰⁷ TS 2036–2037 correspond to MAK 22–23. On this, see Introduction §6.4 and n. 288.

³⁰⁸ This argument is used also in the **Vajracchedikāṭikā* in order to refute the *sākāravāda*. Cf. *re zig nam pa dan bcas pas ni ma yin te | ri mo'i gden ba la sogs pa mtho'i ba'i tshes ses pa gcig pu dan tha mi dad pas nam pa mams kyan gcig pu'i no bor thal bar 'gyur ba'am | ses pa yan nam pa mams dan tha mi dad pas nam pa'i no bo b'zin du du ma'i bdag nid du thal bar 'gyur ro ||* (Cf. **Vajracchedikāṭikā*, ed. p. 269, 4–8). Another argument regarding the contradiction between the (expected) singularity of cognition and the multiplicity of its images is also found in *Bhāvanākrama* I. In this case, Kamalaśīla aims to refute the reality of immaterial *dharmas*, such as cognitions, etc., and asserts that images in cognition are unreal (*alīka*). Cf. *ye 'py arūpinas te 'pi tathaiva vicāryamānā niḥsvabhāva eva | tathā hi — bāhyasya nīlāder arthasyābhāvāt sāmāthyād eva vijñānādāyo 'rūpiṇaḥ skandhā nīlādīrūpeṇa pratibhāsanta ity abhyupeyam | uktam ca bhagavatā — bahirdhā nāsti vai rūpaṃ svacittam dr̥ṣyate bahiḥ | iti | tatas ca nīlādicitrākāranirbhāsatayā grāhyagrāhakākāranirbhāsatayā ca naikasvabhāva amī yuktāḥ | na hy ekasyānekarūpatā yuktimatī, ekānekavirodhāt | ekasya kasyacit svabhāva-syāsidhāv anekarūpatāpy ayuktimatī, ekasamūharūpatvād anekasya | athavā tatrālīkā evāmī rūpādāya ākāraḥ pratibhāsanta ity abhyupagamyate | tadā vijñānam apy alīkam prāpnoti | vijñānasya tatsvarūpā-vyativṛkāt | na hi samprakāśamānarūpatāvyativṛkēṇānyad vijñānasya rūpaṃ asti | svayam ca na nirbhāsante rūpādāyaḥ | teṣāṃ ca vijñānasvarūpāpannānām alīkatve, sarva eva vijñānam alīkam abhyupetaṃ syāt | tasmān māyopamaṃ ca vijñānam ity uktam bhagavatā |* (*Bhāvanākrama* I, ed. p. 13, 4–15). “Also those immaterial [*dharmas*], [if] examined precisely in this way, are indeed devoid of *svabhāva*. To explain, since there is no external object, such as blue, indeed, by implication, the immaterial *skandhas*, consciousness, etc., appear with the form of blue, etc. This must be admitted.

However, [there are] those who think, “Cognitions, albeit homogeneous, numerous, precisely according to the number of the images, arise simultaneously in the case of a multicolored carpet, etc.,³⁰⁹ as [it happens with] cognitions of sounds and visual forms, etc., which are heterogeneous [and arise simultaneously].³¹⁰ And therefore, regarding the undesirable consequence [put forward by the opponent], there is the establishing of what is [already] established.” [Precisely] for them[, the reply will be the following]. As, with regard to a multicolored carpet, many images — such as a blue one — are brought to awareness, likewise, also with regard to a single image — such as a white one — there will be many images, [each] having the form of parts [situated] below, in the middle or above. Therefore, in this case too, the cognition [of a single white image], consisting of those [(i.e., images of different parts of that white image)], [will] follow as having a manifold nature.³¹¹ If [it is argued,] “[This] is indeed admitted,” [then the reply will be,] “One must say which one is the unitary cognition in this case.” If [it is argued that the unitary cognition is that cognition] that has the partless atom as [its] content,³¹² [the reply will be that] precisely this is contradicted by direct experience, for nowhere can the partless form of an atom be seen, as appearing, in cognition.³¹³ Nor is it logical that immaterial things[, like cognitions,]³¹⁴ are placed in continuity extending in space (*deśakṛta*), by virtue of which, in order to establish the truth of that [image], the conception of many cognitions [occurring together] could be fit. If what

Furthermore, the Bhagavān said, ‘A form does not verily exist outside; one’s own mind appears [as if it were] outside’ (*Lankāvatārasūtra* 10.489ab, ed. p. 326). And, therefore, since they appear with variegated images like blue, etc., and since they appear with the [two] aspects of apprehended and apprehender, these [immaterial *skandhas*] are not tenable as having a unitary *svabhāva*. For it is not logical for something unitary to have a manifold nature, since there is a contradiction between one and many. [Moreover,] if some unitary *svabhāva* is not established, the fact of having a manifold nature is also not logical, because something manifold consists of the aggregation of unitary things. Or else [a second argument is that] it must be admitted that these images, such as visual forms, appear as truly false in it[, i.e., cognition]. Then, the cognition also follows as false, since the nature of cognition is not distinct from them. For the nature of cognition is not different from having the nature of manifesting itself; and visual forms, etc., do not appear by themselves. Moreover, if these [visual forms, etc.] having arisen with the own-nature of cognitions, are false, [then] indeed every cognition can be admitted as false. Therefore, the Bhagavān said, ‘And cognition is similar to illusion.’”

³⁰⁹ Here T_{2D} adds *rig*; T_{2P} adds *rigs*.

³¹⁰ Cf. MAV (ed. p. 94, 8–10). See Introduction §6.4. and n. 289.

³¹¹ Cf. MAK 32 and MAV (ed. p. 96, 6–9). See Introduction §6.4. and n. 290. Cf. Tib. *mam pa du ma'i bdag nīd du 'gyur ro*. “[The cognition] will follow as consisting of many images.”

³¹² Cf. MAV (ed. p. 96, 10–12). See Introduction §6.4 and n. 291.

³¹³ Cf. MAK 33 and MAV (ed. p. 96, 15). See Introduction §6.4.

³¹⁴ Tib. has here *śes pa la/*jñāne* “in cognition,” which I have translated as belonging to the previous sentence.

appears as extending in space is false, how can images be true?³¹⁵ For an image of cognition, such as a blue [thing], different from the appearance of a blue [thing], etc., placed as extending in space is not brought to awareness. Therefore, the conception of many cognitions is indeed useless.”³¹⁶ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2036–2037 ◇

[Śāntarakṣita] states another defect [of this theory in the verse] beginning with “moreover, if a cognition.”

2038. Moreover, if a cognition had complete similarity of form [with its object], then[, regarding that cognition,] there would be the fact of being non-cognition and so on. [Meanwhile,] if it had an identity [of form only] with some part, [then] every [cognition] would be aware of everything. (PV Pratyakṣa 434)³¹⁷

“The fact of being non-cognition” [means] the fact of having an insentient nature. By the word[s] “and so on,” it is intended (*grhyate*) that there is not the fact of being endowed with passions, [as well as] that there is not the fact of being endowed with hatred, etc. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2038 ◇

³¹⁵ A cognition would be subject to the same criticism as the atoms. Cf. *ci ste mam pa'i graṅs bžin du || mam par śes pa khas len pa || de tshe rdul phran 'drar gyur ba || dpyad pa 'di las bzlog par dka' ||* (MAK 49). On the latter verse, cf. Kajiyama 1966: 150 and n. 426.

³¹⁶ Cf. *du ma ṅid du yaṅ rigs pa ma yin te | rdul phra rab gcig tsam 'dzin pa'i śes pa ṅams su myoṅ ba med pa'i phyir śes pa gcig mi 'grub po | de ma grub na du ma yaṅ mi 'grub po | du ma ni gcig 'dus pa'i ṅo bo yin pa'i phyir ro | śes pa mams ni lus med pa'i phyir gaṅ gis ri mo'i mām pa ṅid gzuṅ gzuṅs pa'i don du śes pa du ma skye bar rtog pa legs par 'gyur ba śes pa yul la khebs par gnas pas yoṅs su dzin par skye ba yaṅ mi srid do ||* (**Vajracchedikāṭikā*, ed. p. 269, 9–14).

³¹⁷ On the transmission of this PV verse, see Kellner 2009–2010 (particularly, p. 200 n. 111). There must be a relationship between the cognition and its object, by virtue of which one can explain why one cognition apprehends only one object and not every other. The relationship admitted (by the *sākāravādin*) is one of causality. With reference to this, the effect, i.e., the image of cognition, is similar to the cause, i.e., the object of it. Nevertheless, if the similarity is thought of as absolute, then the cognition will be unconscious, like the object. If it is admitted as partial, then the cognition, being only partially connected to that object, could know any other object at the same time. The latter argument is introduced as follows in the **Vajracchedikāṭikā*. Cf. *gžan yaṅ bdag ṅid thams cad dam phyogs gcig 'dra bar 'gyur graṅ na | re žig bdag ṅid thams cad du ma yin te | don bžin du śes pa bems po'i ṅo bor 'gyur ba'i phyir ro | cha śas kyis kyaṅ ma yin te | gcig pu la cha śas med pa'i phyir ro || ldog pa'i bye brag gyis cha śas su yoṅs su brtags na yaṅ dños po la sogs pa chos 'dra ba thams cad la yod pas thams cad kyis thams cad la rig par 'gyur ro || 'on te de las skyes pa dan 'dra ba gñis kyis rig par 'jog na ni de ma thag pa'i rkyen don mthun pa yaṅ 'dzin par thal bar 'gyur ro ||* (**Vajracchedikāṭikā*, ed. p. 269, 15–270, 2). “Furthermore, the similarity [of form] can be either complete or with one part. First of all, it is not complete, since [in that case] the cognition would have an insentient nature, like the object. Nor is [there similarity] even with [one] part, since a unitary thing[, like a cognition,] does not have parts. Even though one imagines parts based on a difference due to exclusion (**vyāvṛtti*), since there would exist everywhere *dharma*s similar to things, etc., every thing would be cognized by every [cognition]. If [someone] establishes that cognition [occurs] by means of the two [conditions], [i.e.,] arising from that [object] and [being] similar to that [object], then [it will be answered that, if this were the case,] it would follow that [a cognition] also apprehends the immediately preceding homologous cognition concordant with [its] object.”

3.4. Refutation of the *Anyākāravāda*

Referring to the other, subsequent, third thesis — namely, [a cognition] “being endowed with an appearance different [from that of the object]” (TS1998b) — [Śāntaraṣṭita] states [the verse] beginning with “also, being endowed with one image.”

2039. Also, being endowed with one image, how can a cognition be aware of another thing?³¹⁸ Every [object] could [then] be brought to awareness by every [cognition], and the cause would not be restricting (*niyāma*).

However, this might be the [objection], “A cognition can bring to awareness only that from which it is generated; hence, not ‘every [object]’ will ‘be brought to awareness’ ‘by every [cognition].’” Therefore, [Śāntaraṣṭita] states, “and the cause would not be restricting.”³¹⁹ This is the intended meaning: because of the undesirable consequence that also the eyes, etc., would be brought to awareness. ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2039 ♦

[Śāntaraṣṭita] advances [the possible] objection by Bhadanta Śubhagupta, with [the verse] beginning with “if [Śubhagupta objects].”

2040. If [Śubhagupta objects,] “As, indeed, in your opinion, cognition is devoid of images in reality, and [yet still] brings an unreal image to awareness, similarly [it will also bring] a real object [to awareness].” (BASK 101)³²⁰

For [Śubhagupta] states, “‘As’ indeed ‘in your opinion’ — i.e., in the opinion of the [Alikākāravāda-]Vijñānavādins — according to absolute truth, cognition (*vijñāna*) is ‘devoid of images,’³²¹ because the scriptural statement says, ‘[its] purity is admitted like the purity of the element of

³¹⁸ Tib. has *gal te don rig yin pa na* || instead of *katham anyasya vedakam*.

³¹⁹ Here, the subtended cause is the *āmbanapratyaya*, the object-support of a cognition.

³²⁰ Cf. *ji ltar khyod kyi ses pa ni* || *yañ dag du na mām med kyañ* || *yañ dag min mām myoñ ba ltar* || *kho bo’i yañ dag don de b’zin* || (BASK 101). “As, in your opinion, cognition, albeit devoid of images in reality, brings an unreal image to awareness, [it will,] similarly, for us, [bring] a real object [to awareness].” This can be regarded as **T**. On Kamalaśīla’s theory of false images in real cognition, see Funayama 2007. Funayama (2007: 191) notes that a good number of Tibetan doxographies classify Śāntaraṣṭita and Kamalaśīla as **satyākāravādins*, as far as their Yogācāra position is concerned. In this respect, he mentions the studies of Mimaki (1982a: 29–31; 1983: 162) and Matsumoto (1980b: 162–169). He says that, conversely, Kajiyama (1982: 54) and Ōki (1982: 190–192) suggest the possibility that they were **alīkākaravādins*, based on the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and the related *pañjikā*. Ichigō (1985a) maintains that Śāntaraṣṭita’s position was different from both (but, in my opinion, in 1985b: LXXIX, he seems more inclined to consider Śāntaraṣṭita an *alīkākaravādin*), while Watanabe Shōkō (1967: 25) and Nishizawa (1995: 22), based on a passage from TSP *ad* TS 536, claim that Kamalaśīla admitted that he himself was a *nirākāravijñānavādin*. In the passages under consideration here, Śāntaraṣṭita and Kamalaśīla seem to defend themselves as *nirākāravijñānavādins*.

³²¹ On the *Alikākāravāda* doctrine, cf. *ci ste ño bo ñid du de’i* || *mām pa ’di dag med pa ste* || *yañ dag tu na mām med pa’i* || *mām par ses la nor bas snañ* || (MAK 52).

water, gold and ether (*akāśa*).’ (*Madhyāntavibhāga* 1.16cd) ‘And’ if [cognition] ‘brings to awareness’ that ‘image,’ [it will] ‘similarly’ also [bring to awareness] an external [object].” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2040 ◇

With reference to this, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “this nature of mind.”

2041. This nature of mind and mental states³²² is indeed non-common. Therefore (*tad*), awareness of things different from this [(i.e., the nature of cognition)] is not direct in any way.³²³

2042. Resorting to the fact of being dependent on one complex or to being cause and effect, etc., the awareness of something real could indeed be secondary.

2043. [However,] a *svabhāva* [that is] devoid of nature (*rūpa*) cannot be dependent on one complex. And there is no other [possible cause of the metaphor];³²⁴ therefore, there is not even an indirect awareness of this [(i.e., something unreal)].³²⁵

The awareness of something unreal is not direct at all. To explain, precisely that “nature,” i.e., essence (*ātman*), of mind and mental states — which indeed, having the nature of light, [and being] “non-common,” i.e., being the abode of the conception of individuality, appears with the form of pleasure, etc. — is the direct awareness of those [(i.e., mind and mental states)]. “From this,” i.e., from the nature of cognition, “of things different,” i.e., of false images, “therefore” (*tad*),³²⁶ it is “not” logical that “awareness” is “direct,” since those [images] are, indeed, unreal.³²⁷

Nor is [the awareness] “indirect,” because there is no cause of the metaphor (*upacāra*). To explain, “the fact of being dependent on one complex” “or” the relationship “of cause and effect” [and] the similarity of form [intended] by the word “etc.,” [all] these [things] could be a foundation of the metaphor. Yet all these [things] are not [possible] regarding

³²² The stanza has *cittacaittaṇoḥ* instead of *cittacaittānām* (as in the commentary) due to metrical reasons.

³²³ The nature of a cognition is particular and unique, and every cognition is established in its own-nature. Therefore, an awareness of things different from it, such as false images, cannot be direct in any way. Cf. Tib. *des na gžan dag gso bor ni || rig pa de ni gan gis min ||*.

³²⁴ Tib. has *šin tu med pa/*atyantāsat* instead of *anyat*.

³²⁵ The awareness of something real can be admitted (even though only to a certain degree) as secondary, because that thing can be the cause of its own image in a cognition; that is, it can be part of the causal complex producing its image as appearing in cognition. However, something unreal, being non-existent, cannot be the cause of anything and therefore, with reference to an unreal image, the awareness cannot be admitted as secondary either.

³²⁶ Tib. here has *rig pa de ni/*tatsamvedanam*. “That awareness.”

³²⁷ In the commentary, Kamalaśīla reinforces the idea that the nature of mind and mental states consists precisely in the direct awareness of only those mind and mental states (*teṣām*) and, accordingly (*tad*), anything different from cognition cannot be an object of direct awareness.

something unreal. “And there is no other” [possible] cause of the metaphor. It is just that (*kevalam*), by force of ignorance, a cognition — indeed devoid of an object, showing an unreal image — arises as erroneous. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2041–2043 ◇

If [it is argued,] “then precisely this error will be the cause of the metaphor with reference to the awareness of a false image,” in this respect, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “or rather it is intended.”

2044. Or rather it is intended that [a cognition] cognizes an unreal image. Since, because of the error,³²⁸ [a cognition] does not cognize according to reality, it is indeed devoid of an object.

2045. If also you say that a cognition is the cognizer of such a thing [i.e., an unreal image] because of an error, [then,] for you [also], [that cognition] is evidently devoid of an object.³²⁹

“It,” i.e., a cognition³³⁰ that is said to have an unreal image as [its] object. To explain, according to absolute truth, an unreal image is not knowable due to the undesirable consequence that it would be real if it were admitted as knowable through its affirmation (*vidhi*). ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2044–2045 ◇

Moreover, that very [same Śubhagupta] states:

“It is endowed with an image [or] devoid of an image, synchronic [with its object or] arising at a different [time];’ why are these [sorts of] considerations not also undertaken with regard to a cognition (*viññāna*) of the Buddha? (BASK 95)

In the [same] way that, for example, the consideration, ‘the apprehending of an [external] object by a cognition (*viññāna*) endowed with [its] image, etc., is not logical’ is made, similarly, why is not [a consideration of this sort] also made regarding the apprehending of an object by a cognition (*jñāna*) of the Bhagavān?” In this respect, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “[regardless of whether it is] endowed with [its] image [or] devoid of [its] image.”

2046. “[Regardless of whether it is] endowed with [its] image [or] devoid of [its] image, it is not logical that that (*ta*) [(i.e., cognition)] is aware of something different.”³³¹ However,

³²⁸ Cf. Tib. *’on kyañ yañ dag min mam pa* || *’khrul pas reg ces bya bar brjod* ||. “Or rather it is intended that ‘[a cognition] cognizes an unreal image because of the error.’” Tib. reads *vibhramāt* as referring to the first half-verse.

³²⁹ Cf. Tib. *gal te der yañ mam śes ni* || *’khrul pas de ltar snañ ’gyur na* || *rig par byed par brjod pas na* || *de ni yul med gsal bar ’gyur* ||. “If, also in this case, cognition can appear like this[i.e., as being endowed with an unreal image] because of error, [then,] since [it] is said cognizer, it evidently follows as [being] devoid of [an] object.”

³³⁰ Tib. lacks *jñānam*.

³³¹ Cf. Tib. *de ni (ni) deest P* *gžan med rigs ma yin* ||. “It is not logical that that is without another.” Tib. lacks *vedakam*.

no consideration [of this sort] is undertaken also with regard to a cognition (*viññāna*) of the Buddha.³³²

For a cognition (*jñāna*) of the Bhagavān is not admitted as an apprehender of that [(i.e., a different thing)], wherefore, also with regard to it [(i.e., a cognition of the Bhagavān)], [this kind of] consideration could be made. Since (*yāvata*)³³³ it is admitted that, because He is free from all obstacles, for Him there are no concepts of apprehended and apprehender. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2046 ◇

But [Śubhagupta may object that] — even if[, for the sake of the argument,] an external object does not exist as apprehended — nevertheless there is indeed another mind abiding in another continuum,³³⁴ why cannot that be apprehended by the cognition of the Bhagavān? (cf. BASK 86).³³⁵ Regarding this, [Śāntarakṣita] states, “if there is an awareness of passions, etc.”

2047. If there is an awareness of passions, etc., belonging to another [continuum], due to [its] originating through the similarity of form with those [(i.e., passions)], [for him] the subsistence of obstacles [would] follow according to the view of the upholders of perception (*aupalambhika*, *dmigs pa can*).³³⁶

For awareness of “passions, etc.” abiding in “another” continuum, if at all (*yadī param*), [can be admitted] as logical only due to similarity of form,³³⁷ not otherwise, because [then] an overextension [would follow]. And, therefore, if the similarity of form is complete, then a cognition of the

³³² According to McClintock (2010: 354), this verse is proof that, in this context, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla “seem to reject the idea that the apprehender/apprehended relationship exists even figuratively for a buddha.”

³³³ This translates *yāvata* in the Sanskrit text and *gan gi phyr* in Tib.

³³⁴ Cf. Tib. *de lta na yañ rgyud gžan la gnas pa'i sems gžan yod pa ma yin nam* |. “Nevertheless there is not another mind abiding in another continuum, or [...]”

³³⁵ Cf. *thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes kyi* || *myoñ bar bya ba rgyud gžan la* || *bsgos pa'i chos mams gan dag yin* || *de dag gis kyañ ma ñes te* || *rtogs med ji ltar thams cad mkhyen* || (BASK 86). “Also because of [the instance of] the *dharma*s that are placed in another mental *continuum* [and] are perceived by the cognition of the Omniscient [Buddha], [the logical reason] is inconclusive. And if He does not know [them], how can He be omniscient?” Matsuoka (2014a: 300–301) suggests a parallel with BASK 140, 141ab. Cf. *gžan sems śes pa'i śes pa ni* || *ji bžin don min ji lta bur* || *gan tshe gžan gyi sems yod na* || *śes pa de ni mam par jug* || (BASK 140) *don yod de yi mam pa yi* || *mam par śes pa 'dzin par 'dod* || (BASK 141ab). Matsuoka (2014a: 331 n. 9), quoting Shastri (1967: 59 n. 238 [n. 128 according to her article]), notes that BASK 140ab corresponds to *Vimśikā* 21ab: *paracittavidāṃ jñānam ayathārthaṃ kathāṃ yathā* |.

³³⁶ *Aupalambhika* are those who are “characterized by the heresy of *upalambha*.” Cf. Edgerton 1953: 163 (s.v.). Reliance on *upalambha* is considered as an error, indicated as *upalambhadrṣṭi*, “the heresy that relies on *upalambha*.” Similar are *upalambhasamjñin*, “having the [false] notion of *upalambha*,” or *upalambhayogena*, “according to the [erroneous] method of perception.” Cf. Edgerton 1953: 140 (s.v.).

³³⁷ Tib. has *'dra ba ñid ston par lhur len pa yin te*, instead of *yadī param sārūpyād eva yuktam*.

Bhagavān too would be affected with passions. If this were the case, the obstacles of defilements (*klesāvaraṇa*) would be unremoved [and], accordingly, “the subsistence of obstacles” “[would] follow.” “According to the view,” i.e., to the thought, of the “upholders of perception,” [that is, those who] rely on perception.³³⁸ Or else, the meaning is as follows: since [at this stage] “the view,” i.e., the cognition, of the Bhagavān is [provisionally] admitted³³⁹ as “characterized by perception” (*aupalambhika*).

If the similarity of form is only with one part, since the two aspects [of apprehended and apprehender] have not been removed, the subsistence of the epistemic obstacles (*jñeyāvaraṇa*)³⁴⁰ follows nevertheless, because [His cognition] would be stained with the aspect of the apprehended.³⁴¹ To explain, with regard to only one thing, the fact of being endowed with two truly existing natures is illogical. Hence, that [similarity] must necessarily be determined as erroneous. And therefore, since [He would] not [have] removed that wickedness that is the seed of error, the Bhagavān would, indeed, be endowed with unremoved obstacles. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2047 ◇

[Śubhagupta may object,] “If [there is] something [that] He does not know, then how can He be omniscient?” [As a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “although [He] cannot be shaken by the winds.”

2048. Although [He] cannot be shaken by the winds of all concepts, like a wish-fulfilling tree, the ascetic acts, indeed, for the accomplishment of the benefit of all beings.

2049. Therefore, all [Buddhists] call [Him] omniscient winner, although devoid of vision,³⁴² because [He] effortlessly accomplishes all the duties of the omniscient.³⁴³

³³⁸ Matsuoka (2014a: 302) translates this as “one who/that which follows the path of cognition.” She also mentions Jha (1939: 973 [1936: 973 in her article]) as rendering this as “those who proceed on the basis of Cognitions alone — i.e., the Apprehensionists, the Idealists.” McClintock (2010: 354) refers to these as those who uphold a “view in which there is an objective referent.”

³³⁹ In TSP, *abhyupagam-* is used at times to indicate the provisional admittance of a thesis at a certain stage of the reasoning. Cf. Introduction n. 108.

³⁴⁰ For the translation of *jñeya*^o as “epistemic” in *jñeyāvaraṇa*, see McClintock 2010: 108, 125 and n. 322.

³⁴¹ As Matsuoka (2014a: 304) highlights, Śubhagupta’s view on the Buddha’s omniscience is exemplified in BASK 145. Cf. *śes pa ’dzin pa kho na yis || de gzuñ ma lus ’dzin pa’i phyir || thams cad mkhyen par bsad pa yin || gñis min mam par rig phyir min ||* (BASK 145). “Because he apprehends that apprehensible in its totality, indeed through [His] apprehending cognition, [the Buddha] is called omniscient, not because [His] cognition is devoid of the two [aspects of apprehended and apprehender].”

³⁴² Cf. Tib. *rgyal ba thams cad mkhyen pa ni || des na gzigs pa med par bstan ||*. “Therefore, they define the winner omniscient [also] as ‘devoid of vision.’” McClintock (2010: 38) argues that the Buddha’s omniscience as presented here “is understood to be a kind of unknowing or non-knowing that nevertheless appears to unawakened sentient beings to be total omniscience.”

“Devoid of vision” [means that] the [Bhagavān] has no vision, i.e., perception; in this sense, [He] is devoid of vision. [All Buddhists] “call” him omniscient, because [He] properly accomplishes the benefit of the entire world, according to what is suitable (*yathābhavyam*); [this he does] “effortlessly,” by force of the preceding vows, like the wish-fulfilling tree, [but] not by force of perception, since the perception of another *svabhāva*, in whichever way, is illogical.³⁴⁴ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2048–2049 ♦

4.

Rejection of the *Pramāṇas*
Proving External Objects

Thus, after having expounded the *pramāṇa* that denies the [existence of an] external object, in order to reject [those *pramāṇas*] proving it [(i.e., the existence of an external object)] that others have brought forward, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “if a cognition.”

2050. If a cognition is not endowed with a form — like white, etc. — how [can] it be the direct experiencing (*anubhava*)³⁴⁵ of that [(i.e., an external object)]? If a cognition is endowed with a form — such as white — which proof does an external object have? (cf. PV Pratyakṣa 432)³⁴⁶

³⁴³ McClintock (2010: 354) translates this as “because he knows everything simultaneously as an effect [of his previous vows].” However, Kamalaśīla comments on it with “because [He] properly accomplishes the benefit of the entire world” (*aśeṣajagadarthasampādanāt*), thus confirming my interpretation.

³⁴⁴ McClintock (2010: 36–38) introduces this as a third model of omniscience within the TS and TSP. Such a model, present only in this chapter, is defined by her as “spontaneous omniscience.” The other two models are referred to as “dharmic omniscience” and “total omniscience.” Dharmic omniscience refers to “the Buddha’s complete knowledge of Dharma in the sense of everything necessary for the removal of ignorance and the attainment of the highest good, freedom from *saṃsāra*.” Total omniscience “refers to an understanding in which the omniscient being can *in some fashion* be said to have simultaneous knowledge of all things whatsoever.” However, even though the model of omniscience introduced in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā is found earlier in the works, it represents the final and ultimate model that they defend, and is advanced from a Madhyamaka point of view. The arguments in support of the other two models of omniscience contained in the final chapter, which is put forward on a lower level of analysis, “must be understood as in some sense *prior* to the arguments for spontaneous omniscience in BAP.” Spontaneous omniscience consists in the Buddha accomplishing the benefit of all beings spontaneously. This accomplishing flows by force of the preceding vows, according to the conditions of beings, as if it were a wish-fulfilling tree that realizes the aims of people without having concepts regarding anything.

³⁴⁵ Tib. has *re ṣig* instead of *sā...anubhava*.

³⁴⁶ Cf. *dhiyo nīlādirūpatve bāhyo ’rthaḥ kiṃpramāṇakāḥ | dhiyo ’nīlādirūpatve sā tasyānubhavaḥ katham ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 432). “If a cognition is endowed with a form — such as blue — which proof does an external object have? If a cognition is not endowed with a form — such as blue — how [can] it be the direct experiencing of that [external object]?” In the quotation of the

To explain, an external object could be proven through direct perception or through inference, since [any] other existing³⁴⁷ *pramāṇa* is included in only them. Between these, it is certainly not through direct perception. To explain, an apprehension of an object can occur by a cognition, admitted as direct perception, which is either devoid of [its] image or endowed with [its] image. [That apprehension] does not at all [occur] by a [cognition that is] devoid of [an object's] image, lacking the foundation that is immediate proximity [to the image of the external object]. “If a cognition is not endowed with a form — like white, etc.” — [*asitādirūpatve sati*, a locative absolute] — “how” can “it,” i.e., a cognition, be the “direct experiencing” “of that,” i.e., an [external] object? It cannot at all. This was said previously. But if (*atha*) [the apprehension occurred] by [a cognition] endowed with [an object's] image, then, since only the image of a blue [thing,] etc. — which is one and belongs to cognition — is perceived, the external object would indeed be beyond the range of sight (*parokṣa*), [and] not be directly perceived. For two blue [forms (*rūpa*)] are never brought to awareness, one being the reflection in cognition [and] the other bestowing that [(i.e., the reflection) on cognition]. Accordingly, there is indeed no establishment (*siddhi*) [of the external object] through direct perception. ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2050 ♦

If [it is argued,] “Then let there be the establishment through inference.” With respect to this, Bhadanta Śubhagupta demonstrates [the following],³⁴⁸ “That which is an image of a cognition, if [it] is reliable, is generated by an object different [from it], having such a [form,] like, for instance, the aspect of apprehender. And this specific appearance of a blue [thing], etc., which is reliable for someone whose sense organs are not defective, is an image of a cognition. This is a logical reason as essential property.”³⁴⁹ He advances precisely this [possible objection, stating the verse] beginning with “the arising of the appearance.”

2051. The arising of the appearance of a blue [thing], etc., from something homogeneous (*tulyajātīya*) is established by virtue of the fact that it is an image of a cognition insofar as it is endowed with reliability [*hetuviśeṣana*], like a cognition (*bodha*).

kārikā, Śāntaraṁśita has reversed the half-verses, arguably to respect the order according to which he has refuted the views — the *nirākāravāda* preceding the *sākāravāda*.

³⁴⁷ Cf. Tib. *yod na yan*. “Even though existing.”

³⁴⁸ It is quite puzzling that Śubhagupta is mentioned immediately after the assertion that the external object can, in fact, be inferred (cf. TSP *ad* TS 2051). It appears as if he is consciously treated as being a Sautrāntika. The Sautrāntikas admit that an external object is not perceivable but is, instead, inferred. Here, Jp^s and Pp^s have a gloss that reads as follows: “With regard to someone whose sense organs are not defective, the appearance of a blue [thing], etc., when it is reliable, is generated by an object, different [from it], having such a form, because [that image] is an image of cognition.” On this subject, cf. Introduction §6.3.

³⁴⁹ Tib. lacks the word *svabhāva*, cf. *žes bya ba ni gtan tshigs so* ||. “This is a logical reason.”

“Insofar as it is endowed with reliability” [is an instrumental of quality or attribute, according to the rule of Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.3.21,] “the third [*vibhakti*] is [used] in the sense of the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of who/what is in such a manner.” “The arising” of the image of the cognition “from something homogeneous” “is established” by virtue of that [property of] being an image of the cognition characterized “as endowed with reliability,” which is the logical reason. “Like a cognition,” i.e., like the aspect of [being] apprehender. This is the meaning.³⁵⁰ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2051 ♦

[Śāntarākṣita] states the refutation with [the words] beginning with “if the attainment.”

2052. If the attainment of an external object,³⁵¹ or else the capacity of that [attainment], is admitted as reliability, [then] this is unestablished for he who denies the [existence of an] external object.

2053. If [it is argued that] being the cause regarding a cognition that determines (*avasāya*) causal efficiency is admitted as reliability, [the reply will be that,] nevertheless, this is possible also with regard to a [cognition] devoid of an [external] support.³⁵²

In this respect, if “the attainment of an external object,” or the capacity to attain it, is intended as reliability, i.e., the qualification of the logical reason [that is, *jñānākāratayā*], then “for he who denies the [existence of an] external object,” i.e., for the upholder of *vijñaptimātratā*, “this” “is unestablished.” Hence, the logical reason is unestablished for either of

³⁵⁰ On this, cf. Introduction §6.3. Here, Śubhagupta is reported as saying that the form of something blue, etc., in a cognition is established as being generated by something homogeneous and different from it because it is a form of a cognition. This logical reason is based on essential property and is further qualified by the property of being endowed with reliability. That is to say, the property of being a form of a cognition (when there is reliability) is identical to the property of being generated by something homogeneous. This argument is very similar to that by a Sautrāntika, expounded and refuted, in PV Pratyakṣa 320; cf. Introduction n. 137 and 138. In BASK 7cd and 8, Śubhagupta determines his view on reliability, it being identical to non-erroneousness. Additionally, he refutes the Vijñānavāda by introducing this property as a distinctive feature belonging to cognitions, which distinguishes the non-erroneous from the erroneous ones. He states that a non-erroneous cognition is a reliable cognition of an object that is different from it and occurs at the moment of its cognition. TS 2051 and the related TSP are likely referring to Śubhagupta’s same viewpoint. However, they appear to introduce Śubhagupta as referring to the idea of images of cognitions. This could also mean the mere apprehension by a cognition of forms that belong exclusively to external objects.

³⁵¹ Cf. TSP *ad* TS 1978 and n. 72 on *prāpti*.

³⁵² In these two verses, Śāntarākṣita is reintroducing an argument from TS 1977–1978. The statement of the argument is close to that of Kamalaśīla in TSP *ad* TS 1977–1978.

the two [(i.e., the opponent or the proponent)] (*anyatarāsiddha*).³⁵³ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2052 ◇

If [it is argued that] the fact of being “the cause” of “a cognition,” reflecting the desired “causal efficiency,” is admitted “as reliability,” then there is the dubious exclusion [of the *hetu*] from heterogeneous instances (*sandigdha vipakṣavyāvṛtti*), because a *pramāṇa* that disproves [the presence of the logical reason] in the opposite [of the *sādhya*] is not observed.³⁵⁴ Hence, the logical reason is inconclusive, since the reliability of this sort is not contradicted “also with regard to” a cognition “devoid of an [external] support.” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2053 ◇

In order to establish precisely [this] non-contradiction, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “just as the restriction of the capacity.”

2054. Just as the restriction (*niyama*) of the capacity [for producing a certain effect] is thought of with regard to external [things like] water, etc., exactly so [it is thought of] also regarding cognitions. Therefore, there is a dubious negative concomitance (*vyatireka*).

2055. Because of [the instance of] an image belonging to inference, this [logical reason] is also evidently common (*sādhāraṇa*) [to both the *vipakṣa* and the *sapakṣa*].³⁵⁵ [However,] the vivid form of fire, etc., is not indeed the same as that.

Moreover, with reference to “an image belonging to” [that] cognition that is “inference,” there is reliability even though there is no [external] support. Hence, because of [its] ascertained presence in the heterogeneous instances, the common inconclusiveness (*sādhāraṇānaikāntikatā*) of the logical reason is “evident” (*spṛṣṭā*), like the fact of being knowable, etc.³⁵⁶

Let the following be the case, “The fact of being devoid of an [external] object-support, with regard to a concept belonging to inference, is unestablished.” He therefore states [the words] beginning with “[however,]”

³⁵³ If the qualification of the logical reason, i.e., reliability, is admitted by the proponent as the attainment of an external object, then, for the opponent, the logical reason is not valid, since he does not admit such an attainment.

³⁵⁴ Cf. *athābhimatārthakriyāvabhāṣijñānam evārthakriyāsaṃvādas tadāyam anyathāpi bāhyārthālambanam antareṇāpi sambhāvyata iti* | (TSP *ad* TS 1978).

³⁵⁵ But cf. Tib *ma nes thun* (*mtshun* P) *moñ/*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*.

³⁵⁶ The logical reason is endowed with a common inconclusiveness (*sādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*) when it is present in both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, as is the case with the property of being knowable. Regarding an inference, the images related to inferential cognitions are reliable, but at the same time their objects, being concepts, do not really exist externally. Hence, the instance of an inferential cognition proves that the logical reason is present also in the *vipakṣa*. Regarding *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*, it lacks both *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. In this sense, Katsura (1992: 1051) interprets PV Parārthānumāna 206cd: [...] *ato viśeṣe na vyatireko na cānvayaḥ*. “Thus, a unique[, i.e., *asādhāraṇānaikāntikahetu*,] lacks both *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.”

the vivid [form] of fire, etc.” The proof statement is [as follows].³⁵⁷ That [cognition], which is devoid of the image of some thing, cannot have that as [its] content, just as the cognition of a visual form (*rūpa*) does not have a sound as its object. And a cognition that is inference is devoid of the image of an external [object]. Thus, [the proof is based on] the cognition of the contradictory of the pervading [property].³⁵⁸ Moreover, the logical reason is not unestablished. To explain, whatever “form” that is the “vivid” [form] “of fire, etc.,” “is not the same as,” i.e., similar to “that,” i.e., the image of the cognition that is inference, because the latter is not vivid. For, otherwise, [fire, etc.] in the same way as it appears, in a cognition that is direct perception, with an established form — due to the difference, for example, between [a fire] made from grass and [another one] made from leaves — could, similarly, also appear in a cognition that is inference; to explain (*yāvatā*),³⁵⁹ abandoning [its particular] established form, fire, etc., which is beyond the range of sight, appears in the inference indeed through a universal form that [always] follows [that which] makes [it] known.³⁶⁰ And it is not logical for one single thing to have two images — a universal [one] and a particular [one] — that contradict each other. This has been previously demonstrated (in TS 1985 and TSP *ad* TS 1985). Nor is the logical reason contradictory, because of its presence in the homologous instances. Nor is it inconclusive, because an overextension [would then follow].³⁶¹ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2054–2055 ♦

With [the verse] beginning with “if [Udyotakara argues that], because of the logical reasons,” [Śāntarakṣita] advances the [possible] proof (*pramāṇa*) [objected] by Udyotakara.

2056. If [Udyotakara argues that], because of the logical reasons like “[because] it is knowable,” etc., what appears as

³⁵⁷ Here, Jp^g reads: “The cognition that is inference does not have a fire as [its] object because it is devoid of the image of a fire.” And Pp^g: “The cognition that is inference does not have a fire as [its] object because it is devoid of an external image [of a fire.]”

³⁵⁸ Here, Jp^g and Pp^g read: “With regard to an inference, the fact of having a fire as content is the pervaded [property]; the fact of having its image is the pervading [property]; the contradictory of the latter is the fact of being devoid of its image; there is the perception of this.”

³⁵⁹ I shall translate *yāvatā*, which is rendered as *di 'ltar* in Tib., as “to explain” here and in similar cases.

³⁶⁰ This part corresponds to almost half a verse in the PV; cf. Sanskrit Text: *gamakānugāsā-mānyarūpeṇaiva tadā gatih | tasmāt sarvaḥ parokṣo 'rtho viśeṣeṇa na gamyate ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 61). For the latter verse and its English translation, see Franco–Notake 2014: 147.

³⁶¹ The logical reason is not inconclusive either, because if a cognition devoid of an image of something could have that as its content, then every cognition would be the apprehension of every thing.

separate in space is different from the internal experiencing, like a mind [belonging] to another continuum,³⁶²

For [Udyotakara] states, “Whatever — blue, etc. — that ‘appears as separate in space’ is ‘different’ ‘from the internal experiencing,’³⁶³ because it is knowable (*prameya*), because it is impermanent, because it is an effect, because it is cognition [and] because it is endowed with a cause, like ‘a mind [belonging] to another continuum.’” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2056 ◇

2057. [it will be answered that,] also with regard to these [logical reasons], there is the condition of having deviation because of the own-nature of this cognition (*cetas*) [, i.e., the internal experiencing]. Similarly, [there is the condition of having deviation] because of [the instance of] a yellow [conch shell] or the two moons, etc., perceived by [a person] whose eyes are defective.

“Also with regard to these,” i.e., with regard to, indeed, all [these] logical reasons, there is “the condition of having deviation,” i.e., the condition of being inconclusive, because, also in the case of internal experiencing, [the logical reasons,] such as “because it is knowable,” are present.³⁶⁴ “Similarly” there is the inconclusiveness “because of [the instance of] the two moons, etc.,” appearing in the cognition of someone suffering from dimness, etc. However, the fact of being knowable for the two moons, etc., must be seen as [their] being the object (*viśaya*) of the conceptual cognition “two moons,” etc.,³⁶⁵ and not with regard to that cognition in which these[, i.e., the two moons, etc.,] appear, since[, in the latter case,] there is the absence of considering (*adhimokṣa*)³⁶⁶ them as an object. As [Dharmakīrti] states, “The hairs,³⁶⁷ etc., [seen by someone suffering from myodesopsia] are not an

³⁶² Udyotakara discusses a similar topic in a bigger passage in *Nyāyavārttika* 4.2.34 (ed. p. 489–491).

³⁶³ Tib. has *myoñ* (*myaṅ D*) *ba las* for *āntarānubhavāt*.

³⁶⁴ In this case, the *hetu* “because it is knowable” and the others are valid not only in the case of cognitions of external objects, but can also apply to internal experiences, such as the dream state or erroneous cognitions caused by dimness, which have no external objects corresponding to them. Accordingly, the *hetu* is present also in the *vipakṣa*, i.e., it is inconclusive.

³⁶⁵ Tib. lacks *divi*; cf. *zla ba la sogs pa'o sñam pa'i*. “Moons, etc.”

³⁶⁶ I translate this term as “consideration” in the sense of conceptually determining something as such. Franco–Notake (2014: 32 n. 8) note that Manorathanandin takes the term as an equivalent of determination (*adhyavasāya*), in the sense of cognizing something as something, this interpretation being confirmed by Devendrabuddhi’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s commentaries. For a discussion of the term, see Franco–Notake 2014: 32 n. 8.

³⁶⁷ Tib. has *skra śad*, which translates *keśaṇḍuka* (cf. Negi 1993: 260), the literal meaning of which is hair-net, “standardly used as a symbol of unreality” (cf. Edgerton 1953: 193). It refers to the non-existent “hair-net,” i.e., floaters, seen by someone suffering from myodesopsia. On floaters and their identification with *timira* disease, see n. 250.

object, because they are not considered as an object.” (PV Pratyakṣa 1c2d)³⁶⁸
 ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2057 ◇

With “if [Kumārila argues that],” etc., [Śāntarakṣita] advances [the possible objection of] the unestablishedness regarding the locus of deviation (*vyabhiṇvāṇa*), according to Kumārila’s thought.

2058. If [Kumārila argues that], [albeit] in another fashion, a truly external object is, in this case, brought to awareness,³⁶⁹ [the reply will be that,] surely, that image appearing [in an erroneous cognition] does not have the nature of that [external] object.

2059. Moreover, that [image], since it appears in this way, is brought to awareness³⁷⁰ by cognition. However, regarding the [external] object, the innate form does not appear in that [(i.e., cognition)] in this way.

2060. And how can it possibly be logical (*upapadyate*) that [an image] be non-appearing and[, at the same time,] brought to awareness? Moreover, [the statement,] “[cognition] both brings it to awareness and in another fashion” contains the mutual contradiction [of those two elements].

2061. Precisely because of this, the self-awareness of cognitions is not hard to prove at all, since it is observed that what appears as real is brought to awareness in that moment [of its cognition].

2062. Hence, this erroneous cognition, imagining, does not imagine an object indeed that exists in another way; therefore, it ascertains itself.³⁷¹

For [Kumārila] states that “in this case,” i.e., in the case of a cognition [endowed with the image] of a yellow [conch shell] and two moons, etc., which has been brought forward as a locus of deviation, the “object,” like a conch shell, “truly external,” is perceived as yellow, etc. Therefore, the deviation is not established.³⁷²

³⁶⁸ The verse is found at the beginning of the Pratyakṣa chapter, and states that there are only two *pramāṇas*, since their objects are of two kinds, particular and universal, based on whether or not they are causally efficient. Cf. *pramāṇam dvividhaṁ meyadvaidhyāc chaktyaśaktiḥ | arthakriyāyām keśādīr nārtho ’narthādhimokṣataḥ ||* (PV Pratyakṣa 1). For a recent analysis and English translation of the verse, see Franco–Notake 2014: 29–32.

³⁶⁹ Cf. ŚV Nirālambanavāda 108, quoted in TSP *ad* TS 1998.

³⁷⁰ Here, Tib. has *rtogs* (*rtog* D) *mi ’gyur*. “Is not brought to awareness.”

³⁷¹ Here, Śāntarakṣita is criticizing Kumārila’s view on erroneous cognitions. Cf. ŚV Nirālambanavāda 108–110 (cf. TSP *ad* TS 1998 and n. 153).

³⁷² Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have put forward the example of erroneous cognitions in order to prove that the above-mentioned logical reasons (i.e., because it is knowable, etc.) also apply to them. Since erroneous cognitions are not, by definition, cognitions of external

In this respect, [Śāntarakṣita] states [the words] beginning with “that image appearing,” etc. The following is the concise meaning here. It is logical that precisely the “image” that appears in a cognition be brought to awareness by that [cognition]; for, otherwise, every cognition would have everything as [its] object. Therefore, [with regard to an object,] the fact of being brought to awareness is pervaded by the fact of appearing [with its own image]; and a white image does not appear in a cognition endowed with a yellow image, because there is the non-cognition of what is admitted as observable. Hence, provided the absence of the pervading [property,] i.e., the fact of appearing [with its own image], the pervaded [property,] i.e., the fact of being brought to awareness, is also absent. The proof statement is [as follows].³⁷³ The image that does not appear in that [cognition] is not brought to awareness by it, just as a visual form does not [appear] in the cognition of a sound. And the form of a white conch shell does not appear in a cognition endowed with a yellow image. Thus[, in this proof,] the non-cognition of the pervading [property] [is the logical reason].³⁷⁴ [Moreover,] by [stating] “[cognition] both brings it to awareness,”³⁷⁵ [Kumārila] states the contradiction of his own words. “Precisely because of this,” i.e., through the undesirable consequence,³⁷⁶ [Śāntarakṣita] establishes the self-awareness [of cognitions]. Accordingly, what is admitted by the followers of Jaimini — [(i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas,) who state], “according to us cognition is not directly perceived and is devoid of images”³⁷⁷ — is rejected. With “hence, this erroneous cognition,” etc., there is the summary. “Imagining” — *satī* [a feminine present participle] — [the erroneous cognition] “imagines” an “object indeed” “that exists” [*santam=vidyamānam*] “in another way.” [An erroneous cognition] does not do this. This is the

objects, those logical reasons are endowed with deviance, being found with the opposite of the *sādhya*, the latter being the existence of an object distinct from its own cognition. Kumārila answers that there is no deviance. Erroneous cognitions are always apprehending external objects, albeit in another fashion. They are always cognitions of something external, such as a real white conch shell that is perceived as yellow.

³⁷³ Jp^s and Pp^s read here: “In a cognition endowed with the image of yellow, the form of a white conch shell is not brought to awareness, because this is not appearing in that.”

³⁷⁴ Jp^s and Pp^s read here: “The fact of being brought to awareness by that [cognition] is the pervaded [property]; the fact of appearing in that [cognition] is the pervading [property]; there is perception of this[, i.e.,] the fact of appearing in that [cognition]”

³⁷⁵ TS 2060c1 reads *taṃ ca veti*. Nevertheless, the commentary refers just to *taṃ veti*. That *ca* must be understood as a particle introducing the new argument.

³⁷⁶ Tib. here has *ha can thal bar 'gyur bas/*atiprasaṅgena*, “because of an overextension,” for *prasaṅgena*.

³⁷⁷ This is just a synopsis of their thought. Cf. *nirākārā tu no buddhiḥ* | (*Śābarabhāṣya ad* 1.1.5, ed. p. 31, 3). Immediately before, the sentence *pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ* is found as referring to the Vijñānavāda view of cognition as being self-aware. Cf. *śūnyas tu katham* | *arthajñānāyoraṅkārabhedam nopalabhāmahe* | *pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ* | *atas tadbhinnam artharūpaṃ nāma na kiṃcid astīti paśyāmaḥ* | (*Śābarabhāṣya ad* 1.1.5, ed. p. 31, 1–2). The same passage (preceded by *atra bhāṣyam*) is referred to by Pārthasārathi Miśra; cf. *Nyāyaratnākara* (ed. p. 191, 8–9).

syntactic relationship (*sambandha*). And, with this, [Śāntarakṣita] refutes what was stated by Kumārila. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2058–2062 ◇

[Śāntarakṣita] expounds the sets of arguments [put forward] by Kumārila himself, with [the verse] beginning with “now, [Kumārila states that].”³⁷⁸

2063. Now (*atha*), [Kumārila states that] there is a difference between what is the apprehender with regard to a visual form and [what is] apprehended by it, because [cognition] is not brought to awareness while bringing that [visual form] to awareness, as with the apprehender of taste and so on. (ŚV ŚūV 172cd–173ab)

2064. And, likewise, [what is] apprehended [is different] from its apprehender, since it [(i.e., the apprehender)] is necessarily not an object of the reflective awareness by what performs the reflective awareness like, for example, the apprehender of taste and so on; (ŚV ŚūV 173cd–174ab)

2065. [For the latter reason,]³⁷⁹ [those] two [(i.e., the visual form, etc., and its apprehender)] are established as being different from one another,³⁸⁰ as, for example, in the case of taste; or, since they are not cognized as being identical, like a perception belonging to another continuum. (ŚV ŚūV 174cd–175ab)

2066. Cognition does not apprehend a part of itself, since it arises from cognition, like its own *śakti*. And[, with regard to a part of cognition,] there is the negation of being apprehended, for the imprint is devoid of [those] two [(i.e., the apprehended and the apprehender)]. (ŚV ŚūV 175cd–176ab)

2067. The cognition of Caitra cannot be the perceiver of [that] apprehended that is a part of the cognition arising from it [(i.e., cognition of Caitra)], since it is cognition, just like [a cognition] arising in a different physical body [cannot be the perceiver] of that [part of the cognition having arisen from the cognition of Caitra]. (ŚV ŚūV 176cd–177ab)

(i) “What”ever is “the apprehender,” i.e., the cognition “with regard to visual form,” [precisely] “that”³⁸¹ is different from that “apprehended by it,” i.e., the visual form, since, “while bringing to awareness” — [*saṃvittau satyām*, a locative absolute] — that visual form, the [cognition] “is not brought to

³⁷⁸ On TS 2063–2068, cf. Matsuoaka 2014b.

³⁷⁹ As further explained by Kamalaśīla, the reason “since it [(i.e., the apprehender)] is necessarily not an object of the reflective awareness by what performs the reflective awareness” (*tat parāmrśatā yato na parāmrśyate 'vaśyam*) applies to both TS 2064a and TS 2065ab.

³⁸⁰ Tib. lacks *dvayaṃ paraspareṇaiva*.

³⁸¹ *Tat* stands for *tasya* in the stanza.

awareness,” “as with” “the apprehender of taste and so on.”³⁸² ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2063 ◇

(ii) Or else [another argument may be the following]: the “apprehended,” i.e., the visual form, etc., is different from its own “apprehender” “since” [*yataḥ*, i.e., *yasmāḥ*] “it,” i.e., the apprehender, “is not an object of the reflective awareness” “by what performs the reflective awareness,” as [it is different], for example, from “the apprehender of taste and so on.”³⁸³ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2064 ◇

(iii) Or else, [because of the latter reason,] [those] “two,” i.e., the visual form, etc., and its apprehender, are different “from one another,” because, if one of the two is an object of the reflective awareness, the other will not be such, “as,” “for example,” “taste” and visual forms.³⁸⁴ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2065 ◇

(iv) “Or,” because they are not cognized (*parijñāna*)³⁸⁵ as one, “like” the mind “belonging to another continuum.” ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2065 ◇

(v) Or else, “cognition” is not an apprehender of “a part of itself,” because it has arisen “from cognition.” And what is called “imprint” is [nothing but] a “*śakti*” of cognition.³⁸⁶ Thus, one must also make the “negation of being apprehended” with regard to cognition. For instance, a part of cognition is not apprehended by cognition, because it has[, itself,] arisen from cognition, as with the imprint. How — also in these two immediately [preceding] arguments — is the example established as being endowed with the property [that is the] *sādhya*? [In order to show this,] he states, “for the imprint is devoid of [those] two.”³⁸⁷ [Devoid (*hīna* is

³⁸² The apprehender of a visual form is established as distinct from the apprehended because, while apprehending the latter, the apprehender cannot simultaneously apprehend itself. Exactly like, in the case of another sense perception (such as taste), the apprehender cannot apprehend a visual form.

³⁸³ The apprehended and apprehender are established as being different because the latter, performing a reflective awareness, cannot be the object of itself.

³⁸⁴ The apprehended and apprehender are established as being different because when one is an object of reflective awareness, the other is not. Like, for example, when one perceives a visual form, there is no perception of a taste by that same cognition.

³⁸⁵ Here Kamalaśīla comments on the word *jñāna* with *parijñāna*. So does Śāntarakṣita in TS 2068c, where, referring back to TS 2065c, he uses the word *parijñāna*.

³⁸⁶ In the ĀP and ĀPV, Dinnāga argues that one cognition endowed with the appearance of an object generates a *śakti*, a power in the form of an imprint. This *śakti*, left in consciousness by that previous cognition, contains, in a potential state, one knowable internal form, corresponding to the object of the previous cognition. That will be the content of the new cognition arising when the *śakti* actualizes itself. Therefore, this new cognition will have the same content as the previous one and will be the effect of the actualization of the *śakti*. The actualization of the *śakti*, i.e., the arising of the knowable internal form, is, nevertheless, together with the arising of the cognition that has it as an object. Cf. ĀP 6 and ĀPV *ad* ĀP 7b in TSP *ad* TS 2082.

³⁸⁷ A cognition cannot apprehend a part of itself because it arises from itself, and a cognition cannot act upon itself, i.e., apprehend itself. By the same token, a part of cognition, arising from cognition, cannot be apprehended. However, the *śakti* admitted by Dinnāga is nothing but cognition itself. Hence, it cannot be apprehended by a cognition.

understood)] of the two, i.e., of the condition of apprehended and apprehender. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2066 ◇

Or else [the following is] another proof statement. “The cognition of Caitra” is not the “perceiver” of “a part of the cognition arising” from the cognition of Caitra, “since it is cognition.” “Just like,” “of that,” i.e., of a part of the cognition having arisen from the cognition of Caitra, the cognition, “arising in a different physical body” (like Maitra’s for example) [is not the perceiver]. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2067 ◇

[Śāntarakṣita] explains the defect [regarding these arguments] with [the verse] beginning with “since [they] are not brought to awareness separately.”

2068. Since [they] are not brought to awareness separately, because of what was demonstrated earlier precisely with regard to that, [the logical reasons] up until “since they are not cognized as being identical” (TS 2065c) are not established.

“Since [they] are not brought to awareness separately,” i.e., because of the necessity of being perceived together (*sahopalambhaniyama*) with regard to a blue [thing] and its cognition. “Because of what was demonstrated” through the proof of self-awareness [of cognition] on account of that [half-verse by Dharmakīrti, stating],

“The vision of an object is not established for someone who does not directly perceive [its] perception.” (PVin 1.54cd)

That is to say, because the non-difference between a blue [thing] and its cognition is established, the logical reasons up until “since they are not cognized as identical” are “not” established.³⁸⁸ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2068 ◇

The adversary [(i.e., Kumāṛila)] highlights the establishment [of the logical reasons] with [the verse] beginning with “[objection:] with the [words].”

2069. [Objection:] with the [words] “the [object], found in external space,” (*Śābarabhāṣya ad* 1.1.5) it is said [by Śabara] that the awareness of the apprehended image is without the direct experiencing of the apprehender. (ŚV ŚūV 79)

“The external object is endowed with a form.³⁸⁹ ‘The [object], found in external space,’ is directly apprehended.” (*Śābarabhāṣya ad* 1.1.5) [Thus,] with this passage (*grantha*) by Śabara — the author of the commentary on

³⁸⁸ The logical reasons brought forward by Kumāṛila are: (i) “because [cognition] is not brought to awareness while bringing that [visual form] to awareness;” (ii) “since it [(i.e., the apprehender)] is necessarily not an object of the reflective awareness by what performs the reflective awareness;” and (iii) “since they are not cognized as being identical.” All these logical reasons are unestablished because the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument advanced by Dharmakīrti (and defended here by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla) has proved that a blue thing and its awareness are always non-different.

³⁸⁹ Cf. Tib. *phyi rol gyi don ni mam pa dañ ldan pa ma yin te* |. “The external object is not endowed with a form.”

[the *Jaiminīsūtra*] — it is demonstrated that “there is ‘the awareness of the apprehended’ even without ‘the direct experiencing of the apprehender.’” (TS 2069cd; ŚV ŚūV 79cd) And therefore, the following — “because [cognition] is not brought to awareness while bringing that [visual form] to awareness” (TS 2063c; ŚV ŚūV 173a) — is established. ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2069 ♦

How are the logical reasons, including the second, etc., established? Accordingly, [Kumārila] states [the verse] beginning with “moreover, [thinking,] ‘I do not remember.’”

2070. Moreover, [thinking,] “I do not remember whether I apprehended some object at that time,” [people] remember the arising of the [form of the] apprehender as devoid of the form of the apprehended. (ŚV ŚūV 83)³⁹⁰

2071. And if [the apprehended] were non-different from that [(i.e., the apprehender)], when the memory of the apprehender occurs, a memory would arise also with regard to the apprehended, but, in that case, only that [(i.e., the form of the apprehender)] is apprehended. (ŚV ŚūV 84)

2072. Thus, the difference between those two is established through positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). (ŚV ŚūV 85cd) And, thus, these logical reasons too are established with regard to the property-bearer.

Even if one does not have the memory of the apprehended, the memory of the apprehender is observed. And if the apprehended could be conclusively non-different “from that” (i.e., the apprehender), then “a memory would arise also with regard to the apprehended,” like in the case of the apprehender. But this is not the case. Therefore, the apprehended and the apprehender are different, since they have a different existence (*bhinnayogakṣema*).³⁹¹

Let the following be the case, “There is indeed a memory, also with regard to the apprehended.” Therefore, [in reply] [Kumārila] states the words beginning with ‘when the memory of the apprehender occurs.’ ‘In that case,’ i.e., at the moment in which the memory of the apprehender occurs. ‘Only’ ‘that,’ i.e., only the apprehender is apprehended, not the apprehended. Hence, the word *eva* is displaced.³⁹² ‘Through positive

³⁹⁰ In general, Kumārila admits that only objects are remembered, not their cognitions. From the memory of the object, one infers, through *arthāpatti*, that it was known before. Cf. *smṛtibhṛāntiś ca yāpy atra paścāj jñāneṣu jāyate | tadaivārthasmiṛter eṣāṃ tajjñānādīpramāṇatā ||* (ŚV₁ ŚūV 192). Cf. also n. 184. Sucarita further comments on it: *artho hi tatra smaryate | tatsmaraṇānyathānupapattyā ca tasya prāg jñātatvam eva kalpyate | tato 'pi prācīnajñānakalpanā |* (*Ślokaṣāṭṭhikāśikā*, ed. p. 168). The verse in ŚV ŚūV is a criticism on Dinnāga's PS 1.12b2. On this point, cf. Hattori 1968: 112 n. 1.79.

³⁹¹ On this translation, see Nakamura 2004: 479 n. 26.

³⁹² Tib. has *rim pa bžin du/*yathākramam* for *bhinnakramam*.

concomitance and negative concomitance,’ i.e., because of the presence and absence[, respectively,] of the memory of the apprehender and the memory of the apprehended. To explain, even in the presence of the memory of the apprehender,³⁹³ there is the absence of the memory of the apprehended.
 ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2070–2072 ◇

[Śāntarakṣita] rebuts with [the verse] beginning with “the awareness of an object.”

2073. The awareness of an object is not established for someone whose perception is not established. Therefore, there is no awareness of an apprehended without directly experiencing an apprehender.³⁹⁴

“The [object] found in external space is directly apprehended.” (Śābarabhāṣya *ad* 1.1.5) With regard to this, Śāntarakṣita states the inconclusiveness [with the verse] beginning with “a yellow [conch shell], etc.”

2074. A yellow [conch shell], etc., seen by someone whose eyes are defective, is vividly (*niṣkṛṣṭam*)³⁹⁵ seen like this, but [it] is not brought to awareness [separately (*niṣkṛṣṭam*)] from the apprehender; likewise, [the same] is [true regarding] the other [(i.e., a yellow thing, etc., admitted as real by the opponent)].

“Vividly” (*niṣkṛṣṭam*)³⁹⁶ — at this point there is a *caesura* (*cheda*=*pāṭhaccheda*). “Like this,” that is to say, as a yellow [thing], etc., admitted as real, is perceived distinctly as situated in external space. In the same way, [a yellow conch shell, etc.], even though perceived by someone whose eyes are affected by jaundice, is seen. If it is indeed seen, what [follows] from this? Therefore, [Śāntarakṣita] states, “but [it] is not brought to awareness [separately] from the apprehender.” Here there is a *caesura*. [Regarding] “from the apprehender,” [here,] one needs to supply [the word] “separately” (*niṣkṛṣṭam*). “*Samvedyaṃ na*”: [here] [the word] *bhavati* needs to be supplied.

³⁹³ Cf. Tib. *’dzin pa dran pa med par* [...]. “In the absence of the memory of the apprehender [...]”

³⁹⁴ Here, Śāntarakṣita rebuts the previous point proving that there is indeed a negative concomitance. There is no apprehension of the apprehended without apprehension of the apprehender.

³⁹⁵ Cf. Tib. *gsal por*. The term *niṣkṛṣṭam* literally means something like “extracted, drawn out.” However, the Tibetan translation for that word in the TS is *gsal por*. In the TSP, the comment on it mentions *gsal bar*. Moreover, a gloss on that word in the TSP suggests *vispaṣṭam* as a reading for *niṣkṛṣṭam*. Therefore, here I shall translate it as “vividly,” because this seems to be the meaning that was intended by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla for this particular occurrence of the term. Nevertheless, *niṣkṛṣṭam* is translated as “separate” in the two following occurrences in the TSP. There, as Kamaśīla states, that term needs to be supplied insofar as it is accompanied by *grāhakāṃśāt* and is commented on with *prthak*. Moreover, Tib. translates them both as *blon nas*.

³⁹⁶ As seen, here Jp^s and Pp^s suggest *vispaṣṭam* as a reading for *niṣkṛṣṭam*.

Therefore, the meaning is as follows: and that yellow [conch shell], etc., perceived by someone suffering with dimness, etc., is not brought to awareness separately from, i.e., without [*niṣkṛṣṭam*=*prthak*], the apprehender part. And if [it is said that] it is perceived as being situated in external space, therefore, it is inconclusive. “Likewise, [the same] is [true regarding] the other,” i.e., a yellow [thing], etc., even though [it is] admitted as real. By virtue of this mere vivid appearance as separate, also with regard to [those] two, [(i.e., a yellow object admitted as real and its cognition),] the identity will follow.³⁹⁷ ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2074 ◇

Referring to [TS 2070a; ŚV ŚūV 83a] — “I do not remember [whether I apprehended] some object [at that time]” — [Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “this memory is both endowed with an undistinguished particular.”

2075. This memory is both endowed with an undistinguished particular as well as related to the form of the apprehended.³⁹⁸ However, it does not³⁹⁹ relate to a form distinct (*bhinna*) from everything else because of the non-occurrence of the habituation, etc.⁴⁰⁰

With this, [Śāntarakṣita] states that the absence of a memory of an apprehended in the memory of an apprehender is unestablished.

Let the following be the case, “If ‘this memory’ relates to the apprehended, why is it endowed ‘with an undistinguished particular’? To explain, exactly in the way that that apprehended is distinct “from everything else,” i.e., from what is homogeneous or heterogeneous, in that way [a memory] can remember that [(i.e., the apprehended)]. For, like this, the [memory] can have that [apprehended] as [its] content (*viśaya*). Otherwise, how could [the memory], not apprehending that

³⁹⁷ As perceived by someone with xanthopsia, a yellow conch shell, although vividly grasped as being separate, cannot truly be apprehended as distinct from the image apprehender, which is the yellow image belonging exclusively to the cognition of that person. Accordingly, this is an instance that establishes the identity between apprehended and apprehender, in spite of the apprehended appearing as being separate from the apprehender.

³⁹⁸ Cf. Tib. *khyad par mtshon pa med pa yi* || *gzun ba'i no bo la de'an dran* ||. “And this memory is related to the form of the apprehended that is devoid of a distinguished particular.” Tib. seems to read TS 2075ab1 as something along the lines of *alakṣitaviśeṣagrāhyarūpe*, where *ca* is missing. This would be *contra metrum*, as such. However, the Tibetan reading *gzun ba'i/*grāhya°*, as opposed to *bāhya°* in Jk, is preferable here, since Śāntarakṣita is arguing precisely against the establishment of the absence of the memory of the apprehended, while remembering the apprehender.

³⁹⁹ Tib. lacks *na*. Cf. Tib. *thams cad las ldog no bo la* || *de ('di P)* [...]. “It relates to a form distinct from everything else [...].”

⁴⁰⁰ In this case, it is not that one remembers only the apprehender. That memory relates to an uncharacterized apprehended; that is, it is related to an apprehended that is not conceptually determined because of the absence of the causes of such determination.

difference [from everything else], have that [apprehended] as its content? Since[, otherwise,] there would be an overextension.”⁴⁰¹

Therefore, [in response,] [Śāntarakṣita] states the words beginning with “from everything else.” The point is as follows. A concept is not at all endowed with the capacity to apprehend a real thing (*vastu*) as it is found, because it does not have a real thing as its object (*viṣaya*). However, by force of the direct experiencing of a thing (*padārtha*) with a certain nature, a cognitive memory, indeed devoid of an object, is — with reference to that [thing] — determining [precisely] that image, regarding which only there are the causes of the ascertainment, such as interest. Since its appearing is devoid of an object according to absolute truth,⁴⁰² being [its] activity through the determination of an object, every [cognitive memory (*smṛtaṭpratyaya*)] arises as truly erroneous. However, with reference to that [cognitive memory], the establishment of an object [occurs] by force of the determination, not according to absolute truth. And, furthermore, also with reference to a memory, there is no determination of the apprehended, but it is endowed with an undistinguished particular because of the absence of causes, such as habituation, acuity, interest, proximity and difference in degree of that sort through which it differs from another memory.⁴⁰³ ♦ TSP ad TS 2075 ♦

Let the following be the case, “How is it ascertained that the memory, in this case, determines an apprehended?” Accordingly, he states [the verse] beginning with “some [object] was apprehended [by me].”

⁴⁰¹ The objection is as follows: a memory cannot be related to an apprehended and, at the same time, have an uncharacterized object as its content. For a memory can remember some thing only if it is determined through a concept. Only through that concept can a memory have that apprehended as its object. I cannot remember a *śvalakṣaṇa* that was the object of my direct perception, I can only remember the concept through which I determined that *śvalakṣaṇa* as distinct from all heterogeneous things.

⁴⁰² Tib. reads “according to absolute truth” as referring to the previous line (*pratyayo nirviṣaya eva paramārthataḥ*). Cf. *śes pa don dam par yul med pa ñid du* [...]. “A cognition indeed devoid of an object, according to absolute truth [...].”

⁴⁰³ A conceptual cognition cannot apprehend a real thing as it is found because it does not have a real thing as its object. The *śvalakṣaṇa* is perceived through direct perception, while the *anumāna* has the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as its content. However, if one directly experienced a certain thing, then a recollection arises regarding that conceptual image through which that object was determined when the causes of the ascertainment were there. For example, one remembers something red because they remember a conceptual cognition that determined one real thing through that concept of “red.” In this sense, every cognitive memory is ultimately erroneous because it does not have a real thing as its object, but rather its activity is through conceptual determination, not according to true reality. Additionally, the object of a memory that is endowed with an uncharacterized particular is such because, at this moment, there are no causes of the determination, such as habituation, etc., whence it could be distinguished from another memory. On the subject of apprehension and ascertainment, see Introduction §4.3, particularly PV Svārthānumāna 58 and PVSV in n. 162.

2076. “Some [object (*artha*)] was apprehended [by me].” In this way, and not otherwise, a recollection can arise; and the recollection is not apprehended as resembling a pure crystal.

2077. Because of [the instance of erroneous] cognitions, like a yellow conch shell, etc., the inconclusiveness of the last two logical reasons too (TS 2066b1; TS 2067c1) is evident; this method (*dis*) is [found] elsewhere in the demonstration.⁴⁰⁴

For, if that memory does not also determine the apprehended endowed with a non-characterized particular, then [it (i.e., memory)] cannot engage in the judgment (*pratyavamarśa*)⁴⁰⁵ related to the apprehended also “in this way,” namely according to the general image: “some [object]” “was apprehended [by me].”⁴⁰⁶ Moreover, not even the apprehender, alone, endowed with a form devoid of the stain of the image of the apprehended, is remembered “resembling a pure crystal.” Because it is said [by Kumārila], “[People] remember the arising of the [form of the] apprehender as being devoid of the form of the apprehended.” (TS 2070cd; SV ŚūV 83)⁴⁰⁷ Therefore, the absence of the recollection of the [apprehended] in the recollection of the [apprehender] is not established.

Moreover, with regard to these last two logical reasons that [were discussed before] — “since it arises from cognition” (TS 2066b1) [and] “since it is cognition” (TS 2067c1) — there is a deviation, because of [the instance of] the cognition of a yellow conch shell, etc. To explain, the cognition of a yellow conch shell, etc., though having arisen from a cognition, apprehends one part of itself that is endowed with the image of yellow, etc.; additionally, even though it is a cognition, [this] is the apprehender of the apprehended — like yellow, etc. — that is part of cognition. Likewise, [the situation] is [similar] also [in the case of all] other [cognitions]. Accordingly, there is the fact of the two logical reasons being endowed with deviation (*vyabhicāritā*); moreover, it is demonstrated that the cognition of a yellow conch shell, etc., is devoid of an [external]

⁴⁰⁴ Cf. Tib. *sgrub pa gzan la'añ*. “Also in another demonstration.” Here, Śāntarakṣita is suggesting that the inconclusiveness of the two logical reasons, *jñānotpatteḥ* and *jñānatvāt*, because of the instance of erroneous cognitions is the grounds for refuting external objects in other cases as well.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. Tib. *gzun ba rtogs pas 'jug par mi 'gyur ro ||*. Here, Tib. reads **grāhyapratyavamarśena na pravarteta* instead of *grāhyapratyavamarśane na pravarteta*.

⁴⁰⁶ Here Kamalaśīla also wants to provide the right word order in the stanza: *ko 'pi gṛhīta ity evam*.

⁴⁰⁷ In Tib. these two sentences appear in an inverted order: *gañ gis gzun (bzun P) ba'i no bo dan bral ba'o || 'dzin pa skyes pa dran par 'gyur || 'zes brjod pa 'ba' 'zig la gzun ba'i nam pa dan bral ba'i lus can gyi 'dzin pa 'sel goñ dag pa lta bur dran pa yan ma yin no ||*. “Since it is said [by Kumārila]: ‘[People] remember the arising of the [form of an] apprehender as being devoid of the form of an apprehended,’ but not even the apprehender endowed with a form devoid of the image of the apprehended is remembered as ‘resembling the pure crystal.’”

object-support. Therefore, indeed, because of the awareness of the image of yellow, etc. — which knows itself — self-awareness is established.⁴⁰⁸ This too is proven. “This method,” that is to say, also “elsewhere,” i.e., “in the demonstration” of external objects brought forward as an example by the adversaries⁴⁰⁹ [(such as Kumāṛila in ŚV ŚūV)], “this” is “the method” of the refutation.

With reference to what was said by the adversary [(i.e., Kumāṛila)], [namely,] “How is the non-duality [between apprehended and apprehender] admitted as *sādhya*? [Is it] perhaps because of the absence of an image of blue, etc., that appears, and of a form of cognition established by direct experience? How is this possibly logical? If this were the case, there would be the undesirable consequence of the non-existence of every entity[, including other mental continuums].”⁴¹⁰

In this respect, one should respond [with the following.] “The non-existence of every entity[, including other mental continuums,] does not [follow] since [a cognition] is devoid of the aspect of an apprehended, because [(i)] an apprehended like the earth that is separate from itself, does not exist, based on [its] *svalakṣaṇa*; but [also] because [(ii)] another mental continuum does not exist as an apprehended. Moreover, since, with reference to a cognition, there is not that fact of being a *karṭṛ*, [which is assumed by] thinking ‘it cognizes, therefore it is [called] cognition’ (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 2.34ab)⁴¹¹ [and which is] imagined as dependent on that [aspect of an apprehended], [that cognition] is [also] devoid of the aspect of apprehender; however, it is not because also all *svalakṣaṇas* of cognition do not exist at all.⁴¹² Moreover, the following was stated:

⁴⁰⁸ The two logical reasons adduced by Kumāṛila (ŚV ŚūV 175d1; ŚV ŚūV 177a1) to prove that a cognition does not apprehend a part of itself are also present in the case of the erroneous perception of a yellow conch shell. In this instance, a cognition belonging to a man with an eye disease apprehends a part of itself. That form does not exist outside of that cognition, i.e., as separate from the cognition apprehending it. Hence, the logical reasons are established as being endowed with deviance, since they are found along with a cognition apprehending only a part of itself. Accordingly, they cannot demonstrate the fact that a cognition does not know itself. Instead, *vijñaptimātratā* is established.

⁴⁰⁹ Tib. lacks *para*° “by the adversaries.”

⁴¹⁰ One cannot admit the non-difference between apprehender and apprehended as being proved by the fact that they do not experience two things — an image of a blue thing and, at the same time, one image in cognition that is its perception. This would lead to the undesirable consequence that nothing exists, including other mental continuums, since one never sees two images — that of the apprehended and the apprehender. Everything would be reduced to just one mental continuum that perceives all things.

⁴¹¹ Cf. *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* 2.34ab (ed. p. 61, 23). On this cf. Introduction n. 256 and Sanskrit Text.

⁴¹² A *svalakṣaṇa*, which is an external *grāhya*, separate from its own cognition, does not exist. Therefore, if an external object that is separate from being a *grāhya* of a cognition does not exist, a cognition is devoid of the aspect of an apprehended. However, another mental continuum does not have the nature of being a *grāhya* of a cognition, since it is never known.

A blue, yellow [thing,] etc.,⁴¹³ which appears as if it were external to [its] cognition, is not true; therefore, according to the true reality, there is no apprehended externally.

And that aspect of *karṭṛ*, imagined as dependent on that [aspect of the apprehended], with regard to awareness, is not true; hence, the non-duality of awareness is proven.”⁴¹⁴

Furthermore, having been considered in this way, this reading of the *Prajñāpāramitā* also becomes clear (*sunīta*), [namely,] “[Bare] cognition (*viññāna*)⁴¹⁵ is devoid of the nature of awareness because of the voidness of characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*).”⁴¹⁶ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2076–2077 ♦

5.

Conclusion

In this way, having established the pervasion of the logical reason by the *sādhya* in the main original argument — that is to say, “every cognition [is devoid of the two conditions of apprehended and of apprehender, [precisely] because it is cognition, like the cognition of a reflection]” (TSP *ad* TS 1964) — [Śāntarakṣita] summarizes [the argument in the verse] beginning with “therefore, [that] cognition [which] is taken as the subject of dispute.”

2078. Therefore, [that] cognition, [which is] taken as the subject of dispute since it is cognition, is non-dual because it is devoid of the condition[s] of apprehended and *karṭṛ* [of apprehension], like a reflection.

With the qualification “subject of dispute” he argues the following: the sense cognition of a healthy person, here, is the specific property-bearer, not

Hence, the undesirable consequence that another mental continuum would not exist, like any external object, does not hold true because, while the object can be a *grāhya*, the continuum cannot. On the other hand, the aspect of *grāhaka* does not exist, since the aspect of *grāhya* is not admitted, and not since the *svalakṣaṇas* of cognitions do not exist. Cognitions, being devoid of the aspect of apprehended and apprehender, do exist indeed.

⁴¹³ Tib. has *so sor la sogs* instead of *nīlapītādi*.

⁴¹⁴ These two verses are ascribed to the PV by Haribhadra Sūri in his *Anekāntajayapatākāśvopajñavyākhyā*, cf. *tathā coktam nyāyavidā vārtike* | (ed. p. 82, 21). Lindtner (1984: 162) refers to them as verses of Dharmakīrti that are extant in later literature, but not found in any of his works. For more references regarding these two verses, see Sanskrit Text and Lindtner 1984: 162 n. 36.

⁴¹⁵ Cf. *viśayaṃ viśayaṃ prati viññaptir upalabdhir viññānaskandha ity ucyate* | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad* 1.16a, ed. p. 11, 7–8). And: *upalabdhir vastumātragrahaṇam* | (*Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, ed. p. 38, 24). For these references and the English translation of the term *viññāna* in this context, see Eltschinger 2014: 300 and n. 191. For similar references in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, see Introduction n. 256.

⁴¹⁶ For the parallel passages in the *Bhāvanākrama* I and the MAV, see Sanskrit Text.

every [cognition].⁴¹⁷ However, the logical reason “because it is cognition” is a universal; therefore, there is no [defect] of the logical reason being identical with the object of the thesis (*pratijñārthaikadeśatā*) [i.e., with the *sādhya*]. “Because it is devoid of the condition[s] of apprehended and *kartṛ* [of apprehension]” — [this] is the qualification of non-duality. “Non-duality” is admitted through the absence of the duality of the condition[s] of apprehended and *kartṛ* [of apprehension], but not because of [its] absolute non-existence; this is the meaning. “Like a reflection,” that is to say, with the word “reflection” it is said “the cognition of a reflection,” because of the metaphor of the object with reference to the object-possessor.⁴¹⁸

Or else, [the affix] *vat* can be considered as governing a seventh ending [(i.e., the locative case — *pratibimbe iṅ*)], therefore, by implication, cognition itself is obtained as being comprehended. And the logical reason is not unestablished since, in this way, precisely the essential property (*svabhāva*) [of being a cognition (i.e., *jñānatva*)] is indicated through the repudiation of other different [properties], [but] not the [property of] being a cognizer. Nor is [the logical reason] contradicted because of [its] presence in the homologous instance.⁴¹⁹ ♦ TSP *ad* TS 2078 ♦

The opponent [(i.e., Kumāṛila)] highlights that the example is devoid of the *sādhya* with [the verse] beginning with “[one may object that,] moreover, also with regard to a reflection.”⁴²⁰

2079. [One may object that,] moreover, also with regard to a reflection, cognition is admitted as being endowed with an object-support,⁴²¹ since one sees their own face, etc., in this way [(i.e., as a reflection)] indeed when the light rays of the eye turn back.

Since the ocular light rays that turn back after having struck the surface of a mirror, etc., come into contact with one’s own face, etc., in this way, they therefore become the causes of the cognition of the face, etc. Hence, there is a vision precisely of “their own face, etc.,” “in this way,” that is to say, with [a reflection, i.e.,] a form that is internal, etc., to a mirror, etc. And

⁴¹⁷ Tib. has *’dir skyon med pa’i mig la sogs pa’i khyad par ’di bsgrub bya’i chos can du bstan gyi | thams cad kyi spyi ni ma yin no* [...]. “Here, this particular related to a person with flawless senses is said to be the *sādhya*dharmīn, but not every universal,” for *svasthanetrādivijñānam atra viśeṣaḥ sādhya*dharmī na sarvaḥ | *sāmānyam tu* [...].

⁴¹⁸ The term “reflection” is metaphorically used to refer to its cognition.

⁴¹⁹ The logical reason is not contradicted because it is found in the instance of the cognition of a reflection, which is similar to the proposition to be proven; for the cognition of a reflection is devoid of apprehended and apprehender, and is a cognition.

⁴²⁰ Unlike many other occurrences, the *pratīka* in T_{2D} T_{2P} literally quotes the beginning of the stanza as translated in T_{1D} T_{1P}.

⁴²¹ Cf. Tib. *dmigs pa dañ ldan ’dod min nam* | |. “[Cognition] is not admitted as being endowed with an object-support or [...].” Tib. maybe reads *na tu* for *nanu*?

therefore, the cognition of a reflection is not established as being devoid of the duality of apprehended and apprehender.⁴²² ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2079 ◇

[Śāntarākṣita] rebuts with [the verse] beginning with “in this way.”

2080. In this way, there is not the vision of one’s own [actual] face, etc., because one sees that (*taṭ*) in front [of their own face] and because one sees [it] as different, for example, regarding size and space, like another thing (*padārtha*).

“In this way” “there is not” “the vision” “of one’s own face, etc.,” because of the showing [in the mirror] of that [(*tasya*=*taṭ* in the stanza)], i.e., one’s own face “in front [of their face].” “And because one sees [it]” with a “difference” regarding its “space,” “size,” color, etc., “there is not the vision of one’s own [actual] face, etc., in this way.” This is the syntactic relation. “Like another thing,” i.e., like a thing, such as a sound.⁴²³

The point is as follows. If the cognition of that [reflection] could be the apprehender of a face, etc., then it could apprehend that face, etc., precisely as it exists [according to its real original form, not the reflected one]. For it is not logical that a cognition endowed with one image have another [thing as its] apprehended, because of an overextension. To explain, one who is facing south, looking at the surface of a mirror, sees their own face facing north. Similarly, in a smaller surface of a mirror, a small reflection of one’s own face is perceived, even though [their face] is big[ger]. In the same way, [a reflection] that is found in the surface of a mirror is seen as if it were inside[, very small], far away and at the bottom.⁴²⁴ However, first of all, that surface of a mirror is not that deep, nor is [one’s own] face, etc.,⁴²⁵ found in it. Analogously, on a lake with clear waters, the reflections of the trees and mountains that stand at the edge of the shore are perceived as [respectively] having peaks and tops, like branches, for example,⁴²⁶ going downwards; but the [mountains and trees] do not stay like this. Therefore, the cognition of a reflection is not the apprehender of one’s own face, etc., because it has an

⁴²² Here the opponent wants to prove that the instance of the cognition of a reflection is not devoid of the duality of apprehended and apprehender, because it is always the cognition of something external that is reflected, for example, in the mirror. When one sees one’s own face reflected in a mirror, they have their own real face as a support of that cognition, since the ocular rays, bouncing off the mirror, come into contact with it.

⁴²³ When one sees a reflection of one’s own face, they do not see their face, since that reflection is indeed in another place, i.e., in front of their actual face. That reflection is also different in size, color, etc., like a completely different thing. Accordingly, while apprehending its reflection, one does not have their real face as a support of that cognition.

⁴²⁴ Cf. Tib. *khron par gñin du žugs pa lta bur* [...]. “As if it had entered deeply in a well [...].” The metaphor of water inside a well is used elsewhere in the TSP. Cf. *tathā hi — kūpāntargatodakavad darṣanatale pratibimbakam antargatam upalabhyate* | (TSP *ad* TS 259, ed. p. 132, 19–20).

⁴²⁵ Cf. Tib. *bdag ñid byad/*ātmanamukha*. “One’s own face.”

⁴²⁶ Here, Tib. has *ñin dan ri’i rtse mo*. “The tops of trees and mountains.”

appearance that is different from that [(i.e., one's own face)], like the cognition of a sound. ◇ TSP *ad* TS 2080 ◇

However, Bhadanta Śubhagupta says:

And, being the cognition-only (*dhīmātratva*, *blo tsam ñid*) to be proven, every *proband* [(i.e., *hetu*)], such as being a cognition, since it is not contradicted in heterogeneous [instances], is said [to be] not conclusive (*śeṣavat*).⁴²⁷ (BASK 29)⁴²⁸

Therefore, [Śāntarakṣita] replies to him [with the verse] beginning with “being a cognition.”

2081. Being a cognition is having [the nature of] light and that, with regard to [some] apprehended [object], has no place. The pervasion of this [*jñānatva*] by that [*grāhyagrāhakatvadvayarahitva*] has been ascertained because of the illogicality of [its apprehension by a cognition as] being devoid of [its] image, etc.

2082. If there is a *śakti* in the immediately preceding cognition, [then] there is the establishment of the apprehensible part [of cognition] as an object.⁴²⁹ This is not admitted by us as being ultimately real; hence this [establishment] is not demonstrated.

2083. The establishment of *viññaptimātratā* has been made clear by wise persons. We have proceeded through this method in the *Paramārthavinīścaya*.⁴³⁰

[End of the] Bahirarthaparīkṣā [of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*]

⁴²⁷ For a definition of *śeṣavat-anumāna*, see *kiṃ punar etac cheṣavat* | **yasyādarśanamātreṇa vyatirekaḥ pradarśyate** | **tasya saṁśayahetutvāc cheṣavat tad udāhṛtam** || *sa tasya vyatireko na niścīta iti vipakṣe vṛttir āśaṅkyeta* | *vyatirekasādhanaśyādarśanamātrasya saṁśaya-hetukvāt* | *na sarvānupalabdhir gamikā* | *tasmād ekanivṛtyā 'nyanivṛttim icchatā tayoh kaścit svabhāva-prati-bandho 'py eṣṭavyaḥ* | *anyathāgamako hetuḥ syāt* | (PV Svārthānumāna 14 and PVSV, ed. p. 10, 18–25). On the meaning of the term, see Steinkellner 1979: 113–116 n. 433 and n. 436.

⁴²⁸ Here, Śubhagupta refers to Dinnāga's theory that a cognition has no other *ālambana* than another cognition. Cf. *de yi phyogs la ñes pa med* || *gañ gi len pa ṣes bya ba'i* || *ṣes pa las rgyu gžan med pa* || *de yi śin tu 'brel pa med* || (BASK 28). According to him, by means of a logical reason that is *jñānatva*, when the *sādhya* is “being cognition-only,” one cannot conclusively establish that a cognition has no external object. His point here appears to be that in this case one cannot ascertain the non-presence of the *hetu* where the opposite of the *sādhya* is found. And if *jñānatva* is not proved as being absent when *grāhyagrāhakarāhitva* is absent, then the *vyatireka* between these two properties is not demonstrated. Accordingly, the presence of the *hetu* in the *vipakṣa* is still doubtful, and the logical reason is inconclusive.

⁴²⁹ This apprehensible part is the *avabhāsa* of an object, which casts a *śakti* in the immediately preceding cognition. This produces an effect, similar in form, which is the part that is actually apprehensible to the new cognition. Cf. n. 386.

⁴³⁰ This verse, in its Tibetan translation, is found identically also in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 123, 7–10).

Since [its (i.e., of *jñānatva*)] pervasion [by *grāhyagrāhakatvadvyarahitātva*] has indeed been previously proven with [the argument expounded in the *kārikā*] beginning with “being devoid of [the object’s] appearance, [or] endowed with [the object’s] appearance” (TS 1998), the logical reason is not inconclusive.⁴³¹ In order to establish the *ālambanapratyaya* [of cognition], the Venerable Master Dinnāga said:

But, the knowable internal form, which appears as [if it were] external, is the object [of a cognition], because it is a form in cognition and because it is the cause of that [cognition].⁴³² (ĀP 6)

With this, the apprehensible part is indeed established as the object (*viṣaya*) [of a cognition].

Moreover, it is said, “Or else, ‘successively, because of casting a *śakti*’ (ĀP 7b), also successively, [since] that appearance of an object generates a *śakti*, which resides in consciousness, in order to produce an effect that corresponds with its own form[, i.e., with the form of the appearance of an object]; therefore, there is no contradiction.” (ĀPV *ad* ĀP 7b)

With this, it is demonstrated that that appearance is the cause, because of casting a *śakti* that is the cause of the production of an effect corresponding with its own form in an immediately preceding cognition.

In this regard, that same Venerable (*bhadanta*) [(i.e., Śubhagupta)] states the defect:

Even if the apprehensible part might, indeed, be the cause of a sense perception, it nevertheless is not [its] object (*viṣaya*) — like the sense organs — since that [perception] is not endowed with its appearance. ([partly]⁴³³ ĀP 1)⁴³⁴

⁴³¹ Kamalaśīla says that the logical reason is not inconclusive, as Śubhagupta maintains, because they have proved the pervasion of the two properties. They have proved that cognition cannot have an external *grāhya*, regardless of how that may be admitted as occurring; accordingly, there is no instance in which the logical reason can be found with the opposite of the *sādhyā*.

⁴³² The knowable internal form satisfies both requirements for being an *ālambana* of a cognition: it imposes its image on that and it is its cause. On this, cf. Introduction n. 124.

⁴³³ This verse is in fact partly the Sanskrit original of ĀP 1, which is correctly cited in PVA *ad* PV Pratyakṣa 294 (ed. p. 336, 5). See Sanskrit Text. Here, one finds *grāhyāmśaḥ* instead of *phra rab rdul dag* (and *paramāṇavaḥ* in the PVA) and *sa tu* instead of *rdul phran* (and *aṇavaḥ* in the PVA). This is of course not a statement of Dinnāga’s thought. It appears as though Kamalaśīla wants to suggest that Śubhagupta might have made this objection to Dinnāga. The verse, as it is, cannot be found in the BASK. However, it can be regarded as a reference to the criticism of Dinnāga’s theory that is actually present in the BASK (perhaps BASK 117–119). On the ĀP as quoted in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā*, see Chatterji 1930; Matsuoka 2012.

⁴³⁴ McClintock (2010: 102) states that “in his commentary on the final three verses of the ‘Investigation of External Objects,’ Kamalaśīla explains that the implication of the Vijñānavāda doctrine is that ultimately all cognitions are devoid of an object, since even the aspect of a cognition that appears as an object (i.e., the *grāhyākāra*) does not have any real existence (i.e., any real causal function) separate from the awareness itself.”

In this respect [Śāntarakṣita] says, “if there is a *śakti*,” etc. The two locatives “*śaktau*” and “*anantare jñāne*” relate to different objects. “In the immediately preceding cognition,” i.e., in the immediately preceding and homologous cognition — that is to say, the receptacle (*ālaya*) — [that] that is the *śakti* is considered [to be] the cause⁴³⁵ of the appearance of an object with such [form]. “[This] is not admitted as being ultimately real,” since — having demonstrated extensively that the fact of being an object-support (*ālambanatva*) [of cognitions] with regard to an atom, etc., that is separate [from cognitions] is not tenable — the Master [Dīnāga] demonstrates⁴³⁶ of which sort the *ālambanapratyaya* is intended in the *sūtra*, as well as in common sense, according to conventional truth [and] not according to absolute truth. This is [done] in order to demonstrate the non-contradiction in the following way, “let there not be a contradiction of the common belief if you deny the [existence] of an object-support [of cognitions] in any case. Similarly, [let there not be] also a contradiction with what is admitted because the Buddha said (*vacana*) in the *sūtra*, ‘Four [things have the] condition of causal condition of [a cognition]; [they are] characterized as *ālambanapratyaya*, *adhipatipratyaya*, *samanantarapratyaya* [and] *hetupratyaya*.’”⁴³⁷ However, according to absolute truth, every cognition is devoid of an object-support.⁴³⁸ ♦ TSP ad TS 2081–2083 ♦

[End of the] Bahirarthaparīkṣā [of the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*]

⁴³⁵ Tib. lacks **pratyaya*, “cause.” Cf. *mam pa de lta bu'i don snan bas bsgrubs pa* for *tathāvidhārtha-pratibhāsapratyayasamarthitā*.

⁴³⁶ Tib. interprets *paramāṇvādeḥ* as an ablative. Cf. [...] *rdul phra rab la sogs pa las ma gtogs pa'i dmigs pa rigs pa ma yin no 'jes rgyas par bstan nas* |. “[...] Having demonstrated extensively that an object-support [of cognitions], which is other than atoms, etc., is not logically tenable [...]”

⁴³⁷ Cf. *catvāraḥ pratyayā uktāḥ* | (*Abhidharmakośa* 2.61c) *kvoktāḥ* | *sūtre* | *catasraḥ pratyayatāḥ* — *hetupratyayatā, samanantarapratyayatā, ālambanapratyayatā, adhipatipratyayatā ceti* | *pratyayajātīḥ pratyayatā* | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 2.61c, ed. p. 98, 5–6). On this passage and its topic, cf. Poussin–Pruden 1991: 360 n. 417.

⁴³⁸ Matsuoka (2012) interprets this passage as an analysis of the ĀP by Kamalaśīla. According to the latter, Dīnāga first proves that external *ālambanas* of cognitions are not logical. Subsequently, he admits the existence of the knowable part of a cognition as the *ālambana*, but only from a conventional point of view. He does this in order to avoid contradictions with the common belief as well as the Scriptures. However, Dīnāga (like Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita) believes in the non-duality of cognition.

PART III

**BĀHYĀRTHASIDDHIKĀRIKĀ*

Appendix 1

Reuse of Materials from the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*

1.

Corresponding Passages between the
Tattvasaṅgraha/*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*
and the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*

TSP *ad* TS 1969

pratyekaṃ na hi cānūnām
svātantryeṇāsti sambhavaḥ |
ato 'pi paramāṇūnām
ekaikāpratibhāsanam | |

k. 44 (i)¹

rdul phran nmams ni re re nas | |
rañ dbaṅ 'byuñ ba mi srid do | |
de phyir phra rab rdul nmams ni | |
re re snañ bar mi 'gyur ro | |

TS 1971

tulyāparakṣaṇotpādād
yathā nityatvavibhramah |
avicchinnaśajātīya-
grahē cet sthūlavibhramah | |

k. 35 (i)

'dra ba'i skad cig gzan 'byuñ phyir | |
ji ltar rtag pa ñid 'khrul ltar | |
rgyun chags rigs mthun 'dzin pa la | |
ñion po ñid du 'khrul pa skye | |

TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991

yathaikasvabhāvasyāsadaḍṛavyādivyāvṛtta-
syānekaṃ sāmānyaṃ na tattvena kalpyate
evam ihāpi paramāṇūnām anekamadhya-
varitvād anekatvaṃ kalpyate na bhūtārthe-
na |

k. 48 (ii)

du ma'i dbus na 'dug pa'i phyir | |
du ma ñid du mnam rtog la | |
'di ltar ldog pa'i sgo dag nas | |
mañ po ñid du spyir rtog ciñ | |

TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991

kevalam aṇava eva pauraḥparyeṇāvasthitā
dikśabdavācyaḥ |

k. 45cd (ii)

'ga' yis khyad par dan bcas pa'i | |
rdul la phyogs kyi sgrar bstan bya | |

TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991

tataś ca digbhāgabhedavattvād iti kevalam
bahubhiḥ parivāraṇam evoktaṃ syān na
sāvayavatvaṃ iti |

k.46 (ii)

de phyir phyogs cha'i khyad par gyis | |
de ni mañ pos yonś bskor bar | |
brjod par zad kyi rdul nmams ni | |
cha śas bcas pa'i bdag ñid min | |

¹ For my classification of kinds of quotations of the BASK in the TS and the TSP, cf. §2.1.

TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991

*athāsaty api paramārthata ūrdhṛvādhobhā-
gavattve bahubhiḥ parivāraṇaṃ syāt [...]* |

k. 49 (iii)

*de las gžan pa la bltos na | |
no bo gžan gaṇ dper 'dzin pa | |
de der kho nas yod min te | |
tshu rol pha rol sogs dbye bžin | |*

TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991

*yathā vartamānacittakṣaṇasyātītānāgatā-
bhyām cittakṣaṇābhyām kālakṛtanairanta-
ryam asti,*

k. 50 (iii)

*gal te maṇ por 'dab chags phyir | |
cha śas bcas par 'dod na ni | |
skad cig sña phyi 'dab chags la | |
ci phyir de dan 'dra mi 'gyur | |*

k.51 (ii)/(iii)

*atha ca na vartamānacittakṣaṇa-
sya kalāmuhūrtādivat sāvayavatvam evam
anūnām saty api bahubhiḥ parivāraṇe na
deśakṛtaṃ sāvayavatvam bhaviṣyati |*

*śes pa'i skad cig gñis dag gis | |
'dab chags yin yaṇ de la ni | |
cha śas bcas gzugs mi 'dod ltar | |
rdul phran rnams la'an de bžin no | |*

TSP *ad* TS 2008

*kathaṃ tadgrāhakaṃ tac cet
tatparicchedalakṣaṇam |
vijñānaṃ tena nāśaṅkā
kathaṃ tat kiṃvad ity api | |*

k. 89 (i)

*de 'dzin byed de ji ltar źes | |
de ni yonś su gcod pa yi | |
mtshan ñid yin te de yi phyir | |
de ni ji ltar ci 'dra źes | |
the tshom za bar mi bya'o | |*

TSP *ad* TS 2029–2030

*sahasabdaś ca loke 'smin
naivānyena vinā kvacit |
viruddho 'yaṃ tato hetur
yady asti saḥavedanam | |*

k. 71 (i)

*jig rten 'di na lhan cig sgra | |
gžan med par ni 'ga' na'an min | |
gal te lhan cig myoṇ yod na | |
de phyir gtan tshigs 'gal ba'an yin | |*

TSP *ad* TS 2029–2030

*punaḥ sa evāha — yadī sahaśabda
 ekārthas tadā hetur asiddhaḥ | tathā hi —
 naṭacandramallaprekṣāsu na hy ekenaivo-
 palambhaḥ | nīlāder nāpi nīlatadupala-
 mbhayor ekenaivopalambhaḥ | tathā hi —
 nīlopalambhe 'pi tadupalambhānām anya-
 santānagatānām anupalambhāt | yadā ca
 sarvaprāṇabhṛtām sarve cittakṣaṇāḥ sarva-
 jñēnāvāsīyante tadā katham ekenaivopa-
 lambhaḥ siddhaḥ syāt |*

*kiṃ cānyopala-
 mbhāṇiṣedhe saty ekopalambhaniyamaḥ
 siddhyati | na cānyopalambhapraṭiṣedha-
 sambhavaḥ svabhāvaviprakṛstasya vidhīpra-
 tiṣedhāyogāt | atha sahaśabda ekakālaviva-
 kṣayā tadā —*

*buddhavijñeyacittena
 cittacaittaś ca sarvathā |
 anaikāntikatā hetor
 ekakālavivakṣayā |*

*yathā kila buddhasya bhagavato yad vijñe-
 yaṃ santānāntaracittaṃ tasya buddhajñā-
 nasya ca sahopalambhaniyamo 'sty atha ca
 nānātvam | tathā cittacaittānām saty api
 sahopalambhe naikatvam ity ato 'naikāntiko
 hetur iti |*

TSP *ad* TS 2031

*nānyo 'sti grāhako jñānān
 nākṣadhīr viśayair vinā |
 ataś ca sahasaṃvittir
 nābhedaṇ nīlataddhīyoḥ |*

TSP *ad* TS 2031

*pūrvikaiva tu sāmagrī
 sajñānam viśayaḥ saṅgam |
 sālokarūpavat kuryād
 yena syāt sahaśvedanam |*

k. 72 (ii)

*gal te lhan cig sgra gcig don ||
 de ltas gžan la ma grub ñid ||
 thun moñ gi ni dños po la ||
 gcig pus ji ltar mthoñ ba yin ||*

k. 73 (ii)

*gal te thams cad mkhyen pa yi ||
 ye śes śes bya sems kun na ||
 de tshe gcig pu kho na yis ||
 dmigs pa grub pa gañ du brjod ||*

k. 74 (ii)

*gžan gyis dmigs pa 'gog pa ni ||
 tshad ma min pas mi grub ste ||
 ran bžin bskal pa yin pas na ||
 de phyir the tshom ma grub bo ||*

k. 68 (i)

*dus gcig tu ni brjod 'dod pas ||
 sañs rgyas mkhyen bya'i sems dan ni ||
 sems dan sems byuñ nams kyis kyañ ||
 kun tu gtan tshigs ma ñes 'gyur ||*

k. 66 (i)

*śes pa las gžan 'dzin pa med ||
 yul med par ni dbañ blo med ||
 de phyir lhan cig rig pas na ||
 sñon po de'i blo gcig phyir min ||*

k. 81 (i)

*gañ gis lhan cig myoñ 'gyur ba ||
 tshogs pa sña ma kho na las ||
 śes pa yul bcas skad cig ste ||
 snañ ba dan bcas gzugs bžin no ||*

TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034

svābhāṣajñānajanakatvam evārthasya saṃ-
vedyatvam |

k. 84cd (ii)

yul ni rab tu snañ ba yi | |
śes pa skyed phyir myoñ ba yin | |

TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034

na hi gośabdasāmyād vāgādīnām viśāñitva-
siddhiḥ |

k. 85 (iii)

myoñ bar bya ba'i sgrar 'dra yañ | |
de yi don ni tha dad ñid | |
dper na ba lan ñid kyi phyir | |
ba lan ñag la sogs pa mams | |
de bžin nam par mi 'grub phyir | |

TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034

sākārajñānapakṣe ca
tannirbhāṣasya vedyatā |
tasyābhede ca saṃsādhye
siddhasāadhanatā bhavet | |

k. 87 (i)

śes pa nam bcas phyogs la ni | |
de ltar snañ ba myoñ bya ñid | |
de dan tha dad min sgrub na | |
grub pa sgrub pa ñid du 'gyur | |

TS 2040

yathā hi bhavatām jñānam
nirākāraṃ ca tattvataḥ |
vetti cābhūtam ākāraṃ
bhūtam arthaṃ tathāiva cet | |

k. 101 (i)

ji ltar khyod kyi śes pa ni | |
yañ dag du na nam med kyañ | |
yañ dag min nam myoñ ba ltar | |
kho bo'i yañ dag don de bžin | |

TSP *ad* TS 2046

sākāraṃ tan nirākāraṃ
tulyakālam atulyajam |
iti bauddhe 'pi vijñāne
kiṃ na cintā pravartate | |

k. 95 (i)

nam pa bcas sam ci nam med | |
dus mñam mi mñam las skyes śes | |
sañs rgyas mkhyen la'an ci yi phyir | |
byis pa rab tu 'jug mi byed | |

TSP *ad* TS 2047

tathāpi cittāntaram asty eva santānāntara-
vartī tad bhagavajñānasya kim iti grāhyaṃ
na bhavet |

k. 86 (iii)

thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes kyi | |
myoñ bar bya ba rgyud gžan la | |
bsgos pa'i chos mams gañ dag yin | |
de dag gis kyañ ma ñes te | |
rtogs med ji ltar thams cad mkhyen | |

TSP *ad* TS 2051

yo jñānākāraḥ sa saṃvāditve sati tathāvi-
dhāparapadārthanītaḥ [...] |

k. 7cd (iii)/k. 8abc (iii)

śes pa mi bslu ma 'khrul te | |
bslu ba dag ni 'khrul pa yin | |
yul dan dus dan mi gžan la | |
śes pa mi bslu gañ yin pa | |
de ni mi 'khrul yin par śes | |

TSP *ad* TS 2081

dhīmātratve ca samsādhye
yaj jñānatvādisāadhanam |
vijātīyāvīruddhatvāt
sarvaṃ śeṣavad ucyate | |

k. 29 (i)

blo tsam ñid du bsgrubs pa la | |
śes phyir la sogs bsgrub pa gañ | |
mi mthun rigs dan mi 'gal phyir | |
thams cad lhag dan bcas śes bya | |

2.

Tentative Sanskrit Reconstructions of *kārikās* in the BASK

These Sanskrit reconstructions (except for BASK 35) are by Francesco Sferra who suggested them, among other possible, in the form of a personal communication (August 2015).

2.1 Reconstructions with Corresponding Passages

k. 35

'dra ba'i skad cig gzan 'byun phyir | |
ji ltar rtag pa ñid 'khrul ltar | |
rgyun chags rigs mthun 'dzin pa la | |
sñon po ñid du 'khrul pa skye | |

tulyāparakṣaṇotpādād
yathā nityatvavibhramah |
avicchinnasajātīya-
grahaṇe nīlavibhramah | |

k. 48

du ma'i dbus na 'dug pa'i phyir | |
du ma ñid du mam rtog la | |
'di ltar ldog pa'i sgo dag nas | |
mañ po ñid du spyir rtog cin | |

anekamadhyavartitvād
aneko hi vikalpyate |
evaṃ vyāvṛttinānekaṃ
sāmānyam vai vikalpītam | |

k. 45cd

'ga' yis khyad par dan bcas pa'i | |
rdul la phyogs kyi sgrar bstan bya | |

kenacit saviśiṣṭo 'nur
dikṣabdenopapāditaḥ | |

k. 46

de phyir phyogs cha'i khyad par gyis | |
de ni mañ pos yons bskor bar | |
brjod par zad kyi rdul rnams ni | |
cha śas bcas pa'i bdag ñid min | |

tasmād digbhāgabhedena
bahubhiḥ parivāritāḥ |
uktā evāṇavaḥ santi
na tu sāvayavātmakāḥ | |

(or *pādas* c and d may be:

uktā evāṇavas te vai
naiva sāvayavātmakāḥ | |

k. 49

de las gžan pa la bltos na | |
 ño bo gžan gañ dper 'dzin pa | |
 de der kho nas yod min te | |
 tshu rol pha rol sogs dbye bžin | |

tadanyāpekṣayānyasya
 yadrūpam avadhāryate |
 tad asat tatra tattvena
 pārāvārādibhedavat | |
 (Abhisamayālaṅkāralokā,
 ed. Lee 2016 p. 53, 16–17)²

2.2 Reconstructions with No Corresponding Passages

k. 32

gžan dag nam śes thams cad ni | |
 yul yod rtog pas 'khrul sems kyi | |
 śes bya rañ sems las skyes gañ | |
 gzugs sam de yi ma yin no | |

vibhrāntaṃ sarvavijñānam
 arthabhāvavikalpanāt |
 yaj jñeyam tu svacittotthaṃ
 na rūpaṃ tan na tasya vā | |

k. 33

don med yañ dag bsgrub pa la | |
 re re yoñs su mi chod phyir | |
 rdul phran mi snañ źes smras pa | |
 sems dañ sems byuñ mams kyis kyañ | |
 the tshom za ba ñid du 'gyur | |

pratyekam te hy avicchinā
 arthābhāvasamarthane |
 aṇavo na prakāśanta
 ity uktam aparair iha |
 cittasya caittikānām ca
 saṃśayatvaṃ bhaved api | |

k. 34ab

ji ltar skad cig 'jig pa mams | |
 re re nas mi rtogs pa ltar | |

yathā tatkaṣaṇikā bhāvā
 na vijñātāḥ pṛthak tathā | |

k. 37

de phyir rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis | |
 nam par śes la rdul phran mams | |
 mi snañ źes ni smra ba gañ | |
 de dag thams cad sgrub ma yin | |

tasmāt svalakṣaṇatvena
 vijñāne paramāṇavaḥ |
 na prabhāntīti vākyam yat
 tat sarvaṃ naiṣa sidhyate | |

k. 45ab

rdul phran phyogs cha tha dad phyir | |
 med ces smras gañ de ma 'brel | |

aṇur digbhāgabhedatvān
 nāstīty uktam asaṅgatam | |

² I thank Harunaga Isaacson and Bhikṣu Hejung for pointing out to me the quotation of k. 49 in the *Abhisamayālaṅkāralokā*.

Appendix 2

Survey of Previous Research on Śubhagupta and the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*

1.

Vidyabhusana 1921

In his *History of Indian Logic*, Vidyabhusana (1921: 328–329) refers to Kalyāṇarakṣita, whose Tibetan name is dGe bsrūn. He was the teacher of Dharmottarācārya¹ and active “during the reign of Mahārāja Dharma Pāla who died in 829 A.D.”

Vidyabhusana indicates five works attributed to Kalyāṇarakṣita, the original Sanskrit versions of which are lost. These are (according to the order and titles given in Vidyabhusana’s work):

1. The *Sarvajñasiddhikārikā* (*Thams cad mkhyen pa grub pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa*);
2. The *Vāhyārthasiddhikārikā* (*sic*) (*Phyi rol gyi don grub pa zes bya ba’i tshig le’ur*);
3. The *Śrūtiparīkṣā* (*Thos pa brtag pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa*);
4. The *Anyāpohavicārakārikā* (*gZan la brtag pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa [sic]*); and
5. The *Īśvarabhāṅgakārikā* (*dBañ phyug jig pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa*).

Regarding the BASK, he states that the Sanskrit version of the work was lost, but that a Tibetan translation existed in the bsTan ’gyur, prepared by the Vaibhāṣika teacher Jinamitra of Kaśmīr and the Tibetan interpreter-monk dPal brtsegs rakṣita.² On the other hand, in the same work (1921: 346), we read about Śubhakaragupta, disciple of Abhayākara-gupta, high priest of the monastic university of Vikramaśīla, active at the end of the 11th century. Śubhakaragupta wrote a treatise on logic following Dharmakīrti, and was criticized by the Jaina logician Haribhadra Sūri, who designates him as Śubhagupta.³

¹ Vidyabhusana (1921: 328) is probably the first to mention the tradition according to which the author of BASK is Dharmottara’s teacher. As we will see, this tradition is also referred to by other authors. Matsumoto (1980a: 278) shows how Dharmottara uses the same arguments as Kamalaśīla in order to refute three kinds of logical fallacy regarding *sahopalambhaniyama* that are similar to those found in BASK 65–82. Therefore, he considers their *guru-śiṣya* relation to be impossible. More recently, Dreyfus (1997: 363–364) has traced some similarities between Dharmottara and Śubhagupta, suggesting that the former might have been influenced by the latter.

² Vidyabhusana had provided similar information on a previous work; cf. Vidyabhusana 1909: 130–131.

³ However, as already seen, later studies proved that the Śubhagupta quoted by Haribhadra Sūri was in fact the author of the **Anyāpohavicārakārikā*.

In his valuable and pioneering work, Vidyabhusana makes no mention of a Bhadanta Śubhagupta,⁴ whose name is translated as dGe sruṅs and can be found nine times in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter of the TSP. In fact, he had never seen the Sanskrit text of that work. In his discussion of the TS and the TSP, Vidyabhusana (1921: 324) maintains that the original Sanskrit versions were lost and that he had, accordingly, consulted only the Tibetan translation in the monastery of Labrang, Sikkim in June 1907. Nevertheless, he appears to be aware that the manuscript found by Bühler in Jaisalmer in 1873 (the name of which he mistakenly believed to be *Tarkasaṅgraha*) was, in fact, the original Sanskrit of the TS and the TSP.⁵ He mentions this in a footnote on that same page (Vidyabhusana 1921: 324 n. 3), providing proof based on a comparison with the Tibetan translation. However, in spite of consulting its Tibetan translation, he never refers to the fact that dGe bsrūṅ is mentioned in the TSP. In fact, he considers dGe bsrūṅ as an author from the ninth century, that is, after Kamalaśīla.

2.

Bhattacharya 1926

The identification of Śubhagupta with Śubhakaragupta is criticized by B. Bhattacharya in his foreword to Krishnamacharya's first edition of the TS and the TSP (Bhattacharya 1926: LXXXIV–LXXXV). The author sheds light on the fact that the frequent mention of Śubhagupta in the TS and the TSP⁶ makes Vidyabhusana's thesis untenable. He maintains that the Śubhagupta mentioned in the TS and the TSP is the same as the Śubhagupta mentioned, and criticized, by Haribhadra Sūri in his *Anekāntajayapatākāṭikā* (sic for *Anekāntajayapatākāsvopajñavyākhyā*), who calls him "a follower of the *Vārttika*." Moreover, he argues that it is unlikely that Śubhakaragupta had written a work on logic. Accordingly, he maintains that Śubhagupta should be placed after Dharmakīrti, and that his dates must be

⁴ The name "Śubhagupta" is also recorded in *dKar chag 'Phaṅ than ma* 622 (44–5); cf. no. 397.

⁵ "Dr. George Bühler, during his explorations of the Bṛhat-jñāna-koṣa in the temple of Pārśvanātha at Jesalmir, found in 1873 a *pothi*, consisting of 189 ancient palm-leaves showing the characters of the 12th or 13th century, and bearing on the outside corner the title Kamalaśīla-tarka (*vide* Dr. G. Bühler's correspondence with Rai Sarat Chandra Das, Bahadur, C.I.E., published in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of Calcutta*, Vol. i, part ii, p. x). The real name of the work, according to Dr. Bühler is *Tarkasaṅgraha*. Now this *Tarkasaṅgraha* is nothing but *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śānta Rakṣita with the commentary by Kamala Śīla. [...]. At the end of the note, he maintains that the work contained in the *pothi* corresponds to the TS only, which is, in fact, the case.

⁶ Bhattacharya explicitly mentions only the TS; nevertheless, at the beginning of the paragraph, he had referred to both Śāntarakṣita's work and Kamalaśīla's commentary as the "*Tattvasaṅgraha*." As already mentioned, the name "Śubhagupta" (as "Bhadanta Śubhagupta") is indeed found only in the TSP.

between 650 and 700.⁷ Bhattacharya still fails to identify Śubhagupta (whose name is rendered as dGe sruñs in the Tibetan translation of the TSP) with the dGe bsruñ who is the author of the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* and other works, mentioned by Vidyabhusana (and whose Sanskrit name he had erroneously given as Kalyāṇarakṣita).

3.

Frauwallner 1933a

Frauwallner (1933a: 240) discusses an author named Bhadanta Śubhagupta, whose views are refuted by Śāntarakṣita and whose verses are quoted by Kamalaśīla. He says that this author was already known from the Tibetan tradition, but up until then his Tibetan name, dGe bsruñs, had been incorrectly translated as Kalyāṇarakṣita. Moreover, he explicitly ascribes to this Śubhagupta all the works attributed to dGe bsruñs in the bsTan 'gyur. He observes that all the stanzas extant in Sanskrit (and traced in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā) come from the BASK, except for one, quoted by Haribhadra Sūri and found in his *Anekāntajayapatākā*, which comes from the **Anyāpohavicāraṅkārikā*. Furthermore, Frauwallner was the first to suggest the hypothesis that the prose passages referred to as quotations by Śubhagupta in the TSP were actually extracts from an autocommentary by the author on his verses;⁸ this would not have reached us because of the inexistence of a Tibetan translation. His proof is mainly based on the fact that the prose passages correspond to specific verses of the BASK and quote some words verbatim; moreover, seemingly no paraphrase of the verses is found in the TSP.⁹ Frauwallner points out that Śubhagupta addresses his criticism to Vasubandhu,¹⁰ Dinnāga and, above all, Dharmakīrti. In spite of this reference, he does not openly discuss the matter of whether or not Śubhagupta can be considered a follower of the latter, but mentions that Dharmottara was likely his student. Finally, he clearly regards the philosopher as an exponent of the Vaibhāṣika school.

⁷ At the beginning of that same paragraph, he had suggested the dates 640–700, instead of 650–700.

⁸ Analogously, Frauwallner (1962) tries to demonstrate that some verses from the final chapter of the TS are indeed to be regarded as part of the now-lost *Bṛhaṭṭikā* by Kumāṛila.

⁹ Cf. Frauwallner 1933a: 240 “Auch die Prosazitate bei Kamalaśīla entsprechen bestimmten Versen des tibetischen Textes, und da allem Anschein nach wörtliche Zitate vorliegen und keine Paraphrase der Verse durch Kamalaśīla, so müssen wir annehmen, daß Śubhagupta zu seinen Versen auch einen Prosakommentar geschrieben hat, daß aber nur die Verse ins Tibetische übersetzt wurden.”

¹⁰ Here, Frauwallner is likely referring to the author of the *Vimśikā* – this being, in fact, the work that Śubhagupta refutes. Subsequently (1951), he wrote of the existence of two different Vasubandhus. On this, cf. Introduction n. 189.

4.

Kapadia 1947¹¹

In the introduction to his edition of the *Anekāntajayapatākā*, Kapadia (1947: XCV) states that Śubhagupta (whom he dates to 650–700) is mentioned by Haribhadra in his autocommentary on the work. There, Śubhagupta is referred to as *vārttikānusārin*, that is, a follower of Dharmakīrti.¹² Kapadia also quotes five verses found in the *Anekāntajayapatākā* (which are attributed to him)¹³ and refers to the fact that Śubhagupta is mentioned in the TSP. Furthermore, he argues that an author by the same name is referred to in Haribhadra's autocommentary on the *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya*. He believes them to be one and the same person.

5.

Hattori 1960

Hattori (1960: 400) briefly summarizes the state of studies (or rather, of the information) regarding Śubhagupta. He notes that Vidyabhusana indicates “Kalyāṇagupta” (instead of “Kalyāṇarakṣita”) as the Sanskrit equivalent of the Tibetan “dGe sruṅs” (instead of “dGe bsrui”). He refers also to the fact that the same author identifies “Śubhagupta, who is called a follower of Dharmakīrti (*vārttikānusārin*) by Haribhadrāsūri, with Śubhakaragupta.” Based on a paper by Miyasaka (1959),¹⁴ Hattori accepts the view that dGe sruṅs is nothing but the Tibetan name for Śubhagupta and provides a list of identifications (*sic*) from the BASK in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā. In a final note (1960: 395), he expresses regret for his inattention to Frauwallner's article “Diñnāga und Anderes” (Frauwallner 1933a), which had already disclosed the idea of the identity between dGe sruṅs and Śubhagupta. Hattori focuses his article on the analysis of the BASK and asserts that it is composed of 183 couplets.¹⁵ Moreover, independently of Frauwallner, he also suggests the idea that there was seemingly an autocommentary on the verses, which had not been translated into Tibetan. His hypothesis is based on the fact that some prose passages in the TSP are referred to as quotations from a prose work of

¹¹ On this, cf. Introduction §2.3.

¹² See *yathoktaṃ vārttikānusāriṇā śubhaguptena* | (*Anekāntajayapatākāsvopajñāvyākhyā*, vol. I, ed. p.337, 23–24).

¹³ On these five verses and the identification of four of them with verses from the **Anyāpohavicāraṅkārikā* of Śubhagupta, see Introduction n. 63.

¹⁴ In order to support this view, the arguments put forward by Miyasaka are that (i) *dge* is equivalent to *śubha*; (ii) Śubhagupta's theory of the “conventional designation” (*saṅketa*), as expounded by Haribhadra Sūri, is similar to dGe sruṅs's theory in the **Śrūtiparīkṣāṅkārikā*; and (iii) Śubhākaragupta cannot be the figure referred to by Haribhadra Sūri, who, according to the accepted theory of H. Jacobi, is dated to ca. 750.

¹⁵ On the numbering of the *kārikās* in the BASK, see Introduction n. 36.

Śubhagupta's. In fact, he also provides a list of those prose passages,¹⁶ along with those *kārikās* in the BASK on which they were presumably the commentary.

While analyzing some of the main ideas found in the BASK, Hattori determines that Śubhagupta's atomic theory is identical to that of Vāgbhaṭa as described in the *Ālambanaparīkṣāṭīkā* of Vinītadeva. Moreover, he considers him a non-faithful successor of Dharmakīrti, and likely to have been Dharmottara's teacher, "for the latter and his successors are known to have interpreted Dharmakīrti's theory from the Sautrāntika viewpoint [...]" He proposes 650 to 750 as his dates. Hattori's list of "identifications" is as follows:¹⁷

1. *dhīmātratvena samsādhye* ... p. 582, 1–2 [TSP ad TS 2081] = *blo tsam ñid du* ... k. 25 P 201a₃ [BASK 29];
2. *tulyāparakṣaṇotpādād* ... p. 552, 6–7 [TS 1971], cf. *'dra ba'i skad cig* ... k. 31 P 201a₈ [BASK 35];
3. *pratyekaparamāñūnām* ... p. 551, 21–22 [TSP ad TS 1969] = *rdul phran mams* ... k. 40 P 201b₆ [BASK 44];
4. *bhadantaśubhaguptas tv āha* ... *kevalam aṇava eva* ... *na sāvayavatvam* p. 556, 16 ff. [TSP ad TS 1989–1991], cf. *de phyir phyogs cha'i* ... k. 42 P 201b₇ [BASK 46];¹⁸
5. *nānyo 'sti grāhako*¹⁹ ... p. 569, 14–15 [TSP ad TS 2031] = *śes pa las gžan* ... k. 62 P 202b_{4–5} [BASK 66];
6. *punaḥ sa evāha* — *atha sahaśabda ekakāla vivakṣayā* ... p. 567, 25 ff. [TSP ad TS 2029–2030], cf. *dus gcig tu ni* ... k. 64 P 202b₆ [BASK 68];
7. *sahaśabdaś ca loke*²⁰ ... p. 567, 17–18 [TSP ad TS 2029–2030] = *'jig rten 'di na* ... k. 67 P 202b₈ [BASK 71];
8. *yadā ca sarvaprāṇabhṛtām*²¹ ... p. 568, 1–2 [TSP ad TS 2029–2030], cf. *gal te thams cad* ... k. 69 P 203a_{1–2} [BASK 73];
9. *kiṃ cānyopalambha* ... p. 568, 2–7 [TSP ad TS 2029–2030] = *gžan gyis dmigs pa* ... k. 70 P 203a_{2–3} [BASK 74];

¹⁶ With regard to the Sanskrit text of the TS and the TSP, Hattori refers to K, which was the only edition existing at that time. Nevertheless, some of the variants that he suggested as corrections to K are actually found in Jk and Jp, which he likely never consulted.

¹⁷ The list is recorded exactly as it is found in the article. I refer to my numbering in square brackets.

¹⁸ Cf. my analysis of this passage in Introduction §5.4.

¹⁹ Here, Hattori suggests *jñānān nāksadhīr* instead of *jñānāc cākṣuṣair* (the accepted variant in K). The former variant is also found in Jp. Cf. Sanskrit Text.

²⁰ Here, Hattori suggests *loke 'smin naivānyena* instead of *loke 'nyo{syā?}n naivāne{nye?}na*, conjectured by K. The former variant is also present in Jp. Cf. Sanskrit Text.

²¹ Here, Hattori suggests *sarvaprāṇabhṛtām* instead of *satvām prāṇa*°. Cf. Sanskrit Text.

10. *pūrvikaiva tu*²² ... p. 569, 15–16 [TSP *ad* TS 2031] = *gañ gis lhan cig* ... k. 77 P 203a₆₋₇ [BASK 81];
11. *syād etat* — *na hi mukhyato yādṛśaṃ* ... p. 570, 18 ff. [TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034], cf. *śes pa myoñ bar* ... k. 80–81 P 203a₈–b₂ [BASK 84–85];
12. *sākārajñānapakṣe* ... p. 570, 23–24 [TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034] = *śes pa rnam bcas* ... k. 83 P 203b₃ [BASK 87];
13. *kathaṃ tadgrāhakaṃ* ... p. 561, 11–12 [TSP *ad* TS 2008–2009] = *de 'dzin byed de* ... k. 85 P 203b₄₋₅ [BASK 89];
14. *sākāraṃ tan nirākāraṃ* ... p. 573, 7–8 [TSP *ad* TS 2046] = *mam pa bcas sam* ... k. 91 P 203b₈ [BASK 95];
15. *sa hy āha* — *yathaiva bhavatāṃ vijñānavādināṃ* p. 572, 10–12 [TSP *ad* TS 2040], cf. *ji ltar khyod kyi* ... k. 97 P 204a₄₋₅ [BASK 101];²³ and
16. *atra bhadantaśubhaguptaḥ pramāṇayati* — *yo jñānākāraḥ sa saṃvāditve sati* ... p. 574, 20–22 [TSP *ad* TS 2051], cf. *śes pa mi bslu* ... k. 7 P 200a₅ [BASK 7cd].

6.

Frauwallner 1961

Frauwallner (1961: 147) attempts to determine the dates of Śubhagupta on the basis of a new chronology regarding some Indian authors. He mentions him as one of the authors whose works are contained in the catalogue of lDan (*sic* for lHan) kar ma,²⁴ dating the latter to 800 or 812.²⁵ Specifically, he follows the testimony of Bu ston in his “History of Buddhism,”²⁶ who regards Dharmottara (dated to ca. 750–810 by him) as the pupil of Dharmākaraḍatta and Śubhagupta. Moreover, on the grounds of his being quoted and attacked by Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788) in the TS, Frauwallner concludes that the author of the BASK must be dated to some time between the two authors, that is to say ca. 720–780.

²² For this *kārikā*, Hattori suggests *sajñānam* instead of *prajñānam*. Cf. Sanskrit Text.

²³ In fact, TSP *ad* TS 2040 is only the commentary on TS 2040, which is the actual literal quotation of BASK 101.

²⁴ Steinkellner (1985: 221–222 n. 7) suggests that the right name for the palace was lHan dkar rather than lDan kar.

²⁵ Regarding 800 as the date of composition for the catalog, Frauwallner (1961: 146 n. 84) refers to his own article (Frauwallner 1957); as for 812, he refers to Tucci (1958: 46 n. 1).

²⁶ Untraced. Frauwallner himself (1961: 147 n. 87) admits that he could not trace the source of this statement and quotes Obermiller’s translation. See “[...] but in the Commentary it is said that Dharmottara was the pupil of Dharmākaraḍatta and Kalyāṇarakṣita” (Obermiller 1932: 155).

7.

Shastri 1967

The first extensive work on the BASK is Shastri 1967. This is a complete edition of the Tibetan text (based on N and P), along with an annotated English translation. The author also provides a reconstruction of the Sanskrit text and a short philosophical analysis of some verses in the notes. Moreover, Shastri (1967: 9) gives a list of Sanskrit *kārikās* that are found in the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā*²⁷ and correspond to those from the BASK.²⁸ This list also includes stanzas that had not been previously traced by Hattori.

In the introduction, Shastri states that the BASK (whose Tibetan title he gives as *phyi rol gyi don grub pa*) consists of 190 verses (*anuṣṭubh*), counted as 188 for the sake of convenience. Furthermore, he maintains that Śubhagupta is a Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivādin. With reference to his dates, Shastri (1967: 2) argues that Śubhagupta must be placed somewhere between Dharmakīrti and Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla, and that the BASK must be prior to the *Nyāyaviniścaya* of Akalaṅka (a Jaina author, ca. 700), as the latter quotes BASK 71. Accordingly, he proposes 650 to 700. Shastri does not take a position regarding the existence of an autocommentary on the BASK, not translated into Tibetan. He simply notes that the presence of some prose passages attributed to Śubhagupta in the TSP gave rise to that assumption.

The list provided by Shastri is as follows:²⁹

- [TSP *ad* TS 2081 =] BASK 29;
- [TS 1971 =] BASK 35;
- [TSP *ad* TS 1969 =] BASK 44;
- [TSP *ad* TS 2031 =] BASK 66;
- [TSP *ad* TS 2029–2030 =] BASK 68;
- [TSP *ad* TS 2029–2030 =] BASK 71;
- [TSP *ad* TS 2031 =] BASK 81;
- [TSP *ad* TS 2033–2034 =] BASK 87;
- [TSP *ad* TS 2008–2009 =] BASK 89;
- [TSP *ad* TS 2046 =] BASK 95; and
- [TS 2040 =] BASK 101.

²⁷ With regard to the Sanskrit text of the TS and the TSP, Shastri could consult only K, since Ś was published only one year later, in 1968.

²⁸ Although he presents all of them as the original Sanskrit verses as found in the TS and the TSP, Shastri partly retranslated some *kārikās* into Sanskrit from Tibetan.

²⁹ References to the TS and the TSP are mine and given in brackets.

8.

Matsumoto 1980

Matsumoto provides an edition, English translation and analysis of BASK 65–82. There, he discusses the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument as refuted by Śubhagupta. Even though he does not take any definite position on the matter, Matsumoto (1980: 289) adduces Ratnākaraśānti's *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*³⁰ and Atiśa's *Ratnakaraṇḍodghātanāmamadhyaṃakopadeśa*³¹ as evidence that the two authors considered Śubhagupta, Dharmottara and the former Vasubandhu as Sautrāntikas. This idea appears to underpin all of Matsumoto's argumentations.

9.

Mikogami

Mikogami is responsible for the broadest and most in-depth analysis on Śubhagupta and the BASK. In particular, he provided a Japanese translation of the whole text (Mikogami 1982a, 1982b, 1982c and 1983) and a new critical edition (Mikogami 1986) based on D, P, N and C, which improved the old edition by establishing a new numbering for the verses. In his articles, he investigates various aspects of Śubhagupta's views on external reality and cognition, mainly describing him as a Vaibhāṣika. At the same time, Mikogami (1993: 90) describes Śubhagupta's theory of cognition as *sākārajñānavāda*, introducing the idea of a mental cognition which perceives its object as being endowed with a coarse form. This coarse form is defined by him as both a sense perception and a constructive cognition, but not as conceptual.³² Mikogami (1993: 90) regards the latter theory as “different from the Sautrāntika and the Vijñānavāda.”

³⁰ Cf. *btsun pa dge sruṅs kyi kyaṅ* | [...] (BASK 81) *žes smras so* || *de'i ltar na yaṅ šes pa kho na gsal ba yin te* | *gsal ba'i no bo ṅid yin pa'i phyir ro* || *don ni ma yin te* | *bzlog pa yin pa'i phyir ro* || *btsun pa chos mchog gis kyaṅ* | *dper na bum pa la sogs pa daṅ phyi rol gyi snaṅ ba 'dre pa ṅid na gsal ba yin no* || *bśin du šes pa daṅ snaṅ ba yaṅ yin no žes smras so* || (*Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* by Ratnākaraśānti, P 327b₈–328a₃). “Bhadanta Śubhagupta also said, [...] (BASK 81) Also according to this view, cognition indeed manifests itself (*gsal ba yin te*/**prakāśate*), because it has the nature of manifesting. However, the object does not [manifest itself] because it has the opposite [nature]. This is the **siddhānta* for these two[, i.e., Śubhagupta and Dharmottara]: a blue [thing], etc., is brought to awareness as internally experienced at the same time as its awareness.” Cf. Potter (1970: 179) who defines the BASK as a Sautrāntika work.

³¹ Cf. *slob dpon dge bsrus daṅ* | *chos mchog daṅ* | *dbyig gñen sna ma la sogs pas ṅan thos mdo sde pa'i gśuṅ rgyas par mdzad do* || (*Ratnakaraṇḍodghātanāmamadhyaṃakopadeśa* P 126a₃₋₄). “The Venerable Śubhagupta, Dharmottara, the former Vasubandhu, etc., [all] extensively composed treatises of the Śrāvaka Sautrāntika.”

³² Mikogami (1993: 92) argues that “for Śubhagupta, gross form, such as something blue, etc., is both a sense perception and a constructive cognition, but not in the sense of constructive cognition as defined by language.” I do not agree with this analysis of Śubhagupta's theory of cognition. On this, cf. Saccone 2014.

10.
Steinkellner 1985

In his article on *Paralokasiddhi* texts, Steinkellner (1985: 216–218) identifies two more works to be attributed to Śubhagupta. They are listed in the IḤan dkar ma (*sic*) catalogue under the names *’jig rten pha rol grub pa* and *De’i grel pa*.³³ He points out that Frauwallner had tentatively ascribed them to Dharmottara, but he brings forward evidence to demonstrate that they are, in fact, the **Paralokasiddhi* and its commentary by Śubhagupta. These two texts did not reach us, the commentary already having been lost by the beginning of the 14th century. Steinkellner (1985: 218) also refers to Śubhagupta’s known works as deviating from the “roughly speaking ‘orthodox’ line of Dignāga-Dharmakīrtian Sautrāntika-Yogācāra ontology.” Still, he says, they are included among the works of this tradition due to their thematic interest. He also notes that Śubhagupta’s **Paralokasiddhi* served as a model for Prajñāśena’s, the latter being representative of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*-tradition. In this sense, it is possible that Śubhagupta used some argumentations that were dependent on the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*-methodology.³⁴

As proof for the attribution of the commentary to Śubhagupta, he points to the existence of his commentary on the BASK. In doing so, he lists some prose Sanskrit fragments from the TSP (1985: 222 n. 15) (see below). This list also includes passages which were not included in the previous ones (namely, Hattori’s and Shastri’s). Some of these passages are analyzed in the Introduction.³⁵

Ś 673, 13–17 [TSP *ad* TS 1971]³⁶

Ś 678, 8–13 [TSP *ad* TS 1989–1991]³⁷

Ś 684, 12–14 [TSP *ad* TS 2008–2009]³⁸

Ś 692, 11–21 [TSP *ad* TS 2029–2030]³⁹

Ś 698, 12–15 [TSP *ad* TS 2040]

Ś 701, 10–12 [TSP *ad* TS 2051]⁴⁰

³³ On this, see Introduction n. 33.

³⁴ Steinkellner (1985: 223 n. 16) also notices that it is difficult to think of Śubhagupta as a Mahāyānist author. However, his possible use of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*-methodology does not necessarily imply it, since that methodology as such was rather neutral.

³⁵ The references to the TSP that are given in brackets are mine.

³⁶ Cf. Introduction §4.1.

³⁷ Cf. Introduction §5.4.

³⁸ Cf. Introduction §6.2.

³⁹ Cf. Introduction n. 253.

⁴⁰ Cf. Introduction §6.3.

11.

Mimaki 1987–1988

Mimaki draws attention to the existence of two different theses regarding Śubhagupta's doctrinal affiliation in the ancient sources. Depending on the source, he was identified as either a Vaibhāṣika⁴¹ or a Sautrāntika.⁴² Mimaki also provides an interesting analysis and a French translation of BASK 59–60.

12.

Other Studies

Other studies on Śubhagupta include (in chronological order): Mikogami 1987; Wakahara 1988–1989a; Wakahara 1988–1989b; Mikogami 1989a; Mikogami 1989b; Mimaki 1989; Mikogami 1993; Eltschinger 1999; Manabe 2010 and Manabe 2011. Some references to Śubhagupta can also be found in Matilal 1986: 368–370; Steinkellner–Much 1995: 52–55; Dreyfus 1997: 363–364.

Another work specifically on the BASK is by Gangopadhyaya (1980: 98–103), who gives a brief analysis and English translation of kk. 33–58.

⁴¹ In this respect, Mimaki (1987–1988: 276 n. 10) quotes the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (see ed., édition facsimilé 124b₃), where Śubhagupta is identified as a logician of the Vaibhāṣika. On this, see Introduction n. 73.

⁴² Mimaki (1987–1988: 276 n. 11) mentions the same reference in Atiśa's *Ratnakaraṇḍodghāṭanāmadhyamakopadeśa* as in Matsumoto (1980a: 289, in his article 1989: 289). In the same footnote, he also refers to *sTag tshan grub mtha'* (Thimphu ed. 1976 rtsa ba 7a₂ sic) as a source for Śubhagupta's identification as an author of the Dārṣṭāntika.

Introduction to Appendix 3 and 4

**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* by Śubhagupta

The **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* (Tib: *Phyi rol gyi don grub pa źes bya ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa*), the “Verses on the Establishment of External Objects,” is lost in its original Sanskrit and preserved in full only in Tibetan in the *bsTan 'gyur*. According to the colophon, the authors of this translation are Jinamitra (ca. 800), a Vaibhāṣika master from Kaśmīr, and the translator dPal brtsegs rakṣita (ca. 800), a Tibetan monk:

*kha che bye brag du smra ba'i slob dpon chen po ji na mi tra dañ | bod kyi lo
tsa ba dge sloñ dpal brtsegs ra kṣi tas bsgyur cin źus te gtan la phab pa'o |*
(BASK D 196b₁)

“The Great Kaśmīrian Vaibhāṣika Master Jinamitra and the Tibetan lo tsa ba monk dPal brtsegs ra kṣi ta translated [it] and established [its] final redaction.”

The **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* is listed in the *lHan kar ma* (dated ca. 800).¹ Accordingly, one can determine the beginning of the ninth century as a *terminus ante quem* for this translation, which, given Śubhagupta's dates, must have been carried out not a long time after the composition of the text.

The following Tibetan text relies on three sources:

- (a) D: 4244, tshad ma, źe 189b₃–196b₁;
- (b) P: 5742, tshad ma, ze 199b₈–207b₇;
- (c) M: Mikogami E. (ed.). Śubhagupta no *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*. *Ryūkoku daigaku ronshū* 429. 1986. 2–44.

I have also emended the text when needed. Generally, with reference to the Sanskrit correspondent terms of Tibetan words, I refer to Negi: 1993–2005, more rarely to the *Mahāvīyutpatti*.

¹ Cf. Introduction n. 33 and 35.

Appendix 3

**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* of Śubhagupta

Tibetan Text of

kk. 2–8; 29; 32–58; 66; 68; 71–74; 77–92; 95; 101; 185

rnal gnas mig la sogs pa yi | | *nam śes spyod yul phyi'i don min* | |
śes phyir don du snañ ba'i phyir | | *rmi lam zla ba gñis blo bžin* | | (k. 2)

de ltar blo tsam smra ba yis | | *phyi yi dños med par bsgrubs pa* | |
dañ po mi slu mthoñ ba'i phyir | | *de yod smra ba min źes smras* | | (k. 3)

śes pa slu ba'i phyir ram ni | | *gzugs sogs ruñ ba ma¹ yin phyir* | |
dmigs pa med par 'gyur grañ na | | *de gñis kyañ ni mi bzañ no* | | (k. 4)

rañ gi yan lag bcad la sogs | | *rmi lam mthoñ ba de dag med* | |
gal te don rnams gtan med na | | *sad na'an de bžin mi 'gyur ram* | | (k. 5)

khyod ni sad pa'i mgo bcad dañ | | *lus rgyas pa yañ rmi lam bžin* | |
'dod na ci'i phyir de spon dañ | | *'thob phyir khyod ni 'bad dañ ldan* | | (k. 6)

gal te 'khrul pas thams cad du | | *'jug go źe² na min ldog med* | |
śes pa mi bslu³ ma 'khrul te | | *bslu⁴ ba dag ni 'khrul pa yin* | | (k. 7)

yul dañ dus dañ mi gžan la | | *śes pa mi bslu⁵ gañ yin pa* | |
de ni mi⁶ 'khrul yin par śes | | *ma 'khrul mtshan ñid gžan med do* | | (k. 8)

[...]

blo tsam ñid du bsgrub⁷ pa la | | *śes phyir la sogs bsgrub pa gañ* | |
mi mthun rigs dañ mi 'gal phyir | | *thams cad lhag dañ bcas śes bya* | | (k. 29)

[...]

¹ *ma* D P] *mi* M

² *źe* D] *ce* P M

³ *bslu* P M] *slu* D

⁴ *bslu* P M] *slu* D

⁵ *bslu* P M] *slu* D

⁶ *mi* P M] *ma* D

⁷ *bsgrub* P M] *bsgrubs* D

gžan dag nam śes thams cad ni || *yul yod rtog⁸ pas 'khrul sems kyi* ||
śes bya rañ sems las skyes gañ || *gzugs sam de yi ma⁹ yin no* || (k. 32)

don med yañ dag bsgrub pa la || *re re yonś su mi chod phyir* ||
rdul phran mi snañ źes smras pa || *sems dañ sems byuñ nmams kyiś¹⁰ kyañ* ||
the tshom za ba ñid du 'gyur || (k. 33)

ji ltar skad cig 'jig pa nmams || *re re nas mi rtogs pa ltar* ||
de bžin gśegs pas yonś bcad la'añ || *rdul phran ñes par mi 'gyur ro* || (k. 34)

'dra ba'i skad cig gžan 'byuñ phyir || *ji ltar rtag pa ñid 'khrul ltar* ||
rgyun chags rigs mthun 'dzin pa la || *śion po ñid du 'khrul pa skye* || (k. 35)

blo yis rtag tu rgyun chags dañ || *rigs mthun pa la 'dzin mod kyi* ||
mam par rtog pa'i śes pa yis || *de gcig ñid du ñes par byed* || (k. 36)

de phyir rañ gi mtshan ñid kyiś || *mam par śes la rdul phran nmams* ||
mi snañ źes ni smra ba gañ || *de dag thams cad sgrub ma yin* || (k. 37)

gañ ltar snañ de de las min || *rdzas med phyir zla gñis bžin źes* ||
smras pa'i sgrub pa gañ yin pa || *de la'añ gtan tshigs ma ñes ñid* || (k. 38)

rdul phran gañ dag phrad gyur ciñ || *rigs mthun bya ba gcig byed pa* ||
de dag 'dus pa źes brjod na || *de dag rdzas med ga la žig* || (k. 39)

gcig gi sgrar¹¹ brjod de dag ni || *de dag la ni gcig med do* ||
sgra yi don ni mam brtags te || *dbañ po'i sems la mi snañ ño* || (k. 40)

gañ gi blo la cha gcig gi || *mam pa snañ ño źes smras pa* ||
de ni ñes par ri mo yi || *gdin ba mthon ba ma gtogs so* || (k. 41)

la la dag tu gañ žig la || *gzugs kyi mam pa gcig 'dzin pa* ||
de yañ mtho dman rten pa yi¹² || *dbye bas¹³ bkra bar snañ ba yin* || (k. 42)

śes gcig snañ ba'i rdul phran gañ || *phan tshun med na mi 'byuñ phyir* ||
de la mam par bcad nas ni || *ji ltar re re snañ bar 'gyur* || (k. 43)

rdul phran nmams ni re re nas || *rañ dbañ 'byuñ ba mi srid do* ||
de phyir phra rab rdul nmams ni || *re re snañ bar mi 'gyur ro* || (k. 44)

⁸ *rtog* D] *rtogs* P M

⁹ *ma* P] *min* D M

¹⁰ *kyis* D M] *kyi* P

¹¹ *sgrar* D P] *sgras* M

¹² *yi* D M] *yis* P

¹³ *bas* D M] *bar* P

*rdul phran phyogs cha*¹⁴ *tha dad phyir* | | *med ces smras gañ de ma 'brel* | |
'ga' yis khyad par dañ bcas pa'i | | *rdul la phyogs kyi sgrar bstan bya* | | (k. 45)

*de phyir phyogs cha'i khyad par*¹⁵ *gyis*¹⁶ | | *de ni mañ pos yonīs bskor bar* | |
brjod par zad kyi rdul nmams ni | | *cha śas bcas pa'i bdag ñid min* | | (k. 46)

rdul phran tshu rol ños na (*tale) *gcig* | | *pha rol gžan mam*¹⁷ *gnas pa ni* | |
tshu rol pha rol cha gñis kyi | | *rdul de gñis su thal ba med* | | (k. 47)

du ma'i dbus na 'dug pa'i phyir | | *du ma ñid du nmam rtog la* | |
'di ltar ldog pa'i sgo dag nas | | *mañ po ñid du spyir*¹⁸ *rtog cin* | | (k. 48)

*de las gžan pa la bltos*¹⁹ *na* | | *no bo gžan gañ*²⁰ *dper 'dzin pa* | |
de der kho nas yod min te | | *tshu rol pha rol sogs dbye bžin* | | (k. 49)

gal te mañ por 'dab chags phyir | | *cha śas bcas par 'dod na ni* | |
skad cig śia phyi 'dab chags la | | *ci phyir de dañ 'dra*²¹ *mi 'gyur* | | (k. 50)

śes pa'i skad cig gñis dag gis | | *'dab chags yin yañ de la ni* | |
cha śas bcas gzugs mi 'dod ltar | | *rdul phran nmams la'añ de bžin no* | | (k. 51)

gañ žig dañ ni ñe ba las | | *'gros ldan gañ gi*²² *'gros 'gag pa* | |
des de'i sgrib pa rab bsad pa | | *cha śas gžan gyis ma yin no* | | (k. 52)

ñi ma'i sgrib pa yod na ni | | *grib ma kun tu 'byuñ 'gyur gyi* | |
*grib ma ñi ma rdul gñis kyi*²³ | | *bar na gnas par mi rigs so* | | (k. 53)

grib ma dañ ni sgrib pa la | | *mañ po'i mthu ni skye ba ltar* | |
de bžin rdul phran nmams la ni | | *re re nas ni gtan du min* | | (k. 54)

de phyir tha dad ma yin phyir | | *gon bu de dag ma yin žes* | |
gañ smras de ni res 'ga' žig | | *gal te 'gyur ba med la rigs* | | (k. 55)

phan tshun bdag ñid ma reg pa | | *cha śas med par mam gnas te* | |
de phyir sa yi dkyil 'khor sogs | | *bsags pa las ni byuñ ba yin* | | (k. 56)

phan tshun du ni phan 'dogs pa'i | | *bye brag gis ni brgyus pa bžin* | |
rdo rje la sogs rdul phran nmams | | *de dag chad par mi 'gyur te* | | (k. 57)

¹⁴ *cha* D] *la* P M

¹⁵ *par* D P] *pa* M

¹⁶ *gyis* P] *gyi* D M

¹⁷ *mam* em.] *nmams* D P M

¹⁸ *spyir* D P] *phyir* M

¹⁹ *bltos* P M] *ltos* D

²⁰ *gañ* em.] *yañ* P D M

²¹ *'dra* P D] *deest* M (*contra metrum*)

²² *gi* D] *gis* P M

²³ *kyi* D] *kylis* P M

ji ltar snags kyi mthu yis ni || *'dre sbrul la sogs 'dzin pa bžin* ||
rdzas kyi mthu yis phan tshun du || *rdul phran kha cig srid 'gyur gyi* ||
gžan dag nus pa stobs chuñ no || (k. 58)

[...]

śes pa las gžan 'dzin pa med || *yul med par*²⁴ *ni dbaṅ blo med* ||
de phyir lhan cig rig pas na || *śion po*²⁵ *de'i*²⁶ *blo gcig phyir min* || (k. 66)

[...]

dus gcig tu ni brjod 'dod pas || *saṅs rgyas mkhyen bya'i sems dan ni* ||
sems dan sems byuñ mams kyiś kyañ || *kun tu gtan tshigs ma nes 'gyur* || (k. 68)

[...]

jig rten 'di na lhan cig sgra || *gžan med par ni 'ga' na'an min* ||
gal te lhan cig myoñ yod na || *de phyir gtan tshigs 'gal ba'an yin* || (k. 71)

*gal te lhan cig sgra gcig*²⁷ *don* || *de ltas gžan la*²⁸ *ma grub ñid* ||
thun moñ gi ni dños po la || *gcig pus ji ltar mthoñ ba yin* || (k. 72)

gal te thams cad mkhyen pa yi || *ye śes śes bya sems kun na*²⁹ ||
de tše gcig pu kho na yis || *dmigs pa grub pa gañ du brjod* || (k. 73)

gžan gyis dmigs pa 'gog pa ni || *tshad ma min pas mi grub*³⁰ *ste* ||
rañ bžin bskal pa yin pas na || *de phyir the tshom ma grub bo* || (k. 74)

[...]

gal te don gcig kho na žig || *dmigs pa*³¹ *gañ*³² *de*³³ *rtog byed na* ||
*śes pa'i no bos dben*³⁴ *pa yis* || *de ni ji ltar kun du myoñ* || (k. 77)

don dmigs tše na gduñ ba dan || *dga' ba'i tshor ba de dag ni* ||
gal te śes pa'i no bo yi || *tshor ba med par mi srid do* || (k. 78)

²⁴ *par* D] *pa* P M

²⁵ *po* em. Matsumoto 1980a: 297] *po'i* D P M

²⁶ *de'i* em. Matsumoto 1980a: 297] *de* D P M

²⁷ *gcig* D M] *cig* P

²⁸ *la* D] *las* P M

²⁹ *na* P M] *nas* D

³⁰ *grub* P M] *'grub* D

³¹ *pa* em.] *par* D P M

³² *gañ* em.] *gal* D P M

³³ *de* em.] *te* D P M

³⁴ *dben* D P] *dbyen* M

gal te rtogs³⁵ pa³⁶ rañ no bo || *'ga' žig kho na myoñ že na* ||
śes dag no bo mi myoñ bas || *de yi phyir na de mi rigs* || (k. 79)

[...]

gañ gis lhan cig myoñ 'gyur ba || *tshogs pa śña ma kho na las* ||
śes pa yul bcas skad cig ste || *snañ ba dañ bcas gzugs bžin no* || (k. 81)

gañ tshe śes pa dañ don dag || *śña phyi kun tu 'byuñ de'i tshe* ||
de dañ 'dra phyir de min gi || *dños su lhan cig myoñ ma yin* || (k. 82)

myoñ bar bya phyir nam śes las || *don gžan ma yin gzuñ ba yi* ||
cha bžin śes bsgrub smra ba gañ || *de la gtan tshigs ma nes ñid* || (k. 83)

śes pa myoñ bar rañ bžin phyir || *myoñ bar bya ba žes brjod do* ||
yul ni rab tu snañ ba yi || *śes pa skyed phyir myoñ ba yin* || (k. 84)

myoñ bar bya ba'i sgrar 'dra yañ || *de yi don ni tha dad ñid* ||
dper na ba lañ ñid kyi phyir || *ba lañ nag³⁷ la sogs pa nmams* ||
de bžin nam par mi 'grub phyir || (k. 85)

thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes kyi || *myoñ bar bya ba rgyud³⁸ gžan la* ||
bsgos³⁹ pa'i chos mams gañ dag yin || *de dag gis kyañ ma nes te* ||
rtogs⁴⁰ med ji ltar thams cad mkhyen || (k. 86)

śes pa nam bcas phyogs la ni || *de ltar snañ ba myoñ bya ñid* ||
de dañ tha dad min sgrub na || *grub pa sgrub pa ñid du 'gyur* || (k. 87)

gzugs dañ 'dra ba'i byed pa'i don || *'bras bu'i sgo nas myoñ byar 'dod* ||
de dños myoñ bya ma yin pas || *tha dad min par mi 'gyur ro* || (k. 88)

de 'dzin byed de ji ltar žes || *de ni yonś su gcod pa yi* ||
mtshan ñid yin te de yi phyir || *de ni ji ltar⁴¹ ci 'dra žes* ||
the tshom za bar mi bya'o || (k. 89)

nam śes no bo⁴² gžan gyis ni || *nam par gžag⁴³ nas sgro btags te* ||
ji lta bur ni de yi don || *yonś su gcod ces⁴⁴ brjod bar⁴⁵ bya* || (k. 90)

³⁵ *rtogs* em.] *rtog* D P M

³⁶ *pa* D] *par* P M

³⁷ *ñag* em.] *dag* D P M

³⁸ *rgyud* D P] *brgyud* M

³⁹ *bsgos* P M] *dgos* D

⁴⁰ *rtogs* P M] *rtog* D

⁴¹ *ltar* P M] *lta* D

⁴² *bo* P M] *po* D

⁴³ *gžag* D] *bžag* P M

⁴⁴ *ces* D M] *byed* P

⁴⁵ *bar* P] *par* D M

gañ gi tshe na mnam śes don | | *yoñs gcod tsam du 'dod de'i tshe* | |
śes pas ji ltar rañ gi yul | | *rig par 'gyur źes smras ma 'brel* | | (k. 91)

mnam śes de ni byed po min | | *dam pa'i don du bya ba'an min* | |
rig pa tsam du zad mod kyi | | *byed po⁴⁶ ñid du sgro btags gsuñs* | | (k. 92)

[...]

mnam pa bcas sam ci mnam⁴⁷ med | | *dus mñam mi mñam las skyes śes* | |
sañs rgyas mkhyen la'an ci yi phyir | | *byis pa rab tu 'jug mi byed* | | (k. 95)

[...]

ji ltar khyod kyi śes pa ni | | *yañ dag du na⁴⁸ mnam med kyañ* | |
yañ dag min mnam⁴⁹ myoñ ba ltar | | *kho bo'i yañ dag don de bžin* | | (k. 101)

[...]

rigs dan mi rigs dpyad⁵⁰ pa la | | *bdag la mkhas blo mtshan⁵¹ bcas⁵² med* | |
'on kyañ gžan smras bden pa ni | | *mañ po⁵³ mdor bsdus nas bstan gyis* | | (k. 185)

⁴⁶ *po* em.] *pa* D P M

⁴⁷ *mnam* P M] *mams* D

⁴⁸ *na* P D] *ni* M

⁴⁹ *mnam* em.] *mams* D P M

⁵⁰ *dpyad* P M] *dpyod* D

⁵¹ *mtshan* P M] *mtshar* D

⁵² *bcas* D M] *žig* P

⁵³ *po* P M] *por* D

Appendix 4

**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* of Śubhagupta

English Translation¹ of

kk. 2–8; 29; 32–58; 66; 68; 71–74; 77–92; 95; 101; 185

An external object that is the object (**gocara*, **viṣaya*) of a sense cognition of a healthy person is not [real,] since it is cognition and since [this] appears as an [external] object, as [in the case of] perceptions in the dream state or [of] the two moons. (k. 2)

Thus by the upholder of *vijñaptimātra* (Vasubandhu/Diñnāga) the absence of an external real thing (*dñios*/**vastu*) is demonstrated. First of all, because the reliability is commonly experienced, the supporter of the existence of that [external thing] says it is not [like that]. (k. 3)

An [external] *ālambana* [of our cognitions] does not exist [according to Vasubandhu in the *Vimśikā*] because of [the instance of] erroneous cognitions or because the visual forms, etc., are not logical. Also these two [arguments] are not good. (k. 4)

The experiences (*mithong ba*) belonging to the dream state, like, for example, the cutting of one's own members, are not real. If [external] objects [in the dream state] are completely non-existent, also [external objects] in the waking state, [exactly] like them, are not [real], is [not this the case]? (k. 5)²

[But, then,] if you admit that also the cutting of the head and the flourishing of the body in the waking state are [exactly] like [the ones] in the dream state, why do you do an exertion in order to avoid the [former] and obtain the [latter]? (k. 6)

If [it is argued:] “action is completely [led] by error,” [it will be answered] there is no deviation regarding names. [According to us,] a reliable cognition is non-erroneous (*ma 'khrul*/**abhanta*) [and] the deceiving [ones] are erroneous.” (k. 7)

¹ Since here I am translating the BASK, namely a work lost in its Sanskrit original and extant in its Tibetan translation, I am directly translating the Sanskrit original verses, when they have been identified as **Ci**.

² Cf. *ran gi yan lag bcad la sogs* || *rmi lam mithon ba de dag med* || *gal te don rnam gtan med na* || *sad na'an de bžin mi 'gyur ram* ||. This verse, in its Tibetan translation, is found identical in the *Blo gsal grub mtha'* (ed. p. 136, 28–137, 3).

That which is the reliable cognition of [an object that is] not different [from it] with regard to space and time, this [must be] known as being non-erroneous. There is no other characteristic of “non-erroneous.” (k. 8)

[...]

And, being the cognition-only (*dhīmātratva*, *blo tsam ñid*) to be proven, every *probans* [(i.e., *hetu*)], such as being a cognition, since it is not contradicted in heterogeneous [instances], is said [to be] not conclusive (*śeṣavat*). (k. 29)

[...]

Others [say,] “All [types of] cognitions are erroneous consciousness, since there is the imagination of the existence of an [external] object. However, the knowable, which arises from one’s own mind (**svacitta*), is neither form, nor is it of that [form].” Regarding the correct proof of the non-existence of [external] objects it is said, “Since they are not distinguished one by one, atoms do not appear [in perception].” [To this we answer, “If this were the case,] also because of [the instance of] mind and mental states[, that] would be doubtful.” (k. 32–33)

Just like instantaneous things are not understood separately, likewise, atoms cannot be ascertained [by a deluded person], even though the Tathāgata distinguishes them. (k. 34)

Just as, because of the arising of similar, subsequent instants, there is the error of permanence, likewise the error of [something] being blue occurs when one apprehends spatially continuous and homogeneous [atoms]. (k. 35)

Even though cognition always apprehends continuous and homogeneous [atoms], [still] conceptual cognition determines them as one. (k. 36)

Therefore, all statements [of the kind] “atoms do not appear in terms of *svalakṣaṇa* in cognition” are unestablished. (k. 37)

“What appears like this[, i.e., with the image of some thing,] is not from that, since it does not exist substantially (**dravyataḥ*), like a double moon.” Also with regard to this proof stated (*smras pa/*ukta*) [by Dīnnāga], the logical reason is inconclusive. (k. 38)

If [it is argued,] “Atoms are aggregated [when,] joined [and] being homogeneous, they produce one effect,” [it will be answered,] “Then how can they not exist substantially?” (k. 39)

Those [(i.e., atoms)] are denoted by one word. [However,] they are not one. The object of a word, being conceptually constructed, does not appear in sensory cognition. (k. 40)

He who says that the image of one part appears in a cognition certainly [can] not see a multi-colored rug. (k. 41)

[When,] in some cases, regarding something, one grasps one [single] image of the visual form (**rūpa*) [such as the single image of the blue part of a multi-colored rug], that too will have a variegated appearance by virtue of the difference of the *locus* [(i.e., that image)] in high and low [parts]. (k. 42)

How can an atom, which appears in one [single] cognition, since [atoms] do not arise without one another, being separated [from the others], appear singly? (k. 43)

Moreover, atoms do not indeed arise one by one, independently [from one another]. For this reason also, atoms do not appear [in cognition] one by one. (k. 44)

What is said [by Vasubandhu], “Atoms are not real, since there is a difference of parts based on orientation” is incoherent. With the word “orientation,” one indicates atom[s] as being different through some [aspect]. (k. 45)

Therefore, with “difference of parts based on orientation,” it is only said that they are surrounded by many [other atoms], but atoms do not have a nature endowed with parts. (k. 46)

An atom is located with one [atom] on [its] surface on one side and another [atom] on [its surface on] the other side; there is no undesirable consequence of it being twofold by virtue of [having] two parts on this and the other side. (k. 47)

[An atom] is conceptually constructed as being manifold because it is in the middle of many [atoms]. In the same way, by means of exclusion, a universal “manifoldness” is conceptually constructed. (k. 48)

Regarding one thing, the nature, which is conceptually determined in dependence on [some] other thing [different] from it, does not really exist in that [thing], like the difference of this and the other side, etc. (k. 49)

If, since [an atom] is continuous with many [other atoms], [it] is admitted as endowed with parts, [then] why is it not like that [also] regarding the instants, the preceding and the subsequent one, [which are] continuous? (k. 50)

As, even though [a cognition] is continuous with two instants of cognition, it is not admitted as endowed with parts, likewise it will also be for atoms. (k. 51)

Because of [its] vicinity with that (*yena*), it is spoken of obstruction by [an atom] of [another] moving [atom] whose movement is blocked, but not by virtue of another part. (k. 52)

If there is an obstruction of the sun, shadow will arise everywhere, but it is not logical that the shadow stands in the middle of two atoms of the sun. (k. 53)

As shadow and obstruction arise by force of many things, similarly atoms are never [arising] singly. (k. 54)

Therefore, what is said [by Vasubandhu], “since there is no difference [between atoms and conglomerates], these two [shadow and obstruction] do not relate to the conglomerate [of atoms],” [would be] logically tenable if [atoms] did not arise at certain times[, i.e., at specific times] (k. 55)

[Atoms] do not touch each other’s nature-form [and] are established as being devoid of parts; therefore[, i.e., because they are devoid of parts and, hence, unitary,] they arise having aggregated, like in the sphere of earth. (k. 56)

By virtue of the distinctive quality of mutual assistance, these atoms, like [those of] a diamond, are indivisible, as if they were tied to each other. (k. 57)

Just as, by force of a mantra, demons, snakes, etc., are subdued, likewise, certain atoms arise, one with the other, by the force of [their] being **dravya*, but others have [only] a small [amount of the] power of [that] *śakti*. (k. 58)

[...]

There is no other apprehender besides cognition, [and] there is no sensory cognition without objects. And therefore, the [fact of] being aware [of them] together is not because of the non-difference of a blue [thing] and its cognition. (k. 66)

[...]

Because of [the instances of] a mind known by the Buddha or mind and mental states, in every respect, as intending “synchronically” the logical reason is inconclusive. (k. 68)

[...]

Moreover, the word “together,” in common [linguistic] usage, is nowhere [used] without [there being] another [thing]. Therefore, if there is [the fact of] being perceived together, this logical reason is contradictory. (k. 71)

If the word “together” means one, [the logical reason] is therefore unestablished for the adversary. With regard to a common thing, how is the observation by only one [individual possible]? (k. 72)

If every mind is cognized by the cognition of the Omniscient [Buddha], then, where is it stated that a perception by only one [individual] is established? (k. 73)

The negation of the perception by another is not established because of the absence of a *pramāṇa* [to prove it,] since [that perception] is essentially remote. Therefore, there is a dubious non-establishment. (k. 74)

[...]

If it is [argued that] the perception of only one is that [cognition] is aware of the [external] object [only], [then,] due to its difference with the nature of cognition, how [can] that [external object] be brought to awareness (**saṃvedyate*)? (k. 77)

In the moment of the perception of an object, the awareness of pain and pleasure could not occur if there is not awareness of the form of cognition (k. 78)

If [it is argued that] the awareness is just of the mere form of cognition, [the reply will be that] it is illogical since the form of pure cognition is not brought to awareness. (k. 79)

[...]

But [it is] precisely the preceding (*pūrvikā*) [causal] complex [that] can make the instant of the object cognized, in the same way that a visual form [is lit up] by light, by which there can be [their] being brought to awareness together. (k. 81)

Since cognitions and [their] objects always arise in continuity, then, the term [“co-perception”] is [used], because it is like that; however, in reality there is no co-perception [of them]. (k. 82)

In that argument that is stated [as follows], “since it is brought to awareness, an object is not different from [its] cognition, like an apprehended part,” the logical reason is inconclusive. (k. 83)

A cognition is said [to be] brought to awareness, since it is endowed with the *svabhāva* of being an awareness. The object is brought to awareness because it generates a cognition having [its] appearance [as an object]. (k. 84)

Even though there is similarity regarding the word ‘brought to awareness,’ the objects [referred to by] that [word] are indeed different, since, for example, due to being ‘*go*’ [(i.e., to both being expressed by the same word, ‘*go*,’)] cows, words, etc., are not established [as being] of such kind[, i.e., similar]. (k. 85)

Also because of [the instance of] the *dharmas* that are placed in another mental continuum [and] are perceived by the cognition of the Omniscient [Buddha], [the logical reason] is inconclusive. And if He does not know [them], how can He be omniscient? (k. 86)

Moreover, in the thesis [that] a cognition [is] endowed with the image [of an object], the appearance of that [(i.e., the object)] is brought to awareness. And if the non-difference of this [(i.e., the appearance) with its awareness] is [that which is] to be proven, [then] there would be the fact of establishing that which has [already] been established. (k. 87)

The object that causes [an image] similar to [its] form is admitted as being brought to awareness by means of [that] effect. [However,] since that [external] thing is not brought to awareness, it would not be non-different [from its cognition]. (k. 88)

If [someone asks,] “How does this [(i.e., a cognition)] apprehend that [(i.e., an object)]?” [The reply will be that a] cognition has the characteristic of distinguishing it [(i.e., the object)]. Therefore, there [can] be no objection like, “how does this [apprehend that or,] also, resembling what does it [(i.e., a cognition) apprehend that]?” (k. 89)

Regarding a cognition, when a different form [from that of the object as it is found outside], having been established, is superimposed [on it], then, one should say, “how can that [cognition] discriminates the [external] object?” (k. 90)

Since a cognition is admitted as [having the nature of] mere discrimination of the object, then what is said, “how can the cognition know its object?” is incoherent. (k. 91)

This cognition is not the agent, nor is there [any] activity ultimately. Although there is only a perception, [cognition] is metaphorically said to be the agent. (k. 92)³

³ This verse is quoted in the *Blo gsal grub 'mtha* (ed. p. 68, 12–15).

[...]

“It is endowed with an image [or] devoid of an image, synchronic [with its object or] arising at a different [time];” why are these [sorts of] considerations not also undertaken with regard to a cognition of the Buddha? (k. 95)

[...]

As, in your opinion, cognition, albeit devoid of images in reality, brings an unreal image to awareness, [it will,] similarly, for us, [bring] a real object [to awareness]. (k. 101)

[...]

In the investigation of what is logical or illogical, I am not extremely wise; however, I show the truths stated by others in many *sūtras*. (k. 185)

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